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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
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File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. IV 1/1/82 - 9/30/82 (4)

Archivist: smf
FOIA ID: F97-030 (Friedrich)
Date: 06/01/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	112317Z MAY 82 3p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #156	5/11/82	P1/F1 →
2. cable	071428Z MAY 82 4p R " #157	5/7/82	P1/F1 →
3. cable	061837Z MAY 82 (Section 1 of 2 Bonn 09942) 2p R " #158	5/6/82	P1/F1 →
4. cable	061839Z MAY 82 (Section 2 of 2 Bonn 09942) 2p R " #159	5/6/82	P1/F1 →
5. cable	061457Z MAY 82 2p R " #160	5/6/82	P1/F1 →
6. cable	051610Z MAY 82 1p R " #161	5/5/82	P1/F1 →
7. cable	050242Z MAY 82 2p R " #162	5/5/82	P1/F1 →
8. cable	011847Z MAY 82 2p R " #163	5/1/82	P1/F1 →
9. cable	271949Z APR 82 4p R " #164	4/27/82	P1/F1 →
10. cable	271948Z APR 82 2p R " #165	4/27/82	P1/F1 →
11. cable	270027Z APR 82 2p R " #166	4/27/82	P1/F1 →
12. cable	212351Z APR 82 2p R " #167	4/21/82	P1/F1 →
13. cable	171102Z APR 82 2p R " #168	4/17/82	P1/F1 →
14. cable	081846Z APR 82 1p R " #169	4/8/82	P1/F1 →
15. cable	130452Z MAR 82 15p R " #170	3/13/82	P1/F1 →
16. cable	051812Z MAR 82 3p R " #171	3/5/82	P1/F1 →
17. cable	171724Z FEB 82 2p R " #172	2/17/82	P1/F1 →

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 8088
SIT805 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 112317Z MAY 82 PSN: 024494
TOR: 132-0413Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT 1001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC 10088 181058
O 112317Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BOWN IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 128088

MODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/11/02 (BURT, RICHARD R.)
TAGS: MUC, PARM, START
SUBJECT: START; BRIEFING OF UK, FRG, ITALIAN AND
FRENCH EMBASSIES

REF: A) STATE 104486
B) STATE 104467

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ON MAY 8, FM DIRECTOR BURT MET INDIVIDUALLY WITH
UK, FRG, AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS AND FRENCH CHARGE TO
BRIEF THEM ON US APPROACH TO START.

3. BURT HANDED OVER COPY OF SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER TO
ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS (REF B). IN SUPPLEMENTARY
REMARKS, HE EMPHASIZED THREE POINTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

--FIRST, OUR OVERALL CONCEPT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS
ENVISAGED NOT ONLY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, BUT
REDUCTIONS IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. IN THE
FIRST PHASE, WE WOULD SEEK REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC
MISSILE WARHEADS BY APPROXIMATELY A THIRD FROM CURRENT
LEVELS AS WELL AS REDUCTIONS IN DEPLOYED MISSILES, WITH
NO MORE THAN HALF OF THE REMAINING WARHEADS TO BE

DEPLOYED ON LAND-BASED MISSILES. IN OUR VIEW,
LAND-BASED ICBMS -- PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET SS-18S AND
SS-19S -- POSED THE GREATEST THREAT TO STRATEGIC
STABILITY. IT WAS THESE SYSTEMS THAT MADE OTHER
SYSTEMS VULNERABLE AND, IF DEPLOYED IN A FIXED
LAND-BASED MODE, WERE VULNERABLE THEMSELVES.

SECONDLY, OUR PROPOSAL WAS EQUITABLE IN THAT BOTH

DECLASSIFIED

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F97-030/2 #156

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BY

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NARA, DATE

4/30/01

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SIDES HAD ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBERS OF BALLISTIC WARHEADS AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO TAKE ROUGHLY EQUAL WARHEAD REDUCTIONS.

. --THIRD, OUR OBJECTIVE OVER THE LONG-RUN WAS TO REDUCE THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BY SEEKING TO LIMIT THEIR THROWWEIGHT. IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR PHASED APPROACH, WE BELIEVED THAT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR THE FIRST PHASE WOULD LAY THE BASIS FOR EQUAL LEVELS IN THROWWEIGHT IN A SECOND PHASE. OUR PROPOSED WARHEAD AND MISSILE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE WOULD IN THEMSELVES RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN SOVIET THROWWEIGHT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BURT PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS ON THE US APPROACH:

. --BOMBERS. THE US WAS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH BOMBERS IN AN EVEN HANDED WAY IN BOTH PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

. --CRUISE MISSILES. APART FROM GLCMS BEING DEALT WITH IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CRUISE MISSILES IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR PHASED APPROACH. HOWEVER, THE MAIN FOCUS OF OUR APPROACH WAS ON THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. CRUISE MISSILES DID NOT HAVE THE DESTABILIZING QUALITIES OF LAND-BASED

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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ICBMS.

. --INTERIM RESTRAINT. CURRENT US POLICY WAS TO CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS PROVIDED THE SOVIETS DID THE SAME.

. --MX. START MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING BOTH MX AND TRIDENT II, WITHOUT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

INF START LINKAGE. IN US VIEW THERE IS A CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS. THE REDUCTIONS IN WARHEADS AND DEPLOYED MISSILES PROPOSED FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF START WERE COMPATIBLE WITH OUR INF APPROACH. WE WOULD CLOSELY COORDINATE THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS, BUT BELIEVED IT WAS PREMATURE TO DEFINE THE FORMAL RELATIONSHIP.

. --PHASED APPROACH. US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT INCORPORATING FIRST-PHASE OBJECTIVES, WITHOUT WAITING FOR FULL NEGOTIATION OF PHASE TWO OBJECTIVES.

. --SOVIET REACTION. BURT SAID IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIET WOULD ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL FOR BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JUNE, SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN PRESSING TO BEGIN. ON THE SUBSTANCE, THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO REACT NEGATIVELY, AT LEAST INITIALLY, TO ANY PROPOSAL FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, WE DID NOT EXPECT OUTRIGHT PUBLIC REJECTION AS IN MARCH 1977. WE HAD HAD SOME INDICATIONS FROM SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE THEMSELVES MORE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF REDUCTIONS AND WERE THEMSELVES BECOMING CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR OWN SYSTEMS.

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--CONSULTATIONS. BURT NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AT LUXEMBOURG AND BONN. BEYOND THAT, WE INTENDED TO CONSULT AT LEAST AS EXTENSIVELY ON START AS ON INF; WE SAW NAC AS MAIN FOCUS FOR FORMAL START CONSULTATIONS. THOUGH WE WERE CONSIDERING VARIOUS INFORMAL POSSIBILITIES AS WELL AND WOULD REMAIN READY TO CONSULT BILATERALLY AS NEEDED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE DID NOT FAVOR AN SCG-TYPE MECHANISM.

5. REACTION OF FOUR AMBASSADORS WAS UNIFORMLY POSITIVE. FRG AMBASSADOR HERMES SAID THAT US APPROACH WAS GOOD AND TIMELY AND PREDICTED THAT "EVERYONE IN EUROPE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY." HE SAID HE EXPECTED A PROMPT REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH FROM BONN, THOUGH PROBABLY NOT BEFORE MONDAY. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR PETRIGNANI PREDICTED THAT OUR APPROACH--WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS BOLD AND REALISTIC--WOULD HAVE A FAVORABLE EFFECT ON THE ALLIES AND AN IMPACT COMPARABLE TO IF NOT GREATER THAN THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH. UK EMBOFF PENWICK COMMENTED THAT SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO EMPHASIZE THE MERITS OF SALT II AND THAT OUR HEAVY FOCUS ON LAND-BASED ICBMS WOULD PRESENT PROBLEMS, BUT SAID THAT THE LOGIC UNDERLYING THE US

APPROACH OF FOCUSING ON HARD-TARGET KILL CAPABILITY WOULD BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED. AS WOULD THE DECISION TO SEEK LIMITS ON THROWEIGHT IN A SECOND PHASE. WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH BOMBERS WOULD ALSO HELP FROM PRESENTATIONAL POINT OF VIEW. BURT STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF EXPRESSIONS OF ALLIED SUPPORT; ALLIANCE UNITY ON START WOULD BE CRUCIAL FOR OUR SUCCESS.

HAIG

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SIT847 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 071428Z MAY 82 PSN: 017719
TOR: 1271458Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE SECSTATE WASHDC 01 071428Z
071428Z MAY 82 PSN:
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9920
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4251
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9756
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9577
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3641
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 7304

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7527
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 124488

NODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 05/06/88 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: FEPR, FGOV, NATO

SUBJECT: JUNE SUMMITS: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

1. ~~9~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POSTS SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, AND PRIME MINISTERS
MARTENS, SPIDOLINI, AND TRUDEAU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR (AS APPROPRIATE):

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS OUR MEETINGS AT VERSAILLES AND BONN DRAW NEAR, I
WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY OWN THINKING ABOUT ADVANCING
OUR EFFORTS FOR A STRENGTHENED AND MORE UNIFIED WEST.
WE ALL APPROACH THE SUMMITS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
PEACE, PROSPERITY, AND SECURITY ARE INDIVISIBLE. OUR
MEETINGS, THEREFORE, SHOULD COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND
REPRESENT A SET OF SHARED GOALS.

I SUGGEST THAT, AT VERSAILLES, WE CONCENTRATE ON THREE
THEMES: MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION ON ECONOMIC POLICIES

TO PROMOTE GREATER PROSPERITY AND MARKET STABILITY;
CONCRETE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
IN ORDER TO COUNTER RISING PROTECTIONISM; AND PROGRESS
IN ASSURING THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE EAST

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BY GU NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS. I WILL ALSO WANT TO ADVANCE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND TO DISCUSS COOPERATIVE EFFORTS ON ENERGY.

AS YOU KNOW, I AM WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR A HEALTHY U.S. ECONOMY. AT THE SAME TIME, I REMAIN STRONGLY COMMITTED TO COOPERATION WITH YOU TO STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. TOGETHER, WE CAN REDUCE INFLATION AND IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR INCREASING EMPLOYMENT IN OUR COUNTRIES.

STRONG AND GROWING PRESSURES FOR PROTECTIONISM ENDANGER OUR MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM. I SUGGEST THAT WE AGREE UPON THE PRIORITY AREAS ON WHICH THE GATT MINISTERIAL SHOULD FOCUS THIS FALL. IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF THE TRADING SYSTEM TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OLD AND NEW AND TO EXTEND ITS PRINCIPLES TO NEW COUNTRIES OR NEWLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS WE NEED TO BUILD ON OUR OTTAWA DISCUSSIONS. THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF SOME EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IS PUTTING MAJOR PRESSURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. I HOPE THAT AT VERSAILLES WE CAN AGREE TO A COMMON CREDIT POLICY TOWARD THE USSR AND A MEANS TO MONITOR CREDIT FLOWS TO THE EAST. SUCCESS HERE WILL ENABLE US BETTER TO MANAGE OTHER ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ALTHOUGH ECONOMIC SUBJECTS WILL DOMINATE THE VERSAILLES AGENDA, I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES. I ALSO HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS HOW TO REACH OUT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE YOUNGER GENERATIONS. WE HAVE PROPOSED AN INITIATIVE TO INCREASE EXCHANGES AMONG OUR YOUNGER PEOPLE, WHICH I THINK MERITS BROAD WESTERN SUPPORT AND TO WHICH I WILL REFER IN MY JUNE 8 LONDON SPEECH ON DEMOCRACY.

TURNING TO BONN, I FORESEE THREE BASIC THEMES: CELEBRATION OF THE VALUES AND VITALITY OF THE ALLIANCE, SYMBOLIZED BY SPAIN'S ACCESSION; STRENGTHENED RESOLVE TO DEAL WITH THREATENING SOVIET BEHAVIOR, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS TO REINFORCE DETERRENCE AND SAFEGUARD A

SECURE PEACE; AND OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.

WE SHOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE SHARE A COMMON ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND CONFIRM OUR INSISTENCE THAT CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS CAN ONLY BE BASED ON MUTUAL ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY.

TOWARD THIS END WE MUST IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION OR INTIMIDATION. THEREFORE, I PROPOSE THAT THOSE OF US PARTICIPATING IN NATO'S

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SIT846 DATE 05/19 82

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC 0405 02 127.481
C 071428Z MAY 82 Z-FF
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9921
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4252
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3757
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9578
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3642
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 7305

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7528
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 124488

MODIS

INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE ADOPT AT BONN. IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMIT DECLARATION. A DOCUMENT UNDERSCORING OUR RESOLVE TO IMPROVE OUR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES AS AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE'S DETERRENT.

WE WILL WANT TO EMPHASIZE OUR DEDICATION TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, LEAVING NO DOUBT THAT WE OFFER THE BEST PROGRAM TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. THIS SUNDAY I WILL ANNOUNCE OUR PROPOSAL TO OPEN START TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SECRETARY HAIG IS COMMUNICATING WITH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER WITH FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS MATTER. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING OUR START OBJECTIVES WITH YOU IN JUNE. I ALSO HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE IN BONN NATO'S INTENTION TO PRESENT NEW DEFENSE PROPOSALS, AND TO DISCUSS OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE WILL ALSO WANT TO SHOW OUR SENSITIVITY TO WORLD-WIDE ASPIRATIONS FOR FREEDOM AND JUSTICE. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN. WE SHOULD REAFFIRM OUR MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND POLISH REGIME IF CIRCUMSTANCES SO DICTATE, WHILE SHOWING OUR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOR POLAND IF WESTERN CONDITIONS ARE MET.

BY CONCENTRATING ON THESE THEMES AND WORKING TO ENHANCE THE QUALITY OF OUR CONSULTATIONS, I AM CONFIDENT OUR MEETINGS WILL SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE, LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR RENEWED PROSPERITY, AND PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVELY FOR OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

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DTG: 071428Z MAY 82 PSN: 017721

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH AND DISCUSSING
THESE AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

SINCERELY,
RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT. HAIG

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DTG: 071428Z MAY 82 PSN: 017721

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 9942
SIT545 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 061837Z MAY 82 PSN: 016358
TOR: 126/1943Z

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WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHOL #9942/01 1261840
O 061837Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6629

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 09942
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/6/02 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, INF, GE, CH, UR
SUBJ: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL MET SEPARATELY WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON MAY 6. PORTION OF CONVERSATION CONCERNING FALKLANDS HAS BEEN REPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY
3. DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BURNS AND EXEC ASST MATTHEWS. CALLED ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MORNING OF MAY 6. CHANCELLOR WAS IN CONGENIAL, GOOD HUMORED MOOD AND DISCOURSED ON FOLLOWING MAIN TOPICS.
4. BEGINNING WITH A STRONG EMPHASIS ON HIS VIEW OF THE SERIOUS WORLD ECONOMIC DECLINE (A THEME WHICH RECURRED THROUGHOUT THE MEETING WITH SCHMIDT), CHANCELLOR EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT ADVERSE ECONOMIC TRENDS AND INFLATION HAD ALREADY CAUSED A LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN VARIOUS WESTERN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THIS WAS A STRATEGIC FACTOR AND SHOULD BE SEEN VERY MUCH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN CONTEXT OF ITS OVERALL GRAND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS. CONCERNING THE UPCOMING VERSAILLES SUMMIT, SCHMIDT EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT THE RESULTS WOULD BE ALL THAT PRODUCTIVE. HE NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE INCREASINGLY FORCED TO PLAY TO THEIR PUBLIC OPINIONS WITH AN INEVITABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CONTINUITY/DISCONTINUITY OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES. SCHMIDT NOTED THAT FORMER SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO BONN VALENTIN FALIN HAD RECENTLY VISITED HIM AND HAD ALSO BEEN PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE STATE AND COURSE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SCHEDULED TO GIVE AN IMPORTANT SPEECH ON SUNDAY, MAY 9, IN WHICH HE WOULD PROPOSE A SPECIFIC TIME

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NARA, DATE

4/30/01

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FOR BEGINNING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION (START) TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. ALTHOUGH OUR DETAILED POSITIONS WERE STILL BEING WORKED OUT, WE ARE AIMING FOR TRULY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS. SCHMIDT RESPONDED BY TURNING TO HIS AIDE AND INSTRUCTING HIM THAT HE SHOULD ARRANGE PREPARATION OF A STATEMENT OF APPROVAL ON THE PART OF THE FRG. SCHMIDT NOTED TO STOESEL THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD TO HAVE AS MUCH DETAIL ABOUT WHAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE SAYING AS SOON AS THIS IS AVAILABLE. PICKING UP ON THE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS, THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY KNOW THAT BREZHNEV IS NO LONGER ABLE TO FUNCTION SATISFACTORILY IN OPERATIONAL TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, SCHMIDT SAID THAT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF "BIG" RESULTS, THERE SHOULD NONETHELESS BE A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND BREZHNEV. SCHMIDT SAID THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT PRINCIPALLY AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING A DEGREE OF PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING: BREZHNEV WOULD SEE THAT REAGAN IS NOT A "BABY EATING CAPITALIST" AND PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD SEE THAT BREZHNEV IS TRULY OPPOSED TO WAR. SCHMIDT WENT ON TO EXPRESS HIS CONVICTION THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A TIME SUCH AS THE PRESENT WHEN THERE WAS SO LITTLE CONTACT AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE U. S.

6. ON CHINA, SCHMIDT VEHEMENTLY EXPRESSED HIS STRONGEST VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT RPT NOT JEOPARDIZE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE U. S. -CHINA RELATIONSHIP OVER TAIWAN AND RISK FORCING CHINA BACK INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIETS. SCHMIDT ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE QUITE OPENLY BOASTING THAT THIS WILL INEVITABLY HAPPEN BECAUSE OF U. S. -CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE.

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7. DEPUTY SECRETARY REPLIED THAT U. S. IS FULLY AWARE OF CHINESE VIEWS AND NOTED THAT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IS BASED ON BALANCED APPROACH WHICH TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION ALL RELEVANT FACTORS. STOESEL ADDED THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WAS IN CHINA AT PRESENT TO CONDUCT HIGH LEVEL TALKS.

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8. DEPUTY SECRETARY RAISED WITH THE CHANCELLOR U. S. DESIRE TO ACHIEVE ALLIED REAFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE AT UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. SCHMIDT RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING HIS WELL-KNOWN VIEW OF PRESENT FRG CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH, INCLUDING RETENTION OF DRAFT (UNLIKE THE U. S.),

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TOR: 126/1944Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #9942/02 1261841
O 061839Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6630

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 09942

NODIS

AND HE GENERALLY EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SUCH AN AFFIRMATION WAS NECESSARY. SCHMIDT MUSED THAT FIRST THERE HAD BEEN A CALL FOR GREATER NUCLEAR STRENGTH IN THE ALLIANCE (INF MODERNIZATION), THEN A CALL FOR GREATER DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (3 PERCENT FIGURE) AND NOW, IT WOULD SEEM, A CALL FOR GREATER EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS. FOR HIS PART, SCHMIDT EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE NUCLEAR BALANCE SHOULD REMAIN THE PROPER PRIORITY.

9. IN A SUBSEQUENT SEPARATE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER WOESSNER AND EXEC ASST MATTHEWS, DEPUTY SECRETARY AGAIN REVIEWED STATUS OF PREPARATIONS FOR UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING IN VERSAILLES AND BONN. AND OUTLINED MAIN ISSUES INVOLVED. GENSCHER WAS NOT NEGATIVE AS SUCH REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL STATEMENT ON NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS STRENGTH, AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE BONN COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE BALANCED AND WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE PUBLIC. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE PRESENT MEETING OF DPC IN BRUSSELS WOULD BE LOOKING AT WHETHER EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS SHOULD BETTER BE TREATED SEPARATELY OR AS A PORTION OF OVERALL SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE.

10. DEPUTY SECRETARY RAISED U. S. CONCERN OVER CREDITS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND GUARANTEES TO SOVIET UNION AND TO EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT THIS SUBJECT--WHICH HAD BEEN THE MAIN EMPHASIS OF THE BUCKLEY MISSION--COULD BEST BE ADDRESSED ON THE EVE OF THE UPCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL. DISCUSSING POLAND AND THE POLISH DEBT SITUATION, GENSCHER NOTED THAT THESE CONCERNS COULD BEST BE DISCUSSED DURING THE MEETINGS IN JUNE.
BURNS

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 #159
BY CYS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 9942

DTG: 061839Z MAY 82 PSN: 016360

BONN 9942

DTG: 061839Z MAY 82 PSN: 016360

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 9887
SIT547 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 061457Z MAY 82 PSN: 016105
TOR: 126/1640Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP MR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #9887 1261459
O 061457Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6605

~~SECRET~~ BONN 09887

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/6/02 (STOESSEL, WALTER J., JR.)
TAGS: PEPR, UK, FA, AR, GE
SUBJ: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT: FALKLANDS

1. (B-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BURNS, I MET TODAY WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. HE HAD FOLLOWING TO SAY WITH REGARD TO HANDLING OF FALKLANDS SITUATION (OTHER TOPICS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTTEL).
3. REFERRING TO YOUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENSCHER YESTERDAY, SCHMIDT MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR INCLUDING FRANCE AND ANOTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY (HE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR "FLATTER-ING" MEXICO BY INCLUDING HER) IN THE FORMATION OF THE CONTACT GROUP. SCHMIDT MADE THE CASE FOR INCLUDING FRANCE NOT ONLY ON ITS MERITS, BUT ALSO ON THE BASIS OF FACILITATING THE FRG'S OWN ROLE IN THE CONTACT GROUP. I SAID I WOULD REPORT THIS TO YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION/ACTION IN YOUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE FALKLANDS SITUATION. WHEN I SAW GENSCHER LATER IN THE DAY, HE ALSO URGED THAT WE CONSIDER INCLUD-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ING FRANCE IN THE CONTACT GROUP.

-
-

4. SCHMIDT NOTED TO ME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT YESTERDAY WITH MITTERRAND, WHO WAS INCLINED TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT IN THE FALKLANDS. ACCORDING TO SCHMIDT, MITTERRAND BELIEVES PM THATCHER WANTS TO INTRODUCE BRITISH FORCES INTO THE FALKLANDS, AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT, BEFORE BEING PREPARED TO CONSIDER A CEASEFIRE/RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.

5. SCHMIDT ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS WARMEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO YOU FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR ENDEAVORS.
BURNS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 #160
BY CH NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 9887

DTG: 061457Z MAY 82 PSN: 016105

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 9795
SIT551 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 051610Z MAY 82 PSN: 014405
TOR: 125/1744Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #9795 1251611
O 051610Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6567

~~SECRET~~ BONN 09795
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 05/05/02 (WOESSNER, W. M.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: MISSION OF SPECIAL EMISSARY
REF: A) STATE 112814, B) STATE 112813

1. ~~B~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
 2. WE UNDERSTAND MR. SHULTZ IS ARRIVING IN FRANKFURT 11:15 A.M. ON MAY 6. HE WILL BE MET BY EMBASSY FSO KARL JONIETZ, WHO WILL ACCOMPANY HIM VIA MILITARY AIRCRAFT, TO BONN.
 3. ON ARRIVAL IN BONN HE WILL BE MET BY SEMI-ARMORED VEHICLE AND UNOBTRUSIVE GERMAN SECURITY DETAIL WHO WILL ESCORT HIM TO AMBASSADOR BURNS' RESIDENCE. WHERE WE ASSUME HE WILL WISH TO REST AND RELAX.
 4. WE HAVE SET ASIDE 4-6 P.M. FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR BURNS. AT APPROXIMATELY 6:10 P.M. HE WILL DEPART FOR APPOINTMENT WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SCHEDULED FOR 6:30 P.M. THERE IS NO FIXED TIME FOR TERMINATION OF MEETING BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT CHANCELLOR WILL BE LEAVING FOR HAMBURG AS SOON AS MEETING ENDS. MR. SHULTZ WILL THEN RETURN TO AMBASSADOR BURNS' RESIDENCE TO OVERNIGHT.
- MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
5. AT MR. SHULTZ'S REQUEST WE HAVE KEPT FRIDAY'S SCHEDULE FREE. BURNS

BONN 9795

DTG: 051610Z MAY 82 PSN: 014405

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NLS F97-030/2 #161

CH NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1222
SIT875 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 050242Z MAY 82 PSN: 013441
TOR: 125 0255Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
E T EHC 1222 121224
C F 121224 121224 121224
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9807

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4124
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3554
COMMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 9583
WHITE HOUSE 7507
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 121222

MODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5.4 (2002 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)
TAGS: NATO, NAC, GE
SUBJECT: NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION

REF: BONN 5298

1. FRG EMBASSY DOM WALLAU CALLED ON ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLMES TO REINFORCE FRG CONCERN, EXPRESSED AT RECENT MEETING, CONCERNING SEPARATE STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. WALLAU ARGUED THAT THE FRG PREFERS A SINGLE DOCUMENT (THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION) TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE UNITY. THEY DO NOT WISH TO HAVE ONE DOCUMENT SIGNED BY ALL MEMBERS AND ANOTHER SIGNED BY 14. FRG HAD REVIEWED AND FAVORED THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF DRAFT ATLANTIC DECLARATION. A FURTHER DIFFICULTY FOR THE FRG WITH THE STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE WAS THAT OF TIME. SUCH A DOCUMENT WOULD REQUIRE REVIEW BY THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND WALLAU WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT THE FOUR WEEKS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REMAINING PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT WOULD PERMIT THE NECESSARY REVIEW OF THE DRAFT BY COMPETENT AUTHORITIES.

2. HOLMES RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. REMAINED STRONGLY ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF A DEFENSE COMPONENT OF SUBSTANCE COMING OUT OF THE SUMMIT. NATO IS AFTER ALL A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND THERE MUST BE A

BALANCE BETWEEN DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL. THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT SUGGESTING MAJOR NEW DEPARTURES, RATHER SOMETHING SHORT. TO THE POINT, EXPLICITLY WITHIN EXISTING NATO STRATEGY, AND ANALOGOUS TO DPC MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A STATEMENT IS JUSTIFIED BY THE MERITS OF INCREASING EFFORTS ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND IN RESPONDING TO

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NLS

F97-030/2- #142

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY

Ctj

NARA, DATE

4/30/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1022

DTG: 050242Z MAY 82 PSN: 013441

PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRIES. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH COULD NOT ADHERE TO SUCH A STATEMENT

SINCE IT WOULD CONTRADICT FRENCH SECURITY DOCTRINE, HENCE, THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE STATEMENT OF LESSER STATURE THAN THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION WITHOUT THE FRENCH. PRECEDENTS EXIST FOR SUCH SEPARATE DOCUMENTS, AND WE HAVE DETECTED NO FRENCH OPPOSITION TO SUCH A DOCUMENT IN THIS CASE. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WOULD BE ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE AT THE DPC

-- WE WOULD CONSIDER NEXT STEPS AFTER HIS PRESENTATION.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF TIME, THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE SUGGESTED DRAFT STATEMENT, WITH POSSIBLY ONE SMALL EXCEPTION, NOT ALREADY A PART OF ACCEPTED NATO PROGRAMS. THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION WAS STEP NUMBER 3, "USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES". HE FELT THAT THIS ELEMENT COULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE "DEFINING OF THE NATO STRATEGY".

4. UPON LEAVING WALLAU ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING TO THE RUMORS THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN HEARING ABOUT A POSSIBLE SUMMIT MEETING IN BERLIN. HOLMES STATED OUR POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF A US-SOVIET SUMMIT AND ADDED THAT NO ELEMENT OF THE USG WAS ADVOCATING THE TYPE OF

SECSTATE WASHDC 1022
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 050242Z MAY 82 PSN: 013441

SUMMIT DESCRIBED IN THE US AND GERMAN PRESS. HAIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8534
SIT148 DATE 05 03 82

DTG: 011847Z MAY 82 PSN: 008548
TOR: 1211859Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST/NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8534 1211858
O O 011847Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 9707

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7473
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 118534

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 05/01/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER, M.)

TAGS: WA, PEPR, GW

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO GENSCHER
-- ON NAMIBIA

1. ~~/~~ S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE
FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON NAMIBIA TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HANS-DIETRICH,

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE FRONT LINE STATES ALONG WITH NIGERIA
AND KENYA PLAN TO MEET IN DAR IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE,
PERHAPS AS EARLY AS MAY 4, IN CONNECTION WITH OUR PROPOSAL
TO SWAPO ON THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE ONE OF THE NAMIBIA
NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE HAVE REACHED A CRUCIAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CROSSROADS IN THE NEGOTIATION. IN ORDER TO HOLD TO OUR
GOAL OF BEGINNING IN 1982 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC
RESOLUTION 435, WE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD TO PHASE TWO AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IN THAT EFFORT, I PLAN TO TELEPHONE
AUDU AND SALIM TO URGE THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO MOVE

EVENTS IN THE PROPER DIRECTION. I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME BY
CONTACTING PERSONALLY SOME OF THE FLS LEADERS. BECAUSE OF
YOUR LONG AND CONSCIENTIOUS INVOLVEMENT WITH THIS PROCESS,
YOU HAVE UNMATCHED CREDIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE. I URGE YOU
TO USE IT ON THIS IMPORTANT OCCASION. I AM ALSO ASKING
CLAUDE TO HELP US ON THIS ONE.

SINCERELY, AL.

HAIG

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NLS F97-030/2 #143

BY CH, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8534

DTG: 011847Z MAY 82 PSN: 008548

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 2814
SIT629 DATE 04/28/82

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844
TOR: 117/2200Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2814 1172001
O 271949Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 112814
NODIS
USEC ONLY, FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS 4/26/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: MISSION OF SPECIAL EMISSARY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED GEORGE SHULTZ TO SERVE AS HIS SPECIAL EMISSARY TO DISCUSS SHARED ECONOMIC CONCERNS WITH OUR MAJOR ALLIES. THIS CABLE PROVIDES A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN, BACKGROUND ON THE PRIVATE MISSION, A PROPOSED SCHEDULE, AND TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR USE IN DELIVERING THE LETTER. END SUMMARY.
3. ACTION REQUESTED. DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER DIRECTLY TO THE HEAD OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT AND TO PRESIDENT THORN. THERE WILL BE NO ORIGINAL.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. BEGIN TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. DEAR (USE FIRST NAME):
-- AS OUR PLANNING PROGRESSES TOWARD THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN EARLY JUNE, I AM STRUCK BY THE OPPORTUNITY WE WILL HAVE IN THESE MEETINGS TO SHAPE THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE 1980S. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND OF CHALLENGES TO GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WE MUST EXERCISE CARE TO ASSURE THAT OUR ACTIONS LEAD TO STRENGTHENED COOPERATION AND SOUND POLICIES FOR THE LONG TERM.
-- WE EACH FACE TROUBLESOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO DISSOLVE IN THE SHORT TERM AND WE NEED TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR A CLOSE LONG TERM PARTNERSHIP WHICH CAN LEAD TO INCREASED PROSPERITY AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AMONG OURSELVES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS.

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NLS

F97-030/2 #144

BY

CHJ

NARA, DATE

4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 2814

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844

-- I AM FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE WORK OF OUR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES AND BELIEVE THE FOCUS AND DIRECTION OF THEIR EFFORTS ARE VERY POSITIVE. TO ENHANCE FURTHER THE DIALOGUE AMONG US, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR ME TO GET AN UP-TO-DATE PICTURE OF YOUR PERSONAL CONCERNS. AND, I WANT TO PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR PERSPECTIVES.

-- I HAVE ASKED GEORGE SHULTZ TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOU AND WITH OTHER COLLEAGUES. HE WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO ME ON HIS CONVERSATIONS.

-- IN VIEW OF THE TIGHT SCHEDULE FOR HIS TRIP, COULD I PREVAIL ON YOU TO SEE GEORGE ON MAY (FILL IN APPROPRIATE DATE) ? HIS MISSION WILL BE PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL, WITH NO PUBLICITY AND NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

-- I LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION TO SEEING YOU IN JUNE. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

5. BACKGROUND. GEORGE SHULTZ HAS AGREED TO UNDERTAKE A PRIVATE MISSION AS A SPECIAL EMISSARY FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY ALLIED LEADERS. THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING THIS PROMINENT AMERICAN TO UNDERTAKE A PRIVATE TRIP TO PRINCIPAL CAPITALS TO MEET WITH MITTERRAND, SCHMIDT, SPADOLINI, SUZUKI, THATCHER, THORN AND TRUDEAU TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR COUNTRIES. HIS MISSION WILL BE (1) TO UNDERSCORE THE PRESIDENT'S OWN PERSONAL INTEREST IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BEFORE THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES; (2) TO HEAR AND ASSESS THE ECONOMIC CONCERNS OF THE LEADING ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT; AND (3) TO REPORT THEIR VIEWS DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

-- SHULTZ WILL BE TRAVELING IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY. HE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS OF CHANGES IN U.S. OR OTHER COUNTRIES POLICY. HOWEVER, HE WILL EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM AND PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT THE CONCERNS OF WEST EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE LEADERS AND, PERHAPS, SOME RECIPES FOR ACTION BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE IN JUNE. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAS EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS; MITTERRAND WAS INFORMED OF THIS IMPENDING MISSION DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. ALTHOUGH THE SHULTZ MISSION IS NOT PART OF THE REGULAR PREPARATIONS FOR THE VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT, IT CAN HELP PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING WHICH CAN LEAD TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME FOR THAT MEETING AND THE REST OF THE JUNE TRIP.

-- THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TRIP. SINCE IT IS TO BE CONDUCTED AS A PRIVATE FACT-FINDING MISSION, U.S. OFFICIALS ARE NOT TO COMMENT ON THE TRIP. THE EMISSARY WILL MAKE A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON HIS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP.

6. ALL CONTACT FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF THE LETTER TO THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT IS TO BE HANDLED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT AND MR. SHULTZ' OFFICE.

7. TENTATIVE GENERAL SCHEDULE:

WEDNESDAY EVENING, MAY 5
THURSDAY MORNING, MAY 6

DEPART WASHINGTON
ARRIVE FRANKFURT/BONN

THURSDAY/FRIDAY, MAY 6-7
FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 7

BONN
ARRIVE ROME

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 2814

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844

SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 8
SATURDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 8

ROME
ARRIVE LONDON

SATURDAY/SUNDAY, MAY 8-9
MONDAY, EARLY A.M., MAY 10

LONDON
ARRIVE BRUSSELS

SECSTATE WASHDC 2814
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844

MONDAY, AFTERNOON, MAY 10
TUESDAY, MAY 11

ARRIVE PARIS
DEPART PARIS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12
THURSDAY EVENING, MAY 13

ARRIVE TOKYO
DEPART TOKYO

THURSDAY EVENING MAY 13
FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 14

ARRIVE OTTAWA
RETURN TO WASHINGTON

8. TALKING POINTS FOR THE AMBASSADOR. THE FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FROM WHICH YOU MAY DRAW IN YOUR PRESENTATION TO THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT:
-- PRESIDENT REAGAN PLACES HIGHEST EMPHASIS ON EFFORTS TO ASSURE SUSTAINED ECONOMIC RECOVERY FOR THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES. HIS OWN DOMESTIC PROGRAM ADDRESSES THAT PRIORITY OBJECTIVE.
-- THE PRESIDENT APPRECIATES THE EFFECTS OF HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAM ON THOSE UNDERWAY ELSEWHERE -- AND VICE VERSA. HE IS VERY SENSITIVE TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE.
-- FOR THAT REASON, HE WANTS TO FACILITATE THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON OUR SHARED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

-- HE LOOKS FORWARD TO HIS TRIP TO EUROPE IN JUNE AS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR CANDID DISCUSSIONS AMONG ALLIED LEADERS.

-- HE IS PLEASED THAT PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT ARE GOING WELL.

-- HE ALSO WANTS TO ENHANCE THE ALLIED DIALOGUE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES BY SENDING A SPECIAL PRIVATE EMISSARY FOR DISCUSSIONS IN BONN, LONDON, BRUSSELS, PARIS, ROME, TOKYO AND OTTAWA. HE HAS ASKED GEORGE SHULTZ TO MEET WITH YOU -- BOTH TO CONVEY HIS VIEWS TO YOU AND TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS. SHULTZ WILL THEN REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

-- MR. SHULTZ IS NOW MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS TRIP. HE PLANS TO LEAVE WASHINGTON, MAY 5. HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH YOU ON (FILL IN APPROPRIATE DATE). HE WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING DIRECTLY FROM YOUR OFFICE ABOUT A TIME AND PLACE CONVENIENT FOR YOU. HE CAN BE REACHED AT

SECSTATE WASHDC 2814
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844

(415) 768-7844.

-- THERE IS TO BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS TRIP. IT IS A PRIVATE MISSION, PERFORMED AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL.

9. INFORMATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SEPTTEL. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 2814

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844

SECSTATE WASHDC 2814

DTG: 271949Z APR 82 PSN: 001844

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2813
SIT584 DATE 04/28/82

DTG: 271948Z APR 82 PSN: 001863
TOR: 117/2206Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2813 1172004
O 271948Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9509
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3780
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3089
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3306
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6044
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 7148
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9351
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 112813

NODIS
USEC ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS 4/20/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LS.)
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: MISSION OF SPECIAL EMISSARY
FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. DESCRIPTION OF MISSION: FORMER SECRETARY OF TREASURY GEORGE SHULTZ WILL TRAVEL TO BONN, BRUSSELS, PARIS, ROME, LONDON TOKYO, AND OTTAWA IN EARLY MAY ON A SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL MISSION IN SUPPORT OF OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE 4-6 VERSAILLES SUMMIT. OBJECTIVE OF MISSION IS DESCRIBED SEPTTEL. DETAILS OF SHULTZ MISSION SHOULD BE TREATED ON CLOSE-HOLD BASIS.

3. EMBASSY SUPPORT: MR. SHULTZ WILL TRAVEL ALONE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMBASSADORS ARE REQUESTED TO SEE THAT SUITABLE EMBASSY OFFICE SPACE AND SECRETARIAL SUPPORT ARE PROVIDED AT EACH POST.

4. TRANSPORTATION AMENITIES: EMBASSIES SHOULD MEET AND ASSIST THE MISSION AT AIRPORTS AND SHOULD DEDICATE A VEHICLE AND DRIVER FOR SHULTZ'S FULL TIME USE WHILE AT POST.

5. ACCOMMODATIONS: IN LINE WITH CONFIDENTIAL, HIGH-LEVEL NATURE OF SHULTZ'S PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT REQUESTS ACCOMMODATIONS IN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE WHEREVER POSSIBLE (EXCEPT BONN IF SCHMIDT SHOULD OFFER TO HOST SHULTZ PERSONALLY).

6. SECURITY: RSO SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO PROVIDE LOW-KEY SECURITY COVERAGE FOR SHULTZ, IN PARTICULAR AVOIDING

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DTG: 271948Z APR 82 PSN: 001863

CONSPICUOUS TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS.

7. ITINERARY: SHULTZ WILL TRAVEL VIA COMMERCIAL CARRIER TRANSATLANTIC AND VIA MAC JET WITHIN EUROPE. TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOLLOWS:

MAY 5	DEPART WASHINGTON	ARRIVE FRANKFURT/BONN,
-		MAY 6
MAY 7	DEPART BONN	ARRIVE ROME
MAY 8	DEPART ROME	ARRIVE LONDON
MAY 10	DEPART LONDON	ARRIVE BRUSSELS AM, PARTS PM
MAY 11	DEPART PARIS	ARRIVE TOKYO, MAY 12
MAY 13	DEPART TOKYO	ARRIVE OTTAWA, MAY 13
MAY 14	DEPART OTTAWA	ARRIVE WASHINGTON

BRUSSELS TIMING REMAINS TO BE WORKED OUT.

8. DETAILED ITINERARY AND INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL. NO APPROACH TO HOST GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE MADE PENDING RECEIPT OF FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
HAIG

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DTG: 271948Z APR 82 PSN: 001863

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2083
SIT603 DATE 04/28/82

DTG: 270027Z APR 82 PSN: 000383
TOR: 117/0228Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #2083 1170027
O 270027Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9468
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3270
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3743
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3035
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9394
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 112083
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 4/26/02 (NILES, THOMAS M. T.)
TAGS: NATO NAC
SUBJECT: GERMAN REACTION TO SECRETARY'S MSG TO GENSCHER
REF: A) STATE 107552; B) STATE 107551

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FRG DCM WALLAU CALLED EUR DAS NILES APRIL 26 TO REPORT THAT BONN HAD BEEN EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE SECRETARY'S POSITIVE RESPONSE (REF A) TO GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS. HE ADDED THAT GENSCHER HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF A RECENT VISIT TO ROME, WHICH HAD BEEN FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF A MEETING WITH THE POPE, TO HAVE A SEPARATE SESSION WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO. AT THAT MEETING, GENSCHER AND COLOMBO DISCUSSED THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCED US-EUROPEAN CONSULTATIONS, WELCOMED THE SECRETARY'S RESPONSES (REFTELS), AND AGREED THAT FRG AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WASHINGTON SHOULD PRESENT A JOINT RESPONSE TO THE DEPARTMENT. WALLAU ADDED THAT FRG POLDIRECTOR PFEFFER AND HIS ITALIAN COUNTERPART (BOTTAI) WERE WORKING ON THIS JOINT PRESENTATION. NILES SAID WE WERE PLEASED WITH FAVORABLE FRG AND ITALIAN REACTIONS AND LOOKED FORWARD TO JOINT APPROACH BY THE TWO AMBASSADORS. HAIG

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NLS F97-030/2 #146
BY CJS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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DTG: 270027Z APR 82 PSN: 000383
DTG: 270027Z APR 82 PSN: 000383

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7552
SIT746 DATE 04/28/82

DTG: 212351Z APR 82 PSN: 049838
TOR: 112/0005Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7552 1120004
O 212351Z APR 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9272
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9258

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3528
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2755
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3113
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7409
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 107552
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 04/20/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)
TAGS: NATO, NAC
SUBJECT: NATO CONSULTATIONS: MESSAGE FOR GENSCHER
... ~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. FOR BONN: YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE (THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL):

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR HANS-DIETRICH:

. DURING OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS HERE IN WASHINGTON,
YOU SUGGESTED THE DESIRABILITY OF INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS BY NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ALONG THE LINES
OF THE EC'S "GYMNICH" WEEKENDS. I BELIEVE YOUR IDEA
HAS CONSIDERABLE MERIT AS A WAY TO IMPROVE OUR DIALOGUE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND, THROUGH IT, OUR DECISIONMAKING. CONSEQUENTLY,
YOUR INITIATIVE, WHICH WOULD BE A HIGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE
AND SPECIFIC OUTCOME FOR THE BONN SUMMIT, HAS MY FULL
SUPPORT.

. AS YOU KNOW, EMILIO COLOMBO HAS EXPRESSED CONCERNS

SIMILAR TO YOURS ABOUT THE STATE OF TRANSATLANTIC
CONSULTATIONS. ALTHOUGH EMILIO SEEMS TO HAVE A BROADER
INITIATIVE IN MIND, I BELIEVE YOUR IDEA RESPONDS TO HIS
CONCERNS. THEREFORE I HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY OF
ADVISING HIM DIRECTLY OF MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR EFFORT.

. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ON THIS AND
OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST. MEANWHILE, I HAVE
INSTRUCTED MY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP

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NLS 197-030/2 M 147

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BY Cts NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 212351Z APR 82 PSN: 049838

AND OUR MISSION TO NATO TO SUPPORT YOUR PROPOSAL.

SINCERELY, AL. END TEXT.

3. FOR USNATO: IF THE FRG RAISES THIS ISSUE AT EVERE,
YOU SHOULD EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IT ALONG THE LINES OF
PARA 2 ABOVE. YOU SHOULD ALSO BRING LUNS INTO THE
PICTURE. BASED ON HIS STATEMENT AT THE MARCH 30
PERMREPS LUNCH, (USNATO 2199) WE ASSUME HE WILL WELCOME
OUR ACTION. HAIG

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DTG: 212351Z APR 82 PSN: 049838

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PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 8368
SIT756 DATE 04/19/82

DTG: 171102Z APR 82 PSN: 043793
TOR: 107/1322Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT RENT FONT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #8368 1071102
MCN NAR
O 171102Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6044

~~SECRET~~ BONN 08368

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (STADIS CAPTION DELETED)

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 4/17/02 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M

TAGS: FA, UK, AR, US, GE, PEPR, FGOV, PINS, PINT

SUBJECT: GENSCHER ON FALKLANDS DISPUTE

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING BREAKFAST MEETING IN SAARBRUCKEN TODAY WITH MICHAEL DEEVER, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER REITERATED STRONG FRG SUPPORT FOR SECRETARY HAIG'S EFFORTS TO MEDIATE A SOLUTION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE. HE REPEATED HIS BASIC CONVICTION THAT WESTERN ALLIANCE COULD NOT AFFORD TO HAVE THE US EFFORT FAIL. IT WOULD BE A GREAT PRESTIGE VICTORY FOR THE SOVIETS.

3. GENSCHER INFORMED DEEVER THAT HE HAD RECENTLY TELEPHONED THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AND TOLD HIM TO TELL PRESIDENT GALTIERI THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD NOT THINK IT COULD PUT THE WEST EUROPEANS UNDER PRESSURE BY THREATENING TO PLAY THE SOVIET OR CUBAN CARD. SUCH AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE FIRMLY REJECTED; THE WEST EUROPEANS WERE NOT SUBJECT TO BLACKMAIL.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. GENSCHER ALSO INFORMED DEEVER THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH THE POPE YESTERDAY, THE POPE HAD EXPRESSED HIGH EXPECTATIONS AND HOPES FOR THE SUCCESS OF HAIG'S MISSION. HE SAW CLEARLY THE DANGERS OF GREATER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA SHOULD HAIG FAIL. GENSCHER URGED THE POPE TO APPEAL TO ALL NATIONS TO SUPPORT THE US EFFORTS AND THE POPE PROMISED TO CONSIDER THIS SERIOUSLY (THIS IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION AND SHOULD BE HELD CLOSELY).

5. DEEVER PRAISED THE GREAT JOB THAT HAIG WAS DOING, AND REPORTED THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH MRS. THATCHER YESTERDAY, SHE HAD EXPRESSED HER FULL SATISFACTION WITH HIS MISSION.

6. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY DEEVER. BURNS

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BY

CJS

NARA, DATE

4/30/01

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DTG: 171102Z APR 82 PSN: 043793

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BONN 7885
SIT243 DATE 04/14/82

DTG: 081846Z APR 82 PSN: 030938
TOR: 098/2031Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/FYI

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHOL #7885 0981847
O 081846Z APR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5880

~~SECRET~~ BONN 07885
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4-8-02 (YORK, CHARLES C.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), GE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL
REF: STATE 089280

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN THE ABSENCE OF LAHNSTEIN, AND UNAVAILABILITY OF VON STADEN, CHARGE READ JUDGE CLARK'S LETTER TO FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR PFEFFER, WHO ADVISED THAT LETTER HAD NOT YET COME DOWN TO HIM FROM GENSCHER'S OFFICE. HE ASSUMED THAT GENSCHER HAD NOT COMPLETED NECESSARY COORDINATION OF RESPONSE WITH CHANCELLOR AND FEDERAL PRESIDENT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR BRAZIL. HE PROMISED TO INQUIRE.

3. PFEFFER ADVISED THAT GENSCHER, WHO IS BACK IN BONN TODAY, IS DRAFTING A REPLY TO JUDGE CLARK WHICH WILL BE TRANSMITTED VIA CABINET LINE. PFEFFER ANTICIPATES WHITE HOUSE WILL RECEIVE MESSAGE BEFORE EASTER. BURNS

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BY CJS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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SIT082 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 130452Z MAR 82 PSN: 053222
TOR: 072/2316Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7025 0720707
O R 130452Z MAR 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0000
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000
AMEMBASSY BERN 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000
AMEMBASSY MADRID 0000
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0000
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0000
USMISSION USBERLIN 0000
ALL NATO CAPITALS

XMT AMEMBASSY BONN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 067025

NODIS
USEEC, USOECD, MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/31/02
TAGS: NATO, EEC, CSCE, PARM, GE, PL, UR, OVIP
(GENSCHER, HANS-DIETRICH)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRG FOREIGN
MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHE - MARCH 8, 1982,
SECRETARY'S CONFERENCE ROOM

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY MET WITH FRG FOREIGN
MINISTER GENSCHE ON MARCH 8 FOR TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS
OF DISCUSSION IN A MEETING HELD IN THE SECRETARY'S
CONFERENCE ROOM AND DURING A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY THE
SECRETARY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. AFTER LUNCH, THE
SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER TAPED A 12-MINUTE
INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN TELEVISION AND MET WITH THE U. S.
AND FOREIGN PRESS IN THE MAIN LOBBY OF THE STATE
DEPARTMENT. MAIN SUBJECTS DISCUSSED DURING THE
MEETINGS WERE THE NATO AND VERSAILLES SUMMITS, THE
SITUATION IN POLAND, THE BUCKLEY MISSION AND TRADE WITH
THE EAST, AND THE MADRID CSCE MEETING. THE SECRETARY
ALSO RAISED PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH PROPOSED REPAIR OF
EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT IN THE FRG AND THE QUESTION OF
CONSULTATIONS OVER SALE OF SOVET GAS TO WEST BERLIN.
THE DISCUSSIONS RESULTED IN ROAD AGREEMENT ON THE NEED

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F97-030/2 #170

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BY

GLS

NARA, DATE

4/30/01

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TO FOCUS THE NATO SUMMIT ON IMPROVED COORDINATION OF ALLIANCE POLICIES AND ON THE NEED FOR CAREFUL MANAGEMENT OF ALLIANCE APPROACHES TOWARDS POLAND AND THE ;SSR IN THE WEEKS TO COME. GENSCHER SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD IMPROVE COORDINATION OF ALLIED POLICIES BY MAKING A MAJOR SPEECH ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS BEFORE THE MAY NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE SAID THE FRG WOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY TO POINTS MADE BY THE BUCKLEY MISSION BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST OVERESTIMATING THE VOLUME OF FRG CREDITS OR TRADE WITH THE EAST.

3. IN ADDITION TO GENSCHER, OTHER GERMAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETINGS INCLUDED AMBASSADOR PETER HERMES, FOREIGN OFFICE ECONOMIC DIVISION CHIEF PER FISCHER, FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS SPOKESMAN KARL PASCHKE, EMBASSY DCM WALLAU AND FOREIGN OFFICE INTERPRETER HEINZ WEBER. OTHER U.S. PARTICIPANTS WERE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY, EB ASSISTANT SECRETARY HORMATS, PM DIRECTOR BURT, EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY NILES, EUR/CE DIRECTOR KORNBLUM AND STATE DEPARTMENT INTERPRETER HARRY OBST. END SUMMARY.

4. THE SECRETARY OPENED THE MEETING BY THANKING GENSCHER FOR THE SPECIAL EFFORT HE HAD MADE TO COME TO WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME. HE BELIEVED THAT THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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DISCUSSIONS WOULD ASSIST CONSIDERABLY IN COORDINATING BOTH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND OUR COMMON APPROACH TO MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN THE WEEKS TO COME. IN ADDITION TO THE MANY CONTINUING TOPICS ON THE AGENDA HE SAID HE WISHED DURING THE MEETING TO PLACE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE MISSION HEADED BY UNDER SECRETARY PUCKLEY, WHOSE TASK WOULD BE TO BRING INTO LINE OUR POSITIONS ON CREDITS WITH THE EAST. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD APPROACH THESE DISCUSSIONS FROM HIS CONTINUING STRONG BELIEF THAT BONN-WASHINGTON UNITY WAS CRITICAL TO THE CONTINUING HEALTH OF THE ALLIANCE.

5. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY AND HIS COLLEAGUES. HE WAS ESPECIALLY SATISFIED THAT THE PRIVATE DISCUSSION HE AND THE SECRETARY HAD CONDUCTED OVER DINNER THE EVENING BEFORE HAD DEMONSTRATED SUCH WIDE AREA OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEM. HE TOO REALIZED HOW IMPORTANT U.S.-FRG RELATIONS WERE FOR MAINTENANCE OF ATLANTIC TIES. HE WAS PLEASED THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO PARTICIPATE PERSONALLY WITH THE SECRETARY IN THIS EFFORT, MOST RECENTLY IN WASHINGTON AND MADRID.

MADRID CSCE MEETING.

6. TURNING TO MADRID, GENSCHER SAID THAT INFORMATION HE HAD RECEIVED THAT MORNING DEMONSTRATED THAT THE CONCEPT AGREED TO BY THE ALLIES EARLY IN THE YEAR WAS BEGINNING TO WORK. GENSCHER SAID THE FRG WOULD AGREE TO THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR ADJOURNMENT, HOPING OF COURSE THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT SEND A BAD SURPRISE FROM MOSCOW. HE HAD HEARD THIS MORNING THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION CHIEF HAD SAID THAT HE FIRST MUST OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW BEFORE AGREEING TO THE NNA PROPOSAL. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT A PRESS REPORT

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HAD STATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO RECESS THE MEETING ON MARCH 12. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT THIS WAS AN AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT AND THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL FROM MOSCOW.

7. GENSCHER SAID ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT WOULD BE THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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FINAL STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY HEADS OF DELEGATION ON MARCH 12. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PURPOSES TO COORDINATE THESE STATEMENTS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. THE WEST SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT HAD MAINTAINED ITS UNITY TO THE VERY END AND THAT THE DECISION TO ADJOURN HAD BEEN TAKEN BY CONSENSUS OF CSCE PARTICIPANTS. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CLAIM THAT THEY HAD WISHED TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN THE WEST WHICH HAD DEMANDED ADJOURNMENT. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS THE MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN WHO WOULD BE RETURNING TO MADRID THAT AFTERNOON. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT HE WISHED TO STATE DIRECTLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES HOW GRATEFUL THE U. S. WAS FOR THE FINE WORK OF AMBASSADOR KASTL IN MADRID. ALL REPORTS INDICATED THAT HE HAD PERFORMED SUPERBLY AND THAT HIS GOOD WORK HAD HELPED CONSIDERABLY IN SUPPORTING WESTERN INTERESTS.

8. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD WELCOME AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR ADJOURNMENT AT THE END OF THE COMING WEEK AND RESUMPTION OF THE MEETING IN NOVEMBER. HE PERSONALLY WOULD-HAVE-PREFERRED AN EARLIER DATE-FOR RESUMPTION, BECAUSE-THIS IN ITSELF WOULD INCREASE PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS. CONCERNING COORDINATION OF SPEECHES, THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH THE STATEMENT GENSCHER HAD MADE AT THEIR DINNER THE EVENING BEFORE THAT EVENTS IN POLAND MADE IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO STRESS HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS IN MADRID. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THAT THE WEST SHOULD ALSO STRESS ITS HOPE THAT EVENTS BEFORE

THE END OF THE RECESS WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR CONTINUATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IN MADRID. THIS POINT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE WEST EXPECTED SOME PROGRESS IN POLAND. GENSCHER CAUTIONED AGAINST - ESTABLISHING FORMAL PRECONDITIONS FOR-RESUMPTION OF THE MADRID DISCUSSIONS, BUT AGREED THAT THE-WEST SHOULD - MAKE CLEAR IN ITS CONCLUDING SPEECHES THAT PROGRESS IN THE CSCE WOULD BE MADE EASIER BY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

9. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SUGGESTED THAT THE NATO DELEGATIONS IN MADRID SHOULD WORK OUT A-PUBLIC AFFAIRS LINE SO THAT NATO COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO BE SAYING THE SAME THING IN THE PERIOD AFTER THE CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY AGREED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD-ASK AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN TO PROPOSE SUCH AN EXERCISE TO HIS NATO COLLEAGUES IN MADRID.

U. S. POLICIES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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10. GENSCHER RECALLED THAT DURING DINNER ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO MAKE A MAJOR SPEECH ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MAY. GENSCHER HOPED THAT SUCH A SPEECH - COULD PROVIDE A CLEAR PICTURE OF U. S. CONCEPTS-- CONCERNING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ESPECIALLY THAT IT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WERE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN STRATEGY. -GENSCHER SUGGESTED THAT EVENTS IN RECENT WEEKS HAD SHOWN CLEARLY THAT THE WEST HELD A BETTER HAND IN THE CSCE. IN HIS VIEW WHEN ONE HAD GOOD CARDS HE SHOULD PLAY THEM.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A SPEECH. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ARTICULATE OUR OVERALL CONCEPTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TO EXPAND ON THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. ANOTHER GOAL WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE EAST THAT THERE WERE; - POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION IF THE SITUATION IN - POLAND IMPROVED. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD WELCOME ANY IDEAS THE GERMAN SIDE MIGHT HAVE ON THE CONTENT OF SUCH A SPEECH. HE STRESSED THAT THE U. S. WAS NOT SEEKING GIMMICKS. THERE WAS A GOOD BASTS OF SQLID TOPICS, SUCH AS CSCE, MBFR AND START, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A GOOD FRAMEWORK FOR SUCH A SPEECH. -

12. THE SECRETARY SAID THE NEXT IMPORTANT QUESTION MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD BE THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING AHEAD WITH THE START NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT REMAINED COMMITTED TO MAKING PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HAD FELT THAT WITH UNCERTAINTIES IN POLAND THE U. S. WOULD HAVE APPEARED HYPOCRITICAL IF IT HAD AGREED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE START PROCESS DURING THE SECRETARY'S LAST MEETING WITH GROMYKO. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT VIEW START AS BEING IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS U. S. SANCTIONS IN REACTION TO EVENTS IN POLAND. LIFTING OF THESE MEASURES WAS CLEARLY LINKED TO THE THREE CONDITIONS WHICH THE WEST HAD JOINTLY PUT FORWARD. START WAS NOT LINKED DIRECTLY TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT, ASSUMING THERE WERE NO FURTHER NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH START THIS SPRING.

13. THE SECRETARY STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U. S. HAD NOT LOST ANY TIME ON THE START NEGOTIATIONS BY POSTPONING AN ANNOUNCEMENT. THE STRATEGIC DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING CAREFULLY PREPARED AND WORK WAS STILL NOT FINISHED. THE U. S. WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID THE PITFALLS OF SALT II. THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN DEFICIENT AND IT COULD NEVER HAVE GAINED SUFFICIENT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SALT II HAD NOT BEEN A VICTIM OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN; IT WAS ALREADY LOST BEFOREHAND. THE U. S. WAS NOW MOVING CAREFULLY TO PUT TOGETHER A POSITION WHICH COULD WIN SENATE APPROVAL. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS AND THAT THE U. S. WOULD HAVE A SOLID POSITION WHICH WOULD STAND IN ITS OWN RIGHT. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THIS POSITION WOULD INCLUDE A DEMAND FOR

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MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE MAJOR PROBLEM WITH SALT II HAD BEEN THAT WHILE IT HAD LIMITED GROWTH IN CERTAIN AREAS, IT HAD PROVIDED VIRTUAL FREEWAYS FOR GROWTH IN OTHERS. THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO AVOID THAT DIFFICULTY IN A NEW AGREEMENT.

14. GENSCHER THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS DESCRIPTION OF U. S. PREPARATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE GERMAN

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SIDE TO HEAR THAT THE U. S. POSITION WOULD STRESS MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS. THIS APPROACH WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT IN EUROPE. IT HAD ALSO BEEN INTERESTING TO HEAR THE SECRETARY'S DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POLISH SANCTIONS AND THE START NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS EXACTLY THE SORT OF NUANCED APPROACH WHICH THE FRG HAD CALLED FOR DIRECTLY AFTER EVENTS IN POLAND AND AT THE MADRID MEETING. GENSCHER

CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS BASIC PHILOSOPHY WAS VERY IMPORTANT. WHEN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT SIMPLY TO STATE BASIC POSITIONS. THE WEST MUST ALWAYS PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH THE DECISION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE COOPERATION. THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO EFFECT SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND IN FACT WAS THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE HARMEL REPORT.

SITUATION IN POLAND.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE SITUATION IN POLAND HAD NOT IMPROVED. OPPOSITION TO MARTIAL LAW CONTINUED AND MIGHT EVEN BE GROWING STRONGER. REPORTS INDICATED THAT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS WERE BEING ESTABLISHED AT SECONDARY LEVELS AND THAT WORKERS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY ALIENATED. THIS SITUATION WOULD REMAIN UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT AGREED TO BEGIN A REAL DIALOGUE. THE SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS FOUND THEMSELVES CAUGHT IN A CLASSIC "CATCH-22" SITUATION. THEY WERE AFRAID OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERALIZATION, BUT WERE ALSO AFRAID OF THE INSTABILITY WHICH WOULD DEVELOP IF REPRESSION CONTINUED. THE U. S. VIEW WAS THAT THE MAIN ADDRESSEE FOR WESTERN PRESSURE SHOULD BE THE SOVIET UNION. THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT RELATIONS WOULD NOT ONLY NOT RETURN TO NORMAL BUT THAT WE WOULD IN FACT CONSIDER FURTHER SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS LIBERALIZATION BEGAN IN POLAND. IN THIS REGARD THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT DESPITE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES THE NATO ALLIES HAD DONE REMARKABLY WELL IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON COMMON REACTIONS TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND. THE SECRETARY RECALLED A STATEMENT BY GENSCHER THAT IT WAS BETTER TO TRAVEL 10 KILOMETERS TOGETHER THAN 50 KILOMETERS -

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APART. IT WOULD NOW BE IMPORTANT TO PULL TOGETHER EVEN MORE. -- - - -

16. CONCERNING SOVIET STRATEGY IN POLAND, THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. HAD RECEIVED SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR INDICATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT GENERAL JARUZELSKI HAD INTENDED TO BE MORE MODERATE IN HIS RECENT SPEECH. UT

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THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD FORCED HIM TO MAKE IT TOUGH. THE U. S. HAD NOTICED THAT A NEW SOVIET LINE BEING PEDDLED BOTH IN THE U. S. AND IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS THAT GENERAL JARUZELSKI WAS REALLY A POLISH NATIONALIST AND THAT IF THE WEST DID NOT HELP HIM HE WOULD BE REPLACED BY SOMEONE WHO WOULD FOLLOW AN EVEN HARDER LINE. -THE U. S. REJECTED THIS THESIS. THE SECRETARY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY WAY FOR THE SOVIETS TO

DISCARD GENERAL JARUZELSKI. HE WAS THE ONLY POLISH LEADER WHO COULD DELIVER THE ONE ELEMENT OF POLISH SOCIETY WHICH REMAINED LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT -- THE MILITARY. THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE DELUDED BY SUCH ARGUMENTS. HE DID, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT WHILE THE WEST SHOULD BE TOUGH ON THE SOVIETS IT SHOULD ALSO WATCH CAREFULLY FOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN POLAND AND SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE WITH THE POLES THEMSELVES. THE TIME HAD NOT YET COME FOR SUCH A CHANGE. ONE IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, MIGHT BE TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT OUR RHETORIC TO MAKE SURE THAT WE DID NOT CREATE ANTI-WESTERN UNITY IN POLAND.

17. GENSCHER SAID HIS BASIC PRINCIPLE REMAINED THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT PUNISH THE POLISH PEOPLE FOR HAVING A GOVERNMENT THEY DID NOT WANT AND SHOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE POLISH PEOPLE FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD CREATE EXACTLY THE TYPE OF ANTI-WESTERN UNITY WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD MENTIONED. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION IN POLAND LAY WITH THE SOVIETS. IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT WHETHER JARUZELSKI HAD DECLARED MARTIAL LAW ON SOVIET ORDERS OR WHETHER HE HAD DONE IT TO AVOID SOMETHING WORSE, SUCH AS SOVIET INTERVENTION. IN BOTH CASES THE SOVIETS WERE AT FAULT. GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAD BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WESTERN POSITION SET FORTH IN MADRID. THE SECOND IMPORTANT POINT, AS MENTIONED BY THE SECRETARY, HAD BEEN TO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO THE POLES IF THEY FULFILLED THE NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS.

18. CONCERNING THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN POLAND, GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT THE ARMY STILL BACKED JARUZELSKI. IF POLAND WERE TO BE CONTROLLED WITH A POLISH POWER STRUCTURE, IT COULD ONLY BE DONE THROUGH JARUZELSKI. GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT IF THE SOVIETS WISHED TO REPLACE JARUZELSKI THEY COULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT A MORE DIRECT ENGAGEMENT IN POLAND, I. E., INTERVENTION. GENSCHER DID NOT BELIEVE THAT JARUZELSKI WAS THE COMMUNIST LEADER WITH WHOM THE SOVIETS WERE MOST COMFORTABLE. HOWEVER, NONE OF THE OTHERS COULD PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH THE INTERNAL SUPPORT THAT JARUZELSKI PROVIDED. THIS SUGGESTED THAT JARUZELSKI POSSESSED A CERTAIN STRENGTH. IT SUGGESTED ALSO THAT A CAREFUL POLICY OF OFFERING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND COULD BE SUCCESSFUL. GENSCHER SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE U. S. AND THE FRG WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC SITUATION IN POLAND. HE THOUGHT THE MOST

IMPORTANT POINT WAS TO MAKE CLEAR CONTINUOUSLY THAT THE SOVIETS BORE THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION AND THAT THE WEST WAS READY TO COOPERATE IF THINGS IMPROVED.

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19. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE AND GENSCHER WERE VERY CLOSE IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN - POLAND. THIS SHARED ASSESSMENT WOULD BE CRITICAL IN DEALING WITH OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE. -

NATO SUMMIT.

20. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE HAD SUGGESTED THAT NATO MILITARY STRATEGY WAS OUTDATED AND THAT THE MAIN TASK OF THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT SHOULD BE TO - REPLACE IT WITH A MORE VISIONARY APPROACH. - THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE WOULD BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DISASTER AND THAT IT SHOULD BE AVOIDED-AT ALL COSTS. HE ADDED THAT SUCH PROPOSALS MIGHT EVEN COME-IN SUGGESTION FROM THE BRITISH IN LONDON. AFTER YEARS OF FRUSTRATION WITH THE MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS, -THE BRITISH HAD BEGUN LOOKING AT OVERALL STRATEGY. THERE HAD BEEN SOME THOUGHT OF ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL - - PLANNING PROCESS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SUPPORT SUCH IDEAS SINCE THEY WOULD INTERFERE WITH NATIONAL PLANNING WHICH WAS FINELY TUNED TO INTERNAL POLITICAL REALITIES. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THE - EXISTING STRUCTURE COULD GIVE MORE ATTENTION TO - IMPROVING FORWARD DEFENSES THROUGH IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY, ETC.

21. GENSCHER SAID HE WISHED TO WARN STRONGLY AGAINST OPENING A BASIC DISCUSSION OF WESTERN MILITARY STRATEGY. SUCH A DISCUSSION WOULD BE UNWISE SINCE IT WOULD AWAKEN MANY SLEEPING DOGS AND CAUSE CONFUSION IN THE ALLIANCE. GENSCHER ALSO AGREED THAT THE EXISTING NATO STRUCTURE HAD PROVEN ITSELF. WHEN ONE CONSIDERED HOW THE NATO INF DECISION HAD BEEN PREPARED, -THE - - ALLIANCE HAD DEMONSTRATED THE FLEXIBILITY-OF THE STRUCTURE. THE SCG HAD WORKED WELL IN PREPARING THE DECISION' AND WAS NOW DEMONSTRATING THAT IT COULD DEAL WITH BOTH THE INSTITUTIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF - THESE NEW ISSUES. IN GENSCHER'S VIEW SUCH A - - DEVELOPMENT REPRESENTED A CONCRETIZATION OF THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE HARMEL REPORT. THE BASIC STRATEGY AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE COULD IN FACT BE ADAPTED TO MEET CHANGING CONDITIONS. - -

22. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT HE AND GENSCHER SAW EYE TO EYE ON THIS POINT. THE SUMMIT SHOULD OF COURSE PLACE STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE DEFENSES. HOWEVER, THE MAIN FOCUS SHOULD BE ON THE NEED FOR A SENSE OF REDEDICATION TO THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE. THE RESULTS SHOULD STRESS THE JOINT VALUES AND PERSPECTIVE AND THE CLOSE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS. CONCERNING THE BEST MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT, THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WERE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FIRST SUGGESTED A MODEST RESULT WHICH STRESSED THE EVOLUTION OF ALLIANCE THOUGHT AND STRATEGY. THE OTHER SCHOOL OF THOUGHT PROPOSED THAT THE ALLIANCE UPDATE ITS BASIC POLITICAL STRATEGY WITH A "WISE MEN'S" REPORT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE TENDED TOWARDS THE MORE

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MODEST APPROACH, BUT HE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING GENSCHER'S VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.

23. GENSCHER SAID THAT EVENTS IN RECENT MONTHS HAD DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXPAND THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE ALLIANCE. THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES SHOULD CONCENTRATE POLICIES EVEN MORE CLOSELY AND SHOULD WORK HARDER TO DEVELOP JOINT CONCEPTS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. CONCENTRATED POLICIES HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE PAST ON SPECIFIC ISSUES SUCH AS NAMIBIA AND CSCE. THESE EFFORTS HAD RESULTED FROM A SPECIFIC NEED TO TAKE ACTION. IN OTHER AREAS WHERE THE NEED HAD NOT BEEN SO CLEAR, AGREEMENT HAD BEEN LESS FIRM. THERE WAS ANOTHER REASON FOR CLOSER ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING BASIC AGREED CONCEPTS. THAT WAS THAT IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM GOVERNMENTS CHANGED REGULARLY AND THAT SUCH CHANGES WERE NOT ALWAYS FOR THE GOOD. GENSCHER RECALLED THAT DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN ROME HE HAD PREDICTED CHANGES IN PARIS AND ATHENS. NOW THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A CHANGE IN OSLO. HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER ON THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A CHANGE. HE WOULD ADD ONLY THAT AT THE MOMENT THE EC-10 WAS REALLY THE 10 MINUS ONE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AREAS WHERE MONEY WAS TRANSFERRED FROM BRUSSELS TO COMMUNITY MEMBERS. HERE THE EC WAS COMPOSED OF NINE PLUS TWO. IT WAS EXACTLY FOR THIS REASON THAT THE BASIC FOUNDATION OF ALLIANCE POLICIES SHOULD BE STRESSED IN BONN.

24. IN THIS REGARD GENSCHER SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT AN IDEA WHICH HE HAD ALREADY RAISED IN NATO DISCUSSIONS. EXPERIENCE IN THE EC HAD SHOWN THAT THE COMMUNITY PROFITED CONSIDERABLY FROM THE SO-CALLED GYMKNICH MEETINGS IN WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MET INFORMALLY OVER A WEEKEND AND DISCUSSED PROBLEMS

FRANKLY, AWAY FROM PRESS AND PUBLIC ATTENTION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT SUCH AN INSTITUTION WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT BENEFIT WITHIN NATO. OF COURSE ALL MINISTERS WERE FACED WITH SEVERE SCHEDULING PROBLEMS, BUT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND TWO WEEKENDS IN A YEAR DURING WHICH THEY COULD GET TOGETHER. SUCH MEETINGS WOULD PROVIDE A NEW QUALITY TO NATO CONSULTATIONS, ESPECIALLY FOR THE SMALLER COUNTRIES. GENSCHER SAID ONE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE NEED OF THE SMALLER COUNTRIES TO FEEL A GREATER SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATO DECISIONS.

25. CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF A "WISE MEN'S" REPORT, GENSCHER SAID THE ALLIANCE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS INTENDING TO CHANGE ITS BASIC POLICIES. THE SECOND PROBLEM WAS THAT DURING THE YEAR OR TWO THAT SUCH A REPORT WOULD BE UNDER PREPARATION, THERE WOULD BE GREAT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ULTIMATE ALLIANCE POLICIES. DIRECT CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE IN ABEYANCE DURING THIS PERIOD. THIS WAS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED. CURRENT PROBLEMS REQUIRED STRONG POLICIES, CLOSE COORDINATION AND A CLEAR WESTERN APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO SPEAK TO THE CHANCELLOR ABOUT THE PROPOSAL FOR A "WISE MEN'S" REPORT, BUT HIS FIRST PERSONAL REACTION WAS SKEPTICAL.

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26. THIS HAVING BEEN SAID, GENSCHER BELIEVED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE MEANS OF IMPROVING POLICY COORDINATION. ONE OTHER POSSIBILITY WAS THE COLUMBO INITIATIVE WHICH CALLED FOR CLOSER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U. S. AND EUROPE. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT VERY HIGHLY OF COLUMBO AND ASKED THAT THE U. S. GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO HIS IDEAS. HE REPEATED AGAIN HIS IDEA FOR INFORMAL MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND ASKED THAT THE SECRETARY ALSO CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ONE BASIC QUESTION CONCERNING THE COLUMBO INITIATIVE. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, COLUMBO'S PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE PRIMARILY IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U. S. AND THE EC-10 AND WAS CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THE SECRETARY'S VIEW WAS THAT-CLOSER CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED

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IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO AND THAT POLITICAL RELATIONS SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. GENSCHER SAID IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT COLOMBO HAD MADE HIS PROPOSAL IN THE EC-10 CONTEXT BECAUSE THE ITALIANS WERE UNCLEAR ABOUT THEIR ROLE IN VARIOUS SPECIAL GROUPS. IT WAS OF COURSE TRUE THAT THE

ALLIANCE COULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT THE ECONOMIC ASPECT, BUT HE AGREED THAT ECONOMIC ISSUES SHOULD NOT DOMINATE THE DISCUSSIONS. THE NATO CONTEXT WAS- IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT INCLUDED COUNTRIES WHICH DID NOT YET BELONG TO THE EC. IN THIS CONTEXT GENSCHER SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN NORWAY. THE ECHAD - MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN ALLOWING NORWEGIAN-MEMBERSHIP TO FAIL OVER THE QUESTION OF FISHERIES. THIS ISSUE HAD AT THAT TIME BEEN OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE NORWEGIANS BUT HAD BEEN A PERIPHERAL ISSUE FOR OTHER EUROPEANS. COMMISSION BOOKKEEPERS IN BRUSSELS HAD- FORCED NORWAY OUT OF THE COMMUNITY. THE RESULT HAD BEEN THAT NORWAY HAD NOT JOINED THE COMMUNITY-AND THAT DENMARK HAD NOT FELT ITSELF FULLY ANCHORED IN THE EC GROUP. IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED IF DENMARK COULD BE JOINED BY A SECOND NORDIC COUNTRY IN THE-EC.

27. GENSCHER SAID THE EC HAD MADE THE SAME MISTAKE WITH GREENLAND. GREENLAND WAS INHABITED BY 50,000- PEOPLE FOR WHOM FISHING WAS A FUNDAMENTAL INDUSTRY. THE EC HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THEM WHAT THEY NEEDED AND THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE COMMUNITY COULD HAVE - - BROADER CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD NOT YET BE FORESEEN. GENSCHER REPORTED THAT THE FRG WAS LOOKING-INTO-WAYS OF TRYING TO LURE GREENLAND BACK INTO THE COMMUNITY BEFORE THE DECISION TO LEAVE HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID HE HAD MENTIONED THESE ISSUES IN SUCH DETAIL BECAUSE THEY- DEMONSTRATED THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF WESTERN - - RELATIONSHIPS AND UNDERScoreD AGAIN THE NEED FOR THE BROADEST POSSIBLE CONTEXT. - -- -

28. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT U. S. VIEWS ON THE NTO SUMMIT WERE CLOSE IF NOT IDENTICAL TO THOSE SET FORTH BY GENSCHER. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT ONE POINT WHICH CONCERNED HIM SOMEWHAT WAS THE IMPORTANCE -

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OF PUBLIC OPINION. WHATEVER THE RESULT OF THE SUMMIT,

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THE ALLIES MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY HAD LOOKED INTO THE FUTURE AND HAD LAID A FOUNDATION FOR COMING DECADES. -THE RESULT OF THE SUMMIT SHOULD NOT BE PICTURED AS SIMPLY BUSINESS AS USUAL. GENSCHER SAID HE AGREED STRONGLY WITH THIS POINT, BUT THAT THE TASK OF SETTING FORTH PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD NOT BE PLACED ON THE SUMMIT ALONE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE PRESIDENT MADE A SPEECH ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS BEFORE THE LUXEMBOURG NATO MINISTERIAL, HE WOULD ALSO PROVIDE IMPORTANT FUTURE PERSPECTIVES.

SPAIN AND NATO.

29. IN CONNECTION WITH THE NATO SUMMIT THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U. S. WISHED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN RATIFICATION OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP BEFORE JUNE. HE REPORTED THAT THE U. S. SHOULD BE READY TO COMPLETE ACTION IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO PROBLEMS, FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS. -ACTION IN PARIS WAS APPARENTLY BEING DELAYED BY DISPUTES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION OVER ECONOMIC POLICIES. -- THE OPPOSITION REFUSED TO SCHEDULE DEBATE OF ANY IMPORTANT BILLS UNTIL THIS DISPUTE WAS SOLVED. -IN HOLLAND IT WAS APPARENTLY A QUESTION OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U. S. WOULD PUSH THIS ISSUE WITH MITTERRAND IN WASHINGTON LATER IN THE WEEK. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL ALLIES COULD EXERT AS MUCH PRESSURE AS POSSIBLE IN PARIS AND THE HAGUE IN ORDER TO HAVE SPANISH ENTRY COMPLETED BEFORE THE SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT SPANISH MEMBERSHIP WAS AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT WHICH WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN.

30. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE PROBLEM IN PARIS. HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE DUTCH DURING THE QUEEN'S RECENT VISIT TO BONN. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM IN GAINING APPROVAL BUT THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT IT WOULD HAPPEN BEFORE JUNE. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRE OF SPANISH LEADERS TO MOVE AHEAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE WITH RATIFICATION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT

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DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL OF THE ALLIES KNEW ABOUT THE UNFATHOMABLE WAYS OF DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY. THE SECRETARY ASKED FOR GENSCHER'S ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR GREEK RATIFICATION OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GREEK POSITION COULD BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT IF THE DUTCH DELAYED ACTION. HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE DUTCH POSITION BECAME CLEAR THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE GREEKS.

31. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR MAJOR ALLIES TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE ON THIS SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD INSTRUCT HIS STAFF TO WORK UP SOME PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE GERMANS, THE BRITISH AND OTHERS, AND THAT HE HOPED WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO EXERT THE NECESSARY PRESSURE.

VERSAILLES SUMMIT.

32. HORMATS BEGAN DISCUSSION OF THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT

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BY NOTING THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS PREPARATION HAD RECENTLY CONCLUDED A VERY USEFUL MEETING IN PARIS. THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT MACROECONOMIC ISSUES SUCH AS INTEREST RATES. HORMATS THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN GOOD TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES OPENLY. IF THE BASIC CONCERNS OF ALL COUNTRIES WERE CONSIDERED BEFOREHAND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID HAVING THEM BECOME DIVISIVE ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT. GENSCHER SUGGESTED THAT SOME - ISSUES MIGHT BE HANDLED THROUGH NATIONAL ECONOMIC - DECISIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE SUMMIT. FOR EXAMPLE, SENATOR BAKER HAD TOLD HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE U. S. BUDGET SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY APRIL. HORMATS SAID HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE, BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO LOOK-BEYOND CURRENT ISSUES AND TO DEVELOP COMMON POSITIONS ON TRADE QUESTIONS FOR THE GATT MINISTERIAL. GENSCHER AGREED AND SAID THAT DETAILED ADVANCE PREPARATION WOULD BE CRITICAL TO SUCCESS OF THE VERSAILLES-SUMMIT. HE - SAID THE GERMANS WERE LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE MIGHT SPEAK TO ALL THE CHIEFS OF STATE-OR HEADS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE MEETING TO HELP IMPROVE - COORDINATION.

33. HORMATS SAID THAT OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES WOULD INCLUDE ENERGY, EAST-WEST TRADE AND NORTH-SOUTH - ISSUES. THERE WOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH NEW ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, BUT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TAKE ONE ISSUE SUCH AS FOOD AND TO CONSIDER IT IN MORE DETAIL. GENSCHER AGREED, RECALLING THAT FOOD HAD BEEN CONSIDERED CAREFULLY ALSO AT CANCUN.

34. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ANOTHER ISSUE BEING DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON WAS RECIPROCITY LEGISLATION. HE KNEW THAT IN EUROPE RECIPROCITY LEGISLATION WAS OFTEN CONSIDERED TO BE SYNONYMOUS WITH PROTECTIONISM. HE ASKED HORMATS TO EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND SUCH LEGISLATION. HORMATS SAID THERE WAS ALSO A DEBATE IN WASHINGTON OVER THE EXACT MEANING OF SUCH PROPOSALS. ONE GROUP ARGUED THAT IT SHOULD BE USED TO GAIN ACCESS TO DIFFICULT MARKETS SUCH AS JAPAN OR IN CERTAIN CASES CANADA, AND THAT IT REALLY MEANT EQUITY. THE OTHER - MORE WORRISOME DEFINITION-WAS THAT THE U. S. SHOULD RETALIATE IF IT DID NOT RECEIVE THE EXPECTED ENTRY INTO A VARIETY OF MARKETS. HOWEVER, THIS GROUP AGREED THAT SUCH STEPS SHOULD ONLY BE TAKEN WHERE GATT RULES DID NOT COVER TRADE IN AREAS SUCH AS SERVICES AND COMMUNICATIONS. THERE WAS AS YET NO FORMAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON THIS ISSUE AND HORMATS BELIEVED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT OPEN ITSELF

TO CHARGES OF PROTECTIONISM AS IT DEALT WITH THE QUESTION. HOWEVER, IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE WERE ALREADY AREAS WHERE TRADE WAS HANDLED ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS SUCH AS AVIATION. THE CONCEPT DID EXIST AND SEEMED TO BE DRAWING INTEREST IN CONGRESS.

35. FISCHER SAID THAT THE MAIN CONCERN IN THE FRG WAS THAT SUCH LEGISLATION WOULD UNDERMINE MULTILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS AND WOULD LEAD TO A PROLIFERATION OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. HORMATS SAID THAT THIS WAS THE REASON THAT SUCH LEGISLATION WAS CONSIDERED ONLY WHERE

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GATT ARRANGEMENTS DID NOT APPLY. ONE HAD TO ADMIT, HOWEVER, THAT DURING A PERIOD OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, RECIPROCITY WAS AN APPEALING CONCEPT BOTH IN THE U. S. AND IN EUROPE. IN FACT, THE U. S. HAD FIRST LEARNED OF THE CONCEPT FROM THE EUROPEANS. FISCHER STRESSED THAT THIS VIEW HAD NOT ORIGINATED IN GERMANY. THE FRG HAD BEEN FIGHTING IT FOR YEARS. HOWEVER, IF RECIPROCITY LEGISLATION BEGAN TO SPREAD, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM GERMAN FIRMS TO TAKE SIMILAR STEPS. HORMATS SAID THAT THE KEY POINT WAS THAT UNLESS PROGRESS WAS MADE ON STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL RULES, IT WOULD BE HARD TO RESIST PRESSURES FOR SUCH LEGISLATION. FISCHER SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS ARGUMENT.

BUCKLEY MISSION.

36. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE MAIN TASK OF THE BUCKLEY MISSION WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF FUTURE CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST. THE U. S. BELIEVED THAT SUCH AN EXAMINATION WAS JUSTIFIED IN ITS OWN RIGHT EVEN WITHOUT THE POLISH SITUATION. FOR YEARS WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD PERMITTED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO PURSUE POLICIES WHICH HAD RESULTED IN A VIRTUAL HEMORRHAGING OF CREDITS TO THE EAST. SOME ESTIMATED THE FIGURE AS HIGH AS 80 TO 90 BILLION DOLLARS. THIS LEVEL OF CREDITS FAR EXCEEDED WHAT HAD BEEN CONTEMPLATED IN THE U. S. IN THE EARLY 1970'S WHEN WE HAD BEGUN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS TO THE EAST.

37. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE MAIN CONCERN WOULD BE TO EXPLORE MEANS OF TIGHTENING UP FUTURE CREDITS THROUGH SUCH METHODS AS MOVING TO COMMERCIAL RATES, CONSIDERING THE TERMS AND LENGTH OF CREDITS AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION AMONG WESTERN COUNTRIES ON FUTURE CREDITS. HE SAID THE U. S. HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY EVEN OF AGREEING TO WITHHOLD CREDITS IF

THEY WOULD RESULT IN MAJOR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE THE COCOM FRAMEWORK. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY WOULD BE IN BONN NEXT WEEK AND THAT THE RESULTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR THE QUESTION OF CREDITS THEMSELVES, BUT ALSO FOR THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN ITS UNITY ON TRADE WITH THE EAST. HE HOPED THAT THE GERMAN SIDE WOULD COOPERATE FULLY WITH THIS EFFORT.

38. GENSCHER SAID HE WELCOMED THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE IN THE U. S. WHO WERE AGAINST INTERRUPTION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS WITH THE EAST. HE ASKED ALSO THAT THE U. S. UNDERSTAND THAT EVERY UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN U. S. POLICIES MADE FUTURE COOPERATION ON ISSUES SUCH AS CREDITS MORE DIFFICULT. GENSCHER RECALLED A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF AEG WHO HAD SAID THAT HIS COLLEAGUES HAD QUESTIONED THE ADVISABILITY OF FUTURE COOPERATION WITH U. S. FIRMS BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT U. S. TRADE POLICIES. GENSCHER SAID THE GERMAN SIDE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF CREDITS. HE NOTED THAT THE FEDERAL

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GOVERNMENT GAVE NO PUBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR SUCH CREDITS AND THAT EVEN THE HERMES INVESTMENT GUARANTEES WERE FINANCED THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PARTICIPATING FIRMS AND NOT THROUGH TAXES. GENSCHER SAID HE THOUGHT THE OECD WOULD BE THE PROPER FORUM FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS. HE QUESTIONED STRONGLY THE ADVISABILITY OF INSTITUTIONALIZING SUCH DISCUSSIONS OUTSIDE OF COCOM. HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO HEAR U. S. VIEWS IN MORE DETAIL.

39. CONCERNING OVERALL FRG TRADE WITH THE EAST, GENSCHER SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THAT IT WAS CLEAR TO U. S. PUBLIC OPINION THAT SINCE THE MID-70'S GERMAN-SOVIET TRADE HAD DECLINED CONSIDERABLY FROM ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF OVERALL GERMAN EXPORTS TO THE CURRENT FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY 1.9 PERCENT. THIS REPRESENTED ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE TRADE CONDUCTED BY THE FRG WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS FORCED TO ADMIT THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE FRG HAD THEMSELVES CONTRIBUTED TO FALSE IMPRESSIONS ABOUT THE VOLUME-OF FRG-SOVIET TRADE. SUCH-ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD DURING THE PERIOD WHEN THERE WAS STILL MUCH CONTROVERSY ABOUT DETENTE POLICIES. TRADE ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN OVERSOLD FOR INTERNAL REASONS IN

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ORDER TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR DETENTE. THE TRUTH WAS THAT THE FRG WAS NOT DEPENDENT ON TRADE WITH THE EAST AND THAT IT WAS VERY WILLING TO DISCUSS STRICTER CONTROLS WITH UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY. GENSCHER HOPED IT WAS

CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRG COULD NOT CONSIDER QUANTITATIVE LIMITS TO TRADE. -

40. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE IDEA OF CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS ON CREDITS-INSIDE THE-OECD. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE DIVERSE MEMBERSHIP OF THE OECD, WHICH INCLUDED COUNTRIES SUCH AS SWEDEN AND FINLAND, WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS. GENSCHER SAID THAT IF WE WISHED-TO-ACHIEVE-LONG-TERM PROGRESS IT WAS PERHAPS BETTER-TO FOLLOW-A-ROUTE ALREADY PAVED. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WELL TO BEGIN IN THE OECD AND SEE HOW DISCUSSIONS PROGRESSED. AT SOME POINT IT WOULD PERHAPS BE POSSIBLE TO FORM-A SMALLER GROUP. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT IN THIS-DELICATE PHASE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS TO DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS IN ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. HE DID NOT WISH TO BEGIN A BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS WHICH SHOWED NO RESULTS.

41. RETURNING TO THE BASIC QUESTION OF CREDITS TO THE EAST, HORMATS SAID THE U. S. BELIEVED THAT ITS CONCERNS WERE JUSTIFIED FROM AN ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW AS WELL AS FROM A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE. THE SOVIET UNION-WAS NOW GRANTED A CREDIT STATUS SIMILAR TO THAT OF A MIDDLE-LEVEL LDC. THIS MEANT THAT THEY WERE PROVIDED WITH CREDIT SUBSIDIES FROM MANY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, EXCEPT OF COURSE THE FRG. THE SECOND PROBLEM WAS THAT SOVIET BORROWING COULD ALSO INCREASE NOTICEABLY IN COMING YEARS. IF THE TREND IN SOVIET-HARD CURRENCY IMPORTS CONTINUED, THE USSR WOULD HAVE SOMETHING LIKE 40 BILLION DOLLARS IN WESTERN DEBT. - THERE WAS THUS STRONG REASON FOR LIMITING-SUCH-GROWTH.

42. FISCHER SAID THAT THE EC HAD HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE PUT IN A HIGHER CREDIT--

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GROUP. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

U. S. ON THIS POINT. CONCERNING HORMATS' SECOND POINT, -
FISCHER NOTED THAT WESTERN BANKS WERE INCREASINGLY
HESITANT ABOUT LENDING FURTHER MONEY TO THE SOVIET
UNION OR EASTERN EUROPE. THE CURRENT SOVIET DEBT WAS
ONLY ABOUT 16 BILLION DOLLARS. GIVEN SOVIET HARD
CURRENCY EARNINGS OF APPROXIMATELY 40 BILLION ANNUALLY,
THIS WAS NOT AN UNREASONABLE FIGURE. --

SOVIET GAS FOR WEST BERLIN.

43. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE AS
SOME CONCERN IN BONN THAT THE U. S. WAS SEEKING TO BLOCK
THE SALE OF SOVIET GAS TO WEST BERLIN. THERE WAS NO

JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH CONCERNS. THE U. S. HAD RAISED
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED SO FAR
AND EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL CONSULTATIONS ON
THIS POINT. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, NO BASIC PROBLEM WITH
THE IDEA OF GAS SALES TO WEST BERLIN. GENSCHER SAID HE
WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS STATEMENT OF THE U. S. POSITION. -

CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE.

44. THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 3
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE SPEECH AND SAID HE HOPED FOR
POSITIVE SUPPORT FROM THE GERMAN SIDE. GENSCHER SAID
THAT MINISTER OF STATE HAMM-BRUECHER HAD MADE A VERY
POSITIVE STATEMENT ON THE INITIATIVE IN THE BUNDESTAG
ON MARCH 5. THE U. S. COULD COUNT ON A SYMPATHETIC
POSITION FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

EL SALVADOR.

45. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT MEXICO HAD INTRODUCED AN
UNHELPFUL RESOLUTION ON EL SALVADOR AT THE MEETING OF
THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN GENEVA. THE
SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD
VOTE NO OR AT LEAST ABSTAIN ON THIS RESOLUTION.
GENSCHER PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE QUESTION.

REPAIR OF EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

46. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE GERMAN
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER MBB CONDUCT REPAIRS ON EGYPTIAN
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. HE SAID HE HOPED THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO THIS CONTRACT.
GENSCHER NOTED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER
STRONG PRESSURE FROM MBB TO APPROVE THE CONTRACT. -
UNFORTUNATELY, SUCH REPAIRS FELL INTO THE SAME CATEGORY
AS ARMS SALES. GERMAN LAW FORBODE ARMS SALES TO AREAS
OF TENSION AND GENSCHER DID NOT SEE ANY CHANCE TO -
CHANGE THE GERMAN POSITION. HE ADDED THAT A REVISION
OF THIS EXPORT POLICY WAS NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN THE
BUNDESTAG. IF THE NEW-GUIDELINES WERE APPROVED, HE
WOULDSEE WHETHER THE EGYPTIAN PROJECT COULD BE
ACCOMMODATED. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT BELIEVE-THIS WOULD
BE THE CASE. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY TO UNDERSTAND THAT
ALL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST WERE VERY
DELICATE AT THE MOMENT. HE WISHED TO STATE HONESTLY
THAT HE HAD ARGUED STRONGLY DURING FEDERAL SEC RITY

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DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION THAT GERMAN ARMS SALES
POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST CONTINUE TO BE SEEN IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD THE
JEWISH PEOPLE. HAIG

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E. O. 12065: GDS 3/5/88 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO BERLIN
REFS: (A) BONN 3840, (B) USBERLIN 379, (C) STATE 52999,
(D) STATE 51807

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT, IN WHATEVER WAYS YOU
DEEM BEST, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME CONCERNING
HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BONN FOR THE NATO SUMMIT
WILL CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. IT WILL
ALSO SHOW THE PRESIDENT ACTING AS A WORLD LEADER WHOSE
RESPONSIBILITIES TRANSCEND NATO.

4. THESE BASIC PURPOSES WOULD BE STRENGTHENED
BY A PRESIDENTIAL APPEARANCE IN BERLIN. IN ESSENCE:
(A) THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENCE IN BERLIN WOULD EMPHASIZE
IN A DRAMATIC WAY THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF BERLIN. IT WOULD ALSO
SERVE AS A REMINDER OF THE STILL PRESENT SOVIET

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THREAT TO THE CITY.

(B) BERLIN WOULD PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH AN IDEAL
PLATFORM FOR ADDRESSING EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL
OR SOME MAJOR ASPECT OF THOSE RELATIONS. I SAY THIS
BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE POLITICAL SYMBOLISM THAT
ATTACHES TO BERLIN. THERE WOULD ALSO BE SOME
ADVANTAGE IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON FOREIGN
POLICY IN AN ENVIRONMENT THAT IS FREE FROM THE DIS-
TRACTIONS OF THE NATO SUMMIT.

(C) A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO BERLIN WOULD BE A USEFUL
REMINDER THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SPECIAL RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO GERMANY AND
CENTRAL EUROPE, QUITE APART FROM NATO.

(D) SINCE OTHER PRESIDENTS (KENNEDY, NIXON AND CARTER)
WENT TO BERLIN IN THE COURSE OF THEIR VISITS TO GERMANY,
IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED HERE THAT EVERY AMERICAN

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PRESIDENT HAS DONE THAT. THERE IS CONSEQUENTLY A WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL RESPECT TRADITION. A DECISION NOT TO VISIT BERLIN WOULD BE INTERPRETED IN MANY QUARTERS AS AN INDICATION OF DIMINISHED AMERICAN INTEREST IN BERLIN. THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS ALSO BE SOME WHO ASCRIBE THE OMISSION OF BERLIN TO FEAR OF DEMONSTRATIONS OR TO UNWILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET PRESENCE THERE DIRECTLY.

5. I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST A VISIT TO BERLIN.

(A) FIRST OF ALL, A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT WOULD PROVOKE DEMONSTRATIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT OCCURRED LAST SEPTEMBER DURING SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT. NOR CAN WE RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME VANDALISM OR EVEN PHYSICAL VIOLENCE. FURTHERMORE, THE MEDIA MIGHT FOCUS ON THE DEMONSTRATIONS AS A POPULAR REPUDIATION OF AMERICAN POLICY. I WOULD NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE BERLIN AUTHORITIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED IN THE PAST THEIR ABILITY TO CONTAIN PROVOCATEURS, AND WE SEE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A PERSONAL THREAT TO THE PRESIDENT OR HIS PARTY. TO BE SURE, AN UNFRIENDLY DEMONSTRATION WOULD BE REGRETTABLE; EVEN SO, IT MIGHT HAVE THE INCIDENTAL ADVANTAGE OF AWAKENING THE SILENT MAJORITY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND THAT EUROPE'S FREEDOM, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY DEPEND ON A STRONG AMERICAN PRESENCE IN GERMANY. IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD ANTICIPATE AN OUTPOURING OF SYMPATHY FROM THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MAJORITY OF BERLINERS WHO REALIZE THAT AMERICAN DETERMINATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL COURAGE ARE THE ONLY TRUE GUARANTORS OF BERLIN'S SECURITY AND FREEDOM.

(B) SECONDLY, I FULLY REALIZE THAT ADDING BERLIN TO THE PRESIDENT'S ALREADY CROWDED SCHEDULE WOULD INEVITABLY PLACE MORE EXACTING DEMANDS ON HIS TIME AND ENERGY. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE VISIT, HOWEVER, COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN ABOUT FIVE HOURS. THAT COULD INCLUDE, BESIDES THE TRAVEL TO AND FROM BERLIN, A MEETING WITH THE MAYOR AND OTHER CITY LEADERS, A SPEECH AT A GOLDEN BOOK CEREMONY, AND A BRIEF BUT ESSENTIAL VISIT TO THE WALL.

6. ON BALANCE, I URGE THE PRESIDENT TO INCLUDE BERLIN IN HIS PROGRAM. WE MUST NOT SHYAWAY FROM OUR RESPONSIBILITIES THERE IN THE FACE OF EITHER HOSTILE DEMONSTRATORS OR POSSIBLE SOVIET PRESSURE. THIS APPLIES WITH SPECIAL FORCE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHO HAS DISPLAYED GREATER PERSONAL COURAGE IN CONFRONTING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS THAN ANY AMERICAN

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/17/02 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M

TAGS: GE

SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, FEBRUARY 15.

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAD A TWO-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15. THIS REPORT COVERS ONLY ONE IMMEDIATE ITEM.

3. THE CHANCELLOR ASKED ME TO INFORM THE PRESIDENT THAT HE CONSIDERS HIS BUDGETARY POLICY DISASTROUS FOR EUROPE, THAT HE FEELS SURE THAT THE ENORMOUS U.S. BUDGET DEFICITS WILL KEEP INTEREST RATES AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL IN THE UNITED STATES, THAT THOSE HIGH AMERICAN INTEREST RATES ARE CAUSING AN OUTFLOW OF CAPITAL FROM EUROPE TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES ARE FALTERING AS A CONSEQUENCE, AND THAT A SEVERE WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC DEPRESSION WILL INEVITABLY TAKE PLACE IF THE U.S. DOES NOT REVISE ITS BUDGETARY PLANS. HE INDICATED THAT THE HEADS OF OTHER EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS,

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APPARENTLY MEANING BRITAIN AND FRANCE, SHARE HIS VIEW. THE CHANCELLOR HAS BEEN EXPRESSING SUCH VIEWS FOR SOME TIME, BUT THE URGENCY OF HIS TONE AND MANNER ON THIS ECONOMIC ISSUE IS NEW.

4. A WORD ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE ABOVE MESSAGE: ON FEBRUARY 11, THE CHANCELLOR AND I ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE NEWLY FORMED GERMAN-AMERICAN PARLIAMENT GROUP (CONSISTING OF SOME 120 MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG WHO HAVE JOINED IN AN EFFORT TO FOSTER FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS). AT THAT TIME THE CHANCELLOR TOLD ME THAT HE WAS PLANNING A PUBLIC ATTACK ON U.S. BUDGETARY POLICY. I STRONGLY WARNED HIM AGAINST ANY SUCH THING. I OBVIOUSLY HAVE HEADED THIS OFF--AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. BURNS

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