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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File
File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. III 9/1/81 - 12/31/81 (3)

Archivist: smf
FOIA ID: F97-030 (Friedrich)
Date: 05/23/00

Box 14

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	141642Z SEP 81 2p R 4/27/01 F97-030/2 #28	9/14/81	P1/F1
2. cable	111715Z SEP 81 4p R " " #29	9/11/81	P1/F1 →
3. cable	110138Z SEP 81 3p PART " " #30	9/11/81	P1/F1
4. cable	051423Z SEP 81 8p PART " " #31	9/5/81	P1/F1
5. cable	051411Z SEP 81 10p R " " #32	9/5/81	P1/F1 →
6. cable	021236Z SEP 81 2p R " " #33	9/2/81	P1/F1 →
7. cable	011538Z SEP 81 8p R " " #34	9/1/81	P1/F1 →
8. cable	011316Z SEP 81 1p R " " #35	9/1/81	P1/F1 →
9. cable	290439Z DEC 81 4p R " " #36	12/29/81	P1/F1 →
10. cable	262222Z DEC 81 2p R " " #37	12/26/81	P1/F1 →
11. cable	242211Z DEC 81 2p PART " " #38	12/24/81	P1/F1
12. cable	081402Z DEC 81 4p R " " #39	12/8/81	P1/F1 →
13. cable	081347Z DEC 81 6p Part. " " #40	12/8/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE396
UTS9270
DD RUFHC
DE RUFHOL #7881 2571646
ZNY CCCCC Z7H
U 141642Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0128
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 4964
INFO RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5179
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9492
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0912
RUFHEP/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0776
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6447
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 17881

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/14/91 (WJESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: BOG, GE, WSR, UR

SUBJ: SOVIET PROTEST ON THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BERLIN

REF: (A) STATE 240760, (B) 78 STATE 172467,

(C) 78 STATE 101239, (D) 78 STATE 87696

1. (C)-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST THE VISIT OF SECRETARY HAIG TO BERLIN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS VISIT TO THE FRG AND THE INCLUSION OF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IN THE TRIP WAS DISCUSSED AT THE SEPTEMBER 11 MEETING OF THE BONN GROUP. ALL MEMBERS AGREED THAT A RESPONSE WAS DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF THE LEVEL OF THE DEMARCHÉ, THE ALLEGATIONS THAT U.S. ACTIONS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE QA, AND THE PRECEDENT OF OUR SPECIFIC REJECTION OF SIMILAR PROTESTS CONCERNING PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT TO BERLIN IN 1978. THE U.S., UK, AND FRG REPS AGREED THAT THE RESPONSE USED BY THE U.S. IN 1978 (PARA 2 OF REF B) WITH THE SUBSTITUTION OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PRESIDENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THE TEXT OF THE RESPONSE, WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES, IS REPEATED IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW.

3. THE FRENCH REP SAID HE COULD AGREE TO THE FIRST TWO POINTS BUT NOT THE THIRD. HE WOULD NOT OBJECT IF THE U.S. USED ALL THREE POINTS IN A UNILATERAL RESPONSE, HOWEVER. (THE FRENCH REP SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLAINED PRIVATELY THAT AS A MATTER OF PRIN-

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NLS F97-030/2 #28
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CIPLE, THE FRENCH DO NOT PERMIT FRG OFFICIALS TO ACCOMPANY FRENCH VISITORS TO BERLIN. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT USEFUL OR NECESSARY TO DEBATE IN THE BONN GROUP WHETHER SUCH ACTIONS SHOULD BE DEFENDED TO THE SOVIETS AS PROPER OR APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF THE FIRM FRENCH POSITION.)

4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND SUBJECT TO COMMENTS FROM MISSION BERLIN, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT RESPOND AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO THE SOVIETS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES DRAWN FROM THE 1978 RESPONSE:

-- THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ITINERARY AND WHO MAY ACCOMPANY HIM TO BERLIN ARE NOT MATTERS RESTRICTED BY THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS FULLY AWARE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO RESPECT FULLY THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT.

-- IN ANY EVENT, IT IS PROPER FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS TO ACCOMPANY VISITORS TO WEST BERLIN BECAUSE OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN AND BECAUSE OF THE ACCEPTED ROLE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF WEST BERLIN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE764
STU7127
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHOL #7774/01 2541717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111715Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0098
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0903
RUEHLC/AMCONSUL Leningrad 0333
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4251
RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6439
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 17774

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09-11-91 (WDESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PARM, GE, TNF

SUBJECT: CODEL CRANSTON/MATHIAS: TALKS WITH FOREIGN

- MINISTER GENSCHER

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1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE REPRESENTS SLIGHTLY EDITED NOTES OF THE DISCUSSION SENATORS CRANSTON AND MATHIAS HAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IN BONN ON SEPTEMBER 7. THESE "ROUGH NOTES" WERE PROVIDED BY THE CODEL STAFF FOR USE AS WE SAW FIT. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST ARE GENSCHER'S COMMENTS ON TNF, THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON, SOVIET ATTITUDES, AND PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. END SUMMARY.

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BEGIN TEXT:

GENSCHER: TELL US OF MOSCOW.

MATHIAS: WE PENETRATED THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE. WE SAW URGARKOV, GRUMKYU.

GENSCHER: WHAT DID YOU HEAR?

MATHIAS: ONE EXAMPLE, THEY BELIEVE THAT CARTER DID NOT WANT SALT.

CRANSTON: WE EDUCATED THEM. WE TOLD THEM EMPHATICALLY THAT SALT IT COULD NOT BE RATIFIED. WE TOLD HIM THAT A NEW TREATY COULD BE RATIFIED.

MATHIAS: WE SPENT A LOT OF TIME ON TNF SPECIFICALLY WITH URGARKOV.

CRANSTON: THEY ARE VERY SPECIFIC ABOUT OUR SYSTEMS AND

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NLS F97-030/2 # 29
BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LESS SO ABOUT THEIRS.

GENSCHER: WHAT IS THEIR INTENTION IN THIS FIELD?

MATHIAS: THE SS-20 IS THERE TO STAY. RESTATEMENT OF BREZHNEV OFFER.

CRANSTON: THEIR GREATEST CONCERNS ARE PERSHING/CRUISE AND SALT II.

GENSCHER: DO THEY STILL HOPE THAT THEY CAN ELIMINATE THE TWO-TRACK AGREEMENT?

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-

CRANSTON: THEY ARE CERTAINLY TRYING. IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL AND WE ARE BLAMED WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE DECISION?

GENSCHER: DEPENDS ON THE PUBLIC RELATIONS. IN GERMANY TWO-TRACK DECISION WILL BE CARRIED OUT. IN BRITAIN AND ITALY AS WELL.

I HAD A DISCUSSION WITH MY PARTY CONGRESS. OUT OF 400 MEMBERS ONLY 96 OPPOSED AND THEY WANTED TO EXPLORE SFA BASING REFLECTING DISCUSSION IN U.S. ON MX. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ARGUMENT. YOUR PRESENT ADMINISTRATION (REAGAN) GUES BEYOND CARTER DECISION; THIS WILL HURT IN EUROPE, WHETHER LAND BASED OR SFA BASED.

MATHIAS: I THINK WE HAVE A JOB TO DO TO SENSITIZE OUR PEOPLE ON PERCEPTIONS HERE IN THIS COUNTRY AND EFFECTS OF STATEMENTS MADE IN U.S.

GENSCHER: THE CHANCELLOR AND I TIED OUR POLITICAL LIFE TO THE TNE DECISION. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THWARTING US, NATO WILL BE IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTY.

CRANSTON: WHAT IS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION ON TNE?

GENSCHER: IT IS CLEARLY STATED THAT WESTERN ARMAMENTS CAN BE STUDIED BASED ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THE PRESENT SS-20 LEVEL, WE WOULD DEPLOY FULLY. THEY MUST NOT ONLY WITHDRAW THESE WEAPONS BUT MAKE THEM UNUSABLE.

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THEY WILL ONLY NEGOTIATE IF THEY ARE CONVINCED WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE765
STU7131
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHDL #7774/02 2541719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111715Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0099
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0904
RUEHLG/AMCONSUL Leningrad 0334
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 4252
RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6440
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 17774

EXDIS

ATHIAS: NEUTRON WEAPON?

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GENSCHER: OUR POSITION IS THAT IN 1978 WE TOOK DECISION
TO DEPLOY NEUTRON (ENHANCED RADIATION) WEAPONS. THEN
48 HOURS BEFORE NATO MEETING WE WERE INFORMED THAT U.S.
WOULD NOT DEPLOY. I ARGUED FOR THEM. ON THE RECENT
ANNOUNCEMENT -- THE TIMING WAS NOT VERY AGREEABLE.
IT WAS TIED TO TNF BY OUR PUBLIC. THERE SHOULD HAVE
BEEN A PRIOR, AGGRESSIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN.
MATHIAS: THIS IS A MESSAGE THAT I GAVE WASHINGTON.
BUT YOU MUST GIVE IT HERE TO VISITORS.
GENSCHER: HERE YOU HAVE A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS BEEN
TAKING FIRM POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES, AND THE OPPOSITION
SUPPORTS US. BUT WE BELIEVE WIDER PUBLIC SUPPORT IN
EUROPE CAN BE OBTAINED. I HAVE TO PAY MY RESPECT TO
THE ITALIANS, BECAUSE DESPITE STRONG COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
THEY HAVE BEEN FIRM.
CRANSTON: HOW DO YOU SPARATE DEFENSIVE FROM OFFENSIVE
ASPECTS OF SOVIET ACTIONS?
GENSCHER: THERE IS IN USSR A HIGHLY DEVELOPED SENSE OF
SECURITY -- DUE TO WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE AND PRC.
BUT THIS DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE EXTENT OF THE (CURRENT)
BUILDUP. THIS EXCESSIVE ARMAMENTS EFFORT IS USED AS
A METHOD OF EXPANSIONISM -- NOT IN EUROPE, BUT CONSIDER
AFGHANISTAN. MOSCOW DOES NOT WISH TO FIGHT A WAR WITH
THE WEST, BUT BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF THIS THEY ARE
WILLING TO PURSUE A POLICY OF IMPERIALISM. THE WEST
MUST BE FIRM BUT SHOW ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION.

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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MATHIAS: HOW DO YOU SEE THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION?

GENSCHER: WE ARE NOT SURE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP IS AWARE OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY IN SADAT. THINGS MAY NOT BE COMPLETELY STABLE IN EGYPT. THERE IS RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND JORDAN. I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THIS CONSTELLATION WILL LAST.

MATHIAS: WHAT OF REJECTION OF AWACS?

GENSCHER: YOU WILL LOSE FACE, SO THERE IS A QUESTION WHETHER YOU SHOULD HAVE OFFERED. BUT HAVING DONE SO, YOU MUST KEEP THE PROMISE.

MATHIAS: WE ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO PROMISES.

GENSCHER: THIS WILL BE UNDERSTOOD IN BONN AND LONDON, BUT NOT IN ARAB WORLD. THERE IT IS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAKES POLICY. THIS IS THE BACKGROUND. THINK OF THE DECISION WITH RESPECT TO TURKEY. IN GENERAL REGARDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS, A GOVERNMENT MUST BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY AND FULFILL ITS PROMISES.

MATHIAS: FRENCH POSITION?

GENSCHER: I DON'T THINK THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL DEVIATE FROM VENICE. MOST EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE MET ARAFAT. I HAVE NOT AS YET. HAIG IS GOING TO BERLIN, I CONSIDER THIS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. ESPECIALLY TO DO THIS BEFORE HIS TALK WITH GRUMYKO.

AS MANY SENATORS AS POSSIBLE SHOULD COME TO EUROPE -- PARTICULARLY THE NEW ONES. END TEXT.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE459

RR RUEHC RUFHOL

DE RUEHC #2202 2540218

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 110138Z SEP 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PONN 0569

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 242202

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/9/91 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: GE (GENSCHER, HANS-DIETRICH)

SUBJECT: REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER.
BEGIN TEXT DEAR HANS-DIETRICH:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 7 IN WHICH YOU
DESCRIBE IN MORE DETAIL YOUR VIEWS ON THE IDEA OF INCLUDING
IN MY BERLIN SPEECH A PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT IN EUROPE. OUR CONCERN IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS
IDEA WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN
THE INITIATIVE ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN EUROPE. WE
THOUGHT THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD BE A USEFUL WAY OF
TURNING ATTENTION FROM THE CURRENT SOVIET PEACE CAMPAIGN,
HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THE POINTS YOU HAVE RAISED IN CON-
NECTION WITH THE MADRID CONFERENCE, AND AFTER READING YOUR
LETTER HAVE DECIDED THAT I WILL NOT INCLUDE THE PROPOSAL
IN MY BERLIN SPEECH.

AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, AS WE DISCUSSED AT OUR
MEETING IN CANCUN, I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE IN THE
WEST BOTH CAN AND MUST TAKE STEPS TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL DEBATE IN
EUROPE. I WAS PLEASED THAT YOU SHARED MY VIEWS ON THIS
POINT. WHILE WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS,
THE BASIC APPROACH IS OF VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE. THE
REINFORCED MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-030/2 #30

By C/S, NARA, Date 4/27/01

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SEPTEMBER 16 WILL PROVIDE A VERY TIMELY OPPORTUNITY FOR
THE ALLIES TO SET THIS EFFORT IN MOTION.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT.

3. FYI, TEXT OF GENSCHER'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY IS AS
FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT DEAR AL,

-----REDACTED-----

-----RED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----RED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REL-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

REDACTED-----

-----REDACTED-----

-----RED-----

-----REDACTED-----

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SITUATION LISTING

• DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

WITH PLEASURE I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT TO THE FEDER
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND TO BERLIN AND REMAIN UNTIL THEN

WITH KIND REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY,

SGD. HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER END TEXT. HAIG

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE913
STU5340
DD RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #7371/01 2481428
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
D 051423Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9937
INFO RUFHPR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0735
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9470
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6425
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6204
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7210
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1605
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 7371
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4598
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 17371

EXDIS

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE
EUR/CE PASS AMBASSADOR BURNS
TOKYO FOR AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/5/01 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, GE
SUBJECT: ALLEN-SCHMIDT MEETING, SEPTEMBER 4
1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. SUMMARY: DURING MEETING WITH RICHARD ALLEN SEPTEMBER 4, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT REPEATED HIS FAMILIAR CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGERS TO THE WORLD ECONOMY OF HIGH US INTEREST RATES, AND URGED THE ADMINISTRATION TO CUT ITS 1982 BUDGET DEFICIT SUFFICIENTLY TO RESTORE MARKET CONFIDENCE. HE ASSURED ALLEN THAT AMERICA'S ALLIES WOULD BE RELIEVED RATHER THAN DISCONCERTED IF THE US MILITARY BUDGET WERE INCLUDED IN THE CUTS, BUT CONCEDED THE DANGER THEREIN OF SENDING A MISLEADING SIGNAL TO MOSCOW. THE SOVIETS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TALKED TOUGH BUT THEN FAILED TO CARRY THROUGH. ALLEN ASSURED THE CHANCELLOR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD THESE CONSIDERATIONS FULLY IN MIND. HE INFORMED THE CHANCELLOR THAT THE MX SYSTEM AS PROPOSED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED, BUT THAT A LAND-BASED DETERRENT WOULD DEFINITELY BE RETAINED. HE EXPECTED SECRETARY

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NLS 197-030/2 #31

By GS, NARA, Date 4/27/01

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HAIG WOULD BRIEF THE CHANCELLOR NEXT WEEK ON THE PACKAGE OF MILITARY DECISIONS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW.

SCHMIDT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT US POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE DANGER THE CONTACT GROUP MIGHT FALL APART. ALLEN ASSURED HIM THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING THAT TO HAPPEN, BUT NEITHER COULD IT ALLOW NAMIBIA TO BE HANDED OVER TO SWAPO. SCHMIDT ADVISED THE US TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THEIR IMPACT ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND CAUTIONED AGAINST CREATING THE IMPRESSION THE US WAS OBSESSED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SCHMIDT URGED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO VISIT EUROPE. HIS SINCERITY AND CREDIBILITY WOULD DO MORE THAN ANY ARGUMENTS TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT IN EUROPE FOR AMERICAN POLICIES.
END SUMMARY.

3. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICHARD ALLEN, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE, MET FOR 45 MINUTES SEPTEMBER 4 WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. MEETING WAS ARRANGED ON SHORT NOTICE AT CHANCELLOR'S REQUEST. ALSO PRESENT WERE CHANCELLERY STATE SECRETARY MANFRED LAHNSTEIN AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR OTTO VON DER GABLENTZ.

4. SCHMIDT OPENED UP BY ASKING WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. WHAT WAS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES? ALLEN EXPLAINED THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE US BUDGET FOR 1982. SCHMIDT, IN TURN, EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS OWN BUDGET DELIBERATIONS JUST CONCLUDED, BUT SAID HE WAS VERY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE IMPACT THE GIGANTIC US ECONOMY MIGHT HAVE ON THE FRG ECONOMY OVER THE NEXT 15 MONTHS (I.E., TO THE END OF FRG BUDGET YEAR 1982). IT SEEMED TO SCHMIDT THAT THE US BUDGET DEFICIT FOR 1982 THREATENED TO BE MUCH HIGHER THAN THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ANTICIPATED. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PAUL VOLCKER INDICATED THAT HIGH US INTEREST RATES WOULD CONTINUE. THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME ADVANTAGES FOR THE FRG IN THAT IT WOULD IMPROVE THE DOLLAR/DM RATIO -- IN FACT SOME IMPROVEMENT HAD ALREADY OCCURRED -- WHICH COULD RELIEVE THE FRG OF HIGH IMPORT PRICES, ESPECIALLY IN THE PRICE OF OIL. ALL OF THIS WAS NOT TRUE, HOWEVER, FOR OTHER EUROPEAN CURRENCIES. THERE WAS A GREAT NEED TO REASSURE OTHER EUROPEANS.

5. ALLEN ASSURED THE CHANCELLOR THAT THE PRESIDENT AND OMB DIRECTOR STOCKMAN KEPT THE US ECONOMY UNDER DAILY REVIEW. OMB ASSISTANT DIRECTOR SCHNEIDER HAD JUST RECENTLY INFORMED HIM THAT FURTHER SHARP CUTS IN THE 1982 BUDGET WERE IN THE OFFING. THE MILITARY BUDGET

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DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WAS UNDER PARTICULAR SCRUTINY. THE ADMINISTRATION WAS
CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT CUTS IN THE MILITARY BUDGET
MIGHT SEND A FALSE SIGNAL TO OUR ALLIES. IT MIGHT
CAUSE THEM TO DOUBT THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE US.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

MESSAGE:

HCE914
UTS2152
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #7371/02 2481430
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051423Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9938
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0736
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9471
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATU 6426
RUEHKQ/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6205
RUEHRQ/AMEMBASSY ROME 7211
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1606
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 7372
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4599
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 17371

EXDIS

SCHMIDT ASSURED ALLEN THAT THE ALLIES WOULD IN NO WAY BE MADE UNEASY. THEY WOULD IN FACT FEEL RELIEVED SINCE WITH THEIR SHRINKING ECONOMIES THEY COULD NOT MEET THEIR OWN GOALS. FOR HIS OWN PART, SCHMIDT WAS ONLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EURO-STRATEGIC (I.E. TNF) BALANCE. OTHERWISE THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE US POSSESSED THE NECESSARY MILITARY COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION. A MORE WORRISOME ASPECT OF US MILITARY CUTS, HOWEVER, MIGHT BE THE SIGNAL THEY WOULD SEND TO MOSCOW. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAD A BIG MOUTH BUT NO MUSCLE. IT WAS DANGEROUS TO MISLEAD THE SOVIETS INTO THINKING THAT YOU ANNOUNCED MEASURES AND THEN FAILED TO FULFILL THEM.

6. REVIEWING THE PARLOUS STATE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIES, SCHMIDT EXPLAINED THAT AMERICA'S NATO ALLIES HAD LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVER. IF THEY HAD ANY EXTRA MONEY TO SPEND, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON JOB-CREATION PRDGRAMS. ALLEN EXPRESSED FULL US UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS AND NOTED THAT THE US REACTION TO THE FRG ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILITARY CUTS IN 1982 - ALTHOUGH UNFAIRLY PEGGED TO HIGH US INTEREST RATES - HAD BEEN MILD. SCHMIDT LAUNCHED INTO A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF HIS CONCERNS ABOUT US HIGH INTEREST RATES AND WARNED THAT THEY WERE THE SINGLE GREATEST FACTOR THREATENING TO PRECIPITATE A ROUND OF

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PROTECTIONISM AND A WORLDWIDE RECESSION. HE ASKED ALLEN TO FORGIVE HIM THAT ONLY SIX WEEKS AFTER OTTAWA HE VIEWED THE SITUATION AS SO MUCH MORE DANGEROUS.

7. ALLEN REASSURED THE CHANCELLOR AGAIN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS FOLLOWING THESE ISSUES CLOSELY AND WAS WELL AWARE OF EUROPE'S SITUATION AND CONCERNS. HE NOTED THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD AT LEAST HAVE AMBASSADOR BURNS TO TALK TO EVERY DAY. SCHMIDT REJOINED THAT EVEN BURNS WOULD SAY 20 PERCENT INTEREST RATES WERE TOO HIGH. ALLEN OBSERVED THAT THE ECONOMIC PRESS IN THE US, REFLECTING THE UNCERTAINTY STILL SURROUNDING FINAL BUDGET DECISIONS, CONVEYED A GREAT DEAL OF MISINFORMATION THAT WAS PICKED UP IN THE EUROPEAN PRESS. HE WAS SURE THIS WOULD END ONCE THE BUDGET DECISIONS WERE MADE. SCHMIDT ADVISED THE ADMINISTRATION TO CUT THE BUDGET DEFICIT SUFFICIENTLY TO RESTORE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MARKETS.

8. TURNING TO THE ACTUAL CONTENTS OF THE US MILITARY BUDGET, ALLEN SAID THERE WOULD BE A PACKAGE OF DECISIONS COVERING A WIDE RANGE OF ITEMS. SECRETARY HAIG WOULD BRIEF THE CHANCELLOR IN DETAIL NEXT WEEK. THE CHANCELLOR SHOULD KNOW HOWEVER THAT THE HORIZONTAL MX RAILROAD SYSTEM PROPOSED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN REJECTED, BUT THAT A LAND-BASED DETERRENT WOULD DEFINITELY BE RETAINED.

9. SCHMIDT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE NOTED THAT THE US HAD VETOED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID INTO ANGOLA, THAT FRANCE HAD VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION, AND THAT THE UK HAD ABSTAINED ONLY IN ORDER NOT TO VOTE AGAINST THE US. HE ADDED THAT IF THE FRG HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IT WOULD HAVE HAD TO VOTE WITH FRANCE. HE SAW A GREAT DANGER THAT THE CONTACT GROUP MIGHT BE FALLING APART. REFERRING TO A RECENT LETTER FROM HAIG TO GENSCHER, ALLEN SAID THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING THE CONTACT GROUP TO FALL APART. THE US WAS NOT WILLING, HOWEVER, TO HAND NAMIBIA OVER TO SWAPO. THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD NEVER AGREE TO THAT. SCHMIDT REMARKED THAT IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WERE FOUND, IT WOULD EVENTUALLY AMOUNT TO JUST THAT, AS IT HAD WITH MUGABE IN ZIMBABWE. HE ADDED THAT THE FRG HAD A SPECIAL STAKE IN NAMIBIA SINCE 28 TO 30 THOUSAND FRG CITIZENS WERE LIVING THERE.

10. ALLEN EXPLAINED THAT THE US WAS TRYING TO EXPLORE WHAT CONNECTION THERE MIGHT BE BETWEEN A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. OTHER-

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WISE, HE WARNED, BEFORE LONG WE WOULD SEE THE SOVIETS
IN NAMIBIA. SCHMIDT REMINDED ALLEN THAT THE US HAD HAD
ITS BEST CHANCE IN ANGOLA YEARS AGO, BUT THAT THE
AMERICAN SENATE HAD THROWN IT AWAY. HE SAID HE WOULD
ADVISE HAIG TO FOLLOW GARRINGTON'S LEAD ON THIS. HE
ASSURED ALLEN THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE CONTACT
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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE916
STU5341
DD RUEHC
DE RUFHDL #7371/03 2481432
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051423Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9939
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0737
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9472
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6427
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6206
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7212
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1607
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 7373
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4600
BT

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EXDIS

GROUP LINE UP IN CONFRONTATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

11. ALLEN STRESSED THAT THE US WAS NOT OBSESSED WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- CONCERNED BUT NOT OBSESSED. SCHMIDT SAID THE US MUST NOT, BY UNCONTROLLED PUBLIC UTTERANCES, GIVE THE WORLD THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS INDEED OBSESSED.

THE WHOLE THING WAS RIDICULOUS AND HE TOLD THEM SO. HE KNEW THAT THE US WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING STUPID AND HE HAD NEVER DOUBTED THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN FACT, HE WAS SURE THAT BY NEXT YEAR THE US AND THE USSR WOULD BE WORKING THINGS OUT TOGETHER.

12. ALLEN CAUTIONED AGAINST TOO MUCH GERMAN TALK ABOUT ANTI-AMERICANISM. THERE WAS NO ANXIETY IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SCORE NOW, BUT IF GERMANS KEPT HAMMERING ON IT, WASHINGTON MIGHT BEGIN TO WORRY TOO. HE ADDED THAT THE US HAD TO DO BETTER IN THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE WITH THE SOVIETS. SCHMIDT COMMENTED THAT AMERICAN SPOKESMEN PLAYED TOO MUCH TO THEIR DOMESTIC AUDIENCE AND NOT ENOUGH TO THEIR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE. WHEN ALLEN ASKED THE CHANCELLOR WHAT SPECIFIC ADVICE HE HAD TO GIVE, SCHMIDT REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID IN WASHINGTON IN MAY,

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THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TOUR EUROPE. HE HAD A CREDIBLE PERSONALITY THAT WOULD DO MORE THAN ALL THE ARGUMENTS TO WIN EUROPEAN POPULAR OPINION. THERE WERE MANY MISGUIDED PEOPLE IN THE FRG -- IN CHURCH CIRCLES AND AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE AND OTHERS, BUT OVERALL POPULAR OPINION WAS MORE PRO-AMERICAN THAN IT HAD BEEN IN RECENT YEARS. IN HOLLAND, HOWEVER, PUBLIC OPINION WAS SUCH THAT THE NEWLY FORMED GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO TAKE A POSITIVE DECISION ON THE STATIONING OF LRTNF OR ERW. PUBLIC SUPPORT IN ITALY REMAINED REMARKABLY GOOD BUT THE US SHOULD DO A BIT MORE TO CULTIVATE PERTINI. HE WAS A LITTLE TOUCHY BUT WAS A MAN OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY AND ENJOYED THE GREATEST MORAL AUTHORITY. WOESSNER

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE917
STU5328
DO RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #7370/01 2481420
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051411Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9933
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0731
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9466
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6421
RUEHKQ/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6200
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 17370

EXDIS

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE
EUR/CE PASS AMBASSADOR BURNS
TOKYO FOR AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
E.O. 12065; RDS-1 9/5/01 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, GE
SUBJECT: ALLEN-GENSCHER MEETING, SEPTEMBER 4
1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: DURING ONE-HOUR MEETING SEPTEMBER 4, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ALLEN ASSURED FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER THAT THE US WOULD RETAIN A LAND-BASED NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND SAID HE EXPECTED SECRETARY HAIG WOULD BRIEF HIM ON THE PACKAGE OF MILITARY DECISIONS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW BY THE ADMINISTRATION. GENSCHER PRAISED THE PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. HE AND ALLEN AGREED THAT WESTERN SPOKESMEN SHOULD STICK TO A FEW, POWERFUL, EASILY-GRASPED ARGUMENTS IN THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. GENSCHER AND ALLEN ALSO AGREED THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEM WAS IN LONG-TERM DECLINE AND THAT THE DANGER OF MILITARY ADVENTURE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS WAS THEREFORE ALL THE GREATER. IT WAS DOUBLY NECESSARY FOR THE WEST TO REMAIN UNIFIED AND FIRM. GENSCHER MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE US TO RE-INTRODUCE THE DRAFT. HE ALSO EXPLAINED WHY, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, HE COULD NEVER AGREE TO A CAP ON THE BUNDESWEHR IN MBFR. END SUMMARY.

3. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICHARD ALLEN, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE, MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AT THE

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NLS# F97-030/2 # 32

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LATTER'S REQUEST FOR ONE HOUR SEPTEMBER 4. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE GENSCHER'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT THEODOR WALLAU AND US DESK OFFICER WOLFGANG GERZ.

4. ALLEN INFORMED GENSCHER THAT DURING HIS STOP IN PARIS SEPTEMBER 3 HE HAD MET WITH JACQUES ATTALI AND THAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED AMONG OTHER THINGS THE MEXICAN/FRENCH INITIATIVE ON SALVADOR. ALLEN NOTED THAT OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES HAD REACTED BADLY. ATTALI WAS CERTAIN THAT THE US HAD ARRANGED THIS, BUT IN FACT THE REACTION HAD BEEN SPONTANEOUS AND A PLEASANT SURPRISE FOR THE US. HE NOTED TOO THAT MITTERRAND HAD UNEXPECTEDLY JOINED THEM FOR 45 MINUTES. HE DESCRIBED MITTERRAND AS AN ACCOMPLISHED POLITICIAN WHO GAVE EVERY APPEARANCE OF BEING COMPLETELY RELAXED.

5. ALLEN EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO BONN AT THE INVITATION OF THE KONRAD-ADENAUER STIFTUNG TO PARTICIPATE IN A THREE-DAY SEMINAR ON THE FUTURE OF US-FRG RELATIONS. A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL AMERICANS WERE TAKING PART AND THE SEMINAR WAS INTENDED TO BE AN OBJECTIVE, NON-PARTISAN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

6. ALLEN NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS FACING SEVERAL IMPORTANT STRATEGIC DECISIONS AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SPENT MUCH OF HIS VACATION IN CALIFORNIA GRAPPLING WITH THESE. HE PROMISED THAT HAIG WOULD BRIEF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT INDICATED THAT THE OVERALL PACKAGE WOULD REASSURE GENSCHER. HE THOUGHT THE FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS. GENSCHER CAUTIONED THE ADMINISTRATION AGAINST FLINCHING IN THE FACE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES. ALLEN ASSURED GENSCHER THAT THIS WAS NOT THE MAJOR CONCERN, BUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS RATHER ENGAGED IN A DEBATE OVER THE SIZE OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET, WITH HAIG, ALLEN AND WEINBERGER GENERALLY FAVORING PRESENT DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS AND OTHERS FAVORING REDUCTIONS.

7. GENSCHER IN TURN BRIEFLY REVIEWED FOR ALLEN THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED FRG BUDGET DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE CABINET. HE SAID HE DIDN'T MIND INCREASES IN ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAXES BUT OTHERWISE WANTED NO TAX INCREASES AND NO NEW SOCIAL PROGRAMS. HE STRESSED THAT THE FRG HAD A MARKET ECONOMY AND NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE INDUSTRY. INDUSTRY HAD TO BE ENCOURAGED TO BE SELF-RELIANT AND NOT DEPENDENT ON STATE SUBSIDIES.

8. GENSCHER WELCOMED SECRETARY HAIG'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE FRG AND ESPECIALLY THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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BERLIN TO MAKE A SPEECH. HE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO HAIG'S LANDING IN BONN FIRST AND PICKING HIM UP FOR THE FLIGHT TO BERLIN. IT WAS NECESSARY, HE
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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE918
STU5329
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #7370/02 2481422
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051411Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9934
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0732
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9467
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6422
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6201
BT

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STRESSED, TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THESIS THAT WEST BERLIN AND THE FRG WERE TOTALLY SEPARATE ENTITIES. THE WEST SHOULD NOT RETREAT EVEN ONE MILLIMETER FROM ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.

9. GENSCHER ALSO PRAISED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT SPEECH AND HIS EMPHASIS ON THE NECESSITY OF VERIFICATION FOR ARMS CONTROL MEASURES. HE SAID THIS WAS A SIMPLE THEME AT WHICH THE WEST SHOULD HAMMER AWAY AND WHICH PUBLIC OPINION COULD READILY GRASP. STATISTICS ON RELATIVE MISSILE NUMBERS, WARHEADS, THROWWEIGHTS ONLY CONFUSED THE PUBLIC. HE SAID HE HAD DEPLOYED TO GOOD EFFECT, EVEN WITH GROMYKO, THE ARGUMENT THAT WESTERN ARMAMENT PROJECTS WERE ANNOUNCED WELL IN ADVANCE AND NEVER TOOK THE SOVIET UNION BY SURPRISE. DOING THINGS THIS WAY WAS IN EFFECT A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE, QUITE UNLIKE THE EASTERN PRACTICE OF SURPRISING THE WEST WITH NEW WEAPONS. HE CITED THE CONCEPT OF CBMS FROM THE URALS TO THE ATLANTIC AS ANOTHER SIMPLE IDEA EASILY UNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION THAT HAD PUT THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSIVE. HE STRESSED THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT LET AFGHANISTAN BE FORGOTTEN AND PRAISED THE INTENTION OF THE FOUR WESTERN POLITICAL DIRECTORS TO COORDINATE THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS' BILATERALS WITH GROMYKO AT THE UNGA. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS STRESS THE SAME THEMES. THIS WOULD MAKE AN IMPRESSION NOT ONLY ON WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION BUT ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS WELL. GENSCHER CITED THE IMPORTANCE OF LRTNF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CSCE AND NOTED THAT THE LATTER SUBJECT WOULD BE AIRED IN A BUNDESTAG

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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DEBATE NEXT WEEK.

10. ALLEN AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH GENSCHER ON THE NEED FOR WESTERN SPOKESMEN TO REITERATE OVER AND OVER A FEW SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENTS. HE NOTED THAT DURING AN ARD INTERVIEW THE EVENING BEFORE, HE HAD MADE THE POINT THAT FOR THE UNITED STATES A TRUE PEACE MOVEMENT MEANT SUPPORT OF NATO. HE ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE FRG DID NOT REPRESENT MAJORITY OPINION, BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT IF IT CONTINUED TO GROW, IT COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THERE WAS NO CONCERN IN THE US NOW ABOUT ANTI-AMERICANISM, BUT THAT IF THE FRG LEADERSHIP FOCUSED ATTENTION EXCESSIVELY ON THIS ONE CONCERN, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS MIGHT FOLLOW SUIT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME THE US-FRG RELATIONSHIP HAD BECOME A STRATEGIC QUESTION. THIS WAS SOMETHING NEW.

11. GENSCHER ASSURED ALLEN THAT THE BASIC ATTITUDES OF GERMANS TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE REMAINED BROADLY UNCHANGED. SO-CALLED ANTI-AMERICANISM WAS SIMPLY A SUPERFICIAL WAVE. IT WAS TROUBLING, BUT COULD BE CONTAINED. THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS THE FRG HAD PRESSED SO STRONGLY FOR LRNTF NEGOTIATIONS TO START. HE REMINDED ALLEN OF HOW THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD HANDLED THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. THE ENTIRE FRG LEADERSHIP ENGAGED ITSELF AND FINALLY PREVAILED. SIMILARLY, THE GOVERNMENT HAD MOVED PUBLIC OPINION TO AN ACCEPTANCE OF ERW IN 1978, BUT THEN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD LEFT THEM IN THE LURCH. GENSCHER ASSERTED THAT HIS OWN VIEW ON THE NECESSITY OF ERW REMAINED UNCHANGED, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED FOR THE US DECISION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE US COULD FIRST HAVE MADE A PUBLIC APPEAL FOR A REDUCTION IN THE MASSIVE SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET TANKS. AFTER CONTINUING SUCH A CAMPAIGN FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, IT COULD THEN HAVE INVOKED SOVIET INTRACTABILITY AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ERW DECISION.

12. IN A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SUCH CRITICAL DECISIONS. HE ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST YIELDING TO ENVIRONMENTALISTS ON THE MX ISSUE, LEST THESE SAME ARGUMENTS BE PICKED UP EVEN MORE TELLINGLY AGAINST LRNTF DEPLOYMENT IN THICKLY POPULATED EUROPE. RECALLING HIS ONLY DIFFICULTIES WITH THE RECENT FDP CONFERENCE, HE WARNED AGAINST MOVING THE MX TO SEA.

13. ALLEN REASSURED GENSCHER THAT UNDER ALL CIRCUM-

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STANCES THE US WOULD MAINTAIN A LAND-BASED DETERRENT,
THE PROBLEM WITH THE BASING OF THE MX WAS NOT ENVIRON-
MENTAL; IT WAS RATHER THAT THE BASING SYSTEM AS PRO-
POSED BY CARTER REALLY WOULD NOT WORK. FURTHERMORE
ITS COSTS WOULD BE ASTRONOMICAL, WITH ESTIMATES RANGING
UP TO \$80-100 BILLION.

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE919
STU5332
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDL #7370/03 2481424
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051411Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9935
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0733
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9468
RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6423
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6202
BT

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14. GENSCHER THEN MADE A STRONG PLEA FOR THE REINTRODUCTION OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION IN THE UNITED STATES; ONLY THAT, HE ASSERTED, WOULD IMPRESS THE SOVIETS. HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED IT A MISTAKE TO ABOLISH THE DRAFT. NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION, THANKS TO ITS MASSIVE NAVAL BUILDUP, HAD THE ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER AND EXERT PRESSURE IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, THE WEST HAD TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER THIS POWER. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION WERE WORKING TO WESTERN ADVANTAGE. POLAND WAS ADMITTEDLY A SPECIAL CASE, BUT SYMPTOMATIC. THERE WAS A GROWTH OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS EVERYWHERE, DRAWING NEW LIFE FROM DECOLONIZATION IN THE THIRD WORLD. IN EXERTING ITS POWER, THE SOVIET UNION WAS REPEATING ALL OF THE MISTAKES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COLONIAL IMPERIALISM. IN AFGHANISTAN IT HAS APPEARED AS A NEO-COLONIALIST POWER. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IF THE WEST HELD FIRM, THE LONG-TERM TRENDS WERE IN ITS FAVOR. THE GREATEST RISK LAY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS THE SOVIETS SAW THE LONG-TERM TREND WORKING TOWARDS THEIR DISADVANTAGE, THEY MIGHT RESORT TO DANGEROUS MILITARY ADVENTURES. IT WAS, THEREFORE, ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THE WEST REMAIN UNIFIED AND EXHIBIT DISCIPLINED FIRMNESS.

15. ALLEN AGREED FULLY WITH GENSCHER'S THESIS. THE NEXT FEW YEARS, DUE TO THE SO-CALLED "WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY," WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. IN THIS RESPECT THE WEST SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD DISPUTES THAT WERE NOT CENTRAL QUESTIONS. CITING A RECENT QUOTE OF WILLY BRANDT IN

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SPIEGEL, HE ASKED WHAT KIND OF TALK THIS WAS ABOUT THE FRG'S BEING "A COLONY" OF THE UNITED STATES. GENSCHER DEMURRED THAT HE DID NOT BELONG TO THE SPD AND ALLEN HASTENED TO EXPLAIN THAT HE WAS NOT INCLUDING GENSCHER OR THE CHANCELLOR IN HIS QUESTION. HE WENT ON TO ASSURE GENSCHER THAT WHEN THE US GOVERNMENT ASSESSES ITS POLICY OPTIONS TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION, IT DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE FRG SHOULD GIVE UP ITS ULTIMATE GOAL OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION OR THE OSTPOLITIK POLICY. POLAND WAS, IN FACT, A RESULT OF OSTPOLITIK. WHEN THE US NEGOTIATES WITH THE USSR, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAD TO SEE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE SAME WAY. THESE WERE ALLIANCE MATTERS. HE CONCEDED THAT MANY AMERICANS HAD NEVER FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE TO THE FRG OF THE GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP.

16. GENSCHER INSISTED THAT THE FRG HAD ALWAYS GIVEN ABSOLUTE FIRST PRIORITY TO NATO, AND THAT IT HAD TAKEN ALL STRATEGIC DECISIONS IN THE INTEREST OF ALLIANCE SECURITY. HE PLEADED FOR US TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRG COULD NOT SIMPLY REPROGRAM PUBLIC OPINION, AFTER WINNING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION OF 1979, IT WAS DISTRESSED BY LOOSE TALK FROM THE US ABOUT MILITARY SUPERIORITY. SUCH TALK WAS SEIZED UPON WITH GLEE BY OPPONENTS OF LRNF AND ONLY MADE THE GOVERNMENT'S JOB MUCH HARDER. THIS EXPLAINED THE PRESSURE EXERTED BY THE FRG FOR THE EARLY INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR STICKING TO BOTH PARTS OF THE NATO DECISION. HE REPEATED HIS ADVICE THAT THE US SHOULD REALLY HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE ERW DECISION.

17. REGARDING MBFR, GENSCHER ASSERTED THAT ONLY THREE ARMIES MATTERED -- THE RED ARMY, THE AMERICAN ARMY AND THE BUNDESWEHR. WITH THE RED ARMY ON GERMANY'S DOORSTEP AND THE US FAR AWAY, WITH THE SOVIETS EXERTING PRESSURE IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY HAVING NO CONSCRIPTION AND BEING WEAK IN RESERVES, THEN HE, GENSCHER, COULD NOT ACCEPT A CAP ON THE BUNDESWEHR. HE DID NOT WANT AND HAD NO EXPECTATION OF ASKING FOR AN INCREASE IN THE BUNDESWEHR, BUT FOR REASONS OF DETERRENCE HE HAD TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY.

18. GENSCHER ADVISED THE US TO EMPHASIZE IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS THE ECONOMIC BURDEN IMPOSED ON THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE BY THE STEADY SOVIET BUILDUP OF ARMS AND HOW THIS ALSO CUT INTO POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE FOR THE THIRD WORLD. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT THEME TO STRESS IN THE BATTLE FOR

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PUBLIC OPINION. WHILE PURSUING A POLICY OF DETENTE, IT
WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE EXTENT OF THE SOVIET THREAT
FULLY IN THE PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS.
19. RETURNING YET AGAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THE DRAFT,
GENSCHER EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE HE VERY MUCH WANTED CON-
SCRIPTION HE WOULD NEVER MAKE IT A PUBLIC ISSUE WITH
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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE920

STU5333

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHOL #7370/04 2481426

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 051411Z SEP 81

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9936

INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0734

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9469

RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6424

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6203

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 17370

EXDIS

THE UNITED STATES. ALLEN REJOINED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN BELIEVED THAT THE VOLUNTEER ARMY HAD NEVER REALLY BEEN GIVEN A CHANCE. SINCE THE ADVENT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, RECRUITMENT RATES WERE ALMOST 100 PERCENT OF THEIR GOALS AND RETENTION RATES FOR SKILLED SPECIALISTS WERE RISING. NONETHELESS, HE CONCEDED THAT THE EXTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER MIGHT ULTIMATELY REQUIRE THE UNITED STATES TO REINTRODUCE CONSCRIPTION. IN THAT CASE, THE GROUND WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED.

20. GENSCHER EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE GROWING NUMBERS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE FRG. THESE SEEMED TO COME PRIMARILY FROM WEALTHY AND WELL-EDUCATED FAMILIES. IF THIS CONTINUED, HE NOTED WRYLY, THE FRG WOULD ACHIEVE WHAT NO COMMUNIST COUNTRY HAD EVER ACHIEVED, NAMELY, A GENUINE WORKERS' ARMY.

21. IN CONCLUSION, GENSCHER REITERATED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT TIME WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST AND THAT THE MAIN DANGER STEMMED FROM WESTERN UNCERTAINTY AND WAVERING. IN HIS OWN HOMELAND (NOW GDR), THERE HAD BEEN NO DEMOCRACY SINCE 1933. NONETHELESS THE PEOPLE THERE DEEPLY DESIRED THE FREEDOMS EVIDENT IN THE WEST. YOUTH HAD SIMPLY NOT BEEN WON OVER TO COMMUNISM.

WOESSNER

BT

#7370

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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE101
OO RUEHC RUFHOL
DE RUEHC #6065 2461458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031432Z SEP 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0325
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 236065
E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: GE (GENSCHER, HANS-DIETRICH)

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

1. EMBASSY REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
SECRETARY HAIG TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR HANS-DIETRICH:

I MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE EXPRESSING
DISMAY AT THE ATTACK ON U.S. AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN
RAMSTEIN. I KNOW HOW CONTRADICTORY SUCH ACTS ARE TO THE
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND AM GRATIFIED
THAT YOU AND OTHER SENIOR LEADERS HAVE SPOKEN SO CLEARLY
IN CONDEMNING THE EVENT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BONN NEXT WEEK.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT.

2. FYI, TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IS
AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR AL,

IT IS WITH THE GREATEST DISMAY THAT I HAVE LEARNED OF
THE ATTACK ON THE U.S. AIRFORCE HEADQUARTERS AT RAMSTEIN.
WE CONSIDER THIS AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE FREEDOM OF OUR

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 5/22/00

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

COUNTRIES.

I SINCERELY HOPE FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY OF YOUR WOUNDED
COMPATRIOTS.

SINCERELY YOURS, SGD, HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

END TEXT. HAIG

BT

#6065

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE703
UTS8287
OO RUEHC
DE RUHOL #7055 2451230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021236Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9821
INFO RUHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0705
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 17055
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR DENNIS BLAIR
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/2/87 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (ALLEN, RICHARD V.)
SUBJ: VISIT OF RICHARD V. ALLEN
REF: BONN 16958 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARA 6.
3. IN ADDITION TO APPOINTMENTS REQUESTED REFTEL (CDU CHAIRMAN KOHL, AND VON DER GABLENTZ AND LAHNSTEIN OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY), EMBASSY HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN WANT TO MEET WITH ALLEN.
4. GENSCHER'S SCHEDULE IS TIGHT BUT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BELIEVES HE CAN SEE ALLEN AT 1100 A.M. ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 4. (NOTE: ALLEN IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION'S CONFERENCE FROM 9:00 TO 10:30 A.M. ON SEPTEMBER 4. THEREFORE, HE SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME FOLLOWING HIS ADDRESS TO DRIVE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO MEET WITH GENSCHER.)
5. VON STADEN, WHO WILL RETURN FROM HIS VACATION IN THE U.S. ON SATURDAY, WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MEET WITH ALLEN. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS PROPOSED 6:00 P.M. ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, PREFERABLY IN AMBASSADOR BURNS' RESIDENCE.
6. PLEASE ADVISE IF THE APPOINTMENTS WITH GENSCHER AND VON STADEN, AS WELL AS THOSE PROPOSED REFTEL, ARE ACCEPTABLE. ALSO PLEASE ADVISE IF OTHER APPOINTMENTS ARE DESIRED AND IF ALLEN WOULD LIKE CHARGE WOESSNER TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THESE MEETINGS.
7. PROPOSED APPOINTMENTS SCHEDULE:
- SEPT 3, 10:00 P.M. - KOHL (HOTEL DREESEN)

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NLS F97-030/2 #33
BY CAJ NARA DATE 4/27/01

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

- SEPT 4, 11:00 A.M. - GENSCHER (FOREIGN MINISTRY)
- 5:00 P.M. - VON DER GABLENTZ AND LAHNSTEIN
- (FEDERAL CHANCELLERY)
- SEPT 5, 6:00 P.M. - VON STADEN (AMBASSADOR'S RESI-
WOESSNER
BT
#7055
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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ANNOTATIONS:
RVA NAN COL JP VP
PIPES

MESSAGE:

HCE442
STU4952
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #6984/01 2441546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011538Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9792
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5160
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4855
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0880
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2602
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7626
ZEN/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03BONN 16984
MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLADS
E.O. 12065IGDS 08-31-87 (WOESSNER, W) DR=M
TAGS: PINT, PERP, GE
SUBJECT: THE BONN MOOD AS SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT
APPROACHES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE LOOKS AT THE
CURRENT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN BONN AND AT THE
ISSUES UPPERMOST IN THE MINDS OF SCHMIDT AND
GENSCHER.

3. MANY POLITICAL LEADERS IN BONN ARE IN A SOUR MOOD,
MORE INCLINED TO COMPLAIN THAN TO LISTEN. THE ILL
HUMOR HAS VARIOUS CAUSES, INCLUDING THE WORLD SCENE

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NLS F97-030/2 H34

BY CA, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GENERALLY, BUT ALSO FRG-US ISSUES AND DOMESTIC CONTROVERSIES ON DEFENSE AND THE NEW BUDGET. THE SPD/FDP COALITION IS STRAINED, BUT NOT ABOUT TO FLY APART. THE SPD IS DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF MORE SHARPLY THAN EVER.

4. SCHMIDT MUST HOLD THE LINE ON DEFENSE ISSUES AND, AT THE SAME TIME, DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS. HE FACES VARIOUS CONFLICTS WITHIN THE SPD, DECLINING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR IT, AND SOME CONFLICT WITH THE FDP COALITION PARTNER. HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR WAYS, HOWEVER UNPROMISING, TO RALLY BOTH THE SPD AND THE COALITION.

5. GENSCHER, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN ON THE LEFT, HAS MORE FLEXIBILITY AND BETTER OPTIONS. HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO LEAVE THE HARD DEFENSE QUESTIONS LARGELY TO OTHERS. HE CAN PURSUE LESS CONTROVERSIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUES AND ENJOY THE RECURRING SPECULATION: WHEN WILL THE FDP MAKE A MOVE TO CHANGE COALITION PARTNERS AND JOIN WITH THE CDU/CSU? OUR GUESS IS: NOT VERY SOON.
END SUMMARY.

THE KEY ISSUES

6. DEFENSE: THE FRG ALLIANCE COMMITMENT, WHILE STILL BASICALLY SOUND, HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY BUFFETED FROM THE LEFT AND BY BUDGET STRINGENCY.

THE FRG 1982 DEFENSE BUDGET AS NOW PLANNED MAY FEATURE NO REAL GROWTH, AND STRINGENCY IS ALREADY APPEARING IN 1981.

THE GOVERNMENT IS EVEN LESS INCLINED TO BE FORTHCOMING ON MORE GERMAN SPENDING IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN FORCES. EVEN THE IDEA OF A NATO STUDY OF THE NEED FOR MORE INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURES IS BLOCKED BY THE FRG FOR FEAR IT WOULD CALL FOR NEW GERMAN FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS.

ALTHOUGH NOT AN ISSUE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, TNF IS A BURNING DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY. THE UPROAR OVER THE ERW PRODUCTION ANNOUNCEMENT HAS MADE IT EVEN WORSE.

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

7. AS STUDENTS ARE RETURNING FROM VACATIONS, THE PEACE MOVEMENT IS BEING REJUVENATED AND WILL EXPLOIT THE ERW DECISION. THE RECONVENING BUNDESTAG IN EARLY SEPTEMBER WILL FEATURE MORE VOCIFEROUS CRITICISM ON THESE DEFENSE ISSUES, AND ON OTHERS REQUIRING DIRECT BUNDESTAG ACTION, SUCH AS AID TO TURKEY AND GERMAN WEAPONS SALES.

8. THE ECONOMY: INFLATION IS AT ABOUT 5.6 PERCENT;

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE443
STU5147
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHDL #6984/02 2441644
ZNY CCCCC
O 011938Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9793
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5161
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4856
RUEHMQ/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0881
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFDAAB/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2603
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7627
ZEN/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03BONN 16984
MILITARY ADDRESSES FOR POLADS
UNEMPLOYMENT AT 1.35 MILLION. THE MODEST RECOVERY
(GROWTH OF 1.1 TO 2 PERCENT) WHICH SOME OBSERVERS
ARE PREDICTING FOR NEXT YEAR WILL STILL LEAVE A
MASSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM. NONE OF THE CHOICES
AVAILABLE ON THE 1982 BUDGET IS READILY PALATABLE.
AFTER PAINFUL BUDGET CUTTING IN MANY SECTORS
(INCLUDING DEFENSE), LABOR STILL DEMANDS A JOB-
CREATION PROGRAM, FINANCED BY AN INCOME TAX SURCHARGE.
THE LATTER IS OPPOSED BY THE FDP AND BY KEY FIGURES
IN THE SPD ESTABLISHMENT.

SCHMIDT'S POSITION

9. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S BASIC CONCERN AT PRESENT
IS ONE OF SIMPLE POLITICAL SURVIVAL IN THE FACE
OF IMPLACABLY ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES BOTH AT HOME
AND ABROAD. HE FINDS HIMSELF FORCED TO GIVE
GROUND ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND ECONOMIC

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ISSUES, AND HE FACES MULTIPLE MUTINIES IN HIS OWN RANKS.

10. SCHMIDT REMAINS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO FRG INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND TO A STRONG GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE. HE WAS AN EARLY ADVOCATE OF TNF IN 1977 AND RISKED DOMESTIC POLITICAL CAPITAL TO SUPPORT ERW PRODUCTION IN 1978. HE REFUSES TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF EVEN SEMANTICALLY WITH ANY ASPECT OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT, AND HAS CONSTANTLY DONE BATTLE IN RECENT MONTHS WITH ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN PARTY ON BOTH STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF DEFENSE.

11. AT THE SAME TIME, IN HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FRG ECONOMY, SCHMIDT IS DETERMINED TO IMPOSE BUDGETARY AUSTERITY MEASURES THAT HURT EVEN SOME PRIME SUPPORTERS OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. HIS AIM IS TO REDUCE THE GOVERNMENT DEFICIT IN 1982 BELOW THAT OF 1981. HE HAS SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO HOLD TO THIS POSITION EVEN IN THE FACE OF JOB-CREATION DEMANDS FROM ORGANIZED LABOR, THE HARD CORE OF HIS SUPPORT IN THE PARTY AND IN THE COUNTRY.

12. SCHMIDT HAS BEEN ABLE SO FAR TO FACE DOWN BOTH THE LEFT ON DEFENSE ISSUES AND LABOR ON THE BUDGET, BUT HAS PAID AN ENORMOUS PRICE IN TERMS OF SPD UNITY. HE NEEDS NEW THEMES, BOTH TO REUNIFY THE PARTY AND TO HOLD THE SPD/FDP COALITION TOGETHER. THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN IN NOVEMBER AND A MEETING WITH HONECKER SHORTLY THEREAFTER MAY OFFER SCHMIDT AT LEAST MODEST OPPORTUNITIES TO PROFILE ANEW HIS INTEREST IN OSTPOLITIK TO WHICH BOTH THE SPD AND FDP REMAIN DEEPLY COMMITTED.

GENSCHER'S POSITION

13. IF SCHMIDT'S FATE IS TO STRUGGLE TO HOLD TOGETHER A CENTER-LEFT COALITION, GENSCHEER'S IS TO DEFINE AND HOLD THE PRECISE CENTER OF THE FRG POLITICAL SPECTRUM. HIS PARTY'S APPEAL TO THE VOTERS (10.6 PERCENT IN THE 1980 ELECTIONS) AND HIS PARTY'S HARD CORE SUPPORT (ABOUT 3 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE) ARE SMALL. BUT BUILDING FROM AN APPETITE FOR REASONABLENESS, WHICH CONTRASTS WITH

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FREQUENT SCHMIDT IRASCIBILITY, GENSCHER CAN DEVELOP CERTAIN ISSUES AND MAXIMIZE HIS OWN AND HIS PARTY'S LEVERAGE.

14. ON DEFENSE, GENSCHER AND THE FDP HAVE NOT FOUGHT FOR A BIGGER DEFENSE BUDGET; NOR HAVE THEY SHOWN MUCH INTEREST IN THE STOESEL DEMARCHE. ON ERW, GENSCHER HAS LARGELY CONFINED HIMSELF TO CALLING FOR A RETURN TO REASONABLENESS IN SPD CONSIDERATION OF IT. LIKE SCHMIDT, HE HAS PUBLICLY LAID HIS POLITICAL LIFE ON THE LINE IN SUPPORT OF MODERNIZED TNE AND THE 1979 NATO DECISION.

BT

#6984

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SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE446
STU5149
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #6984/03 2441646
ZNY CCCCC
O 011538Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9794
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFHUU/NATO COLLECTIVE
RUFHER/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 5162
RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4857
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0882
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2604
RUFHMO/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7628
ZEN/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL HAMBURG POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL STUTTGART POUCH
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 16984

MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLADS

15. AS FOREIGN MINISTER, GENSCHER CONTINUES TO PURSUE CERTAIN IDEALS AND SOLUTIONS OF PROBLEMS ABOUT WHICH HE FEELS DEEPLY. TWO PROMINENT CURRENT EXAMPLES ARE ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD AND STRENGTHENED EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION. UNLIKE SOME COALITION POLITICIANS, GENSCHER IS AN EXPLICIT ADVOCATE OF PURSUIT OF THESE IDEALS IN ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE WOULD WELCOME RECOGNITION OF THIS.

16. GENSCHER IS PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT NAMIBIA. THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INCURSION INTO ANGOLA WILL REINFORCE HIS CONCERNS. WHILE HE SHARES U.S. OBJECTIVES OF INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, AND AN ANGOLA FREE OF ALL OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE (CUBAN, SOVIET, OR SOUTH AFRICAN), HE IS NOT SURE OF OUR TACTICS. HE WILL RAISE NAMIBIA WITH THE

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SECRETARY.

17. DOMESTICALLY, AN INTERNAL FDP POLL RECENTLY SHOWED THAT THE FDP COULD CHANGE COALITION PARTNERS WITH A LOSS OF ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF ITS 1980 ELECTORATE. THE EVIDENCE IS THAT GENSCHER WILL CONTINUE TO USE HIS POSITION TO GOOD ADVANTAGE, NOT TO THREATEN DISSOLUTION OF THE COALITION BUT TO OBTAIN INCREASED LEVERAGE WITHIN IT, FOR EXAMPLE ON THE BUDGET.

18. IN SUM, THE SECRETARY WILL FIND A TROUBLED CHANCELLOR, MUCH AT ODDS WITH HIS OWN PARTY, ALLIED WITH AN FDP WHICH, WHATEVER THE SPECULATION, STILL SEEMS TO HAVE MORE TO GAIN BY CONTINUING THE CURRENT COALITION. BOTH SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER WILL BE LOOKING FOR EXPOSITION OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS - PARTICULARLY OF OUR SERIOUS INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS. THEY MAY WANT ASSURANCES OF CLOSER COORDINATION ON DELICATE MATTERS SUCH AS ERW, WHICH CAN COMPLICATE THEIR POLITICAL BALANCING ACTS IN BONN AND PUT AT JEOPARDY POLICIES THEY ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE, SUCH AS BOTH PARTS OF THE NATO 1979 DECISION.

WOESSNER

BT

#6984

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE355
UTS6885
DD RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #6958 2441310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011316Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9789
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BONN 16958
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR DENNIS BLAIR
E.O. 120651 GDS 9/1/87 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M
TAGS: OVIP (ALLEN, RICHARD V.)
SUBJ: VISIT OF RICHARD V. ALLEN
REF: (A) BONN 16726

1. (C) EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING APPOINTMENT REQUESTS FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN:
A. HELMUT KOHL WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALLEN ALONE AT THE DRESEN HOTEL AT 10:00 P.M. ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, FOLLOWING THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION'S WELCOMING RECEPTION/DINNER FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS.
B. OTTO VON DER GABLENTZ HAS SUGGESTED THAT ALLEN'S MEETINGS WITH HIM AND STATE SECRETARY MANFRED LAHNSTEIN TAKE PLACE IN THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, BETWEEN 5:00 AND 6:00 P.M.
2. (C) PLEASE ADVISE IF THESE APPOINTMENTS ARE ACCEPTABLE AND ALSO IF ALLEN WOULD LIKE CHARGE WOESSNER TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO THE MEETINGS WITH VON DER GABLENTZ AND LAHNSTEIN.
3. (LOU) HANS RUEHLE OF THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION PLANS TO JOIN WOESSNER IN GREETING ALLEN ON HIS ARRIVAL AT COLOGNE AIRPORT ON SEPTEMBER 3.
4. (U) AN EMBASSY CAR AND DRIVER WILL BE AT ALLEN'S DISPOSAL THROUGHOUT HIS STAY IN BONN.
WOESSNER
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197-030/2 #35

BY CIS

NARA, DATE 4/27/11

SENSITIVE

STATE NO 15

QUT

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1804
SIT457 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 290439Z DEC 81 PSN: 011216
TOR: 363/0449Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /00:

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1804/01 3630449
O O 290439Z DEC 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 4647
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 5861
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 8176

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7025
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 341804
NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 12/28/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: PL

SUBJECT: POLAND: MESSAGE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. /S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY
HAIG TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (I.E.,
IN ORDER THAT IT IS RECEIVED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S
DECEMBER 29 ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET
UNION). THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR (BLANK):

TN SPITE OF COSMETIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE POLISH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REGIME OVER THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS, THE WIDESPREAD
REPRESSION OF THE POLISH POPULACE CONTINUES WITH NO
SIGN OF ABATING. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT
MOSCOW'S COMPLICITY IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S BASIC RIGHTS HAS IN ANY WAY LESSENED.
PRESIDENT BREZHNEV HAS RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
LETTER ON POLAND BY UNDERSCORING THE SOVIET UNION'S
SUPPORT FOR THE POLISH REGIME'S ACTIONS; BY REAFFIRMING

THE SOVIET UNION'S "RIGHT" TO INTERVENE IN POLISH
AFFAIRS; AND BY ACCUSING THOSE WHO DEFEND THE BASIC
FREEDOMS EMBODIED IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT AS THE GUILTY PARTIES. THE SOVIET
LEADERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THEIR
READINESS TO PERMIT AND ENCOURAGE THE BEGINNING OF A
PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN POLAND; YET TO DATE WE

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F97-030/2 #36

BY

CAS

NARA, DATE

4/27/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1804

DTG: 290439Z DEC 81 PSN: 011216

HAVE SEEN NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THEIR GOAL IS ANYTHING LESS THAN THE END OF THE POLISH REFORM MOVEMENT.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS THEREFORE DETERMINED THAT HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BEGIN TO TAKE CONCRETE MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS DECIDED THAT THE FOLLOWING STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY BY THE UNITED STATES AND WILL ANNOUNCE ALL BUT THE LAST TWO ON DECEMBER 29:

- . 1. ALL AEROFLOT SERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES WILL BE SUSPENDED.
- . 2. THE SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION IS BEING CLOSED.
- . 3. THE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL OF LICENSES FOR THE EXPORT TO THE USSR OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, COMPUTERS AND OTHER HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MATERIALS IS BEING SUSPENDED.
- . 4. NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT ARE BEING POSTPONED.
- . 5. NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME AGREEMENT ARE BEING SUSPENDED. AND A NEW REGIME OF PORT-ACCESS CONTROLS WILL BE PUT INTO EFFECT FOR ALL SOVIET SHIPS WHEN THE CURRENT AGREEMENT EXPIRES ON DECEMBER 31.

SECSTATE WASHDC 1804

DTG: 290439Z DEC 81 PSN: 011216

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- . 6. LICENSES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXPORT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN EXPANDED LIST OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT. ISSUANCE OF SUCH LICENSES WILL BE SUSPENDED. THIS INCLUDES PIPELAYERS.
- . 7. U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS COMING UP FOR RENEWAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, INCLUDING THE AGREEMENTS ON ENERGY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WILL NOT BE RENEWED. THERE WILL BE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL OTHER U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS.
- . 8. RADIO BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ANTI-JAMMING ACTIVITIES WILL BE INTENSIFIED.
- 9. CONDEMNATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN POLAND WILL BE STEPPED UP. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE PRESIDENT WILL URGE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE BY THE ILO.

I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE MEASURES, LIKE THOSE WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED TOWARD THE POLISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES, ARE AIMED AT REESTABLISHING THE CONDITIONS FOR RECONCILIATION AND A RESUMPTION OF THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL IN POLAND. THEY REPRESENT THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND AN EARNEST OF OUR COMMITMENT TO MEET REPRESSION AND INTERVENTION WITH CONCRETE AND SERIOUS RESPONSES. BUT THEY ALSO ARE REVERSIBLE IF REPRESSION AND SOVIET COMPLICITY IN POLAND ARE REVERSED.

THESE MEASURES ARE IN LINE WITH AND IN SOME CASES

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1804
SIT456 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 290439Z DEC 81 PSN: 011218
TOR: 363/0450Z

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1804/02 3630449
O O 290439Z DEC 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 4648
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 5862
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 8177

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7026
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 341804
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IDENTICAL TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE NATO CONTINGENCY PLAN -- ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT GO AS FAR, SINCE THAT PLAN WAS ESTABLISHED AS A RESPONSE TO OVERT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION. THERE ARE APPROPRIATE RESPONSES REMAINING IF THE REPRESSION IN POLAND CONTINUES AND THE SOVIET ROLE THERE ESCALATES.

IT IS ONLY THROUGH CONCERTED ACTION THAT THERE WILL BE ANY CHANCE FOR A RETURN TO NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE IN POLAND. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, AND URGE THAT YOU TAKE PARALLEL STEPS OF YOUR OWN TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMON RESOLVE AND THE COST TO THE SOVIET UNION OF ITS ROLE IN THE POLISH TRAGEDY.

(FOR LONDON, PARIS ONLY) WE SHOULD STAY IN ESPECIALLY CLOSE TOUCH IN THE QUADRIPARTITE CONTEXT. IN THAT REGARD, I HAVE EXPRESSED TO HANS-DIETRICH THE HOPE THAT THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN PREPARING, FOR PRESENTATION IN THE NAC, SUGGESTED THEMES FOR ALLIED DEMARCHES IN MOSCOW, WARSAW, OTHER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND IN THE THIRD WORLD. I HOPE THAT THE ALLIED DEMARCHES CAN REFLECT WESTERN UNITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS TAKEN. (END LONDON, PARIS ONLY)

(FOR BONN ONLY) WE SHOULD STAY IN ESPECIALLY CLOSE TOUCH IN THE QUADRIPARTITE CONTEXT. IN THAT REGARD, I HOPE THAT THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN PREPARING, FOR PRESENTATION IN THE NAC, SUGGESTED THEMES FOR ALLIED DEMARCHES IN MOSCOW, WARSAW, OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND IN THE THIRD WORLD. WE HAVE TRANSMITTED TO YOUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT THEMES. OUR COMMENTS TAKE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISIONS INTO ACCOUNT, AND FOLLOW THE GENERALLY FIRMER LINE WHICH I BELIEVE IS NECESSARY IN THIS THIRD WEEK OF UNABATED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 290439Z DEC 81 PSN: 011218

REPRESSION IN POLAND. (END BONN ONLY)

WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO MAINTAIN EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE SUFFERING OF THE PEOPLE OF POLAND. WE WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PROVIDED WE CAN BE CERTAIN THAT IT WILL GO TO THE NEEDY.

AS YOU CAN SEE, WE HAVE TAKEN NO DECISIONS THAT WOULD AFFECT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZES THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO ALTER OUR STANCE UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS.

WE CONTINUE TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT A MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN POLAND -- POSSIBLY THE FIRST OR SECOND WEEK IN JANUARY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF SUCH A MEETING AND THE TIMING.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT.

4. POSTS SHOULD REPORT REACTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 1804

DTG: 290439Z DEC 81 PSN: 011218

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0733
SIT468 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 262222Z DEC 81 PSN: 009063
TOR: 361/0200Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0733 3602228
O 262222Z DEC 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4623

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 340733
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 12/26/01 (EAGLEBURGER, L.S.)

TAGS: OTRA (SCHMIDT, HELMUT)
SUBJECT: WORKING WITH THE FRG ON POLAND

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS WE LOOK AHEAD TO THE SCHMIDT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN JANUARY 5, IT IS CLEAR THAT POLAND, IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WILL BE THE MAJOR ISSUE. AT THIS POINT, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SOME MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITH OUR GERMANS FRIENDS ON THIS ISSUE, AND OUR ABILITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE SOVIET ON THE POLISH ISSUE WILL BE SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO NARROW SIGNIFICANTLY THE SPACE BETWEEN US AND THE FRG OVER THIS ISSUE.

3. IN CONSIDERING HOW WE CAN BEST ENCOURAGE THE CHANCELLOR TO MOVE CLOSER TO OUR POSITION, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE FRG TRADE UNIONS MAY WELL BE THE KEY POINT OF PRESSURE. WE HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST YOUR REPORT ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

YOUR RECENT MEETING WITH HEINZ-OSCAR VETTER AND THE GOOD RELATIONSHIP WHICH YOU SEEM TO HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH HIM. YOUR PLAN TO MEET WITH THE DGB'S ENTIRE GOVERNING BOARD IS AN EXCELLENT INITIATIVE. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT STRIKES US THAT THE DGB, DESPITE ITS OFT-STATED SUPPORT FOR DETENTE, IS LIKELY TO BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE OBVIOUS EFFORT BY THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE SOVIETS TO DESTROY SOLIDARITY.

4. ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR ADVICE AS TO HOW WE CAN BEST ENCOURAGE THE DGB TO BECOME MORE OUTSPOKEN AGAINST WHAT IS HAPPENING IN POLAND AND PUT PRESSURE ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE SPD, TO ADJUST ITS POSITION. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE AFL/CIO NEXT WEEK TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO BECOME MORE

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NLS F97-030/2 437
BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 262222Z DEC 81 PSN: 009063

ACTIVELY INVOLVED WITH THE DGB. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IT
WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO GET TOGETHER WITH VETTER
AGAIN. GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION? ARE THERE
OTHER DGB OFFICIALS WHO COULD BE MORE HELPFUL, IN PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, THAN VETTER? HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 0733

DTG: 262222Z DEC 81 PSN: 009063

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0493
SIT472 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 242211Z DEC 81 PSN: 007154
TOR: 358/2232Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOS:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #0493 3582231
R 242211Z DEC 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN 4588

INFO WHITE HOUSE 7016
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 340493
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/31/87 (NILES, THOMAS M. T.)
TAGS: GE, PL, UR

SUBJECT: TEXT OF GENSCHER-HAIG LETTER ON POLAND
S - ENTIRE TEXT.

FOR EMBASSY'S INFORMATION, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FOREIGN
MINISTER GENSCHER'S LETTER DATED DECEMBER 17 TO SECRETARY
HAIG.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR AL,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COMMUNICATION OF DECEMBER 15,
1981.

~~REDACTED~~

~~DACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDAC~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~DACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

YOURS SINCERELY,

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NLS F97-030/2 #38
By GAJ, NARA, Date 4/27/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 242211Z DEC 81 PSN: 007154

SGD. HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

END TEXT. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 0493

DTG: 242211Z DEC 81 PSN: 007154

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 4154
SIT982 DATE 12/09/81

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TOR: 342/1903Z

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EOB:
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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHOL #4154/01 3421406
O 081402Z DEC 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2356

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 24154
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/8/2001 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M
TAGS: EGEN, EFIN, GE, US, UK
SUBJECT: SCHMIDT ON ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND POLICY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I MET WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ON DECEMBER 7 FOR OVER 90 MINUTES. WE COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS, AND SEPARATE MESSAGES DEAL WITH GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PORTION OF OUR DISCUSSION. THIS MESSAGE DETAILS SCHMIDT'S VIEWS ON THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE U.S., GERMANY, AND THE U.K.; HIS VIEW ON THE ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES; AND ON ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION.

3. U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
SCHMIDT BEGAN HIS REVIEW BY NOTING THAT THE OECD FORECAST FOR 1982 WAS "GLOOMY." HE SAID THIS WAS HIS VIEW AS WELL, AND THAT HE WAS PREDICTING PRIVATELY A DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE U.S. EXPORT DEFICIT IN 1982 WOULD BE ABOUT DOLS 100 BILLION. HE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN INTEREST RATES IN THE COMING MONTHS, ALTHOUGH PREVIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT INTEREST RATES HAD SUBSIDED FOR THE MOMENT. "I

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEE A CAPITAL MARKET CREDIT CRUNCH AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO FINANCE THE DEFICIT," SCHMIDT SAID. HE SAID HE DOUBTED THAT EVEN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS COULD SUPPORT THE NECESSARY BORROWING WITHOUT INTEREST RATE IMPACTS.

4. I SUGGESTED THAT THE DIFFICULT TIME WITH REGARD TO INTEREST RATES IS LIKELY TO BE WHEN RECOVERY STARTED, TO WHICH HE RESPONDED "IF RECOVERY OCCURS AT ALL NEXT YEAR." SCHMIDT SAID THAT BY WINTER'S END, HE BELIEVED UNEMPLOYMENT WOULD BE ALMOST 10 PERCENT. HE SAID THIS WOULD LEAD TO A SITUATION "WHERE UNEMPLOYMENT SPREADS AROUND THE WORLD." HE ADDED THAT HE SAW "SOME PARALLEL" TO THE SITUATION IN THE EARLY 1930'S. "I DO NOT SAY THE RECIPES OUGHT TO BE THE SAME AS THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN

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BY GHS

NARA, DATE

4/27/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081402Z DEC 81 PSN: 041932

THEN, BUT I AM DEEPLY WORRIED," HE STATED.

5. "THE U. S. BALANCE OF TRADE IS IN DEFICIT, AND I EXPECT RISING INTEREST RATES. I HOPE I AM WRONG." THE CHANCELLOR CONCLUDED THIS PART OF OUR TALK BY ASKING ME "TO TELL THE PRESIDENT" OF HIS PERSONAL CONCERN.

6. ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING:

SCHMIDT SAID HE BELIEVED THAT NO GOVERNMENT "UNDERSTANDS THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC CRISIS NOR HOW WE AS A WHOLE WILL GET OVER IT." HE SAID THAT MITTERRAND BELIEVES HE HAS THE ANSWER; THATCHER BELIEVES SHE IS RIGHT; AND, OF COURSE, HE BELIEVED HE WAS DOING THE RIGHT THING HERE IN GERMANY. SCHMIDT SAID THAT WHILE ALL LEADERS BELIEVE THEY ARE DOING "THE RIGHT THING," THIS SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS "CANNOT WORK." SCHMIDT SAID HIS PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN LONDON WAS ONE OF "OVERALL HELPLESSNESS."

7. SCHMIDT SAID "ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IS MUCH GREATER THAN IN THE 1930'S. THIS IS A WORLD CRISIS WHICH CUTS DEEP INTO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL." HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS ARE NOW "ENTANGLED TOO MUCH WITH THE WEST'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM TO BE LEFT UNTOUCHED;" THAT IS TO SAY, "THE FULL IMPACT OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIC CRISIS WOULD HIT THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS." HE SAID THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT,

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DTG: 081402Z DEC 81 PSN: 041932

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BREZHNEV ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BY SAYING, "WE (EAST AND WEST) ARE BOTH IN THE SAME DIFFICULT SITUATION."

8. U. S. ECONOMIC POLICY ROLE:

SCHMIDT SAID HE WANTED THE U. S. TO UNDERSTAND THAT "DESPITE THEIR NOT KNOWING IT, THEY LEAD WORLD ECONOMIC POLICY. THERE IS NO WAY TO EVADE THAT RESPONSIBILITY." HE OBSERVED THAT THE UNITED STATES ACCOUNTED FOR 35 PERCENT OF THE OECD'S GNP; THE DOLLAR FOR 80 PERCENT OF OFFICIAL CURRENCY RESERVES; AND THAT 60 PERCENT OF EURO-MARKET TRADING TOOK PLACE IN DOLLARS. "U. S. ECONOMIC POLICY IS THEREFORE AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT," HE SAID. SCHMIDT RECOGNIZED THAT U. S. ECONOMIC POLICY WAS DEvised FOR NATIONAL PURPOSES. BUT, HE SAID, ITS CONSEQUENCES WERE OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. "THIS IS NOT UNDERSTOOD AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE OR THE TREASURY,"

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DTG: 081402Z DEC 81 PSN: 041932

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 4154
SIT981 DATE 12/09/81

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHOL #4154/02 3421409
O 081402Z DEC 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2357

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 24154
CORRECTED COPY (CAPTION NODIS ADDED TO 2ND SECTION)
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HE SAID. I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD IN THE
CONGRESS, A COMMENT WITH WHICH SCHMIDT READILY AGREED.

9. SCHMIDT SAID THE UNITED STATES SHOULD "ACKNOWLEDGE
ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE WHETHER WANTED OR NOT." HE URGED
U.S. POLICY MAKERS TO BE "HONEST" AND NOT TO "SAY YOU
WIN VICTORIES BY CUTTING TAXES AND NOT EXPENDITURES."

10. IN CONCLUSION, SCHMIDT SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR
THE UNITED STATES TO SHOW THAT IT WAS CONSIDERING EURO-
PEAN NEEDS, AS WELL AS ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS WHEN DETER-
MINING ECONOMIC POLICY.

11. FRG ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
SCHMIDT SAID THAT THE 1982 GERMAN BUDGET DEFICIT "WILL BE
LESS THAN THAT IN 1975 OR 1976, IN EITHER REAL OR NOMINAL
TERMS". "WE HAVE CUT OUR CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT BY
ONE-HALF OR BETTER." "RELATIVELY SPEAKING, GERMANY WILL
GET AWAY BEST (OF THE EUROPEAN OECD COUNTRIES), BUT ONLY
RELATIVELY SPEAKING. WE WILL STILL SUFFER," HE SAID.
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE FRG IS NOW AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL SINCE
1952.

-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

12.
I COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE NOW MORE SOCIAL PROPS TO REDUCE
THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT THAN THERE HAD BEEN IN THE
1930'S. TO THIS, SCHMIDT RESPONDED "YES, IF WE CAN
FINANCE THEM LONG ENOUGH."

-

13. U.K. ECONOMY:
I ASKED THE CHANCELLOR FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE UK
ECONOMY, NOTING THE APPARENT RECENT UPTURN AND A VERY
SIGNIFICANT RECENT INCREASE IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY. SCHMIDT
SAID THIS DID NOT COME OUT AT THE RECENT EUROPEAN COUNCIL
MEETING IN LONDON. SCHMIDT SAID THAT IN THE UK CASE HE
BELIEVED THAT HEAVY LAYOFFS OF UNDEREMPLOYED WORKERS HAD
INCREASED PER CAPITA PRODUCTIVITY. IN GERMANY, EMPLOYERS
HAVE HELD ON TO WORKERS. I RESPONDED THAT A PRODUCTIVITY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081402Z DEC 81 PSN: 041933

IMPROVEMENT HAD FAVORABLE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFITS, FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT, AND FOR THE INFLATION RATE.

14 U. K. POLITICAL SITUATION:

SCHMIDT THEN TURNED TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION SAYING THAT "THE MOOD IN ENGLAND IS DISASTROUS. BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE EXHAUSTED THE CONFIDENCE THEY HAD WITH THE PEOPLE." SCHMIDT DESCRIBED THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS BY SAYING THAT "THE WHOLE THING IS AN EVASION BY THE PUBLIC." THE ECONOMIC SITUATION (IN THE U.K.) HAS GRAVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, SCHMIDT CONTINUED, SAYING THAT THE BY-ELECTION IN CROSBY SHOWS THAT THE PUBLIC IS "DEEPLY IRRITATED." IN ADDITION, HE SAID, "MARGARET THATCHER MUST FACE A REVOLUTION IN HER OWN PARTY."

15.

I ASKED THE CHANCELLOR IF HE KNEW SHIRLEY WILLIAMS, SAYING THAT TO A LIMITED DEGREE I BELIEVED THAT THE CROSBY ELECTION MUST BE SEEN AS A PERSONAL SUCCESS. WILLIAMS IS AN ATTRACTIVE CANDIDATE WHO DID WELL AT THE POLLS ON THIS BASIS. SCHMIDT SAID HE BELIEVED THIS HAD HAD ONLY A LIMITED EFFECT. "WE HAVE A DIFFERENT SYSTEM HERE IN EUROPE WHERE A VOTER WOULD NOT PAY TRIBUTE TO HER (WILLIAMS) PERSONAL IMAGE," HE NOTED. UNDERSCORING HIS POINT, SCHMIDT COMMENTED THAT IN HIS CONSTITUENCY IN HAMBURG THERE HAPPENED TO BE A LOCAL NEWSPAPER. THERE WERE NO LOCAL RADIO OR TV STATIONS, HE SAID, AND NONE OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SEVEN OTHER HAMBURG CONSTITUENCIES HAVE LOCAL MEDIA.

16.

SUMMING UP, SCHMIDT SAID "THE CONSERVATIVES HAVE LED TO NOTHING AND LABOR IS COMPLETELY ROTTEN." BURNS

BONN 4154

DTG: 081402Z DEC 81 PSN: 041933

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 4153
SIT977 DATE 12/09/81

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TOR: 343/0344Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHOL #4153/01 3421355
O 081347Z DEC 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2352

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 24153
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/08/2001 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M
TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, GE, US
SUBJECT: SCHMIDT ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND OTHER
POLITICAL TOPICS
REF: BONN 24114
-

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON DECEMBER 7, I HAD A WIDE-RANGING TALK WITH CHANCEL-
LOR SCHMIDT WHICH LASTED OVER 90 MINUTES. HE WAS ASSISTED
BY VON DER GABLENTZ AS NOTETAKER AND I BY AN EMBASSY
OFFICER.

3. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS. SEPARATE MESSAGES
COVER GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS (REFTEL) AND ECONOMIC MATTERS.
TOPICS COVERED AND REPORTED IN THIS MESSAGE INCLUDE
THE INF TALKS, EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, A POSSIBLE
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EUROPE, SPEECH MAKING
BY U.S. OFFICIALS, THE GDR-FRG SUMMIT AND GREECE.
-

4. INF TALKS:
SCHMIDT SAID HE HAD MET WITH U.S. CHIEF NEGOTIATOR PAUL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NITZE AND HAD GIVEN HIM "MY IDEAS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE." SCHMIDT SAID THE
U.S. MUST MAKE "A GENUINE EFFORT" TO SHOW THAT IT IS
SERIOUS ABOUT THESE TALKS. HE SAID "THESE NEGOTIATIONS
MUST BE LED SO AS TO CONVINCE EUROPEANS THAT THE AMERICANS
ARE MAKING A TRUE AND SERIOUS EFFORT AT DISARMAMENT."
HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS
OF THE TALKS WOULD BE "ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT" AND THAT
HE HAD SUGGESTED TO NITZE THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD APPOINT
A HIGH-RANKING PERSON TO MANAGE PUBLIC RELATIONS. HE
SAID HE WAS NOT THINKING PRIMARILY OF PRESS RELEASES
AND THE LIKE BUT IN BROADER TERMS. SCHMIDT SAID THAT THE
EUROPEANS SHOULD BE BRIEFED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE
TALKS AND THAT, WITH CAREFUL COORDINATION, REFERENCES
TO THE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN SPEECHES BY
BOTH U.S. AND EUROPEAN CABINET MEMBERS AND LEADERS. HE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS

F97-030/2 #40

By CAS, NARA, Date 9/27/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081347Z DEC 81 PSN: 042679

SAID HE BELIEVED THAT INCLUSION OF SUCH REFERENCES TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN GENEVA WOULD INFLUENCE NOT ONLY THE SOVIETS, BUT ALSO SERVE AS A MEANS OF CONVINCING EUROPEANS THAT THE U. S. WAS COMMITTED TO THIS PROCESS.

5. U. S. -EUROPEAN RELATIONS:

I ASKED THE CHANCELLOR WHAT HE WOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT IF THEY HAD A MEETING AT WHICH NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT SO THAT THEY COULD BE VERY FRANK.

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6. SCHMIDT SAID HE WOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT "THERE IS NO NEED TO BOTHER ABOUT IRRITATION IF THERE ARE NO CAUSES." AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE "BELLIGERENT AND BELLICOSE" SPEECHES GIVEN BY SOME IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR. THESE SPEECHES, HE SAID, HAD DEEPLY ALIENATED MANY INFLUENTIAL EUROPEANS. HE SAID THAT IF THE SPEECH MADE BY THE PRESIDENT ON NOVEMBER 18 HAD BEEN GIVEN IN MARCH, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO TALK OF THE U. S. AND EUROPE DRIFTING APART. SCHMIDT SAID THE PRESIDENT SHOULD STICK TO HIS NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH AND TO ITS SUBSTANCE.

7. COMING BACK TO THE POINT LATER IN OUR TALK, SCHMIDT REPEATED THAT SPEECHES SUCH AS HAD BEEN GIVEN BEFORE NOVEMBER 18 WERE IRRITATING IN EUROPE EVEN IF FACTUAL. HE SAID THEY ONLY SERVED TO UNDERCUT THE INFLUENCE OF THE U. S. IN EUROPE. "DO YOU REALIZE THAT THE MAJORITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF EUROPEANS NOW BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS STRONGER THAN THE U. S. ?," HE ASKED. I OBSERVED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE U. S. DOCUMENT ON COMPARATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH HAD NOT HELPED IN THIS REGARD. SCHMIDT AGREED, CALLING THE PUBLICATION "RIDICULOUS." HE SAID THE U. S. SHOULD IMPROVE ITS WEAPONRY, BUT "WITH LESS DRAMA AND DRAMATICS."

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8. WHAT WAS GOOD DOMESTIC POLITICS WAS FREQUENTLY MIS-INTERPRETED ABROAD, HE SAID. CITING THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE OF DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS FOR NEARLY 40 YEARS, HE SAID THAT "YOU DON'T DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS LIKE THEY ARE THE DEVIL." HE SAID WHAT IS NEEDED IS TO DEAL IN A "CALM, DECISIVE BUT RELAXED WAY." HE SAID THE EUROPEANS NEED TO SEE THE U. S. RELAX, AND STOP ITS "CONTORTIONS."

9. THE WAY TO DEAL WITH MOSCOW, SCHMIDT SAID, IS NOT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BY SPEECHES OR INTERVIEWS. THESE, HE SAID, ARE NOT
READ BY THE SOVIETS. MOSCOW MUST BE DEALT WITH QUIETLY.

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10. POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EUROPE:
I ASKED THE CHANCELLOR FOR HIS VIEW ON A POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EUROPE, EMPHASIZING THAT I DID NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. SCHMIDT SAID HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE PRESIDENT TO COME TO EUROPE IN THE EARLY FALL. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD MADE A MISTAKE BY COMING TO EUROPE ONLY FIVE MONTHS AFTER HIS INAUGURATION. HE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE FOR THE VISIT, SAID SCHMIDT, AND IT HAD NOT GONE WELL.

11. VON DER GABLENTZ NOTED THAT THE NEXT ECONOMIC SUMMIT WOULD BE HELD IN FRANCE IN EARLY JUNE AND THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT CONSIDER OTHER STOPS IN CONNECTION WITH THAT TRIP. SCHMIDT SAID THAT VISITS TO TWO OR THREE OTHER DESTINATIONS MIGHT BE USEFUL. EIGHTEEN MONTHS WOULD HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S INAUGURATION AND THAT HE WOULD THEN HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME FOR PREPARATION.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

12. I ASKED IF TIMING OF A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EUROPE SHOULD NOT DEPEND ON PROGRESS IN GENEVA. SCHMIDT SAID, "NO, BY THAT TIME THERE WILL HAVE BEEN AT LEAST ONE CONFERENCE CRISIS." HE BELIEVED THE CRISIS WOULD COME AFTER BOTH SIDES HAD GIVEN INITIAL EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR POSITIONS AND THESE WERE ANALYZED. HE SAID THIS MIGHT HAPPEN IN MARCH OR AT SOME OTHER TIME BUT THAT SUCH A CRISIS WOULD BE "NORMAL AND WOULD HAVE TO HAPPEN."

13. U. S. "LOOSE TALK":
IN CONNECTION WITH U. S. -EUROPEAN RELATIONS, SCHMIDT SAID THERE HAD ALSO BEEN SOME "LOOSE TALK" ABOUT HIM. HE SAID THAT HE HAD READ THIS IN THE PAPERS AND IN REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON. "PERSONALLY, I DON'T MIND THIS, BUT POLITICALLY, I DO," HE SAID. WASHINGTON MUST REALIZE THAT "IF THEY LOSE THIS GOVERNMENT, THEY WILL LOSE THE

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ONLY REAL, RELIABLE ALLY THEY HAVE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT (IN GERMANY) WOULD MEET WITH OPPOSITION; NOBODY (ELSE) CAN HOLD THE VARIOUS INTERESTS TOGETHER." KOHL CERTAINLY COULD NOT.

14. FRG-GDR RELATIONS:

SCHMIDT MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD BE SPENDING FRIDAY AND THE WEEKEND (DECEMBER 11-13) IN THE GDR. HE SAID THAT HE GUESSED THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT CHANGE IN FRG-GDR RELATIONS AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT. HE SAW THE TRIP AS A "PSYCHOLOGICAL HELP AND BOOST TO THE GERMANS LIVING OVER THERE." HE SAID HE AND HONECKER WOULD BE MEETING OUTSIDE OF BERLIN, BOTH BECAUSE SCHMIDT COULD NOT GO THERE WITHOUT ALTERING BERLIN'S STATUS AND BECAUSE THE GDR DID NOT WANT ANY POSSIBLE PUBLIC DISPLAY IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT.

15.

WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE GDR, SCHMIDT RESPONDED THAT HE WAS STRONGER AND COULD AFFORD TO MAKE THE GESTURE. SCHMIDT SAID HONECKER PLANNED TO MAKE A COUNTER VISIT IN 1982 AND WILL USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THEIR MEETING OUTSIDE OF BONN TO VISIT HIS OLD HOME TOWN IN THE SAAR.

16.

I ASKED IF HONECKER WAS TRULY A RUSSIAN PUPPET. TO THIS MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SCHMIDT REPLIED THAT HONECKER WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY NOT ACCEPT THE DESCRIPTION OF "PUPPET", SAYING THAT HONECKER PROBABLY VIEWED THE GDR AND THE SOVIET UNION BOTH AS MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST COMMUNITY. SCHMIDT SAID THAT ARGUMENTS TOOK PLACE PRIVATELY WITHIN THE GDR POLITBURO AND THAT OTHER GOVERNMENT MEMBERS ARE MORE SUBSERVIENT THAN HONECKER, WHO APPEARED RELATIVELY SELF-CONFIDENT. FOR EXAMPLE, SCHMIDT SAID POLITBURO MEMBER (HERMAN) AXEN WAS MUCH CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN HONECKER.

17.

SCHMIDT SAID THAT HE BELIEVED HONECKER WOULD LIKE TO BE LIKE THE HUNGARIAN PARTY LEADER KADAR. IN SCHMIDT'S VIEW, KADAR WOULD BE THE ONLY EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADER WHO WOULD BE ELECTED IF FREE ELECTIONS WERE TO BE HELD. KADAR KEEPS HIS DISTANCE FROM MOSCOW BY TRANSLATING SOVIET DEMANDS

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18.
I ASKED IF HONECKER STILL BELIEVED IN A "GERMAN NATION."
SCHMIDT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT THAT IN THE PAST HONECKER
HAD REFERRED TO THE GDR AS THE "SOCIALIST STATE OF THE
GERMAN NATION." THIS REFERENCE HAS NOT BEEN USED RECENTLY
ACCORDING TO SCHMIDT. VON DER GABLENTZ NOTED THAT ABOUT
A YEAR AGO HONECKER HAD AGAIN EMPLOYED SIMILAR PHRASEOLOGY
WHEN REFERRING TO THE GDR BUT THAT THIS HAD BEEN QUICKLY
DROPPED AND HAD NOT BEEN SEEN AGAIN.

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20.
ON GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, SCHMIDT SAID THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT TO KNOW THE LAST 60 YEARS OF HISTORY OF THE
REGION. HE SPOKE OF THE TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS AND OF
THE "AMBIGUOUS" ROME OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS. HE SAID "THE
WEST SHOULD NOT BE TOO SYMPATHETIC TOWARD ECEVIT," AS IT

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