

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files

**Folder Title:** Germany FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] (09/01/1981-12/31/1981) (4 of 8)

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
Country File  
**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. III 9/1/81 – 12/31/81 (4)

**Archivist:** smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-030 (Friedrich)  
**Date:** 05/24/00

Box 14

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	080653Z DEC 81 1p R 4/27/01 F97-030/2 # 41	12/8/81	P1/F1
2. cable	071819Z DEC 81 2p R 11 u #42	12/7/81	P1/F1
3. cable	020122Z DEC 81 4p R u #43	12/2/81	P1/F1
4. cable	281858Z NOV 81 2p R u #44	11/28/81	P1/F1
5. cable	171454Z NOV 81 4p R u #45	11/17/81	P1/F1
6. cable	161713Z NOV 81 6p R u #46	11/16/81	P1/F1
7. cable	161710Z NOV 81 2p R u #47	11/16/81	P1/F1
8. cable	text same as document 7 1p R u #48	11/16/81	P1/F1
9. cable	051713Z NOV 81 7p R u #49	11/5/81	P1/F1
10. cable	280158Z OCT 81 3p R u #50	10/28/81	P1/F1
11. cable	061715Z OCT 81 1p R u #51	10/6/81	P1/F1
12. cable	021827Z OCT 81 1p R u #52	10/2/81	P1/F1
13. cable	021808Z OCT 81 1p R u #53	10/2/81	P1/F1
14. cable	290046Z SEP 81 2p R u #54	9/29/81	P1/F1
15. cable	250225Z SEP 81 (Section 1 of 6 10021) 3p R u #55	9/25/81	P1/F1
16. cable	251575Z SEP 81 (Sections 2-6 of 6 10021) 14p R u #56	9/25/81	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      BONN 4118  
SIT983                      DATE 12/09/81

DTG: 080653Z DEC 81 PSN: 041347  
TOR: 342/0900Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MR  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #4118 3420654  
O 080653Z DEC 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2337

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 24118  
NODIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FROM  
EAGLEBURGER  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/07/01 (PRICE, THOMAS L.)  
TAGS: GE, OVIP (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)  
SUBJ: CANADIAN PROPOSAL FOR CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL  
IN BRUSSELS

1. ~~let~~ DURING MY TALKS WITH GENSCHER THIS MORNING,  
HE SAID THAT HE, TOO, FELT THAT THERE WAS NO REAL  
NEED FOR A CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL THIS WEEK,  
BUT THAT THE GERMANS WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE  
IN ORDER TO OBLIGE THE CANADIANS. IF WE TOLD THE  
CANADIANS WE THOUGHT IT WAS UNNECESSARY, THE GERMANS  
WOULD NOT DISAGREE WITH US.  
BURNS

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-038/2 #41  
BY CHS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 4114  
SIT984 DATE 12/09/81

DTG: 071819Z DEC 81 PSN: 041013  
TOR: 342/0226Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: N O D I S / C H E C K L I S T

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHOL #4114 3411824  
O 071819Z DEC 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2333

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 24114

NODIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12065: XGDS 12/7/87 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-E

TAGS: ENSD, EGEN, EAID, GE

SUBJECT: SCHMIDT'S VIEWS ON GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS.

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT A MEETING WITH THE CHANCELLOR ON DECEMBER 7 ON ANOTHER SUBJECT (REPORTED SEPTELS), I RAISED THE ISSUE OF GERMAN SUPPORT FOR THE KITTANI RESOLUTION REGARDING GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THIS RESOLUTION WOULD BE TROUBLESOME TO US AS IT WOULD REDUCE THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF THE IMF AND THE IBRD. I TOLD THE CHANCELLOR OF MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FRG HAD DECIDED WITH OTHERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO GO ALONG WITH THE RESOLUTION, BUT TO INDICATE THAT ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE RESOLUTION DID NOT INVOLVE ANY CHANGE IN THE AUTONOMY OF THE IMF, THE IBRD, ETC. I EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THIS AMBIVALENCE. SCHMIDT RESPONDED FORCEFULLY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT "CERTAINLY WOULD NOT GIVE UP THE AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE" OF THE BANK OR FUND.

3. I SHOWED THE CHANCELLOR A COPY OF THE RESOLUTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND A COPY OF THE LETTER FROM SECRETARY REGAN TO FRG FINANCE MINISTER MATTHOEFER. SCHMIDT READ THE RESOLUTION CAREFULLY, SAYING HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIFICS OF THE ISSUE. I TOLD HIM THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT LIKE TO FIND ITSELF ISOLATED IN OPPOSITION TO THE RESOLUTION, AND THAT GERMAN AND U.K. SUPPORT OF SOME CHANGES IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE HELPFUL. I SAID IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAD DECIDED TO GO ALONG WITH THE EC AND ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION, BUT THAT MINISTERS MATTHOEFER AND LAMBSDORFF WERE NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY ABOUT IT. I EMPHASIZED THAT I WAS NOT SEEKING TO INVOLVE MYSELF IN A DEBATE WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BUT WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ALONE IN ITS DOUBTS OR OPPOSITION.

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F97-030/2 #442

BY CS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 4114

DTG: 071819Z DEC 81 PSN: 041013

4. THE CHANCELLOR REREAD PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE KITTANI RESOLUTION AND COMMENTED THAT THE TEXT WAS OPEN TO INTERPRETATION. HE SAID THERE "CERTAINLY WOULD BE CONFLICT" ABOUT ITS MEANING, AND THAT THIS WAS "MOST UNFORTUNATE". SCHMIDT NOTED THAT BOTH THE IBRD AND THE IMF WERE CREATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND SAID HE BELIEVED, GIVEN THE LDC MAJORITY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LIP SERVICE HAD TO BE PAID TO THEIR CONCERNS. I RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE AN ERROR TO POLITICIZE THESE TWO INSTITUTIONS. SCHMIDT SAID HE WAS NOT SO PESSIMISTIC. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID THAT IT CAME DOWN TO A QUESTION OF WHO WOULD PROVIDE THE MONEY. IF WE, THE DONOR COUNTRIES, DID NOT LIKE THE WAY THINGS WERE DEVELOPING, WE COULD CHANGE THINGS.

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5. SCHMIDT SAID HE HAD BEEN "A POLITICAL ANIMAL" TOO LONG TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO GET ONE'S WAY. HE CHARACTERIZED GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AS "NONSENSE" BUT SAID HE SAW "NO NEED TO MAKE ONE HUNDRED ENEMIES". HE THOUGHT NOTHING WOULD COME OUT OF THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS BUT THAT IT MET LDC NEEDS AND SHOULD CONTINUE. I SAID I SOUGHT TO WIN TIME TO WORK OUT A COORDINATED POLICY ON THIS ISSUE.

6. SCHMIDT RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD RAISE THE GERMAN POSITION AT THE CABINET MEETING ON WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 9 AND WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. HE ASKED VON DER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GABLENTZ, WHO TOOK NOTES FOR SCHMIDT, TO ALERT GENSCHER AND MATTHOEFER THAT HE WOULD RAISE THIS QUESTION. HE ALSO SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT FRENCH ECONOMICS AND FINANCE MINISTER DELORS WOULD GIVE ANYTHING AWAY. HE REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT "VERBAL PROGRESS" WAS NEEDED BUT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT "A BANK CAN NEVER BE RUN BY THE DEBTORS." BURNS

BONN 4114

DTG: 071819Z DEC 81 PSN: 041013

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 8512  
SIT690 DATE 12/02/81

DTG: 020122Z DEC 81 PSN: 033133  
TOR: 336/0148Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8512/01 3360146  
O R 020122Z DEC 81 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3695  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8776

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 6987  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 4392  
USMISSION USNATO 6184  
WHITE HOUSE 6985  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 318512

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 11/30/91

TAGS: NATO, PARM, UR, GE

SU T: SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH FRG FOREIGN OFFICE  
STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN - NOVEMBER 27, 1981

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSIONS WITH UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER (SEP-TEL), FRG FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN MET FOR THIRTY MINUTES WITH THE SECRETARY ON NOVEMBER 27 FOR A CONVERSATION ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT AND RELATED ISSUES. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE STRONG SUPPORT GIVEN BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH AND DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. WAS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT AND BELIEVED IT HELPED PROVIDE A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR NEXT STEPS ON INF. ONE POTENTIAL PROBLEM CONCERNED REPORTS THAT THE FRG WOULD ASK THAT TWO CONTINENTAL STATES ACCEPT MODERNIZED INF, RATHER THAN ONLY ONE WHICH WAS NOW THE CASE. IF SUCH REPORTS WERE MADE PUBLIC, THE ENTIRE FOUNDATION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE UNDERMINED. VON STADEN AGREED, BUT STRESSED THAT TH HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POSITION.

3. IN ADDITION TO VON STADEN, GERMAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING WERE AMBASSADOR HERMES, VON STADEN'S PERSONAL ASSISTANT VON BUTLAR AND EMBASSY OFFICER BUERSTEDDE. OTHER U. S. PARTICIPANTS WERE UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, PM DIRECTOR BURT AND EUR/CE DIRECTOR JOHN KORNBLUM. END SUMMARY.

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NLS F97-030/2 #43

BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 020122Z DEC 81 PSN: 033133

4. THE SECRETARY OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY EXPRESSING HIS THANKS TO MINISTER GENSCHER FOR SENDING VON STADEN TO WASHINGTON TO BRIEF THE U. S. ON RESULTS OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE TIMELY COORDINATION ON THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND THE HELPFUL FRG REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE AND GENSCHER HAD BOTH BEEN INVOLVED PERSONALLY IN THE PROCESS WHICH HAD RESULTED IN THE SPEECH. TH RO LEVEL IDEA HAD REALLY BEEN BORN DURING GENSCHER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW DURING WHICH HE HAD MADE A VERY STRONG PRESENTATION OF WESTERN VIEWS. IT COULD BE SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAD REALLY BEEN THE RESULT OF CLOSE GERMAN-AMERICAN CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. WAS ALSO PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN. THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT THE CHANCELLOR HAD GIVEN HIM ON HIS SPEECH AND LATER FOR TH ILLIANT MANNER IN WHICH HE HAD HANDLED THE DIFFICULT BREZHNEV VISIT. IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONE OR TW OBLEMS IN THE PRESS AFTERWARDS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN MENTIONED BY UNDER SECRETARY STOESSSEL AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. IN PARTICULAR, THE HINT OF SPECIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS OR OF A SEPARATE GERMAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MIDDLEMAN ROLE COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS IF NOT HANDLED CAREFULLY. HOWEVER, THESE WERE IN REALITY MORE QUESTIONS OF PRESS HANDLING AND SHOULD NOT CAUSE GREAT DIFFICULTIES.

6. OF MORE CONCERN WAS THE APPARENT GERMAN DESIRE, REPORTED BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS, THAT A SECOND EUROPEAN NATION AGREE TO DEPLOY INF AS A CONDITION FOR GERMAN DEPLOYMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS FIRST VERY CONCERNED THAT THESE REPORTS NOT BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. IF THEY WERE, THE INF NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE AFFECTED IN A PROFOUND WAY. SECOND, THE SECRETARY HOPED THAT THIS REQUEST COULD BE RECONSIDERED. SINCE HEARING THE REPORT FROM LUNS, THE U. S. HAD BEEN OVER THE RECORD AND HAD FOUND NO PREVIOUS MENTION OF THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENT BY TWO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE U. S. WAS READY TO DO EVERYTHING TO HELP THE FRG WITH ITS DEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, BUT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ADDING A SECOND COUNTRY WAS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEED.

7. FINALLY, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING, THERE HAD BEEN AN UNEXPECTED PROBLEM WITH THE DUTCH ON SPANISH ENTRY INTO NATO. AMBASSADOR HERMES NOTED THAT A LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WAS ON ITS WAY TO THE SECRETARY WHICH REPORTED THAT GENSCHER HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH THE DUTCH IN LONDON AND THAT VAN DER STOEL HAD PROMISED THAT POSITIVE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN BY DECEMBER 1. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED THE U. S. AND THE FRG COULD WORK TOGETHER TO KEEP SPANISH ENTRY ON TRACK. IN ADDITION, IF THERE WERE OTHER SUBJECTS FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WISHED TO INFORM HIM ABOUT BEFORE THE NATO MINISTERIAL, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR ABOUT THEM. THE U. S. WOULD ALSO TRY TO KEEP IN TOUCH.

8. VON STADEN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS. GERMAN ACTIONS IN RECENT WEEKS HAD BEEN NO MORE THAN CONTINUATION OF THEIR TRADITIONAL STRONG SUPPORT OF WESTERN POSITIONS. DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT, THE GERMAN

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 020122Z DEC 81 PSN: 033133

SECSTATE WASHDC 8512

DTG: 020122Z DEC 81 PSN: 033133

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      SECSTATE WASHDC 8512                      DTG: 020122Z DEC 81 PSN: 033134  
SIT689                      DATE 12/02/81                      TOR: 336/0149Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8512/02 3360146  
O R 020122Z DEC 81 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3696  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8777

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 6988  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 4393  
USMISSION USNATO 6185  
WHITE HOUSE 6986  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 318512  
NODIS

SIDE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THE FRG WOULD HOLD TO BOTH TRACKS OF THE NATO DECISION. THIS WAS ONE IMPORTANT PREREQUISITE FOR SUCCESS OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND THIS WAS THE MAIN REASON WHY GENSCHER HAD STATED THAT HE WISHED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE ISSUE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY SPECIAL CHANNEL. THE GOAL WOULD BE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS ON A CONTINUING BASIS GERMAN DETERMINATION TO HOLD TO THE NATO DECISION.

9. VON STADEN AGREED THAT THE STATIONING QUESTION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT DISCRETION. THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POSITION, BUT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT NOT TO SAY ANYTHING WHICH WOULD TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THE DUTCH AND ESPECIALLY THE BELGIANS TO CARRY THROUGH WITH DEPLOYMENT. ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO PUSH THE DUTCH TOO HARD. IF FORCED TO DECIDE NOW, THEY WOULD PROBABLY MAKE THE WRONG

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CHOICE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CHANCES FOR BELGIAN DEPLOYMENT. HE HAD PERSONALLY WORKED CLOSELY WITH KING BAUDOUIN, WHO HAD MORE INFLUENCE ON SUCH MATTERS THAN WAS GENERALLY REALIZED. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 8512

DTG: 020122Z DEC 81 PSN: 033134

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6810  
SIT156 DATE 11/30/81

DTG: 281858Z NOV 81 PSN: 029330  
TOR: 332/2241Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #6810 3321916  
O R 281858Z NOV 81 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3621  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8719

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID 3455  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 316810  
NODIS  
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/30/91 (STOESSEL, WALTER J. JR)

TAGS: SHUM, CSCE, UR, GE

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN: DISCUSSION OF SAKHAROV  
CASE

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING BRIEFING ON BREZHNEV VISIT ON NOVEMBER 27, FRG FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN TOLD UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL THAT THE FRG HAD RAISED THE SAKHAROV CASE WITH THE SOVIETS BEFORE AND DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT. VON STADEN HIMSELF HAD FIRST RAISED THE QUESTION WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO DURING PREPARATIONS FOR THE VISIT. KORNIYENKO HAD SAID THE MATTER WAS A DOMESTIC ISSUE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND OF NO INTEREST TO OTHER COUNTRIES. HE HAD ARGUED THAT HE IN ANY CASE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY EVERYONE IN THE WEST WAS SO INSISTENT SINCE SAKHAROV DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY RELATIVES IN THE WEST. VON STADEN SAID HE HAD TOLD KORNIYENKO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO DEBATE DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW ON THE SAKHAROV CASE. THE SOVIETS SHOULD SIMPLY TAKE AS A FACT OF LIFE THAT DEVELOPMENT OF THIS ISSUE WOULD HAVE A STRONG EFFECT ON THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE WEST.

3. VON STADEN SAID THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALSO RAISED SAKHAROV IN HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH BREZHNEV. BREZHNEV HAD LISTENED, BUT HAD NOT REACTED IN ANY FASHION.

4. VON STADEN REQUESTED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE TREATED WITH UTMOST CARE. HE NOTED THAT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-036/2 #44  
BY CJS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 281858Z NOV 81 PSN: 029330

SAKHAROV'S RELEASE WOULD BE DAMAGED IF IT BECAME KNOWN  
THAT THE GERMANS HAD RAISED HIS CASE IN THIS FASHION.

5. SEPTTEL FOLLOWS DESCRIBING UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL'S  
NOVEMBER 27 DEMARCHE ON SECRETARY'S BEHALF CONCERNING  
SAKHAROV. CLARK

SECSTATE WASHDC 6810

DTG: 281858Z NOV 81 PSN: 029330

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17 NOV 81 15 00 5060

Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

COPY 13 OF 20 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

NOD041

PAGE 01 BONN 22741 01 OF 02 171503Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W  
-----201167 171511Z /41

O 171454Z NOV 81 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1793

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 22741

NODIS

FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY BREMER ONLY FROM DCM

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/17/87 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M) OR-M  
TAGS: GE  
SUBJECT: HAIG LETTER TO GENSCHER

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. LARRY ASKED ME TO SEND YOU THE TEXT OF THE LETTER  
FROM THE SECRETARY THAT HE HANDED OVER TO GENSCHER THIS  
MORNING.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR HANS-DIETRICH: THE UNITED STATES AND  
THE SOVIET UNION WILL OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE  
RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. THIS WILL  
BE AN EVENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MY COUNTRY, AS I KNOW  
IT IS TO YOURS, AND TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.  
OVER THE PAST TEN MONTHS OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN  
WORKING CLOSELY TO FORMULATE AN APPROACH TO THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY. I  
BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN THIS TASK, OWING LARGELY  
TO THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

4. THE BASIC US APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN  
DEVELOPED THROUGH AN INTENSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE PROCESS OF

~~SECRET~~

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NLS F97-030/2 #45  
BY CH, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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## Department of State

# INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

BONN 22741 01 OF 02 171503Z

ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. IN THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP (SCG) WE HAVE REFINED AND STRENGTHENED THE BASIC ARMS CONTROL APPROACH OF THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS MY GOVERNMENT HAS REVIEWED AND REAFFIRMED THAT APPROACH AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND HAS REACHED CONCLUSIONS ON THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF ALLIED COMMENTS.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER NOTED AT THE LAST SCG THAT TWO MAJOR ISSUES WERE STILL UNDER STUDY. THE FIRST WAS HOW TO FORMULATE A PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS. THE SECOND WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH SHORTER RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS.

6. IN CONSIDERING THE FIRST OF THESE POINTS, WE HAVE GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT TO THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BROADLY BY THE ALLIES REGARDING THE CRITICAL NEED TO SECURE PUBLIC SUPPORT BY ADVANCING A POSITION WHICH DRAMATIZES THE FACT THAT OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET BUILD-UP. ACCORDINGLY, WE INTEND TO PROPOSE, IN THE FIRST ROUND OF TNF NEGOTIATIONS, THE DISMANTLING OF THE SS-20'S, AND THE RETIREMENT OF THE SS-4'S AND SS-5'S, IN EXCHANGE FOR WHICH WE WOULD CANCEL PLANS TO DEPLOY GLCM AND PERSHING II MISSILES.

7. REGARDING SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, RECENT SCG MEETINGS HAVE PRODUCED A CONSENSUS THAT THESE SYSTEMS COULD SUBSTITUTE FOR LONGER-RANGE MISSILES AND COVER MANY OF THE SAME TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE LIMITED SOMEHOW BY ANY AGREEMENT WHICH CONSTRAINED LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS. THE ALLIES FELT STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO LIMIT THESE SYSTEMS WITHIN THE AGGREGATE LIMITS ON LONGER-RANGE MISSILES. WE HAVE OURSELVES NOW CONCLUDED THAT IT IS BEST TO SEEK

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## Department of State

# INCOMING TELEGRAM

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SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS ON THESE SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS,

8. WE BELIEVE THAT, WITH THESE ELEMENTS, OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IS STRONG AND CONVINCING. I WANT TO STRESS, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT WE WILL APPROACH THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH. THUS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE ANY CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS TO ELABORATE OUR OWN. AS THE NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOP, WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE THE INTENSE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE FORMULATED OUR POSITION TO DATE.

9. IN ADDITION TO OFFERING THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE, THE CONDUCT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE A PART OF A BROADER EFFORT TO SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE IS COMMITTED TO ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND IS ACTIVELY PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND MILITARY PROGRAMS.

10. IN THIS CONNECTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL MAKE A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. HE WILL PRESENT OUR BASIC AIMS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO OUR OFFER TO CANCEL OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IF THE SOVIETS ELIMINATE THEIR CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES, AS I HAVE EXPLAINED ABOVE. HE WILL EMPHASIZE THE US COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, AND OUR GENUINE DESIRE FOR PROGRESS. THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH HIS PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE, WILL PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794

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FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY BREMER ONLY FROM DCM

WHICH WE EMBARK UPON THIS ENDEAVOR.

11. I HAVE ASKED LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO YOU TO LAY OUT IN GREATER DETAIL OUR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESPOND TO ANY INQUIRIES YOU MAY HAVE. I TRUST YOU WILL FIND THAT THE CONCLUSIONS WE HAVE REACHED ARE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR VIEWS AND WILL EARN YOUR FULL SUPPORT. THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF WE HAVE SOLID ALLIANCE BACKING FROM START TO FINISH. NO LESS CRITICAL FOR SUCCESS WILL BE THE CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, WHICH WE MUST ALL MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR CAN BE ALTERED ONLY AS THE RESULT OF A CONCRETE AGREEMENT.

12. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NO DOUBT TEST OUR RESOLVE AS WELL AS OUR INGENUITY. WITH YOUR SUPPORT I AM SURE THE CHALLENGE WILL BE MET. SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
BURNS

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 2703  
SIT992 DATE 11/23/81

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TOR: 320/2030Z

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O 161713Z NOV 81  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1771

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 22703  
NODIS  
PLEASE PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/16/01 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, GE, UR  
SUBJ: CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT BRIEFS AMBASSADOR NOV. 15  
- ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE CHANCELLOR TOLD THE AMBASSADOR OF HIS PLANS TO SEND THE NEXT DAY A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING THE BREZHNEV VISIT, AS WELL AS THE CURRENT DISCOURAGING WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION. SCHMIDT OUTLINED FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS THE PROBABLE OBJECTIVES BREZHNEV HAD FOR HIS IMPENDING BONN VISIT: FIRST, TO LEARN MORE ABOUT U.S. POLICIES AND INTENTIONS; SECOND, TO INFLUENCE GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, IN PARTICULAR BY PURSUING MOSCOW'S PEACE OFFENSIVE; AND THIRD, TO DEEPEN SOVIET-FRG BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE CHANCELLOR COULD NOT BE SURE THAT THE PIPELINE-GAS AGREEMENT WOULD BE FINALLY SIGNED BEFORE BREZHNEV'S VISIT. HE DESCRIBED HOW HE INTENDED TO PRESS THE SOVIETS FOR PROMPT RESULTS IN THE GENEVA TNF TALKS, AND HOW HE WOULD EMPHASIZE HIS FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION, I.E., TO NATO DEPLOYMENT OF LRTNF IF THE GENEVA TALKS FAILED TO YIELD SATISFACTORY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESULTS. SCHMIDT WOULD ADVOCATE A MUTUAL ZERO SOLUTION IN THIS AREA, AND WOULD ALSO URGE REVITALIZING THE SALT TALKS. THE CHANCELLOR WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES CONCERNING WHETHER TO RAISE WITH BREZHNEV A FUTURE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.  
END SUMMARY  
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3. AMBASSADOR BURNS MET WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT FOR TWO HOURS AT MID-DAY NOVEMBER 15 AT THE LATTER'S INITIATIVE AT THE CHANCELLOR'S BUNGALOW. ALSO PRESENT WERE CHANCELLERY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR VON DER GABLENTZ AND THE ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR. IN ADDITION TO BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN THE CONVERSATION COVERED THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE

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BY GAS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY (SEPTELS).

4. AT THE OUTSET THE CHANCELLOR EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD BE SENDING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT THE NEXT DAY VIA THE FRG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. IT WOULD DEAL WITH THE NOV 22-25 BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN AND WITH THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION. SCHMIDT SAID IT WOULD NOT BE A LONG LETTER, SINCE IT WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY HIS TALKS WITH THE AMBASSADOR. THE LETTER WAS NOT FOR PUBLICATION, HE EMPHASIZED. (NOTE: A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE END OF THE DAY NOV. 15.) SCHMIDT SAID HE MIGHT ALSO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENT BY PHONE LATER IN THE COMING WEEK. FONOFF STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN WOULD GO TO WASHINGTON TO BRIEF ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS CONCLUSION. SCHMIDT PERSONALLY WOULD BRIEF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES AT THE NOVEMBER 26-27 LONDON MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (EC-10 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT).

5. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THE VISIT WAS NOT A STATE VISIT BUT WAS ON THE SAME LEVEL AS SCHMIDT'S VISIT IN THE SUMMER OF 1980 TO MOSCOW. BREZHNEV THUS WILL RECEIVE LESS GLAMOROUS TREATMENT IN BONN THAN HE MIGHT HAVE PREFERRED; THE SOVIETS IN FACT HAVE INDICATED A CERTAIN DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PLANS IN THIS REGARD. TURNING TO THE PURPOSES OF THE VISIT, SCHMIDT NOTED THAT BREZHNEV PROBABLY HAD THREE OBJECTIVES IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MIND: FIRST, BREZHNEV WANTS TO UNDERSTAND BETTER WHAT IS GOING ON IN WASHINGTON. THE SOVIETS CANNOT "READ" THE U. S., SCHMIDT SAID. THEY DO NOT COMPREHEND, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SITUATION SURROUNDING THE SALT II TALKS WHICH THEY CONDUCTED WITH THREE SUCCESSIVE U. S. PRESIDENTS, NIXON, FORD, AND CARTER, AND WHICH THEY WILL NOW CONDUCT WITH A NEW MAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHOM THEY DO NOT KNOW. THE SOVIETS REGARD SCHMIDT, INCORRECTLY, AS THE ORIGINATOR OF NATO'S DOUBLE DECISION, AS SOME IN WASHINGTON NOW ALSO INCORRECTLY DO. THEY DO UNDERSTAND, AFTER FIVE OTHER SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH ME, THAT THEY CANNOT PUSH ME AROUND, THE CHANCELLOR SAID. BECAUSE THEY KNOW ME WELL, AND KNOW THAT I HAVE A SHARP TONGUE, THEY REGARD ME AS AN HONEST FOE WHO IS NOT MISLEADING THEM, SCHMIDT SAID; THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS HOPE THE CHANCELLOR CAN EXPLAIN WASHINGTON TO THEM; AT LEAST THIS IS THE CHANCELLOR'S GUESS.

6. BREZHNEV'S SECOND OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO INFLUENCE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1772

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 22703

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GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, IN PARTICULAR WITH HIS EXPRESSIONS ABOUT PEACE. SCHMIDT IS WILLING TO TAKE THIS RISK INTO "THE BARGAIN OF THE VISIT." THE PROBLEM IS SOME AMERICANS WILL THINK HE IS BEING SUCKED IN BY THE SOVIETS, SCHMIDT SAID. SCHMIDT ACCEPTS THIS RISK ALSO BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WEST TALK TO THE SOVIETS. SCHMIDT SAID HE WOULD TRY TO EXPLAIN TO HIS VISITORS WHAT MUST APPEAR TO THEM AS A VERY UNSTEADY U. S. GOVERNMENT COURSE. THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE OLD, AND GENERALLY THINK IN THE LONGER RANGE (E. G., OF FIVE-YEAR PLANS). THEY KNOW SCHMIDT TO BE STUBBORN, AND SOME EVEN HATE THE CHANCELLOR, BUT THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO BREZHNEV HIMSELF, SCHMIDT COMMENTED.

7. BREZHNEV'S THIRD OBJECTIVE WILL BE AN HONEST ATTEMPT TO DEEPEN BILATERAL SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS (TRADE, ETC.), AND THIS IS THE CHANCELLOR'S OBJECTIVE TOO, HE SAID. THIS THIRD OBJECTIVE IS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THE FIRST TWO, SCHMIDT THOUGHT.

8. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT THE LATEST INFORMATION WAS CONCERNING THE CHANCES OF CONCLUDING THE PIPELINE-NATURAL GAS AGREEMENT DURING BREZHNEV'S VISIT. SCHMIDT SAID THAT, BECAUSE THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE HONESTLY DID NOT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

KNOW; THE UNDECIDED QUESTION OF GAS PRICE SEEMS TO PERSIST. VON DER GABLENTZ SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE SURE; HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS DO SEEM TO BE MOVING AND IT DOES SEEM LIKELY THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL BE COMPLETED SOON.

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9. REVERTING TO BREZHNEV'S FIRST OBJECTIVE, ABOVE, SCHMIDT OUTLINED HOW THEIR DISCUSSIONS WOULD LIKELY FOCUS ON THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20 MISSILES AND PERSHING II'S AND GLCM'S. SCHMIDT WOULD ATTEMPT TO REASSURE BREZHNEV ABOUT THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA: FIRST, HE WOULD TELL THE SOVIETS THAT HE WELCOMED THE HAIG-GROMYKO DECISION TO START THESE TALKS. SECOND, CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT OF "EURO-

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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STRATEGIC" WEAPONS, SCHMIDT WOULD STAND BEHIND THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION, TELLING BREZHNEV THAT EITHER SATISFACTORY LIMITS ARE AGREED, OR DEPLOYMENT WILL OCCUR. HE WILL EMPHASIZE THAT NOT JUST THE CURRENT GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT THIS POSITION, BUT ALSO ANY LIKELY ALTERNATIVE. (NOTE: THE CHANCELLOR REITERATED HIS FAMILIAR DISTASTE FOR THE EXPRESSION "THEATER" NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REMINDING THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNHAPPY IMPACT THIS TERM HAD ON EUROPEANS PSYCHOLOGICALLY.) 10. SCHMIDT CONTINUED, THIRD, THAT HE PLANNED TO ADVOCATE TO THE SOVIETS A MUTUAL ZERO SOLUTION IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. BREZHNEV HAD IN FACT ALREADY OPENED THESE TALKS IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW IN "DER SPIEGEL," EXPRESSING THE SOVIET'S MAXIMUM POSITION. SCHMIDT WILL WARN AGAINST ARGUING FOR MAXIMUM POSITIONS AND WILL REMIND THE SOVIETS THAT TIME WAS FLYING: FOR EXAMPLE, HE WILL REMIND THEM OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MONTHS LOST UNTIL BREZHNEV'S DECISION IN JUNE 1980 TO REMOVE HIS CONDITION FOR TNF TALKS. SCHMIDT WILL URGE SPEEDY PROGRESS AND WILL TELL BREZHNEV THAT IF THERE ARE NO DECISIONS IN THE GENEVA TALKS BY SEPTEMBER 1983, THEN NATO DEPLOYMENTS WILL PROCEED.

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11. CONCLUDING THE DESCRIPTION OF HIS APPROACH TO BREZHNEV, SCHMIDT SAID HE WILL ALSO ADVOCATE RESUMPTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE SALT TALKS. FINALLY, SCHMIDT WILL EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY THAT BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT REAGAN MEET AND TALK, A POINT TO BE COVERED IN SCHMIDT'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. THE FRG SIMPLY CANNOT SERVE AS THE U.S. SPOKESMAN VIS-A-VIS THE USSR FOR IT IS TOO SMALL AND TOO VULNERABLE, SCHMIDT EMPHASIZED.

12. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IF THE GENEVA TALKS GO WELL, THEN THERE MIGHT BE A REASONABLE CHANCE FOR A REAGAN-BREZHNEV MEETING, BUT PROBABLY NOT EARLIER THAN SEPTEMBER 1982. SCHMIDT AGREED, NOTING THAT THE TALKS NEED NOT TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW OR WASHINGTON. HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE SOVIETS SIMPLY MUST EXPERIENCE THE PRESIDENT AS A MAN, AND SENSE HIS SELF-ASSURANCE. ALSO, THEY MUST SEE THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT WANTS TO TALK TO THEM AND HAS THE WILL AND THE COURAGE TO DO SO. THE CHANCELLOR CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD LEAVE IT TO THE PRESIDENT WHETHER HE (SCHMIDT) SHOULD RAISE THE MATTER OF A REAGAN-BREZHNEV MEETING WITH BREZHNEV; HE WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES.

13. FOOTNOTE: AT DIFFERENT POINTS IN THE COURSE OF

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT990 DATE 11/23/81

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1773

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 22703

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THIS LENGTHY DISCUSSION SCHMIDT MADE THREE OBSERVATIONS "IN BRACKETS" AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THOSE WHO HAD NOT EXPERIENCED OR READ OF THE GUADELOUPE SUMMIT IN JANUARY 1979 HE SUMMARIZED FOR THE AMBASSADOR HOW THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION ORIGINATED. RECALLING HIS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCE THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE THE NEW EURO-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN THE SALT TALKS, SCHMIDT NOTED HE HAD NOT REQUESTED PERSHING II'S OR GLCM'S TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. HE HAD ONLY REQUESTED A BALANCE OF INTERCONTINENTAL AND EURO-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. AT GUADELOUPE IT WAS PRESIDENT CARTER WHO HAD PROPOSED DEPLOYING PERSHING II'S AND GLCM'S IN EUROPE AS THE RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20 MISSILES, WHICH THEN WERE VERY FEW IN NUMBER. SCHMIDT HAD RESPONDED THAT NOW THE U. S. UNDERSTOOD THE THREAT AND HE HAD ADVOCATED NEGOTIATIONS IN SALT TO DEAL WITH IT. PM CALLAGHAN HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE U. S. NOT DEPLOY THE NEW SYSTEMS IN EUROPE UNTIL ATTEMPTING THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO REMOVE THE SOVIET SS-20'S. PRESIDENT GISCARD'S POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNTIL THEY WERE CONVINCED BY WESTERN PREPARATION FOR NEW DEPLOYMENTS THAT NATO WAS SERIOUS. SCHMIDT THEN HAD SUPPORTED GISCARD'S POSITION. SCHMIDT TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE INTENDED TO REHEARSE FOR BREZHNEV THE ABOVE VERSION OF THE HISTORY OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DOUBLE DECISION, THUS CORRECTING THE INCORRECT VERSION THE SOVIETS HELD.

14. THE CHANCELLOR'S SECOND COMMENT "IN BRACKETS" REFERRED TO THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY HIGH OFFICIALS RECENTLY EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT CURRENT NATO NUCLEAR STRATEGY. HE REGRETTED THAT THEY PROBABLY WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE SOVIETS AS A SIGN OF U. S. WEAKNESS AND THEREFORE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD CEASE. THIS IS OF COURSE THE WRONG READING. SCHMIDT EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE U. S. IN THIS CRITICAL AREA. BUT THE IMPRESSION OF CONFUSION IS INFECTING THE EUROPEAN PRESS. WHAT WASHINGTON SHOULD SAY IS SIMPLY THAT THE U. S. ADMINISTRATION WILL STICK TO THE NATO STRATEGY.

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 161713Z NOV 81 PSN: 013360

15. SCHMIDT'S THIRD BRACKETED COMMENT WAS THAT THE AMBASSADOR MAY ON OCCASION HEAR FROM THE U.S. THAT HE IS PRESIDING OVER A SHAKY COALITION GOVERNMENT. SCHMIDT URGED THOSE WHO BELIEVE THIS TO STUDY CAREFULLY THE FRG CONSTITUTION, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO REPLACEMENTS OF THE CHANCELLOR (I.E., THE REQUIREMENT TO VOTE IN AN ACCEPTABLE REPLACEMENT BEFORE THE OLD GOVERNMENT CAN BE THROWN OUT). LIKE IT OR NOT, THOSE IN THE U.S. HOPING FOR A CHANGE IN BONN WILL HAVE TO DEAL FOR SOME TIME WITH A SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF STATE ELECTORAL CHANGES BRINGING A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR THE OPPOSITION IN THE BUNDESRAT, SCHMIDT SAID FIRMLY THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD NOT IMMOBILIZE A GERMAN GOVERNMENT. TO BE SURE, THE BUNDESRAT COULD EXERT INFLUENCE ON LEGISLATION, FOR EXAMPLE BY HOLDING UP INDIVIDUAL BILLS. THE OPPOSITION IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES COULD STOP LEGISLATION ONCE, PERHAPS TWICE; BUT THEREAFTER, BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC PRESSURES WHICH A DETERMINED CHANCELLOR COULD MOUNT, THE OPPOSITION WOULD SEE THAT IT WAS AGAINST ITS OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS TO CONTINUE. SCHMIDT CONCLUDED THAT THE MORE PRUDENT AMONG THE CDU/CSU ALREADY UNDERSTOOD THE LIMITS OF SUCH TACTICS IN THE BUNDESRAT.

16. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: AFTER CONCLUDING THE TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH SCHMIDT, AS REPORTED ABOVE, I

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REQUESTED A PURELY PRIVATE SESSION WITH HIM. THIS LASTED ABOUT 50 MINUTES AND I WILL REPORT ON IT WHEN I'M IN WASHINGTON TO ATTEND THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 10 OF THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC POLICY ADVISORY BOARD. SUFFICE IT TO SAY AT THIS TIME THAT THE CHANCELLOR LOOKED GOOD. HE WAS ALSO IN A BETTER MOOD AND MUCH CALMER THAN I HAVE FOUND AT RECENT MEETINGS.  
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DTG: 161713Z NOV 81 PSN: 013360

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DE RUFHOL #2701 3201710  
O 161710Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1770

~~SECRET~~ BONN 22701  
NODIS  
PLEASE PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
E.O. 12065: GDS 11/16/87 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: OVIP, GE  
SUBJ: SCHMIDT VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE COURSE OF A LENGTHY CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR BURNS NOVEMBER 15 (SEPTELS) THE CHANCELLOR DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 13 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICHARD ALLEN AND STATE SECRETARY LAHNSTEIN RELATING TO THE PROPOSED VISIT OF SCHMIDT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY. SCHMIDT CONFIRMED THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE THEN, NAMELY THAT IN CONNECTION WITH A VACATION TRIP WITH HIS WIFE TO FLORIDA HE WOULD UNDERTAKE A "WORKING VISIT" TO WASHINGTON. THE CURRENT PLAN IS TO ARRIVE THE EVENING OF MONDAY, JANUARY 4, POSSIBLY SPEND THE NIGHT IN BLAIR HOUSE, AND MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT ON JANUARY 5 LATE IN THE MORNING AND OVER LUNCH. THE BRIEF VISIT WOULD SERVE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT (SCHMIDT RECALLED THE PLANS OF STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN TO BRIEF WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VISIT); ALSO, THERE WOULD BE OTHER POINTS TO DISCUSS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. SCHMIDT NOTED THAT ONE QUESTION WAS STILL OPEN: WHEN TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THIS VISIT. AMBASSADOR BURNS THOUGHT THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IF MADE BEFORE THE BREZHNEV VISIT (NOV. 22-25), WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN SCHMIDT'S HAND. THE CHANCELLOR AGREED, AND HOPED IT COULD BE DONE IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING WEEK. HE WOULD MENTION THIS IN THE LETTER HE WAS SENDING TO THE PRESIDENT THE NEXT DAY, HE SAID. BURNS

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BY

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NARA, DATE

4/27/01

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 161710Z NOV 81 PSN: 013162

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PLEASE PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/16/87 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M

TAGS: OVIP, GE

SUBJ: SCHMIDT VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE COURSE OF A LENGTHY CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR BURNS NOVEMBER 15 (SEPTELS) THE CHANCELLOR DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 13 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICHARD ALLEN AND STATE SECRETARY LAHNSTEIN RELATING TO THE PROPOSED VISIT OF SCHMIDT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY. SCHMIDT CONFIRMED THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE THEN, NAMELY THAT IN CONNECTION WITH A VACATION TRIP WITH HIS WIFE TO FLORIDA HE WOULD UNDERTAKE A "WORKING VISIT" TO WASHINGTON. THE CURRENT PLAN IS TO ARRIVE THE EVENING OF MONDAY, JANUARY 4, POSSIBLY SPEND THE NIGHT IN BLAIR HOUSE, AND MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT ON JANUARY 5 LATE IN THE MORNING AND OVER LUNCH. THE BRIEF VISIT WOULD SERVE AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT (SCHMIDT RECALLED THE PLANS OF STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN TO BRIEF WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VISIT); ALSO, THERE WOULD BE OTHER POINTS TO DISCUSS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. SCHMIDT NOTED THAT ONE QUESTION WAS STILL OPEN: WHEN TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THIS VISIT. AMBASSADOR BURNS THOUGHT THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IF MADE BEFORE THE BREZHNEV VISIT (NOV. 22-25), WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN SCHMIDT'S HAND. THE CHANCELLOR AGREED, AND HOPED IT COULD BE DONE IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING WEEK. HE WOULD MENTION THIS IN THE LETTER HE WAS SENDING TO THE PRESIDENT THE NEXT DAY, HE SAID. BURNS

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #48  
BY C45, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE544  
STU0284  
UN RUEHC  
DE RUEHNL #2054/01 3091718  
ZNY CCCCC Z7H  
U 051713Z NOV 81 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1523  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 22054  
NDDIS  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS PARIS AND KINSHASA  
E.L. 12065: RDS-4 11-05-2001 (WDESSLER, WILLIAM M.) UR-M  
TAGS: PEPP, PINT, CG, CD, GE  
SUBJECT: WALKER/DAKLEY CONSULTATIONS IN FRG: CHAD AND ZAIRE  
REFS: (A) BONN 21818  
- (P) PARIS 33395  
-

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).  
2. SUMMARY: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WALKER AND  
AMBASSADOR DAKLEY CONFERRED NOVEMBER 2 WITH FOREIGN  
OFFICE OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH AFRICAN AFFAIRS.  
THEY DISCUSSED CHAD AND ZAIRE IN SEPARATE CONVERSA-  
TIONS WITH POLITICAL DIRECTOR (THIRD WORLD) GORENFLOS,  
WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR HAFERKAMP, AND  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS HAAS. THE  
GERMANS REPORTED A RECENT FRENCH DEMARCHE CONCERNING  
CHAD AND EXPRESSED DEEP APPREHENSION ABOUT THE SITUA-  
TION THERE. THEY AGREED ON THE NEED TO GET SOMETHING  
MOVING, EXPRESSED SOME QUESTION ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO  
PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT, BUT THOUGHT THAT IN THE END  
THEY COULD DO SO TO MEET SPECIFIC REQUESTS. ON ZAIRE  
THEY HEARD AN EXPOSITION OF U.S. VIEWS, EXPRESSED  
INTEREST IN COMING TO A COMMON ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION  
IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS, AND INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO  
PARTICIPATE IN LIMITED EFFORTS TO SHORE UP THE SITUATION  
NOW AS A MEANS OF AVERTING A LARGER AND MORE COSTLY  
CRISIS LATER. END SUMMARY.

3. CHAD  
- ----

ALTHOUGH THE MEETING HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN SET WITH  
GORENFLOS TO TALK ABOUT ZAIRE, WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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NLS

F97-030/2 # 49

BY

CJS

NARA, DATE

4/27/01

SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DIRECTOR HAFERKAMP ASKED FOR A SEPARATE SESSION IN ORDER TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERNS ABOUT CHAD AND TO HEAR U.S. VIEWS. AFTER PERHAPS TWENTY MINUTES OR SO THE MEETING MOVED TO HAAS' OFFICE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CHAD.

4. HAFERKAMP SAID THE FRENCH HAD APPROACHED THE FRG ABOUT FIVE DAYS AGO, EXPLAINING THAT THEY WANT TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) AND WOULD LIKE FRG FINANCING. HAFERKAMP SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO HELP, BUT IT MUST SEARCH FOR THE MONEY. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT A TOP-LEVEL DECISION IS NEEDED. HE INDICATED THE FRENCH ARE SUGGESTING THAT THE FRG SUPPORT NIGERIAN CONTINGENTS, BUT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE FRG DOES NOT GIVE DEVELOPMENT AID TO NIGERIA, SINCE IT IS A WEALTHY OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRY. HE SAID THE FRG AID MINISTER WOULD PREFER TO HELP SENEGAL OR TOGO.

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5. WALKER OUTLINED THE RECENT US-FRENCH CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS, EXPLAINING THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS FRENCH DIPLOMACY ON THIS QUESTION. HE OUTLINED THE BACKGROUND TO GOUKOUNI'S REQUEST FOR COMPLETE LIBYAN WITHDRAWAL IN TWO STAGES BY THE END OF 1981 AND GOUKOUNI'S REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. AND FRENCH. HE EMPHASIZED FRENCH WORRIES THAT GOUKOUNI MAY NOW HAVE MOVED TOO SOON AND THAT A MULTILATERAL FORCE IS NOT READY TO FILL THE GAP. HE STRESSED THAT BOTH FRANCE AND THE U.S. WANT THE OAU TO MOVE QUICKLY TO SET UP THE FRAMEWORK FOR SUCH A FORCE AND THAT FRANCE WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE AT THE FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT BEGINNING NOVEMBER 3.

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6. REITERATING THESE POINTS IN THE SESSION WITH HAAS, WALKER STRESSED THE U.S. VIEW THAT IT IS NOW A RACE AGAINST TIME AND THAT THE FRENCH PLAN SHOULD BE SUPPORTED. HE SAID THE U.S. HAS NOT IDENTIFIED THE MONEY YET, BUT IT IS SAYING TO THE FRENCH GET STARTED AND WE WILL SUPPORT YOU WHERE WE CAN. HE ALSO STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO MAKE THE AFRICANS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT TIME MAY BE RUNNING OUT IN THE EFFORT TO CONTAIN QADHAFI. HE IS DANGEROUS AND WE MUST STOP HIM SOMEWHERE. CHAD IS A GOOD PLACE TO START, WALKER CONCLUDED, NOTING THAT OTHERWISE THE COST TO BE BORNE IN THE NEXT CRISIS MAY BE MUCH GREATER.



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7. HAAS SAID THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD THE FRENCH  
THEY ARE READY TO BE HELPFUL. HE EXPLAINED THE  
LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ABILITY TO PROVIDE MONEY,

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SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE545  
UTS5615  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #2054/02 3091720  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
D 051713Z NOV 81 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1524  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 22054  
NDDIS

BUT INDICATED SOME SMALL AMOUNTS MIGHT BE FOUND. HE STRESSED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE GERMANS ARE ALREADY ENCOURAGING AFRICAN COUNTRIES LIKE NIGERIA AND KENYA TO MOVE AHEAD. HAAS SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT FRG SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND ADDED THAT SUPPLY OF TRANSPORTATION WOULD ALSO BE A PROBLEM. HE CITED NOW WELL-KNOWN FRG BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS AND SAID THAT THE PLACE THE FRG WILL HAVE TO LOOK IS IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BUDGET. HE SUGGESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE FRG MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE COMMODITY AID TO COUNTRIES LIKE SENEGAL OR TOGO SO THAT THEY COULD SAVE MONEY WHICH COULD THEN BE USED TO DEFER COSTS OF A PARTICIPATION IN THE PKO, BUT HAAS DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH COMMODITY AID COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. HE TOO EMPHASIZED THE LIMITATIONS REGARDING HELP TO NIGERIA. TO WALKER'S QUESTION, HE INDICATED THAT PERHAPS SOME ASSISTANCE COULD BE EXTENDED IN CHAD ITSELF, FOR EXAMPLE, CAPITAL AID TO NDJAMENA. HAER CAMP SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO NDJAMENA HIMSELF NEXT WEEK TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT THERE IS ABOUT 10 MILLION MARKS ALREADY IN THE PIPELINE AND THAT PERHAPS MORE COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE AID MINISTRY, BUT HE SAID MORE FOR CHAD WOULD LIKELY MEAN LESS FOR SENEGAL AND TOGO.

8. THE DISCUSSION ABOUT CHAD CONTINUED AS THE GROUP MOVED TO GORENFLOS' OFFICE. WALKER AND OAKLEY REITERATED FOR HIM THE MAIN POINTS OF THE U.S. POSITION. ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE FRG ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO SUPPORT A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, HAAS NOTED THAT IF

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MORE THAN A FEW HUNDRED DEUTSCHE MARKS ARE TO BE INVOLVED, THE URGENCY MUST BE FELT AT THE TOP LEVEL OF THE FRG GOVERNMENT. AGREEING, GORENFLOS STRESSED THAT THE DECISION SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO THAT LEVEL TOO EARLY. OAKLEY NOTED THAT WE STILL NEED TO CONDUCT SPECIFIC TALKS WITH THE FRENCH TO SEE EXACTLY WHAT NEEDS DOING. GORENFLOS REMARKED THAT WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE OPERATION REMAINS AN AFRICAN ONE. IT WAS NOTED THAT FRANCE INTENDS TO BRING THE CHAD QUESTION INTO THE UPCOMING EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING IN MID-NOVEMBER.

## 9. ZAIRE

TURNING TO ZAIRE, WALKER AND OAKLEY EMPHASIZED THAT THE SITUATION WE FACE THERE IS MUCH THE SAME: IF WE DO NOTHING NOW, WE WILL HAVE TO DO MUCH MORE AND SPEND MUCH MORE LATER. WALKER THEN PRESENTED THE U.S. ANALYSIS OF THREE BASIC TRENDS WHICH IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS COULD ENDANGER ZAIRE'S STABILITY. HE SPOKE OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE TWO MILITARY BRIGADES AND THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE FLNC. HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE GROWING ECONOMIC SQUEEZE FACING MOBUTU, PARTICULARLY IN HIS EFFORTS TO MEET IMF TARGETS AND THE PROBLEMS THAT WILL FACE HIM IF, AS IS POSSIBLE, HE FALLS OUT OF COMPLIANCE. FINALLY, WALKER SKETCHED MOBUTU'S OWN GROWING SENSE OF ISOLATION AND PARANOIA WHICH HARMS HIS ABILITY TO EXERCISE PROPER LEADERSHIP.

10. WALKER THEN OUTLINED U.S. IDEAS FOR A WAY TO MEET THESE PROBLEMS, STRESSING THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO COME UP WITH A LOT OF MONEY BUT BELIEVE INSTEAD IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION IN EACH OF THE THREE AREAS DESCRIBED AND TRY TO PUT TOGETHER SOME MONEY AND ADVICE WHICH WOULD HELP SHORE UP THE SITUATION. HE SUGGESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE U.S. MIGHT FIND SOME MONEY TO HELP THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS BRING THE TWO BRIGADES UP TO SNUFF. HAAS AND HAFERKAMP OBSERVED THAT THE VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR THESE BRIGADES COME FROM THE U.S. AND FRG, RESPECTIVELY. FRG MONEY REMAINS EARMARKED FOR THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR YEARS, ACCORDING TO HAFERKAMP. WALKER SAID WE MIGHT ALSO LOOK FOR A LITTLE MONEY TO REHABILITATE THE US-PROVIDED C-130S. POLITICALLY, HE SUGGESTED WE MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE ANGOLANS TO BE MORE AWARE OF THE FLNC BUILD-UP AND TO TRY TO COOL DOWN THE SITUATION. HE ALSO SAID WE COULD DISCUSS WITH THE ZAIREANS

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

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WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO STAY WITHIN THE  
IMF PROGRAM AND ELIMINATE SOME DEFICIENCIES IN IT.  
FINALLY, WALKER CONCLUDED, WE ALL NEED TO TALK TO OUR  
FINANCE MINISTERS TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER  
DEBT RESCHEDULING.

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11. RESPONDING, GORENFELS SAID THE FRG HAD NOT BEEN  
AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE  
SECURITY SITUATION. HE ASKED SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS  
BT

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SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE546  
STU0289  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHDL #2054/03 3091722  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 051713Z NOV 81 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1525  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 22054

NODIS

ABOUT THE BUILD-UP OPPOSITE SHABA, WHICH OAKLEY ANSWERED  
IN SOME DETAIL.

12. GORENFLOS SUGGESTED WE EXCHANGE INTELLIGENCE  
ASSESSMENTS IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON ANALYSIS  
OF THE FACTS. NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF ZAIRE AS A  
PILLAR TO STABILITY IN AFRICA, HE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT  
THAT WE MUST DO SOMETHING, BUT THE QUESTION WAS WHAT.

13. OAKLEY AND WALKER NOTED THAT WE HAD TRIED IN THE  
TALKS IN PARIS TO POINT OUT TO MOBUTU THE PROBLEMS HE  
FACES AS WE SEE THEM, BUT DID NOT MEET WITH INITIAL  
SUCCESS. HE MENTIONED THAT WE HOPE TO GET A FURTHER  
REACTION IN THE SECOND MEETING THAT GENERAL WALTERS  
WAS TO HAVE WITH MOBUTU THAT DAY AND THAT WALTERS  
WOULD GO TO ZAIRE LATER IN NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS OUR  
ASSESSMENT FURTHER. OAKLEY NOTED THAT WE MUST ALSO  
DEAL WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK PEOPLE IN ZAIRE.

BURNS

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: STATE  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE343  
RR RUFHC RUFHOL RUEHMO  
DE RUEHC #7319 3010234  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 280158Z OCT 81 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2417  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7580  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 287319  
NODIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/26/01 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)  
TAGS: PEPR, GE, UR, US

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV'S REMARKS TO FRG VISITOR RAU

REF: A) MOSCOW 14962; B) STATE 285713

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRG EMBROFF (STRICTLY PROTECT) PROVIDED DEPARTMENT ON OCTOBER 26 WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF BREZHNEV'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA PREMIER RAU (REFTEL A). FRG EMBROFF REQUESTED THAT SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETING BE CAREFULLY PROTECTED.

3. THE MEETING OPENED WITH BREZHNEV READING A STATEMENT. WHILE BREZHNEV SEEMED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, HE HAD TROUBLE ARTICULATING HIS WORDS, AND DURING THE EXCHANGE WITH RAU THAT FOLLOWED THE PREPARED STATEMENT BREZHNEV ASKED ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV TO WRITE OUT ANSWERS TO RAU'S QUESTIONS, WHICH BREZHNEV THEN READ TO RAU. AS IN PAST MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN GUESTS, AFTER HE HAD READ THE PREPARED STATEMENT BREZHNEV TURNED TO ALEKSANDROV AND ASKED, IN RUSSIAN, "HOW DID I DO?"

4. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, BREZHNEV'S PREPARED STATEMENT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS. THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH THE FRG WERE IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD BALANCE AND BREZHNEV DESIRED CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE FRG IN THE 1980'S. THERE WERE OTHER LARGE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION BESIDES THE GAS PIPELINE, PARTICULARLY IN THE TRANSPORTATION FIELD. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE PORT CONSTRUCTION AND EXPLORATION OF SIBERIA.

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NLS

F97-030/2 #50

BY

CAJ

NARA, DATE

4/27/01



SITUATION: STATE  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(OUR SOURCE NOTED THAT HE BELIEVED THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAD MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF FRG CONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET PORTS.) THE USSR EXPECTED THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT SACRIFICE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES TO VIEWS FROM THE WEST THAT ADVOCATED MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND IMPOSITION OF WILL ON OTHERS BY FORCE, THAT ADVOCATED REARMAMENT AND EXPECTED ALLIES TO DO THE SAME. THE SOVIET UNION WILL RESIST SUCH POLICIES.

5. BREZHNEV CONTINUED THAT SUCH POSITIONS WERE NOT HELD IN THE FRG WITH THE SAME ENTHUSIASM AS IN THE US. THE US WAS TRYING TO DISRUPT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. THE GENERAL COURSE OF THE CURRENT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WAS TO DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN BUILT UP IN EARLIER YEARS. BY PLACING MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS IN EUROPE, THE US WAS TRYING TO CHANGE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE WORLD AS WELL AS IN EUROPE, AND AS CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR DEFENSE COUNCIL BREZHNEV COULD STATE THAT THE USSR HAD SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 1000 - LAUNCHERS IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE NATO ENJOYED A 1.5 ADVANTAGE IN WARHEADS.

6. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT STATIONED WEAPONS THAT COULD REACH THE US IN ANY COUNTRY, BREZHNEV ASSERTED. IF THE US INSISTED UPON DEPLOYING NEW WEAPONS, EXISTING PARITY WOULD BE VIOLATED. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE FRG'S MOTIVATION IN AGREEING TO DEPLOYMENT, SINCE THE FRG'S SECURITY WOULD NOT BE ENHANCED BY SUCH A MOVE. THIS WOULD BE A GIFT TO THE US, WHOSE ROCKET COULD THEN REACH THE USSR IN FIVE OR SIX MINUTES. SUCH ROCKETS WERE FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS. THE FRG SHOULD SEE WITH OPEN EYES THAT THE COUNTER-STRIKE WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE FRG, AND BONN WOULD NOT DECIDE WHO PUSHED THE BUTTON FIRST. IT WOULD THUS PLACE ITS SECURITY IN THE STRANGE HANDS OF A COUNTRY FOR WHICH THE SECURITY OF THE FRG WAS NOT ITS MAIN PRIORITY.

7. THE WAY OUT OF THIS SITUATION, BREZHNEV CONTINUED, WAS TO EVALUATE THE CURRENT BALANCE CORRECTLY AND TO FREEZE WEAPONS AT THEIR EXISTING LEVEL. LIMITATION COULD FOLLOW, AND THEN REDUCTIONS COULD BEGIN. THIS APPROACH WOULD CREATE A FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR THE COMING DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA. GIVEN WASHINGTON'S CURRENT INSISTENCE UPON DEPLOYMENT, THE USSR FEARED

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT THE US WOULD USE THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ONLY-AS A  
PRETENSE FOR DEPLOYMENT. THE USSR HAS DIFFERENT  
INTERESTS AND IS PREPARED TO LIMIT AND ALSO REDUCE THE  
WEAPONS IN QUESTION, AND EVEN TO LIMIT "LAUNCH  
FACILITIES" ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL  
SECURITY. (OUR SOURCE SAID THAT THE GERMAN PHRASE FOR  
"LAUNCH FACILITIES" WAS DIFFICULT TO TRANSLATE INTO  
ENGLISH, BUT CLEARLY WAS MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN  
"LAUNCHERS.")

8. OUR SOURCE ADDED THAT THE FRG EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WAS  
STRUCK WITH SHARP ANTI-US TONE OF BREZHNEV'S REMARKS.  
HE NOTED THAT BREZHNEV'S PITCH TO VETTER (KEFTELS) WAS  
SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME BUT LACKED SHARP INVECTIVE  
DIRECTED AT THE US. HAIG

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81/1314

SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE283

STU0978

UN RUEHC

DE RUEHDL #9758 2791716

ZNY SSSSS 27h

U 061715Z OCT 81 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0710

BT

~~SECRET~~ BONN 19758

MODIS

E.O. 12065 RDS-3 10-06-01 (YORK, CHARLES) DR-E

TAGS: MNUC, NATO, TNE, NL, GE

SUBJECT: TNE: DUTCH DECISION REGARDING REAFFIRMATION OF  
- DECEMBER 1979 DECISION

REF: STATE 266525

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

-

2. SINCE FONMIN GENSCHER IS IN PEKING, WE DELIVERED THE  
TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (REFTEL) TO ONE OF HIS  
PERSONAL AIDES (VON BRAUNMUEHL) ON OCTOBER 6.

3. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT GENSCHER HAS A PREVIOUSLY  
SCHEDULED MEETING WITH VAN DER STOEP ON THURSDAY OCTOBER  
8 AND THAT GENSCHER WILL BE INFORMED OF THE SECRETARY'S  
MESSAGE BEFORE THAT MEETING.

-

4. VON BRAUNMUEHL ALSO SAID THAT, AS WE WELL KNEW, GENSCHER  
WOULD SHARE OUR CONCERN ON THIS SUBJECT. HE ALSO NOTED,  
AS HAVE OUR PREVIOUS FONUFF CONTACTS, THAT THE FONUFF  
HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY HAD SUCH FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THE PROBLEM  
HAS REACHED THE STAGE IT NOW HAS. BURNS

BT

#9758

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #51  
BY CRJ NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE333  
UTS9964  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUFHOL #9509 2751827  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 021827Z OCT 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0638  
BT  
S E C R E T BONN 19509  
NODIS  
E.O. 12065 GDS: 10/2/87 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.)OR-M  
TAGS: MPOL, GE  
SUBJECT: MODERNIZING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES  
REF: STATE 263734  
1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)  
2. LETTER TRANSMITTED REFTEL DELIVERED MORNING OCTOBER 2.  
BURNS  
BT  
#9509  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #52  
BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 4/27/01

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SITUATION: EUR  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE341  
ST03896  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHOL #9507 2751808  
ZNY SSSSS ZTH  
U 021808Z OCT 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0634  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ BONN 19507  
NNDIS  
FOR EUR DEPT. ASST. SECRETARY NILES  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/2/10 (WJESSNER, WILLIAM M.) DR-M  
TAGS: CASC, GM, UF  
SUBJ: REPORTED PRISONER EXCHANGE  
REFS: (A) STATE 259670  
1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~  
2. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE TRIED REPEATEDLY SINCE TUESDAY  
MORNING TO GET APPOINTMENT WITH HIRT TO CARRY OUT  
INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL. HIS OFFICE HAS BEEN POINTEDLY  
UNRESPONSIVE. I SHALL LEAVE FOR HAMBURG TOMORROW AND  
NOT RETURN UNTIL TUESDAY EVENING. AT THAT POINT, I  
SHALL PRESS AGAIN FOR AN APPOINTMENT. ALTHOUGH  
SUBJECT HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, I SHALL INFORM  
HIRT OF MY INSTRUCTIONS AND ASK FOR EXPLANATION OF  
HIS UNAVAILABILITY TO SEE ME.  
GURNS  
BT  
#9507  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 197-030/2 # 53  
BY QJS NARA DATE 4/27/01  
SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE961

DD RUEHC RUEHOL RUEHTV RUEHJA RUEHER RUEHMO RUEHDT

DE RUEHC #9670 2720054

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

U 290046Z SEP 81 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1238

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3478

INFO RUEHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE 0639

RUEHER/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 5008

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6540

RUEHDT/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 5025

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 259670 TOSEC 100098

NODIS

FOR MINISTER WOESSNER ONLY FROM NILES ; SECRETARY FOR SEITZ

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/28/10 (NILES, THOMAS M. T.)

TAGS CASC GW UR

SUBJECT REPORTED PRISONER EXCHANGE

REFS: (A) TEL AVIV 15145; (B) STATE 175515

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR EVRUN RAISED WITH COUNSELOR MCFARLANE SEPTEMBER 28, ISRAELI INTEREST IN A POSSIBLE PRISONER EXCHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY INVOLVING GUENTER GUILLAUME (STORY ALSO IN PRESS HERE). ISRAELIS WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE KNEW ABOUT THESE REPORTS AND WHAT EFFORTS WE WERE MAKING TO SECURE RELEASE OF JEWISH DISSIDENTS, LIKE SHCHARANSKIY, AS PART OF THIS DEAL. THIS APPROACH IS OBVIOUSLY PARALLEL TO APPROACH IN TEL AVIV (REF A, REPEATED TO BONN AND INFO ADDRESSEES).

3. FOR BONN: EMBASSY SHOULD CONTACT HIRT AT INNER-GERMAN MINISTRY AND ASK WHETHER THE REPORTS OF A PROPOSED TRADE ARE TRUE, AND IF SO, WHETHER ANY PERSONS ON LIST WE GAVE GERMANS IN JULY (REF B) ARE INCLUDED. YOU MAY INDICATE THAT, IN ADDITION TO OUR OWN INTEREST, THE ISRAELIS HAVE APPROACHED US. WE WOULD ALSO BE

INTERESTED IN WHETHER ISRAELI EMBASSY BONN CONTACTED GERMANS AS SUGGESTED REF A.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 1997-030/2 #54  
BY GJS NARA, DATE 4/27/01

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. FOR TEL AVIV: AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONTACT KIMCHE AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- USG IS ASKING THE FRG WHETHER REPORTS OF A PRISONER EXCHANGE INVOLVING GUILLAUME ARE TRUE, AND IF SO, FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

-- IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM THE FRG THIS SUMMER, THE USG GAVE THE FRG A LIST OF PERSONS IN WHOM WE WERE INTERESTED IN INCLUDING IN ANY EXCHANGE WITH GDR; SHCHARANSKIY WAS AT THE TOP OF THAT LIST.

-- IF WE LEARN ANYTHING FURTHER, WE WILL PASS IT TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT MUST ADD THAT OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT PUBLICITY ON POSSIBLE EXCHANGES IS ALWAYS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND OFTEN KILLS PROMISING ARRANGEMENTS. THEREFORE, THESE DISCUSSIONS MUST REMAIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL IF THEY ARE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

5. COUNSELOR WILL MAKE THE POINTS IN PARA FOUR IN HIS RESPONSE TO ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE. CLARK

BT

#9670

NNNN



SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

Q 250225Z SEP 81 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6030

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 SECTO 10021

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09/22/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWKENCE)

TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M)

SUBJECT: (S) BREAKFAST MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG  
AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ONE-HOUR BREAKFAST CONVERSATION ON SEPTEMBER 21 BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER CONCENTRATED ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: (A) EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INCLUDING POLAND AND THE RESPECTIVE GERMAN-AMERICAN MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO; (B) THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS; (C) SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NAMIBIA CONTACT GROUP; (D) THE MIDDLE EAST; (E) SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA; (F) GENSCHER'S UPCOMING VISIT TO CHINA AND (G) THE SOVIET-EUROPEAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT. THE DISCUSSION REVEALED A BROAD AREA OF AGREEMENT ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE. GENSCHER WAS NOT, HOWEVER, HOPEFUL THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY DELAY IN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GAS PIPELINE PROJECT. END SUMMARY

3. MEETING WITH GROMYKO: GENSCHER BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT HE HAD JUST SEEN THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 21ST LETTER TO BREZHNEV. HE ASSUMED THAT THE

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SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:003628

DTG:250225

TOR:2680527

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLS

F97-030/2-#55

BY

CJS

NARA, DATE

4/27/01

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

APPROACH TAKEN IN THE LETTER WOULD ALSO FORM THE BASIS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. A MAIN SUBJECT WOULD BE THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THE U.S. ALSO INTENDED TO PURSUE A BROAD DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. WE WOULD RAISE IN DETAIL SUBJECTS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, BUT EVEN STRONGER EMPHASIS WOULD BE PUT ON AREAS WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE HIGH LOSS OF FACE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SUCH AS CUBA, ANGOLA AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

4. CONCERNING THE TNF NEGOTIATIONS, THE SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT THE WEST WAS IN GOOD SHAPE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN NATO ON A U.S. OPENING POSITION WHICH STRESSED CONCENTRATION ON LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS; HAD A GLOBAL RATHER THAN A EUROPEAN FOCUS; AND FORESAW EQUAL REDUCTIONS IN MISSILE STRENGTH.

5. GENSCHER NOTED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A DEBATE WITH THE SOVIETS OVER WHETHER THE TERM "TNF" SHOULD BE USED. HE SENSED A SMALL OPENING IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH SPOKE OF "WEAPONS WHICH WE CALL TNF." GENSCHER SAID HE WAS RAISING THIS POINT BECAUSE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGREED STRONGLY WITH THE GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE TERM "TNF" CONNOTED A REGIONAL APPROACH. THIS IS WHY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS REFERRED TO "MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS." GENSCHER SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS IF THE SOVIETS SUCCEEDED IN FOCUSING THE TALKS ON A REGIONAL AREA. THEY WOULD THEN GAIN A PROPAGANDA EDGE BY CLAIMING THEY HAD MOVED THEIR WEAPONS BEHIND THE URAL MOUNTAINS WHERE THEY WOULD BE A THREAT ONLY TO THE CHINESE. THEREFORE, GENSCHER SAID WE SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION TO SHIFT FROM USE OF THE PHRASE "TNF."

6. THE SECRETARY AGREED, BUT NOTED THAT IF THE WEST MADE TOO BIG AN ISSUE OF THE QUESTION, TERMINOLOGY ITSELF COULD BECOME A PROBLEM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD BEGUN TO USE THE TERM "MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS." HOWEVER, THERE SHOULD BE AN EVOLUTION RATHER THAN AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN WESTERN TERMINOLOGY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT A FURTHER REASON FOR A CAREFUL APPROACH TO THE TERMINOLOGY QUESTION WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN A LONG DEBATE WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS POINT. WE NEEDED TO GUARD AGAINST SEEMING TO BUY THEIR POSITION BY CHANGING OUR TERMINOLOGY TOO ABRUPTLY. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO SEE FLEXIBILITY IN THE U.S. POSITION AND NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO DISAGREE-

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND GERMAN SIDES OVER TERMINOLOGY.  
7. GENSCHER ASKED WHETHER AGREEMENT ON THE TNF NEGOTIA-  
TIONS WOULD COME AFTER THE FIRST OR SECOND MEETING WITH  
GROMYKO. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WOULD WAIT AND SEE.  
HE FEARED THAT GROMYKO WAS ENTERING THE DISCUSSIONS WITH  
A FEELING THAT PRESSURE FROM THE EUROPEAN ALLIES HAD  
PUT THE U.S. IN THE POSITION OF DEMANDEUR. WE DID NOT  
WANT HIM TO HARBOR SUCH ILLUSIONS AND IF THE SOVIETS  
ENTERED THE TALKS IN A RESISTANT MOOD, THEY WOULD FIND THE  
U.S. RELAXED ABOUT AGREEMENT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE  
SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR HAD BEEN EXCHANGING  
DRAFTS OF A POSSIBLE COMMUNIQUE. WE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS  
THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ISSUE THE COMMUNIQUE AFTER  
EITHER THE FIRST OR SECOND MEETING. SO FAR THE SOVIETS

BT

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

U 251575Z SEP 81 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6031

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 SECTION 10021

NODIS  
HAD NOT RESPONDED TO OUR LATEST COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT.  
THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED GROMYKO TO OPEN THE  
MEETING WITH A LONG PRESENTATION, THIS WAS STANDARD  
SOVIET PRACTICE, BUT THE SECRETARY DID NOT INTEND TO  
RESPOND. INSTEAD, HE WOULD RAISE PRACTICAL ISSUES AND  
ATTEMPT TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.  
8. AMBASSADOR HERMES ASKED WHETHER AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY  
BEEN REACHED ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.  
FOR EXAMPLE, WAS IT CLEAR THAT FBS WAS EXCLUDED? THE  
SECRETARY SAID THE SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED, BUT IT  
WAS CLEAR THAT THE U.S. OPENING POSITION EXCLUDED FBS.  
THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY RAISE THE ISSUE BOTH IN THE  
GROMYKO MEETING AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES.  
SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE WOULD AVOID GETTING INTO DETAILS  
DURING THE DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO. HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR  
THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO AGREE ON THE TIME  
AND THE PLACE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID  
HE WOULD HOLD FIRMLY TO THIS APPROACH BECAUSE HE BELIEVED  
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GUARD AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF  
DISAGREEMENTS AT THIS MEETING WHICH COULD CAUSE FURTHER  
DIFFICULTIES. THE U.S. WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, VERY SENSITIVE

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SIT:  
FOR:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:003630

DTG:251555

TOR:2680529

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLS F97-030/2 #56

BY CHS, NARA, DATE 4/27/01



SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO GERMANY'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS.

9. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SECRETARY NOTED A RECENT GERMAN PRESS REPORT WHICH HAD RELATED THE SO-CALLED ZERO OPTION TO THE COMPLETE DISMANTLEMENT OF ALL SS-20S. THE REPORT HAD ALSO STATED THAT THE SPD SPOKESMAN HAD WARNED ALL PARTY MEMBERS NOT TO SPEAK AT THE OCTOBER 10 ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATION IN BONN. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS COMFORTABLE WITH BOTH OF THESE POSITIONS.

10. GENSCHER SAID THE REPORT PROBABLY REFERRED TO A CLARIFICATION BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ON THE FRG'S POSITION CONCERNING THE ZERO OPTION. THIS CONCERN HAD BEEN DISCUSSED RECENTLY IN THE BUNDESTAG AND GENSCHER WOULD STRESS IT AGAIN IN HIS SEPTEMBER 22 UNGA SPEECH TO BE SURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GERMAN POSITION. THE EXACT POSITION OF THE FRG WAS THAT IF THE SOVIETS DISMANTLED ALL SS-20 MISSILES, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR NATO MODERNIZATION. THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW PUT FORWARD BY WILLY BRANDT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WEST COULD GIVE UP MODERNIZATION IF THE SOVIETS DISMANTLED A PORTION OF THEIR SS-20 ARSENAL.

11. GENSCHER SAID THAT THIS DEFINITION OF THE ZERO OPTION GAVE THE WEST A STRONG PUBLIC ADVANTAGE AND CAUSED THE EAST CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES. HE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, DESCRIBED IT IN THESE TERMS TO THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN A MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 20 AND THE HUNGARIAN HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY REPLY. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD TOLD THE HUNGARIAN THAT DURING HIS 1978 VISIT TO BONN, BREZHNEV HAD AGREED THAT THERE WAS A BALANCE OF FORCES. THE POINT NOW WAS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD DESTROYED THIS BALANCE BY DEPLOYING THE SS-20. ONLY IF THEY RETURNED TO THE STATUS QUO WOULD NATO MODERNIZATION BECOME UNNECESSARY.

12. POLAND: GENSCHER SAID THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HE HAD ALSO PLACED STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND. HE HAD TOLD THE HUNGARIAN THAT THE FRG WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT BY ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS. GENSCHER SAID THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY TO HIS PRESENTATION AND HAD NOT REJECTED IT. GENSCHER NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 21 LETTER HAD STRESSED THAT THE POLES MUST DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THIS WAS TRUE, BUT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN TWO POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS. ONE COULD BE AN INVASION FROM OUTSIDE, BUT ANOTHER COULD BE A "POLISH SOLUTION" WHICH DID NOT COINCIDE WITH THE WISHES OF THE POLISH PEOPLE. IF SUCH

SITUATION: NNDIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A SOLUTION CAME ABOUT, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO MAKE ITS VIEWS JUST AS CLEAR.

13. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE SPEAKING WITH THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER DIRECTLY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH GENSCHER. HE ASKED FOR GENSCHER'S ADVICE ON WHAT HE SHOULD SAY. GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY WOULD CREATE A DIFFICULT SITUATION. NO ONE COULD KNOW WHERE SUCH A DECLARATION WOULD LEAD. THE ASSUMPTION WOULD BE THAT IT HAD BEEN DONE UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE. GENSCHER NOTED THAT THE RECENT STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD ATTACKED THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS AS WELL AS THE SOLIDARITY UNION. THE REASON HAD BEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY HAD REFUSED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION. THE POLES WERE NOW CLEARLY UNDER STRONG

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SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

0 251575Z SEP 81 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6032

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 SECTION 10021

NODIS  
PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIETS.  
14. SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE DETAIL: THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE HAD HEARD THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT. HE HOPED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE PROPOSAL ON ALTERNATIVE SOURCES, WHICH THE U.S. HAD PROMISED AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT, WAS PRESENTED BY THE TEAM WHICH HOPED TO TRAVEL SOON TO BONN. THERE WOULD BE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WERE MADE BEFORE THE TEAM HAD MADE ITS PRESENTATION.  
15. GENSCHER SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE UNDERSTOOD, THE GERMAN-SOVIET MIXED COMMISSION WAS NOW MEETING IN MOSCOW. HE DID NOT KNOW IF AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS PLANNED, BUT IF IT WERE, IT WOULD NOW BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DELAY IT. GENSCHER ASKED THAT THE U.S. NOT MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OF THE PIPELINE PROJECT. HE SAID THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM WAS THE U.S. LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AFTER THAT ACTION GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AND BUSINESS CIRCLES HAD DECIDED THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY PROBLEM WITH NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, GENSCHER STRESSED THAT THE FRG CONTINUED TO WELCOME DISCUSSIONS ON ALTERNA-

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SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:003632

DTG:251555

TOR:2680531

SENSITIVE



SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TIVE ENERGY SOURCES. THE PIPELINE WOULD NOT MAKE THE FRG DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE GERMANS WOULD WELCOME AS MANY ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY AS POSSIBLE.

16. SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER'S MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON THE THREE-PHASE APPROACH IN NAMIBIA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEMED WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL AND WERE PREPARING A REASONED REPLY. ALL SPECIFIC CONCERNS HAD BEEN ANSWERED SATISFACTORILY AND CROCKER'S VIEW WAS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS GENUINELY BELIEVED THAT THE U.S. HAD PLAYED STRAIGHT WITH THEM. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE HAD REGISTERED NOTABLE SUCCESSES IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PRETORIA. THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EVEN STATED THAT IF THE CABINET DID NOT ACCEPT THIS POSITION, HE WOULD RESIGN.

17. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE THREE-PHASE APPROACH WAS BASED ON THE SIMULTANEITY OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE HAD ASSURED THEM THAT THIS WAS THE U.S. POSITION BUT THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY THE POSITION OF THE ENTIRE CONTACT GROUP. HE ADDED THAT THE FINAL SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE END OF THE MONTH. GENSCHER ASKED ABOUT THE TIMETABLE FOR THE THREE-PHASE APPROACH. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT SUCCESS OF PHASE THREE WOULD REQUIRE SOME SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS ON CUBAN TROOPS WHICH WERE NOT YET POSSIBLE. WE WERE RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE POINT WHERE SOME AGREEMENT MUST BE ACHIEVED ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. SPEAKING FRANKLY, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED PRIVATELY, WE WOULD WISH TO PLACE IT BEFORE THE PUBLIC. THE ONUS WOULD THEN BE ON THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT UNTIL TALKS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED WITH THE SOVIETS, THE CUBANS AND THE ANGOLANS, IT WOULD BE TOO EARLY TO TELL HOW THINGS WOULD PROCEED.

18. GENSCHER AGREED THAT IT WAS STILL TOO EARLY TO ESTABLISH A TIMETABLE. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER THAT A TIMETABLE WOULD BE DECISIVE FOR THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST NOT LOSE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH THESE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SHOWN GREAT PATIENCE RECENTLY. GENSCHER REPORTED THAT THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM DURING HIS VISIT TO BONN THAT, FROM THE POINT OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, THERE WOULD NO LONGER BE ANY NEED FOR CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA. GENSCHER AGREED THAT WE WERE FACING THE OLD QUESTION OF THE CHICKEN AND THE EGG. HOWEVER, HIS PERSONAL FEELING WAS THAT IF WE WERE TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY WITH THE BLACK AFRICAN

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

STATES, WE MUST PROVIDE FIRST THE INDEPENDENCE AND THEN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS.

19. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT TO GET AROUND THIS PROBLEM WE MUST REACH A COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION OF SIMULTANEITY. IN HIS VIEW, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SEQUENTIALLY PHASED WITHDRAWALS OF CUBAN TROOPS AS PART OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS AT GRAND RAPIDS, FOREIGN MINISTER CASTENEDA HAD SAID THAT CASTRO WAS VERY NERVOUS ABOUT THE SITUATION; CASTANEDA HAD OFFERED TO FACILITATE CONTACTS WITH THE CUBANS, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR SIMULTANEITY.

20. RETURNING TO GENSCHER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS, THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD MENTIONED PROSPECTS FOR A SHARING OF POWER AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL

BT

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

O 251575Z SEP 81 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6033

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 SECTO 10021

NODIS  
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE CUBANS.  
GENSCHER SAID THIS QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN RAISED, BUT HE  
PERSONALLY WAS CONVINCED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE ONLY  
POSSIBLE RESULT. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE  
ANGOLANS HAD TOLD THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THEY  
FULLY INTENDED TO TAKE THIS APPROACH. GENSCHER NOTED  
AGAIN THAT THEY HAD NO OTHER CHOICE IN LIGHT OF THE  
BALANCE OF POWER WHICH EXISTED WITHIN THE COUNTRY.  
21. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY HOPING THAT THE CONTACT  
GROUP MEETING WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. HE NOTED THAT  
CARRINGTON WAS MORE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE SITUATION IN  
ANGOLA. HE ALSO SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS  
WERE STRINGING THE THE CONTACT GROUP ALONG. HE DID NOT  
BELIEVE THAT THEY REALLY INTENDED TO RELINQUISH NAMIBIA.  
THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD COMPARED THE SITUATION TO  
THE PROBLEMS WITH ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE SINAI. IT  
WAS IMPORTANT TO CREATE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD  
MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOT TO GO ALONG.  
22. MIDDLE EAST: THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ONE  
ENCOURAGING ASPECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WAS THE  
FACT THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAD ANNOUNCED ON SUNDAY THAT

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SIT:  
EOR:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:003634

DTG:251555

TOR:2680533

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THEY HAD AGREED TO A FIRM TIME SCHEDULE FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THEY HAD NOT WAITED FOR THE FIRST FORMAL MEETING TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT. THIS SUGGESTED A WELCOME SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

23. THE SECRETARY NOTED, OF COURSE, THAT OTHER OBSTACLES REMAINED FORMIDABLE. ONE QUESTION WAS THE SAUDI POSITION. CARRINGTON HAD TOLD HIM THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH MRS. THATCHER, PRINCE FAHD HAD ADOPTED A DIFFERENT LINE THAN THE ONE HE HAD GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY IN MARBELLA ON SEPTEMBER 12. IN HIS TALK WITH THATCHER, FAHD HAD OPPOSED THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND HAD URGED THE EC TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS INITIATIVE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE PLO. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WAS WORRISOME, BUT CONSISTENT WITH PAST PATTERNS. HIS IMPRESSION FROM TALKS WITH FAHD WAS THAT THE SAUDIS WANTED US TO PRESS THE AUTONOMY TALKS BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT SADAT. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT IF THE AWACS SALE WERE DEFEATED THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS EFFECTS ON SAUDI ATTITUDES.

24. THE SECRETARY SAID HIS MAIN CONCERN CONTINUED TO BE LEBANON. WHEN HE SAW BEGIN IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY ISRAELI MOVES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PROVOCATION OF SUCH A MAGNITUDE THAT USE OF FORCE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE MAIN REASON THAT HE HAD TRAVELED TO NEW YORK TO SEE BEGIN. BEGIN HAD REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THIS POINT DURING TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN NECESSARY TO MAKE IT VERY CLEARLY ONCE MORE.

25. THE SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT IF THE PLO WERE NOT RESTRAINED THERE WAS A REAL DANGER IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE SITUATION WAS DIFFICULT BECAUSE A CRITICAL PART OF PEACE EFFORTS REMAINED ACTIVE SAUDI DIPLOMACY WITH THE SYRIANS, THE PLO, AND THE VARIOUS FACTIONS IN LEBANON. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT PRINCE FAHD HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS MAKING PROGRESS. THE NEXT MEETING WOULD BE IN NOVEMBER AND WOULD DEAL WITH RETURN OF SYRIAN FORCES. THIS WAS VITAL, BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS FEARED THAT IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD WHILE SYRIAN FORCES WERE STILL IN LEBANON, THE RESULT WOULD BE A SYRIAN PUPPET STATE. THAT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY EITHER TO MOVE THE SYRIAN FORCES FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS OR TO POSTPONE THE ELECTIONS. THE LATTER WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS.

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

26. FINALLY, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE WAS THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF THE CHRISTIAN FACTIONS IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS WERE CEASING THEIR SUPPORT. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE PLO IN LEBANON AND ABOUT PLO EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION DURING THE CEASE FIRE. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THERE WERE GREAT PROBLEMS IN THE AREA AND WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES. WE MIGHT SOON BE FACED WITH ISRAELI ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

27. GENSCHER AGREED THAT A NEW ISRAELI MOVE AGAINST THE PLO WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS, BOTH FOR THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS. HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE ISRAELI BOMBING OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PLANT HAD HAD A STRONG INFLUENCE ON THE ELECTION OF THE UNGA PRESIDENT.

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SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

Q 251575Z SEP 81 ZFF-6  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6034

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 SECTO 10021

NODIS

28. CONCERNING PRINCE FAHD'S COMMENTS, GENSCHER SAW NO CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY AND WHAT HE HAD TOLD THATCHER. HIS SHORT-TERM TACTICAL GOAL WAS TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR SAPAT UNTIL THE ENTIRE SINAI HAD BEEN RETURNED TO EGYPT. HIS LONGER TERM STRATEGIC INTEREST WAS TO ACHIEVE A BROADER SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HERE THE EC PROPOSAL WAS USEFUL.

29. GENSCHER NOTED THAT THE INCLUSION OF ISRAEL IN A US SECURITY ZONE HAD ALSO CREATED PROBLEMS FOR OTHER MOSLEM COUNTRIES. A NEW ISRAELI STRIKE IN LEBANON WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION IMPOSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT SOME ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS HAD ARISEN BUT THAT WE HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS WITH PAKISTAN. THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR ARMS PROPOSAL AND WE HAD BEEN URGING THEM TO SOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE IAEA. WE HAD TOLD ZIA THAT IF HE DID NOT COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA, CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE ARMS PACKAGE WOULD BE PUT IN JEOPARDY. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT WE HAD ALSO BEEN TRYING TO REASSURE THE INDIANS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS RE PAKISTAN, SO FAR WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS.

30. CENTRAL AMERICA: THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PSN:003636

DTG:251555

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GENSCHER TO KNOW THAT THE US WAS ENGAGED IN THOROUGH PLANNING ON CUBA WHICH COULD IF CARRIED OUT INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL ESCALATION IN INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THE SITUATION WAS SUCH THAT IF WE DID NOT REVERSE THE TREND IN CENTRAL AMERICA, BRUSH FIRE CONFLICTS WOULD PROBABLY BREAK OUT IN PLACES SUCH AS GUATEMALA, COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS. THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME AVAILABLE TO CHANGE THE SITUATION. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT CONSIDERING ANYTHING IRRESPONSIBLE, BUT IF CUBAN BEHAVIOR CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT, THERE COULD BE PROBLEMS.

31. GENSCHER RECALLED THAT THE US AND SOVIETS HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING ON CUBA IN 1962. HE ASSUMED THAT CURRENT PLANNING DID NOT AFFECT THESE AGREEMENTS. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED THAT CURRENT PLANNING DID NOT AFFECT THESE AGREEMENTS. THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. GENSCHER ASKED ALSO THAT THE US CONSIDER POLAND IN THE CUBAN CONTEXT. HE PERSONALLY HAD NEVER FORGOTTEN THE 1956 CONNECTION BETWEEN HUNGARY AND SUEZ. THERE WAS ALSO THE UNFORTUNATE REMOVAL OF US MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS FROM ITALY AND TURKEY AFTER THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE TOO WOULD NEVER FORGET THIS LATTER ISSUE, SINCE IT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF HIS FIRST MAJOR BATTLE IN THE JOINT STAFF IN 1962. GENSCHER SAID HE WISHED ONLY TO STRESS AGAIN THAT CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A PAWN TO BE EXCHANGED FOR A CONCESSION IN EUROPE.

32. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT DURING THE MEETINGS IN GRAND RAPIDS, MEXICAN PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO HAD BEEN CONTRITE ABOUT THE FRENCH-MEXICAN STATEMENT ON EL SALVADOR. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE BEFOREHAND OF THE DEAL WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE MEXICANS NOW SEEMED MORE COOPERATIVE.

33. GENSCHER SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW, THE BEST SOLUTION FOR CENTRAL AMERICA WAS TO ORGANIZE REGIONAL COOPERATION WITH MASSIVE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE. THE EC-10 COULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, MUCH AS IT HAD DONE WITH THE ASEAN STATES. THIS WAS THE ONLY REAL WAY TO REMOVE CUBAN INFLUENCE FROM THE REGION. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD BE BEST PLACED IF IT WENT TO GOVERNMENTS RATHER THAN FORCES OUTSIDE GOVERNMENTS. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT HIS PHILOSOPHY WAS THAT DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD WORK TOGETHER AND MOVE AWAY

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FROM FORCES OF VIOLENCE.

34. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH SUCH AN APPROACH. IN EL SALVADOR, FOR EXAMPLE, WE AGREED THAT DUARTE SHOULD BEGIN TALKS WITH UNGO UNDER THREE CONDITIONS: A) THAT UNGO REJECT THE USE OF FORCE; B) THAT HE AGREE TO JOIN FREE ELECTIONS AND C) THAT THERE BE NO IMPLIED RECOGNITION OF THE GUERRILLAS IN SUCH TALKS. DUARTE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE WAS READY FOR TALKS IF UNGO REJECTED THE USE OF FORCE. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE US WOULD BE IN FAVOR OF ANY PLAN WHICH DID NOT VIOLATE US CONDITIONS.

35. CHINA: GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD BE VISITING CHINA FOR THREE DAYS IN EARLY OCTOBER. HE ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE CHINESE REMAINED NERVOUS. HIS VISIT TO CHINA HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, BUT THE CHINESE WERE

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SUSPICIOUS THAT US WILLINGNESS TO SELL ARMS TO BEIJING WAS MERELY A COVER FOR PLANS TO SELL MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO TAIWAN. AT PRESENT, WE WERE STILL AWAITING A CHINESE RESPONSE ON ONE ARMS SALES OFFER. THEY CONTINUED TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF WHO WAS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH TO CHINESE CONCERNS. THE US INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH TAIWAN IN A CAUTIOUS MANNER, WHILE REMAINING SENSITIVE TO CHINESE NEEDS. 36. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME NEGATIVE AFTERMATH TO THE ASEAN CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK, ESPECIALLY NEW TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA. WE WERE NOW SEEKING TO REDUCE THESE TENSIONS AND THE NEW PROPOSALS ON KAMPUCHEA HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. HE ADDED THAT THE US WOULD HOLD FIRM ON THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEAN REPRESENTATION IN THE UN. IN GENERAL, THE SITUATION WITH THE CHINESE WAS GOOD, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT GENSCHER COULD BE HELPFUL BY ASSURING THE CHINESE THAT THE US WISHED TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THAT WE WOULD NOT ABUSE THE

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WHSR COMMENTS:

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DTG:251555

TDR:2680536

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DATE 09/30/81//273

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TAIWAN CONNECTION.  
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