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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC
Country File

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OA/Box:
File Folder: Japan (02/03/84 – 03/29/84)

FOIA ID: F00-037 (1539), Oberdorfer
Date: 02/09/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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1. Memcon	Vice President – Minister Okonogi Meeting, 3p	2/3/84	B1
2. Memo	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Draft ICAO Resolution, 1p	2/7/84	B1
3. Draft Resolution	re Downing of Korean Airliner by Soviets, 2p	nd	B1
4. Memo	Jack Matlock to McFarlane re Conference on Soviet Strategy in Tokyo, 1p <i>R 7/24/06 F00-037, #575</i>	3/5/84	B1
5. Memo	Douglas McMinn, et al to McFarlane re Japanese Message, 1p <i>R " " #576</i>	3/9/84	B1
6. Cable	240423Z MAR 84, 7p <i>R " " #577</i>	3/23/84	B1
7. Memo	McFarlane to the President re Trade Negotiations with Japan, 2p <i>PART " " #578</i>	3/29/84	B1
8. Paper	Assessment, 1p <i>D " " #579</i>	nd	B1, <i>B3</i>
9. Memo	Gaston Sigur/Don Gregg to McFarlane re Negotiations with Japan, 2p <i>PART " " #580</i>	3/28/84	B1
10. Memo	Sigur to McFarlane re Bill Brock and the National Cattleman's Association, 1p <i>R " " #581</i>	3/29/84	B1
11. Memo	Gregg to the Record re Brock's meeting with National Cattleman's Association, 2p <i>R " " #582</i>	3/29/84	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 7/20/2007

File Folder JAPAN (02/03/1984-03/29/1984)

FOIA

F00-037 (F1539)

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
7	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN (F00-037/1#578)	2	3/29/1984	MVN 5/21/08
9	MEMO	SIGUR/GREGG TO MCFARLANE RE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN (F00- 037/1#580)	2	3/28/1984	MVN 5/21/08

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ID 8401124

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 07 FEB 84 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 07 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

KAL FLIGHT 007

SUBJECT: US / JAPAN DRAFT TEXT ON ICAO COUN RESOLUTION / KAL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO HILL DUE: 10 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

CHILDRESS

LAUX

MCMINN

FORTIER

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8403734

LOG

NSC/FID

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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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ID 8401859

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 06 MAR 84 14

TO MCFARLANE FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 05 MAR 84

KEYWORDS USSR

JAPAN

CLINE, RAY

SCANLAN, J

SUBJECT: CONF ON SOVIET STRATEGY IN TOKYO DURING 13 - 14 MAR

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 09 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

SIGUR

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(HW)

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 1859

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Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	<u>2</u>	<u>JS</u>	_____

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1984


Dear Ray:

I am very pleased to learn of the plans for a conference in Tokyo on Soviet Strategy in Asia, sponsored by the World Strategy Network and the World Strategy Council of Japan.

The subject is obviously of great importance both for the United States and for our Japanese Allies. I commend the initiative taken by both your organizations to provide an opportunity for government officials and prominent specialists from both countries to meet and discuss the strategic questions which arise from increasing Soviet activity in Asia.

You have my best wishes for a successful conference and I look forward to seeing your report on the views expressed there.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Dr. Ray S. Cline
World Strategy Network
1015 Eighteenth Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 5, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT: Conference on Soviet Strategy in Tokyo

Ray Cline of CSIS, Georgetown, has written me and Gaston Sigur regarding a conference on Soviet strategy in Asia which his organization, the World Strategy Network, is organizing in Tokyo March 13-14. The conference is funded by DOD.

Ray had hoped to have a participant from the NSC, but we were able to locate no one with an appropriate background who could get away next week. I managed to arrange, however, for Jack Scanlan of State, who is familiar with the issues, to go. Stillwell's deputy will go from Defense.

Ray's second request was for a letter from you endorsing the conference. Since I believe that this is a laudable effort, I attach a letter which I believe would be appropriate for the occasion.

GHS
Gaston Sigur concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment:

- Tab I - Letter to Dr. Ray S. Cline
Tab II - Cline-Matlock letter of Feb. 14, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-037/1 #575BY LOS, NARA, DATE 7/24/16



World Strategy Network

1015 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N.W. • SUITE 805
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 • 202-775-3212

February 24, 1984

CHAIRMEN:

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Morris I. Leibman, ABA

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Dr. Ray S. Cline

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SECRETARY:

Dr. James Arnold Miller

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Dr. Stefan Halper

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Maj. Gen. Michael Collins
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Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham
U.S.A. (Ret.)

Science & Technology:

Dr. Edward Teller
Dr. Miles Costick

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Special Assistant to the President

National Security Council

Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Jack:

Herewith is a brief description of the project in researching and conferring abroad with scholars and officials interested in Soviet strategy. This specific conference plan is for Japan.

We expect to hold a number of conferences this year but have scheduled only two: Tokyo, 13-14 March 1984 and Rome, 15-16 May 1984.

I am very anxious to have the NSC involved in and supportive of the whole project. Right now, however, it is urgent to demonstrate high-level enthusiasm for what we are doing in Tokyo. This means an NSC staff member should attend the Tokyo conference -- no paper necessary, just participation in discussions on Washington's view of Soviet strategy in Asia.

We also need a brief note of encouragement and endorsement from Bud McFarlane, or, if he thinks it appropriate, the President. Such a note would simply say White House officials concerned with strategic planning have been briefed on the Tokyo Conference on Soviet Strategy in Asia. This conference is sponsored by the World Strategy Network in Washington, whose Director Ray S. Cline will attend the Tokyo meetings. It is hosted by the World Strategy Council, Japan, an association of distinguished Japanese scholars and experts on Asian strategic issues.

Please help us get a name promptly for an NSC representative participating (unofficially and informally) at the Tokyo scholars' conference and also clear a letter endorsing the concept of the conference prior to 10 March 1984. Both the Defense Department and the State Department have approved the Tokyo project and are supporting it. Two officers from General Stilwell's staff will attend. Speedy action on a letter should be easy.

SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS

Center for Strategic & International
Studies,
Georgetown University


Interaction
Systems
Incorporated

The John Davis Lodge
Center
for International Studies

Ambassador Jack Matlock
February 24, 1984
Page Two

Sorry to trouble you, but we want these discussions to be successful in improving understanding of the American view of the Soviet threat to world security.

Cordially

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ray S. Cline". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Ray S. Cline
Director

Encs.

cc: Dr. Gaston Sigur, NSC



SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY AGAINST ASIA

POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS

CONFERENCE IN TOKYO, JAPAN, MARCH 14, 1984

The Japan host for the conference effort will be the Japan World Strategy Council (JWSC) whose leaders include:

Gen. Ichiji Sugita (Ret.) (JWSC Chairman)
Honorary President, Japan Veterans Association

Amb. Shinsaku Hogen (JWSC Co-Chairman)
Former Vice Foreign Minister

Prof. Osamu Miyoshi (JWSC Executive Director)

Prof. Kenzo Kiga
Keio University, and President of the Association for
Soviet-East European Studies

Adm. Kenichi Kitamura (Ret.)
Former Commander, Self-Defense Fleet

Dr. Koh Maruyama
Former Vice Minister of State for Defense

Gen. Shigeto Nagano (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force

Prof. Haraki Niwa
Kyoto Sangyo University

The JWSC tentatively plans to invite to the March 14, 1984, conference in Tokyo the following persons, all of whom were met by Drs. Cline and Miller at various meetings during a planning trip to Tokyo, December 11-16, 1983:

Adm. Hirosato Asonuma (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet

Amb. Ryuichi Ando
Former Ambassador to Athens

Mr. Yukiyasu Harano
Secretary, Kangaku-in Foundation

Gen. Tiichi Hirose (Ret.)
President, Japan Veterans Association

Mr. Hajime Iki
Executive Director, Japan Veterans Association

Mr. Toyokazu Isaka
Monthly Magazine "JIYU"

Mr. Hideaki Kase
Chairman, Japan Center for the Study of Security Issues (JCSSI)

Mr. Hiroshi Kimura
Critic

Mr. Nobutane Kiuchi
Chairman, Institute of the World Economy

Mr. Yoshihisa Komori
Senior Correspondent, Mainichi Newspapers

Mr. Hiroshi Komoto
Director, RF-RADIO NIPPON Inc.

Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu (Ret.)
Former Chairman, JSC

Gen. Hisatomo Matsukane (Ret.)
Former North-Eastern Army Commander

Dr. Akishige Matsumoto
Vice President, Defense Association

Mr. Masahiro Miyazaki
Secretary General, JCSSI

Mr. Masahiko Motoki
Deputy Chief, Monthly Magazine "GENDAI"

Prof. Yatsuhiro Nakagawa
Tsukuba University

Mr. Toshio Nakajima
Director, U.S. Affairs, Cabinet Research Office

Ms. Kaoru Nakamaru
Director, International Affairs Institute

Mr. Toyoo Nobori
Director, Sogo Security Service Corporation

Adm. Ryohei Ohga (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, Self-Defense Fleet

Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki
Director General, Research and Planning Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Tomoya Okumura
President, Ohsaka Riki-Knives Mfg. Co., Ltd.

Amb. Shizuo Saitoh
Former Ambassador to the United Nations;
Chairman, The Foreign Press Center

Mr. Tomohisa Sakanaka
Senior Correspondent, Asahi Newspapers

Mr. Norimitsu Sasagawa
President, The Nippon Times

Prof. Yoshiaki Sasaki
Lecturer, Takusyoku University

Dr. Hideo Sekino
Director, Historical Research Institute

Prof. Yasunobu Somura
Tokyo Scientific University

Mr. Yasutoh Takada
The Star & Stripe Association

Mr. Minoru Tamba
Director, Soviet Union Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Dr. Jun Tsunoda
Executive Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

Mr. Takehiko Ueda
Director, Office of Total Produce, News Track Japan, Inc.

Mr. Sanji Ueki
Secretary, Kangaku-in Foundation

Prof. Kazuro Umezu
Osaka Foreign Policy University

Prof. Tetsuji Yasuhira
Soka University

Prof. Yasuhiko Yoshida
Aoyama Gakuin University

Mr. Joji Yoshihara
Senior Staff, Cabinet Research Office

Other Japanese, not met by Drs. Cline and Miller, yet perhaps suitable for invitation include:

Mr. Masamichi Inoki
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

Prof. Hiroshi Kimura
Hokkaido University

Prof. Masataka Kosaka
Kyoto University

Prof. Masamori Sasse
Japan Defense College

Prof. Seizaburo Sato
University of Tokyo

Prof. Hayao Shimizu
Tokyo Gaiko University

Most of these are believed to be Soviet specialists, or at least specialists on foreign policy and defense matters.



SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY AGAINST ASIA

FACT SHEET

The nature, objectives, intensity, and modus operandi of Soviet global strategy against Asia are being treated in a major research effort being undertaken by Interaction Systems Incorporated (ISI) of McLean, Virginia. Located near Washington, D.C., ISI is a research firm which concentrates on international political, military, and economic issues. As part of its Soviet Global Strategy Project, ISI is preparing a study entitled Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia.

Global strategy can be viewed as a systematic process involving the employment of the political, economic, technological, military, diplomatic, psychological, ideological, and moral elements of national power to promote national goals and objectives. Many analysts in the free world believe that the Soviet Union has a multifaceted global strategy which consciously and, with the exception of occasional, relatively minor setbacks, effectively promotes Moscow's long-term expansionistic aims. Full understanding of the essence of Soviet global strategy is essential to policymakers in the free world.

Contributing to the project will be dozens of recognized Asian and American specialists on Soviet affairs. Relying whenever possible on primary Soviet sources of information, these Soviet specialists are being asked to document the existence of and the Asia-oriented manifestations of Soviet global strategy. A major element of the research process is extensive interviewing, panel discussions, and library-type research in the United States.

But in order to obtain the essential Asian perspective on Soviet global strategy, Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia will also be based heavily on the results of several conferences to be held in Japan. These conferences in Japan will be hosted by the Japan World Strategy Council and assisted by three American organizations based in the Washington, D.C. area: the World Strategy Network, the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, and Interaction Systems Incorporated. At these meetings, Asian and American specialists on the Soviet Union will meet and, in a structured manner, exchange facts and insights on Soviet global strategy as applied to Asia. In addition, a select audience of Asians, who are not necessarily Soviet specialists

but who have concerns and expertise about international affairs, will be invited to participate in each meeting so that their perceptions of Soviet global strategy against Asia might be noted. Each conference will also include keynote and other special presentations by distinguished guests.

As Director of ISI's Soviet Global Strategy Project and Chairman of the firm's Advisory Council, Dr. Ray S. Cline serves as the Senior Editor for Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia. Dr. Cline is the former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He is also Director of the World Strategy Network, Washington, D.C., and Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. A prolific commentator and writer on strategic matters, Dr. Cline is the author of World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (1980). His most recent book, written with Dr. Yonah Alexander, is Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (1984), which reports on the increasing use by the Soviets of terrorism and other forms of low-intensity conflict to implement their global strategy.

Co-Editors of Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia will be Dr. Roger E. Kanet and Dr. James Arnold Miller. Dr. Kanet is Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A distinguished authority on Soviet foreign and military policies, Dr. Kanet has written hundreds of articles and written and edited a number of major books. Dr. Miller has written widely on such topics as terrorism and insurgency, geopolitics, raw materials availability, and Soviet global strategy in general. He is the Executive Secretary of the World Strategy Network, Washington, D.C. And in his capacity as Chairman of Interaction Systems Incorporated, Dr. Miller is responsible for the administrative aspects of the Soviet Global Strategy Project and the preparation of Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8490313

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

217104

RECEIVED 09 MAR 84 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM MCMINN

DOCDATE 09 MAR 84

SIGUR

09 MAR 84

LEVINE

09 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: JAPAN

EXPORT CONTROLS

SUBJECT JAPANESE MSG RE 232 CASE ON MACHINE TOOLS

ACTION. FOR INFORMATION

DUE.

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8490259

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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Kimmitt	✓	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	m	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	6		N
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90313

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DOUGLAS W. McMINN *DM*
GASTON SIGUR *GS*
RICHARD LEVINE *RL*

SUBJECT: Japanese Message Concerning Section 232 Case on
Machine Tools

In separate meetings we have had this week with Japanese Embassy officials, we have been asked to convey the following points to you:

- o The Government of Japan stands ready to send a delegation to Washington to discuss machine tools (based on instructions from MITI Minister Okonogi).
- o Minister Okonogi is said to be prepared to listen to U.S. "wishes" on machine tools.
- o If the United States is heading toward an affirmative finding in the Section 232 case, the Japanese would like to have bilateral discussions before a final conclusion/decision is reached.
- o Japan is greatly concerned about the impact of a positive Presidential decision in this case.
 - The Japanese are worried about the precedent that might be set in using national security considerations as a basis for implementing increased trade barriers.
 - They are also concerned about the impact that a positive finding could have on Japanese public opinion.

In plain English, what the Japanese are saying is that they are prepared to cut a deal with us on machine tools, if necessary. The deal would be in the form of a negotiated voluntary restraint agreement.

There is great anxiety on the part of Japan's Government and business community that a positive 232 finding would open the floodgates to other U.S. industries that seek relief from Japanese imports. Moreover, a positive finding would, in their view, severely hurt Prime Minister Nakasone at home.

The three of us will put our heads together and prepare an options paper for you laying out pros and cons on possible ways to proceed on the machine tools case.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Let's get our best effort here to settle to bring our US-Japan agenda of restraint to get machine tool in case.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb-037/1-4576

BY Lot NA. DATE 7/24/06

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8402595

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MMH
2/4/03

RECEIVED 28 MAR 84 21

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 28 MAR 84

GREGG, D

28 MAR 84

KEYWORDS. JAPAN

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT. NEGOTIATIONS W/ JAPAN RE BEEF & CITRUS ISSUES

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE. 30 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Pres

1P MAR 30 1984

for info
Pres noted

VP

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DISPATCH

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National Security Council
The White House

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System #

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II
2595

REC P 7: 20

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Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP

(Date/Time)

VP wants to raise this issue with
President before departure in Conakry.

3/30
Per Phil Hughes - send forward via Darman
etc -

KMS

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 TOKYO 1550
SIT936 AN005286

DTG: 230423Z MAR 84 PSN: 059477
TOR: 083/0654Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007
WHSR COMMENT: ADVISE ON FURTHER DISSEM

ROUTINE

DE YEKOHR #1550/1 0830432
R 230423Z MAR 84 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 230423Z MAR 84 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON TOKYO 550 SECTION 1 OR 2

FOR: EYES ONLY FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RECOMMENDED CC: DONALD FORTIER

WILLIAM F. MARTIN

RICHARD BEAL

GASTON SIGUR

DAVID LAUX

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S CHIEF OF STAFF
HASEKAWA

SUMMARY:

TODAY ATTENDED A ONE HOUR BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MR. HASEKAWA CONSISTENT WITH YOUR MANDATE. THE MEETING WAS AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS IN TERMS OF THE OBJECTIVES. IN ADDITION TO PRIMARY TOPIC OF "HEADS UP" ON US SEEKING COORDINATED RESPONSE AND BURDEN-SHARING CONCERNING IRAN-IRAQ ENERGY/ECONOMIC SITUATION, ALSO TOUCHED ON GENERAL ASPECTS OF CURRENT POLITICAL/MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, AND SELECT HIGHLIGHTS OF SECRETARY REGAN'S CHINA TRIP.

DISCUSSION:

1. CHINA -- MEETING BEGAN WITH HASEKAWA'S PREDICTABLE INTEREST IN REGAN CHINA TRIP (NAKASONE DEPARTS 12:00 NOON TOKYO

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 100-0371 #577

BY 101 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 TOKYO 1550

DTG: 230423Z MAR 84 PSN: 059477

TIME TODAY FOR BEIJING). I SUMMARIZED SELECT HIGHLIGHTS OF REGAN VISIT.

- POSITIVE GROUNDWORK LAID FOR A SUCCESSFUL VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT INCLUDING GREAT IMPORTANCE ZHAO ATTACHES TO THE VISIT AND HIS VIEW THAT TRIP MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE OUTCOME OF SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS. (I WAS INCLUDED IN ALL BILATERALS-GOC MINISTERS CHEN-TRADE; WANG-FINANCE; WU-FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PREMIER ZHAO).

- INITIALING OF BILATERAL INCOME TAX TREATY
- ADVANCED NEGOTIATIONS FOR BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDING ZHAO'S STATEMENT TO REGAN THAT HE HAD STRONG INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT IN TIME FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD PUSH THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAMS.

- NOTABLE ABSENCE OF DISCUSSION OF ANY ASPECT OF TAIWAN RELATIONS WITH EXCEPTION OF FOREIGN MINISTER WU'S LOW-KEY DISCUSSION ON RESOLVING TAIWAN PARTICIPATION IN ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK.

- US DELEGATION STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF CHINA LIVING UP TO TERMS OF AGREEMENTS (GRAIN) AND AVOIDING LINKAGE OF UNRELATED DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AREA (TEXTILES/GRAIN). COULD DAMAGE CHINESE CREDIBILITY ON CAPITOL HILL AND WITHIN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IN TURN COULD ADVERSELY EFFECT PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE MORE SENSITIVE AGREEMENTS (I.E. NUCLEAR) GOC OFFICIALS DEFINITELY TOOK US CONCERNS SERIOUSLY AND IN POSITIVE SPIRIT.

- OVERALL WARMTH OF CHINESE HOSTS AND STRONG INTEREST IN IMPROVING US-CHINA TIES ACROSS THE BOARD.

HASEKAWA WAS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND MENTIONED THEY WERE CONSISTENT WITH SECRET CHINESE DOCUMENT WHICH CAME INTO GOJ POSSESSION. I INTERPRETED HIS DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT AS KIND OF GOC NSDD EQUIVALENT WHICH DEPICTS JAPAN AS CHINA'S BEST NON-SOCIALIST PARTNER AND GOES ON TO CITE DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US (INDEPENDENT OF TAIWAN QUESTION). HASEKAWA STATED PM'S CONFIDENCE THAT US-CHINA RELATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD BARRING SIGNIFICANT NEW US ACTION TAKEN ON TAIWAN THAT QUOTE RUBS SALT INTO OPEN WOUNDS UNQUOTE. (CITED PAST SOLARZ AMENDMENT TO EMIGRATION ACT). HASEKAWA ALSO STATED INTENTION TO DEBRIEF AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD ON MARCH 28 ON OUTCOME

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 TOKYO 1550

DTG: 230423Z MAR 84 PSN: 059477

OF PM'S CHINA TRIP AS WELL AS THE SENDING OF A SPECIAL ENVOY TO DEBRIEF SOUTH KOREA PRESIDENT CHUN. ASEAN LEADERS WOULD BE DEBRIEFED BY GOJ EMBASSIES.

2. US-JAPAN -- HASEKAWA RAISED STATUS OF US-JAPAN FOLLOW-UP AND ASKED OUR IMPRESSION. I RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH VP'S OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR ISSUE, WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PACE OF PROGRESS AND THE DISTANCE WE MUST TRAVEL TO HAVE REQUIRED CONCRETE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN KEY AREAS PRIOR TO LONDON SUMMIT. HASEKAWA AGREED. AT SAME TIME, I CITED OUR APPRECIATION FOR PM'S STRONG PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO INVIGORATING THIS PROCESS. HASEKAWA STATED STRONG GOJ INTEREST IN SETTLING BEEF AND CITRUS BY END MARCH. I RESTATED US POSITION THAT ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT THIS ISSUE WAS MORE SYMBOLIC THAN SUBSTANTIVE IN DOLLAR TERMS AND SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS SUBSTITUTE FOR PROGRESS ON "BIG TICKET" ITEMS. WE THEN DISCUSSED IMPORTANCE OF GOJ WILLINGNESS TO PURCHASE INTEGRATED US TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (E.G. SATELLITE) RATHER THAN ALWAYS ON A PIECE-MEAL BASIS. I REMARKED THAT THIS PRACTICE COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A BROADER BASED CONCERN AMONG US HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS ON HILL THAT OUR "NATIONAL TREASURES" ARE BEING PURCHASED AWAY ONLY TO FOSTER NEW COMPETITORS, PARTICULARLY IN SPACE AREA.

3. IRAN-IRAQ POLITICAL/MILITARY -- REVIEWED GENERAL ASPECTS OF PRESENT SITUATION ON THE GROUND (CONSISTENT WITH ROUTINE CIA UPDATES FOR GOJ):

- MILITARY ACTIVITY AT LOW-LEVEL; PROBABLY SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE MAJOR OFFENSIVE; NO MAJOR GAINS BEING MADE BY EITHER SIDE.

- GCC STILL SUPPORTIVE OF IRAQ BUT CAUTIOUS FOR FEAR OF IRANIAN RETALIATION; NOT ENTIRELY SMOOTH SAILING CONCERNING US EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH GULF STATES; GCC PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO REAPPRAISE SUPPORT FOR IRAN.

- IRANIAN THREATS TO RETALIATE AGAINST US INTERESTS IN EVENT OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION TO ASSURE UNIMPEDED NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS.

4. IRAN-IRAQ ENERGY/ECONOMICS -- STATED THIS ITEM WAS CENTRAL

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 230423Z MAR 84 PSN: 059477

PURPOSE OF OUR MEETING AND WAS DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A "HEADS UP"
TO A US DELEGATION THAT WE INTEND TO SEND TO JAPAN IN THE COMING
DAYS TO SOLICIT THE SUPPORT OF THE GOJ CONCERNING OUR EFFORTS TO

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 TOKYO 1550
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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY 230423Z MAR 84 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

TO: TO WHILE HOUSE.

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON TOKYO 550 FINAL SECTION OF 2

FOR: EYES ONLY FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RECOMMENDED CC: DONALD FORTIER

FORGE A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO ENERGY/ECONOMIC CONTINGENCIES
ASSOCIATED WITH A POTENTIAL EXPENSION OF THE WAR. MADE THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

- PRESIDENT HAD RECENTLY AUTHORIZED ALLIED CONSULTATIONS
IN THIS AREA DURING WHICH US WOULD MAINTAIN A FLEXIBLE POSTURE.

- OUR RECOGNITION THAT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT
CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO SUPPLY DISRUPTION.

- WE WOULD URGE IN ALL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AN
INCREASE IN USEABLE STOCKS PRIOR TO CRISIS AND COORDINATED ALLIED
UNDERSTANDING THAT STOCKS WOULD BE DRAWN EARLY.

- US WOULD ENCOURAGE ALLIES TO ACT ON BASIS OF
CONDITIONS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND FOLLOW APPROPRIATE POLICIES
WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE: EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY TO
CALM MARKET; REFRAIN FROM EXCESS CONSUMPTION; LIMIT PURCHASE ON
WORLD OIL MARKETS IF THERE IS THREAT OF PRICE INCREASE.

- US WILL PLAY ITS PART IN ACTIVATING SPR EARLY BUT
WE WILL NOT REVEAL DETAILS OF DRAWDOWN RATES TO DISCOURAGE SPECULATORS.

- WILL DEVELOP OUR OWN PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 TOKYO 1550

DTG: 230423Z MAR 84 PSN: 059521

ENSURE THAT ALLIES, CONGRESS AND PUBLIC HAVE ACCURATE INFORMATION.

- STATED NEED FOR A COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY BASED ON A FAIR DEGREE OF BURDEN SHARING AMONG THE ALLIES. CITED POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING SUPPORT OF CAPITOL HILL AND AMERICAN PEOPLE IF US IS SEEN AS CARRYING INORDINATE SHARE OF THE LOAD (I.E. INCREASED SPR FIVE FOLD SINCE START OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION, GREATLY REDUCED SUPPLY DEPENDENCY ON GULF - 3 PERCENT; CENTRAL ROLE IN POLITICAL/MILITARY CONTINGENCIES)

- WENT THROUGH VISUALS COVERING FACTORS INFLUENCING ECONOMIC IMPACT: 1979 AND 1980 SCENARIOS; RECOMMENDED INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE; DISASTROUS IMPACT ON MANAGEMENT OF DEBT CRISIS AND IMF/COMMERCIAL BANK RESOURCES. (NO TEXT WAS SHOWN TO HASEKAWA).

- DISCUSSED DISTURBING TREND OF BEHAVIOR ALLIES AND MARKET TOWARD 1979 SCENARIO CITING LOW STOCKS (EXCEPT IN US), THE CURRENT SLACK MARKET AND EXCESSIVE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY THAT WERE ENCOURAGING COMPLACENCY AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR A BIDDING WAR ON THE SPOT MARKET.

HASEKAWA WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH STARK DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1979 AND 1980 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES AS HE WAS INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN GOJ DELIBERATIONS. HE AGREED WITH THE UNSETTLING TREND AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED A COORDINATED AND FIRM ALLIED APPROACH TO MAINTAIN THE STABILITY OF THE MARKET. I INQUIRED IF HE VIEWED OUR OVERALL APPROACH AS SENSIBLE AND HE CONFIRMED THAT HE DID. IN OUR CLOSING MOMENTS, I ALSO ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THE PM'S OFFICE COULD MOBILIZE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT WITHIN THE GOJ BUREAUCRACY FOR THIS TYPE OF COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY AND HE RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT YES. I THEN MENTIONED THAT WE WERE AIMING FOR A DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES IN THE IEA (BOTH GOVERNING BOARD AND MINISTERIAL) UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE BILATERALS AND THAT A POTENTIAL DISCUSSION AMONG THE HEADS AT THE LONDON SUMMIT COULD BY ITSELF HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT ON THE MARKET. HE FOUND THIS SCENARIO VERY REASONABLE. IN DEPARTING HASEKAWA EXPRESSED HIS SINCERE APPRECIATION TO NSC FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES AND AGREED TO KEEP THIS MATTER IN CONFIDENCE PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF A US DELEGATION TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS. HE ALSO STATED THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 TOKYO 1550

DTG: 230423Z MAR 84 PSN: 059521

DEBRIEF ON SECRETARY REGAN'S CHINA TRIP WOULD BE OF VALUE TO THE PM. WE ALSO AGREED TO MAINTAIN A PERSONAL DIALOGUE ON IRAN-IRAQ AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS.

END HASEKAWA MEETING.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

I AGREED TO SEEK A DEBRIEF ON SECRETARY REGAN'S CHINA TRIP FOR THE PRESIDENT AT TUESDAY'S 0930. THIS WAS REGAN'S STRONG PREFERENCE. I THINK WE ALL WANT TO GET THIS DONE ASAP TO MAINTAIN THE POSITIVE MOMENTUM IN THE PRESS. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER SECRETARY SHULTZ'S PARTICIPATION ALTHOUGH I DID NOT DISCUSS THIS WITH DON. I THINK I COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THIS MEETING AND PERHAPS ASSIST DON WITH THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS. I AM SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON FRIDAY EVENING IN THE EVENT I CAN BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE.

- RECOMMEND THAT PRESIDENT RECEIVE A "HEADS UP" ON HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REGAN CHINA VISIT PRIOR TO THE TUESDAYS MEETING. IF YOU AGREE I WILL PREPARE SOME APPROPRIATE REMARKS ON 3 X 5'S. WE CAN EITHER ACCOMPLISH THIS WITH A PACKAGE ON MONDAY OR YOUR BRIEFING FRIDAY OR MONDAY ON THE BASIS OF THIS CABLE.

BEST REGARDS.

DECL OADR

~~S E C R E T~~ EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen _____

2595

Received SS

1984 MAR 30 AM 11:58

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA: THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *rcm*

SUBJECT: Trade Negotiations with Japan

We are rapidly approaching the first major crossroad in negotiating a broad array of trade issues with the Japanese as a follow-up to your visit to Japan. The key issues are beef and citrus quotas. The dollar amounts involved are not large but the symbolism is very potent -- if we can reach a satisfactory agreement on beef and citrus, the rest of the issues to be decided in April should flow rather smoothly. Our current agreement on beef and citrus expires on Saturday, March 31, so the time is limited.

The key issue is beef. The Japanese have offered a 28,000 metric ton increase over five years (5,600 metric tons per annum). We have rejected this offer, indicating that if the increase could be compressed into a three-year period, we would accept the offer (this would amount to 9,333 metric tons per annum). We have indications that the Japanese may be willing to offer a 7,000 ton per annum increase over a five-year period. This would more than double our current annual quota of 30,800 tons. The Japanese, in their own typical way, are awaiting some sort of signal from us as to what we would accept so that their Agriculture Minister can come to the United States and make an offer which he feels confident will be acceptable.

Under Secretary Amstutz of the Department of Agriculture believes that he could sell an increase of 7,000 tons per year to the U.S. Cattlemen, although he did mention preferring a 7,500-ton increment. Amstutz stresses that the lower the annual increase, the shorter the timeframe of the next beef agreement should be. Amstutz recognizes the political factors in this case, and also agrees that we should signal the Japanese as to what our bottom line is so that they will come forward with a final offer.

~~SECRET~~

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F00-037/1#578

By LOT, NARA, Date 7/24/06

With TOP SECRET
attachment

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-2-

The intelligence shows that the Japanese are very anxious to keep these talks going and that they do not wish to be perceived as the side causing any breakoff of the talks. Public statements by officials from USTR and Treasury in the March 28 issue of the Washington Post, indicate that the U.S. is taking quite a hard-line position.

It is my opinion that we must not play such a hard game as to discourage the Japanese unduly and abort a visit by their Agriculture Minister in the next two or three days. The Japanese need a signal that an agreement is attainable. I believe that we should signal flexibility. If we do not show flexibility, we risk prolongation of the beef-citrus dispute which threatens to unravel the remainder of our negotiations. This could seriously damage our relations with Japan and could contribute to the political weakening of Prime Minister Nakasone, who is recognized to be one of our best friends in Asia.

Bill Brock is perfectly willing to keep negotiating with the Japanese and is willing to settle for anything that will guarantee a vote of support and appreciation to you from the Cattlemen's Association. Brock will be meeting with the head of the Cattlemen's Association, Sam Washburn, today to see what is acceptable to them. Brock agrees with Amstutz that if we have to settle for a lower figure, such as 7,000 tons, a shorter period should be covered by the new agreement. Brock will be very much influenced by the Cattlemen's attitude as he believes that we must gain their support for any agreement that we sign with the Japanese.

The Japanese signal to us that Foreign Minister Abe is urging the Agriculture Minister to come to Washington, probably next week, to try to conclude the negotiations. This would seem clearly to be in our interests.

I believe we have played our hand well up to now. Nakasone is clearly focusing on this issue and I believe that a discreet signal to him of our willingness to consider seriously the key offer on beef will bring this crucial stage of the follow-up negotiations to a successful close.

Attached are excerpts from [REDACTED] assessment of where we stand on the other follow-up issues. This information will indicate that if we get over the beef and citrus hurdle, the rest of the negotiations should flow rather smoothly.

FOIA(b)(1)

Attachment

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8
KN9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: Gaston Sigur *JS*
Don Gregg *DG* **SECRET**

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Japan

Attached is a memorandum from you to the President via the Vice President. It contains our latest assessment of where we stand, primarily on the beef and citrus issues.

Key new developments:

- Under Secretary Amstutz of Agriculture believes he can sell a 7,000 ton annual increase to the Cattlemen. He would prefer a 7,500 or 8,000 ton increase, but we do not believe the Japanese can reach that. If we have to settle for a lower number, such as 7,000, Amstutz believes that a shorter period of time would be preferable to the Cattlemen.
- Bill Brock this afternoon stated that it is imperative that the Cattlemen be sufficiently satisfied with what has been won from the Japanese in terms of a beef quota. An expression of public appreciation by the Cattlemen for the achievements of the President in reaching a satisfactory deal on beef is a must. Brock agreed with Amstutz that if we have to settle for a number around 7,000, the Cattlemen would be more willing to accept it for a one-year period along with the assurances that a tougher negotiating stance would be taken with the Japanese a year from now with our elections out of the way. Brock plans to meet with Sam Washburn of the Cattlemen's Association tomorrow to test out that theory. He feels at this point that the Japanese Agriculture Minister may not come unless he has an invitation and a bottom line from the United States. Brock is willing to give him this bottom line only after he has some assurances that the Cattlemen are on board.

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DECL: ~~OADR~~DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS FDD-037/1 #580
By LDI, NARA, Date 7/24/06

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-2-

If we successfully reach an agreement on beef and citrus, the way is paved for development of a pretty successful package of follow-up decisions. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

[REDACTED] A trip by you to Japan, to convey directly to Nakasone the political situation here, would probably not be as necessary if we succeed with beef and citrus than it would be if we fail. However, the Vice President has a trip by you very much in mind as possibly a most useful way of communicating some hard realities to the Japanese, and he will stay in close touch with your office on this if that becomes necessary.

We recommend that you forward the attached paper to the Vice President, who can use it in his talks with the President tomorrow or can seek a formal Presidential decision.

Attachments

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

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RECEIVED 29 MAR 84 18

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2/3/04

DOCDATE 29 MAR 84

TO MCFARLANE FROM SIGUR

KEYWORDS JAPAN

SUBJECT. MEMCON OF BROCK MTG W/ NATIONAL CATTLEMANS ASSOC 29 MAR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 30 MAR 84 STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	MAR 30 1984	Mcfarlane noted		54

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The White House

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84 MAR 29 P 5: 10

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Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	R	
John Poindexter	2		
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		✓
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Do NOT send NOT in Red
back to staff. Do NOT
send this chit either.

BTM

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DESTROY

Bud,

We simply can't let the
Cattlemen's Association have the
problem. We've been told some
Okawana recently that we
will get everything they
want. It seems to me
one possibility is to get the
7000 increase and make
agreement on that contingent
on getting the other items we
want.

We've made the point to Don
that the VP will have to exercise
some leadership here with our
own negotiators. Don will (over)

3/20/80
I expect
Don will
come
back to us
with some
"guilt" help
solution
Don

Talk to VP during the trip

R

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: GASTON SIGUR *Gast*
SUBJECT: Don Gregg Memorandum on meeting between
Bill Brock and the National Cattlemen's
Association, March 29

CM HAS SEEN

I asked Don to put down on paper his notes of the meeting held this morning in Bill Brock's office with the National Cattlemen's Association. His memorandum is attached (Tab I) and brings up-to-date the memo he and I sent you last night on negotiations with Japan. I have also briefed John Poindexter on this matter orally.

We are moving down to the wire with the Japanese on this beef issue and need to keep our cool.

Attachment:

Tab I Don Gregg's memo

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DECLASSIFIED
NLS F00-037/14581
BY LOS 7/24/06

~~SECRET~~OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Don Gregg *DG*

SUBJECT: Highlights of Bill Brock's Meeting with
Executives of the National Cattlemen's
Association

The following points emerged from the 50-minute meeting between Bill Brock and his staff and members of the National Cattlemen's Association, including their newly elected President, Joanna Smith.

Brock described the situation saying that he had seen Ambassador Okawara earlier in the day, that Abe and Nakasone are urging the Agriculture Minister to come to Washington to make his final offer, and that a positive signal from Brock would be helpful. Brock said he would welcome the Agriculture Minister and listen to him seriously. This the Japanese accepted as a positive signal and it will be used to try to get the Minister to come for a meeting with Brock on Sunday or Monday.

Okawara, upon his departure, said that it would be impossible for the Japanese to get up to an increase of 7,000 tons per year. This came as a shock to Brock, who had been told by others (including me) that indications were that the Japanese could reach 7,000 tons.

The Cattlemen were markedly not enthusiastic about the Japanese offer. Their bottom line is that they want a doubling of the current quota in four years. This would mean an increase of approximately 7,500 tons per year. Brock asked them if they could sit still for a lower figure for a one-year period to buy time and give Mr. Nakasone more of a chance to influence his bureaucracy.

Mrs. Smith spoke up and said that the Cattlemen's Association would prefer taking the Japanese to the GATT rather than having Brock "sell out" with a low offer. She said that the Cattlemen were pleased with a strong U.S. stand.

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NLS FOO-037/1 #582~~SECRET~~BY LOJ N DATE 7/24/06

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-2-

Mechanics of the GATT were then explained. It was made clear that long delays would be involved and that even a positive ruling would not allow the U.S. to sell any more beef to Japan. I pointed out that this was why hard-line conservatives in Japan were hoping that we would take them to the GATT. I also stressed that President Reagan viewed Mr. Nakasone as the best Prime Minister we are likely to have in Japan and he would not want to see his political standing damaged. (This made little visible impression.)

Brock indicated that taking the Japanese to the GATT would probably not be sufficient to bring an attitudinal change toward opening their market and that other forms of retaliation (probably tariffs against their manufactured goods or automobiles) would need to be considered. Brock said it is the President who would make the decision to go to the GATT, and that he would urge that the Japanese be taken to the Gatt immediately if the beef negotiation breaks down.

Brock was very fair in spelling out to the Cattlemen the other equities involved. He stated that the citrus growers want to settle and that the Japanese have hinted at more generous settlements in the other aspects of the follow-up process if beef is surmounted. None of these points seemed to make much impression on the Cattlemen.

In closing, Brock asked that the Cattlemen tell him within twenty-four hours the smallest figure they would accept for a one-year settlement with the Japanese. He also asked them to come up with an acceptable sliding formula leading to a doubling of the Japanese quota in four years (15% the first year, 25% the second year, 35% the third year, etc.).

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