

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files

**Folder Title:** Germany FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] (09/01/1981-12/31/1981) (2 of 8)

**Box Number:** RAC Box 14

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
Country File  
**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. III 9/1/81 – 12/31/81 (2)

**Archivist:** smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-030 (Friedrich)  
**Date:** 05/23/00

Box 14

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	051007Z NOV 81 10p R 4/26/01 F97-030/2 #17	11/5/81	P1/F1
2. cable	031420Z NOV 81 3p R " " #18	11/3/81	P1/F1
3. cable	291300Z OCT 81 8p R " " #19	10/29/81	P1/F1
4. cable	192158Z OCT 81 3p Part " " #20	10/15/81	P1/F1
5. cable	191434Z OCT 81 8p R " " #21	10/19/81	P1/F1
6. cable	162023Z OCT 81 5p Part " " #22	10/16/81	P1/F1
7. cable	131909Z OCT 81 7p Part " " #23	10/13/81	P1/F1
8. cable	091708Z OCT 81 11p R " " #24	10/9/81	P1/F1
9. cable	077369Z OCT 81 2p Part " " #25	10/7/81	P1/F1
10. cable	071648Z OCT 81 2p Part " " #26	10/7/81	P1/F1
11. cable	301608Z SEP 81 2p R " " #27	9/30/81	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE299  
STU9020  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #1968/01 3091016  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 051007Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1493  
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1175  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7414  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 1708  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9364  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9847  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1159  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5459  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6677  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 21968  
USDECD, USEC  
FROM UNDERSECRETARY RASHISH  
E.O. 12065: GDS 11/05/87 (YORK, CHARLES T.) UR-E  
TAGS: ENRG, EEWT, GE, SU  
SUBJECT: US-FRG CONSULTATIONS ON SOVIET GAS PIPELINE  
1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: UNDERSECRETARY RASHISH AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES MET WITH ECONOMICS MINISTER COUNT LAMBSDORFF AND GERMAN COUNTERPARTS NOV. 4. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE FRANK AND COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF SIBERIAN PIPELINE ISSUES INCLUDING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONCERNS AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ENERGY ALTERNATIVES. RASHISH FORCEFULLY EXPRESSED U.S. VIEWS THAT: THE ECONOMICS OF THE PIPELINE MAY NO LONGER BE FAVORABLE; INCREASED DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET GAS WOULD AGGRAVATE EUROPEAN ENERGY VULNERABILITIES; AND, THERE ARE MORE ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES FROM AN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY STANDPOINT.  
3. THE GERMANS RESPONDED IN DETAIL, NOTING THAT PRIVATE GERMAN FIRMS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSIDERING THE ECONOMICS OF THE PROJECT; ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF NATURAL GAS THAT COULD BE DELIVERED TO WEST GERMANY IN THE SAME TIME-FRAME (E.G., ALGERIAN GAS) WOULD BE LESS RELIABLE THAN THE SOVIET SUPPLIES; AND, THE PIPELINE WOULD FURTHER DIVERSIFY THE FRG'S MIX OF FUELS AND ENERGY SUPPLIERS AND THEREBY ENHANCE ENERGY SECURITY. THE GERMANS ASSURED

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NLS F97-030/2 #17  
BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/26/01

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

US THEY HAD FULLY CONSIDERED THE SECURITY ISSUES AND WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH A POTENTIAL SUPPLY SHORTFALL ARISING FROM INTERRUPTION OF SOVIET GAS DELIVERIES. THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (PARTICULARLY COAL) THAT IN THEIR VIEW COULD SUPPLEMENT, BUT NOT REPLACE, THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE EXPLORING WITH THE U.S. PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED NORTH SEA GAS PRODUCTION.

4. COMMENT: WE SEE NO PROSPECT THAT THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PIPELINE WILL BE MODIFIED AT THIS LATE DATE. WE BELIEVE WE WERE SUCCESSFUL, HOWEVER, IN REALIZING OUR OBJECTIVES OF 1) IMPRESSING ON THE GERMANS THE NEED TO TREAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS IN A LOW-KEY WAY DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT AND 2) ENGAGING THEIR SERIOUS INTEREST IN WORKING TOGETHER TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY SO AS TO REDUCE THEIR VULNERABILITY TO SOVIET GAS. WE PROPOSE TO FOLLOW UP AND EXPLOIT THIS POSSIBILITY VIGOROUSLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END COMMENT AND SUMMARY.

5. THE U.S. TEAM HELD TWO MEETINGS WITH GERMAN OFFICIALS NOVEMBER 4 -- A LARGE MEETING INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL RELEVANT GERMAN MINISTRIES; AND A SMALLER MEETING WITH COUNT LAMBSDORFF. PARTICIPANTS IN THE LARGER MEETING WERE: UNDERSECRETARY RASHISH, LARRY BRADY (COMMERCE), ALLAN WENDT, WILLIAM MARTIN AND DAVID LOWENFELD (STATE), BERNARD KRITZER (DOE) AND CHARLES YORK AND KARL JONITZ (EMBASSY BONN) FOR THE U.S.; AND

VON WUERZEN, BECKER, ABEL, PFLETSCHINGER, JAHNKE FROM THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY AND MATTHIAS AND DIECHMANN FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. MEYER-SERASTIAN FROM THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE ALSO SAT IN. VON WURZEN LED THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

6. RASHISH BEGAN THE DISCUSSION AT THE LARGER MEETING BY OUTLINING U.S. VIEWS ON THE PIPELINE. HE STRONGLY EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN THAT: INCREASED GERMAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET GAS WOULD CREATE SIGNIFICANT ENERGY SECURITY VULNERABILITIES; THE ECONOMICS OF THE PIPELINE MAY NO LONGER BE FAVORABLE; AND SECURE ENERGY ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE AT COMPETITIVE PRICES. RASHISH ADDED HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT THAT IF THE WEST EUROPEANS INTEND TO PROCEED WITH THE PIPELINE PROJECT, THEY SHOULD NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT NOW. DELAY WOULD ALLOW THEM GREATER OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE MORE FAVORABLE TERMS ON PRICE. DEVELOPMENTS IN CURRENTLY SOFT ENERGY MARKETS COULD COMPEL

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DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE SOVIETS TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PRICE CONCESSIONS IF THE  
EUROPEANS EXTEND THE DISCUSSIONS. FURTHERMORE, A  
SOVIET-GERMAN CELEBRATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE PIPELINE  
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE298  
STU9024  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #1968/02 3091018  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 051007Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1494  
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1176  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7415  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 1709  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9365  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9848  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1160  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5460  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6678  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 21968  
DURING THE FORTHCOMING BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN COULD  
STRAIN U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS, AND SET OFF A NEGATIVE  
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE.

7. VON WUERZEN RESPONDED TO RASHISH'S POINTS FIRMLY.  
HE REITERATED THE FRG POSITION THAT THE PIPELINE IS NOW A  
COMMERCIAL QUESTION. GERMAN COMPANIES MUST EVALUATE THE  
ECONOMICS OF THE PROJECT. HE NOTED THE FRG CABINET'S  
DECISION TO ALLOW GERMAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET GAS TO  
INCREASED TO UP TO 30 PERCENT OF TOTAL GAS CONSUMPTION,  
OR 5-6 PERCENT OF TOTAL ENERGY. HE POINTED OUT THAT  
INCREASED SOVIET GAS IMPORTS WOULD HELP FURTHER DIVERSIFY  
GERMAN ENERGY SUPPLIES, AND THAT DIVERSIFICATION IS  
THE CORNERSTONE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING  
GERMAN ENERGY SECURITY. VON WUERZEN CHALLENGED OUR  
ASSESSMENT OF THE TIMING AND AVAILABILITY OF SECURE  
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES AND NOTED THE STRONG DOMESTIC  
GERMAN BARRIERS TO EXPANDED USE OF NUCLEAR POWER AND COAL.

8. VON WUERZEN SAID THE THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S INFLUENCE  
ON THE TIMING OF AN AGREEMENT WAS LIMITED. HE AGREED  
THAT IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO "CELEBRATE" SOVIET-GERMAN  
AGREEMENT ON THE PIPELINE DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT.  
HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, SOVIET  
OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE FIRMS COULD BE EXPECTED TO MAKE A  
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WOULD RECEIVE EXTENSIVE PRESS  
COVERAGE. THE PARTIES ARE VERY CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT,

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SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND A NUMBER OF MEETINGS ARE SCHEDULED OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE CONCLUDED WITHIN A FORTNIGHT AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE BREZHNEV VISIT. THE GERMANS SAID THEY WOULD HOPE TO PLAY DOWN ANY FANFARE.

9. THE U.S. SIDE THEN AIRED IT VIEWS ON THE WORLD ENERGY MARKET, THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PIPELINE, AND ENERGY ALTERNATIVES. PARTICIPATION EXPANDED. THE GERMANS WERE PARTICULARLY WELL BRIEFED AND ANSWERED THE AMERICAN POINTS IN DETAIL.

10. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON ENERGY SECURITY. THE GERMANS OFFERED A LONG ACCOUNT OF THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON THIS ISSUE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION. THEY OUTLINED THE PARAMETERS OF THE SAFETY NET TO BACK UP THE PIPELINE THAT WILL INCLUDE DOMESTIC GAS SURGE CAPACITY, CONTRACTED NORWEGIAN AND DUTCH GAS SUPPLY FLEXIBILITY, DUAL-FIRED CAPABILITY IN INDUSTRY AND POWER PLANTS, EXCESS ELECTRICAL GENERATION CAPACITY, EXPANDED DOMESTIC GAS STORAGE, AND INTERRUPTIBLE GAS CONTRACTS FOR INDUSTRIAL AND ELECTRIC UTILITY CONSUMERS. THEY PREDICTED THAT THE ONLY EFFECT OF A LONG-TERM, FULL-SCALE CUT OFF OF SOVIET GAS WOULD BE SOME SHORT-FALLS IN ELECTRICAL GENERATION, AND ARGUED THAT EXCESS CAPACITY IN NUCLEAR AND COAL POWER STATIONS COULD MAKE-UP THE SHORT-FALL. (NOTE: THE GERMAN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF A TOTAL SOVIET GAS CUT-OFF DID NOT APPEAR TO INCORPORATE THE POSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS EMBARGO OF GAS AND OIL.)

11. REGARDING ALTERNATIVES, THE GERMANS SAID THEY WOULD PREFER TO INCREASE IMPORTS OF HYDROCARBONS FROM THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, THE UK, OR EVEN NIGERIA AND ALGERIA. BUT SERIOUS PROSPECTS, IN THEIR VIEW, ARE NOT IN SIGHT. THEY RECALLED THE PRECIPITOUS ALGERIAN CANCELLATION OF GERMAN LNG CONTRACTS A YEAR AND A HALF AGO, AS WELL AS THE U.S. AND FRENCH EXPERIENCES WITH ALGERIA. WHILE THE GERMANS NOTED THAT BRITISH, DUTCH AND NORWEGIAN POLICIES LIMITED PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. IN APPROACHING THE EUROPEAN PRODUCERS, PARTICULARLY NORWAY.

12. THE FIRST DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH A GERMAN EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON ENERGY ALTERNATIVES THAT COULD SUPPLEMENT THE PIPELINE. RASHID RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HOPED TO KEEP THE LINES

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SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF COMMUNICATION OPEN AND LOOKED FORWARD TO ADDRESSING  
ENERGY SECURITY IN A COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK.

13. FOLLOWING THE LARGE DELEGATION MEETING, SENIOR  
MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION (RASHISH, BRADY AND  
WENDT) MET WITH ECONOMICS MINISTER COUNT LAMBSDORFF.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE302  
UTS4834  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #1968/03 3091020  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 051007Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1495  
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1177  
RUEHRD/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7416  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 1710  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9366  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9849  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1161  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5461  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6679  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 21968  
RASHISH EXPLAINED THE TWO BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THIS  
TRIP: (1) TO TRY TO MINIMIZE THE LINK BETWEEN A  
SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE PIPELINE NEGOTIATIONS  
AND BREZHNEV'S TRIP TO BONN; AND (2) THE GROWING SENSE  
OF DISQUIET IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE PIPELINE  
AS REFLECTED IN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESS. HE EXPLAINED  
THAT HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO TESTIFY BEFORE SEVERAL  
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND HE NEEDED ASSURANCES FROM  
THE EUROPEANS THAT THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING  
THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE PIPELINE. HE SAID THAT OUR  
DISCUSSIONS TO THIS POINT, WHILE VERY USEFUL, HAD ONLY  
SCRATCHED THE SURFACE. THERE MIGHT BE AN ADVANTAGE  
TO ALL OF US IF THE PIPELINE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE  
DEFERRED FOR A FEW MONTHS SO THAT WE COULD ALL INFORM  
OURSELVES, PERHAPS ON AN AD HOC BASIS, ABOUT THE  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PIPELINE AND THE ALTERNATIVES  
THAT MAY BE PREFERABLE--BOTH FROM AN ECONOMIC AND  
SECURITY STANDPOINT. RASHISH EMPHASIZED THAT HE SAW  
LITTLE RISK TO THE GERMANS IN A DELAY. ON THE CONTRARY  
IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT TIME IS ON THE SIDE OF THE  
GERMANS AND THAT MARKET CONDITIONS WOULD ALLOW THEM  
TO OBTAIN BETTER TERMS, SPECIFICALLY ON PRICE, SHOULD  
THEY CHOOSE TO GO AHEAD.

14. LAMBSORFF RESPONDED THAT THE PIPELINE HAD  
BEEN DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WHEN HE VISITED THE U.S.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LAST FEBRUARY. THE FRG HAD GIVEN ITS BLESSING TO THE COMPANIES IN MAY 1980 TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PIPELINE. THE CABINET DECIDED THAT 30 PERCENT OF GERMANY'S GAS SUPPLY COMING FROM SOVIET SOURCES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE EXCESSIVE ENERGY DEPENDENCE. THE COMPANIES TOOK THAT CABINET DECISION AS A SIGNAL TO PROCEED WITH THEIR COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEY ARE NOW "ONLY A FEW INCHES" FROM THEIR GOAL. THE ONLY REMAINING ISSUE IS THE PRICE AT WHICH GAS WILL BE DELIVERED. IT IS NOW UP TO THE RUSSIANS TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WILL MEET THE GERMAN COMPANIES' PRICE TERMS. IF THEY DO, THE GERMANS WILL SIGN THE DEAL IMMEDIATELY.

15. WITH RESPECT TO THE BREZHNEV VISIT, LAMBSDORFF SAID THE FRG IS AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE IN THE U.S. AND IS NOT INTERESTED IN A LARGE "CELEBRATION". LAMBSDORFF WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THE PIPELINE DEAL BE SIGNED FOUR WEEKS AGO WHICH WOULD HAVE WIDENED THE GAP BETWEEN THE SIGNING AND THE BREZHNEV VISIT. HE HAS LOOKED INTO THE CEREMONIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FIRST GAS DEAL WHICH WAS SIGNED BY SOVIET GAS EXPORT AUTHORITIES AND THE GERMAN IMPORTING COMPANY IN THE PRESENCE OF MINISTERS (THEN SCHILLER FOR THE FRG). WHILE HE CANNOT BE ENTIRELY SURE THAT THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS, HE SAID THEY ARE USUALLY VERY MUCH SWAYED BY PAST PRACTICE AND PRECEDENT AND AGREED TO TRY FOR SUCH A SIGNING. EVEN FOR THE MOST MINOR SIGNING, HOWEVER, THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO "BREAK OUT CHAMPAGNE AND BRING IN THE TELEVISION CAMERAS." IN SUM, THE FRG WOULD LIKE ANY CEREMONY TO HAVE A VERY LOW PROFILE BUT ARE NOT SURE WHETHER THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

16. LAMBSDORFF COULD NOT SEE ANY WAY THAT THE GERMANS COULD PREVENT THE COMPANIES FROM SIGNING IF THE LAST COMMERCIAL DETAILS ARE WORKED OUT. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRG IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO LOWER ITS DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET GAS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE BELIEVED NORWAY HAS A PARTICULARLY STRONG POTENTIAL AND IS PREFERABLE TO LNG FROM OPEC SOURCES.  
17. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE, LAMBSDORFF IS PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE WE ARE IN A POST-OIL ERA IN WHICH GAS AND OTHER FUELS ASSUME A MORE IMPORTANT MARKET ROLE. IN THIS CONNECTION BOTH RELIABILITY OF SOURCE AND SUPPLY

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DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DIVERSIFICATION ARE ESSENTIAL. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE  
EVEN WITH NATO PARTNERS -- HE SINGLED OUT NORWAY  
AND THE NETHERLANDS -- HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY.  
"EVERYONE WHO HAS OIL OR GAS BEHAVES LIKE A SHEIK."

18. LAMBSDORFF EMPHASIZED THAT THE GERMANS ARE NOT  
PUTTING THEMSELVES INTO A POSITION OF DEPENDENCY

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SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE300  
STU9035  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #1968/04 3091022  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 051007Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1496  
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1178  
RUEHRD/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7417  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 1711  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9367  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9850  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1162  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5462  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6680  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 21968  
WHERE SOVIET LEVERAGE COULD BE DECISIVE. NEITHER HE  
NOR GENSCHER WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN A POSITION IN  
WHICH THE FRG COULD BE SWAYED IN ANY VITAL POLITICAL  
OR SECURITY AREA. HE STRESSED AGAIN THAT ANY  
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE WOULD BE  
CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED, BUT AS  
SUPPLEMENTS RATHER THAN SUBSTITUTES FOR THE SOVIET  
PIPELINE.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE504  
STU3834  
ON RUEHC  
DE RUEHNL #1794 3071421  
ZNY CCCCC Z7H  
O 031420Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1437  
INFO RUEHRR/EC COLLECTIVE  
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0856  
RUEHBB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5374  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1393  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1089  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1150  
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH 0100  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1759  
KUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 5438  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 21794  
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 11-03-1991 (WHESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS:PEPR, CE, SA  
SUBJECT: SAUDI CROWN PRINCE FAHD'S STOP IN BONN,  
- OCTOBER 28  
-

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).  
2. SUMMARY: SAUDI CROWN PRINCE FAHD AND FOREIGN  
MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL FEISAL CONFERRED FOR ABOUT  
TWO HOURS WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER  
GENSCHER ON OCTOBER 28. IT WAS A LIGHTNING VISIT AR-  
RANGED BY GENSCHER AND FAHD AT CANCUN, EVIDENTLY SO THE  
CHANCELLOR, WHOSE ILLNESS PREVENTED HIM FROM GOING TO  
CANCUN, COULD PERSONALLY FOLLOW UP GENSCHER'S TALKS WITH  
FAHD IN MEXICO. A MINOR CONTRETEMPS DEVELOPED WHEN THE  
PRESS MISTAKENLY REPORTED THAT THE FRG SPOKESMAN HAD  
SAID AFTERWARDS THAT FAHD HAD SUPPORTED EGYPT'S CAMP  
DAVID POLICY. ACTUALLY, FAHD HAD ONLY EXPRESSED  
GENERAL SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S EFFORT TO ASSURE  
STABILITY IN EGYPT. SCHMIDT EXPLAINED THE DOMESTIC  
CONSTRAINTS LIMITING BONN'S ABILITY TO RESPOND FAVORABLY  
TO RIYADH'S REQUEST FOR WEAPONS, AND FAHD EXPRESSED  
UNDERSTANDING. THESE WERE THE MAIN POINTS EMERGING FROM  
A BRIFFING NOVEMBER 2 BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE MIDDLE EAST  
OFFICE DIRECTOR. END SUMMARY.  
-

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS NLS DDC F97-030/2 #18 SENSITIVE  
BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/29/81

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-  
3. FAHD'S COMMENTS ON EGYPT  
-----

THE CROWN PRINCE TOLD SCHMIDT HE KNOWS AND ESTEEMS MUBARAK AND IS CONFIDENT THE NEW EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT WILL "MASTER" EGYPT'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS. FAHD NOTED THAT THE "WHOLE ARAB WORLD" MUST BE INTERESTED IN EGYPT'S STABILITY. A DESTABILIZATION THERE WOULD AID ONLY THE COMMUNISTS AND THE FUNDAMENTALISTS. FAHD CONCLUDED THAT HE HOPES EUROPE AND THE U.S. WILL HELP MUBARAK IN TWO WAYS:

- HELP HIM MAINTAIN INTERNAL STABILITY, AND
- ENSURE RETURN OF THE REST OF SINAI.

4. SCHMIDT EXPRESSED DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT EGYPT ALONG THESE LINES.

5. FAHD'S 8-POINT PEACE PLAN  
-----

THIS SUBJECT HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY GENSCHER IN CANCUN, WHERE THE FRG FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD FAHD BONN SEES THE PLAN AS "VERY CONSTRUCTIVE." SCHMIDT MERELY REITERATED THIS, AND FAHD PROMISED TO CONVEY GERMAN VIEWS TO ARAB HEADS OF STATE WHEN THEY MEET SOON IN MOROCCO.

-  
6. FRG WEAPONS SALES  
-----

SCHMIDT EXPLAINED THE STATUS OF THE INTERNAL DISCUSSION IN GERMANY AND THE COALITION'S DIFFICULTIES OVER THE WEAPONS SALE ISSUE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MEET THE SAUDI REQUEST.

7. FAHD EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION, INDICATING IT (PRESUMABLY A DENIAL OF THE SAUDI REQUEST) WOULD NOT CREATE ANY FURTHER DIFFICULTIES (MEANING IN FRG-SAUDI RELATIONS). THE CROWN PRINCE ADDED A HOPE THAT "SOMEDAY" THE FRG WOULD "UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO CONTRIBUTE TO SAUDI SECURITY."

8. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S.  
-----

FAHD MADE FAVORABLE COMMENTS ABOUT THE U.S. AND SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVELY IMPRESSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. SCHMIDT ECHOED THESE VIEWS, SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS BROUGHT STABILITY AND CALCULABILITY TO AMERICAN POLICY. BURNS

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SENSITIVE

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PAGE 1 - R6

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE886

UTS6485

PP RUEHC

DE RUFHOL #1401/01 3021306

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 291300Z OCT 81

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1326

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 21401

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/29/81 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M

TAGS: PINT, GE, PEPR

SUBJECT: SCHMIDT/STOESSEL/BURNS MEETING OCTOBER 23

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. GIVEN BELOW IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE REPORT ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL AND AMBASSADOR BURNS PREPARED BY THE CHANCELLOR'S NOTETAKER AND EDITED BY AMBASSADOR BURNS. STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING. UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL MAY WISH TO MAKE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1982 AT 12:30

OTHER PARTICIPANTS: STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN  
AMBASSADOR BURNS  
MDG DR. ZELLER, AS NOTETAKER

4. THE CHANCELLOR WAS VERY PLEASED TO MEET MR. STOESSEL AGAIN. HE WANTED TO CONVEY TO HIM AND TO AMBASSADOR BURNS SOME OF HIS IMPRESSIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION. AMONG THE MULTITUDE OF EXISTING DANGERS, THERE ARE TWO WHICH ARE OF SPECIAL CONCERN: ONE GROWS OUT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE OTHER OUT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.

5. ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION:

THE CHANCELLOR STATED THAT THE POLICIES OF TWO AUTONOMOUS CENTRAL BANKS, THE ONE IN WASHINGTON AND THE OTHER IN FRANKFURT, MAY LEAD TO A DEFLATIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN THE

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DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F97-030/2 #19

BY

CAS

NARA, DATE

4/26/01

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WORLD, THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN WASHINGTON PLAYS HERE A CONSIDERABLY MORE IMPORTANT PART. HE, THE CHANCELLOR, ALWAYS CONDUCTED ANTI-INFLATIONARY POLICIES IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE BUNDESBANK AND ALSO WITH THE CENTRAL BANKS OF OTHER NATIONS. THIS IS CURRENTLY MORE DIFFICULT, FOR HIM IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY, BUT HE SEES CLEARLY THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A STRICTLY MONETARIST POLICY ON GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACTS. HERE ONE NOTES THE CONFLUENCE OF VARIOUS DEFLATIONARY FACTORS, IN ADDITION TO OIL PRICE INCREASES WHICH HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR YEARS, AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND EXCHANGE RATE DISTORTIONS WHICH HAVE INFLAMED THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS ANEW.

6. UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL AND AMBASSADOR BURNS POINTED OUT THAT THE CONGRESS DOES NOT INTEND TO PURSUE A DEFLATIONARY POLICY. AMBASSADOR BURNS POINTED TO THE RECENT REDUCTION OF TAXES WHOSE IMPACT, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE FELT IMMEDIATELY. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES IN THE U.S. HAVE COME DOWN BY SEVERAL PERCENTAGE POINTS. THE CHANCELLOR AND AMBASSADOR BURNS AGREED THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES MAY INCREASE FOR A TIME. IN SOME COUNTRIES, THE CHANCELLOR FEARS UNEMPLOYMENT MAY REACH DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. FROM THIS HE DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE WINTER OF 1981-1982 MIGHT BE PERCEIVED BY THE POPULATION AS NEGATIVELY AS WAS THE SITUATION IN THE WINTER OF 1931-1932.

7. IN REPLY TO A REBUTTAL BY AMBASSADOR BURNS, THE CHANCELLOR REMARKED THAT HIS WAS A POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STATEMENT, NOT A MATERIAL-ECONOMIC ONE. IN ADDITION, SUCH A DESTABILIZING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT COULD LEAD POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS KEYNESIAN AND PROTECTIONIST RECIPES. GOVERNMENTS THAT WISHED TO RESIST THIS COURSE WOULD EXPERIENCE CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

8. THE CHANCELLOR CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO EXPRESS THESE THOUGHTS IN CANCUN, SINCE THESE QUESTIONS CONCERN US ALL. IN ANY CASE, HE IS ABOVE ALL PREOCCUPIED WITH THESE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

9. THE U.S. HAS A LEADING ROLE; GERMANY'S ECONOMIC POLICY CANNOT, AND WOULD NOT WANT TO, STRAY FAR FROM THAT OF THE U.S. THE U.S. CARRIES PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

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DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD. THE WESTERN WORLD NEEDS THE  
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S. BECAUSE THIS IS SO, EUR-  
UPEANS LISTEN ATTENTIVELY TO ALL THAT IS BEING SAID BY  
LEADING AMERICAN POLITICAL FIGURES. WHEN AMERICAN  
POLITICIANS ADDRESS A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, EUROPEANS ALSO  
LISTEN. AMERICAN POLITICIANS SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS  
APPLIES TO THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS AS WELL AS TO OTHER  
FIELDS.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE888  
STU2886  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUEHNL #1401/02 3021308  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 291300Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BUNN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1327  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BUNN 21401  
EXDIS

10. POLITICAL QUESTIONS:

REFERRING TO THE TALK OF MINISTER GENSCHER WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS SATISFIED WITH THE REACTION OF THE FRG CABINET OF LAST WEDNESDAY. HE HOPED ESPECIALLY THAT IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE TRIED TO BE HELPFUL. AMBASSADOR BURNS AND UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL EMPHATICALLY CONFIRMED THIS.

11. THE CHANCELLOR THEN REMARKED THAT FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW THE FOLLOWING MATTERS PERTAINING TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS WILL BE OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN THE COMING MONTHS: PURPOSEFUL RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA; CONCLUSION OF THE MADRID NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONCRETE RESULTS; CONTINUATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND MINISTER GRUMYKO; RESUMPTION OF THE SALT PROCESS IN THE SPRING OF NEXT YEAR. THE CHANCELLOR NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT SALT IS MENTIONED IN THE NPG COMMUNIQUE. THAT COMMUNIQUE, AS WELL AS THE COURSE OF THE NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING ABOUT WHICH MINISTER APEL REPORTED, WAS VERY SATISFYING TO HIM. HE ADDED THAT MINISTER APEL COULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO THE COMMUNIQUE IF IT HAD NOT CONTAINED A PASSAGE ABOUT THE ZERO OPTION. UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE THE ZERO OPTION, BUT THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID RAISING EXCESSIVELY OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS.

12. THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT, ABOVE ALL, THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION SHOULD BE AVOIDED THAT FUTURE AMERICAN HARDWARE, AND NOT THE ALREADY EXISTING SOVIET HARDWARE, THREATENS THE BALANCE OF POWER AND PEACE.

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE WANTED TO POINT OUT AT THE SAME TIME THAT THERE EXISTS ON THE SOIL OF THE FRG THE GREATEST DENSITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HENCE ALSO THE GREATEST DENSITY OF TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THAT THIS EXISTS IN A DENSELY POPULATED AREA OF 60 MILLION INHABITANTS.

13. THE CHANCELLOR THEN MENTIONED THE IMPENDING VISIT OF GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, AND THAT HE IS INTERESTED IN U.S. THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WILL CONTINUE ECONOMIC EXCHANGES WITH THE USSR AT THE NORMAL LEVEL AND TRY TO EXPAND THEM IN SOME AREAS.

14. REPLYING TO A QUESTION OF UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR EXPECTED NEW SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS DURING THIS VISIT, THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT SO FAR HE HAS HAD NO INDICATIONS TO THIS EFFECT AND WOULD THEREFORE BE SURPRISED IF THE SOVIETS CAME UP WITH AN UNANTICIPATED INITIATIVE. STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN SURMISED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE LITTLE THAT IS NEW TO OFFER, BUT ARE LIKELY TO PURSUE THE PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR A MORATORIUM. THEY (SOVIETS) ARE NOT LIKELY, ACCORDING TO THE CHANCELLOR, TO GIVE THE GERMANS ANY PROBLEMS; GERMANY'S POSITION IS CLEAR. STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN CONSIDERED IT POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT UNILATERALLY FOREGO FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS -- HAVING PREVIOUSLY CARRIED OUT MASSIVE DEPLOYMENTS, AS UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL INTERJECTED. THE CHANCELLOR DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE A CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT IN THE FRG.

15. UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL REPORTED THAT GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV HAD REPLIED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE REPORTED ON THAT AT THE NATO COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 16, 1981, THE LETTER WAS IN ITS TONE QUITE CONSTRUCTIVE; IT EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE HAIG/GROMYKO TALKS AND, AS A SOMEWHAT NEW ELEMENT, RECOGNIZED THAT SOME RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED DURING THE TALKS. FOR THE REST, BREZHNEV TWISTED U.S. ACCUSATIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, ETC. AND THREW THEM BACK AT THE U.S. DESPITE THIS, THE LETTER TAKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY WAS NOT VERY POLEMICAL. AMBASSADOR BURNS ADDED THAT HE GAINED THE IMPRESSION DURING A RECENT TALK WITH ABRASIMOV ABOUT SOME TROUBLESOME BERLIN QUESTIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO PURSUE A REASONABLY ACCOMMODATIVE COURSE AT THIS TIME. THIS ABRASIMOV ATTITUDE IS BELIEVED BY AMBASSADOR BURNS TO HAVE BEEN BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS.

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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16. THE CHANCELLOR REMARKED THAT DESPITE THE CONTINUITY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE CHANGE OF LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IMPORTANT NATIONS CONSTITUTES A NEW POLITICAL FACTOR. THE SOVIETS ARE STILL COPING WITH THE PROBLEM OF GETTING USED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. WITH A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE WEST WOULD EXPERIENCE INCOMPARABLY GREATER PROBLEMS. WE WOULD BE CONFRONTED BY PERSONALITIES WHO HAD NO EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THEIR CAREERS HAVING BEEN IN DOMESTIC FIELDS. TODAY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BREZHNEV, THERE ARE IN

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE889  
STU2891  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #1401/03 3021312  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 291300Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1328  
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 21401

EXDIS

THE SOVIET UNION ONLY TWO PERSONALITIES WITH INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, GROMYKO AND PONOMAREV. WITH A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP NONE OF THEM WILL GAIN ADDED INFLUENCE BEYOND THAT WHICH THEY ALREADY COMMAND. WE MUST THEREFORE USE CONSTRUCTIVELY THE TIME WHEN BREZHNEV IS STILL AROUND. HE STILL HAS INFLUENCE. ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT HOLD ALL LEVERS IN HIS HANDS, HE IS STILL THE CAPTAIN. HE FEARS WAR, KNOWS IT FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND CAN BE TALKED TO. IN ANY CASE, HE IS NOT A COLD, POWER-TECHNICIAN WHO SEEKS SOVIET SUPERIORITY WITHOUT REGARD TO THE RISKS OF WAR. HE WANTS STABILITY, NOT UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE U.S., NOR UNDER FRG CONDITIONS, BUT HE DOES WANT STABILITY.

17. REFERRING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS IN CONNECTION WITH HIS HOSPITALIZATION, THE CHANCELLOR REMARKED THAT HE FULLY INTENDS TO STAY IN OFFICE. THE REST IS SPECULATION WHICH HE, IF NECESSARY, WILL COUNTER ENERGETICALLY.

18. THE PEACE DEMONSTRATORS, HE ADDED, SHOULD NOT BE MISTAKEN FOR COMMUNISTS, THOUGH THERE ARE COMMUNISTS AMONG THEM. MOST OF THEM ARE NORMAL YOUNG PEOPLE WITH WHOM ONE MUST TALK AND DEBATE. AMBASSADOR BURNS REPORTED ABOUT A DISCUSSION WITH RADICAL STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS IN BERLIN. DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS FEARS OF AMERICAN REARMAMENT WERE EXPRESSED; NO ONE, HOWEVER, WANTED U.S. TROOPS TO GO HOME. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION OF UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL, THE CHANCELLOR REMARKED THAT THE BONN DEMONSTRATION DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT HAS REACHED A CLIMAX; OTHER, ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED MOVEMENTS MAY SPRING UP IN ADDITION.

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

19. RISING UNEMPLOYMENT, EVEN IF THE ECONOMY DOES NOT BECOME AS DEPRESSED AS DURING THE THIRTIES, HAS A SEVERE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN THE FRG. HERE TOO, THERE ARE STILL MEMORIES OF THE THIRTIES. IN CERTAIN MAJOR INDUSTRIES, SUCH AS STEEL, TEXTILES AND CONSTRUCTION, WORRY ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT IS RAPIDLY GROWING. THIS IMPACTS ALSO ON THE ATTITUDES OF THE UNIONS. HE, THE CHANCELLOR, TAKES THESE WORRIES VERY SERIOUSLY. SOCIAL PEACE IN THE FRG DEPENDS UPON REASONABLE COOPERATION WITH THE UNIONS. HE HAS NOT LOST CONFIDENCE THAT THE SITUATION IS MANAGEABLE; BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN AS DIFFICULT IN A LONG TIME.

-  
20. THE CHANCELLOR EMPHATICALLY ADVOCATED A EUROPEAN TRIP FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE FORCE OF REAGAN'S PERSONALITY WILL NOT FAIL TO BRING POSITIVE RESULTS IN WEST GERMANY; IT WILL CREATE CONFIDENCE. THE CHANCELLOR IS SURE THE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE THE RIGHT APPROACH AND THAT HE WILL BE WELL-UNDERSTOOD.

-  
21. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TALK, AMBASSADOR BURNS PRESENTED A PERSONAL MESSAGE OF GOOD WISHES FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. END TEXT. BURNS

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE575  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #8266 2930016  
ZNY SSSSS 27H  
P 192158Z OCT 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000  
INFO RUHJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000  
RUEHIN/ AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 278266  
E.O. 12065: RDS 10/14/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER, JR.)

TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, US, GW, CH, TW

SUBJECT: (S) GENSCHER-HAIG EXCHANGE ON US-CHINA  
RELATIONS (S/S NOS. 8129273 AND 8129683)

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS A RESPONSE FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO  
LETTERS FROM GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WHICH ARE  
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AT PARAS 4 AND 5. REQUEST  
EMBASSY BONN CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO THE  
FOREIGN MINISTRY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL AND  
NO RELEASE IS INTENDED.

3. SECRETARY HAIG'S REPLY:

QUOTE: DEAR HANS-DIETRICH,

I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTERS REPORTING ON YOUR  
CONVERSATIONS IN BEIJING. AS I MENTIONED DURING OUR  
BREAKFAST CONVERSATION IN NEW YORK, WE HAVE NO INTENTION  
OF DOING ANYTHING ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE WHICH WILL CAUSE A  
SETBACK IN OUR RELATIONS WITH BEIJING. I AM GRATEFUL  
THAT YOU MADE THIS POINT SO CLEARLY IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS.

AS ALWAYS, I DEEPLY VALUE YOUR ADVICE AND FRIENDSHIP.

SINCERELY, AL

HIS EXCELLENCY  
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER,

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS

F97-C30/2 #20

By

CJS

DATE

4/26/01

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
FOREIGN MINISTRY,  
BONN. END QUOTE.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S LETTER DELIVERED  
OCTOBER 7:

-----REDACTED-----

-----RED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----RED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----RED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

REDACTED-----

SINCERELY,  
(SIGNATURE)  
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER END QUOTE.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S LETTER DELIVERED  
OCTOBER 9:

QUOTE: DEAR AL,

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

SINCERELY,  
(SIGNED)  
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER END QUOTE.  
HAIG  
BT  
#8266  
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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

3. U.S. DEFENSE POLICY  
-----

SCHMIDT SUBSCRIBED TO MITTERRAND'S VIEW THAT THE DEFENSE DECISIONS OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT ARE APPROPRIATE TO RESTORATION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AND WOULD THEREBY FURTHER THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS. BOTH SIDES, ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, ARE INDEED HAPPY THAT THE U.S. HAS COME OUT WITH SUCH AN ARMAMENT PROGRAM AT THIS TIME AND EXPECT IT TO FACILITATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

4. THE NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT  
-----

BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED FOR SUCH AN "IMPORTANT CONFERENCE" AS THE ONE COMING UP IN CANCUN TO PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS. GIVEN THE PRESSURES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, THEY FELT IT WOULD NOT BE POLITICALLY WISE TO ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO BE SEEN AS A FAILURE.

5. POLAND  
-----

SCHMIDT SAID HE HAD PROBLEMS REGARDING FUTURE AID TO POLAND. THE FRG HAS GIVEN DM ONE BILLION IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS IN ONE FORM OF ASSISTANCE OR ANOTHER, AND IT CANNOT CONTINUE TO DO SO AT THIS RATE. NOTING THAT FRG ASSISTANCE TO POLAND HAS ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT ONE QUARTER OF ITS ENTIRE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM THIS YEAR, SCHMIDT CITED BUDGETARY LIMITS AND SUGGESTED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE FRG CANNOT DO MUCH MORE FOR POLAND. MITTERRAND EXPRESSED SIMILAR CONSTRAINTS, AND BOTH LEADERS AGREED THAT THE POLES SHOULD DO MORE TO GET THEMSELVES OUT OF THEIR ECONOMIC PREDICAMENT.

6. EUROPEAN ISSUES: FRENCH AND GERMAN PROPOSALS  
-----

DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT INVOLVED SEVERAL HOURS, AND OUR SOURCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE MEETING. HE SAID THERE WAS EXTENSIVE TALK ABOUT SUCH THINGS AS THE ONE PERCENT CEILING ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EC BUDGET AND MANY ECONOMIC DETAILS.

7. OUR CONTACT ALSO DESCRIBED THE BASIC DIFFERENCE IN THE APPROACHES OF FRANCE AND GERMANY TO EUROPEAN PROBLEMS. THE FRENCH HAVE PRODUCED A PAPER WHICH IS HIGHLY TECHNICAL

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND EMPHASIZES THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN  
PROBLEMS. THE ERG PAPER ON THE OTHER HAND STRESSES THE  
BT  
#0560  
NNNN

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81/1296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE375  
UTS5025  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #0560/02 2921443  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 191434Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1032  
INFO RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5300  
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1376  
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3874  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3744  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1066  
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0836  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1749  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 5280  
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4305  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 20560  
NEED FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD POLITICAL UNION AND IMPROVEMENT  
OF THE POLITICAL COOPERATION MECHANISM. OUR SOURCE DENIED  
A NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT MITTERRAND HAD ACCEPTED "IN PRINCIPLE"  
THE FRG AIMS. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN PARIS PERSONALLY  
OCTOBER 15 AND KNEW THAT THE RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL DIRECTOR  
AT THE QUAI HAD NOT YET EVEN READ THE FRG PAPER. CONTRASTING  
THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, OUR CONTACT NOTED  
THAT FRANCE SEEMS UNEASY ABOUT THE MALFUNCTIONING IN THE  
EC ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, ITS BUDGETARY AND AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS,  
AND VARIOUS TECHNICAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS UNEMPLOYMENT  
AND THE HOUSING MARKET. ON THE OTHER HAND, BONN CONTINUES  
TO EMPHASIZE THE LACK OF STRUCTURE IN THE POLITICAL COOPERATION  
AREA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FRG IS ALSO VERY CONCERNED  
ABOUT SUCH ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AS AGRICULTURAL REFORM BUT THAT  
IT HAS NOT YET PRESENTED A "CONCEPT" TO ITS PARTNERS.  
RATHER, IT IS THE FRENCH WHO HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE  
IN THE ECONOMIC AREA.

8. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR CONTACT EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS  
IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE COME OUT NOW WITH A  
RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING TO SOLVE THE  
COMMUNITY'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. WHETHER  
THEIR TWO APPROACHES ARE COMPLEMENTARY, OR

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EVEN COMPATIBLE, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. HE SAID FRANCE, LIKE THE FRG, IS JUST BEGINNING TO CONTACT THE OTHER MEMBERS ON THESE QUESTIONS.

## 9. SPAIN

SCHMIDT REPORTEDLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SPANISH ENTRY INTO THE EC AND NATO. OUR CONTACT SUGGESTED HE HAD DONE SO IN THE CONTEXT OF MITTERRAND'S DISCUSSION OF FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT COMPETITION FROM CHEAPER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. SCHMIDT EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE YOUNG SPANISH DEMOCRACY BY HELPING IT FIND A PLACE IN EUROPE.

10. SCHMIDT ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO EUROPE OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE BASQUE TERRORISM PROBLEM.

## 11. THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ISRAEL

THERE WAS A LONG, COMPLICATED, AND NUANCED DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES. OUR SOURCE SAID SCHMIDT GOT THE IMPRESSION MITTERRAND HAS "DIFFICULTIES IN HIS OWN MIND" ABOUT SOME OF THE HARSHER ATTITUDES ESPOUSED BY THE RADICAL ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY LIBYA. HE WANTS TO MOVE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT BUT SEEMS STYMIED BY THE OBSTACLE POSED BY THOSE STATES WHICH DENY ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXISTENCE, AND HAS DIFFICULTY TALKING WITH THEM AND WITH PEOPLE SUCH AS SOME OF THE WEST BANK MAYORS WHOSE POLITICS ARE "TOO HARSH" FOR HIM.

12. MITTERRAND GAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT SEEK A MEDIATING ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. EVEN THOUGH HE RECOGNIZED IT IS IN EUROPE'S INTERESTS TO PUSH FOR A SOLUTION, MITTERRAND ALSO LAID HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN. HE MADE A POINT OF NOTING THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF FRENCH NAVAL AND MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IS TO BE FOUND IN THAT REGION, BECAUSE IT IS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO FRANCE.

## 13. NAMIBIA

THERE WAS BROAD DISCUSSION IN WHICH BOTH SIDES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, EXPRESSED AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM AFRICA. OUR CONTACT

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLINED TO INDICATE WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY COMMENTS  
ABOUT U.S. POLICY.

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14. THE FRANCE-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE376  
UTS5026  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #0560/03 2921444  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 191434Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1033  
INFO RUFHFB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5301  
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1377  
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 3875  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3745  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1067  
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0837  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1750  
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 5281  
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4306  
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 20560  
OUR CONTACT SUGGESTED THAT THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN  
THE TWO LEADERS HAD DONE MUCH TO REAFFIRM THE PRE-  
PONDERANCE OF HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, SOCIAL,  
POLITICAL, AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH BIND THE TWO  
COUNTRIES INTO A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP. HE  
EMPHASIZED THAT THESE BROAD INTERESTS HAVE THE EFFECT  
OF OBLIGING THE TWO COUNTRIES TO LIMIT THE DISHARMONY  
ON OTHER ISSUES TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL. HE ADDED THAT  
EVEN IF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT OR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND  
WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE NEW PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP,  
THEY WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME THIS BY FORCE OF CIRCUM-  
STANCES.

15. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "DISHARMONIES"  
DO OCCASIONALLY ARISE, RESULTING FROM DIFFERENT VIEWS ES-  
PECIALLY REGARDING ECONOMIC POLICIES. HE NOTED THE CON-  
TRASTING APPROACHES OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO THE INFLATION  
QUESTION. IN GERMANY, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO ACCEPT A  
CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISING UNEMPLOYMENT, EVEN THOUGH THIS  
RUNS AGAINST PRINCIPLES OF THE SPD. FRANCE, HOWEVER,  
PREFERS TO FIGHT UNEMPLOYMENT RATHER THAN INFLATION.  
GERMANY IS ALSO STRIVING TO KEEP INFLATION DOWN  
TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, WHEREAS THE FRENCH SAY THAT  
HOLDING DOWN THE BUDGET IS NOT SO IMPORTANT. THESE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81/1296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DIFFERING ATTITUDES DO CREATE DIFFERENT POLICIES, BUT  
THE TRICK IS TO FIND WAYS OF OVERCOMING THE DIVERGENCIES  
SO AS TO AVOID ANY "UNACCEPTABLE DISHARMONY." THE RECENT  
MEETING BETWEEN SCHMIDT AND MITTERRAND CONFIRMED, IN OUR  
SOURCE'S VIEW, THAT SO FAR THE "DISHARMONIES," ARE BEING  
NICELY CONTAINED. BURNS

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81/A314

SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE768  
UTS3705  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHDL #0511/01 2892029  
ZNY SSSSS ZTH  
U 162023Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY RUNN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1019  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUNN 20511

EXDIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER PASSING TO MANAGUA

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10-16-2011 (WIDESSNER, WILLIAM M.) UR-M

TAGS: PFPP, NU, ES, GE

SUBJECT: TEXT OF SPEECH OF NICARAGUAN DEFENSE MINISTER

- ORTEGA; FRG REACTIONS TO THE SPEECH

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1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM ITS EMBASSY IN MANAGUA A TRANSLATION INTO GERMAN OF EXCERPTS FROM A MAJOR POLICY SPEECH BY DEFENSE MINISTER ORTEGA TO "SPECIALISTS" OF THE SANDINISTA PEOPLE'S ARMY AUGUST 25. THE EMBASSY SAYS IT OBTAINED THE TEXT FROM "A RELIABLE SOURCE." GIVEN THE APPARENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPEECH, AND THE FACT THAT WE ARE UNSURE IF THE DEPARTMENT HAS THE TEXT, WE TRANSMIT IT HERewith IN INFORMAL TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN INTO ENGLISH. FOREIGN OFFICE REACTION TO THE SPEECH FOLLOWS THE TEXT BELOW.

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3. BEGIN TEXT:

IDEOLOGY (HEADINGS APPARENTLY SUPPLIED BY FRG EMBASSY)

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WE ARE LED BY THE SCIENTIFIC TEACHINGS OF THE REVOLUTION, AND BY MARXISM-LENINISM...SANDINISM IS THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUGGLE IN NICARAGUA; WITHOUT SANDINISM, WE CANNOT BE MARXIST-LENINISTS, AND WITHOUT MARXISM-LENINISM SANDINISM CANNOT BE REVOLUTIONARY. THEREFORE, THE TWO ARE INEXTRICABLY BOUND TOGETHER; THEREFORE OUR MORAL STRENGTH IS SANDINISM, OUR POLITICAL STRENGTH IS SANDINISM, AND OUR DOCTRINE IS MARXISM-LENINISM.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

By CS 77-036/2 # 22, NARA, Date 9/26/81

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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#### BOURGEOISIE

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WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF BOURGEOIS FORCES STILL TO BE FOUND IN NICARAGUA, WHICH MUST BE STOPPED HERE BY THE FSLN, IN ORDER TO DEFEND NATIONAL UNITY AGAINST YANKEE IMPERIALISM AND TO BRING OUR LAND MORE QUICKLY OUT OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT. WE CANNOT VIEW THE ACTIVITIES OF THOSE WHO WOULD SELL OUT THE FATHERLAND, THE ROBELO GROUPS, THE CLERGY, SEPARATELY FROM YANKEE IMPERIALISM. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE CLEAR TO US THAT THIS BOURGEOISIE WHICH IS READY TO SELL OUT THE FATHERLAND IS HERE BECAUSE WE WANT IT TO BE HERE. WE CAN TAKE THEIR FACTORIES ANY TIME WE WANT, WITHOUT FIRING A SHOT, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT FIGHT US WITH THEIR WEAPONS, BECAUSE THEY ARE COWARDS. WE CAN TAKE EVERYTHING FROM THE BOURGEOISIE WHICH REMAINS HERE, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT WE CAN TAKE ALL THEIR POSSESSIONS FROM THEM.

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-

#### POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTIONS

-----  
THE DEMOCRACY WHICH ROBELO WANTS MEANS THEY (THE BOURGEOISIE) WANT THEMSELVES RATHER THAN US TO HAVE THE ARMY AND POWER; (THEY WANT) US TO BE LIKE THE LEFT IN COSTA RICA, A GROUP, A MOVEMENT, WHICH PUBLISHES ITS NEWSPAPERS WHILE THEY, THE BOURGEOISIE, HAVE THE POWER. NOW IT IS THE OTHER WAY AROUND. NOW IN NICARAGUA SANDINISM HAS THE POWER, THE PEOPLE HAVE THE POWER, AND THEY (THE BOURGEOISIE) ARE AND MUST BE WHAT WE BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE, NAMELY A POLITICAL FORCE WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE REVOLUTION.

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THEY DO NOT WISH TO ACCEPT THIS, AND HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING SPOKEN OF ELECTIONS, BUT WE HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ELECTIONS OF THE KIND THEY WANT, AND WE WILL NEVER...DISCUSS POWER, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE SEIZED THIS POWER WITH ARMED FORCE. THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE WILL NEVER BE GAMBLER.

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#### LEFT EXTREMISM

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(ONE MUST BE) WARY OF THE ULTRA-LEFT GROUPS, WHICH WANT  
AN IMPOSSIBLE RADICALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS,  
AND WHICH ATTEMPT TO GAIN POLITICAL TERRAIN BY MAKING

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE769  
UTS3706  
UD RUEHC  
DE RUEHDL #0511/02 2892031  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
U 162023Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BUNN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1020  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUNN 20511

EXDIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////  
PROMISES WHICH CANNOT BE FULFILLED -- SUCH AS GIVING ALL  
FACILITIES TO THE WORKERS, OR (ASKING) WHY THERE ARE NOT  
MORE SCHOOLS.

USE OF SOLDIERS TO SPREAD IDEOLOGY, PROTECTION OF THEM

-----  
AGAINST OUTSIDE INFLUENCE  
-----

GIVEN THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT  
"LA PRENSA" APPEARS FREELY, AND THAT THE RADIOS BROAD-  
CAST FREELY AND ARE USED BY (THE FORCES OF) REACTION...  
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT OUR PEOPLE SEE CLEARLY, AND  
EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE PART OF THE PEOPLE SERVING  
IN THE ARMY SEE EVEN MORE CLEARLY. WHEN A SOLDIER ENTERS  
HIS NEIGHBORHOOD, HE MUST BRING WITH HIM THE AWARENESS  
THAT HE IS AN ELEMENT OF ENLIGHTENMENT... IF HE DOES NOT  
SEE IDEOLOGICALLY CLEARLY BECAUSE IDEOLOGICAL WORK IS  
CARRIED OUT POORLY IN THE ARMY, THEN IN THE CASE, OF,  
SAY, SCARCITIES IN HIS NEIGHBORHOOD, HE CAN BRING CON-  
FUSION INTO THE ARMY. END TEXT.

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██████████ TOLD US HE WAS PREPARING A "PESSIMISTIC" PAPER  
ON NICARAGUA FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER BASED ON THE  
SPEECH. THE OFFICIAL, WHO ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS TOLD US  
THE FRG FELT THAT WHILE THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA WAS  
WORRYING, "THE TRAIN HAD NOT YET LEFT THE STATION"  
NOW CONCEDED THAT THE TRAIN WAS "WAY DOWN AT THE END OF  
THE PLATFORM." ASKED IF HE REALLY THOUGHT IT COULD BE  
REGARDED AS STILL IN THE STATION AT ALL, HE SHRUGGED HIS  
SHOULDERS AND SAID HE WAS "NOT OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT NICARAGUA.  
HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR ASTONISHMENT THAT URTEGA WOULD LET

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE MASK FALL LIKE THIS AT A TIME WHEN THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS HAD SHOWN THE U.S. WAS STILL INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT SOME KIND OF FUNCTIONING RELATIONSHIP WITH NICARAGUA. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE THAT GENSCHER HAD HAD TO CALL OFF HIS TRIP TO MANAGUA, AS IT PROBABLY REPRESENTED THE "VERY LAST OPPORTUNITY" TO TRY AND TALK SENSE INTO THE SANDINISTAS -- OR EVEN TO VISIT NICARAGUA.

5. THE OFFICIAL WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SPEECH, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATEMENTS FROM MANAGUA AND THE FACT THAT UNGO WAS INCLUDED IN THE NICARAGUAN U.N. DELEGATION, MADE IT CLEAR THAT NICARAGUA'S AIM WAS INDEED THE INSTALLATION OF MARXIST GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA. THE EMBASSY OFFICER SPEAKING WITH HIM SAID THAT WHILE MANY PEOPLE IN EUROPE ARE AMAZED AT THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTRIBUTES TO EL SALVADOR, OUR POLICY THERE MAKES PERFECTLY GOOD SENSE IF ONE CONSIDERS THAT COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN THAT COUNTRY IS SIMPLY PART OF A LARGER PLAN. THE OFFICE DIRECTOR FULLY AGREED.

6. COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE483  
UTS9220  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHDL #0194/01 2861925  
ZNY SSSSS/BRBRB ZZH  
O 131909Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0879  
INFO RUEHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1045  
RUEHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1367  
RUEHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5220  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
RUSNAAA/USEUCOM  
RUEFRSHH/USDNCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 20194

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12065:RDS-1 10/13/2001 (WOESSNER, W.M.) OR-M  
TAGS: SALT, PARM, TNF, GE

SUBJECT: ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOW'S DISCUSSION ON ARMS  
CONTROL ASPECTS OF TNF/SALT/STRATEGIC WEAPONS  
WITH FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. DIRECTOR ROSTOW SAID HE THOUGHT U.S. WAS MAKING GOOD PROGRESS IN WORKING TOWARD NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ON TNF AND SALT. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ACHIEVING ANY AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER, UNLESS THE SOVIETS ALTERED THEIR BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. GENSCHER SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST USE SIMPLE FORMULAS SUCH AS THE "ZERO OPTION" FOR THE SAKE OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS DOUBTFUL THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A SOLUTION. HE THOUGHT THE U.S. DECISION ON MX BASING WOULD HARM THE EFFORT TO CARRY OUT THE NATO DECISION OF 1979, BUT REAFFIRMED THE SUPPORT OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE U.S. POSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOW AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER MET IN BONN OCTOBER 8 FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR. DCM AND EMBOFF ALSO PRESENT, ALONG WITH FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH. THE DISCUSSION DEALT MAINLY WITH ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, ALTHOUGH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT WERE ALSO

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 197-036/2 #25

By CTS, NARA, Date 4/26/01

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MENTIONED (SEPTTEL).

4. GENSCHER OPENED THE MEETING BY ASKING HOW ROSTOW SAW THE OVERALL ARMS CONTROL SITUATION. ROSTOW REPLIED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS THE U.S. WAS MAKING IN DEVELOPING ITS POSITIONS FOR THE COMING TNF NEGOTIATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT START TALKS. AFTER FOUR DAYS OF MEETINGS WITH OFFICIALS IN BONN, IT WAS CLEAR TO ROSTOW THAT THE SPD HAD INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES BUT ROSTOW THOUGHT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WOULD PREVAIL IN THIS INSTANCE AS IT HAD IN EVEN MORE CRITICAL TIMES IN THE PAST. ROSTOW SAID HE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR A TNF OR START AGREEMENT, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE APPROACHED SUCH NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PAST WITH A DIFFERENT AIM THAN THE U.S. THE ONE RECENT DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT LEAD THE SOVIETS TO SEEK A GENUINE ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT WAS POLAND. IT WAS CONCEIVABLE, SAID ROSTOW, THAT THE SOVIET NEED FOR A PERIOD OF STABILITY WITH THE WEST BECAUSE OF THE UNREST IN POLAND MIGHT INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD TNF/START.

5. IN ANY CASE, SAID ROSTOW, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE BETTER OFF AS A RESULT OF THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS: IF AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, THAT WAS GOOD; IF NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BECAUSE OF SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY THE FACT OF ITS INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON NEGOTIATING POSITION.

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE LIKELY TO EXPLOIT ANY DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS, AND WOULD LIKELY APPROACH THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS FROM A PROPAGANDA STANDPOINT. MR. ROSTOW POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR'S SELECTION OF A GERMAN EXPERT AS ITS TNF NEGOTIATOR CONFIRMED THIS.

7. GENSCHER SAID THE WEST MUST MAKE USE OF SIMPLE FORMULAS TO POPULARIZE ITS POSITIONS JUST AS THE SOVIETS DID. THE "ZERO SOLUTION" WAS ONE SUCH FORMULA. HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVING SUCH A RESULT, SAID GENSCHER, BUT THE CONCEPT IS USEFUL, AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE WEST. IT IS SO SIMPLE AND CLEAR THAT IT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD BY EVERYONE.

8. GENSCHER SAID THE WEST SHOULD ALSO BEGIN A COUNTER-PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SOVIETS CONCERNING THE SS-20 MISSILE. HE SAID THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD SHOULD BE DISABUSED OF THE BELIEF THAT THEY WERE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOMEHOW NOT INVOLVED IN THE LRTNF QUESTION. IT SHOULD  
BE FREQUENTLY POINTED OUT TO THE COUNTRIES OF NORTH  
AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA THAT THEY  
WERE WITHIN RANGE OF THE SS-20, AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO  
SOVIET BLACKMAIL. THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ASKED WHAT  
THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IN AN ANALOGOUS SITUATION IF THE  
U.S. WERE TO DEVELOP A MISSILE THAT WOULD NOT REACH  
THE SOVIET UNION, AND THEN DEPLOY THAT WEAPON AROUND  
VARIOUS PARTS OF THE USA.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE484  
UTS9225  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHDL #0194/02 2861927  
ZNY SSSSS/BBBBB ZZH  
O 131909Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0880  
INFO RUEHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1046  
RUEHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1368  
RUEHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5221  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
RUSNAAA/USEUCOM  
RUFRRSHH/USDNCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 20194  
EXDIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

~~REDACTED~~

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10. GENSCHER SAID HE WISHED ROSTOW TO KNOW THAT HE BELIEVED THE RECENT U.S. DECISION ON THE MX MISSILES WAS MISTAKEN AND WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS IN MOSCOW. HE BELIEVED THAT CHANGING THE CARTER DECISION ON THE MISSILE, WHATEVER GOOD REASONS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, WOULD PROVE TO BE UNWISE. TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT, HE SAID HE WISHED TO RELATE AN INCIDENT FROM HIS OWN POLITICAL PARTY EXPERIENCE. IN MAY 1981, AT THE FDP PARTY CONGRESS, 94 OF THE 400 DELEGATES VOTED AGAINST REAFFIRMATION OF THE NATO DECISION. OF THOSE 94, 75 OR 80 WOULD HAVE GONE ALONG WITH GENSCHER'S REQUEST FOR SUPPORT OF THE NATO DECISION IF GENSCHER HAD BEEN WILLING TO ADD ONE SENTENCE TO THE PARTY STATEMENT, TO WIT: "IT SHOULD BE EXAMINED WHETHER A SEA-BASED MODE FOR THE NATO LR TNF WEAPONS IS FEASIBLE." GENSCHER SAID HE REFUSED, BECAUSE EVEN SUCH A SEEMINGLY INNOCUOUS STATEMENT WOULD HAVE LED MANY CITIZENS TO ASK WHY WASN'T SUCH AN INVESTI-

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GATION DONE BEFORE THE DECISION? ONCE A DECISION IS TAKEN, SAID GENSCHER, IT MUST BE FIRMLY MAINTAINED.

11. HAVING RAISED THE TOPIC OF SLCMS HIMSELF, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ALLUDED AGAIN TO THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE DECISION. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE U.S. WOULD DEPLOY SOME NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILES ON US NAVY SHIPS WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS IN THE FRG FOR THE NATO DECISION. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE OPEN TALK IN THE U.S. ABOUT BASING MISSILES AT SEA WOULD CAUSE "REVIVAL" OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE SAME BASING MODE FOR THE NATO MISSILES.

12. MR. ROSTOW REPLIED THAT WHILE HE WAS AWARE THAT THE SET OF U.S. DECISIONS ON STRATEGIC FORCES MIGHT BE VIEWED IN SOME QUARTERS AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS, HE BELIEVED THAT INTERPRETATION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY MISTAKEN. ROSTOW SAID SECDEF WEINBERGER, WHOSE ABILITY HE RESPECTS HIGHLY, HAD APPROACHED THE DECISIONS WITH THE VIEW IN MIND THAT HE WAS MAKING CHOICES THAT WOULD DETERMINE U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE UNTIL THE 21ST CENTURY. OF UTMOST PRIORITY, HOWEVER, WAS THE NEED TO CLOSE THE "WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY." THAT MEANT OPTING FOR THE B-1 BOMBER, ALTHOUGH IT WAS VERY EXPENSIVE. (GENSCHER INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE B-1 DECISION.) IT ALSO MEANT PUTTING SLCMS ON SUBMARINES. ROSTOW SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE DECISION WOULD CAUSE SOME DIFFICULTIES IN EUROPE, BUT HE WISHED TO STRESS TO GENSCHER THAT THE DECISION WAS MADE IN ORDER TO ADD TO THE U.S. STRATEGIC RESERVE, THAT IT WAS NOT RELATED TO THE EUROMISSILE ISSUE.

13. ANOTHER IMPORTANT PART OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S THINKING CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC FORCE DECISION, SAID ROSTOW, IS THE NEED TO AVOID DECOUPLING OF THE U.S. FROM EUROPE. TO PREVENT DECOUPLING, THE U.S. MUST ENSURE THAT THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA DOES NOT LEAK. THE REASON FOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S ALARM IN 1977 WAS DOUBT WHETHER THE U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE. SUCH DOUBTS WERE SERIOUS IF THEY WERE HELD BY EUROPEANS, SAID ROSTOW. BUT THEY WOULD BE FAR MORE DANGEROUS IF THEY EMERGED IN MOSCOW. THUS, AS HE HAD NOTED EARLIER, EUROPEAN CONSIDERATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN THE U.S. WAS DECIDING ON MX DEPLOYMENT AND OTHER STRATEGIC FORCE QUESTIONS.

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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14. GENSCHER CLOSED THE TNF/STRATEGIC WEAPONS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION BY REPEATING THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY NOT CONVINCED THE U.S. HAD MADE THE CORRECT DECISION ON THE MX MISSILE. THAT DECISION WAS IMMEDIATELY RELEVANT TO HIS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY LIKELY TO AFFECT GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE 1979 NATO DECISION. NEVERTHELESS THE DECISION WAS MADE, AND NEITHER HE NOR ROSTOW WERE LIKELY TO CHANGE IT. IN ANY CASE, SAID GENSCHER, HE HAS STAKED HIS CAREER ON THE FRG'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE NATO DECISION. HE WILL STICK TO THAT, ALTHOUGH HE SUSPECTS THE SOVIETS WILL BE MAKING SOME VERY TEMPTING OFFERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN AN  
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SITUATION LISTING

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE486  
STU4634  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUHQDL #0194/03 2861930  
ZNY SSSSS/BBBRB ZZH  
O 131909Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0881  
INFO RUHQDU/NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1047  
RUHQMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1369  
RUHQJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 5222  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
RUSNAAA/USEUCOM  
RUFRSHH/USDONCSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 20194

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
EFFORT TO SPLIT THE ALLIANCE. BUT THE FRG WILL NOT FALL  
INTO THE SOVIET TRAP, HE ASSERTED. WE WILL CONTINUE  
"TO STAND WITH YOU," HE SAID, WHATEVER DISAGREEMENTS WE  
MAY HAVE ON LESSER DECISIONS. BURNS

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE510  
STU9752  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHNL #0063/01 2821716  
ZNY CCCCC Z7H  
U 091708Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BUNN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0821  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BUNN 20063  
EXDIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/8/11 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS: OVIP (POSTOW, E.V.) OTRA, PARM, NATU, GE  
SUBJ: ROSTOW CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT,  
OCTOBER 6

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ROSTOW REVIEWED WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT THE RATIONALE AND TIMING OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS PRESENT TRIP TO EUROPE WAS TO CONSULT THE ALLIES ON U.S. PLANS AND TO LEARN MORE ABOUT EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO THE PUBLIC ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. HE ASKED THE CHANCELLOR HOW THE U.S. COULD HELP THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN THIS AREA. IN REPLY SCHMIDT REITERATED HIS PLEAS FOR GREATER SENSITIVITY TO EUROPEAN AND ESPECIALLY GERMAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS. SCHMIDT WARNED AGAINST ANY EXPECTATIONS OF OBTAINING HIS APPROVAL FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THE ERW IN THE FRG FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. END SUMMARY
3. ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOW MET LATE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 6 FOR ONE HOUR AND A QUARTER WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR BURNS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR TO THE CHANCELLOR VON DER GABLENTZ, ROSTOW'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT LEHMAN AND ACTING CHIEF POLITICAL SECTION (NOTETAKER).
4. AFTER SCHMIDT WELCOMED HIS VISITORS, ROSTOW OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING GERMANY'S PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEMS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL AND LRINF ISSUES. HE ASKED THE CHANCELLOR: HOW CAN WE HELP.
5. CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT HE LIKED THIS QUESTION, AND NOTED THAT SO FAR THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN VERY

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NLS F97-030/2 #24  
BY CAJ NARA, DATE 4/26/01

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HELPFUL WITH THE FRG'S PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEMS; THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ACTIONS. HE CITED THE NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN VARIOUS WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (E.G., THE NETHERLANDS) NOTING WITH RELIEF THAT, SO FAR, ITALY HAD NOT YET BEEN AFFECTED, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF ITALY'S ABSORPTION WITH ITS OWN DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. SCHMIDT LAMENTED THE MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE FRG THAT THE U.S. SEEKS MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR, NOT AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES. HE COULD READILY UNDERSTAND THIS MISREADING IN THE LIGHT OF THE VARIOUS CONFUSING "NOISES" COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON WHICH ARE GIVEN EMPHASIS BY THE MEDIA.

6. SCHMIDT RECALLED WITH PLEASURE HIS MEETING LAST NOVEMBER WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN WHO CONVINCED HIM THAT THE U.S. SINCERELY WANTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. SCHMIDT RECALLED HOW, UPON HIS RETURN FROM WASHINGTON, HE TOLD THIS TO EVERYONE IN THE FRG, A MESSAGE WHICH WAS NOT EASY TO CONVEY BECAUSE OF OTHER CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS EMANATING AT THE SAME TIME FROM WASHINGTON. HE WAS THANKFUL THAT A DATE HAD NOW BEEN SET TO BEGIN THE LRTNF TALKS, ALTHOUGH, IN PASSING, HE HAD TO NOTE HIS DISTASTE FOR THE TERM "THEATER," HE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THE FRG MORE THAN JUST A "THEATER."

7. SCHMIDT THEN REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTS ON LRTNF TO DATE. DRAWING ON HINDSIGHT, HE RECALLED HOW DIFFICULT IT HAD BEEN IN 1977 TO CONVINCE THE USG THAT A PROBLEM WAS ARISING (FROM NEW SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS). HE WAS TOLD TO MIND HIS OWN BUSINESS AND FOCUS ON THE FRG'S PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT. HE BECAME ANNOYED AND DECIDED TO SPEAK OUT IN HIS NOW FAMOUS SPEECH IN LONDON IN 1977 TO THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS). IT REQUIRED MOST OF 197, HE SAID, BEFORE THE U.S. UNDERSTOOD THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT THE NEW SOVIET THREAT. AT THE SUMMIT MEETING INVOLVING PM CALLAGHAN, GISCARD AND SCHMIDT HIMSELF THE U.S. PROPOSED THE IDEA OF PUTTING NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE. THIS REPRESENTED THE BIRTH OF THE 1979 NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION.

8. SCHMIDT THEN REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION TO STICK TO THIS DECISION, RECALLING THE TOUGH FIGHT HE HAD AT THE SPD BERLIN MEETING JUST PRIOR TO THE 1979 NATO DECISION WHEN HE HAD FOUGHT FOR AND WON SPD SUPPORT BY FOUR TO ONE IN FAVOR OF THE DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION.

9. THEN CAME AFGHANISTAN, NOTED SCHMIDT, WHEN PRESIDENT

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CARTER DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHAT TO DO. HE DID CUT  
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND THEN HIT ON THE  
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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE511  
UTS7248  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHOL #0063/02 2821718  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 20063  
EXDIS

OLYMPIC BOYCOTT IDEA, AFTER THE FRG HAD BEEN TOLD REPEATEDLY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO BOYCOTT. THE FRG, SCHMIDT NOTED SARCASTICALLY JOINED THE "WORLD POWERS," MONACO AND NORWAY IN WHAT WAS INTENDED AS AN ACT OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. THIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. PERMITTED HIM TO OBTAIN IN MOSCOW IN THE SUMMER OF 1980 A SOVIET CLEAR-CUT INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE LRTNF. THEN, CONTINUING HIS HISTORICAL REVIEW, SCHMIDT NOTED THE U.S. ELECTED A NEW PRESIDENT IN THE FALL OF 1980, WHO SAID HE HAD A NEW SET OF PRIORITIES, WHICH FOCUSED ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC SITUATION. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT DECISION AND APPROVED IT, BUT IT CAUSED HIM PROBLEMS.

10. SCHMIDT THEN EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ON RECORD PUBLICLY TO RESIGN IF LRTNF NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT STARTED AND CONTINUE WITH A SERIOUS CHANCE OF RESULTS. COMPLETING HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE HISTORY OF THIS ISSUE, SCHMIDT NOTED THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC OPPOSITION (E.G., CHURCH GROUPS AND COMMUNIST-INFILTRATED ORGANIZATIONS) TO THE LRTNF DECISION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG COULD MAKE LIFE MORE DIFFICULT OR EASIER; SO FAR, THE USG HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL, HE REITERATED.

11. INSISTING THAT NO NOTES BE TAKEN AT THIS POINT SCHMIDT THEN PROCEEDED TO CRITICIZE A HIGH USG OFFICIAL FOR HIS INDISCREET REMARKS SOME TEN DAYS AGO WHEN THIS OFFICIAL SPECULATED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN THE FRG GOVERNMENT. CORRECTLY, SCHMIDT NOTED WITH SOME SATISFACTION, THIS US OFFICIAL HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION IN GERMANY WOULD BE EVEN WORSE. SCHMIDT ALSO SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH AT THIS

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

STAGE OF THE CONVERSATION ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY OF A COUNTRY SUCH AS THE FRG, THE SIZE OF OREGON (WHERE THERE WERE NO NUCLEAR MISSILES OR TARGETS), WITH A POPULATION OF 63 MILLION, LIVING SO CLOSE TO THE SOVIET THREAT.

12. PERMITTING NOTE-TAKING TO RESUME, THE CHANCELLOR NEXT DESCRIBED THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO FRIGHTEN AND INTIMIDATE THE GERMAN PEOPLE, AND PLEADED THAT THE U.S. NOT ALSO ADD TO THEIR FEAR. IN THIS CONNECTION HE EMPHASIZED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FRG AND FRANCE AND THE U.K. MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT SOVIET INTIMIDATION DID NOT APPLY TO THE LATTER TWO POWERS BECAUSE BOTH ARE NUCLEAR POWERS. PUBLIC OPINION IN NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES HAS TO RELY ON THE PROTECTION OF OTHERS, HE SAID. HE THEN STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES WOULD NOT BE FIRED AGAINST THE GERMANS, BUT WOULD BE USED -- AS THEY ARE NOW -- SUBLIMINALLY, TO EXERT SUBTLE POLITICAL BLACKMAIL. THIS THREAT EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE U.S. TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

13. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO SUCCEED, IF IT CAN, BUT SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE ACTIONS OF BOTH SIDES. IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S QUESTION ABOUT THE TIMETABLE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS ROSTOW SAID THE ONLY CONDITION FOR THE OPENING OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS WAS AN INTELLECTUAL ONE: I.E. TO REASSESS THE THEORY OF SALT AND TO WORK OUT AN APPROACH COMPATIBLE WITH THE NEW REALITIES. WE WOULD SEEK AN AGREEMENT WHICH PERMITTED EACH SIDE TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE BUT PREVENTED THE SOVIETS FROM USING THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENAL AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COERCION AND BLACKMAIL. ROSTOW THEN DESCRIBED BRIEFLY THE PLACE AND ROLE OF HIS AGENCY, ACDA IN THE USG ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, REMINDED SCHMIDT OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS TO BEGIN THE LRTNF TALKS ON NOVEMBER 30, AND NOTED THE U.S. PLANS TO RESUME THE SALT (OR START) TALKS EARLY IN 1982.

14. ROSTOW CONTINUED THAT OUR BASIC GOAL WAS A SIMPLE, CLEAR AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD AGREEMENT, WITH ARMS REDUCED TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVELS. WILL THE SOVIETS AGREE TO U.S. PROPOSALS? WE DO NOT KNOW, BUT WE MUST TRY TO ACHIEVE SUCH AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION ROSTOW CITED THE POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE THE SITUATION IN POLAND COULD PLAY IN BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. ROSTOW EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT THE U.S. AND FRG COULD CONSOLIDATE THEIR ARMS  
CONTROL POSITIONS. HE NOTED THAT ONE PURPOSE OF HIS  
VISIT TO GERMANY AT THIS TIME WAS TO PURSUE CONSULTATIONS  
AND COMMUNICATION. HIS SPEECH THAT EVENING, AND HIS  
INTERVIEWS WITH THE MEDIA WERE INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE  
TO THIS PROCESS, AND TO BE HELPFUL.

15. ROSTOW NOTED THAT THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WITH  
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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE512  
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DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #0063/03 2821720  
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O 091708Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0823  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 20063

EXDIS

THE SOVIETS ACTUALLY BEGAN IN AUGUST WHEN HE HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY DCM IN WASHINGTON WHICH FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. ROSTOW EMPHASIZED THAT THE MX PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC ARMS DECISIONS WAS TAKEN WITH EUROPEAN CONCERNS IN THE FOREGROUND. SCHMIDT SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THIS WAS THE CASE AND APPRECIATED IT. ROSTOW COMMENTED THAT SOME PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON BELIEVED THAT LAND BASED MISSILES COULD NOT BE MADE INVULNERABLE AND THAT, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL NUMBERS OF SOVIET MISSILES, LAND-BASED MISSILES ARE OBSOLETE.

16. THE CHANCELLOR INTERVENED FORCEFULLY TO NOTE THAT, IF WEINBERGER MAKES SUCH AN OBSERVATION PUBLICLY, HE MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPACT IN GERMANY: THERE WILL SIMPLY BE NO PERSHING II MISSILES OR GLCM'S INSTALLED ON EUROPEAN SOIL. "THERE MUST BE NO NONSENSE ABOUT THIS," SCHMIDT EMPHASIZED. IF THIS OCCURS, HE PROMISED HE WOULD SEND THE USG A PRIVATE TELEGRAM WITH HIS REACTIONS WHICH HE WOULD MAKE PUBLIC THE FOLLOWING DAY. ROSTOW SAID THAT THIS IS UNDERSTOOD.

17. SCHMIDT THEN URGED THAT, FOR THE PROGRAM OF LRTNF MODERNIZATION TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN EUROPE, THE U.S. MUST STICK TO THE ORIGINAL DECISION, I.E., ABOUT NUMBERS AND SITES FOR NEW MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS. IN RESPONSE TO ROSTOW'S ASSURANCE OF NO PLANS TO ALTER THE DECISIONS, SCHMIDT EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT THE U.S. MILITARY MIGHT, NEVERTHELESS, TRY TO RAISE THE NUMBERS.

18. IN RESPONSE TO LEHMAN'S ASSURANCES THAT THERE NOW EXISTS IN WASHINGTON GREAT SENSITIVITY TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF THE DEPLOYMENT QUESTION, SCHMIDT SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR IT, BUT HE REMAINED SKEPTICAL,

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GIVEN THE WASHINGTON RECORD OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1981.

19. SCHMIDT THEN MENTIONED THE 6,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS CURRENTLY IN EUROPE, ASKING IF IT WAS SO FUTILE TO THINK OF A REDUCTION OF THIS NUMBER. WHEN ROSTOW REMINDED HIM THAT 1,000 HAD BEEN REMOVED, SCHMIDT REGRETTED THAT MORE FAVORABLE PROPAGANDA HAD NOT BEEN MADE OF THIS ACTION. HE REVERTED TO HIS EARLIER THEME, LAMENTING THAT THE U.S. DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGY IN EUROPE OF SUCH AN ACTION. ROSTOW NOTED THE DOUBLE STANDARD APPLIED BY THE MEDIA IN SUCH INSTANCES AND RECALLED FOR SCHMIDT HIS EXPERIENCES AND FRUSTRATIONS IN TRYING TO EXPOSE AND HIGHLIGHT THE USE OF SOVIET GAS IN YEMEN IN 1967.

20. INSISTING AGAIN THAT NO NOTES BE TAKEN AT THIS POINT SCHMIDT SHARED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE CURRENT SOVIET SITUATION. NOTING THAT BREZHNEV WOULD BE IN BONN IN NOVEMBER SCHMIDT COMMENTED ON THE GREAT UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SUCCESSION OF THIS REALLY QUITE SICK LEADER, A MAN WHO COULD NOW WORK ONLY SIX OR SEVEN HOURS A DAY WITH A THREE-HOUR BREAK IN THE MIDDLE REQUIRED. SCHMIDT RECALLED THEIR CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW IN 1980 AND THEIR JOINT COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING A KIND OF GENERAL BALANCE OF FORCES, WITHOUT AGREEING SPECIFICALLY ON NUMBERS. WHEN HE SAW BREZHNEV IN NOVEMBER SCHMIDT SAID HE WOULD TELL HIM THAT HE HAD CHEATED ON THAT AGREEMENT. HE ALSO WOULD WARN BREZHNEV TO STOP SOVIET EFFORTS TO TOPPLE THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT.

21. SCHMIDT WAS CRITICAL OF THE RECENT DOD PUBLICATION "SOVIET MILITARY POWER" WHICH SIMPLY DID NOT MEET THE NEEDS OF SOPHISTICATED (HE SAID THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE DOZEN IN GERMANY) EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS AND OTHER INFORMED OBSERVERS WHOSE GREAT NEED WAS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES. THE ANNUAL IISS PUBLICATION "THE MILITARY BALANCE" WAS MORE USEFUL AND SCHMIDT QUOTED FROM THE LATEST VERSION.

22. SCHMIDT THEN REVERTED TO THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. ROSTOW REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF "NATIONAL MEANS," BUT ALSO NOTED THEIR LIMITATIONS: FOR EXAMPLE, THEY COULD NOT DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON A GIVEN MISSILE, OR MEASURE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PRECISELY PRODUCTION RATES. THE U.S. HAS TOLD THE  
SOVIETS THAT SUCH MEASURES WILL HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED  
BY "COOPERATIVE MEASURES."

23. SCHMIDT INTERVENED FORCEFULLY THAT HE DID NOT  
WANT SOVIET INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE FRG. ROSTOW

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE513  
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DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #0063/04 2821722  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
D 091708Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0824  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 20063  
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SAID HE TOOK NOTE OF THIS AND THOUGHT THERE WAS NOT MUCH DANGER OF IT. SCHMIDT OBSERVED THAT HE WAS MOST WORRIED ABOUT SOVIET LAUNCHERS. THERE WILL BE NO SECOND ROUND IN A NUCLEAR WAR, SO RE-LOAD CAPACITY DID NOT SEEM IMPORTANT. SCHMIDT SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS, THEIR MOBILITY AND RELATIVE INVULNERABILITY AND MULTIPLE WARHEADS ALSO WORRIED HIM. HE WARNED ROSTOW NOT TO RAISE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO TOO HIGH A LEVEL.

24. TURNING TO ERW AS THE CONVERSATION CONCLUDED -- AND URGING THAT PRECISE NOTES BE TAKEN ON WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO SAY -- SCHMIDT URGED THE USG NOT TO COMPLICATE THE SITUATION BY TALKING TOO MUCH ABOUT THIS WEAPON. HIS JUDGMENT WAS THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN HIS AGREEMENT FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS FOR DEPLOYING ERW IN THE FRG. "DON'T OVERLOAD THE CARRIAGE," HE WARNED, AS ILLUSTRATION OF A SENSITIVE AND SENSIBLE APPROACH, SCHMIDT RECALLED THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITION LINE FROM THE BALTIC TO BAVARIA TO PROTECT AGAINST INVASION FROM THE EAST. HE RECALLED HOW WELL THEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD UNDERSTOOD GERMAN CONCERNS AND CALLED OFF THE WHOLE IDEA. SCHMIDT CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT THERE IS A REAL FEAR IN GERMANY THAT DEPLOYING THE ERW WOULD LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD.

25. ROSTOW'S COMMENT: THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE SHORTLY AFTER WORD OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT SADAT REACHED BONN AND THE CHANCELLOR APPEARED DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THIS PIECE OF BAD NEWS. HE ALSO CAME DIRECTLY

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO THE CONVERSATION FROM THE WEEKLY MEETING OF THE SPD BUNDESTAG CAUCUS WHICH WAS PREOCCUPIED BY PLANS FOR THE OCTOBER 9 BUNDESTAG DEBATE SCHEDULED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE OCTOBER 10 LARGE PEACE DEMONSTRATION IN BONN WHICH HAS HAD SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE EFFECTS ON SCHMIDT'S PARTY. NONETHELESS, HE WAS NOT IN A HAMLET MOOD, BUT VIGOROUS, COLORFUL AND CATEGORICAL IN HIS BEST STYLE, EVEN THE GRUMBLING WAS NO MORE THAN SPORT. HE COMMENDED HIS TWO BOOKS ON DEFENSE POLICY TO ROSTOW, SAYING THAT IF ROSTOW READ THEM HE WOULD SEE THAT HE (SCHMIDT) WAS STUBBORN AND CONSISTENT IN HIS VIEWS. WHAT CAME OUT OVER AND OVER AGAIN WAS SCHMIDT'S FLAT COMMITMENT TO THE DOUBLE TRACK DECISION WITHOUT ANY MODIFICATION WHATEVER. HE SENT ROSTOW OFF WITH A CHEERFUL "GOD. BLESS YOU."

26. ROSTOW HAS APPROVED THIS MESSAGE. BURNS

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DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE847  
UTS4558  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUEHDL #9851/02 2801656  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 077369Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN ((MSG UN SVC FOR DTG))  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0750  
INFO RUEHFG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1369  
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0107  
RUEHJJ/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1075  
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0828  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1740  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 19851

EXDIS

TO A QUESTION ABOUT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S STATEMENTS  
IN DOHA (REF A) CONCERNING THE SAUDI ARABIAN PEACE PRINCIPLES,  
[REDACTED] NOTED THESE POSITIVE ELEMENTS:

- IMPLIED RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST,
- EXPRESSION OF A DESIRE FOR PEACE AND WILLINGNESS TO  
FOREGO THE MILITARY OPTION, AND
- INTEREST IN A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

[REDACTED] AGREED ABOUT SUCH "NEGATIVE ELEMENTS" AS ABNEGATION  
OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVED THE  
FAHD PROPOSALS COULD BE USED FOR "TACTICAL REASONS" TO  
ENCOURAGE THOSE MODERATE ARABS WHO ARE WILLING TO RECOGNIZE  
ISRAEL AND WORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO CONTINUE THEIR  
EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION.

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7. COMMENT

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[REDACTED] REMARKS REFLECT A GENERAL WORRY WE HAVE HEARD  
FOR SOME TIME HERE THAT THE U.S. IS NOT PUSHING HARD  
ENOUGH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.  
THERE IS A NEW TWIST IN THAT OUR PERCEIVED NEGLECT IS  
SEEN NOT ONLY AS A FAILURE TO PUSH THE ISRAELIS HARD ENOUGH  
BUT ALSO AS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA-  
TION TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE SOVIET THREAT RATHER THAN TO  
A CRUCIAL REGIONAL ISSUE, THE VERY RESOLUTION OF WHICH  
WOULD HELP US VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS BY DENYING THEM ONE  
MORE AREA TO MAKE MISCHIEF.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 197-030/2 #25

2/15/01, HANA, Date 7/26/01

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT SAID, WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT [REDACTED] REPRESENTATION  
STEMS FROM GENUINE CONCERN FOR MUTUAL U.S. AND FRG INTERESTS  
IN THE AREA AND A DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL, FOR EXAMPLE IN  
PROVIDING US REPORTS OF MODERATE ARAB REACTIONS TO OUR  
POLICY.

-

-

8. THE REFTELS WERE EXTREMELY USEFUL. WE HOPE THROUGH  
A CONTINUING SUPPLY OF SUCH BRIEFING POINTS (E.G.,  
FOLLOWING VISITS BY FAHD AND HUSSEIN TO WASHINGTON)  
TO KEEP [REDACTED] UP ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH KEY ARAB LEADERS.  
[REDACTED] BELONGS TO THE EC WORKING GROUP ON THE MIDDLE EAST  
AND HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN THE PAST TWO YEARS IN ALERTING US  
TO KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT FORUM. BURNS

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE846  
STU3967  
RR RUFHC  
DE RUFHQL #9851/01 2801650  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 071648Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0749  
INFO RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1368  
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0106  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1074  
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0827  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1739  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 19851

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10-06-1991 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, US, XF, GE

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST: FOREIGN OFFICE CONCERNS ABOUT U.S.  
POLICY EMPHASIS

REFS: (A) DOHA 1363

(R) STATE 244387

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN OFFICE

ON OCTOBER 5 INVITED IN AN EMBASSY OFFICER FOR "CONFIRMATION" OF HIS "INTERPRETATION" OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. VOICING CONCERN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE REACTION OF MODERATE ARABS TO THE EXAGGERATED TALK OF US-ISRAELI STRATEGIC COOPERATION (HE SHOWED US A RECENT CABLE FROM THE FRG EMBASSY IN RABAT AS AN EXAMPLE), EMPHASIZED THE FRG VIEW THAT THE U.S. MUST GIVE RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT "EQUAL PRIORITY" WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS. IF MODERATE ARABS COME TO BELIEVE WE ARE NOT THAT INTERESTED IN A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE, OR IF WE APPEAR TO BE PLAYING UP TO ISRAEL OUT OF STRATEGIC CONCERNS, THEN THE U.S. ITSELF WILL PREPARE THE WAY FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE INTO THE AREA, TO PARAPHRASE A MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL'S REMARK TO THE FRG EMBASSY. ONE WAY OF KEEPING MODERATE ARABS ON OUR SIDE, NOTED, WOULD BE TO EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SAUDI PRINCE FAHD'S

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NLS F97-030/2 #24  
By OLS, Date 4/26/01

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PEACE PROPOSALS. [REDACTED] SAID THIS HAD BEEN THE INTENT OF GENSCHER'S REMARKS IN DUHA (REF A) WHICH [REDACTED] HAD DRAFTED. END SUMMARY.

3. SOVIET THREAT VERSUS ISRAELI QUESTION

RECALLING THE PRESENTATION BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NATO EXPERTS MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON SEPTEMBER 22, [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT HE "INTERPRETS" OUR POLICY AS GOING BEYOND STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ALONE. IT SEEMS TO CENTER ON AN EFFORT TO BUILD THROUGH BILATERAL COOPERATION A SECURITY SYSTEM COMPRISING EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA (AWACS), OMAN, SOMALIA, TURKEY, AND PAKISTAN IN A BROAD REGIONAL APPROACH. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, OUR DISCUSSION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION AS ONLY ONE, ALBEIT INTEGRAL, PART OF THAT APPROACH IS VIEWED BY SOME ARABS AS DOWNPLAYING THAT ISSUE. [REDACTED] REMARKED THAT THIS COMBINED WITH THE EXAGGERATED PRESS INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR DESIRE TO ENTER INTO STRATEGIC COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL IS HAVING A VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT AMONG MODERATE ARABS. IF ON TOP OF THIS, THE AWACS DEAL, WHICH [REDACTED] RECOGNIZED AS CHIEFLY OF SYMBOLIC NATURE, FALLS THROUGH, THEN THE U.S. POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD WILL BE SET BACK CONSIDERABLY.

4. [REDACTED] EMPHASIZED THAT MANY ARAB NATIONS FEAR SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS AS MUCH AS WE DO. BUT SO LONG AS THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE CONTINUES, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE LEVERAGE WITH THE ARABS, EVEN IN COUNTRIES LIKE SAUDI ARABIA. THUS, [REDACTED] ARGUED, TO FURTHER OUR OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING SOVIET INFLUENCE, WE MUST WORK TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE IN PARALLEL WITH EFFORTS TO ADDRESS OTHER ARAB SECURITY CONCERNS. A SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, IN [REDACTED] VIEW, WOULD BE THE "BEST FIRST STEP" WE COULD TAKE TOWARD BUILDING AN ANTI-SOVIET SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE AREA.

5. RESPONDING, WE REHEARSED THE BASIC POINTS IN REF B AND FURNISHED HIM A COPY OF PM DIRECTOR BULTIMS MARCH 23 STATEMENT CONCERNING U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF. PROFESSING TO BE REASSURED, [REDACTED] NEVERTHELESS REITERATED HIS POINT ABOUT THE NEED TO AVOID APPEARING TO DOWNPLAY THE PEACE PROCESS IN OUR DISCUSSION

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF THE LARGER SECURITY FACTORS.

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6. FRG SEEKS TO REASSURE MODERATE ARABS

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE485  
STU7866  
UN RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #0255 2731609  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 301608Z SFP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0550  
RUESTF/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 0134  
RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0164  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 19255  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09-30-2001 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, HN, NU, GE  
SUBJECT: URGENT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION BY FOREIGN OFFICE  
- ON HONDURAN MANEUVERS AND NICARAGUAN POLITICAL  
- SITUATION  
-  
-

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AMERICA HAS URGENTLY REQUESTED OF US INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT JOINT HONDURAN-U.S.-VENEZUELAN MILITARY MANEUVERS HE HAS SEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS, AS WELL AS ON THE STATE OF HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS. THE REASON, HE SAID, IS THAT IF THESE MANEUVERS ARE NOT ROUTINE, BUT REFLECT HEIGHTENED TENSION IN THE AREA, HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER CANCEL HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS FOLLOWING THE CANCUN SUMMIT.
3. THE OFFICE DIRECTOR SAYS FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IS PUSHING HARD FOR INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT. POINTS THE OFFICE DIRECTOR SAYS HE URGENTLY NEEDS INFORMATION ON:  
-- ARE MANEUVERS INDEED GOING ON IN HONDURAS NEAR THE BORDER WITH NICARAGUA?  
.  
-- ARE OTHER THAN HONDURAN TROOPS PARTICIPATING? SPECIFICALLY, ARE U.S. TROOPS PARTICIPATING?  
.  
-- ARE THESE MANEUVERS, IF THEY ARE BEING HELD, MERELY ROUTINE, OR DO THEY REFLECT HEIGHTENED TENSION BETWEEN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA?

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NLS F97-030/2 #27  
BY GAS NARA, DATE 4/26/01

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. FINALLY, THE OFFICE DIRECTOR SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA IN TERMS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT HAD DETERIORATED "DRAMATICALLY" IN RECENT WEEKS, AND THAT THE SANDINISTAS' BACKS WERE TO THE WALL. WHILE GENSCHER FEELS IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO GO TO NICARAGUA TO LECTURE THE GOVERNMENT ON THE NEED TO Mend ITS WAYS, HE DOES NOT WANT TO ARRIVE IN THE MIDDLE OF A CRISIS SITUATION. THE OFFICE DIRECTOR WOULD THEREFORE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN NICARAGUA.

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5. ACTION REQUESTED: THE OFFICE DIRECTOR IS ONE OF OUR BEST CONTACTS AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE. HE IS OUR MAIN POINT OF CONTACT ON EL SALVADOR, AND OUR STAUCHEST SUPPORTER ON THAT ISSUE. WE THEREFORE HOPE ADDRESSEES CAN HELP US BE RESPONSIVE TO HIS REQUEST. BURNS

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE456  
STU9893  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHNL #8264/01 2601625  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
U 171620Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0246  
BT  
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 18264  
E.O. 12065 N/A  
TAGS: EGEN, ENSD, GE  
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM WILLY BRANDT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN  
- ON CANCUN SUMMIT  
BELOW IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT  
REAGAN FROM WILLY BRANDT, CHAIRMAN OF THE INDEPENDENT  
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES (ICIDI).  
LETTER IS ALSO SIGNED BY SHRIDATH RAMPHAL. ORIGINAL IS  
BEING POUCHED TO THE DEPARTMENT.  
BEGIN TEXT:  
-

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

WE WRITE TO YOU IN OUR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, BUT  
ALSO AS PERSONS FROM THE NORTH AND SOUTH RESPECTIVELY WHO,  
THROUGH THE WORK OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTER-  
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, BELIEVE PROFOUNDLY THAT NORTH-  
SOUTH ISSUES DEMAND FROM OUR GLOBAL SOCIETY A PROGRAMME  
OF URGENT, CONCERTED AND SUSTAINED ACTION. THAT EXPERIENCE  
CONVINCES US ALSO THAT THE CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS OF  
NORTH AND SOUTH AND THEIR FUSION WITH THE MANDATES OF MORAL  
PURPOSE ARE REAL ENOUGH TO ENCOURAGE HOPE FOR CONSENSUS  
ON SUCH A PROGRAMME.

WE FEEL, THEREFORE, THAT WHILE THE CANCUN SUMMIT  
CONFRONTS ISSUES OF CONSIDERABLE GRAVITY, IT CAN DO SO  
WITHOUT A SENSE OF HOPELESSNESS. THE VERY FACT OF THE  
MEETING ENCOURAGES HOPE. IT IS THE FIRST OCCASION IN  
HISTORY WHEN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF SO LARGE A PART  
OF HUMAN SOCIETY MEETS TO JOINTLY CONFRONT THE DANGERS  
FACING MANKIND. AND THESE DANGERS ARE REAL. THE CON-  
JUNCTURE OF A MAJOR WORLD ECONOMIC RECESSION WITH BOTH  
PERSISTENT NORTH-SOUTH FAILURES AND HEIGHTENED EAST-WEST  
TENSIONS IN THESE EARLY YEARS OF THE 80S HIGHLIGHTS  
SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN OUR INTERNATIONALISM; DEFICIENCIES  
IN THE AREAS OF PERCEPTION, OF IDEAS, OF INSTITUTIONS

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND, NOT LEAST, OF POLITICAL WILL. NO ONE IS BLAMELESS; BUT ALL ARE ENDANGERED. THE CANCUN SUMMIT PROVIDES A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRECISELY THE KIND OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE BY WHICH A NEW START CAN BE INSPIRED.

IN THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION WE TRIED TO CONVEY THE SITUATION OF CRISIS THREATENING OUR HUMAN SOCIETY: THE DESPERATE PLIGHT OF HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF THE WORLD'S POOREST PEOPLE, THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY THAT DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE INDUCING, THE WAY IN WHICH THE FATE OF THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED, THE DEGREE TO WHICH EAST-WEST TENSIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH FAILURES ARE INTERACTING UPON AND REINFORCING EACH OTHER, THE UNRAVELLING PROCESS THAT IS AT WORK IN MANY AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, THE THREAT TO EVEN THOSE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON WHICH MAN'S HOPES HAVE CENTRED IN THE POST-WAR ERA. WE DO NOT SEEK TO TRAVERSE THAT GROUND HERE. SUFFICE IT TO RECALL THAT THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT AT THE BEGINNING

OF THE 80S THE WORLD COMMUNITY FACES MUCH GREATER DANGERS THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

WE COMPLETED OUR REPORT AT THE END OF 1979. SINCE THEN THOSE DANGERS HAVE GROWN IN THEIR MAGNITUDE AND IN THEIR GRAVITY. THEY NOW CONFRONT ALL COUNTRIES AND, THEREFORE, ALL GOVERNMENTS. BUT THEY COME INTO SHARPEST FOCUS IN THE LIVES OF PEOPLE THE WORLD OVER: IN THE CONTINUING PROSPECT OF STARVATION, DISEASE AND EARLY DEATH THAT FACES THOSE OF THE POOREST COUNTRIES; IN THE JOLT TO SUSTAINED PROSPERITY FOR MANY IN EVEN THE RICHEST COUNTRIES; AND IN THE IMPAIRMENT FOR ALL OF FAITH AND HOPE IN THE FUTURE THEIR CHILDREN WILL INHERIT.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE SEEK TO PUT BEFORE YOU SOME SUGGESTIONS ON POSSIBLE GOALS FOR CANCUN AND ON THE WAYS BY WHICH, AS PARTICIPANTS, YOU MIGHT TOGETHER ATTAIN THEM. IF THEY APPEAR TO BE MODEST IT IS BECAUSE WE REPOSE OUR GREATEST FAITH IN COMMENCING A GENUINE ADVANCE TO CONSENSUS THROUGH A MUTUALLY REINFORCING ACT OF POLITICAL WILL ON THE PART OF THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH; AND BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT WITHOUT THAT NOTHING IS ATTAINABLE.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE AMONG THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE457

STU9898

DN RUFHC

DE RUFHOL #8264/02 2601627

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

U 171620Z SEP 81

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0247

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 18264

CANCUN SUMMIT, AND WE COMMEND THEM TO YOU:

1. TO ENABLE THE GLOBAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMENCE:

THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1980 CAME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GLOBAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHOULD HAVE COMMENCED EARLY IN 1981. SINCE THEN MUCH EFFORT HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO CLEARING THE REMAINING PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, BUT AGREEMENT REMAINS DEFERRED. THE GLOBAL ROUND UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COULD AND SHOULD BE THE PROCESS BY WHICH NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES ARE NEGOTIATED AND RESOLVED IN TERMS OF THE BROAD OBJECTIVES ALREADY AGREED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IF ALL PARTICIPANTS AT CANCUN WERE TO AGREE TO USE THEIR BEST ENDEAVOURS

TO ENSURE THAT THE GLOBAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCES EARLY IN 1982, A SIGNIFICANT STEP WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TOWARDS IMPROVING THE CLIMATE AND PROVIDING THE MEANS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT.

2. TO RECOGNISE THE NEED FOR EMERGENCY ACTION IN CRITICAL AREAS:

THE GLOBAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL COVER A WIDE FIELD AND COULD BE A PROTRACTED PROCESS. MEANWHILE, THE WORLD ECONOMY AS A WHOLE AND MANY COUNTRIES - PARTICULARLY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY, IN THE SOUTH - FACE SITUATIONS OF ACUTE CRISIS. THE RESULTING EMERGENCY REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT RESPONSE. IN THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION WE OUTLINED AN EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR THE PERIOD 1980-85 IN CERTAIN CRITICAL AREAS,  
NAMELY:

- (A) A GLOBAL FOOD PROGRAMME TO STIMULATE  
WORLD FOOD PRODUCTION AND TO BEGIN TO  
ABOLISH WORLD HUNGER;
- (B) A GLOBAL ENERGY STRATEGY TO ACCOMMODATE  
THE NEED FOR SECURITY OF BOTH PRODUCERS  
AND CONSUMERS;
- (C) ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL FLOWS TO ENSURE THE  
STABILITY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES STRAINED  
BY PERSISTING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS  
DEFICITS AND MOUNTING DEBTS;
- (D) REFORMS TO ACHIEVE BROADER PARTICIPATION  
IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
AND MORE BALANCED CONDITIONS FOR WORLD  
TRADE.

THE OVERALL DETERIORATION THAT HAS OCCURRED IN  
THESE AREAS SINCE OUR REPORT APPEARED CONFIRMS  
THE CASE FOR PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE ACTION, AND  
THE TIME THAT HAS PASSED UNDERLINES THE DANGER OF  
FURTHER POSTPONEMENT. WE DO NOT IMPLY THAT OURS  
ARE THE ONLY APPROACHES, BUT WE DO URGE UPON YOU

THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO COME TO  
GRIPS QUICKLY WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION THAT EXISTS.  
WHILE THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED, IT WOULD BE  
WHOLLY IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE CANCUN  
MEETING FOR THE PARTICIPANTS TO ALERT THE INTER-  
NATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION  
IN THESE PARTICULAR AREAS. WE HOPE, INDEED, THAT  
YOU WOULD BE READY YOURSELVES TO STIMULATE AN  
EXAMINATION OF THE FORMS THAT SUCH A RESPONSE MIGHT  
TAKE - THE IDENTIFICATION OF A PROGRAMME OF EMER-  
GENCY MEASURES NEEDED TO RESCUE THE WORLD ECONOMY  
AND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE FROM THE CRITICAL  
DANGERS NOW CONFRONTING IT AND THEM.

3. TO ENLARGE THE PROSPECTS FOR CONSENSUS ON  
NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES:

CLEARLY, HOWEVER, AFTER NEARLY EIGHT YEARS OF AN  
INTENSIVE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE THAT YIELDED ONLY  
MARGINAL CONSENSUS, AND IN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC  
TURMOIL AND ACCOMPANYING DISTRESS, SOMETHING MORE  
IS NEEDED THAN AGREEMENT TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS.  
THE PARTIES TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MUST ENTER THEM

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE458  
UTS3488  
UN RUEHC  
DE RUEHNL #8264/03 2601628  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
U 171620Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0248  
BT

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 18264

IN THIS CONTEXT, WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT LEADERS AT CANCUN SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE IN THEIR COMMITMENT A PLEDGE THAT THEIR NEGOTIATORS WILL WORK ASSIDUOUSLY FOR AGREEMENT ON PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN THE AREAS UNDER NEGOTIATION - ESCHEWING RIGID POSITIONS ON ALL SIDES AND PROMOTING A NEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. THE MOST PROMISING ADVANCES MADE AT CANCUN WILL ONLY BE SUSTAINED IF THE POLITICAL WILL THAT MAKES THEM POSSIBLE IS CARRIED OVER INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF.

WE URGE AS WELL THAT IT WOULD BE OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE IN ENLARGING SUCCESS IN NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS IF LEADERS AT CANCUN WERE TO AGREE TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, TO DEVELOP A CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE IMPORTANCE TO ALL COUNTRIES, NORTH AND SOUTH ALIKE, OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. NORTH-SOUTH CONSENSUS WILL COME MORE EASILY IF ENCOURAGED BY THE PEOPLE OF ALL SOCIETIES; INDEED, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT THEIR SUPPORT.

4. TO PRESERVE THE POTENTIAL OF CANCUN:  
PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF A SUCCESSFUL BEGINNING AT CANCUN WE URGE ON YOU THAT, AT LEAST DURING THE PERIOD OF GREAT DANGER THROUGH WHICH THE WORLD IS NOW PASSING, THE POTENTIAL OF CANCUN FOR CONTRIBUTING TO HUMAN PROGRESS IS NOT LOST. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT YOU CAN HELP THE PROCESS OF NORTH SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES THAT YOU SHOULD, TO THIS END, WE HOPE YOU WILL KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING AGAIN - TOGETHER, AND WITH SUCH

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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OTHERS AS MAY BE AGREED - TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AS THEY DEVELOP IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR COMMITMENTS AT CANUN, AND TO EXAMINE THE WAYS IN WHICH YOU MIGHT FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT.

CANCUN IS IN ONE SENSE AN OCCASION OF LAST RESORT IN THE FACE OF SERIOUS FAILURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE. HOWEVER, IT ARISES NOT MERELY OUT OF DESPERATION, BUT ALSO OUT OF AN AWARENESS OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH ALL PARTS OF OUR HUMAN SOCIETY DEPEND UPON EACH OTHER AND, THEREFORE, NEED TO AGREE WITH EACH OTHER ON THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A TOLERABLE EXISTENCE FOR ALL PEOPLE. CANCUN, IN THIS SENSE, IS NOT AN END BUT A BEGINNING.

WITH DEEP RESPECT,  
/SIGNED/  
WILLY BRANDT

/SIGNED/  
SHRIDATH RAMPHAL

END TEXT.

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