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Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting Files
Folder Title: NSC 00087 09/06/1983 [MBFR
(Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions)/Lebanon] (1
of 3)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 10/22/2008

File Folder NSC 00087 06 SEP 1983 [MBFR/LEBANON] (1) ~~SP-2~~

FOIA

M2008-098/9

Box Number 91285

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	1	Doc Date	Restrictions
		No of Pages			
56461	LIST	MTG PARTICIPANTS [PARTIAL] PAR 8/22/2000 F98-008 #1; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56461	1	ND	B1 B3
56462	MEMO	KIMMITT TO CLARK RE ATTENDEE LIST FOR NSC MTG. ON MBFR PAR 8/22/2000 F98-008 #1; PAR 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56462	1	9/3/1983	B1 B3
56463	FORM	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS [PARTIAL] PAR 8/22/2000 F98-008 #1; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56463	1	9/6/1983	B1 B3
56464	FORM	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS [PARTIAL, ANNOTATED, COPY OF DOC 56463] PAR 8/22/2000 F98-008 #1; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56464	1	9/6/1983	B1 B3
56465	SEATING CHART NSC 9/6 [PARTIAL]	PAR 8/22/2000 F98-008 #1; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56465	1	ND	B1 B3
56466	SEATING CHART FOR CABINET RM [PARTIAL]	PAR 8/22/2000 F98-008 #1; UPHELD 5/19/2010 M08-098/9 #56466	1	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 10/22/2008

File Folder NSC 00087 06 SEP 1983 [MBFR/LEBANON] (1 OF 2)
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FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56467	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE NSC MTG ON MBFR <i>R 10/4/2010 M098/9</i>	4	9/5/1983	B1
56468	PAPER	MBFR OPTIONS <i>R 2/14/2011 M098/9</i>	9	ND	B1
56469	PAPER	VERIFICATION ANNEX TO MBFR OPTIONS PAPER <i>R 2/14/2011 M098/9</i>	4	ND	B1
56470	MEMO	SVEN KRAEMER TO CLARK RE NSC MTG. ON MBFR <i>R 10/4/2010 M098/9</i>	2	9/2/1983	B1
56471	TALKING PTS	FOR JUDGE CLARK <i>R 10/4/2010 M098/9</i>	6	ND	B1
56472	MEMO	SVEN KRAEMER TO CLARK RE NSC MTG ON MBFR <i>R 10/4/2010 M098/9</i>	2	8/16/1983	B1
56473	TALKING PTS	RE [LEBANON] <i>R 10/4/2010 M098/9</i>	3	ND	B1 B3

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSC MEETING

FILES

File Folder: NSC 00087 06 Sep 1983 [MBFR/Lebanon] (1 of 2)

Box 91285

Archivist: dlb

Date: 11/18/99

Bowditch F98-004/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. List	Meeting Participants, page 1 only, (partial), 1 p. <i>P F98-008 #1 8/22/00, 5/19/10</i>	n.d. <i>M08-098/9 #56461 upheld</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Memo	Robert M. Kimmitt to William Clark, re: Attendance List for NSC Meeting on MBFR, ..., page 1 only, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 2</i>	9/3/83 <i>11, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56462</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Form	Request for Appointments, (partial), 1p. <i>P " 3</i>	9/6/83 <i>11, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56463 upheld</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Form	Request for Appointments, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 4</i>	9/6/83 <i>11, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56464 upheld</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Seating Chart	NSC 9/6, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 5</i>	n.d. <i>11, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56465 upheld</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Seating Chart	for Cabinet Room, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 6</i>	n.d. <i>11, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56466 upheld</i>	P1/F1/P3/F3
7. Memo	Clark to Reagan, re: NSC Meeting on MBFR -- Tuesday, September 6, 1983, 4 p. <i>R 10/4/10 M098/9 #56467</i>	9/5/83 <i>11, Part. 5/19/10 M08-098/9 #56467 upheld</i>	P1/F1
8. Paper	MBFR Options, 9 p. <i>R 2/14/11 M08-098/9 #56468</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
9. Annex to Paper	Verification Annex to MBFR Options Paper, 4 p. <i>R 2/14/11 M08-098/9 #56469</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
10. Memo	Sven Kraemer to Clark, re: NSC Meeting on MBFR, ..., 2 p. <i>R 10/4/10 M098/9 #56470</i>	9/2/83	P1/F1
11. Talking Pts.	Talking Points for Judge Clark, 6 p. <i>R 10/4/10 M098/9 #56471</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
12. Memo	Kraemer to Clark, re: NSC Meeting on MBFR -- September 6, 1983, 2 p. <i>R 10/4/10 M098/9 #56472</i>	8/16/83	P1/F1
13. Talking Pts	re: [Lebanon], 3 p. <i>PART 4/19/06 NSC 98-008/1 #13 R 10/4/10 M098/9 #56473</i>	n.d.	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSC MEETING

FILES

File Folder: NSC 00087 06 Sep 1983 [MBFR/Lebanon] (1 of 2)

Box 91285

Archivist: dlb

Date: 11/18/99

Bowditch F98-004/1

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3. Form	Request for Appointments, (partial), 1p. <i>P " 3 5/19/10 m08-098/9 #56463 upheld</i>	9/6/83	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Form	Request for Appointments, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 4 5/19/10 m08-098/9 #56464 upheld</i>	9/6/83	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Seating Chart	NSC 9/6, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 5 5/19/10 m08-098/9 #56465 upheld</i>	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Seating Chart	for Cabinet Room, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " 6 5/19/10 m08-098/9 #56466 upheld</i>	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
7. Memo	Clark to Reagan, re: NSC Meeting on MBFR -- Tuesday, September 6, 1983, 4 p. <i>R 10/4/10 m098/9 #56467</i>	9/5/83	P1/F1
8. Paper	MBFR Options, 9 p. <i>R 2/14/11 m08-098/9 #56468</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
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12. Memo	Kraemer to Clark, re: NSC Meeting on MBFR -- September 6, 1983, 2 p. <i>R 10/4/10 m098/9 #56472</i>	8/16/83	P1/F1
13. Talking Pts	re: [Lebanon], 3 p. <i>PART 4/19/06 NSC98-008/1 #13 R 10/4/10 m098/9 #56473</i>	n.d.	P1/F1

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RECEIVED

S/S 8326726 **CHRON FILE**
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II
91047

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ P 5: 56

September 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: START NSC

The Secretary would like the NSC meeting on START presently scheduled for September 9 to be rescheduled for sometime in the following week, when he can attend personally. Please let us know if this is possible.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

1
nsC 87 ~~NSC~~
NSDD ~~NSDD~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
By *dhb* Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
NARA, Date *11/18/99*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Date:
9/6/83
Cabinet Room
11:00-12:30pm

Subject:
MBFR/ Lebanon

Participants:
The President
The Vice President
Admiral Daniel Murphy
Cmdr Walter Doran

State:
Secretary George P. Shultz
ADM Jonathan Howe (Director,
Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs)
Amb Morton Abramowitz (MBFR
Delegation)
Mr. Robert Pelletreau
Under Sec Lawrence Eagleburger
DOD:
Deputy Sec Paul Thayer
Under Sec Dr. Fred C. Ikle
OMB:
Mr. David Stockman
Dr. Alton Keel (Assoc Director for
Nat'l and Int'l Security Affairs)
CIA:
Mr. William J. Casey

ACDA:
Mr. Kenneth Adelman
Mr. Michael C. Guhin (Counsellor)

JCS:
General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Lt General Herman O. Thomson

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Judge William P. Clark
ADM John Poindexter

NSC:
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
Mr. Ronald Lehman
Mr. Sven Kraemer
Mr. Howard Teicher
Mr. Philip Dur

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

REC #98-0081-#1
By CAS, NANA, Date 8/22/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Commission on Strategic Forces

General Brent Scowcroft

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James A. Baker, III

Mr. Michael K. Deaver

Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Richard G. Darman

Admiral John M. Poindexter

Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein

NSC:

Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt

Mr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

Col. Robert E. Linhard

Mr. Sven F. Kraemer

Mr. Howard Teicher

Cdr. Philip Dur

Mr. Christopher Lehman

National Security Council
The White House

System # non-109

Package#

R2

8: SEP 3 1981

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>MWL</u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Executive Secretary	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>Carol/Rosie</u>	<u>2</u>	<u> </u>	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

September 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Attendance List for NSC Meeting on MBFR,
September 6, 1983, 11:00am-12:00pm (CY)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council meeting on MBFR which is scheduled for September 6, 1983, at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. (CY)

The Vice President
Admiral Daniel Murphy

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz
Admiral Jonathan Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dr. Fred C. Ikle (Under Secretary for Policy)

OMB:

Mr. David Stockman

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

USUN:

Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

ACDA:

Mr. Kenneth Adelman
Mr. Michael C. Guhin (Counsellor)

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Judge William P. Clark

DECLASSIFIED

By CLB White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 11/18/95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MBFR Delegation:
Amb Morton Abramowitz

NSC:
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
Mr. Sven Kraemer

Approved RMK

As Amended _____

Attached is a proposed seating arrangement for this meeting.

Attachment
Seating Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CABINET ROOM

Howe

Ikle

Guhin

Kirkpatrick Shultz President Weinberger Adelman Abramowitz

Stockman

Murphy

Vessey Casey Clark Vice President Meese Baker Deaver

Moreau

Kraemer Kimmitt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Attendance List for NSC Meeting on MBFR,
September 6, 1983, 11:00am-12:00pm (Q)

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✓ The Vice President
Admiral Daniel Murphy 4213 (Phyllis B)

Cabinet Room

State:
✓ Secretary George P. Shultz 632-5804 (Hank) (Early 1983)
Admiral Jonathan Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)
+ Ambassador Morton Abramowitz (MBFR Delegation)
+ Mr. Robert Bellotreau (Lebanon only)
OSD:
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger 695-6064 Dep. Sec. Paul Thayer } Rich Higgins
Dr. Fred C. Ikle (Under Secretary for Policy) }

✓ OMB:
Mr. David Stockman 6816 Diana
+ Dr. Paul Keeler

CIA:
✓ Mr. William J. Casey 351-4301 Ann

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.5(c)

USUN:
Amb. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 632-8344

ACDA:
Mr. Kenneth Adelman 632-4766 ✓
Mr. Michael C. Guhlin (Counsellor)

JCS:
✓ General John W. Vessey, Jr. 695-4924 Set. Dir
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

White House:
Mr. Edwin Meese, III 2235
Mr. James A. Baker, III 6797
Mr. Michael K. Deaver 6475
Judge William P. Clark

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRRM08-1998/9 #56462

BY RW NARA DATE 5-19-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: NADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~MBFR Delegation:~~
~~Amb Morton Abramowitz~~

NSC:
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
Mr. Sven Kraemer 5010

Mr. Howard Teacher

Approved MMK As Amended _____

Attached is a proposed seating arrangement for this meeting.

Attachment
Seating Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

REF ID: F98-0081, #3

By CTS, NARA, Date 8/22/00

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

11:06 STAFF

11:25 General attendees left

12:26 end.

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

September 6, 1983

Please admit the following appointments on _____

for The President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY):

✓ The Vice President
✓ Admiral Daniel Murphy
✓ Cmdr. Walter Doran

State:

✓ Secretary George P. Shultz
✓ Admiral Jonathan Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)
✓ Ambassador Morton Abramowitz (MBFR Delegation) *

✓ Mr. Robert Pelletreau

✓ Undersecretary Lawrence Eagleburger

✓ OSD

✓ Deputy Secretary Paul Thayer
✓ Dr. Fred C. Ikle (Under Secretary for Policy)

✓ OMB:

✓ Mr. David Stockman
✓ Dr. Alton Keel

✓ CIA:

✓ Mr. William J. Casey

✓ ACDA:

✓ Mr. Kenneth Adelman
✓ Mr. Michael C. Guhin (Counsellor) *

✓ JCS:

✓ General John W. Vessey, Jr.
✓ Lt General Herman O. Thomson

White House:

✓ Mr. Edwin Meese, III
✓ Mr. James A. Baker, III 11:15
✓ Mr. Michael K. Deaver 11:18
✓ Judge William P. Clark
✓ Mr. John Podesta

NSC:

✓ Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
✓ Mr. Ronald Lehman *

✓ Mr. Sven Kraemer *

✓ Mr. Howard Teicher

✓ Mr. Philip Dur

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing White House Requested by Rosie Andreatta

Room No. Cabinet Room Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 11:00 A.M. Date of request September 6, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Ref ID: F98-0081-#4

By CAS, NARA, Date 8/22/00 REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

September 6, 1983

Please admit the following appointments on _____, 19____

for The President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY):

✓ The Vice President
✓ Admiral Daniel Murphy
✓ Cmdr. Walter Doran

Left 7/24 MBFR

1105 - 1123 MBF
1123 - Lehman

State:

✓ Secretary George P. Shultz
✓ Admiral Jonathan Howe (Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)
✓ Ambassador Morton Abramowitz (MBFR Delegation) o
✓ Mr. Robert Pelletreau
✓ Undersecretary Lawrence Eagleburger

OSD

✓ Deputy Secretary Paul Thayer
✓ Dr. Fred C. Ikle (Under Secretary for Policy)

OMB:

✓ Mr. David Stockman
✓ Dr. Alton Keel

Damian in
-- asked to leave

CIA:

✓ Mr. William J. Casey

White House:

✓ Mr. Edwin Meese, III
✓ 1105 Mr. James A. Baker, III
✓ 1120 Mr. Michael K. Deaver
✓ Judge William P. Clark

ACDA:

✓ Mr. Kenneth Adelman
✓ Mr. Michael C. Guhin (Counsellor) o

NSC:

✓ Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
✓ Mr. Ronald Lehman o
✓ Mr. Sven Kraemer o
✓ Mr. Howard Teicher

✓ John Poindexter
✓ Phil Dan

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing White House

Requested by Rosie Andreatta

Room No. Cabinet Room

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 11:00 A.M.

Date of request September 6, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on August 12, 1983

for The President of The White House:

(Name of person to be visited)

(Agency)

✓ The President ✓
✓ The Vice President ✓
✓ ~~Mr. Donald P. Gregg~~ ✓
✓ ~~Admiral Daniel Murphy~~
✓ State:
✓ ~~Secretary George P. Shultz~~ ✓
✓ ~~Dep Sec Kenneth W. Dam~~ ✓
✓ ~~Admiral Jonathan Howe~~
✓ ~~Mr. Richard Burt~~

NSER: Delegation:
Amb. Morton Abramowitz

✓ OSD:
✓ ~~Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger~~ ✓
✓ ~~Dr. Fred C. Ikle~~

✓ White House:
✓ ~~Mr. Edwin Meese, III~~ ✓
✓ ~~Mr. James A. Baker, III~~ ✓
✓ ~~Mr. Michael K. Deaver~~ ✓
✓ ~~Judge William P. Clark~~

✓ OMB:
✓ ~~Mr. Joseph Wright~~ ✓
✓ ~~Stockman~~
✓ CIA: (ALTON KEEL?) ✓
✓ ~~Mr. William J. Casey~~ ✓
✓ ~~Mr. Douglas George~~

✓ NSC:
✓ ~~Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt~~ ✓
✓ ~~Mr. Ronald E. Lehman~~ ✓
✓ ~~Mr. Sven Kraemer~~ ✓
✓ ~~Col Robert Linhard~~

Bob
X 2292
2291

✓ USUN:
✓ ~~Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick~~

✓ ACDA:
✓ ~~Mr. Kenneth Adelman~~ ✓
✓ ~~Mr. Michael C. Guhlin~~ ✓
✓ ~~Amb Paul Nitze~~

✓ JCS:
✓ ~~General John W. Vessey, Jr.~~ ✓
✓ ~~Admiral Arthur S. Moreau~~
MEETING LOCATION

Building The White House

Requested by C. Cleveland

Room No. Cabinet Room

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 10:30

Date of request August 11, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

NSC
MBFR
11:00
Cabinet Rm

Please admit the following appointments on Sept 6, 1983
for The President of WHS
(Name of person to be visited) (Agency)

The Vice President

ONP:
Admiral Daniel Murphy

STATE:

Secretary Shultz (telephoned)
~~Sec. Defense~~ Admiral Jonathan Howe
Admiral Morton Abramowitz
(MBFR)

Defense:

Sec. Weinberger (Thayer?)
Dr. Fred C. Kille

CIA:

Mr. William P. Casey

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

OMB:

MEETING LOCATION

Building WHS Requested by Rosie

Room No. Cabinet Room Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 11:00 am Date of request Sept 6, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on _____, 19____

for _____ of _____;
(Name of person to be visited) (Agency)

MEETING LOCATION

Building _____ Requested by _____

Room No. _____ Room No. _____ Telephone _____

Time of Meeting _____ Date of request _____

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM

NSC meeting (MORE)

9/6/83

Cabinet Room
11:00 am

CABINET ROOM

Burt Howe

Ikle

Guhin

Kirkpatrick

Dam

Shultz

President Weinberger Thayer Adelman Nitze

Wright

Gregg

Vessey Casey Clark Vice President Meese Baker Deaver

Moreau George Lehman Linhard Kraemer Kimmitt

DOOR

CABINET ROOM

Pellegrino ~~Howe~~ Howe

Ikle

Guhin

Eagleburger

Kirkpatrick Shultz President

Thayer Ikle

Weinberger Adelman

Abramowitz

Keel

Stockman

Murphy

Dora

Vessey Casey Clark Vice President Meese Baker Deaver

Thompson
Moreau

 Kraemer Whalen Tucker Kraemer-Kimmitt



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NLS ~~F98-0081~~ #6
By CJS, NARA, Date 8/22/00

WUSC Whaler

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
N.S. 19800811 #5
C5, NARA, Date 8/22/00

Guth* Pelleboom Howe
↓ ↓ ↓
Adelman Eagleburger Shultz President Thaiger Ikle

Keel

Stockman

Cabinet Room

NSC 9/6

MBFR | LEBANON

Murphy

Dogen

* Classification:

Casey Clark VicePresident ~~meets~~ Boko Deasier

↓
hanson

Kraemer ^{*} Lehman ^{*} Teicher Kinnitt

NSC Meeting
September 6
11-12
Cabinet Room
CH: The President

Agendas and
Folders removed

Subject: MBFR

VP - Stephanie VP of Adm. Murphy

State - Sharon See Shultz of Adm. Jonathan Howe ✓
(Lauren)

Defense - Betty Dep Sec Thayer Dr. [unclear]

CIA - Ann Casey +

JCS - Seargent Orr Vessey - M

OMB - Diana Stockman-Dr. Alton Keel.

ACDA - Mary Kenville Adelman / Michael Gabria - 632-1116

MBFR Delegation - Joyce — (Executive Secretary) - Amb. Morton Abramowitz (MBFR negotiator)
(Corin) 632-2540

Meese - Carol — Yes

Baker - Cathy K. —

Deaver - Cathy F. —

Darman - Jo

NSC, Kraemer -

CHRON FILE

SYSTEM II
91005

From the desk of President Ronald Reagan

I could agree to switching
from Op. 1 to Op. 3 but
question whether this is the
proper time in view of the
KAL shootdown.

This was handed me by the President
at 0930 hrs, 7 Sept '83 -

U. Clark



MEMORANDUM

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CHRON FILE

SYSTEM II
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56467

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1983

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ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK 

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on MBFR -- Tuesday, September 6, 1983

NLRR M098/9 #56467

BY KML NARA DATE 10/4/10

Issue

How should the US respond formally to recent Soviet proposals, and how should we deal with Allied concerns during the next round of negotiations?

Facts

Following the last NSC meeting on MBFR, on May 18, Ambassador Abramowitz was authorized to undertake an informal bilateral probe with the Soviets to indicate that there could be US flexibility on the long-standing Western position, which was reaffirmed in the West's major MBFR initiative of 1982, and which requires a prior agreement on data concerning existing force levels before undertaking any troop reductions below that agreed level and towards parity in NATO and Warsaw Pact military personnel. In return for a US postponement of the data agreement, the East would have to be willing to accept the entire package for verification that the West has proposed, as well as a subsequent data agreement and large asymmetrical reductions to parity.

In mid-June the Soviets and their allies, independent of our bilateral probe, tabled a new Eastern treaty proposal that remained unsatisfactory on the data issue but moved somewhat closer to our verification stance, although the Soviet measures remain inadequate and would not be operative until after reductions had taken place. In mid-July the Soviets responded to our bilateral probe, rejecting our insistence on what they called our preconditions. However, they indicated some willingness to consider verification measures beyond those in the new Eastern treaty.

Two US Allies have modified their positions recently. The FRG in mid-July at highest levels approved a proposal that a data agreement be postponed until after initial, verified US Soviet

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Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~REF ID: A6497~~

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reductions. No further reductions would take place until this verification process provided a data agreement on the size of the forces. The British, meanwhile, prefer the West's insistence on a prior data agreement, but are proposing large first step reductions of 25,000 US and 60,000 Soviet troops.

A decision is required soon as the next round of the MBFR negotiations begins on September 29, and will be preceded by Trilateral discussions between the US, the UK, and FRG, beginning on September 13.

Discussion

The attached paper (Tab B) prepared for the NSC meeting by the Interdepartmental Group on NATO Conventional Forces and Arms Control identifies three US policy options for early decision:

- Under Option 1, we would stick to our long-standing position that a data agreement is an essential prerequisite for initial US-Soviet reductions, while pressing for movement in the East's proposed verification measures. This option is favored by OSD and OJCS. However, in the IG Paper's elaboration of this option (an elaboration to which OSD and JCS strongly object), it is also suggested that we might move beyond a discussion on limiting military personnel to a discussion on limiting military equipment and armaments as well.
- Under Option 2, we would postpone a data agreement until after treaty signature, but before any reductions take place. In exchange, the East would have to agree to implement a package of verification measures acceptable to the West before any reductions took place. (This verification package is not spelled out in the IG paper, but might well become different from the current Western package.) Further reductions would be dependent upon a data agreement to be derived from mutual inspection of each other's force levels. This option appears to be favored by State's Bureau of European Affairs.
- Under Option 3, we would postpone a data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions, provided the Soviets agreed in advance on a framework for the overall process of reductions to parity, including elements of associated verification measures and a format for data exchanges. (These verification elements and the data exchange format of the "framework" are not spelled out in the IG paper.) This option calls for a freeze at present manpower levels. It is favored by Ambassador Abramowitz, but ACDA's views are not known at this time.

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In sum, the distinction between these options is that with Option 1, we would (while pressing for movement on the Eastern verification position) continue to insist on a data agreement before signing a treaty or undertaking any troop reductions; with Option 2, we would (after getting Soviet agreement to an unspecified verification package) sign the treaty, then seek to reach a data agreement and then initiate troop reductions; with Option 3, we would (after getting Soviet agreement on an overall, but unspecified, framework) undertake initial reductions and then seek to reach a data agreement.

Public Opinion: The issues of whether or not to shift from our long-standing Western insistence on a prior data agreement turns largely on the question of whether or not it might significantly help shape public opinion in the INF context. There has been a division on this issue within the German Government with Foreign Minister Genscher pushing for a change and Defense Minister Woerner opposed, similarly to the State and OSD difference here. However, all principals in Europe and in the US are agreed that while MBFR progress would be helpful to INF, no such progress in terms of an MBFR agreement is likely in the near term, regardless of whether or not we change our position on data. At the same time, there is little public understanding or interest in the MBFR issues in Europe, with both INF and the upcoming CDE (Conference on and Disararmament in Europe) carrying substantially more weight with governments and in the public mind.

Verification: A second question turns on whether a shift on the data issue would produce Soviet movement on verification. Having largely turned us down in the bilateral probe, there is little reason for hope on this score. Furthermore, there is some question as to the specific nature of what verification package, or framework, we would actually press with the Soviets (who have continued to resist required intrusive verification means). At one point, the IG paper indicates all options involve the same verification package as currently approved in Option 1, but the actual wording of Options 2 and 3 is ambiguous and needs to be clarified. Under Option 2, the US would be somewhat protected, before signing a treaty or undertaking any withdrawals, by a Soviet agreement to unspecified "satisfactory" verification measures. However, we would still have to assure that these measures were actually being implemented, a requirement not mandated by this option as worded in the IG paper. Option 3 contains the same ambiguity and weakness as Option 2 and, in addition, leads to reduction prior to a data agreement and adds a freeze on Alliance manpower, a freeze that would be politically very difficult to thaw, even if military requirements dictated otherwise.

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With regard to all of the options, a Verification Annex attached to the IG paper makes clear that only the broad and intrusive package, which is part of the current Western position (and which is explicitly supported only in Option 1), could give us some assurance of Soviet compliance.

As the principals discuss the options at the NSC meeting, you may wish to keep in mind the above considerations, a number of which are also likely to be specified by the Defense Department in arguing for Option 1. Following the NSC meeting, we will prepare a specific decision package for your early review.

Recommendation

OK NO

W/R

That prior to the NSC meeting, you review the attached MBFR IG Options Paper (Tab B).

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B MBFR IG Options Paper for NSC Discussion

Prepared by: Sven Kraemer

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SYSTEM II
91005

NSC MEETING ON MBFR

The Cabinet Room

September 6, 1983 -- 11:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.

AGENDA

1. Introduction - Judge Clark
2. Negotiations Status - Ambassador Abramowitz
3. Discussion
 - Description of the Options - Judge Clark
 - Agency Positions on Options - Principals

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 215 NARA Date 11/14/95

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MBFR OptionsIssue for Decision

NATO is now faced with the question of how to respond formally to the latest Eastern proposal which moves in principle toward US requirements on verification measures. The US needs to decide whether or not this response should be a move in the multilateral forum on data that incorporates in some fashion the USG position on MBFR approved by the President as a result of the NSC meeting of May 18. Two particular considerations are involved in this decision: (a) how to extract further Soviet concessions on verification; and (b) how to deal with Allied, especially FRG, pressures to be forthcoming in Vienna for INF reasons.

A trilateral meeting with the UK and FRG to discuss these issues is scheduled for September 13, and a US position is required before then if we are to take the lead in shaping NATO's response.

Recent Developments

On May 18, the NSC considered whether the US should change its long-term position that, prior to signature of an MBFR treaty and any subsequent troop reductions in Central Europe, both sides in the NATO - Warsaw Pact talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) must reach agreement on the number of Eastern military personnel in the reduction area in light of Soviet hints of willingness to accept effective verification measures.

On the basis of that NSC meeting, the President authorized a bilateral probe to determine whether genuine and timely progress was possible in the MBFR negotiations on the basis of a trade-off between Western willingness to postpone data agreement and Soviet willingness to agree to verifiable reductions to parity. Accordingly, we told the Soviets in mid-June that there is flexibility in the US position on data agreement prior to reductions if the East is willing to accept the entire package for verification which the West has proposed, large asymmetrical reductions to parity and data agreement at some stage.

Since then, there have been a number of significant developments:

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/14/11

Soviet reply: In a mid-July response to our probe, the Soviets acknowledged that the US appeared interested in overcoming the data impasse in Vienna, but suggested that the US preconditions would only prolong the deadlock. They also, however, indicated willingness to consider verification measures beyond those in the new Eastern treaty, provided they did not become an end in themselves.

In light of these mixed results, we will continue bilaterally to seek to pocket any concessions and move the Soviet position on verification still closer to our own.

New Eastern Proposal: On June 23, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, in a move independent of our bilateral probe, tabled a new draft agreement covering the third element of their proposed three-step reduction process: i.e., US-Soviet mutual example cuts, a freeze, and reductions to parity. This draft agreement calls for reductions within three years to common ceilings of 700,000 ground force personnel and 200,000 air force personnel. This Eastern draft moved closer in principle to the Western position on verification. The East has now suggested a set of measures which, although highly conditioned, are more intrusive than anything the East has been willing to accept before, including some form of on-site inspection, permanent exit/entry points with observers, voluntary invitation of observers to witness reductions of "the most substantial contingents", a continuing exchange of information and a permanent joint commission. As they stand, however, these measures remain inadequate; all but one of them would not go into effect until after completion of the reduction process, and many have other significant shortcomings.

FRG and UK proposals: In mid-July, Chancellor Kohl and the German Federal Security Council decided to introduce into NATO, following trilateral discussion, a new data initiative as a response to the Eastern draft agreement, for tabling in Vienna during the fall round. They have asked for US concurrence. The FRG wants a significant Western initiative in MBFR in order to enhance the credibility of the US-FRG posture on arms control, especially given the prospective difficulties over INF deployments.

Specifically, the FRG proposes that the Allies agree to postpone data agreement until after initial, verified US - Soviet reductions. The condition would be that cooperative verification measures would then be implemented in order to

verify a non-contractual commitment by all direct participants (US, UK, FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, USSR, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia) not to increase their forces in the reduction area. Until this verification process yielded agreement on the size of those forces, there would be no further Western reductions.

The British, although preferring to maintain the strong current Western data position, have recently responded to the US-USSR bilateral effort and to building FRG political pressures by proposing a new scheme of their own which would also postpone formal data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions, but would use Western data for the purpose of establishing numerically expressed ceilings on US and Soviet forces remaining after reductions. The UK proposes larger first step reductions of US (25,000) and Soviet (60,000) forces on the grounds that such a reduction would be justified on its own merits, regardless of the ultimate outcome of follow-on negotiations.

Congressional interest: The Congress is showing increased interest in MBFR because of the high level of political interest this year in arms control and the growing Congressional intent to limit US force levels in Europe in the absence of greater Allied contributions. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee are planning hearings on MBFR in September.

To the extent that the Vienna negotiations still have credibility as a realistic alternative to self-imposed troop cuts, it would be desirable to go into these hearings with an agreed US position on how we wish to proceed with MBFR in meeting Congressional concerns.

Timing

The Western Allies should determine their response to the Eastern draft treaty by the opening of the next MBFR round on September 29 or very soon thereafter. This would also be the most favorable moment for tabling a new Western initiative, should we wish to do so, since it would come at a time of sharpened public interest in arms control in Europe and heightened public concerns over INF deployment. It would also coincide with the tenth anniversary of the MBFR talks.

The key dates would therefore need to be close to the following:

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Early September - Decision on US position and transmittal to FRG and UK for their preliminary reaction prior to trilateral meeting.

September 13 - Trilateral meeting scheduled in London.

September 19 - Suggested Western response tabled in NATO.

September 29 - Scheduled opening of fall MBFR round in Vienna.

October 3 - NATO transmits response to Western negotiators in Vienna.

October 6 - West responds formally in the MBFR negotiations.

The Options

The IG has identified three basic options for a NATO response to the Eastern draft treaty:

1) Stick to our position that data agreement is a prerequisite for initial US-Soviet reductions but modify the Western position on non-data issues.

2) Postpone data agreement until after treaty signature but before reductions.

3) Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions.

These options differ principally with respect to the timing of a data agreement. All options include the same package of verification measures, which would be agreed before treaty signature. There are some differences, as noted below in the description of each option, with respect to when the verification measures would be implemented.

The options are discussed below.

Option 1: Stick to our position that data agreement is a prerequisite for initial US-Soviet reductions but modify the Western position on non-data issues. We would press the East for further improvements in their proposed verification measures, perhaps by expanding informal talks on Associated Measures, and seek to maintain the focus on the Western draft treaty of July 82. Under that draft treaty, implementation of all the verification measures would begin at the same time as

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initial reductions. We could also begin a carefully controlled discussion of armaments by adopting a flexible formula offered by the UK at the last Trilateral in Bonn.

Discussion: The current Western position has long been a defensible and coherent one. Changing our data position would carry the risk of eroding the West's present strong substantive position on the need for verifiable asymmetric reductions to parity. MBFR does not at present have high visibility with European publics; however, concrete signs of progress could lead to pressure in Western Europe to compromise essential Western goals in MBFR in order to bring about quick reductions. If even a partial agreement were actually reached, pressures on Western defense budgets and force modernization programs would intensify. Moving forward on issues other than data, such as armaments, could not be characterized by the Soviets as "unforthcoming," nor by our Allies as "stonewalling."

On the other hand, holding fast to our current data position would most likely continue the stalemate on the central issues, in the absence of private Soviet indications to the contrary. Potential moves on minor issues would, by design, be cosmetic in nature, and would therefore provide no incentive for the East to move further on verification.

Proceeding with this option would probably mean sacrificing an opportunity this year to enhance our public posture on conventional arms control, and in light of demonstrations of apparent Eastern flexibility on the central issue of verification, the Alliance could be faced with a difficult public relations problem. Some of our Allies could conclude that the US is not serious about conventional force reductions, with potentially serious negative repercussions for INF deployments. Such a clear deadlock in MBFR after 10 years of negotiations could finally kill any future utility of these talks toward countering Congressional pressures for unilateral US reductions. Signs of progress in the negotiations, however, could encourage both the Congress and European parliaments to at least maintain current force levels and modernization plans until a verifiable mutual reductions agreement is reached.

Option 2: Postpone data agreement until after treaty signature but before reductions. We would maintain the present Western approach of seeking agreement on staged reductions to parity, plus a package of on-site verification measures. However, instead of insisting that both sides reach data agreement on existing force levels as a prerequisite to signing an MBFR treaty, we would agree to postpone data agreement until after treaty signature. In exchange, the East would have to

agree to implement a package of verification measures acceptable to the West before there were any reductions.* If following mutual inspection of each other's force levels, data agreement were reached, then reductions in stages, separated by further verification, would follow.

Discussion: Such a proposal would place the Soviets on the defensive by forcing them to go on the record as opposing verification rather than claiming that the West is using inflated intelligence figures to block progress or seek unfair advantage. At the same time, it would enable us to hold the Soviets to account, since no reductions would take place unless agreement on force levels were forthcoming. This is important because political and financial constraints would prevent the re-introduction of forces withdrawn in any initial U.S./Soviet reductions phase, regardless of whether -- as is likely -- agreement on force levels was not reached subsequently. It would also guard against any "slippery slope" pressures from Allies and Congress either to follow up on initial dataless reductions with more of the same on the grounds that the approach used for phase one was "working" in the sense of bringing down manpower levels, or to move on to stage three general reductions despite inadequate verification of force levels. The FRG's problems with filling the ranks of the Bundeswehr will be a special stimulus for German pressure in this regard. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that following initial U.S./Soviet reductions, Allies will be under considerable political pressure to follow suit and thus demonstrate equal commitment to arms control.

On the other hand, while this option postpones data agreement until after treaty signature, it does not change the Western position that agreement on starting force levels is required before any reductions are taken. For this reason, this option would be viewed by our Allies, the East, and the knowledgeable press and public as only a cosmetic modifi-

* The aim would be to confirm the size of current levels through mutual inspection of each other's forces and data exchange, rather than (as heretofore) through a data discussion confined to assertions and counter-assertions about numbers. Inspection, through random sampling of Eastern units, would provide useful additional evidence (though not absolute proof) to support Western intelligence estimates of Eastern strength. This evidence could put pressure on the East either to agree to Western data, or to bring reality into line with its claims by unilaterally reducing its forces before inspection came into effect.

cation. Whatever debating points it might temporarily give the West, a strong public case could be made that the West was simply postponing the current data dispute without any serious attempt to find a way out of that dispute, and in the process, was also further delaying any possible reductions. This option would therefore not meet FRG interests in a significant initiative on data. The East would immediately dismiss this option, arguing that it is another Western effort, and a highly intrusive one, to prove its own data. This option therefore would not provide any potential for gaining further Eastern concessions or for moving the talks forward. Finally, if no agreement were reached over the next round or two, the Soviets could "pocket" Western acceptance in principle of data postponement.

Option 3: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions. The FRG, the UK, and US delegation proposals are all based upon this approach.

The version proposed by Ambassador Abramowitz would postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions, provided the Soviets agreed in advance on the framework for the overall process of reductions to parity. This process will include all the essential elements of associated measures, including the format for data exchanges, which will facilitate effective verification of reductions and limitations at each stage. Building upon the FRG and UK proposals, the major elements of this process would be the following:

- First step: a verified withdrawal of 13,000 US and 30,000 Soviet troops;
- Second step: a verifiable, time limited no-increase commitment; data agreement to be reached during this period;
- Third step: verified reductions to parity within three years.

This permits initial US-Soviet reductions before requiring agreement on data, a publicly perceptible change in the basic Western position on data. As such, it would provide a convincing public demonstration of US and Allied negotiating flexibility and seriousness, and thus meet FRG interests. By indicating flexibility on an issue on which the East puts a premium -- immediate reductions without prior agreed data -- the West is in a position to press for further Eastern flexibility on issues of importance to the West. At the same time, because this option would require that all basic elements

be worked out in advance of initial US-Soviet reductions, we would not be "giving away" our data position. Requiring data agreement before further reductions to parity took place will also be very difficult for the East to accept.

On the other hand, if stage two did not produce agreement on force levels following initial US-Soviet reductions, the US would have withdrawn 13,000 troops which it might be politically impossible to return. If the desired public impact were not achieved by our initial tabling of the proposal in Vienna, increased pressure by some of our Allies -- and perhaps our own Congress -- could lead to first stage mutual reductions before a satisfactory arrangement for verifying the next stage had been agreed to. This proposal would probably also be rejected by the Soviets, since they would have to agree in advance to measures to verify their force levels in the area before any follow-on reductions (e.g., FRG reductions) would take place. Should the Soviets agree to verifiable first stage reductions and to the West's set of verification measures, post-reduction data agreement might be difficult to achieve even with the aid of these verification measures. The longer the proposal lay on the table, regardless of Soviet performance, pressures in Congress and in Western Europe for further reductions might be strong and hard to resist, and the Soviets might feel they would be able to impede effective verification once reductions had begun. Finally, if no agreement were reached over the next round or two, the Soviets could "pocket" Western acceptance in principle of data postponement until after initial reductions and a no increase stage had occurred.

Verification

An MBFR agreement to reduce and limit manpower presents difficult verification problems. Because Intelligence has no direct means of counting men, its monitoring methods focus on unit structure and personnel strength estimates. These in turn are strongly affected by assumptions concerning Eastern manpower policies and practices for which only fragmentary evidence exists. Intelligence has high confidence in its ability to detect promptly violations involving changes in force structure that would threaten NATO security, but has low confidence that it could detect promptly marginal violations up to several tens of thousands in manpower alone.

Historical experience argues against concluding treaties, such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, containing complex and largely untested verification measures before reaching a full understanding among the parties on the precise nature of these measures and their relationship to treaty compliance.

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See Annex I of this paper for a discussion of the MBFR verification problem.

Attachment:

Verification Annex.

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Verification Annex to the MBFR Options Paper

Summary

This brief assessment of US MBFR monitoring capabilities concludes that Intelligence could promptly detect and report violations large enough to pose significant threats to NATO security in Central Europe. While negotiated verification measures would allow for high confidence in judging the fact and size of Soviet withdrawals and at least moderate confidence in East European reductions, they would only modestly enhance existing unilateral capabilities for monitoring residual ceilings. They should not be expected to ensure detection of all potential Eastern violations, especially marginal ones.

Intelligence would expect to continue to monitor large combat units with moderate to high confidence but, even with the full package of associated measures, it would have low confidence in its ability to estimate manpower in non-combat elements that make up some 25 percent of Pact ground forces. Even though on-site inspection could help confirm the structure of individual units, estimates of Pact manpower strengths would continue to be based largely on indirect methods. The measures would enhance Western confidence of detecting and confirming potential ceiling violations that would threaten Western security, but any MBFR agreement based on manpower seems likely to require that the West accept a certain measure of uncertainty about strict Eastern compliance.

General Intelligence Monitoring Capabilities

1. The selection of manpower as the basis for MBFR poses verification difficulties that are much more severe than any associated with strategic forces arms control. This is because intelligence has no direct means for counting Warsaw Pact military personnel and must therefore estimate manpower totals by inference from force structure. As a result, there is some imprecision inherent in these estimates.

2. With associated measures in place, however, Intelligence could monitor promptly and with high confidence the withdrawal of large Soviet combat units from the reductions area. It would be

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/14/11

confident that most of the men and major weapons associated with the units had been withdrawn, but some uncertainty might persist indefinitely as to whether marginal cheating on disposal of men or weapons had occurred. It could have only moderate confidence in monitoring the disbandment of indigenous Eastern units, and then only if their equipment were removed, mothballed, or scrapped. -- Intelligence would have low confidence in its capacity to monitor reductions of indigenous manpower and equipment not in units.

3. In the post-reductions phase, there is high confidence that Intelligence would promptly detect the formation of large Soviet combat units. It would be difficult, however, even with associated measures, to make a prompt assessment of the net effect of such an action on overall troop levels if the activity involved only one or two such units. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to detect, especially in the short term, a covert, incremental introduction of Soviet troops distributed among units already existing in the area unless increases were very large. Even large increases could take months to demonstrate conclusively with high confidence. Increases by indigenous forces could be even more difficult to detect than Soviet increases.

The Value of Associated Measures

4. Associated measures would modestly enhance our monitoring capability. They would be most helpful for monitoring reductions; probably less helpful, although still valuable, for monitoring post-reduction ceilings. Each of the verification measures currently proposed by the West is assessed below according to its potential contribution to monitoring Eastern troop levels.

5. Inspection. An inspection system which provided for periodic direct access to Eastern military units would improve our ability to monitor MBFR reductions and limitations by:

- helping clarify the structure of residual Eastern forces upon which our manpower assessments are based;
- helping confirm that preannounced Eastern reductions occurred in fact;
- engaging the East in a verification arrangement that would increase the perceived risk of detection of marginal cheating for the sake of small gains in military advantage.

6. An inspection measure will contribute most heavily to the assessment of Eastern force structure. It could help improve further the Intelligence Community's fairly good understanding of the structure of large Eastern combat formations -- especially divisions -- which comprise more than half of Eastern ground forces manpower. More importantly, it could help define elements of the Eastern force structure which currently are invisible or at best vaguely defined, such as certain rear services units and organizations. An inspection system would not, however, enable Intelligence to by-pass the estimative process and obtain direct accountings of the manpower strengths of Eastern forces. The degree of intrusiveness required even to attempt this would likely be non-negotiable and reciprocally unacceptable.

7. Information Exchange. The Western proposal for an exchange of information is potentially the most important of the cooperative verification procedures proposed by the West. This measure would require the East periodically (e.g., annually) to provide detailed information on the structure and manpower strength of its forces in the MBFR area down to the level of small units. Such an exchange would give us a detailed Eastern statement of its forces against which Intelligence could more easily direct its monitoring resources, including any inspections, and would be a baseline against which compliance challenges could be made.

8. Entry/Exit Points and Prior Notification. The West also proposes that all Soviet forces entering and leaving Central Europe be required to pass through designated entry/exit points permanently manned by Western observers, and that prior notification be given if a move into the reductions area involves more than one complete division or more than 25,000 individual soldiers in one calendar month. Coupled with the prenotification of Soviet withdrawal plans, these measures would be critically important in establishing high-confidence monitoring of Soviet force withdrawals and would improve the Intelligence Community's ability to determine whether post-reduction Soviet troop movements into and out of Central Europe were violating post-reduction limitations.

9. The Issue of Warning Versus Verification. A basic premise of the Western MBFR position is that the outcome should reduce the disparity in military forces in Central Europe and that such an outcome would enhance Western security -- especially against short warning attack. In particular, a number of Soviet combat divisions probably would be removed from the reductions area to the USSR from whence their movement back toward Central Europe would provide additional warning.

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10. It is also expected that the associated measures in the agreement would contribute to better warning intelligence, as well as aiding verification and generally enhancing confidence and stability. It is reasonable to assume that the East would be unlikely to risk being caught at marginal cheating for the sake of small gains in military advantage. If the East did violate the agreement it would be much more likely to do so for large gains that would involve major force changes which intelligence should detect promptly.

National Security Council
The White House

System # II
Package# 91005

3 P 3. 23
SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>MJM</u>
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>X</u>
Bud McFarlane		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter		
Executive Secretary		
NSC Secretariat		
Situation Room		

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker DISTRIBUTION
Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

Mon 2:00 pm
(Date/Time)

*This needs to go to President
this afternoon.*

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SYSTEM II
91005

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

56470

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ACTION

September 2, 1983

~~SIGNED~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER SK

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on MBFR -- Tuesday, September 6, 1983

Attached for your transmittal to the President (Tab I) is a memorandum forwarding the MBFR IG's Options Paper (Tab B) and summarizing the options' rationales and their differences.

As I have reported earlier (including in a memorandum to Bob Kimmitt on August 31), OSD, ACDA, and JCS have recently recommended substituting a Senior Arms Control Policy Group meeting instead of an NSC meeting on MBFR at this time, and State is not pressing for it, while at senior levels OSD has disagreed strongly with the version of the IG Options Paper forwarded to us on August 18 and attached at Tab B. Between August 18 and August 31, OSD, State/PM, and ACDA worked unsuccessfully to resolve their differences on the wording of the IG paper. OSD is sending you a separate memorandum, which we have not yet formally received, but whose content we know, pointing out problems in the IG paper's formulations. The essence of OSD's critique has been incorporated into the attached memorandum from you to the President in the two longer paragraphs on Public Opinion and Verification. preceding the recommendation.

Lastly, because such a step can profoundly damage the integrity and efficacy of the NSC Staff's work in serving the President and you in a coordination, rather than an advocacy role, I respectfully request that these cover memoranda we provide to you and the President not be circulated outside the channel from you to the President, as they recently were (for the INF decision package) to the Vice President's office, which subsequently asked me why ^{we} had recommended as I had.

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/4/10

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A proposed Agenda is attached at Tab A. Talking Points prepared for your use are attached at Tab II. Following the NSC meeting, we will forward a decision package with a draft NSDD for your transmittal to the President. At this point, NSC staff are inclined to recommend in favor of Option 1 (minus its "armaments" elaboration).

Ron *4ew*
Ron Lehman and Ty Cobb concur.
match

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the package to the President at Tab I and that, in addition to reviewing the content of that package, you also review the proposed Talking Points prepared for your use at Tab II.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
 A Proposed Agenda
 B MBFR IG Options Paper
Tab II Your Talking Points
Tab III Clearance List of Participants

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WPG HAS SEEN

TALKING POINTS FOR JUDGE CLARK

NSC Meeting on MBFR

September 6, 1983 -- 11:00 A.M.

I. INTRODUCTION (8 minutes)

- Mr. President, today we will be reviewing our policy for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, or MBFR.
- After our last NSC meeting on MBFR, on May 18, you authorized Ambassador Abramowitz to undertake a bilateral probe with the Soviets to indicate that there could be US flexibility on requiring a data agreement as a precondition. In return the East should be willing to accept the entire Western verification package, as well as a subsequent data agreement, and large asymmetrical reductions to parity in numbers of military personnel.
- Since that time, the Soviets have responded to our probe with rather mixed results, and they also launched a new proposal of their own. Meanwhile, our Allies, especially the Germans and the British, have suggested certain modifications to the West's negotiating position.
- We will [shortly be] ^{new}hearing from Ambassador (Mort) Abramowitz concerning these developments, and his assessment of the current state-of-play in the negotiations.

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-- (At any rate), as we enter the next round of the negotiations next month, and as we meet with our key Allies next week, we need to review our position in light of the Soviet response to our proposal, in light of the Soviets' own proposal, and in light of our Allies' views.

for Johnson

II. THE OPTIONS

-- We have all been provided with an Options Paper prepared by the Interdepartmental Group. While we understand that some differences remain among agencies (particularly OSD and JCS) concerning some of the wording in this paper, it is the basis for our discussion today.

-- The paper identifies three Options, which can be summarized as follows:

DOD / With Option 1, we would stick to the long-standing Western position that a data agreement is a prerequisite for initial US-Soviet reductions. However, under this option, we would press the East for improvements in their proposed verification measures, and we could also consider modifying the Western position on certain non-data issues. One of these issues identified in the Options Paper is that of moving from a discussion on limiting military personnel only to a discussion on

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limiting military equipment, or armaments as well, but I understand that at least two agencies (OSD and JCS) object to this particular modification under Option 1.

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and unclear
bill
most
sober

With Option 2, we would postpone a data agreement until after treaty signature, but before any reductions take place. Any further reductions would be dependent upon a data agreement to be derived from mutual inspection of each other's force levels.

With Option 3, we would postpone a data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions, provided the Soviets agreed in advance on a framework for the overall process of reductions to parity. Such a framework would include elements of associated verification measures and a format for data exchanges. As elaborated in the Options Paper, this option calls also for a freeze at present manpower levels.

III. VERIFICATION

-- In addition to describing these three options, the interagency paper attaches an Annex on verification issues. This annex is helpful in reminding us that extensive on-site monitoring will be required to assure compliance. It makes clear that we will

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require the entire package of "associated measures" proposed by the West and incorporated in the draft Treaty the West tabled last year.

- In view of our increasing concern about Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements, we need to be especially confident on this point for any future agreements.
- On this point (verification), the exact package of verification measures associated with Options 2 and 3 remains a bit unclear. At one point, the interagency paper states that "all Options include the same verification package" (p.3), which the West has tabled. However, descriptions of the package of verification measures considered "adequate" for Option 2, and the "package" and "framework" for Option 3, do not explicitly identify these as necessarily being identical to the current Western verification package and framework. Indeed, these options appear to involve somewhat different verification emphases. Our discussion today should help us clarify this important point.

Ron Stryk

IV. AMBASSADOR ABRAMOWITZ

- Ambassador Abramowitz, before we begin our discussion, we would all appreciate your giving us your thoughts on where we stand in the negotiations at this point. We are particularly

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[interested in your views on the results of the bilateral probe which you were authorized to undertake this spring and your views on the Soviet proposal and on Allies' suggestions for modification in the West's current position.

[Ambassador Abramowitz speaks -- 5-7 minutes.]

-- Thank you, Mort.

V. DISCUSSION (45 minutes)

-- Since the Defense Department has raised some questions about this interagency paper and its description of the specific options before us, I believe it would be helpful to begin with your views today. (FYI -- Fred Ikle will speak for OSD in Cap Weinberger's absence.) Fred, could you begin?

-- George (Shultz), what are your views?

-- Ken (Adelman), what about you?

-- Others?

[Discussion follows -- you may wish to draw on your memo to the President to help clarify ambiguities involving armaments (Option 1) and Verification Package (Options 2 and 3), Troop Freeze (Option 3), etc.]

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--. This has been a most helpful discussion. It has helped us clarify some important issues. Thank you all for participating, particularly Ambassador Abramowitz. We will be back in touch with you on the President's decision.

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