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File Folder NSDD 105 [EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
38340	NSDD	DRAFT NSDD 105, PARTIAL PAR 7/10/2013 M226/1	3	ND	B1
38341	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH, AL SAPIA-BOSCH, ROGER FONTAINE TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: EASTERN CARIBBEAN SECURITY R 9/4/2018 M256/1	1	8/13/1983	B1
38342	MEMO	JAMES MICHEL TO LIST, PARTIAL PAR 1/4/2012 M256/1	1	6/20/1983	B1 B3
38343	NSDD	DRAFT NSDD 105, EDITED	8	ND	B1
38344	NSDD	NSDD 105 - EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY - PARTIAL PAR 7/10/2013 M226/1	3	10/4/1983	B1
38345	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE ON EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY	2	10/4/1983	B1
38346	FORM	NSC ROUTING SLIP - PARTIAL R 1/4/2012 M256/1	1	9/22/1983	B1 B3
38347	NSDD	NO NUMBER MARKING - TEXT OF NSDD 105 - PARTIAL PAR 7/10/2013 M226/1	3	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
38348	PAPER	POLICY STUDY CONCLUSIONS FOR EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY PAR 6/4/2012 M256/1	4	ND	B1
38349	NSDD	DUPLICATE OF #38347 PAR 7/10/2013 M226/1	3	ND	B1
38350	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #38348 PAR 6/4/2012 M256/1	4	ND	B1

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NSDD 105
90883

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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August 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security draft
NSDD (S)

Attached at Tab A is a draft NSDD which results from the version circulated by the IG on June 20. The draft at Tab A reflects consultations held among the various IG participants since the last version was circulated for comment. All agree that the document is now ready for review by the SIG/FP. (S)

In accord with established procedures, would you therefore circulate the document to the SIG principals and convene the SIG for final review at the earliest possible opportunity. We should seek to have this document before the President for his signature early in September. (S)

Please note that the classification level of the NSDD has been raised to Top Secret. Appropriate dissemination controls should be effected to prevent unauthorized disclosure. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Draft NSDD

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *db* NARA, Date *7/10/07*

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EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The principal objective of the United States in the Eastern Caribbean is to promote economically viable, independent democratic governments friendly to the United States and free of Cuban and Soviet influence. Increased economic assistance and the recently enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are expected to have a positive impact on the economic independence of these island states. The security situation, however, is a continuing concern; the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean are vulnerable to both internal and external threats.



b1
(s)

Grenada, with increasingly closer ties to Cuba, serves as a location from which anti-democratic elements of each of the other islands receive encouragement, training, and financial support. In the face of Grenada's growing military potential and the possible use of the island as a base for subversion, and Cuban/Soviet strategic outreach, the Eastern Caribbean states entered into a regional security arrangement in late 1982. (S)

U.S. Interests

A significant portion of our imported oil and U.S. commercial shipping transits through the sea lanes of the Eastern Caribbean. U.S. military logistic support and reinforcements essential for use in a Persian Gulf contingency must also pass through the region. Should the small states of the area fall under the control of radical groups with anti-U.S. orientation, the U.S. would face a significant threat to our economic and security interests. (S)

To meet our own security needs and those of the democratically oriented Eastern Caribbean states, the U.S. should increase assistance to the area's security forces and bolster elements dedicated to the enhancement and/or preservation of democratic institutions. The conclusions of the interagency policy review of Eastern Caribbean regional security contain the specific provisions of a program to address the area's security problems. Accordingly, and using the policy study as a basis, the following measures will be undertaken, commencing immediately:

Partially DECLASSIFIED
NLS S.T. 12/20/91 ED. 13356

BY dh NARA, DATE 7/10/07

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- The Secretary of State will develop a plan for the United States to signal our support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean nations through enhanced public diplomacy and private assurances. This approach will be implemented in concert with the availability of the improved security program called for above. (S)
 - To meet longer term needs, the United States should provide security assistance that will enable the Eastern Caribbean security forces to more adequately address internal or external threats to their stability and security. Accordingly, U.S. materiel and training assistance should be earmarked to upgrade the effectiveness of both the regional security forces and those of the individual states. The Departments of State and Defense, in concert with the Director, OMB, should develop a coordinated plan for the implementation of this security assistance. (S)
- 
- 

The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, will develop a plan to meet this objective. (S)

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The coordinated, diplomatic, military, intelligence, resource, and contingency plans called for in the five items above should be forwarded for review by the President by September 30, 1983. (c)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

38341

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August 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: OLIVER NORTH
AL SAPIA-BOSCH
ROGER FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security NSDD (S)

Attached at Tab A is a draft NSDD on Eastern Caribbean Regional Security which we have reworked from an earlier draft provided by the State Department (Tab B). This draft NSDD results from approximately nine months' worth of work with the Interagency Group on the Eastern Caribbean.

The draft NSDD is designed to furnish a security program compatible with the economic support provided in the CBI. Such a security program is also a part of our overall approach to the problems of Central America. The Interagency Group believes in, and we have supported, a companion program for the island states of the Eastern Caribbean region. The NSDD will help us to achieve this goal.

We have conferred with State and the other IG participants in the revised draft at Tab A. We believe that the document should be returned to State and forwarded to the SIG/FP for final review before being sent to the President for his signature. The memo at Tab I (Kimmitt to Hill) will accomplish this step.

Recommendation

That you authorize, by initials below, Robert M. Kimmitt to send the memo at Tab I with the draft at Tab A attached to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I R. M. Kimmitt to Charles Hill
Tab A NSC redraft of Caribbean Regional Security
NSDD
Tab B ARA draft of NSDD for circulation, dated June
20, 1983

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NLRR M25611 #38341
BY WJ NARA DATE 1/4/18



38342
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUN 20 1983

TO: DOD/OSD/PA&E - Mr. Frank A. Tapparo/Mr. Wade Hinkle
HQ/Coast Guard/POLAD - Mr. Dave Simcox
DOD/J-5 (OJCS) - Col. Jim Connally/Cdr. Paul Hansell
OVP - Mr. Philip Hughes
NSC - Mr. Oliver North
DOD - Deputy Assistant Secretary Sanchez
OMB - Mr. John Burnim
DOD/ISA - Mr. Joseph Becelia
[REDACTED]
S/P - Ambassador Stephen Bosworth
M/CT - Ambassador Edward Marks
INR - Mr. Herman Cohen
P - Mr. Robert Perry
PM/RSA - Mr. Robert Gallucci
T - Mr. John Wolf
ARA/RPP - Mr. Datus Proper
ARA/USOAS - Mr. Phil Johnson

13524
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

FROM: ARA - James H. Michel, Acting *JH*
SUBJECT: IG: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security

Attached for your clearance is the draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) memorandum based upon the Interagency Group paper and modified to take into account the results of the June 15 IG meeting. Following the clearance procedure at this level, the draft NSDD will be circulated at the SIG level before being forwarded to the NSC for formal policy approval.

Your clearance, comments and/or changes are requested no later than COB Wednesday, June 22. Please telephone Ms. Mary Kosheleff, ARA/CAR, 632-7385.

Attachment:

Draft NSDD

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BY KML NARA DATE 1/4/2

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The White House

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John Poindexter

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[Signature]

Bud McFarlane

4

[Signature]

Jacque Hill

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Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

Sopru-Bosch

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✓

A

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R-Retain

D-Dispatch

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BY KML NARA DATE 1/4/12

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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October 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense


THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSDD-105: Eastern Caribbean Regional
Security Policy (S)

The President has approved National Security Decision Directive 105 (NSDD-105), subject as above. A copy of the approved NSDD is attached. Please ensure special handling of this document to prevent unauthorized disclosure. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment
NSDD-105

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 7/10/07

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38344	NSDD NSDD 105 - EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY - PARTIAL	3	10/4/1983	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

38344

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October 4, 1983

National Security
Decision Directive 105

EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY (S)

The principal objective of the United States in the Eastern Caribbean is to promote economically viable, independent democratic governments friendly to the United States and free of Cuban and Soviet influence.

Increased economic assistance and the recently enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are expected to have a positive impact on the economic independence of these island states. The security situation, however, is a continuing concern; the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean are vulnerable to both internal and external threats.

Grenada, with increasingly closer ties to Cuba, serves as a location from which anti-democratic elements of each of the other islands receive encouragement, training, and financial support. In the face of Grenada's growing military potential and the possible use of the island as a base for subversion, and Cuban/Soviet strategic outreach, the Eastern Caribbean states entered into a regional security arrangement in late 1982. (S)

U.S. Interests

A significant portion of our imported oil and U.S. commercial shipping transits through the sea lanes of the Eastern Caribbean. U.S. military logistic support and reinforcements essential for use in a Persian Gulf contingency must also pass through the region. Should the small states of the area fall under the control of radical groups with anti-U.S. orientation, the U.S. would face a significant threat to our economic and security interests. (S)

To meet our own security needs and those of the democratically oriented Eastern Caribbean states, the U.S. should increase assistance to the area's security forces and bolster elements dedicated to the enhancement and/or preservation of democratic institutions. The conclusions of the interagency policy review of

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NLS S. Tilley, NSC 12/20/91 EP-12354
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Eastern Caribbean regional security contain the specific provisions of a program to address the area's security problems. Accordingly, and using the policy study as a basis, the following measures will be undertaken, commencing immediately:



- The Secretary of State will develop a plan for the United States to signal our support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean nations through enhanced public diplomacy and private assurances. This approach will be implemented in concert with the availability of the improved security program called for above. (S)
- To meet longer term needs, the United States should use security assistance that will enable the Eastern Caribbean security forces more adequately to address internal or external threats to their stability and security. Accordingly, U.S. materiel and training assistance should be earmarked to upgrade the effectiveness of both the regional security forces and those of the individual states. The Departments of State and Defense, in concert with the Director, OMB, should develop a coordinated plan for the implementation of this security assistance. (S)



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The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, will develop a plan to meet this objective. (S)



The coordinated, diplomatic, military, intelligence, resource, and contingency plans called for in the items above should be forwarded for review by the President by October 15, 1983. ~~TO~~

Ronald Reagan

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38346	FORM NSC ROUTING SLIP - PARTIAL	1	9/22/1983	B1 B3

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Situation Room			
Sopra-Bosch	2		A

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TO: _____

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Executive Secretary

Executive Secretariat SENSITIVEAttachment Classification

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
91092~~TOP SECRET~~

12 P12.05

September 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security NSDD

Attached is the NSDD on Eastern Caribbean Regional Security consisting of a policy study conclusions section covered by a Presidential overview and action directive. It has been circulated and cleared at the SIG level in the Department as well as by the CIA, DOD (ISA and JCS), Coast Guard, and OMB. The clearance process produced only minor, non-substantive changes in the draft NSDD received from the NSC on August 15, 1983. Given the general consensus which apparently exists on the NSDD at the highest levels of the relevant agencies, convening a SIG for a final review does not appear to be necessary.

The Department recommends, therefore, that the attached NSDD be passed to the President for his review and approval.

William P. Clark
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By db NARA, Date 9/10/07~~TOP SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

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NSDD 105 [EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY]

FOIA

F02-085
JEFFREY
RICHELSON

Box Number

91291

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
38347	NSDD NO NUMBER MARKING - TEXT OF NSDD 105 - PARTIAL	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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38347

EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The principal objective of the United States in the Eastern Caribbean is to promote economically viable, independent democratic governments friendly to the United States and free of Cuban and Soviet influence.

Increased economic assistance and the recently enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are expected to have a positive impact on the economic independence of these island states. The security situation, however, is a continuing concern; the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean are vulnerable to both internal and external threats.

Grenada, with increasingly close ties to Cuba, serves as a location from which anti-democratic elements of each of the other islands receive encouragement, training, and financial support. In the face of Grenada's growing military potential and the possible use of the island as a base for subversion, and Cuban/Soviet strategic outreach, the Eastern Caribbean states entered into a regional security arrangement in late 1982.

U.S. Interests

A significant portion of our imported oil and U.S. commercial shipping transits through the sea lanes of the Eastern Caribbean. U.S. military logistic support and reinforcements essential for use in a Persian Gulf contingency must also pass through the region. Should the small states of the area fall under the control of radical groups with anti-U.S. orientation, the U.S. would face a significant threat to our economic and security interests.

To meet our own security needs and those of the democratically oriented Eastern Caribbean states, the U.S. should increase assistance to the area's security forces and bolster elements dedicated to the enhancement and/or preservation of democratic institutions. The conclusions of the interagency policy review of Eastern Caribbean regional security contain the specific provisions of a program to address the area's security problems. Accordingly, and using the policy study conclusions as a basis, the following measures will be undertaken, commencing immediately:

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
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BY ds NARA, DATE 7/10/07
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- 2 -

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-- The Secretary of State will develop a plan for the United States to signal our support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean nations through enhanced public diplomacy and private assurances. This approach will be implemented in concert with the availability of the improved security program called for above.

-- To meet longer term needs, the United States should use security assistance for programs that enable the Eastern Caribbean security forces to address internal or external threats to their stability and security. Accordingly, U.S. materiel and training assistance should be earmarked to upgrade the effectiveness of both the regional security forces and those of the individual states. The Department of State and Defense, in concert with the Director, OMB, should develop a coordinated plan for the implementation of this security assistance.



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- 3 -

 The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, will develop a plan to meet this objective.



The coordinated, diplomatic, military, intelligence, resource, and contingency plans called for in the items above should be forwarded for review by the President by October 15, 1983.

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38350

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Policy Study Conclusions for
Eastern Caribbean Regional Security

Although the economic and security assistance policies we have been pursuing in the Eastern Caribbean (EC) have enjoyed a measure of success, they have failed to address adequately serious emerging political and strategic problems. The EC is a region of endemic weakness which constitutes temptation to the Cubans and Soviets. The security problem for the U.S. in the Caribbean has two principal root causes: the dwindling U.S. and UK presence, and the emergence of the former UK dependencies as independent countries, all with economic problems, some with short-term leadership or corruption problems, and some with radical pro-Cuban groups which could attempt extra-constitutional takeovers. In 1965 there were no independent islands in the EC. Now there are six -- Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, and Grenada. By September of this year there will be seven when St. Kitts-Nevis gains its independence.

A reexamination and redirection of our security assistance program in the sub-region is necessary in order to achieve the principal objective of promoting independent, democratic governments friendly to the U.S. and free of Cuban/Soviet influence. The following initiatives to provide for the security of the Eastern Caribbean should be taken:

I. The United States should signal its strong support for efforts of the democratic Eastern Caribbean states to enhance their collective security against external aggression and extra-constitutional armed seizures of power.

(a) Should a written communication initiated by either Eastern Caribbean heads-of-government or the Council of Ministers of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System be received by the U.S. requesting our support for regional security efforts, we should respond with a Presidential letter.

(b) We should continue reaffirming in public declarations by USG officials, including the President and the Secretary of State, our strong support for the maintenance of stable and prosperous democracies in the Eastern Caribbean and our interest in the prevention of Communist subversion in the Hemisphere. In this context, we should express our support of, and willingness to assist, regional self-help efforts.

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/4/12

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II. Until Eastern Caribbean states are able to do so themselves, the United States should provide funding and emergency air and sea transport, if necessary and consistent with applicable legal requirements, to allow one or several of the members of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System to respond to emergencies on another island. Accordingly:

(a) The DOD should maintain current contingency plans for assistance to local governments, cooperation with regional and indigenous forces, and restoration of peace and order. These plans should include provision for emergency air- and sea-lift using DOD or Coast Guard assets. DOD, the Department of State, and the NSC staff should prepare and preposition, to the extent possible, paperwork needed to execute a rapid U.S. response. Contingency planning should assume either funding by security assistance, or, Department of Defense funding if the national interest so warrants.

(b) For eventualities appropriate to security assistance funding, \$50,000 of MAP resources should be set aside for most of the fiscal year to be available for troop airlift or other logistical support in time of emergency.

(c) The Department of State should respond to inquiries from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent regarding their becoming signatories to the Rio Treaty after consultation with other Rio Treaty members.

(d) The Department of State should design a coordinated approach to France, the Netherlands, the UK, and other appropriate regional governments on possible contingency air and naval transport assistance in an emergency situation.

(e) DOD should conduct a study comparing the feasibility and costs of: (1) long-term use of charter or CONUS-based DOD/Coast Guard assets for emergency transport, (2) provision to Eastern Caribbean governments of, and maintenance through security assistance funding for, indigenous helicopter, STOL or seaplane lift, and appropriate airborne or heliborne training; or (3) permanent or rotating deployment of DOD or Coast Guard air/sea transport assets in the Eastern Caribbean. (Permanent or rotating deployment in Barbados or Antigua of 2 or 3 helicopters for search and rescue, drug

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interdiction, humanitarian civic action, and contingency emergency transport purposes, as recommended by Embassy Bridgetown, should be specifically considered.)

III. The United States should provide security assistance that will prepare for eventual autonomous response by the Eastern Caribbean nations to any threat short of overt aggression by an outside power.

(a) Equipment for the Regional Security System, Coast Guard, ground forces and, depending on the outcome of the DOD study and interim developments, air transport equipment should receive priority funding from earliest available resources commensurate with overall security goals and best use of those resources.

(b) Specialized training should be provided, as appropriate, to Eastern Caribbean personnel in inter-island communications, coastal defense, airborne operations, and heliborne transport and assault operations out of available IMET, when required.

(c) The Eastern Caribbean should be given first priority for assistance under the Department of State's anti-terrorism program once that program has been approved by the Congress.

(d)

(e) The Department of State should work with regional states to approach the UK, France, Canada, the Netherlands, and Venezuela, for possible additional contributions of training, equipment, and advice for participants in the Regional Security System.

IV. The United States should maintain sufficient military presence in the Eastern Caribbean to deter external aggression and to respond to any such aggression, as needed.

(a) DOD should undertake a study of anticipated mid-to-long-term changes in the Eastern Caribbean threat environment and consequent requirements for enhanced U.S. military presence (military facilities, ship and air deployments). The study, which may incorporate the emergency transport analysis requirement if desirable,

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should recommend alternatives for varying or upgrading the U.S. presence. Alternative uses for the U.S. facilities scheduled to be closed should be considered in the study.

(b) DOD should review the possibility of additional "show-the-flag" demonstrations in the Eastern Caribbean (e.g., Blue Angels, Thunderbirds, Golden Knights, and visits by flag/general officers and ships).

(c) DOD should hold annual command post (CPX) and field training (FTX) exercises in the Eastern Caribbean in FY 1984 to test emergency Regional Security System response in conjunction with U.S. forces. Eastern Caribbean participation should be included in service exercises in the region.

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38348

Policy Study Conclusions for
Eastern Caribbean Regional Security

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/4/12

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(c) The Department of State should respond to inquiries from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent regarding their becoming signatories to the Rio Treaty after consultation with other Rio Treaty members.

(d) The Department of State should design a coordinated approach to France, the Netherlands, the UK, and other appropriate regional governments on possible contingency air and naval transport assistance in an emergency situation.

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SYSTEM II
91092

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SENSITIVE

ACTION

September 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM:

ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH *al*

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive: Eastern
Caribbean Regional Security

We have a draft NSDD on the Eastern Caribbean that has been circulated and cleared by State, CIA, DOD (ISA and JCS), Coast Guard, and OMB. Minor non-substantive changes were made to the draft NSDD that we sent to State on August 15.

The Department notes that given the consensus on this NSDD at the highest levels of the relevant agencies, convening a SIG for final review does not appear to be necessary. I concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you initial your memorandum to the President that asks him to review, approve, and sign the NSDD. North K and Fontaine W concur.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Your memorandum to the President
Tab A NSDD
Tab II State memorandum to you dated September 16, 1983

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 2/10/07

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
91092

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05

September 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security NSDD

Attached is the NSDD on Eastern Caribbean Regional Security consisting of a policy study conclusions section covered by a Presidential overview and action directive. It has been circulated and cleared at the SIG level in the Department as well as by the CIA, DOD (ISA and JCS), Coast Guard, and OMB. The clearance process produced only minor, non-substantive changes in the draft NSDD received from the NSC on August 15, 1983. Given the general consensus which apparently exists on the NSDD at the highest levels of the relevant agencies, convening a SIG for a final review does not appear to be necessary.

The Department recommends, therefore, that the attached NSDD be passed to the President for his review and approval.

William H. Sullivan
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlh NARA, Date 3/10/07

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NSDD 105 [EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
38349 NSDD		3	ND	B1
	DUPLICATE OF #38347			

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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EASTERN CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

38349

The principal objective of the United States in the Eastern Caribbean is to promote economically viable, independent democratic governments friendly to the United States and free of Cuban and Soviet influence.

Increased economic assistance and the recently enacted Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) are expected to have a positive impact on the economic independence of these island states. The security situation, however, is a continuing concern; the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean are vulnerable to both internal and external threats.

Grenada, with increasingly close ties to Cuba, serves as a location from which anti-democratic elements of each of the other islands receive encouragement, training, and financial support. In the face of Grenada's growing military potential and the possible use of the island as a base for subversion, and Cuban/Soviet strategic outreach, the Eastern Caribbean states entered into a regional security arrangement in late 1982.

U.S. Interests

A significant portion of our imported oil and U.S. commercial shipping transits through the sea lanes of the Eastern Caribbean. U.S. military logistic support and reinforcements essential for use in a Persian Gulf contingency must also pass through the region. Should the small states of the area fall under the control of radical groups with anti-U.S. orientation, the U.S. would face a significant threat to our economic and security interests.

To meet our own security needs and those of the democratically oriented Eastern Caribbean states, the U.S. should increase assistance to the area's security forces and bolster elements dedicated to the enhancement and/or preservation of democratic institutions. The conclusions of the interagency policy review of Eastern Caribbean regional security contain the specific provisions of a program to address the area's security problems. Accordingly, and using the policy study conclusions as a basis, the following measures will be undertaken, commencing immediately:

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
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BY NARA, DATE 7/10/07

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- The Secretary of State will develop a plan for the United States to signal our support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean nations through enhanced public diplomacy and private assurances. This approach will be implemented in concert with the availability of the improved security program called for above.

- To meet longer term needs, the United States should use security assistance for programs that enable the Eastern Caribbean security forces to address internal or external threats to their stability and security. Accordingly, U.S. materiel and training assistance should be earmarked to upgrade the effectiveness of both the regional security forces and those of the individual states. The Department of State and Defense, in concert with the Director, OMB, should develop a coordinated plan for the implementation of this security assistance.



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- 3 -

 The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State, will develop a plan to meet this objective.



The coordinated, diplomatic, military, intelligence, resource, and contingency plans called for in the items above should be forwarded for review by the President by October 15, 1983.

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SYSTEM II
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VIA LDX

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOHN H. STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSDD-105: Eastern Caribbean Regional
Security Policy (S)

Approval is hereby granted to the November 1, 1983 deadline
request by the Department of State for responses to NSDD-105. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA Date 7/10/07

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SYSTEM II
91184

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH *ALB*

SUBJECT: NSDD 105: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security

As I mentioned under separate cover, the various departments charged with responding to NSDD 105 would like an extension from October 15 to November 1. As presently envisioned, State, DOD, and CIA will forward cleared action responses directly to the NSC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve an extension until November 1.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I State memorandum to you dated October 12, 1983

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 7/10/07

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520

October 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSDD 105: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security

The Department received its copy of NSDD 105 on Eastern Caribbean Regional Security October 6. An informal check with the other agencies involved indicates that the October 15 deadline for responses to the NSDD will not provide sufficient time and that November 1 seems more feasible.

Separate interagency action groups are being established to implement the six principal decisions. As indicated by the NSDD, three of the action groups will be chaired by State, two by DOD, and one by the CIA. Upon completion, the interagency cleared action responses will be forwarded to the NSC directly by the agency charged with primary responsibility.

William McInerney
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *db* NARA, Date *7/10/07*

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