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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1981

Portfolio Follow-up
Bob Bonitati

At the meeting on December 5 in Elizabeth Dole's office, it was agreed that:

1. Bob would prepare a memo for EHD's signature to the Senior Staff requesting that OPL be kept advised of any contacts with organized labor.
2. Bob, and all OPL staff, will absent themselves from the press pit during post-meeting briefings of the press. The lead on all press briefings will be the press office.
3. Bob/EHD will attempt to secure the services of Secretary Haig for the February meeting of the AFL-CIO in Florida.
4. Bob will prepare a memo from EHD to Pen James reminding him of the President's promise (at the AFL-CIO board meeting December 2) to consult with labor in the future on appointments to boards and commissions.
5. Bob will inquire about the possibility of a special White House candlelight tour for OPL's constituent groups.

✓ cc: Bob Bonitati

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA: JACK BURGESS/RED CAVANEY
FROM: BOB BONITATI *B*
SUBJECT: Follow Up on Labor Strategy

As you are aware, the AFL-CIO will hold their annual mid-winter Executive Council meeting in Florida beginning on February 15. This meeting is usually well-attended and covered by the news media. It will trigger another round of media stories about how the Administration is getting along with labor.

In light of this I would propose the following:

1. The first of our regular meetings with the Vice President and labor leaders (as announced by the President in early December) be conducted during the last week of January or the first week in February.
2. We should use the February AFL-CIO Executive Council meeting in Florida as a vehicle to show our interest and concern with what labor has to say.

I would do this in the following ways:

- a) Have the Vice President ask to meet with the Executive Council during their week long meeting.
- b) Have the President call Lane Kirkland indicating that he would like to have Secretary Haig brief the Executive Council on Poland and other foreign policy issues.
- c) Have Ed Rollins and Ken Duberstein as two of the new Senior Staff visit the meeting as a "get acquainted" gesture. (I could probably get one of our friendly unions to host a reception for them.)

I will also be attending the meeting and Thad Garrett is also planning a visit.

All of these devices are relatively safe (they like the Vice President and will treat him well, they will find much to agree about with Secretary Haig), and should permit us to seize the media initiative once again -- as reaching out to consult with the leaders of organized labor.

Please let me know if I should continue to proceed with this plan.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA:

RED CAVANEY/JACK BURGESS

FROM:

BOB BONITATI *B*

SUBJECT:

Labor Strategy Session

I talked with Mac Lovell about our labor strategy session today. He met with Secretary Donovan on the subject and then called me to pass on reactions.

Lovell himself was quite supportive of our thrust and sees the need to take positive steps to attempt to heal the rift and so advised the Secretary.

Mac candidly admitted that he didn't know how Secretary Donovan would react in this afternoon's session, but did caution that the Secretary will want to have a role carved out for him and the Labor Department in any grand strategy.

Maybe you or I should suggest that we consider a Cabinet level task force chaired by Donovan to see that Departments and Agencies are sensitive to labor matters.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST*

FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE
SUBJECT: Labor Strategy

I thought it would be advisable to summarize the basic agreements of our labor strategy meeting of November 4.

It was generally agreed that the current characterization of our relations with organized labor would be counter-productive and that we should develop an approach that is sensitive to the politics of organized labor and that conveys a positive image to the millions of rank and file union members.

It was further agreed that if we are to achieve this objective, we must:

- 1) Take the initiative on advance consultation in order to avoid policy surprises or unnecessary public acrimony;
- 2) Be willing to make some policy accommodations and to consult on labor-sensitive appointments in order to both neutralize opposition and to gain support;
- 3) Be willing to consider labor recommendations for appointments to Administration boards/commissions/task forces/etc., as well as ensure that labor appointments are made;
- 4) Be prepared to periodically dispense political "perks" such as White House social invitations, meetings with the President, inclusion in delegations, invitations for Air Force One travel, etc.

As an initial step in this process of improving relations, we agreed to take the initiative at the time of the AFL-CIO Convention and implement a program designed to portray the Administration as reaching out to the concerns and interests of organized labor.

The plan included:

- a) A memorandum from the President to the Heads of Departments and Agencies urging each to have an "open door" to labor (see attached).

- b) The Vice President hosting a reception for labor leaders to recognize the AFL-CIO Centennial (scheduled for November 30).
- c) A Presidential invitation to meet with the Teamsters General Board (scheduled for December 1) and the AFL-CIO Executive Council (scheduled for December 2).
- d) A Presidential invitation to meet with the independent unions (non AFL-CIO) which will be scheduled early in the year.
- e) At the time of the Teamsters General Board meeting and the AFL-CIO meeting, the President will announce that he is asking the Vice President to meet regularly with a broad range of labor leaders to keep him informed of labor's interests and concerns.

It was further agreed that we would form a working group, to be chaired by the Secretary of Labor and staffed by the Office of Public Liaison, to coordinate our labor strategy implementation, and that recipients of this memo would gather for periodic meetings to reassess our strategy in support of our overall objectives.

* James Baker III
Ed Meese III
Mike Deaver
Secretary Donovan
Dick Darman
Craig Fuller
Lyn Nofziger
Bob Bonitati

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

One of the most important promises made by this Administration is our pledge to seek the advice and counsel of organized labor on public policy issues.

Through the years, the American labor movement has played a major role in the American economic miracle. Unions are among our most valued institutions and serve as some of our best examples of participatory democracy. I want to ensure that their views are fully heard and considered by my Administration.

Throughout last year's election campaign, in meetings with representatives of organized labor, I noted my own labor background and frequently noted that while some areas of disagreement may exist between us, my Administration would be anxious to hear and carefully consider their views.

You should adopt such an open-door policy towards organized labor and where appropriate give full consideration to organized labor's interest and concerns.

I am asking the Secretary of Labor, as this Administration's primary intermediary with labor groups, to keep informed on the policy issues that cover labor in your departments and agencies. I would also hope that you will keep him fully informed on those issues.

Ronald Reagan

A SUGGESTED LABOR STRATEGY

This paper is intended to provide background information and strategy recommendations to achieve four basic objectives for the Reagan Administration.

- A) To hold, and to attempt to expand for 1984, the 44% of the union vote received by President Reagan in 1980.
- B) To expand the group of national labor leaders supporting the President by building alliances with selected labor groups.
- C) To develop a group of state, local and regional labor leaders who will be supportive of the President and his policies.
- D) To move organized labor closer to a policy of bipartisanship.

To achieve these objectives it will be necessary to implement a strategy that considers the impact of the President and his policies on the total labor force and on the elected labor officials of the national unions and employee associations in the country.

LABOR UNREST AND REASSESSMENT

As the Administration begins to shape a strategy for working with the political activities of organized labor, the following comments and observations must be considered:

1. There is a growing unrest among rank and file members of labor unions. This unrest stems from a number of factors:
 - a) Rank and file union members are beginning to question the traditional alliance with the Democratic Party. This questioning of the Labor/Democratic alliance comes from both ends of the labor spectrum: The liberally-oriented union members are beginning to believe that the Democratic Party has shifted to the right, that the Democratic officeholders are no longer as responsive to them as in the past. The middle-of-the-road and more conservative union members tend to be disillusioned with the Labor/Democratic alliance because they believe that the Democratic Party has become the party of big-spending, softness on defense and foreign policy issues,

and has espoused too many liberal social causes. (The middle-of-the-road and more conservative union members are increasing in numbers as their incomes rise. Basically these union members are beginning to question whether the Democratic Party is still the "party of the working man".)

- b) A growing feeling that many of the elected union leaders have "lost touch" with the rank and file and that their leaders no longer speak for them on economic, social and political issues. This attitude becomes more pronounced as union members rise in the economic structure and their wage levels increase. The 1979 California referendum on Proposition 13 is a good case in point; nearly all of the labor leaders were opposed to Proposition 13, while polls showed strong support for its passage from the rank and file.
 - c) A perception by growing numbers of rank and file union members that their elected union leaders have become too closely aligned with the Democratic Party and that they should be more "independent" in their political outlook. This was made quite evident in the 1980 Presidential campaign where the endorsement of Jimmy Carter met strong resistance and opposition at the local union level.
2. While there is growing unrest in the rank and file, one should not assume that these attitudes dominate the labor movement. They don't! But there are clear signs that the numbers of union members holding these views is increasing.
3. The growing unrest in the rank and file and the results of the 1980 election is prompting many national labor leaders to reassess their political activities and operations. Some are merely disenchanted with the Democratic Party and what they perceive to be Democratic officeholders' lack of "responsiveness". Others have become sensitive to the changing economic status of their members and the growing restiveness of the rank and file, while others have decided that the political climate of the country is changing and that they need to be more pragmatic if they are to be politically effective.

To varying degrees, elected national union leaders are examining the following questions:

- a) Should they seek ties with both Democrats and Republicans.

- b) How do they relate to a Republican Administration (and a popular Republican President) and a Republican/conservative-oriented Congress. This is the first time they've had to face that question since 1954.
- c) Should labor begin to narrow its political agenda. (Many leaders feel that organized labor needs to concentrate more on "gut" labor issues and deemphasize social issues - civil rights, welfare, women's right, etc.)
- d) How can labor have a greater impact on the Presidential nominating process - so they don't get stuck with candidates like Jimmy Carter.

The first stage of this reassessment by labor leaders would have to be characterized as the "wait and see period". Many labor leaders are watching the early days of the Reagan Administration to see what its basic attitudes and policies are toward labor unions. They are also carefully watching the Republicans on Capitol Hill to see if legislation they perceive as anti-union begins to move and how much influence their perceived enemies (Sen. Hatch, Sen. Thurmond and others) actually exert.

These labor leaders are also exploring ways to better their communications with the rank and file in the hope that if members are better-educated on issues and candidates, they will be more responsive to the recommendations of the national union.

It should be noted that the more liberal-oriented labor leaders (such as Jerry Wurf, Bill Winpingsinger and Glenn Watts) are concentrating their reassessment efforts on ways to strengthen discipline in the Democratic Party and to wrest control of the Party apparatus so that labor can have a stronger impact on the nominating process. Some of these labor leaders feel that a major reason for labor defections to Republican candidates in recent years is the shift to the right by the Democratic Party.

SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON LABOR

1. While any number of labor leaders might show signs of pragmatism, there is still a strong identification with the Democratic Party. In general, labor leaders feel that Democrats have usually championed their causes and Republicans have fought them.

2. There is general suspicion and skepticism about the Reagan Administration. Campaign statements advocating repeal of Davis-Bacon and the application of anti-trust laws to unions scared the daylights out of many union leaders. Subsequent clarification of those views relaxed some of their fears but has led many labor leaders to wonder whether this was done to merely "win votes" in a close campaign.
3. While there are more than 60,000 union locals and many thousands of individuals involved in the local, state and regional leadership structure of unions, almost all unions are personally run and dominated by the national union president. They control the staff and the communications, and they usually set the policy, especially when it comes to political activities and positions on issues. Except for the occasional maverick local or state leader, most people in the leadership structure of a union usually "go along" with the elected national union leaders. It should also be pointed out that the leader of a large or powerful local union can often be a strong influence on the national union president if he is well-informed and decides to flex his political muscle. The endorsement of President Reagan by the Teamsters is a case in point.
4. The AFL-CIO is still the dominant force in labor's political actions. While none of the 108 unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO is bound by its policies on issues and candidates, the unwritten rule is that you don't "buck" AFL-CIO Headquarters. If an individual union wants to depart from the AFL-CIO policy, it is usually done in a relatively quiet or low-key manner. Discipline was much stronger during the Meany reign, but shows signs of weakness under the newly-elected Kirkland.
5. Many union leaders have expressed covert support for the President and several have indicated a desire to develop a friendly relationship with the Administration. At this point, they are reluctant to publicly voice their support because of the negative signals emanating from AFL-CIO Headquarters and their fear that the Reagan economic plan may turn out to be a failure. It is unclear whether some new realignment is in the making or whether these leaders are merely being very pragmatic.
6. Symbolism is very important in the labor movement. The handshake and the promise are the stock in trade. One's word sometimes seems to have more impact than one's deed. Positive moves by an Administration in terms of public posture and public relations always have great impact on the total labor community. Reasonable appointments to the NLRB, labor leaders being included in visible new events, labor leaders conferring with the President and Administration officials "reaching out" to labor will be interpreted positively.

7. The leadership of the labor movement starts out with very low expectations of a Republican/Reagan Administration. They don't expect to be consulted, they don't expect to be "included", so whatever positive steps are taken will have disproportionate impact.
8. Union leaders are accustomed to dealing on a "quid pro quo" basis. If the Administration does something for a union, they will fully expect to be called upon to reciprocate.
9. In previous Administrations, relations with organized labor were usually channelled through the AFL-CIO and the Washington labor establishment. The labor establishment consists of about 25 unions of varying sizes that have high visibility in terms of political, lobbying and public relations activities. Few efforts have been made to reach out to labor organizations which didn't have a Washington presence or to deal with powerful state and local union officials.
10. All labor leaders are politicians within their own union. They have to stand for reelection and tend to be receptive to the usual activities that enhance their elected positions with their members. All of them like to portray themselves as being important enough (in the eyes of their members) to be consulted by the White House, invited by the White House and appointed to key advisory commissions, boards, etc.
11. Like all politicians, labor leaders don't like surprises. If a policy affecting them, their industry, or their members is announced and they are caught off guard, the reaction is likely to be negative. Even if the policy pronouncement might adversely affect their members, being forewarned of such an announcement can help to soften the blow and makes the union leader appear to his membership to be more knowledgeable about what's going on in Washington.
12. Most unions do not have very extensive research or policy analysis units within their organizations. They are frequently not well-equipped to analyze issues and will follow the lead provided by either the AFL-CIO, another union in their industry, or the management position in their industry if the issue directly affects that industry. Currently one will find the building and construction unions relying on the nuclear power industry for nuclear power issue analysis, and the maritime unions on the shipping industry for programs to improve their economic health.

13. Coalitions are often formed within the labor movement on an industry-by-industry basis. It is not uncommon to find high degrees of cooperation today between labor and management on political issues that directly affect their members such as trade policy, tax policy and regulatory matters. These ad hoc coalitions usually operate outside the AFL-CIO structure and are usually initiated by management operatives who try to enlist the support of employees for the "good of the industry."

IMPACTING THE RANK AND FILE

While the proposition of seizing upon the restiveness in the rank and file of union members may be tempting, directly communicating with an organized work force of approximately 24 million is a difficult proposition unless we build a vast communications network to deal with them. In addition, labor union members do not vote merely as labor union members unless they feel their rights as union members are threatened or under attack. Recent internal AFL-CIO studies show that union members (in general) are affected by issues and candidates much like any other group of citizens except that there has been a long identification with the Democratic Party as the party of the "working man."

In dealing with the rank and file union members, the Administration should accept the premise that the union members' attitudes about President Reagan, the Administration and the Republican Party are shaped by the news media, by other pressure groups, and by the communication (meetings, publications) he receives from his union. The more a union member identifies with his union, the more susceptible he will be to his union communications. In recent years, labor leaders have just begun to recognize that the rank and file member is losing his identification with his union and has become more susceptible to other social, economic and political pressures that may be exerted upon him. This is especially true of the middle income union member.

In general our efforts to impact the rank and file must be geared to dispelling the notion that the President and/or the Administration is anti-labor, and that the President's policies are in the best interests of working men and women.

This can probably be best accomplished through the news media, through symbolism, through direct communications with union leadership below the national level, and by successfully governing the nation.

In trying to directly affect the rank and file union members, the following suggestions are offered:

1. The Administration and its key spokesmen (in particular the Dept. of Labor) should appear in the news media to be friendly to unions and their leaders. Much of this can be accomplished in symbolic ways by appearances and meetings with union members and leaders, visits to work sites and an interest in the problems of workers. Well publicized visits and meetings with workers in troubled industries can deliver a strong message to union members.
2. The Administration and its key spokesmen (in particular the Dept. of Labor) should be publicly portrayed as being "open and accessible" to organized labor and desirous of labor support and participation in the development of policy.
3. Emphasis should be given to the job-producing/economic growth aspects of the economic package. President Reagan's pledge "to put America back to work again" was a strong selling point to workers during the 1980 campaign and needs to be reinforced as the program is implemented.
4. The Administration should try to avoid the public impression of being locked in combat with the AFL-CIO and other major union spokesmen on labor issues (job protection, workers rights, job safety standards). In particular it would be wise to avoid situations where it appears that the Administration is helping big business at the expense of the workers.
5. A major effort to get Administration spokesmen to address large state and local labor meetings where a positive reaction can be reasonably forecast. For too many years, Republicans have passed up opportunities to address labor audiences.
7. The Administration should develop a program to systematically communicate with selected rank and file union members through its own newsletter-style publication. Such a publication (A Report From the President) wouldn't be identified as labor-targetted but in actuality it would be mailed to a list composed primarily of labor union members. Such a publication could get the Administration message out to union members and help to counter some of the union house organs who tend to rewrite AFL-CIO press releases.
8. A special effort should be made by our media liaison office to impact the house organs of labor unions. There are thousands of local, state and national publications that are mailed to union members' homes each week and month that the Administration should be impacting in a positive way.

9. An effort must be made to identify supportive local and state union leaders and bring them to the White House for briefings, meetings and special treatment.
10. Our communications efforts need to be expanded from the normal pattern of only communicating with the elected national leaders of unions to state, local and regional union officials. At a minimum, these local, state and regional officials should receive regular direct communications through the mail so they do not have to depend on their national unions for information concerning the Administration and its policies.
11. Public opinion surveys that depict rank and file union sentiments at variance with the views of the national elected union leadership need to be widely disseminated and publicized by sources outside the Administration.
12. A special effort must be made by the Republican National Committee to "open the doors" to labor. The RNC should be portrayed as seeking labor input and support. This "invitation" to labor must be carried through at the state and local level.
13. Special efforts should be made by the White House and by the Departments and Agencies to bring together leaders of labor and management to solve industry problems and to promote a spirit of labor-management co-operation.

IMPACTING THE AFL-CIO

Like it or not, the AFL-CIO continues to be the focal point for championing the causes of organized labor. Like many institutions, it is run by the professional staff who have strong liberal/Democratic/anti-business biases. The principal spokesmen for the AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland and Tom Donahue (the Secretary-Treasurer) can usually be expected to use whatever materials are placed in front of them by the professional staff. The AFL-CIO does little actual union organizing and collective bargaining but does consider its principal mission to be impacting public policy.

Ostensibly the AFL-CIO is governed by a 33-member Executive Council of union presidents which meets quarterly to shape policy of the Federation, but in actuality this group usually rubberstamps what the professional staff produces and Kirkland and Donahue advance.

In recent years (especially since Lane Kirkland became President) some members of the Executive Council have become disenchanted with the quality and direction of the staff work and have begun to question the lobbying and campaign operations of the Federation as well as the issues being emphasized. Most of this stems from the basic restiveness in the labor movement. While there is increasing dissent in the Executive Council, most of their actions are by unanimous vote. This stems from the perceived need for unity in the labor movement.

While some doubts about the AFL-CIO political agenda exist, it is difficult to conceive of any immediate major shift in the outlook of the AFL-CIO leadership toward Republicans or President Reagan. At the same time though, both Kirkland and Donahue have expressed interest in developing a "working" relationship with the Administration. What form or structure they might have in mind is unclear. Both of them sincerely believe that they have been reasonable, dignified and moderate in their criticism of the Administration and the President. That notion clearly is a matter of some conjecture by the media, by political observers and by many union leaders within the AFL-CIO.

The most likely assessment is that these two leaders of the AFL-CIO don't "know how" to establish a "working relationship" with the Reagan Administration. Because of the traditional orientation of the institution, the campaign rhetoric portraying Reagan as anti-labor, and the radical nature of the Economic Renewal package (which severely impacts programs they have fought for), the institution has been forced to react instinctively -- by lashing out.

Nonetheless, the AFL-CIO and its presence in our national political life and the attention it receives from the news media is a fact of life and must be dealt with.

Recognizing that the AFL-CIO is not likely to ever offer eventual political support to President Reagan, our basic objectives in dealing with the AFL-CIO leadership (Kirkland, Donahue and key staff) should be:

1. To provide few, if any, opportunities for critics to claim the Administration isn't listening to or working with organized labor.
2. To lessen the current atmosphere of hostility, so that individual unions will not feel constrained to "work with" or support the Administration.

3. To minimize their public criticisms of the Administration.
4. To emphasize and publicize those areas of policy agreement (national defense, foreign policy, trade) that potentially exist so that the AFL-CIO is portrayed as supporting parts of the Administration's program.

The following suggestions are offered in hopes of implementing these objectives.

1. At this stage of the Administration, no attempt should be made to "write off" or to "shut them out". Any effort to ignore Kirkland, Donahue and the institution of the AFL-CIO will only serve as a rallying point to those who want to believe that the Administration is anti-labor and will make it more difficult to work with individual unions.
2. For the first year, the Administration and its key figures should be open and accessible to the leadership of the AFL-CIO and willing to discuss their problems and issues. This openness and accessibility should be reassessed in early 1982 to see if it has had any impact on decreasing the current hostility emanating from the AFL-CIO Headquarters.
3. The Administration, in a quiet informal way, must communicate to the AFL-CIO leadership directly and indirectly that continued hostility and confrontation makes the Administration's efforts to develop a relationship with organized labor increasingly difficult.
4. Key figures in the AFL-CIO hierarchy should be invited to the White House for social events, briefings, meetings, etc. and an effort should be made to have the President, Vice President and key Administration officials pictured with AFL-CIO leaders in the news media.
5. The Administration should try to avoid confrontation on highly emotional labor issues or appointments (like Davis-Bacon, NLRB appointments, sub-minimum wage, the Hobbs Act) that can be used as a rallying point by the AFL-CIO to unify its affiliate unions against us.
6. A conscientious effort should be made to educate AFL-CIO leaders on Administration programs and objectives and to win their support on selected issues. Trade issues, national defense and foreign policy issues are likely prospects for agreement.

7. Key figures in the Administration should seize the initiative in reaching out to the AFL-CIO leaders for advice and consultations. Such behavior is not expected of a Republican Administration and will serve to throw everyone off balance. Basically, the Administration should be perceived by the media and by the member unions of the AFL-CIO as trying diligently to build a working relationship with the AFL-CIO. If it fails, they must take the blame.
8. In developing some form of relationship with Kirkland and Donahue, the Administration must be cautious about strengthening them in their positions. While we should work with them, we do not want to bestow any new power on them. We must be able to be sensitive to the needs of the Teamsters who will be most unhappy if the Administration does not share its visible labor relationship with them.

IMPACTING NATIONAL LABOR LEADERS

In trying to expand the group of labor unions supporting the President, our first priority must be to see that our friends (those four unions who supported the President) are treated well and that their good treatment is communicated to the rest of the labor community. Taking care of your friends is a well-established concept among labor politicians, and most are currently watching to see if the Teamsters, MEBA, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers and the National Maritime Union receive special treatment from the Administration. If other labor leaders see it is worthwhile to align with the Administration they will begin to follow suit.

A second priority must be to clearly send the message that the Administration wants to communicate with the leaders of organized labor, that we want to work with them and that we want their political support. In these early days, the Administration should also send a clear message that we don't believe communication is facilitated by street marches, shouting and inflammatory rhetoric.

A third priority is to identify "targets of opportunity" in the labor movement. Certain unions and their leaders are more susceptible to President Reagan and Republican philosophies and they should be singled out for cultivation and special treatment. The maritime unions, transportation unions and the building and construction unions appear to be a logical starting point.

In trying to expand our group of labor supporters, the following recommendations are offered:

1. Cabinet members and key Administration officials should be open and accessible to labor union leaders. No one should feel they are not being heard or consulted.
2. Key Administration figures need to make some symbolic outreach gestures to convey the message that we seek labor input and support. Speeches at union conventions, visits to union headquarters, and taking the initiative to reach out to labor leaders will not go unnoticed. Cabinet members should try to develop a personal relationship with those union presidents directly impacted by their Departments or Agencies and mechanisms should be established for regular communication.
3. National labor leaders should regularly be included on invitation lists for White House social events, important news events, bill-signing ceremonies, and high-level briefings. These officials should also be appointed to boards, commissions and advisory bodies. Special attention must first be devoted to our supporters and more friendly union leaders. Those who are inclined to excessive negative rhetoric and those who are publicly fighting the Administration should receive little or no attention.
4. While it is important to establish good communications and to practice all of the normal stroking operations available to the White House, the Administration must be prepared to "deliver" on substantive issues that concern individual unions. Establishing friendly relations with a union leader will normally not be enough to sustain a relationship. Eventually, we must be prepared to negotiate or make concessions on policy if we are to achieve continued support.
5. Special emphasis should be given throughout the Administration to keeping selected union leaders aware of possible policy changes affecting their union membership. None of them like surprises and advance consultation can often blunt criticism and sometimes win support. The transfer of the Maritime Administration from the Commerce Department to DOT is a case in point. Upon learning of the proposal, the maritime unions were initially opposed. Given some time and adequate discussion about the ramifications of such a move, the unions are now accepting and supportive of such a move.

6. The White House should develop a device for regular high level consultations with selected groups of national union leaders. This will assure them of having input into the White House on a regular basis and can serve to blunt any criticism that we aren't consulting with them.
7. The Republican National Committee needs to begin reaching out to the leaders of organized labor and should begin serving as a focal point for bringing together labor leaders and Congressional Republicans to listen to each other. The Chairman of the RNC can make some symbolic speeches, appoint a Special Assistant to "communicate" with labor and can begin to serve as a contact point for labor leaders' political concerns and requests.
8. The White House Legislative Liaison Office and the Legislative Liaison Offices of the Departments and Agencies should develop a relationship with the political legislative operatives of some of the unions with strong political operations so that issue-by-issue coalitions can be developed to assist the Administration in achieving its legislative objectives. These political operatives are key players in the structure of a national union and continued contact can eventually develop into long-term relationships.
9. The Administration must try to reach beyond the Washington labor establishment and begin to work with labor union leaders who do not have a strong Washington presence. These unions could be more responsive to Administration overtures and tend to be more susceptible to the traditional stroking operations.
10. A special effort should be made to work with unions on an industry-by-industry basis, bringing together labor and management leaders to work on problems unique to their industry. Such a system provides an opportunity to avoid the AFL-CIO framework, develop better labor/management relationships, and lends itself to developing industry coalitions to support Administration policies.

LABOR DEMOGRAPHICS

The most authoritative source of information on union membership is the Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations published by the Department of Labor. The most recent Directory was issued in September 1980. It is based on data for the year ending 1978.

Membership in the nation's 208 labor unions and professional and state employee associations totaled 24.4 million in 1978. Included in this count are 1.7 million union members outside the United States (all but 120,000 are in Canada). Not included in these totals are members of single firm or local unaffiliated unions in the United States and members of municipal employee associations.

Of this total, 108 unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO. These unions have a membership of approximately 17 million.

Union membership accounts for 19.7 of the total labor force. When employee associations are included, this percentage of the total labor force is increased to 22.2%. Approximately 56% of union and employee association members are blue collar, 34% white collar, and 10% service workers.

State membership data for all unions in the United States show that three states account for nearly 1 out of every 3 members - New York, California and Pennsylvania. These three states, coupled with Illinois, Ohio and Michigan, account for 52 percent of the total.

The states listed below have at least 30% of the non-agricultural workforce holding membership in unions or employee associations:

<u>State</u>	<u>Percent of Work Force in unions</u>
New York	41.0
West Virginia	40.4
Michigan	38.5
Pennsylvania	37.3
Washington	36.5
Hawaii	35.9
Ohio	33.6
Illinois	33.4
Alaska	32.3
Indiana	32.0
Missouri	31.0
Wisconsin	30.5

Historically, union membership has been concentrated in a small number of unions. Sixteen unions represent 61% of the total union membership. Over 64% of all employee association members belong to one organization, the National Education Association. Twenty-five associations, or 74% of the total, have fewer than 25,000 members. Most employee associations are state organizations and limited in potential membership.

LABOR VOTING BEHAVIOR

The sources of information for study and analysis of union member voting patterns is extremely limited and not recent. Little research has been done in analyzing the union vote in elections other than Presidential races.

The research does show that persons from labor union households are more likely to turn out at the polls than persons from non-union households. The research also indicates that labor union members do not vote as a cohesive bloc in support of either party, despite the near unanimous effort on the part of labor union leaders in support of Democratic presidential candidates. The actual Democratic presidential vote since 1952 by persons living in a union household varies from a high of 73% in 1964 to a low of 46% in 1972. Available data on voting behavior of union members in congressional races yields similar patterns.

The following table presents the percentage of the union vote received by the major Presidential candidates for 1952 through 1980. The source of this information is the Gallup index.

	1952	
	<u>Stevenson (D)</u>	<u>Ike (R)</u>
Union household	61.0%	39.0%
National total	44.6%	55.4%
	1956	
	<u>Stevenson (D)</u>	<u>Ike (R)</u>
Union household	57.0%	43.0%
National total	42.2%	57.8%
	1960	
	<u>John Kennedy (D)</u>	<u>Nixon (R)</u>
Union household	65.0%	35.0%
National total	50.1%	49.9%
	1964	
	<u>Johnson (D)</u>	<u>Goldwater (R)</u>
Union household	73.0%	27.0%
National total	61.3%	38.7%

	1968		
	<u>Humphrey (D)</u>	<u>Nixon (R)</u>	<u>Wallace (I)</u>
Union household	56.0%	29.0%	15.0%
National total	43.0%	43.4%	3.6%
	1972		
	<u>McGovern (D)</u>	<u>Nixon (R)</u>	
Union household	46.0%	54.0%	
National total	38.0%	62.0%	
	1976		
	<u>Carter (D)</u>	<u>Ford (R)</u>	
Union household	63.0%	36.0%	
National total	51.0%	48.0%	
	1980		
	<u>Carter (D)</u>	<u>Reagan (R)</u>	<u>Anderson (I)</u>
Union household	50.0%	43.0%	5.0%
National total	41.0%	51.0%	7.0%

Almost all of the available research shows that union membership does seem to make a significant difference in the electoral decisions of union members. Data available from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (1948-1968) shows that union members were from 82% to 34% more likely to vote for the Democratic presidential candidates than non-union voters.

In the mid-sixties, though, the research begins to show a significant decline in the Democratic preference of union voters. Although the basic partisan leanings of union voters have not changed greatly since 1952 (2 to 1 Democratic), union members have become more affluent, less working-class conscious, and less closely attached to their unions.

While political scientists will debate the relative value of a labor endorsement, there is little disagreement that the actions taken by organized labor can fundamentally affect the size of urban pluralities for Democratic candidates and that their activity or inactivity is an important factor in determining who wins statewide elections.

Republican National Committee

MAR 16 1982

Richard N. Bond
Deputy Chairman

March 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH DOLE,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

THROUGH: Bob Bonitati

SUBJECT: Labor Support for GOP


In the 1978 election cycle, 68 labor affiliated groups contributed \$232,016 to Republican candidates (\$120,200 - Senate; \$111,816 - House), which represents 6% of their total contributions to all candidates (\$3,693,353).

In the 1980 cycle, 106 labor groups contributed \$902,051 to Republicans (\$440,434 - Senate; \$461,617 - House). Though this appears to represent a significant increase, it still represents only 6% of their total contributions (\$14,213,099).

To accurately interpret these numbers, we need to break this out for candidates and determine exactly what attracted the contributions. This will take some further research and we will report back upon completion.

Also attached for your review are the labor groups that contributed to the 1981 House-Senate Dinner.

I hope you find this information of assistance.


Richard N. Bond
Deputy Chairman

cc: Ed Rollins



Republican National Committee

Richard N. Bond
Deputy Chairman

Mary Matalin
Executive Assistant

March 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR RICH BOND

SUBJECT: Labor Support for GOP

Attached are tables listing labor affiliated groups who have contributed to Republican candidates and the Republican Party.

ATTACHMENT "A" Labor contributions to the 1981
Republican Senate-House Dinner

ATTACHMENT "B" Labor contributions to Republican candidates,
1977-78 and 1979-80

ATTACHMENT "B" KEY

GROUP: All non-party political committees who have indicated
a connection with a labor organization

SENATE: Contributions to Republican Senatorial candidates

HOUSE: Contributions to Republican Congressional candidates

TOTAL REP - % Total contributions to Republican Senate and House candidates -
Percent of total contributions to all (Republican and
Democratic) candidates

TOTAL CONTR Total contributions to all (Republican and Democratic)
candidates

Source: FEC Final Reports on Financial Activity,
Party and Non-party Political Committees
Volume IV, Table B: 1977-78
Volume III, Table B: 1979-80

Mary Matalin
Executive Assistant

The following labor affiliated groups contributed to the
1981 Republican Senate-House Dinner:

National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association	\$23,000
Seafarers' Political Action Donation	10,000
Carpenters' Legislative Improvement Committee	5,000
District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Association	5,000
Laborer's Political League	5,000
National Oil Jobbers PAC	6,000
Civic Involvement Program - General Motors	3,000
Local 745 Drive Political Fund	2,000
Tempo-Tiger Employees Political Organization	2,000
Transportation Political Education League/ United Transport Union	2,000
Truck Operators Non-Partisan Committee	2,000
Westinghouse Employees	2,000
Drive Political Fund/ International Brotherhood of Teamsters	1,000
TOTAL	\$68,000

NOTE: No labor contributions to RNC Eagles Fundraiser or
PAC 40 Club.

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE			
ACTIVE BALLOT CLUB, A DEPT OF UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION					17,000	8,850	25,850-5%	569,775	
AFL-CIO COPE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS COMM	5,000	-	5,000-1%	351,585	18,250	12,000	30,250-4%	776,577	
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION PAC	11,700	21,800	33,500-27%	122,550	31,500	39,715	71,215-24%	300,165	
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION - POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE	2,500	800	3,300 -11%	29,835	1,500	1,900	3,400-2%	148,010	
ALUMINUM WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 105 COPE COMMITTEE					-	300	300-17%	1,799	
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS - TEMPO POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION COMMITTEE					3,000	250	3,250-6%	51,350	
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES - P.E.O.P.L.E.					12,450	4,475	16,925-5%	338,035	
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES - P.E.O.P.L.E.					-	1,600	1,600-4%	38,500	
AMCOPE	1,000	-	1,000-9%	10,600					
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL EDUCATION	-	400	400-1%	26,690	12,250	6,500	18,750-10%	189,145	
ASBESTOS WORKERS POLITICAL ACTION COMM					1,000	-	1,000-11%	9,280	
ASSOCIATION OF PA STATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY FACULTIES	-	100	100-6%	1,650					
ATU COPE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS COMMITTEE	-	200	200-5%	4,400	3,000	-	3,000-6%	52,000	
B. OF L.E. VOLUNTARY POLITICAL FUND					250	2,200	2,450-10%	25,102	
BALTIMORE REGIONAL JOINT BOARD					3,500	1,000	4,500-88%	5,100	
BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTSMEN POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (BACPAC)	-	60	60-4%	1,460	2,500	800	3,300-11%	29,400	

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE		
BROTHERHOOD RAILWAY CARMEN LODGE 886 PAC					500	-	500-63%	800
BUILDING UNION INDIVIDUALS LABOR DONATION (BUILD)					2,900	-	2,900-23%	12,491
CARPENTERS' LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT COMM	4,300	3,500	7,800-5%	142,652	16,000	24,473	40,473-7%	553,675
CHAPTER 557 - D.R.I.V.E.					1,000	-	1,000-100%	1,000
CHICAGO AND CENTRAL STATES POLITICAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE	2,500	-	2,500-89%	2,800				
COMMITTEE FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT					500	-	500-1%	93,500
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEE POLITICAL EDUCATION	1,150	800	1,950-5%	36,831	7,025	5,650	12,675-9%	140,095
COMMITTEE ON LETTER CARRIERS POLITICAL EDUCATION (LETTER CARRIERS POLITICA)	100	300	400-2%	19,750	2,700	1,940	4,640-10%	44,715
COMPOSITION ROOFERS LOCAL UNION #30 POLITICAL ACTION & EDUCATION FUND					100	400	500-5%	10,250
COPE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED RUBBER CORK LINOLEUM & PLASTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA					300	-	300-1%	25,633
CWA-COPE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS COMMITTEE	5,600	1,350	6,950-5%	138,930	17,900	3,900	21,800-5%	444,520
DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN INDEPENDENT VOTER EDUCATION COMMITTEE (DRIVE COMM)	6,000	5,700	11,700-15%	76,600	5,000	5,600	10,600-8%	137,000
DISTRICT 1199 POLITICAL ACTION FUND					1,000	100	1,100-9%	11,850
DISTRICT 2 MEBA - AMO, RETIREES ASSOC FUND					-	6,000	6,000-11%	53,880
DISTRICT 2 MEBA - AMO, AFL/CIO VOLUNTARY POLITICAL ACTION FUND	-	3,200	3,200-5%	65,675	5,000	31,400	36,400-13%	270,016
DISTRICT COUNCIL #3 IUE-AFL CIO COPE AND RAFFLE FUND					-	800	800-4%	21,800

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE		
ELECTRICAL WORKERS POLITICAL, EDUCATION, LEGISLATIVE FUND					-	1,000	1,000-10%	10,250
ENGINEERS POLITICAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE (EPEC)/INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPER	3,500	2,650	6,150-8%	74,825	13,500	10,115	23,615-6%	418,628
F.I.R.E.- PAC	300	1,300	1,600-11%	14,970				
FEDERATION OF TELEPHONE WORKERS OF PA					45	1,250	1,295-7%	18,855
FLA TEACHING PROFESSION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE					-	100	100-5%	2,100
GBBA - POLITICAL EDUCATION LEAGUE	200	-	200-18%	1,100				
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES POLITICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE	300	-	300-4%	7,200	600	100	700-4%	15,625
GRAPHIC ARTS INTERNATIONAL UNION PCC	-	300	300-3%	10,350	1,200	600	1,800-7%	26,150
H. & R.E. & B.I.U. T.I.P. "TO INSURE PROGRESS" (AKA H. & R.E. & B.I.U. COP)	1,500	3,750	5,250-6%	82,172	5,500	2,850	8,350-5%	163,849
HOISTING ENGINEERS LOCAL 513 POLITICAL EDUCATION & CHARITABLE VOLUNTARY	-	250	250-71%	350				
IBPAT POLITICAL ACTION TOGETHER - POL COMM					1,200	1,500	2,700-4%	71,485
ILGWU CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE	250	900	1,150-3%	45,761	3,400	8,050	11,450-2%	488,810
INDEPENDENT MINN PAC FOR EDUCATION MINNESOTA EDUCATION					1,100	2,839	3,939-10%	40,389
INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT AFL-CIO VOL FUND					100	250	350-1%	28,550
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL EDUCATION	2,000	2,200	4,200-7%	63,690	8,500	4,950	13,450-6%	214,758
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF FIREMEN AND OILERS POLITICAL LEAGUE	200	-	200-2%	9,925	200	-	200-2%	9,250

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE		
INTERNATIONAL MOLDERS & ALLIED WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC COPE FUND					500	-	500-3%	14,900
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LO 885 POLITICAL ACTION AND EDUCATION					-	5,790	5,790-18%	32,740
IOWA STATE EDUCATION ASSOC PAC					1,000	1,045	2,045-10%	20,045
IRONWORKERS POLITICAL ACTION LEAGUE	-	200	200-11%	1,850	2,025	1,815	3,840-4%	85,890
IUE COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL EDUCATION	600	-	600-10%	5,850	-	425	425-1%	38,996
LABOR'S INVESTMENT IN VOTER EDUCATION					600	200	800-5%	14,675
LABORERS' POLITICAL LEAGUE	5,200	2,350	7,550-6%	120,795	10,550	7,665	18,215-5%	392,855
LEAGUE OF VOTER EDUCATION					-	300	300-11%	2,840
LEGISLATIVE EDUCATION ACTION PROGRAM CAMPAIGN ASSISTANCE FUND	3,000	1,400	4,400-23%	19,000	1,500	2,650	4,150-7%	60,675
LOCAL 147 PAC FUND					1,000	500	1,500-20%	7,325
LOCAL 302 VOLUNTARY POLITICAL FUND	1,000	2,000	3,000-48%	6,225				
LOCAL 1814 INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMANS' ASSOC AFL-CIO POLITICAL ACTION					6,000	1,150	7,150-11%	67,734
LOCAL 545 ENGINEERS VOLUNTARY POLITICAL ACTION FUND					-	790	790-14%	5,490
MACHINISTS NON-PARTISAN POLITICAL LEAGUE	6,000	500	6,500-3%	194,900	5,000	5,750	10,750-1%	847,708
MAINTENANCE OF WAY POLITICAL LEAGUE	700	900	1,600-6%	26,630	250	550	800-3%	31,475
MARINERS AND DONATION	100	-	100-50%	200				
MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS CONTRIBUTION FUND					5,500	4,000	9,500-8%	113,950
MEBA POLITICAL ACTION FUND	14,600	6,000	20,600-11%	191,121	31,500	44,000	75,500-12%	614,795

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE		
MICHIGAN BOILERMAKERS POL ACT FUND INTERNATIONAL BTH'D OF BLHKRS, IRONSH	100	250	350-6%	5,920	-	50	50-1%	3,635
MICHIGAN D-R-I-V-E POL FUND					-	3,200	3,200-31%	10,425
MICHIGAN STATE AFL-CIO COPE VOLUNTARY FUND	-	550	550-32%	1,714	-	2,100	2,100-12%	17,850
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR POL ACT (NAPA)	-	400	400-3%	11,750	300	730	1,030-7%	13,830
NATIONAL ASSOC OF AIR TRAFFIC SPECIALISTS POL ACT FUND	200	625	825-25%	3,325	100	2,075	2,175-22%	9,750
NATIONAL ASSOC OF POSTAL SUPERVISORS PAC					1,500	1,750	3,250-16%	19,825
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOC PAC	2,000	200	2,200-3%	63,900	10,050	15,150	25,200-9%	283,585
NATIONAL RURAL LETTER CARRIERS ASSOC POL ED COMMITTEE	1,000	2,050	3,050-18%	16,700	2,700	5,775	8,475-21%	39,425
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION PAC (TEPAC)					2,500	4,800	7,300-7%	103,825
NEW JERSEY ASSOC PAC	-	100	100-25%	400	-	160	160-17%	965
NEW JERSEY STATE CARPENTERS NON-PARTISAN POL ED COMMITTEE					-	800	800-11%	7,000
NMU POL & LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION ON WATCH					900	1,950	2,850-4%	64,650
OHIO DRIVE					1,000	3,300	4,300-16%	27,219
OPEIU, LOCAL 153 "VOTE" (VOICE OF THE ELECTORATE) COMMITTEE					-	250	250-6%	4,350
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 324 NAT POL ACT COMM					-	100	100-5%	2,050
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 825 POL AND ED COMM	-	1,000	1,000-31%	3,270				
PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES					120	-	120-17%	695
PAINTERS D.C. #6 COPE FUND (FED)	-	50	50-100%	50				

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE		
PAN AM FLIGHT ENGINEERS' PAC	-	250	250-16 %	1,565	-	500	500-50%	1,000
PATCO PAC	200	300	500-2%	21,800	4,200	10,600	14,800-17%	89,510
PLUMBERS UNION LOCAL 690 POL ACT & SOCIAL FUND (AKA PLUMBERS UNION)	-	569	569-85%	669	-	100	100-1%	11,600
POL ACT COMM FOR EDUCATION					-	100	100-1%	7,265
P.A.C. FOR EDUCATION (C.U.T.W.)					-	200	200-11%	1,800
PAC INTERNATIONAL UNION PLANT GUARD WORKERS	250	-	250-17%	1,474				
PAC OF OPERATING ENGINEERS					-	1,000	1,000-9%	11,100
POLITICAL ACTION LEAGUE OF BRANCH #9 P.A.L.					125	-	125-5%	2,445
POLITICAL ACTION TOGETHER POL COMM	850	450	1,300-8%	16,650				
POLITICAL EDUCATION PATTERNS	-	290	290-33%	890				
POL EDUCATION FUND OF THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES	1,100	3,647	4,747-18%	25,747	10,044	6,200	16,244-11%	152,869
POLITICAL FUND COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION	950	950	1,900-5%	35,295	1,350	1,940	3,290-5%	64,470
POL, ED, LEG, CHARITY AND DEFENSE FUND					1,000	-	1,000-20%	5,000
PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL PAC (NFFE)					-	1,225	1,225-5%	23,750
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ORGANIZED TO PROMOTE LEGISLATIVE EQUALITY QCC	1,000	1,800	2,800-3%	95,545				
RAILWAY CARMEN POLITICAL LEAGUE					3,000	350	3,350-7%	47,175
RAILWAY CLERKS POLITICAL LEAGUE	4,900	3,700	8,600-6%	153,903	7,750	12,150	19,900-5%	385,047
RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES ASSOC POL LEAGUE	-	1,000	1,000-5%	18,990	150	2000	2,150-8%	25,375
REINFORCING IRON WORKERS LOC 426 PA FUND	-	25	25-20%	125				

GROUP	1977-78		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR	1979-80		TOTAL REP - %	TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE			SENATE	HOUSE		
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL UNION	-	250	250-.4%	57,707				
RETAIL FOOD CLERKS LOCAL 1500, ACTIVE BALLOT CLUB					-	50	50-100%	50
RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 1262 ACTIVE BALLOT CLUB					-	500	500-11%	4,500
SEAFARERS POLITICAL ACTIVITY DONATION "SPAD"	8,000	12,050	20,050-9%	222,000	34,950	29,900	64,850-9%	685,248
SEIU - COPE - PCC	-	2,000	2,000-6%	32,647				
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION COMM ON POLITICAL EDUCATION					8,650	1,300	9,950-9%	111,620
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL ASSOC PAC (PAL)	-	1,550	1,550-6%	26,650	11,400	1,800	13,200-9%	152,717
SIGNALMEN'S POLITICAL LEAGUE	-	100	100-2%	4,600				
SOUTH JERSEY CARPENTERS NON-PARTISAN POL ED COMM					-	1,000	1,000-31%	3,200
TEAMSTERS LOCAL #115 POL ACT FUND (AKA DRIVE-LOCAL NO, 115)	-	300	300-55%	550				
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 959 ALASKA LABOR INDEPENDENT VOTER EDUCATION					10,000	6,500	16,500-80%	20,500
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 100 POL CONTR COMM					500	300	800-12%	6,950
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION POL CONTR COMM	-	1,000	1,000-6%	16,200	2,000	4,200	6,200-8%	73,550
TRANSPORTATION POLITICAL EDUCATION LEAGUE	7,500	9,200	16,700-7%	240,133	11,500	31,100	42,600-7%	584,144
U.A. POLITICAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE	350	800	1,150-7%	16,855	2,250	-	2,250-3%	75,670
UAW -V -CAP (UAW VOLUNTARY COMM ACTION PROGRAM)	10,000	1,200	11,200-4%	298,250	16,000	15,700	31,700-2%	1,422,731
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA COAL MINERS PAC					3,500	3,625	7,125-11%	63,450
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA POL ACT FUND	2,500	1,300	3,800-2%	182,299	15,500	8,250	23,750-3%	681,370

GROUP	<u>1977-78</u>			TOTAL CONTR	<u>1979-80</u>			TOTAL CONTR
	SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL REP - %		SENATE	HOUSE	TOTAL REP - %	
UTAH POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (U-PAC)	-	700	700-97%	725	10,000	5,000	15,000-56%	26,700
VOICE OF TEACHERS FOR ED/COMM ON POL ED	-	250	250-41%	610	-	2,000	2,000-14%	14,195
VOICE OF THE ELECTORATE					500	-	500-1%	34,575
WASHINGTON STATE LABOR COUNCIL INDIVIDUAL DONATIONS ACCOUNT					-	500	500-6%	8,279
TOTAL	120,200	111,816	232,016-6%	3,693,353	440,434	461,617	902,051-6%	14,213,099

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1981

EHD	<i>[initials]</i>
RC	<i>[initials]</i>
JB	<i>[initials]</i>
DL	<i>[initials]</i>
bb	

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY DONOVAN
ED MEESE
✓ ELIZABETH DOLE

*file copy to
Labor*

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER *CS*
SUBJECT: Labor Strategy

It is my understanding that the following actions are to be taken following our meeting on labor strategy:

<u>ITEM</u>		<u>ACTION</u>
1.	Form a working group to be chaired by Secretary of Labor (presumably there will also be a staff-level group formed to support the working group). The group would coordinate the overall labor outreach effort.	Donovan/ Dole
2.	Determine which departments and agencies have reason to maintain contact with labor organizations.	Fuller
3.	Schedule a reception for the Vice President with labor leaders and the President, issue invitations now for a reception following the labor convention -- use the meeting to introduce the Vice President as a special liaison with labor. Then schedule 3 follow-up meetings, having the President drop by.	Dole
4.	Schedule quarterly meetings with labor leaders and the Vice President.	Donovan/ Dole
5.	Instruct Cabinet to maintain an open door policy with regard to labor.	Meese

NOV 14 1981

BONITATI PORTFOLIO REVIEW

2/22/82

Bob to do:

- Check with Hill or Duberstein re hold on Andre/Sterrett
- Determine nature/strength of support out of Personnel for Heather Gradison
- Try to ascertain "bottom line" position of Teamsters re Clapp, ICC vacancies
- Check status of Naval ship de-commissioning (Constitution) as possible signing ceremony involving Drozak, maritime unions
- Check with Lehman/Navy Dept re encouraging use of civilian personnel to man ships, merchant marine
- Draft memo for EHD signature to Muffie re OPL role in labor recommendations for state dinners
EHD had Rollins do -
- It was agreed that we would hold off on any visible meetings/ events with AFL-CIO; next "regular" meeting with VP is 3-4 months away

Red to do:

- Draft EHD/Deaver memo on Polish union hall, visit to coal mine

Jack to do:

- Prepare Talking Points for EHD/Rollins meeting on RNC outreach situation (ethnics, minorities, etc.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ELIZABETH H. DOLE

VIA: Jack Burgess

FM: Bob Bonitati

RE: Meeting with Lyn Nofziger, June 12 3:30 p.m.

The purpose of our session with Lyn Nofziger tomorrow is to discuss the components of a labor strategy and try to reach some agreement on the system needed to implement such a strategy.

The attached Executive Summary of my proposed labor strategy incorporates the principal ingredients necessary to achieve our objectives:

- A) To hold, and to attempt to expand for 1984, the 44% of the union vote received by President Reagan in 1980.
- B) To expand the group of national labor leaders supporting the President by building alliances with selected labor groups.
- C) To develop a group of state, local and regional labor leaders who will be supportive of the President and his policies.
- D) To move organized labor closer to a policy of bipartisanship.

I believe our meeting tomorrow should attempt to:

- 1) Reach some agreement on these objectives.
- 2) Determine how we get White House commitment to achieving these objectives.
- 3) Determine what system or resources we will need to achieve these objectives. (You and I cannot wage this campaign by ourselves.)

I'll be glad to talk further with you if you want to go into greater detail.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A SUGGESTED LABOR STRATEGY

Union members account for approximately 20% of the total work force in the U.S. A third of those members are in New York, California and Pennsylvania. These three states coupled with Illinois, Ohio and Michigan account for 52% of the total. All of these states are key to any national political strategy.

Research indicates that persons from labor union households are more likely to turn out at the polls, that wives are highly likely to vote as their union member husbands, and that union membership seems to make a significant difference in the electoral decisions of union members.

Research further indicates that labor union members do not vote as a cohesive bloc, despite the near unanimous efforts of union leaders in support of Democratic candidates. The union household vote for Republican presidential candidates since 1952 varies from a low of 27% in 1964 to a high of 54% in 1972. In 1980 President Reagan received 43-44% of the union household vote.

Since union members have become more affluent, less working class conscious and less closely attached to their unions, there has been a significant decline in the Democratic preference of union voters.

This erosion of allegiance to Democratic candidates presents the Administration with a challenge and an opportunity. The unrest within the rank and file extends further to elected union officials who are currently reassessing their traditional political activities. Some labor leaders are merely taking steps to strengthen their positions in the Democratic Party structure while others have sensed the growing restiveness in the rank and file and have begun to examine bipartisanship and pragmatism as ways to remain politically effective.

The Administration should adopt a strategy for dealing with organized labor that seeks to achieve four basic objectives:

- A) To hold, and to attempt to expand for 1984, the 44% of the union vote received by President Reagan in 1980.
- B) To expand the group of national labor leaders supporting the President by building alliances with selected labor groups.

- C) To develop a group of state, local and regional labor leaders who will be supportive of the President and his policies.
- D) To move organized labor closer to a policy of bipartisanship.

To achieve these objectives it will be necessary to implement a strategy that considers the impact of the President and his policies on the total labor force and on the elected labor officials of the national unions and employee associations in the country.

In general, the Administration's strategy should seem to minimize or neutralize the anticipated opposition and/or hostility from the community while simultaneously seeking to build some support with selected labor unions.

While the tactical recommendations contained in the attached Suggested Labor Strategy are too numerous to detail in this Executive Summary, the thrust of these recommendations can be summarized as follows:

1. Our efforts to impact rank and file union members must be geared to dispelling the notion that the President and his Administration are anti-labor and that his policies are in the best interest of working men and women.
2. Our efforts should be directed at neutralizing or minimizing the expected opposition or hostility of union leadership. While many union leaders will never be happy with us, continued public opposition to the President will eventually have a negative impact on rank and file union votes.
3. The Administration should clearly communicate the message through words and actions that we want to communicate with organized labor, that we seek their input and their support and that we are concerned with impacting the lives of working men and women.
4. Symbolic messages can be transmitted via the news media to union members by the President and Administration spokesmen meeting with union leaders and members, visiting work sites, focusing on the problems of troubled industries and appearing to be open and accessible at all times to the concerns of workers.

5. The Administration should try to avoid the public impression of being locked in combat with organized labor especially on symbolic or emotional labor issues.
6. Because our actions will be closely watched, the Administration should see that the unions who have been supportive of the President (Teamsters, MEBA, National Maritime Union) are well-treated.
7. Certain unions should be targetted as being potentially supportive and should receive priority attention and cultivation. The building and construction unions, the maritime unions and the transportation unions are likely targets.
8. The Administration should be prepared to make some policy concessions if we are to win the support or to contain targetted unions (i.e. Davis-Bacon for the building and construction trades).
9. Efforts should be made to identify supportive state and local union leaders, to meet and communicate with them on a regular basis, and to begin to include them in state and local Republican activities.
10. Efforts should be made to educate union leadership on Administration programs and objectives and to win their support on selected issues. Trade issues, national defense and foreign policy issues are likely prospects for agreement.

