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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 11/5/2007

File Folder NSC 143 25 MAR 1987

FOIA

S2007-080

Box Number 8

RATNESAR

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
44780	MINUTES	NSC MEETING MARCH 27, 1987 RE PM CHIRAC'S OFFICIAL VISIT <i>R 9/14/2010 MR080/1</i>	5	3/27/1987	B1
44781	MEMO	ERMARTH TO CARLUCCI RE CHIRAC PREBRIEF <i>R 12/3/2008 S07-080</i>	1	3/30/1987	B1
44783	MEMO	FROM CARLUCCI RE MEETING WITH CHIRAC <i>R 12/3/2008 S07-080</i>	3	3/28/1987	B1
44786	TALKING POINTS	FOR MEETING WITH CHIRAC <i>R 12/3/2008 S07-080</i>	3	ND	B1
44788	BIO	BIO (1ST PAGE ONLY)	1	ND	B1
44789	MEMO	ERMARTH TO CARLUCCI RE BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHIRAC <i>R 9/14/2010 MR080/1</i>	1	3/27/1987	B1
44791	MEMO	ERMARTH TO CARLUCCI RE TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MEETING <i>R 9/14/2010 MR080/1</i>	2	3/26/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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Box Number 8

RATNESAR

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
44792	TALKING POINTS	FOR NSC MEETING RE CHIRAC <i>R 12/3/2008 S07-080</i>	3	ND	B1
44793	MEMO	FROM CARLUCCI RE NSC MEETING <i>R 11/1/2010 M2007-080/1</i>	3	3/26/1987	B1
45657	TALKING POINTS	FOR NSC MEETING CHIRAC VISIT <i>R 11/1/2010 M2007-080/1</i>	1	ND	B1
44795	MEMO	ERMARTH TO CARLUCCI RE NSC MEETING ON CHIRAC'S VISIT <i>R 9/14/2010 MR080/1</i>	1	3/25/1987	B1
44797	MEMCON	PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PM CHIRAC <i>R 12/3/2008 S07-080</i>	7	3/31/1987	
44801	LIST	ATTENDEES (PARTIAL)	1	3/27/1987	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8790284

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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RECEIVED 24 MAR 87 15

TO GREEN

FROM COBB

DOC DATE 24 MAR 87

GREEN

24 MAR 87

COBB

25 MAR 87

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

NSC

CHIRAC, JACQUES

AGENDA

VISIT

AP

Minutes

SUBJECT: NSC MTG 27 MAR RE PM CHIRAC VISIT 31 MAR / NOTIFICATION MEMO / PRES
BRIEFING PAPERS / TALKING POINTS / PRES MTG W/ CHIRAC 31 MAR

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS IP FILES IF O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GREEN

RODMAN

COMMENTS

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NSC IFID

NSC 000157 (J / 14)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	1P 3/28	File info		
Carlucci	X 3/31	Add on to info		
C	3/31	Noted by Pres		
	3/30	Add on to 4/10 AAR		
		Noted by Carlucci		
		Green Approved Leon		
DISPATCH	E 411	W/ATTCH	FILE	TC - Chosen (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**



27 APR 1 01:23

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 Package # 90284
 DOCLOG SM A/O (05)

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>A</u>
Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>57.41</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON FOUR

March 28, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation, National Security
Council Meeting, March 27, 1987, 2:07 - 2:51 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you ^{*97*} authorize Grant Green to ^{*approve the minutes.*} ~~sign the memo at Tab I~~
~~transmitting the MEMCON at Tab A to State.~~

Approve *6*

Disapprove

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab I Grant Green's Memo to Counterparts
Tab A MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *smf* NARA, Date *11/5/87*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON FOUR

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation, National Security
Council Meeting, March 27, 1987, 2:00 - 3:00 p.m. (S)

Attached at Tab A is a copy of the MEMCON of the National
Security Council Meeting on French PM Chirac's Visit,
March 31, 1987. (S)

Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By any NARA, Date 11/5/07

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON FOUR

National Security Council Meeting
March 27, 1987, 2:07 - 2:51 p.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: French PM Chirac's Official Visit

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President's Office:
Donald Gregg

State:
Secretary George Shultz
Deputy Secretary Rozanne Ridgway

Treasury:
Deputy Secretary Richard Darman

Defense:
Secretary Caspar Weinberger

OMB:
James Miller, Director

CIA:
Acting Director Robert Gates

JCS:
General Robert Herres,
Vice Chairman
LTG John Moellering
Assistant to the Chairman

USIA:
Charles Wick

White House:
Howard Baker
Frank Carlucci
Kenneth Duberstein
Colin Powell

Minutes

In opening the meeting, the President noted that he was looking forward to his meeting with Jacques Chirac. He said that the PM was one of the leading Conservative voices in Europe and he was pleased to see his presence in office along with Helmut and Margaret. (C)

The President said that he was equally mindful that Chirac was a Gaullist and that in any case he would maintain a certain distance from the U.S. The President noted that he could see some of that traditional French feistiness coming through in Chirac's remarks on our trade policies and his complaints about some of our arms control approaches. President Reagan added that he was interested to get an assessment of Chirac's political standing and how he and Mitterrand were getting along under the cohabitation arrangement. He joked that they truly were the "odd couple" in Europe. Mitterrand had written recently with some of his thoughts on arms control, and also to get a jibe in before Chirac got here. (C)

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NLRR MD7-080 #44780

BY RW NARA DATE 9/14/10

President Reagan commented that he knew George and Cap would touch on this in the meeting, but he wanted to point out how impressed he was with the way in which we have worked with the French in Chad. He added that we had provided some very sensitive, but critical help, but we have let the French take the lead. They've done a good job, he concluded. He then asked Mr. Carlucci to kick off the meeting. (S)

Mr. Carlucci reiterated how effective our assistance had been in Chad and how well our cooperation with France had worked. He then noted that Shultz would lead off today's meeting with an overview of Chirac's political situation in France, and touch on some of the Prime Minister's views on major East-West concerns and arms control issues. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he wanted to address five points: the general situation in France; the state of the U.S.-French relationship; Chirac's basic agenda; what we will want to raise with the PM; and, conclude with some comments on cohabitation. (C)

The Secretary noted that this would be the PM's first visit to Washington, although the President saw him in Tokyo. Chirac was following an unusual schedule by stopping first in New York City, where he would deliver a major speech, meet with Mayor Koch, and have a session with the New York Times Editorial Board. In Washington, Chirac would be meeting separately with the Vice President, Jim Baker and with several Congressmen. (C)

Shultz described Chirac as a pragmatic Conservative, one who shared many of the President's views. Chirac takes pride in his knowledge of the United States and the fact that he studied here, at Harvard. He also hitchhiked around the country and worked as a kitchen helper at a Howard Johnson's Restaurant. (C)

As always, the Secretary continued, we have problems in the relationship. But overall things are going rather well at the present, despite some irritations along the way. France has been very supportive of our position on the major international issues. Paris has been especially good in backing our approach to East-West relations. Shultz commented that we understand Chirac is concerned with our INF "0-0" proposal. He knows this has been an Alliance position for some time, but he was not in office when we agreed to it. He will express some reservations, but probably will say that he will publicly support the 0-0 option. We have been sparring around with them on the conventional arms negotiations. Basically the French want to do these talks in the context of the CSCE, while we want to do them Alliance-to-Alliance. I think, the Secretary said, that they want to have these negotiations under the CSCE so that nothing happens. They really do not want these negotiations, but feel under broad European public pressure to do so. Therefore, they favor this potentially ineffective forum. (S)

Our cooperation in the politico-military area has been excellent, Shultz continued. Where we have some problems is in the bilateral trade area, particularly on vegetable oil and feed grains. We also have a serious problem regarding the Airbus contract. We feel that Europeans have heavily subsidized this undertaking. (C)

Our cooperation in counterterrorism has been, on the whole, good, said Shultz. However we are never quite sure where they stand. We were not pleased with Chirac's intervention in the Abdallah trial where we believe he tried to moderate the sentence. But French public opinion was heavily on the side of the judge who handed down a very tough sentence. The main problem with the French is getting them to go along with multilateral cooperation in countering terrorism. Our bilateral work has been good but they are reluctant to go beyond that. Clearly we want to make this an agenda item in Venice and we should insist on obtaining a tough statement on terrorism. (S)

Turning to Chirac's domestic standing, Shultz said that the PM's fortunes were declining. He hopes to bolster his image with his visit to the United States. In his discussion here, he will likely want to go into East-West relations fairly extensively. He will tell the President that he is skeptical of Gorbachev's motives and will seek your assessment of the "glasnost" campaign. Chirac is going to Moscow himself in May and we suspect that he will take a fairly firm stance. Still, like most Europeans who see themselves as some sort of bridge between Moscow and Washington, there may be some new proposals emerge. We want to watch this closely. On arms control, the PM will stress that the negotiations cannot result in any reduction of French nuclear systems. He might also express appreciation that you took that position in Reykjavik. Finally, he will probably be prickly on the trade issues, particularly agriculture, given that he has a strong constituency in rural France. (S)

For our part, continued the Secretary, we will want to insure that Chirac has a clear idea of our East-West position. We need to press our views on multilateral cooperation against terrorism and stress that we need to get a Venice declaration on this subject that picks up from the Tokyo statement. On trade, while the President should listen, he will want to give it back to him as well. France has become more realistic on Central America and we should encourage that tendency. Finally, on Africa, since no one has any great ideas we should listen closely to what he may have to suggest. (S)

Shultz said cohabitation continues to be popular in France -- not so much with the politicians but the public at large. Neither the PM nor the President want to be blamed for not making it work. Frankly, so far Mitterrand has gotten the better of the deal. Chirac's standing in the polls has declined and his conservative rival Raimond Barre's fortunes are going up. (C)

Mr. Carlucci pointed out that there were two further points that we needed to underline. There were significant differences between Mitterrand and Chirac on how far the French should go in supporting Habre in Chad. Frankly, Mitterrand has been the more supportive. Secondly, we are sure that Chirac will be stressing the SRINF problem in the context of the INF negotiations. He will want to underline the necessity of securing some sort of constraint on the Soviet advantage. (S)

Secretary Weinberger began his presentation by stressing that Chirac and France have been excellent in supporting improved defense cooperation. As George said, they can be very difficult at times but overall our military ties have improved greatly. A lot of credit goes to Defense Minister Giraud who has pushed this cooperation. Joint maneuvers are one example of this cooperation. They've worked very well with NATO; while they are not members of the military side of the Alliance they are integrating more. The recent purchase of our AWACs is very significant and this should also enhance NATO interoperability. The bottom line is that should war break out the French will be there. (S)

Weinberger continued that, as George said, Chad has been a great success and as Frank pointed out Chirac does have problems with our INF position. The Secretary said he is concerned with their actions in the conventional negotiations where they have pressed for the CSCE instead of the Alliance forum. In sum, our military-to-military relationship is superb. They have an excellent Minister of Defense and we will be expanding our military-to-military talks. General Herres added that the Chairman of the JCS would be travelling to Paris soon to meet with his counterpart, General Saulnier. (S)

Bob Gates noted that Chirac will argue that our terrorist cooperation has been good. This is simply not the case. We have provided them with considerable information, but have received little in return. However, our cooperation in Chad is clearly going quite well. Secretary Shultz added that the French are very pleased with how we have handled that. We are not perceived as being out front and Habre, therefore, has received most of the credit. (S)

Deputy Secretary Darman observed that the President would be pleased with the direction the French are taking in the domestic economic area. They are attempting to reduce labor market rigidities and are lowering tax rates. The deficit is down but remains a serious concern. (C)

Darman continued that we do have serious disputes with them. If we cannot resolve the problem with vegetable oils this could lead to a major downturn in our soybean exports. While the French charge us with subsidizing our aircraft industry, they have expended considerable sums in supporting the Airbus project.

The agriculture problem is the most difficult. He pointed out that the President stressed in Tokyo that it was silly that we all subsidized our agriculture sectors. While the French expressed some interest in this point, Darman felt that this interest was feigned. Now Chirac is talking about some sort of a grain cartel, where the major producers will insure the price is pegged high. The PM has an idea that some of the profits from this endeavor could be used to aid the LDCs. We need to be very skeptical of this proposal, he concluded. (C)

In closing, the President expressed his thanks for the excellent briefing. He was well aware of the jockeying that was going on between Mitterrand and Chirac, much of that was in evidence in Tokyo. While there were problems in the relationship it appeared that our ties were quite solid, concluded the President. (C)

The meeting concluded at 2:51 p.m. (U)

National Security Council
The White House

DM

37 MAR 30 P 7: 00

System #
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DOCLOG DM A/O (04)

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	I
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	2	✓	
Colin Powell	3		
Paul Thompson	4		
Frank Carlucci	5	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	2
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	6		N
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch ✓ N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other 656

COMMENTS

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Chirac pre-brief 3/31 (Date/Time)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON FIVE

March 30, 1987

NSA Sec Advisor
has seen

44721

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FW*

SUBJECT: Chirac Prebrief

At Tuesday's prebrief for PM Chirac's visit we believe you might raise two additional points:

- EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION: Chirac will not only raise his call for increased European cooperation through the WEU but will seek our endorsement of his efforts. State has some reservations, but NSC staff feels the President should indicate that he sees this as a positive effort.
- CHIRAC'S CRITICISM OF THE U.S.: In a wide-ranging interview with The Washington Post Chirac both praised and criticized the U.S. On the latter front he condemned our "heavy-handed tactics" in trade negotiations, labelling them "hostage taking." He said the April bombing of Libya was a political and military mistake, raised questions regarding the manner in which the Reykjavik negotiations were conducted and reiterated his reservations on an INF agreement. We believe that the President needs to respond firmly to Chirac on this point, perhaps noting that we are aware of his rather frank interview.

Prepared by: *FW*
Tyrus W. Cobb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BY *MT* NARA DATE 12/3/08
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National Security Council
The White House

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Package #

DOCLOG

90284

A/O

03

37 MAR 27 P 7: 11

SEQUENCE TO

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DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson

1

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Marybel Batjer

2

[Signature]

Grant Green

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Colin Powell

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Paul Thompson

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A

Frank Carlucci

Grant Green

NSC Secretariat

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D/N

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

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A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker

Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Chirac 1035 3/31

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The President has seen 3/31

SYSTEM II
90284 a/o 3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON March 28, 1987

MEETING WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER JACQUES CHIRAC

DATE: March 31, 1987

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 9:30 - 11:50 a.m.

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

I. PURPOSE

To confirm strong U.S.-French relations; to encourage French support for Alliance positions on security issues; to insure that Chirac understands U.S. positions on arms control and our approach to Soviet-American relations.

II. BACKGROUND

Conservative Prime Minister Chirac will want to use this visit to promote French positions on foreign and security issues and to enhance his domestic position. Since he still shares power with Socialist President Mitterrand he is especially eager to appear as a polished statesman capable of defending French interests while cultivating a harmonious relationship with you.

Unlike many Frenchmen, Chirac is an extrovert; he likes to get out and meet the man in the street. In contrast to Socialist President Mitterrand, Chirac is not an intellectual and usually approaches issues in a pragmatic matter. He is also a strong nationalist and will be forceful and persistent in portraying France as the injured party in trade disputes and as a staunch defender of European interests.

Arms control and bilateral trade issues will top Chirac's agenda in Washington. As we discussed in Friday's NSC meeting, your session with Chirac will probably focus on East-West relations, theater arms control, and bilateral trade issues. The PM will stress French support for Alliance security and will be receptive to praise for the closer French integration in NATO politico-military planning that he has promoted. At the same time he will candidly lay out his concerns about U.S. arms control moves that he fears could lead to a decoupling of America from Europe.

Chirac has privately expressed concerns that the Iranian/Contra affair has placed the U.S. in a weakened position in negotiating with Gorbachev, whom he views as a more capable Soviet adversary than we had confronted in the past. It would be useful to stress with him the realistic basis on

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cc: Vice President

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BY LOT NARA DATE 12/13/08

which you are seeking an improvement of the dialogue with Moscow. He will be receptive to the argument you have frequently made that it is this policy of realism and strength, supported by our strategic modernization, that has dramatically improved our -- and the West's -- ability to deal with the Kremlin.

You should stress to Chirac that you have no intentions of allowing or encouraging any diminution of our commitment to Europe. The PM will also express reservations about your 0-0 INF proposal, arguing that it could leave the Soviets with a considerable SRINF and conventional force advantage. You should firmly point out that 0-0 is a position the Alliance has endorsed for five years, and that we will insist on stringent verification measures and SRINF constraints.

Under Chirac the French have moved forward on a number of key concerns. Defense spending will average 5% real growth over the next few years, one of the highest in the Alliance. The PM, as well as Mitterrand, has been strongly supportive on most European security issues. Our cooperation in Chad has been exemplary, and French views on Central America have taken a decidedly realistic turn.

However, we do have some important differences with Chirac. We are concerned with French lack of support for multi-lateral cooperation on counterterrorism, and with their resistance to work on a Venice Summit declaration on terrorism. Our most pressing difficulties, however, relate to bilateral trade disputes. Chirac will allege that the U.S. has used heavy-handed tactics in several recent contentious trade issues, especially on Airbus. Agriculture is the most politically sensitive trade issue for Chirac, who is a former minister of agriculture. As you know, his proposal to create a grain cartel among the major producer nations has evoked no enthusiasm here. You should be clear that we oppose any sort of cartelization of the grain industry, but suggest that we place the world agriculture problem high on the Venice economic agenda.

Prior to your meeting, you and the PM will hold a brief ceremony in the Cabinet Room noting the signing of an important agreement to cooperate in combatting AIDS. Chirac had written you on this issue and is pleased that our legal dispute has been resolved. Following your Oval Office meeting, you and Chirac will participate in a Roosevelt Room event commemorating the success that cooperation on encouraging private sector initiatives has gained.

Chirac prides himself on his knowledge of the United States. He wrote a thesis on the Port of New Orleans, attended Harvard for a summer and hitchhiked around the United States.

He would be especially receptive to any compliments on his understanding of the U.S., as well as for his beloved City of Paris -- where he still holds the office of Mayor.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Participants List is at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Full press coverage of arrival statements; pool photo opportunity in Oval Office at outset of meeting. Pool coverage of AIDS ceremony in Cabinet Room; full coverage of Private Sector Initiative ceremony in Roosevelt Room.

V. SEQUENCE

9:30 - 10:00 a.m. Briefing in Oval Office
10:00 - 10:30 a.m. Arrival Ceremony with Welcoming Statements,
South Lawn
10:30 - 10:35 a.m. AIDS event in Cabinet Room
10:35 - 10:40 a.m. Photo Opportunity in Oval Office
10:40 - 11:40 a.m. Meeting in Oval Office
11:40 - 11:50 a.m. Private Sector Initiative Ceremony in
Roosevelt Room

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

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SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON THREE

44786

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH FRENCH PM CHIRAC

- Welcome to Washington. Pleased to meet another Conservative who shares many of my personal, social and economic philosophies. Especially happy that we will be able to highlight the success your encouragement of the private sector has earned.
- EAST-WEST: Prospects for improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations are good. This is result of realistic approach to the USSR that America and France have taken. We are dealing with Gorbachev from position of strength and confidence.
- In dealing with Moscow must be under no illusions. We are definitely pleased with Gorbachev's moves to improve internal regime but movement has been minimal. In foreign affairs need to see explicit Soviet steps such as genuine withdrawal from Afghanistan. Understand you are going to Moscow soon.
- ARMS CONTROL: On ABM/SDI, issue is whether to restructure SDI to take advantage of broader treaty limits. Will keep consulting. Worth remembering key role SDI has played in bringing Soviets this far.
- On conventional arms control we share same objective: strengthening stability in Europe. NATO unity on new

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BY LOI NARA DATE 12/3/08

negotiations must be preserved; negotiations should be distinct from CSCE.

- INF 0-0 option endorsed by Alliance for five years. Will proceed only on basis of strict verification measures; constraints on SRINF. Know you have concerns.
- Removing our INF does not decouple America from Europe. Our commitment to the Continent is deep. We are not yet ready to move away from deterrence based on nuclear retaliation.
- (IF RAISED) Yes I know you have supported increased European defense cooperation through West European Union (WEU). We are supportive.
- FRENCH-U.S. COOPERATION: Pleased with excellent cooperation we have on politico-military issues. Know you have supported closer French integration into NATO planning. That is excellent.
- Very happy to see positive turn in Chad. Qadhafi seems to be on the run. Believe our mutual cooperation there has been quiet, but effective. What are you advising Habre about future dealings with Libya after Qadhafi's forces are driven out of Chad? (IF ASKED ABOUT OUR VIEW:) I would like to see Habre hurt Qadhafi so badly that he ends up having serious problems at home in Libya.

- COUNTERTERRORISM: West must hang together, maintain close contacts. Need multilateral efforts as well. Should issue strong counterterrorism declaration in Venice.
- TRADE ISSUES: Know have some differences, but must fight tendency toward protectionism in both countries.

(IF RAISED:) Hope Airbus issue resolved in cooperative manner. We remain concerned about unfair practices and subsidies.

(IF RAISED:) Not sure creating grain cartel is best approach to world agriculture dilemma. Let's discuss Agriculture in Venice.

- Enjoyed this productive exchange. Let's go outside and join our soulmates in endorsing private sector initiatives.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

No
V

Participants

Presidential Prebrief in Oval Office (9:30 - 9:55 a.m.)

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway
Ambassador Joe Rodgers
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC

AIDS Event in Cabinet Room (10:30 - 10:35 a.m.)

To be provided in separate package.

Photo Op in Oval Office (10:35 - 10:40 a.m.)

The President
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC (Notetaker)

Prime Minister Jacques Chirac
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Notetaker

Plenary Meeting in Oval Office (10:40 - 11:40 a.m.)

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Rodgers
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

Prime Minister Jacques Chirac
Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond
Ambassador Emmanuel de Margerie
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Notetaker

Private Sector Initiative Ceremony in Roosevelt Room
(11:40 - 11:50 a.m.)

To be provided in separate package.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON THREE

ACTION

March 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *for*

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for President's Meeting with
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, Tuesday,
March 31, 1987

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding briefing materials for his meeting with Chirac. Per your discussions last month with Bujon, we anticipate that the thrust of the meeting will focus on East-West relations, strategic and theater arms control and Franco-American politico-military cooperation. However, Chirac may raise at least one bilateral trade irritant -- agriculture -- and press his controversial "grain cartel" plan.

The exact schedule for Tuesday's events is still in flux. There will be a ceremony in the Roosevelt Room commemorating Chirac's private sector initiatives and there may be a brief photo op in the Cabinet Room noting the signing of an agreement between the U.S. and France settling an AIDS test kit patent dispute. The domestic folks will be preparing separate packages for those events.

Peter Rodman, Steve Danzansky, Bob Linhard and Hank Cohen concur. *All concur*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memo at Tab I to the President.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Prepared by: *[Signature]*
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Suggested Talking Points
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-080 #44789

BY RW NARA DATE 9/14/00

National Security Council
The White House

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27 MAR 25 P 3: 08

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Grant Green	2	6	
Colin Powell	3		
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci	4		
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	5		N
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

3/27 1400 TP'S

(Date/Time)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON TWO

44791

March 26, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

Not Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FW*

SUBJECT: Your Talking Points for the NSC Meeting on the
Chirac Visit; Friday, March 27, 1987, 2:00 p.m.;
Situation Room

Today's NSC meeting will provide the President with an overview of Franco-U.S. relations and French positions on international security and bilateral economic issues.

At the NSC meeting you might wish to weigh in on a few issues we have raised with you previously -- encouraging French intra-European defense cooperation, maintaining a realistic basis for Western policy toward the USSR, and refining our approach to European arms control issues. In brief:

- EAST-WEST: We will want to guard against excessive optimism regarding improved East-West relations. The President might tell Chirac that we are looking for evidence of substantive changes; the most important would be a genuine effort to extricate themselves from Afghanistan (not a Potemkin withdrawal). The other key point to stress to Chirac is that Soviet-American relations today are in sound shape; in fact, because of the realistic, cohesive approach the West has pursued over the last six years our common position vis-a-vis the USSR is better than it has been in four decades. To use the Soviet phrase, the "correlation of forces has clearly shifted to our advantage."
- EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL: While we do not appreciate Chirac's sometimes outspoken criticism of our approaches (re: Reykjavik, 0-0), he does reflect a strain of realistic thinking on arms control that deserves to be applauded. What we should aim at is genuine French endorsement of our INF approach -- they will support 0-0 if verification is stringent and constraints on SRINF are real.

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/14/00

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- 2 -

The French have also been a royal pain on the issue of the forum for conventional arms control negotiations. The President should be apprised of French behavior here; he might wish to pin Chirac down on just what their approach is to achieve a more equal conventional balance in Europe.

- EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION: Chirac will likely raise his support for improved European defense cooperation through the WEU. The USG is of two minds on this: EUR is unenthusiastic; NSC staff feels that we ought to endorse it. Of course we will want to promote this cooperation in a direction that supports, not derogates the Alliance. The British and Germans are cautiously supporting this effort, while keeping an ear cocked toward the U.S.

TWC *So* ✓ *TWC* *So* ✓ Peter Rodman, Hank Cohen, and Peter Sommer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw from the suggested talking points at Tab A.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb *TWC*

Attachment

Tab A Suggested Talking Points

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National Security Council
The White House

25



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Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
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NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*Do you know which direction
this was going? to file I
believe. yes? right Ken*



Frank -

In our conversation
this morning about
the networks my
remarks about
Ted Turner doesn't
mean I don't think
CNN should be
included. It
stands.

TH

I told them he is also
with H. 3, but I don't know. Bel

we Ed Turner
I see what the ABC
people think. Turner could blow it.

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ADD-ON TWO

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR CHIRAC NSC

- Thank you, Mr. President. Today George will lead off with an overview of Chirac's political situation in France and touch on some of the PM's views on major East-West concerns and arms control issues. George?
- (If not addressed): Chirac and Mitterrand have publicly endorsed our INF 0-0 option, but the PM has deep reservations. He worries about decoupling, SRINF, the German factor and denuclearization. Believes clever Gorbachev has objective of "denuclearizing" Europe, first through 0-0 INF, then 0-0 SRINF, using "pacifist" German public opinion as instrument.
- Also worried about long-term U.S. commitment to Europe, especially in keeping nucs there. He needs to be persuaded that U.S.-European "coupling" deeper than presence of PIIs. We should remind him that we will rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence for some time; in fact, are modernizing our own nuclear forces.
- Frankly I sometimes get tired of these Europeans who publicly take one stand -- that which is popular in public opinion -- then advise us to do the opposite.

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NLRR 507-080#44792
BY hvj NARA DATE 12/3/08

-- George, I wonder if Habre's successes portend trouble for Qadhafi at home? In Chad our support has been discreet, yet effective. Bujon told me GOF greatly appreciates our quiet but responsive assistance.

-- Cap, do you want to touch on the health of our defense relationship with France? I understand we're doing pretty damn well.

-- (If not raised) On this question of European defense cooperation, I think it is a healthy phenomenon and we should stress the positive. I understand the risks -- we could wind up with another arms control lobby, or procurement cartel, a rival to NATO -- but that's manageable. The British and Germans support it. We should say that as long as it is in step with NATO, and represents serious efforts on detente, we favor it -- and it will even help make Americans more willing to maintain the commitment to Europe.

-- Dick, I understand that Chirac has had mixed success on the economic front?

-- (If not raised:) Will Chirac raise his proposal to create a Grain Cartel? He believes it could set the price of wheat at a commercial rate. Sounds rather bizarre and unworkable to me, but I am intrigued by the suggestion that it could force the Soviets to pay more. Maybe it would be best just to get this on the Venice Summit agenda.

-- Bob, do you have any intelligence insights that we might have missed?

-- One final point. Chirac has been a major supporter of your privatization policies and this has worked real well in France. Fred Ryan is organizing a small event following your meeting where you and Chirac will highlight the successes your private sector initiatives have secured.

-- Mr. President, that wraps up our session.

National Security Council
The White House

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27 MAR 25 P 5: 29



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Bob Pearson	1	P	A
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Paul Thompson	4		
Frank Carlucci	5	✓	A
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NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			


I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker

Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)



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President has seen 3/2

SYSTEM II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1987

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: March 27, 1987

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

44793

I. PURPOSE

To review French-U.S. relations and to discuss key issues that the PM will raise during his March 31st meeting with you.

II. BACKGROUND

Jacques Chirac wants to use his visit to Washington -- and particularly his meeting with you -- to boost his weak domestic standing and his chances in next year's presidential race. Thus, he needs to show that he is a head of government capable of defending French interests and influencing your thinking on East-West and strategic issues.

As a conservative he will want to demonstrate he has a good personal relationship with you. As one who shares your philosophy and approach to social, economic and security issues, Chirac should strike a resonant chord. Indeed, you will probably want to praise his realistic policies on law and order, economic, and defense issues. On the other hand, Chirac is a direct political descendant of de Gaulle; as such, he can often be abrasive, proud, xenophobic and concerned with the way in which France's role in world affairs is portrayed.

Your meeting with Chirac will focus on East-West, strategic and theater arms control and Franco-American politico-military cooperation. It comes at an opportune time, just before your trip to Canada and George's consultations in Moscow. The meeting affords an important opportunity to stress your commitment to the Alliance, to arms control and East-West policies that protect the Alliance and to a realistic exploitation of new opportunities with Moscow. On the key points:

- SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS: Chirac shares your realistic approach to East-West ties. He endorses your defense modernization which has permitted us to deal with the USSR from a position of strength; he also welcomes your renewed -- without illusions -- dialogue with Moscow. Chirac is pleased with the opportunity to consult before George's mid-April Moscow visit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR M07-080 #44793

BY RW NARA DATE 11/10

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff

- ARMS CONTROL: While Chirac has publicly supported your 0-0 INF proposal, privately he has deep reservations. He worries that we may be drifting toward a denuclearized Europe and he is concerned that the removal of the INF missiles (whose deployment the French strongly supported) could lead to a "decoupling" of the U.S. from Europe. He will insist on strong verification measures and constraints on SRINF missiles as part of any INF agreement, as did Mitterrand in his recent message to you.
- FRANCO-U.S. POLITICO-MILITARY COOPERATION: One clear outgrowth of Chirac's assumption of the Prime Ministership has been a dramatic improvement in U.S.-French politico-military coordination and cooperation. The recent French decision to purchase our AWACs, close cooperation in Chad and closer French cooperation in NATO exemplify this.

Chirac will as well want to discuss some continuing irritants in our relationship. He will admonish us for our alleged "protectionist" trade practices and for pressing too hard on counterterrorism cooperation. He will also be interested in our reaction to his outspoken efforts to promote closer European defense cooperation. While we certainly don't want another arms control lobby or procurement cartel, or anything that detracts from NATO, we should keep an open mind on his call for more intra-European defense cooperation.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press coverage.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Following your opening remarks, George will provide an overview of Chirac's political standing and touch on the major East-West and arms control issues on the PM's mind. Cap will look at our improved mutual defense cooperation and the improved politico-military coordination we have achieved. Jim will highlight some of the trade disputes, and Chirac's controversial agricultural plan, although we do not expect the PM to raise these concerns in his meeting with you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

Suggested talking points for your use are at Tab A; an agenda for the NSC meeting is at Tab C.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Agenda

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON ONE

TALKING POINTS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
CHIRAC VISIT

- Appreciate your coming today to talk about Jacques Chirac's visit to Washington. I'm looking forward to this meeting -- he is one of the leading conservative voices in Europe and I am pleased to see his presence there along with Helmut and Margaret.
- However, I am equally mindful that Chirac is a Gaullist and that he is going to keep his distance from the U.S. no matter what. I can see some of that traditional French feistiness in his remarks on our trade policies and complaints about some of our arms control approaches.
- I'm also very interested to hear your assessment of his political standing and how he and Mitterrand are getting along in this "cohabitation" thing. I've got to say that they really are the "Odd Couple" in Europe. Francois wrote to me the other day with some of his thoughts on arms control and I'm sure one of the reasons was to get a jibe in before Chirac gets here.
- I know you're going to hit on this during the meeting, but I've really been impressed by how well we have worked with the French in Chad. We provided very sensitive, but critical help, but the French have taken the lead and done a good job.
- Well, Frank?

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/00

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Participants

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Plus representatives from the following departments and agencies:

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Director, U.S. Information Agency

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON ONE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, March 27, 1987

2:00 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.

Situation Room

PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC'S VISIT

Agenda

- I. Opening Remarks.....President
- II. Introduction.....Frank C. Carlucci
(5 minutes)
- III. Political Overview.....Secretary Shultz
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense and Security Issues.....Secretary Weinberger
(5 minutes)
- V. Economic/Trade Overview.....Deputy Secretary Darman
(5 minutes)
- VI. Discussion.....All Participants
(20 minutes)
- VII. Summary.....Frank C. Carlucci
(5 minutes)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 11/5/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
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ADD-ON ONE

March 25, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FW*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on PM Chirac's March 31, 1987,
Official Visit; Friday, March 27, 1987,
~~2:00 a.m.~~, Situation Room
2:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding briefing materials and suggested talking points for his use for the NSC meeting on the Chirac visit. More background material and your suggested TP's will be forwarded in a separate package.

This visit comes at a propitious moment. The President is embarking on an active foreign policy agenda and Chirac can be expected to endorse many of our objectives. The fact that the PM and the President share the same social and political philosophy should also help insure the success of this meeting. However, Chirac has also been feisty in public in criticizing the U.S., principally for protectionist trade policies and for "unrealistic" approaches to arms control.

Chirac has also been outspoken in favor of greater European defense cooperation; this has caused some concern in the USG, but NSC staff feels we should endorse this appeal. This should be a key topic we address at the NSC. Although we do not want to rework our INF negotiating position at this session, we should examine ways in which we can capitalize on the "realistic" French approach to East-West relations and arms control, particularly on demanding stringent verification and SRINF constraints as part and parcel of an LRINF agreement.

the for Peter Rodman, Bob Linhard, Steve Danzansky and Peter Sommer *Saw in Draft* *Phj*
concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Agenda

Prepared by: *the*
Tyrus W. Cobb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 1/14/10

National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
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NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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NSC 143

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90284
ADD-ON SIX

April 20, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with French Prime
Minister Chirac, March 31, 1987

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the attached Memorandum of Conversation for record purposes

Approve 6 to F.C.

Disapprove _____

Prepared by: TWC
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab A MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

NARA, Date 11/5/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
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ADD-ON SIX

44797

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway
Ambassador Joe Rodgers
Tyrus W. Cobb, NSC
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

Prime Minister Jacques Chirac
Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond
Ambassador Emmanuel de Margerie
Francois Bujon de l'Estang, Notetaker

DATE, TIME: March 31, 1987, 10:31 - 11:34 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

In opening, The President welcomed the Prime Minister to Washington. He noted his disappointment that the sudden deluge of rain had forced us to move the arrival ceremony indoors. The President emphasized he was very pleased to see again another Conservative who shared many of his own personal philosophies. He was particularly pleased that there would be a ceremony today to highlight the success the PM had enjoyed in the promotion of private sector activities in France. (U)

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the kind words the President had said in his arrival remarks. Chirac said that he was always happy to come to the United States to see old and new friends. The President replied that he understood that the Prime Minister knew this country well; after all, he had studied and traveled extensively in the United States. (U)

The President said that he wished to turn his attention to another visit that would soon be coming up. He was sending Secretary Shultz to Moscow in April to explore the possibilities of reaching agreements with the Soviet leadership. He felt that

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NLRR 507-080 #44797
BY WJS NARA DATE 12/3/08

the prospects of improving relations with the Soviet Union were good. He stressed that this was a result of the realistic approach that we -- both America and France -- have taken in dealing with the USSR. The President added that we were now dealing with Gorbachev from a position of strength and confidence. (C)

The President continued that in dealing with Moscow we should be under no illusions. While we were definitely pleased with the General Secretary's moves to improve conditions internally, that movement has been rather minimal. What we need, he said, were explicit steps by the Soviets, in particular a genuine withdrawal from Afghanistan. The President commented that he understood that Mr. Chirac would also be going to Moscow soon. (S)

The Prime Minister said that he appreciated the President's overview of where we were heading with respect to our ties to Moscow. Frankly, he agreed with the President's observation that there was less than met the eye on the internal developments in the Soviet Union. Chirac said that he was a very prudent person and was especially cautious in evaluating what was taking place in Russia. Like the President, he said, more specific steps were needed before we could conclude that Gorbachev was really sincere about making significant changes. Chirac also expressed the view that he was not certain that the Soviet system could tolerate a fundamental restructuring. (S)

Chirac said there were three prerequisites from a French perspective that were required before we accept the idea that Gorbachev's policies will be significantly different. First, we would like to see all of the political prisoners released. Secondly, we would want a definite increase in the levels of Jewish emigration. Finally, a genuine Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was required. If these three steps were to be implemented, then we would be convinced that a genuine evolution in the Soviet system was taking place. To be frank, he said, France was not expecting this to happen. (S)

Saying he wished to turn to arms control, the Prime Minister said that France strongly supports the concept of an initial 50 percent reduction of strategic weapons by the superpowers. Further, France can accept an INF agreement along the lines that have been proposed, including securing real constraints on SRINF. Chirac added that what was significant today was that, for the first time, the European heads of government share a point of view. That was only reasonable; they don't want to be divided. In sum, France, and Europe in general, on the whole support what this initiative is designed to achieve; but there was some real concern on SRINF. (S)

Foreign Minister Raimond said he wanted to press further on the question of negotiations regarding SRINF, which he described as

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- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

those systems between 400 and 1,000 kilometers. Raimond asked if it were not the U.S. position that it would not conclude an agreement unless SRINF were constrained? (S)

Secretary Shultz replied that this was indeed our position, but he wanted to lay it out. Within an INF agreement there should be, with respect to SRINF, a freeze at or below current levels, a U.S. right to equality, and follow-on negotiations on reductions. The question is, if such an agreement emerged, would there be in Europe a willingness to deploy, or would we have an empty agreement? The Secretary raised this because the Soviets might agree to go to zero (SRINF) and we could have equality at that number. But if the Europeans aren't willing to deploy, we won't have equality. (S)

The President said that he wanted to add one key point here. We are proceeding on the basis of realism. We know the history of arms control where many agreements were made just for the sake of securing an agreement. He told the Prime Minister that when he (the PM) met with Gorbachev that he would find the General Secretary to be a skilled, outgoing individual. The President said he understood the domestic problems that Gorbachev faced and why he needed to pursue an arms control agreement. But our bottom line was that we would proceed on the basis of the old Russian proverb, "doveriye, no proverkiye" (trust, but verify). The key point was that if we were to get an agreement on the theater missiles, INF and SRINF, we would still be faced with the problem of enormous Soviet advantages in conventional forces. We would simply not permit this Soviet advantage to remain. (S)

Continuing, the President said he felt the Soviets had a choice. The Soviets could engage in an arms race or they could seek a more equitable conventional balance in Europe. The President reiterated that the Prime Minister would find Gorbachev to be a very engaging individual. However, the General Secretary was raised in the Soviet system and he is very much a product of that environment. For example, my discussions with him convinced me that he honestly believes that some sort of military-industrial complex really does run the U.S. Finally, the President said, Gorbachev will try to turn the tables in discussing issues. For example, he told Margaret Thatcher, when she raised the problem of human rights in the USSR, that she should be more concerned about the human rights that were denied to all those unemployed, poor people in Britain. (S)

The Prime Minister said that he was pleased to outline France's position. Specifically, France will support the 0-0 LRINF option for an agreement. We agree with Secretary Shultz on the necessity regarding a freeze for SRINF and equality. With respect to Secretary Shultz' question whether or not Europe would accept SRINF deployments, he could only say, at this time, that we would need to have consultations on this question. Europe was

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- 4 -

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never so close together; we have a growing consensus on security issues. Europe would not be divided by Soviet initiatives. While he could not speak for other countries, his sense is that we all have a better understanding of each other's security concerns. Referring to the speech that President Mitterrand gave to the German Bundestag, the Prime Minister described Mitterrand's endorsement of INF deployments as a major turning point. (S)

Chirac continued that five European countries deployed the INF missiles despite domestic opposition. It is possible that it could be done again. He could not speak for the others and France is not involved in SRINF, but as for the UK, FRG, Belgium and Italy, but maybe not the Netherlands, if an agreement with a zero LRINF option is reached, then this would mean that the PII could become the PI(B). France would lead such a campaign for the deployment of SRINF to replace the intermediate range missiles that were being removed. He concluded that it was indeed possible that Europe would accept such deployments. (S)

Chirac then asked if we would insist on any specifics on SRINF under a 0-0 LRINF regime. He asked if we would remove the LRINF missiles without this agreement. His first question was: would we accept an agreement on INF if the Soviets had not accepted a restriction on their SRINF. Secondly, if there were a side agreement on SRINF -- and the Soviets subsequently failed to comply with that agreement -- would the U.S. continue to conform with the INF agreement? (S)

Secretary Shultz said our position was that clearly stated by the President: our LRINF position is linked to SRINF constraints. We would walk away from any Soviet offer that failed to include this provision. We don't wish to exchange one inequitable level for another. As the Vice President has clearly stated to our European friends, we would remove our LRINF missiles if the Soviets would. We would search for agreements on SRINF. The question is whether or not it is better to ask for an SRINF freeze with a right to build up, or to accept a 0-0 SRINF agreement. (S)

Foreign Minister Raimond interjected that Secretary Shultz was asking his question because he fears that he would reach agreement on SRINF constraints and then turn to the Allies for their advice. The risk is that within the Alliance you would have zero SRINF forces. (S)

Secretary Shultz stated that he was not certain a combined 0-0 LRINF and 0-0 SRINF agreement would be advantageous, but if there were zero SRINF we would still have a full range of SNF systems. But we have not placed this suggestion on the table. (C)

The Prime Minister observed that such proposals could lead to the satisfaction of the Soviet ambition -- the denuclearization of

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Europe. He insisted that the French would oppose any policy that would result in denuclearization. But we aren't there. There are U.S. systems, and French and British systems. French systems cannot be taken into account. There is no situation in which France would accept that its missiles be taken into account. At present, he said, most of our systems are antiquated. But the Parliament has approved increased military appropriations over five years for the development of newer systems. A high proportion of these will involve mobile, multiple warhead systems and submarines. So this is a central system for the French. It is small, but the nature of the system is the same. It would give us the possibility of destroying 50 percent of Soviet cities. This is the basis of our strategy of deterrence and it will not change. However, France does recognize that someday this will be a problem and we will have to enter into negotiations on these systems. (S)

Secretary Shultz said he wished the Prime Minister could have seen the President in Reykjavik. Although Gorbachev tried many times to put the French and British systems on the table, the President absolutely rejected this proposal. Chirac responded that he knew that and wanted to state that he greatly appreciated the President's firmness. The French have no worries, no fears, concerning the manner in which Americans are negotiating this issue. Of course, if there is a problem, France will speak up. But we have confidence in you. Chirac called attention to the massive Soviet propaganda campaign, both in the U.S. and Europe, designed to create pressure to sign an arms agreement very soon. France steadfastly opposes any rush toward an agreement. What is important is that, in the face of this media offensive by Gorbachev, the West not be divided in its responses. (S)

The Prime Minister said he wanted informal consultations between us. He was also making an effort in Europe to improve consultations and strengthen ties between the two sides of the Atlantic. He was guided by three fundamentals: first, nuclear deterrence will remain a sine qua non for peace for a long time, even if there are reductions; second, "coupling" could never be jeopardized. Those who say that U.S. coupling to Europe could diminish are wrong. (The PM was not worried on that score); third, it is essential for European nations to make an effort on their own behalf. They should be more coherent. There should be more and better planned consultations. As you know, he added, he had proposed that the Western European Union (WEU) promote better European cooperation on defense issues. (S)

The President responded that he agreed with the Prime Minister's points. Specifically, the President said, there was no argument here on INF. There is no way we will decouple America from Europe. Our commitment to the continent was very deep and was based on multiple interests. On Chirac's second point, the President pointed out that we were not yet ready to move away

from deterrence based on nuclear retaliation. The President added that he was aware of the Prime Minister's efforts to increase European defense cooperation through the WEU. The President said we were not opposed to these efforts; in fact, we supported them. We are not thinking of going it alone. (S)

The Prime Minister then asked if he could change the subject. He said that France was quite worried about the growing trend toward protectionism in this country. He quickly added that this was seen in Congress, but certainly not on the part of the President. The PM said this growing protectionist sentiment represented a dangerous trend and could lead to increased conflict between Europe and the United States. The only winner from such a dispute would be the Soviet Union. (C)

Chirac continued that France was quite "angry" with the negotiating techniques the U.S. has employed. He described the U.S. measures proposed recently -- against cognac and cheese -- as American "hostage taking". Chirac said he personally didn't care about cognac, or even grain, but he was concerned over U.S. charges of unfair practices related to the Airbus. These actions are causing a serious division to grow between Europe and the U.S., and has generated anti-American sentiment in France. Chirac concluded that one must be careful in permitting the so called "experts" too much negotiating authority. He warned that the EC was experiencing great solidarity on this issue and said that it would lead to a serious confrontation. He recalled saying in his address at Harvard that minor economic issues could explode; the lobbyists and the experts worked together to create these irritants. (S)

The President responded firmly that there were elements in this country, principally in the other party, that are pressing hard for more protectionist action. The President said he remembered being almost alone at earlier Economic Summits in attempting to draw attention to this growing global problem. Finally, other leaders have recognized the seriousness of the problem. The net result was a concerted effort by all to reform the GATT process. In so doing, we quieted our domestic opposition. (C)

The President continued that we needed more European cooperation and less complaining on this issue. While others might not remember the failings of the world trading system that existed in the 1930's, they were quite vivid to him. He did not want to see a return to a system of strong tariff barriers, such as those fostered by Smoot-Hawley. He said it was ironic that it was the Republicans, at that time, who were pressing for higher tariffs; now the Democrats are leading the charge. (C)

The President acknowledged that we have some problems with Europe and Japan. He said he was concerned with the political situation his good friend Nakasone was experiencing. Nakasone had spent a

lot of political capital in trying to push through the controversial sales tax. In sum, he said, we will not go down the protectionist road. If necessary he would use his veto power to prevent it. What we need to strive for is a "level playing field", not a series of regulations and tariffs that would make it impossible to trade. (C)

The Prime Minister said that he was pleased to hear the President's words. He added that he and the President shared identical positions, but expressed concern about public attitudes. Chirac again asked that we try to insure that minor irritants do not explode into major U.S.-European problems. The growing sentiment toward protectionism in both Europe and the United States could lead to political as well as economic problems. (S)

Secretary Shultz interjected that he wished to point out an example of what caused tempers to rise here in America. The European Community was recently considering raising tariffs again on vegetable oils and fats from the U.S., and this has led to great irritation here. He said that he knew these measures were not yet in effect, but they had generated considerable antagonism. The Prime Minister argued that this tax was not directed against U.S. exports, which were about 99% seeds, not oils. He said that this tax was necessary to insure that the domestic costs did not skyrocket. He described it basically as a consumption tax that was not designed against U.S. commodities. He concluded that this was another issue where the so-called "experts" were creating concern when none should exist. Secretary Shultz replied that we should then agree that this tax should be applied so that it would have no effect on the United States. (C)

Saying that he wanted to make one final point, the Prime Minister said that the Third World debt was becoming a major concern. We should view this not just as an economic problem, but as a political one. Gorbachev's initiatives had created a new, more favorable view of the Soviet Union in the Third World. If we don't do something, the LDC's will turn toward Gorbachev's Marxism. The LDC leaders don't care about disarmament, but they do care about their economic situation. He asked that the President address this issue publicly. Chirac also said that he would be coming to Venice with specific suggestions regarding how the world agricultural surplus could be used to help the less developed countries. The President indicated that he would be looking forward to hearing from the Prime Minister. (C)

The meeting concluded at 11:34 a.m. (U)

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KEYWORDS: FRANCE

NSC

CHIRAC, JACQUES

AGENDA

SUBJECT: NSC MTG 27 MAR RE PM CHIRAC VISIT 31 MAR / NOTIFICATION MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 24, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ROBERT B. ZOELLICK
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON
Assistant to the Attorney General
and Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

CAPT JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant to
the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on French Prime
Minister Chirac's Visit, March 27, 1987 (U)

There will be a National Security Council Meeting on PM Chirac's
Official Visit to the U.S., in the Cabinet Room, Friday,
March 27, 1987, at 11:00 a.m. Attached for your information is
the agenda for the meeting. (c)


Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As Stated

cc Larry Taylor, USIA
L. Wayne Army, OMB
H. Lawrence Sandall, CIA

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By any NARA, Date 11/5/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, March 27, 1987
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
Cabinet Room

PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC'S VISIT

Agenda

- I. Opening Remarks.....President
(3 minutes)
- II. Introduction.....Frank C. Carlucci
(5 minutes)
- III. Political Overview.....Secretary Shultz
(12 minutes)
- IV. Defense and Security Issues.....Secretary Weinberger
(5 minutes)
- V. Economic/Trade Overview.....Secretary Baker
(5 minutes)
- VI. Discussion.....All Participants
(25 minutes)
- VII. Summary.....Frank C. Carlucci
(5 minutes)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 24, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *we*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on PM Chirac Visit

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to your counterparts notifying them of the NSC Meeting Friday on French PM Chirac's Official Visit, March 31. At Tab A is a proposed agenda for the meeting. I will coordinate the participants list.

Fritz Ermarth, Steve Danzansky and Bob Linhard concur. *see memo*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to your counterparts at Tab I.

Approve *B*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Counterparts
Tab A Agenda

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *smf* NARA, Date 4/5/07

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NSC 143
Chua

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 27, 1987, 19__

for President of USA
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

✓ Donald Gregg

✓ George P. Shultz
✓ Rozanne Ridgway

✓ Richard Darman

✓ Caspar Weinberger
✓ Richard Perle

~~Arnold Burns~~
~~Ann Rondeau~~

✓ Robert T. Herres
✓ John Moellering

✓ Robert Gates

✓ James Miller

✓ Charles Wick
✓ Howard Baker
✓ Frank C. Carlucci
✓ Kenneth Duberstein

✓ Colin Powell

✓ Ty Cobb

✓ Muelin Fitzwater

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FOIA(b)(6)

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Requested by Cathy Bergeron

Room No. Situation Room

Room No. qfl/ww Telephone 6534

Time of Meeting 2:00

Date of request 3-27-87

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742