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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Bonitati, Robert: Files

OA/Box: 6845

File Folder: Labor Strategy (2)

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FOIA ID: F01-108, McCartin

Date: 3/20/07

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
A. memo	Elizabeth Dole to James Baker, Edwin Meese, and Michael Deaver re developing a blue collar strategy, 3p	6/8/82	Open 05/13/2008 JFK

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

THRU: RED CAVANEY/JACK BURGESS
FROM: BOB BONITATI *fb*
SUBJECT: Blue Collar Strategy

My research on blue collar workers indicates that these people have very similar attitudes toward politics and politicians as the rest of the population. This might contradict the popular notion that blue collars should be treated as a separate bloc, but there is strong evidence that they view most national issues in much the same manner as the rest of the populace.

To give some substantiation to that claim, I would offer several charts recently supplied to me by Dick Wirthlin's firm, Decision Making Information. In all of these graphs you will see that the opinions of Blue Collar workers, and the more inclusive category of Labor Family, are quite similar to the general population (referred to as "aggregate" in the Wirthlin graphs).

While there is considerable similarity between the views of blue collar workers and the general public on most national issues, you will find that blue collars exhibit a greater sensitivity to issues directly affecting unions or that are perceived to be employment/jobs oriented. Both Wirthlin's data and a recent Washington Post/ABC poll indicate that both blue collars and union families register greater concern than the rest of the public on the issue of rising unemployment.

If blue collars view most national issues in a similar manner as the general public, one has to ask why aren't their voting patterns also similar. The principal explanation has to be that a greater percentage of blue collar voters identify with the Democratic Party than the general public. Research also indicates that fewer blue collars identify with the Republican Party than the general public. Historically, twice as many blue collars identify as Democrats rather than as Republicans.

This strong identification with the Democratic Party (the party of the working man) probably accounts for the traditional voting patterns that show blue collars more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Even though research begins to show a significant decline in the Democratic preference of blue collar voters beginning in the mid-sixties, the 2 to 1 party identification ratio seems to remain relatively constant.

In attempting to influence blue collar workers, I think that we should accept the basic premise that blue collar attitudes about the President/Administration are generally shaped by the mass media and the normal social, economic and political pressures exerted upon them by society.

Still, it is possible to target politically appealing messages to that group by emphasizing jobs, job creation and the direct benefits to workers of our efforts to revitalize the economy. Blue collar workers seem to have been susceptible to such messages and found them very appealing during the 1980 campaign.

Some thought might also be given to staging events that emphasize job creation or economic growth such as the Westway event in New York City in September, 1981. Unfortunately, many politically appealing messages that could be transmitted to blue collars (like limiting auto and steel imports to preserve American jobs) don't make good policy sense.

A second component of a blue collar strategy must be a continuing sensitivity to recognizing workers and unions. Meeting with labor leaders, recognizing Labor Day, visiting with factory workers, mentioning "working people" in speeches - all of these devices send a subtle message to blue collar workers that the President has them in mind as he governs the nation.

The third component of a blue collar strategy must be to constantly guard against the President or the Administration being portrayed as anti-labor. In so doing, we should seek to avoid major public confrontations with organized labor as the cumulative effect will eventually be perceived as the President always being "against" labor. I frankly think we have done a relatively good job thus far of avoiding that posture. On most of the so-called visible anti-labor issues before the Congress (Davis-Bacon, Hobbs Act, Subminimum wage) we have either been on the labor side of the issue or have been in a relatively neutral stance.


While the AFL-CIO and other activist unions may frequently rail against the Administration on a variety of issues, we have afforded them few opportunities to launch a sustained attack on any visible "gut labor issue" which could begin to suggest to blue collar workers that the Administration is anti-labor.

In summary, I would offer the following conclusions:


1. Despite conventional political wisdom, blue collar workers have lost their identity as poor people, have been assimilated into society, and generally view political issues in much the same way as the general public.
2. The President should continue to display a sensitivity to blue collar workers by recognizing their contributions, mentioning them in speeches, and reminding them of his role as a labor leader.

3. There are some opportunities to communicate politically appealing messages concerning job creation and economic growth, and these should be maximized within the constraints of our economic philosophy.
4. We must always guard against appearing, through policy positions, to be anti-labor on visible national issues.


IDEOLOGY



ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT




POLITICAL CYNICISM




THERMOMETERS

REPUBLICANS




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
DEMOCRATS




CHARACTERISTICS OF REAGAN "EXCELLENT/GOOD" RATINGS



REAGAN'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM



REAGAN'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EDWIN MEESE III
JAMES A. BAKER, III
MIKE DEEVER

FROM:

ELIZABETH H. DOLE

SUBJECT:

Developing a Labor Strategy

Since the outset of the Administration, our relationship with organized labor has been rather ill-defined. Consequently, the Administration has initiated several actions which have not been sensitive to the politics or concerns of the labor movement. Simultaneously the AFL-CIO leadership has initiated a rather partisan campaign seemingly designed to discredit the Administration and to portray the President as insensitive to the needs of working people.

In November of our first year of this Administration, we now find our relationship with organized labor characterized by many media, business, labor and political observers as the worst of any modern Republican President. They feel that many of our policy decisions have only served to antagonize labor and that the party and the country can ill afford further hostilities. I can see little merit in the continuation of such characterizations. In fact, I can see considerable long range political damage.

I firmly believe that we should take the initiative in bringing about a more positive relationship with labor. In planning such an initiative, I am cognizant that there is growing sentiment within the AFL-CIO to cease the anti-Administration hostilities and to try to "get along with the Administration". Such labor leaders as Lloyd McBride (Steelworkers), Bob Georgine (Building Trades), Marty Ward (Plumbers), John Sweeney (Service Employees) are urging Kirkland to declare a cease fire.

Initiating a positive labor strategy will provide reinforcement for those who want to begin to work with the Administration and might drive a wedge between them and the hard-line attitudes of Lane Kirkland.

While a host of specific program ideas can be offered, our Administration labor efforts should have the following objectives:

- 1) to hold and expand the 44% of the union vote received by the President in 1980;
- 2) to dispel the notion that the Administration is anti-labor and to convey the impression that we seek the support and the input of labor;
- 3) to avoid public confrontation on symbolic labor issues and to restrain public criticism;
- 4) to develop friendly alliances with targetted groups of unions (e.g. building trades, maritime) and to reach beyond the national labor leaders to identify supportive and potentially supportive state and local labor leaders;
- 5) to see that unions that have been supportive of the President are well-treated as our actions will be closely watched.

In order to accomplish these objectives, we will need an Administration policy that encompasses the following components:

- 1) We must be willing to make some policy concessions and to consult on labor-sensitive appointments in order to neutralize opposition or to gain support.
- 2) We must take the initiative at the White House and in the Departments at reaching out for consultation in order to avoid policy surprises and clashes.
- 3) We must be prepared to periodically dispense political perks such as White House social invitations, meetings with the President, appointments to important Commissions and Task Forces.

In order to implement such a strategy we will need to:

- 1) Develop a labor sensitivity within each Department;
- 2) Develop a labor sensitivity within the White House;
- 3) Develop an interdepartmental organization mechanism to deal with labor issues at the Departmental level;

- 4) Develop a White House organizational mechanism to evaluate and make recommendations concerning the political and media impact of policy and appointments affecting labor;
- 5) Assign additional resources to the White House labor liaison function.

Listed below are several specific suggestions for improving our relationship with organized labor:

- 1) The White House should take the initiative in scheduling regularized consultation sessions with labor leadership (including the AFL-CIO). Participation should be high level (chaired by the Vice President) and such sessions should receive media attention.
- 2) The President should meet or lunch periodically with groups of labor leaders to seek their opinions and advice.
- 3) The White House and pertinent Departments should develop a regularized program to brief and educate AFL-CIO and union leaders on major issues (not just labor issues) facing the country. Every effort should be made to solicit labor input and to maintain a continuing dialogue.
- 4) A high-visibility program should be established by the White House and key Departments to bring together leaders of labor and management on an industry-by-industry basis to solve industry problems and to promote a spirit of labor-management cooperation.
- 5) Continued emphasis should be given to the job-producing/economic growth aspects of the economic package. President Reagan's pledge "to put America back to work again" was a strong selling point to workers during the 1980 campaign and needs to be reinforced as the program is implemented.
- 6) The President, Cabinet members and White House staff need to be portrayed in the media as open, accessible and willing to listen to labor views.
- 7) Targetted unions and groups of unions (maritime, building & construction trades, Teamsters) should be singled out for receiving special attention and treatment on issues, appointments and White House stroking operations.

- 8) The Administration should try to avoid the public impression of being locked in combat with the AFL-CIO and other major union spokesmen on labor issues (job protection, workers rights, job safety standards). In particular it would be wise to avoid situations where it appears that the Administration is helping big business at the expense of the workers.
- 9) The President and key Administration spokesmen should appear in the news media to be friendly to unions and their leaders. Much of this can be accomplished in symbolic ways by appearances and meetings with union members and leaders, visits to work sites and an interest in the problems of workers. Well-publicized visits and meetings with workers in troubled industries can deliver a strong message to union members.
- 10) The Republican National Committee should be perceived as "opening the doors" to labor. It should seek labor input and serve as a focal point to bring together labor leaders and Congressional Republicans to listen to each other. This "invitation" to labor must be carried through at the state and local level.
- 11) A special effort must be made to identify supportive state and local union leaders for inclusion in coalition building and political activities.
- 12) A special effort should be made by the Administration to impact the house organs of labor unions. There are thousands of local, state and national publications that are mailed to union members' homes each week and month that the Administration should attempt to impact in a positive way.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DISTRIBUTION LIST

FROM:

ELIZABETH H. DOLE

SUBJECT:

Labor Strategy Briefing Paper

The initial phase of our liaison strategy was designed with two objectives in mind: to let leaders of organized labor know that we wanted a dialogue and to gradually develop visible labor support for the President.

While we were able to grow from three endorsing unions to fourteen who visibly supported the economic program and have developed a healthy communication with many unions, our efforts have been frustrated by the anti-Administration efforts of the AFL-CIO leadership and the lack of an overall strategic consensus on how to deal with organized labor. There is an interface between labor and the Administration at almost every turn, and it is essential in looking to 1982 and 1984 to both hold and expand the voter support of the President that we coordinate our efforts and follow a common strategy in dealing with organized labor.

Although the AFL-CIO started the year with somewhat restrained criticism, the barrage of rhetoric has steadily escalated since the passage of the economic program. It moved into high gear with the announcement of our Social Security proposal, and further increased with the PATCO strike, ultimately producing the Solidarity Day demonstration. This negativism has made an impact, even amongst our supporters. Several GOP leaders on the Hill have expressed their concern about the increasing distance that is developing between the Administration and the union rank and file. A number of business leaders are fearful that an "anti-union" tag on the Administration will make it exceedingly difficult for them to mobilize grassroots support for the President's initiatives. Additionally, labor peace is important to business.

It appears that Lane Kirkland's confrontation tactics have two objectives: to make the President look as bad as possible in order to erode his support from rank and file union members and to move the AFL-CIO into a position of control in the Democratic Party. While this strategy is accepted by some labor leaders, there is growing sentiment within the AFL-CIO to cease the anti-

Administration hostilities and to try to "get along with the Administration". Labor leaders such as Lloyd McBride (Steelworkers), Bob Georgine (Building Trades), Marty Ward (Plumbers), John Sweeney (Service Employees) are quietly urging Kirkland to declare a cease fire.

There are signs that some of this appeasement pressure is beginning to be felt. In the past six weeks, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Tom Donahue has been communicating regularly with Bob Bonitati, and the AFL-CIO recently agreed to let Walter Davis serve on the Private Sector Initiatives Task Force. This latter is a reversal of an earlier refusal to cooperate. The Building and Construction Trades gave a warm reception to Secretary Donovan, Assistant Secretary Auchter and Bob Bonitati at their recent convention. Carpenters' President, Bill Konyha's willingness to serve on the Productivity Committee is yet additional evidence of a break with Kirkland's hardline program.

The recent negative characterization of our relations with organized labor will prove counter-productive over time and help win converts to Kirkland's approach to politics. Where possible, we should try an approach that is sensitive to the politics of organized labor and conveys a positive image to the millions of union rank and file.

With the forthcoming AFL-CIO Centennial Convention and the expected spate of negative stories on the poor state of relations between labor and the Administration, it is suggested that we seize the media initiative and implement a program designed to portray the Administration as reaching out to listen to the concerns and interests of organized labor.

This plan includes:

- a) A memorandum from the President to the Cabinet this week, urging each to have an "open door" to labor;
- b) Vice Presidential hosting of a reception soon after their convention, in commemoration of the AFL-CIO Centennial Year (VP has approved);
- c) A Presidential invitation this week to the AFL-CIO Executive Council for a meeting at the White House, following the Convention;
- d) Announcement at that meeting that the Vice President will meet regularly (quarterly) with leaders of labor (VP has approved).

In support of our overall objective, three specific goals are set forth as follows:

A. Encourage AFL-CIO Internal Independence

Our approach to dealing with the AFL-CIO should be directed toward encouraging those members of the leadership, so inclined, to display a measure of independence from Kirkland's confrontationalist tactics. This will require working closely with all segments of AFL-CIO, while clearly providing extra recognition and support for those who are willing to "go the extra mile" in support of the Administration. Ultimately, this approach should hamper Kirkland in his efforts to totally control the AFL-CIO at the expense of the President.

B. Assist the Independents

Work to both gain and keep a strong level of support within the organized labor movement outside the AFL-CIO. Such unions would include the Teamsters, the National Federation of Independent Unions, Tool and Die Makers Union and others.

C. Develop State and Local Leadership Support

We should begin to develop a network of state and local union leaders, supportive of the President, who can be cultivated by Administration attention. These state and local leaders can provide support for Administration initiatives and can also be integrated into Republican activities in their local areas. Such a plan will call for close liaison with the RNC as well as with elected GOP officials, business and community leaders. Yesterday's meeting of police organizations to work with the Administration on the forthcoming crime initiatives is an excellent example of how we can create Administration support without having to rely on AFL-CIO leadership.

For the long term, we need to be willing to make some accommodations to accomplish the above, as follows:

- 1) We must take the initiative on advance consultation in order to avoid policy surprises or unnecessary public acrimony.
- 2) We must be willing to make some policy accommodations and to consult on labor-sensitive appointments in order to both neutralize opposition and to gain support.
- 3) We must be willing to consider labor recommendations for appointments to Administration boards/commissions/task forces/etc., as well as ensure that labor appointments are made.
- 4) We must be prepared to periodically dispense political "perks" such as White House social invitations, meetings with the President, inclusion in delegations, invitations for Air Force One travel, etc.

To implement the aforementioned, we recommend the establishment of a White House Working Group on Labor to evaluate recommendations concerning policies and appointments that impact upon the labor community.

In closing, I feel it essential that this group gather together for periodic meetings to reassess our strategy in support of our overall objectives.

* James Baker III
Ed Meese III
Mike Deaver
Secretary Donovan
Dick Darman
Craig Fuller
Lyn Nofziger

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

THRU: RED CAVANEY JACK BURGESS
FROM: BOB BONITATI
SUBJECT: Assessing our Labor Relations

An assessment of the current status of our labor relations program should be examined from three perspectives: a) the perception of union members, b) the perception of union leaders, c) the perception of the news media/opinion leaders. All three are, of course, somewhat intertwined.

Union members

While the President's approval ratings have declined with the general public, there has been a corresponding decline with blue collar/union members. Despite some news stories that the President is losing blue collar supporters, there is no evidence that he is losing blue collar voters in any greater proportion than the rest of the public.

What the available data (several polls) indicates is that union members/blue collar voters just don't differ from the rest of the population in the way they view issues or political figures. The only issue that seems to generate a significantly different view from union members is on the handling of the PATCO strike. Union members tend to view the President's actions more negatively than the rest of the populace -- which should tell us something. Of all the public issues that received considerable media attention in the past year, PATCO is the only one where the President might have been perceived as being anti-union or anti-labor.

Union leaders

In general, our open door policy initiatives haven't brought us any new leadership support, but it has lessened the degree of hostility we were experiencing prior to November, 1981. Labor officials know that their opinions are welcome and that they have a high degree of accessibility to Administration officials. What they now complain about is that we don't heed their advice. The net effect of our outreach efforts has been to remove some of the suspicions that we were "out to get" labor, to dispel the notion that labor was being ignored by the Administration, and to dismantle the barrier that had been erected by the AFL-CIO prohibiting union leadership from working with the Administration. Still, the public criticism and opposition continues.

The Media & Opinion Leaders

Our outreach efforts have succeeded in warding off the criticism that we were receiving from Washington business and political leaders that we were ignoring labor. The unfavorable press reports to that effect were likely to have a damaging effect on the rank and file. Fortunately, they have disappeared. The consensus opinion I have received is that "recognizing labor" was good politics.

Discussion

While it is difficult to point to positive political gains that have resulted from our labor activities, I believe our policy has had the effect of lessening the degree of labor hostility, it has allowed us to avoid the perception that the President is anti-labor or anti-union, and it has permitted us to avoid some needless confrontations. This is particularly important as we keep our attention focused on the 44% of the union members who voted for the President in 1980.

The real dilemma we face in maintaining a labor program is dealing with a group of national labor leaders who represent a different agenda than the rank and file union member. Ignoring them will merely generate the very negative press reports that "labor views" are not being heard. Unfortunately, as we all know, the news media pays a great deal of attention to the handful of visible national labor leaders and the AFL-CIO in particular.

At this point I see no reason to substantially alter our basic labor strategy which has been in effect since November 1981. The courtesies we have extended to labor and the consultation offered has become an expected part of the national political scene, and to retreat from this posture would cause unnecessary grief.

I do believe, though, that until the economy is in a stronger position we should avoid high visibility labor meetings and events. The current economic state is an area where we are particularly vulnerable and the labor leaders have shown no unwillingness to exploit it.

2. I further believe that we should begin to expand our activities to the state and local level where we are more likely to find a greater receptivity and potential political support. Unfortunately, such efforts require more resources than we are now able to devote at the White House level.

Recommendations

1. Continue our current policy of inviting labor leaders to State dinners, including labor leaders in Boards & Commissions, consulting on labor-sensitive personnel appointments, and a willingness to be accommodating on policy considerations.
2. Continue to place special emphasis on looking after the needs and interests of the unions that have been supportive and friendly.

3. Work with the Republican National Committee and the Labor Department's regional representatives in developing a network of supportive state and local labor representatives with the ultimate objective of developing a core of Reagan labor supporters who can be called upon for public support.
4. Avoid for the time being visible labor events that can be turned against us.
5. Adjust our commitment to have the Vice President meet "regularly" with labor leaders so that he meets with individuals rather than as a group.
6. Provide some leadership to the Republican National Committee labor outreach efforts.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
EDWIN MEESE III
MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE

SUBJECT: Developing a Blue Collar Strategy

In developing a strategy to impact blue collar workers, we have begun to reach the opinion that treating blue collar workers as a homogenous bloc may be something of a political anachronism.

While blue collar workers were once at the lower levels of the economic ladder, and might be expected to view issues from such a perspective, there is strong evidence that blue collar workers have been assimilated into the mainstream of the population and now view public issues and political questions in much the same manner as the rest of the population.

Some of the attached data (Tab I) from DMI's profile of blue collar/union voters lends some substantiation to the contention that there is little variance between the attitudes of the general public and the attitudes of blue collar workers. In particular, I would call your attention to the DMI data on ideology and the perception of the President's economic program. While there are some differences between the attitudes of the general public and blue collar workers (usually no more than a 5-6% variance) much of this can be attributed to the fact that blue collar workers have historically identified with the Democratic Party. Approximately twice as many blue collars identify as Democrats rather than as Republicans. This identification with the Democratic Party is also reflected in traditional voting patterns. Although research shows a significant decline in the Democratic preference of blue collar voters beginning in the mid-sixties, blue collar voters are still more likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

Our research on the attitudes of union members also shows striking similarities between the attitudes of union members (less than 50% of union members are now blue collar) and the general public. The attached DMI graphs (Tab II) indicates the strong parallels. In fact, our research of all available polling data shows that despite the strong criticism and opposition of the AFL-CIO and other union leaders, it is difficult to detect a negative impact on union members. While the President's approval rating has declined with union members

and blue collar workers, that decline corresponds to the lowered approval ratings by the general public. We can find no evidence to indicate that the President is losing either blue collar or union voters in any greater proportion than the rest of the population.

This fact in itself raises an interesting dimension to the blue collar question. Conventional political wisdom suggests that you try to reach blue collar workers through union leadership. There is strong evidence that today's workers don't rely very much on union leadership for political guidance. In fact, recent polling data suggests that union endorsement of a political candidate can be a negative factor in the minds of many union voters.

What appears to have happened is that blue collar workers have lost their identity as poor people, become better-educated, earn more, have moved to the suburbs, and have become a part of middle America. In the process they have become more conservative, less willing to surrender a growing percentage of their wages to the federal government, and less willing to accept the traditional economic bromides of the Democratic Party. In many respects, blue collar workers might more appropriately be categorized as part of that "silent majority" so often referred to by a previous President.

Based on the above, I would offer the following suggestions and recommendations regarding blue collar workers:

1. We should accept the premise that blue collar workers do not appear to hold "class" views, and that their basic attitudes about the President/Administration are generally shaped by mass media information and by normal social and economic pressures.
2. While there are serious questions about the political impact union leaders have on their members, we should be mindful that blue collar workers (and the general public) have a positive view of labor unions. The one public issue where we found a sharper differentiation in attitudes among blue collar workers was on the handling of the PATCO strike.
3. Recent polling data seems to indicate that blue collar workers are more concerned with rising unemployment than the rest of the public. This seems to be consistent with blue collar sensitivity to "pocketbook" issues and suggests that blue collar workers would be responsive to messages about economic growth, jobs, and prosperity.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 14, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

THRU: RED CAVANEY/JACK BURGESS
FROM: BOB BONITATI *B*
SUBJECT: Media Emphasis on Labor

As you probably are aware, the AFL-CIO Executive Council will be conducting its quarterly meeting during the week of August 2 in New York City. (I will be attending.) The August meeting is usually well attended by the news media and labor types.

Between that date and Labor Day, we can expect the usual series of political labor media stories with emphasis on the relationship between organized labor and the Administration.

I'll be offering some suggestions in the next few days as to how best to approach this period.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/30/82

Red:

Once you sign off on the Blue Collar Strategy memo, please let me have a copy as I have promised to share it with Rollins.

Bob Bonitati

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/10/82

Bob:

The info. you asked for on family income (blue collar husband, working wife) isn't available at DoI. They tried to run info. through the computer but said it would be costly project to find answer. Info is just not readily available. Per: Jack Bregger 523-1944. He's the guy who prepared attached paper.

J.

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SAVE

1. What percentage of the total employed are blue-collar workers?

In 1981, blue-collar workers accounted for 31 percent of all employed persons. This is down from 34 percent in 1971 and 36 percent in 1961.

2. What is the definition of a blue-collar worker?

There are four broad occupational categories--white-collar, blue-collar, service and farm. Blue-collar workers consist of those persons who work as craft and kindred workers (e.g., carpenters, electricians, mechanics), operatives, except transport (e.g., assemblers, meat cutters, welders), transport equipment operatives (e.g., bus drivers, truck drivers), and nonfarm laborers (e.g., garbage collectors, stockhandlers).

3. What are the earnings of blue-collar workers?

In 1981, the usual weekly earnings of those employed full time in blue-collar jobs ranged from a high of \$352 for craft workers, followed by \$303 for transport equipment operatives, \$242 for operatives, except transport and a low of \$238 for nonfarm laborers. Overall, blue-collar workers averaged \$292 a week working full time.

4. What is the average weekly earnings of a white-collar worker?

In 1981, the usual weekly earnings of those employed full time in white-collar occupations was \$312. Within this grouping, managers and administrators were highest, at \$407, and the lowest was clerical workers, \$233.

5. What percentage of blue-collar workers are members of a union?

As of May 1980, 39 percent of all blue-collar workers were union members.

6. What percentage of blue-collar workers are black and Hispanic?

Blacks accounted for 10.9 percent of all blue-collar workers, while Hispanics made up another 7.7 percent in 1981. This was fairly close to their proportions in the working age population.

7a. In what industries are blue-collar workers employed?

The largest proportion of blue-collar workers is employed in manufacturing (45 percent); construction workers and those employed in wholesale and retail trade each accounted for another 14 percent. Blue-collar workers are least likely to be employed in finance, insurance and real estate; agriculture; and public administration. (See table A.)

7b. What industries have the largest concentrations of blue-collar workers?

Blue-collar workers make up the largest concentration of workers in construction where they accounted for nearly 75 percent of all employed persons in that industry. Another large employer of blue-collar workers is manufacturing, at 64 percent. They accounted for only 3 percent of those employed in finance, insurance and real estate. (See table B.)

8. How many blue-collar husbands have an employed wife?

As of March 1981, two-thirds of all male blue-collar workers were married; and of those married, 52.5 percent had a working wife. Half of all unemployed blue-collar husbands had a working wife.

Table A. Employed blue-collar workers by industry, 1981 annual averages

Industry	Number (In thousands)	Percent
Total blue-collar workers.....	31,263	100.0%
Agriculture.....	387	1.2
Mining.....	701	2.2
Construction.....	4,509	14.4
Manufacturing.....	13,921	44.5
Transportation and public utilities.....	3,469	11.1
Wholesale and retail trade.....	4,345	13.9
Finance, insurance and real estate.....	188	0.6
Services.....	3,215	10.3
Public administration.....	528	1.7

Table B. Percent employed in blue-collar occupations by industry, 1981 annual averages

Industry	Number (In thousands)	Percentage blue-collar
Total employed.....	100,397	31.1%
Agriculture.....	3,368	11.5
Mining.....	1,118	62.7
Construction.....	6,060	74.4
Manufacturing.....	21,817	63.8
Transportation and public utilities.....	6,633	52.3
Wholesale and retail trade.....	20,524	21.2
Finance, insurance and real estate.....	6,133	3.1
Services.....	29,511	10.9
Public administration.....	5,233	10.1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor
Bureau of Labor Statistics
June 1982

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

THRU: JACK BURGESS/RED CAVANEY

FROM: BOB BONITATI

SUBJECT: Blue Collar Strategy

Today's New York Times carries an article which focuses on Congressman Lyle Williams' efforts to continue to represent a heavy blue collar/ethnic district in Ohio where unemployment is approximately 20%. Williams characterizes that blue collar vote as "Johnny Lunchbucket".

My research on the ^{blue collar voters} ~~"Johnny Lunchbuckets"~~ of the world indicates that these ~~voters~~ are not very unique in their attitudes toward politics and politicians than the rest of the population. This might contradict the popular notion that ~~"Johnny Lunchbucket"~~ ^{they} ~~is a breed unto himself~~, but there is strong evidence that he views political questions in the same manner as the rest of the populace.

To substantiate that claim, I would offer ^{Dec 7-14 1981} several charts recently supplied to me by Dick Wirthlin's firm. In all of these graphs you will see that the opinions of Blue Collar workers, and the ^{more inclusive} ~~broader~~ category of Labor Family are quite similar to the general population (referred to as "aggregate" in the Wirthlin graphs).

The only areas where you will find significant differences between blue collar and the general population are in the areas of party identification and some issues. The graph concerning the PATCO strike clearly indicates that blue collar and labor families view the President's handling of PATCO in a different manner than the rest of the population. Blue collar and union families also (according to the Wirthlin data) tend to be more concerned with rising unemployment.

no be treated as a black

Congress

4/20

Republican Says a Key Is Johnny Lunchbucket'

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS

A-2 Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 19 — As the House of Representatives returns tomorrow from its Easter recess, it is appropriate to remember the maxim of Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill Jr.: "All politics is local."

Capitol Hill will echo in the coming weeks with talk of budget deficits and nuclear freezes and Falkland Islands, but what the Congressmen have been doing back home will affect their political fate as surely as any speech or vote.

One case in point is Representative Lyle Williams, an Ohio Republican who defies conventional wisdom by getting elected at all. He represents the Mahoning Valley in the northeast-

For two weeks, Mr. Williams has been making the rounds of his district: a high school class in Struthers, a restaurant in Warren, a truck stop in Hubbard. Everywhere the greeting is the same, casual and friendly, first names all around, reflecting the sort of personal chemistry that cannot be bought by computers or television commercials.

Mr. Williams, once a barber, has traded his white smock for a three-piece suit, but he is still regarded as an "everyday Joe," as one Democrat put it. As a result, Mr. Williams has trimmed two tough opponents in a row, and this year, his strongest potential rival withdrew.

'I Have to Constantly Prove'

"In 1978," Mr. Williams said, "when I first ran, people thought lightning would strike them if they voted Republican. I have to constantly prove I'm one of them."

The House is a collection of 435 individuals, and while national trends and issues certainly influence their prospects, each race is also a local contest, reflecting home conditions and personalities.

What makes Lyle Williams interesting is his ability to win the support of the voter: he calls "Johnny Lunchbucket," the blue-collar, often ethnic-group worker who jumped to the Republican column to vote for Ronald Reagan in the last Presidential race. One of the most important political questions of the year is whether Johnny Lunchbucket will stick with the Republicans, and President Reagan might do well to pick up some pointers from Mr. Williams, the son of a coal miner whose mother lives mainly on Federal black lung widows' benefits.

'Poorest Guy in Congress'

Mr. Williams, surely the only graduate of Molar Barber College ever to sit in the House, describes himself as the "poorest guy in Congress." Of his fellow Republicans, he says, "I always think of them as country club people," and joining the party was a simple matter of expediency.

"The Democrats didn't have room for me," said Mr. Williams, who is 39 years old and moved from the local school board to Capitol Hill in eight years.

Yet that political accident produced a Republican who knows the Greeks and Slavs and Hungarians of the valley, who loves the smell of roasting lamb at backyard picnics on Sunday afternoons and seldom tires of the business of politics.

"He seems to be everywhere shaking hands," moans George Tablack, a former state legislator who is running for the Democratic Congressional nomination. Nancy Sinnott of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee adds: "His approval rating is off the Richter scale."

Mr. Williams has always been an outsider in the Republican Party. One party official derided him as a "local yokel barber" of limited intelligence, and the Congressman is aware of insults behind his back.

'They Should Talk to Labor'

"When I first went to Congress, the Republicans knocked me off the wall — they were rude to me," he remembers with a trace of bitterness. "Half of them wouldn't talk to me, and half still don't. I told them they should talk to labor, and they resented that. It's not the Republican way."

The Ohio Republican admits to a "soft spot" for Mr. Reagan, and like the President, he has appealed to Democratic voters by criticizing big government and high taxes.

"These people genuinely resent freeloaders," Mr. Williams says of his constituents. "They don't want to go back to the old ways."

But he says he fears that the Reagan Administration has taken that principle too far, and has failed to realize that places like the Mahoning Valley need "special attention" to cope with economic turmoil. "Each week that goes by," Mr. Williams warns, "more people blame" the President for their troubles.

Moreover, he adds, the President's style has cost him the sympathy of Johnny Lunchbucket. "His trip to Barbados was a terrible mistake," he said. "I told the White House that we've got to deal with this image of the President that's coming out."

Mr. Tablack views the coming campaign this way: "It gets down to bread and butter issues. What are you doing for us?"

Ronald Reagan will have more trouble answering that question in the Mahoning Valley than Lyle Williams.



Associated Press

Representative Lyle Williams

ern corner of the state, a belt of heavy and troubled industry centering on Youngstown, where shuttered steel mills haunt the river bank and unemployment hovers around 20 percent.

To hear the Congressman tell it, Republicans are as popular as contagious disease in those parts, and this year, as he did two years ago, Mr. Williams ranks at the top of the Democrats' list of vulnerable incumbents.

"The Lyle Williams seat should be ours," Representative Tony Coelho of California, head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, insists.

17

White House Names Black Aides in Move To Improve Ties

4/20
A1 By Herbert H. Denton
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan announced the promotion of his highest-ranking black aide yesterday and the appointment of another black to the presidential staff to handle trade policy as part of a wider effort to improve the White House's relations with black Americans.

In announcing the personnel actions, deputy press secretary Larry Speakes said the administration is also contemplating other appointments and methods "to strengthen the administration's outreach efforts among minorities and the disadvantaged."

The elevation of Melvin L. Bradley, 44, from senior consultant to special assistant to the president was designed to "place a key black White House staff member in the mainstream of administration policy development" and to give him responsibility for continuously monitoring the impact of all administration policies "on minorities and the disadvantaged," Speakes said.

Yesterday's appointment of Wendell Wilkie Gunn, a conservative black Republican who is currently assistant treasurer for PepsiCo Inc., to be a special assistant to the president handling commerce and trade issues will bring the number of black presidential aides to six.

Reagan won office with less than 15 percent of the black vote. Black opposition to the administration's policies on civil rights, spending cuts for social programs and jobs has intensified in recent months. This has clearly been a source of concern in the White House.

"We've never had a large number of blacks [voting for Reagan], but if this administration becomes a symbol of racism, then we will have a large turnout of blacks against us and liberal and moderate whites coming with them . . .," Edward Rollins, assistant to the president for political affairs, told reporters last week. "I'm as much concerned about that problem as anything we face this year."

Black aides have also taken their concerns to Vice President Bush and senior White House advisers, asking that the White House respond in an effective way to the problem of high rates of unemployment among blacks and that the White House make an explicit commitment to defend their civil rights.

Left out of the decision making on policies affecting minorities and controversial black appointments but often finding themselves taking the heat for them from fellow blacks outside the administration, the aides established months ago an informal information-exchange network that one dubbed "The Soul Patrol."

"Patrol" members meet occasionally to discuss problems, then arrange for a member to use personal contacts with senior White House aides to lobby for policy changes.

Bradley, for example, lobbied counselor Edwin Meese III, with whom he has been associated since Bradley served as community affairs assistant on Reagan's California gubernatorial staff.

Steven Rhodes, White House liaison with mayors, lobbied deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver, whom he knew in California when Deaver ran a public relations firm that did work for Rhodes' employer, Reagan adviser Justin Dart.

Rhodes and Bradley addressed a Cabinet meeting late last year to urge unsuccessfully that the administration support the House-passed version of the bill extending the Voting Rights Act. Some black aides met with Reagan in January to explain the outcry that followed the decision to lift the ban on tax exemptions to segregated schools.

The Reagan administration came into office determined not to follow traditional procedures employed by previous administrations of both parties for establishing a link to black Americans.

After one strained meeting with black leaders of major civil rights organizations before the Inauguration, the administration has repeatedly resisted requests for Reagan to meet again with them, although individual leaders have been brought in for occasional sessions.

Senior advisers came into the White House with the feeling that the position of White House liaison with blacks, which had been standard in virtually every White House since President Eisenhower, was patronizing to blacks and to the person assigned to the job.

Shortly after the election, Meese, speaking to black conservatives in California, said that while Reagan intended to appoint blacks to high-level positions, "they're not going to be the ambassadors to the black people. They're going to be there because they have a substantive role to

fulfill. You're not going to have one person that all blacks have to funnel through. I think that is demeaning."

But, after more than a year in office and as relations with blacks and some whites deteriorate, that is what the White House has now assigned Bradley to do.

Spokesmen said the new position is to give Bradley access to any Cabinet council meeting where he felt his voice should be heard. The promotion, however, does not give him enough status to be one of the regulars at Reagan's daily briefings.

MEMORANDUM FOR

FROM:

SUBJECT: Labor & Politics

I have been reviewing the ABC/Washington Post poll released in February. The poll was particularly interesting because of its concentration on public and union member attitudes toward unions and union political activities. I have attached a copy of the complete poll report, but thought I should call your attention to some of its more interesting findings.

1. In general, the poll found that a large segment of the population views labor unions very positively for having improved the wages and work conditions of people.
2. Nearly half of the people expressing an opinion (48%) think labor unions greatly influence the way the country is run, and two-thirds of the public sees union influence increasing or at least remaining constant. Simultaneously, 55% of the public thinks that unions should have less influence than they do now. This includes a full 43% of union members themselves who believe that organized labor wields too much influence in the way the country is run.
3. While union members gave the President a lower approval rating (by 5%) than the total population, the poll also points out that union families lean toward identifying themselves with the Democratic Party in greater numbers than the general public. It's interesting to note that the 5% lower approval rating by union members has held relatively constant since February, 1981.
4. The political endorsement of the AFL-CIO seems to have dubious merit. When asked if the endorsement of the AFL-CIO would influence their vote for a candidate, only 28% of union households said it would, while 27% said it would make them more likely to vote against the candidate. The general public had even more negative feelings. Only 20% would be inclined to vote for an AFL-CIO endorsed candidate, while 37% would be more inclined to vote against.

5. The public believes that the goals of union officials do not match the needs of the rank and file workers. Nearly 6 out of 10 of the people surveyed said that union leaders have lost touch with the workers they represent. More surprising is the 57% of the union households who felt that labor unions and their leaders are out of touch with the workers they represent.

While I am a firm believer in the President's "Open Door" policy with labor and the need to consult with representatives of labor, the attitudes of union members cited by this poll raise some serious questions about whether or not many union leaders really speak for the working people in this country. I think we need to discuss ways of communicating with people who are more representative of working people than the left-wing liberals who currently dominate the AFL-CIO.

DRAFT MEMO

Memo for _____

From _____

RE: LABOR + POLITICS

I have ^{been reviewing} ~~just had an opportunity to review~~ the ABC/Washington Post Poll released in February. The poll was particularly interesting because of its concentration on public and union member attitudes toward unions and union political activities. I have attached a copy of the complete poll report, but thought I should call your attention to some of its more interesting findings.

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3. While union members gave the President a lower approval rating (by 5%) than the total population, the poll also points out that 57% of union members identify themselves as Democrats. This is contrasted to 49% of the total population that identified with the Democratic Party. It's interesting to note that the 5% lower approval rating by union members has held constant since February, 1981.
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While I am a firm believer in the President's "Open Door" policy with labor and the need to consult with representatives of labor, the attitudes of union members cited by this poll raise some serious questions ~~that need to be addressed as we continue our dialogue with representatives of organized labor.~~

about whether or not ^{many} union ~~meet~~
leader really speak for the
working people in this country.

I think we need to discuss
~~ways of~~ ^{ways of} ~~working~~ communicating with
people ~~who~~ who are more representative
of working people ^{than} the left
wing liberals who ^{currently} dominate the AFL-CIO



JUN 8 1982

Mr. Robert Bonitati
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Bonitati:

In response to the telephone request of Ms. Janice Farrell with Mr. Thomas Plewes on June 7, I am pleased to furnish the following information on the blue-collar workforce. Ms. Farrell asked several questions about the labor force status and earnings of blue-collar workers. These questions are answered in the enclosures to this letter.

If the Bureau of Labor Statistics can be of any further assistance to you in this area, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Janet L. Norwood".

JANET L. NORWOOD
Commissioner

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jan 14 I

Russo ✓

Garnett ✓

Bustany ✓

Russell ✓

Bond ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

THRU: RED CAVANEY/JACK BURGESS
FROM: BOB BONITATI
SUBJECT: Labor/Blue Collar Support

The April 26 issue of Business Week carries a story "Why the GOP is Wooing Labor" (see attached). A major contention of the story is that our polls show a dramatic decline in blue collar support for the President. I believe this needs some clarification.

While it is true that the President's standing with blue collar/union families has declined, there is no evidence that this decline in approval is in any greater proportion than the rest of the public. In fact, the President's approval from union families has held up remarkably well despite the harshness and frequency of criticisms from most unions.

The Washington Post/ABC poll for February 1982 (excerpt attached) compares the President's approval rating between that of union families and the general population. That comparison shows that union families have given the President a lower approval rating (by 5%) than the total population since February 1981, and that the 5% lower approval rate has held relatively constant since that time.

Reagan Approval

	<u>Feb.'81</u>	<u>April '81</u>	<u>Sept.'81</u>	<u>Nov.'81</u>	<u>Jan.'82</u>
General Population	68	73	61	53	52
Union Families	63	72	55	47	47

I have checked with Dick Wirthlin's most recent polling data and find that his information coincides with the Washington Post/ABC poll. One factor that should be considered in examining union family attitudes is that some 57% of union family members identify as Democrats, as opposed to 49% of the general population.

cc: E. Rollins

April 26, 1982 / Edited by Lee Walczak

WHY THE GOP IS WOOING LABOR

To stem an alarming erosion in President Reagan's blue-collar support, GOP political strategists are launching a major campaign to keep friendly unions in the fold. Within a matter of days, the Republican National Committee will place a top union official on its executive committee, giving labor its first official role in party affairs. In addition, the RNC will appoint an in-house labor liaison, and will create a national advisory committee to serve as a sounding board for labor issues.

AFL-CIO officials are quick to dismiss the gestures as window dressing, but behind the moves there is a sobering political imperative. Recent surveys by GOP pollster Richard Wirthlin indicate that the President's blue-collar support—which enabled Reagan to win 40% of the union vote in 1980—has declined dramatically. "Because of unemployment, blue collars are laying a lot of blame at the President's feet," says one top White House adviser. "We've lost a lot of ground."

In addition, White House aides are furious over the bitter personal assaults AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland has directed at Reagan and disturbed over recent AFL-CIO moves to enter into a formal political alliance with the Democratic Party. "Basically, we are saying that Kirkland is playing a very dangerous game," says Executive Director Rich Bond of the RNC. "We are not going to let him steal the labor vote by disenfranchising that portion of his membership that voted for Reagan."

RNC officials have hired a young member of the American Federation of Government Employees—not exactly a hotbed of Reagan support—for the new labor liaison slot. They are considering several labor officials in Illinois and Michigan, where unions have a history of cooperating with moderate GOP governors, to take the labor seat on the RNC executive committee. "Kirkland has been telling his people we're not listening," says Bond. "This will show we are."

Putting together a pro-Reagan labor advisory committee, which is being handled at the White House by a former union official, Robert F. Bonitati, is proving trickier. Unions representing the airline pilots, marine engineers, longshoremen, and teamsters are still

sympathetic toward the Administration. But other formerly strong backers, such as the building trades, are nearing an open break. The president of the AFL-CIO Building Trades Dept., Robert A. Georgine, turned his union's recent legislative conference into an orchestrated denunciation of Reaganomics, and he seems likely to spurn a White House offer to join the advisory panel.

LETTING THE ENERGY DEPT. FADE AWAY ON ITS OWN

Although the Administration's plan to abolish the Energy Dept. is going nowhere in Congress, President Reagan may keep up the pressure for action by consciously weakening the department's top management hierarchy. Energy Secretary James B. Edwards plans to quit his job in July to take the presidency of the Medical University of South Carolina. Under Secretary Guy W. Fiske has already bailed out for a position as Deputy Secretary of Commerce. To underscore his desire to get rid of Energy, Reagan may run the agency with "acting" caretaker appointees who will chop away at the department from within.

The White House does not want another Energy chief like Edwards, who got off to a bumbling start but eventually developed into a strong advocate for retaining some energy programs. Despite the objections of the Office of Management & Budget, Edwards made a classic end run around the White House staff to persuade Reagan to fund three synthetic fuel projects. And he used the same approach to persuade the President to restore planned budget cuts for fossil-fuel research.

Under one scenario being discussed at the White House, Edwards would be replaced—but only on an acting basis—by W. Kenneth Davis, the department's Deputy Secretary. Unlike the feisty Edwards, Davis, a former vice-president of Bechtel Inc., is considered a perfect team player who will cooperate with efforts to pare down the agency through administrative action. But with Congress showing no signs of bowing to Reagan's demand that it kill off the Energy Dept., the void at the top could go on indefinitely. Says one insider: "It will be like swimming in Jell-O around here."

Capital wrapup

PEOPLE: John P. Gould Jr., an economics professor at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, is a candidate for the post of Assistant Treasury Secretary for economic policy. Gould is a protégé of former Treasury and Labor Secretary George P. Shultz, having served as Shultz's special assistant for economic affairs at the Labor Dept. from 1969 to 1970. The other top contender for the job is Michael E. Granfield, an associate professor of economics at the UCLA Graduate School of Management.

COMPENSATION: After forcing Carter appointees to the Synthetic Fuels Corp. to halve their salaries last year, the Reagan Administration is now considering a proposal to increase sharply the \$69,630 annual pay of two of the quasi-public corporation's top executives. Synfuels Chairman Edward E. Noble wants to raise the salary of Victor A. Schroeder, the corporation's president, to \$135,000, and is also seeking to increase the salary of Leonard C. Axelrod, vice-president for technology, to \$108,000. White House Counselor Edwin Meese III is cool to the idea, but Noble is arguing that the low pay ceiling at the corporation is hampering the search for a chief financial officer and a key vice-president.

ENERGY: White House officials are working behind the scenes to devise legislation that could revive the stalled Northern Tier oil pipeline. Plans to construct the \$2.7 billion pipeline, which would run from Washington State to Minnesota, came to a halt on Apr. 8 after Washington Governor John D. Spellman refused to approve construction in his state because of environmental concerns. Administration sources say they will try to overturn Spellman's decision—citing national security considerations—in legislation that will reportedly be introduced by Senate Energy Committee Chairman James A. McClure (R-Idaho).

United States on Jan. 22 through 30.

A sample of telephone exchanges was selected to guarantee that each region of the country was proportionately represented.

Telephone numbers were formed by adding random digits to the selected exchanges, enabling interviewers to reach both listed and unlisted phones.

Responses were weighted by age, sex, education and race using the latest available U.S. Census figures. According to sampling theory, you can be 95 percent certain that the results for the entire sample are ± 3 percent. The margin of error for subgroups within the sample is larger.

Jeffrey D. Alderman is ABC News' polling director. He is assisted by Peter Begans, research analyst; Phyllis

Mitsuda, researcher; Val Townsley, secretary. Dr. John Blydenburgh of Clark University is ABC's polling consultant.

Chilton Research Services of Radnor, Pa., a subsidiary of American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., provided sampling, interviewing and processing facilities for the project.

For further information call: (212) 887-4325.

LABOR POLL TREND

Q. 1A. REAGAN APPROVAL: GENERAL POPULATION vs. UNION FAMILIES (ABC/Post)

	- TOTAL SAMPLE -					- UNION FAMILIES -				
	Jan 30	Nov 22	Sept. 20	Apr 22	Feb 20	Jan 30	Nov 22	Sept 20	Apr 22	Feb 20
Approve	52	53	61	73	68	47	47	55	72	63
Disapprove	39	38	34	19	15	44	45	41	22	18
No opinion	8	9	5	8	17	8	8	4	6	19

Q. 11. (SLIGHT WORDING VARIATION) In your opinion, which is most responsible for inflation - government, business, or labor? (Gallup)

Among these three groups which one would you say is most to blame for inflation in the U.S.: government, business or labor? (ABC/Post)

TOTAL SAMPLE

	ABC 1982	GALLUP			
		1978	1974	1973	1968
Gov't	57	51	48	46	46
Business	13	14	16	19	12
Labor	19	20	19	25	26
No opinion	4	15	17	10	16

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1981

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JB	
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<i>bb</i>	

*File copies to
Labor*

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY DONOVAN
ED MEESE
✓ ELIZABETH DOLE

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER *CS*

SUBJECT: Labor Strategy

It is my understanding that the following actions are to be taken following our meeting on labor strategy:

<u>ITEM</u>		<u>ACTION</u>
1.	Form a working group to be chaired by Secretary of Labor (presumably there will also be a staff-level group formed to support the working group). The group would coordinate the overall labor outreach effort.	Donovan/ Dole
2.	Determine which departments and agencies have reason to maintain contact with labor organizations.	Fuller
3.	Schedule a reception for the Vice President with labor leaders and the President, issue invitations now for a reception following the labor convention -- use the meeting to introduce the Vice President as a special liaison with labor. Then schedule 3 follow-up meetings, having the President drop by.	Dole
4.	Schedule quarterly meetings with labor leaders and the Vice President.	Donovan/ Dole
5.	Instruct Cabinet to maintain an open door policy with regard to labor.	Meese

NOV 14 1981