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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File
File Folder: Germany, FRG Vol. IV 1/1/82 – 9/30/82 (7)

Archivist: smf
FOIA ID: F97-030 (Friedrich)
Date: 06/06/00

DOCUMENT NO & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Blair to Clark re Coalition Breakup in Bonn 1p <i>R 6/20/01 NLS F97-030/2 #185</i>	9/7/82	P1/F1
2. memo	Bremer to Clark re Coalition Breakup in Bonn 1p <i>R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #186</i>	9/4/82	P1/F1
3. memo	Clark to RR re Cardinal Hoffner's letter 2p <i>R 6/20/01 NLS F97-030/2 #187</i>	8/9/82	P1/F1
4. memo	Dobriansky to Clark re Cardinal Hoffner's letter 2p <i>R 6/20/01 NLS F97-030/2 #188</i>	8/6/82	P1/F1
5. memo	Bremer to Clark re letter from Cardinal Hoffner 2p <i>R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #189</i>	8/4/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

MEMORANDUM

6211

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

September 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Rumors of Coalition Breakup in Bonn

Attached is the State Department's analysis of the possibilities for the current FRG government coalition breaking up. Rumors are flying thick and fast, but few observers are willing to make solid predictions at this point. (U)

There is little the United States can or should do to influence this situation. U.S.-German relations transcend individual party coalitions and it would be counter-productive to express any preference in the current overheated German political scene. (U)

Tab A State memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 #1885
BY hes NARA, DATE 7/6/01



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82 SEP 4 11:25

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Rumors of Coalition Breakup in Bonn

You will have seen renewed reports of tension within the governing coalition in Bonn and speculation that the Schmidt/Genscher alliance may soon break apart.

Aside from normal speculation, there is considerable evidence that both Helmut Kohl, the CDU candidate for Chancellor, and Foreign Minister Genscher do hope to put together a CDU/FDP coalition this fall. Genscher and other senior party leaders, including Lambsdorff, seem to have concluded that a jump to the CDU is the only way to stop the potentially catastrophic decline of the FDP in public opinion polls. Kohl probably realizes that if he does not succeed in bringing down the government within the next six to nine months, he personally will never be Chancellor.

Working against these hopes are other factors which raise questions about the ability of either Kohl or Genscher to get their way. A majority of the FDP parliamentary group appears to favor continuation of the coalition with the SPD. It is also open to question whether the rest of the CDU/CSU are interested in bargaining with Genscher at this time. With their high standing in the polls, they probably believe they could win an absolute majority in a new election and thus be freed of a burdensome coalition partner. A further consideration is that top CDU leaders and CSU Chairman Strauss do not want Kohl to become Chancellor. They know that the only way to block his candidacy is to delay elections until 1984.

Other possible developments include agreement by all parties to in fact hold new elections this fall. In addition to hesitation within the CDU, this course might be ruled out by fears in the FDP that the party would fall below the five percent of the vote required for representation in Parliament. Or the FDP could withdraw from the coalition, but would tolerate a minority SPD government. A key date continues to be the Hessian election on September 26. If the FDP does poorly, Genscher could gain enough support to force a move. If the party does well, the coalition will probably get another reprieve, until the next crisis blows in.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #186

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

BY Crj NARA, DATE 4/30/01

RECEIVED 07 SEP 82 09

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 SEP 82

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

SUBJECT: RUMORS OF COALITION BREAKUP IN BONN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 09 SEP 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

KRAEMER

MYER

COMMENTS

REF# 8226585

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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Clark1x7/7For InformationSEP 13 1982Clark notedDB

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)
cer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 17, 1982

Jan

Brian--

Could you get the attached letter resigned. As you can see from Tab B they called him "His Excellency" when it should be His Eminence.

As usual this is URGENT!

Thanks.

Carol Cleveland

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 AUG 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: HOFFNER, JOSEPH

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 10 AUG 82

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS

POLAND

AGREEMENT

SANCTIONS

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

UPDATE: 13 AUG 82

COMMENTS:

Michael E. Norton
FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER
STAFF SECRETARY

*Received in 5/5-I
8/12 at 10:11 A.M. (C2)*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 10, 1982

Dear Cardinal Hoeffner:

I recall with pleasure our conversation at Bruhl last June and wish to thank you for your kindness in forwarding to me the proposal from the Polish Episcopate for a multinational program designed to reinvigorate Polish private enterprise in agriculture and other fields.

Despite the economic sanctions of December 23, we have maintained an active program of humanitarian aid to the Polish people financed by the United States Government, charitable organizations and individuals. The proposal which you have forwarded to revive and develop the private sector in Polish agriculture and service trades and industries can be considered in this same humanitarian context.

I have asked that the documents you sent me be given careful study and analysis within our Government to determine both the economic feasibility in this period of severe constraint on United States Government expenditures and the practical problems of organization and administration which such an international effort might entail.

I will write to you again when we have completed our study of the proposed program. Please accept my sincere best wishes and my thanks for your courtesy in developing the ideas we discussed at Bruhl.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Eminence
Joseph Cardinal Hoeffner
President of the German Bishops'
Conference
Bonn

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 10, 1982

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I recall with pleasure our conversation at Bruhl last June and wish to thank you for your kindness in forwarding to me the proposal from the Polish Episcopate for a multinational program designed to reinvigorate Polish private enterprise in agriculture and other fields.

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Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Joseph Cardinal Hoffner
President of the German Bishops'
Conference
Bonn

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 10, 1982

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I recall with pleasure our conversation at Bruhl last June and wish to thank you for your kindness in forwarding to me the proposal from the Polish Episcopate for a multinational program designed to reinvigorate Polish private enterprise in agriculture and other fields.

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Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His ~~Excellency~~ *Eminence*
Joseph Cardinal ~~Hoffner~~ *HOEFFNER*
President of the German Bishops'
Conference
Bonn

S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8205463

RECEIVED 04 AUG 82 17

TO

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 AUG 82

HOFFNER, JOSEPH

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS

POLAND

AGREEMENT

SANCTIONS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smj NARA, Date 5/30/00

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES & DRAFT REPLY TO POLISH EPISCOPACY RE PRIVATE SECTOR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 11 AUG 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

NAU

ROBINSON

MCGAFFIGAN

PIPES

BAILEY

MYER

COMMENTS DUE TO SENSITIVE NATURE THIS PUBLIC MAIL IS NOT BEING FWD

TO SALLY KELLY

REF# 8222672

LOG

NSCIFID

(J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	X 8/9	to Clark for sig	8/9	
Pres	P 8/9	Gov signature		
	C 8/10	Pres sg'd ltr		
Dobriansky	8/10	Gov further action	8/11	NB
State	8/11	La Ouzgatch		Ad NB
DISPATCH	ed 8/11 mn		W/ATTCH	FILE <u>PH</u> (C) <u>N</u>

RECEIVED 04 AUG 82 17

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 AUG 82

HOFFNER, JOSEPH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By any NARA, Date 5/30/00

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By any NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS

POLAND

AGREEMENT

SANCTIONS

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES & DRAFT REPLY TO POLISH EPISCOPACY RE PRIVATE SECTOR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 06 AUG 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~BALLEY~~

NAU

ROBINSON

MCGAFFIGAN

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

MYER

M.C. 8/30/82

COMMENTS DUE TO SENSITIVE NATURE THIS PUBLIC MAIL IS NOT BEING FWD

TO SALLY KELLY

REF# 8222672

LOG

NSCIFID

(J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

RECEIVED

Package # 5463

82 AUG 9 P 5: 39

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>DOBRIANSKY</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Pres sgd ltr

Check Dec 13 date in 2nd P of letter. It should be about Dec 29 or maybe a few days earlier on Poland vs Soviet sanctions.

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 AUG 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: HOFFNER, JOSEPH

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 10 AUG 82

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS POLAND

AGREEMENT


SANCTIONS

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 13 AUG 82

COMMENTS:


FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER
STAFF SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 10, 1982

Dear Cardinal Hoffner:

I recall with pleasure our conversation at Bruhl last June and wish to thank you for your kindness in forwarding to me the proposal from the Polish Episcopate for a multinational program designed to reinvigorate Polish private enterprise in agriculture and other fields.

Despite the economic sanctions of December 23, we have maintained an active program of humanitarian aid to the Polish people financed by the United States Government, charitable organizations and individuals. The proposal which you have forwarded to revive and develop the private sector in Polish agriculture and service trades and industries can be considered in this same humanitarian context.

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I will write to you again when we have completed our study of the proposed program. Please accept my sincere best wishes and my thanks for your courtesy in developing the ideas we discussed at Bruhl.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Joseph Cardinal Hoffner
President of the German Bishops'
Conference
Bonn

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FRAN - CHANGE

DATE -

Econ. sanctions
imposed on

Dec. 23 —

2nd paraq.
of letter

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

August 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner's Letter

Issue: Letter to you from Cardinal Hoffner, President of the German Bishops' Conference, which forwards three papers on Poland.

Facts: Cardinal Hoffner's undated letter to you (Tab B) provides an account of a conversation you had with him at the NATO-Council reception in Bruhl, Germany, on June 9, 1982, regarding the current Polish situation and the Polish Episcopacy's recommended relief measures for private sector agriculture and related economic fields. Specifically, his letter requests that you give consideration to the Polish Episcopacy's private sector assistance program.

In this regard, he forwarded three papers. The first paper drafted by the Cardinal (Tab C - "On the Situation in Poland"), is an account of his extensive discussions with the Polish Primate on current Polish developments and the need for an assistance program for private sector agriculture. The other two papers were drafted by the Polish Episcopate. One (Tab D - "Assistance Program") assesses the impact of U.S. sanctions on Poland, evaluates the situation of the Polish agricultural sector and related economic fields, and recommends an Alliance five-year \$2.02 billion "Poland Recovery Plan" to aid private agriculture. It also asserts that the Polish government has indicated it would not hinder such a church-initiated and -supported program.

The third paper (Tab E - "Theses of the Social Council") does not deal with the proposed recovery plan but rather outlines the Church's position on how to resolve the current political and economic crisis in Poland and how to achieve "a social understanding between society and government." It is a comprehensive account of the Church's stance on martial law and Solidarity's role. Essentially, it restates that Solidarity should be strictly a labor union movement and refrain from political extremism, and that the government should "democratize" the political processes and institute economic reforms.

Discussion: Presently, a unilateral U.S. program to assist the Polish private agricultural sector has been initiated by NSC and is receiving interagency consideration. Thus, the Polish Episcopate's proposals potentially can be compatible with our effort in that the Church could provide the appropriate infrastructure in Poland to implement a private sector program.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OARD

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 #187
BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/6/01

A suggested reply (Tab A) mentions that careful review and consideration of the Church's proposal will be made by the Administration and that upon its completion you will send the Cardinal a follow-up letter. Speechwriters have cleared the text.

RECOMMENDATION:

Yes No That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

Attachments

Tab A	Proposed response to Cardinal Hoffner
Tab B	Letter from Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner
Tab C	Cardinal's paper - "On the Situation in Poland"
Tab D	Polish Episcopate's "Assistance Program"
Tab E	Polish Episcopate's "Theses of the Social Council..."

DER VORSITZENDE
DER DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ

Postanschrift:
Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz
Kaiserstraße 163
5300 BONN

Jr. Nr. V 7223/82

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Sir,

please allow me first of all to thank you once again for having given me the opportunity to talk to you during the official reception on the occasion of the meeting of the NATO-Council at "Schloß Augustusburg" in Brühl on June, 9 1982.

On that day you had given me the chance to give you a report on the discussions I had held with the Polish Primate during my visit to Poland and which primarily had been about the present situation in Poland and the considerations of the Polish Episcopacy on relief measures for the benefit of the private-enterprise agriculture, handicraft, trade and in the field of the services.

At the end of our animated conversation you had asked me to set down the considerations put forward in writing and to have them sent to you personally.

Today I take leave to send you the results of my discussions with the Polish Primate and with several Polish bishops, which you will find in the enclosed report "On the Situation in Poland".

A few days ago the Polish Primate has sent to me a personal representative who delivered a paper dealing with "Reflections concerning an assistance programme for private-sector agriculture and the fields connected therewith (handicraft, trade and services)". I take leave to enclose this paper to this letter too.

The Polish Primate has asked me now to sound out and to discuss in confidential preliminary talks with responsible persons of the European Community and the United States the question whether the member states of the European Community and the United States would possibly be willing to dispense with the sanctions relating to the private-sector agriculture and to take relief measures which seem appropriate to promote the private-enterprise field of Poland's national economy.

I personally would appreciate it very much if the considerations of the Polish Primate and the Polish Episcopacy were received benevolently on the part of the member states of the European Community and the United States.

Along with the Polish Primate I am very much obliged to you, Sir, for your promise to accept these considerations. It would be a great honour for me if you were able to submit the enclosed reflections to an examination.

For your difficult duties the execution of which means such a great responsibility I implore God's blessings for you.

Very respectfully yours

+ Joseph Carl. Hoffner

(President of the German Bishops' Conference)

ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND

and reflections of the Polish Episcopacy concerning an assistance program for private agriculture and the economic fields connected therewith (handicraft, trade and services)

1. General Characterization
2. The Position of the Church
3. The Attitude of the Polish Episcopacy towards the Sanctions of the West
4. An Assistance Program for Private-Sector Agriculture is necessary

1. General Characterization

The proclamation of martial law on December 13, 1981 has been a shock for all Poles.

The Polish military government meets with the general disapproval of all social strata. This is especially true for the workers. And the Polish youth, in particular, in all its social strata is full of deep anger and radically denies itself to the regime. The youth looks forward to the future without hope and does not see, above all, any chance to solve the present socio-economic problems within the political system as it was before August 1980. The influential circles of the intelligentsia too refuse to co-operate with the military government.

In the eyes of the population Poland's Communist Party has discredited and totally compromised itself. At present it presumably passes through the most serious crisis of its history.

It has been the declared aim of December 13, 1981 to restore the party as the 'leading force' within state and society and to put through a 'socialist renewal', i.e. 'a consequent realization of the socialist system'. While with regard to this goal all groups within the party are agreed, the two most important groups take a different view concerning the

way of reaching this aim:

- (1) In the eyes of the present military government only by restoring at least a certain reliability of the party the socialist system can find general acceptance. Therefore the present rulers still declare to carry out economic reforms and to aim at a democratic administration style - i.e. a lot of what the trade union "Solidarity" has been striving for. There are certain first signs to be observed: such as the raising of prices and wages; some few decisions relating to personnel policy; administrative reforms in the field of the single business enterprises (e.g. classical structures of the central administrative economy have been considerably reduced); some of the laws which have been agreed upon with "Solidarity" have been ratified in Parliament after December 13, 1981, though not fully.
- (2) The uncompromising group - the so-called "doctrinarian forces" within the party press for a recantation of all liberties which had been granted since August 1980 and want to put through the socialist system consequently and mercilessly, including the struggle against the Church. At present a lot points to a recovery of the "doctrinarian forces"; a downfall of the present leaders by no means seems to be impossible. It is a common belief that a successor will belong to the "doctrinarian forces" and will be successful only "with the help of a foreign power", i.e. by means of an invasion of the Warsaw Pact. We were reminded of the fact that also the 13th of December 1981 had surprised everyone, and as far as this is known, even the Western secret services. What speaks against a victory of the "doctrinarian forces" are the efforts of the Soviet Union to protect its essential interests - that Poland remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, to safeguard the strategic lines towards the West, to secure the socialist system within the country - in a

way which burdens Moscow only with a slight odium in Poland and in the West. In such a case the present leaders within the party gradually would find general acceptance within the party and bring about an understanding with the various social groups, including "Solidarity". This view starts out from the fact that Moscow reconciles itself to Poland's special features and accepts a certain special position as long as the three mentioned "essentials" seem to be guaranteed.

2. The Position of the Church

As in the past the Church also today unreservedly enjoys the people's complete confidence. Its episcopacy has adhered to full independence of the military government. And until now the military government has not tried to interfere in the internal affairs of the Church. To this very day the military government in no way has restricted the social activities of the Church. It considers the Church as an important factor for the internal peace of society.

The Church, and above all the episcopacy, feels responsible for the future and the fate of the Polish people. It has been like this under Cardinal Wyszyński and it is still like that under the present primate Archbishop Glemp. Just as his predecessor Primate Glemp in full accord with the entire episcopacy particularly strives for the following aims:

- (1) An understanding between the present rulers within party and state and all social groups.

Already in the Communiqué of that General Assembly of March 1982, the Polish Episcopacy has laid down the main aspects of a practical program for "social understanding"; later on these aspects have been developed in greater detail in the "Theses" of the Primate's Social Council.

Before being published they have been accepted by the entire episcopacy; they have been enclosed hereto. The interned leaders of 'Solidarity' have declared their explicit consent to these "theses", even to the critical parts concerning 'Solidarity'.

The basic concern of these "theses" is the emphatical demand for personal human rights and the national rights of the people.

(2) Dialogue instead of violence

The bishops constantly warn the military leaders as well as the various social groups of violence and all steps which could lead to civil war and thereby to an intervention from outside. They avoid all public controversy and public pressure on the rulers in order not to give the "doctrinarian forces" within the party any reason for intervention which would aggravate and worsen the situation which is so extremely critical anyhow.

The bishops are in direct contact with the interned union leaders, especially with Walesa. The judgement of the situation as well as the decision on the actions to be taken as a result is made on the basis of the discussions with them. The prominent leaders of 'Solidarity' who are still in internment camps on the whole support the course of the episcopacy.

Although the Church takes a critical view of certain extreme statements and initiatives of 'Solidarity' it still strives to save the substantial concerns and values of 'Solidarity'; therefore it again and again asks for the restoration of 'Solidarity' on the basis of the valid status.

Until today, the joint efforts of the Church and the interned leaders of 'Solidarity' still have been successful in convincing the overwhelming majority of the population of the necessity of an understanding between government

and the various social groups; i.e. that this cannot be reached by violence but only by means of talks and negotiations.

3. The Attitude of the Polish Episcopacy towards the Sanctions of the West

- (1) If at all, these sanctions should be for those member states of the Warsaw Pact which since August 1980 in a very brutal way have interfered in the internal affairs of the Polish people and have even threatened with invasion under the pretext of saving socialism. It is well-known which countries have exerted the haviest pressure on Poland.
- (2) Sanctions, therefore, should especially be for these countries and not for the Polish population. That is why the representatives of the Polish Episcopacy in the Joint Commission of episcopacy and government after detailed discussions and a unanimous decision within the General Assembly of the Episcopacy have declared twice before the said commission: these sanctions against Poland strike the Polish people, they delay and aggravate the solution of the crisis.
- (3) Due to the decades of state-controlled maladministration Poland's economic situation - which today is on the brink of an economic disaster - above all has been aggravated by the credit difficulties conditioned by this maladministration and finally and even more dramatically, due to the sanctions has been turned into a rather hopeless situation. This has had a devastating effect on the entire economy; they can be directly felt in the unemployment of so many young people and in the supply situation that still becomes even more precarious.

The government again and again declares in public and also in the Joint Commission: "We won't bow to a political dictate of the West". According to the view of the Polish government the Western entrepreneurs are dependent on the trade with the Eastern countries anyhow, so that they soon will force the lifting of the restrictions or will bypass them more and more; it is said that already now there were signs pointing to this.

4. An Assistance Program for Private-Sector Agriculture is necessary

The Polish bishops do not fail to see the difficulties with which those political forces in the West are confronted which advocate a total lifting of the sanctions against Poland. On the other hand the bishops, being conscious of their responsibility for the Polish people, consider it their duty to advocate emphatically the lifting of those sanctions which strike Poland's private economy, i.e. above all, agriculture, 80 per cent of which are still privately owned, but also those sanctions, which strike the firms working for agriculture in the fields of handicraft, trade and services. The West rather should restore and strengthen the productivity of these fields in particular by means of a comprehensive assistance program. After detailed discussions with several experts the bishops have come to the conviction that such an assistance program will relieve immediate distress, strengthen self-initiative by help for self-help, introduce a recovery of economy from its roots, encourage the population and promote not least Poland's independency.

Talks between episcopacy and government at top level as well as at ministerial level have lead to the following result: the present government would not impede such a Church- initiated and -supported assistance program for the said private-enterprise sector. The Polish bishops have cause for being convinced that even in the case of a take-over by the "doctrinarian

forces" private agriculture will continue to exist and the planned assistance program will be carried on. Along with experts the bishops have planned the outlines of such an assistance program, which seems to be appropriate to give immediate impulse to the productivity of private economy in Poland; a program that at the most can be understood as an indirect aid to the system, for which, however, due to the nobler goal aimed at, the Polish Episcopacy considers itself able to assume responsibility.

July 14, 1982

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Assistance Program

for private agriculture and the private-enterprise sector
connected therewith in handicraft, trade and service

1. Concept

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Assistance Program for Private Agriculture and the
Private-Enterprise Sectors Connected Therewith in Handicraft,
Trade and Services

1. Concept

1.1 On the situation of private agriculture and the private-
enterprise sectors connected therewith

- 80 per cent of Poland's agricultural acreage are privately-owned.
- Just so, there are considerable fields of private handicraft, private trade and a private field of services.
- Yet the various governments have dreadfully neglected Poland's private-sector economy, so that due to a total undercapitalization neither mechanization nor rationalization had been realized, a fact that has lead to an extremely low agricultural productivity. This lacking productivity has been rigified even more by refusing any kind of structural promotional measures. The hectic and one-sided industrialization to the disadvantage of agriculture, handicraft, trade as well as of the entire rural areas additionally support urbanization and aggravate the economic and cultural impoverishment of the agricultural sector and the rural areas. For example, the average size of the agricultural enterprises in Poland amounts to 5 ha.

1.2 Aims of the planned assistance program

- (1) By means of 'help for self-help' initiating a developing process that has its own dynamics.
- (2) Above all, the following shall be reached:
 - to overcome the tight supply situation
 - to increase the productivity of private agriculture by improving the necessary infrastructures
 - to initiate thereby a rehabilitation of national economy from its roots
 - to encourage and arouse self-initiative in order to overcome de-motivation
- (3) The episcopacy is prepared for a responsible co-operation under this assistance program.

- since the state and other institutions for various reasons will be unsuitable for the implementation of such an assistance program
- because Church feels responsible for the people and considers the realization of the Catholic social teaching as its task
- and because there is a direct pastoral interest: when striving for the necessary adaptive process of private economy the way of thinking necessarily will have to change (more economic and rational thinking), which shall not, however, lead to a loss of religiousness and of the close ties with Church.

1.3 What kind of aid is envisaged?

- (1) Procurement of money
- (2) Procurement of the necessary means of production, such as seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, equipment - and above all spare parts - veterinarian aid and not least procurement of modern methods of rationalization

NB: Here, it has to be examined whether the means of production will have to be imported from the West or whether it will be possible to create the conditions for a production of the means of production in Poland itself.

- (3) Procurement and exchange of experience ("to know how").

According to the provisional estimates set up by experts of the Polish Episcopacy this aid should cover about 10 per cent of the present input in all sectors of the Polish economy. This would mean about 1 thousand million German Marks. Accordingly a five-year assistance program would require about 5 thousand million German Marks.

1.4 Organization of this assistance program in Poland

- (1) For this program a new organization shall be created which works for the various professional groups and is born by the farmers themselves in consultation with professors and other consultants and it shall work under the responsible co-operation of the episcopacy.

- (2) The allocation of money and means of production would be attached to conditions which guarantee the setting up of an own dynamic development program.
- (3) All aid which in the form of credits is given directly to the enterprises, though at a reasonable price, has to be paid for, in order to use the proceeds for the creation of an investment fund, which will allow new investments of structural promotion.

1.5 Where shall these means come from?

- (1) One has thought of three possible sources in the Western countries, namely:
 1. Church funds (as for example, offertory, contributions, collections of the Church associations)
 2. private economy (single companies, associations of professional groups, banking houses)
 3. contributions of the EC-countries and the United States

NB: Perhaps it is a realistic proposal to think about a quarter of the funds to come from Church funds, another quarter from private economy and the remaining 50 per cent from the member states of the European Community and the United States.
- (2) The assistance program to a far extent shall consist of lost contributions but also of credits.
- (3) Resulting from hitherto considerations it has become obvious that it will be necessary to set up a special organization for the development and management of this assistance program, i. e.
 1. at church level (certainly with the co-operation of the Catholic associations)
 2. at Western European level with the inclusion of the USA

NB: This assistance program shall become a model, similar to that which has proved successful in the "European Recovery Program" (ERP, Marshall-plan), i. e. a kind of Church-organized "Poland Recovery Program (PRP)".

2. Problems of the private agriculture in Poland

2.1 Survey on the changes in the agrarian structure since 1945

The agrarian structure of Polish agriculture underwent very deep processes of changes. In 1945/46, after the Agrarian Reform Act about 40% of the agricultural land which was belonging to land-lords and had an area over 50 and 100 hectare have been divided between agricultural laborers or small holders. Thus, over one million of families benefitted from this reform. At that time over 50% of the professionally active population have been engaged in agriculture. Then a longer process of industrialization and a large rural-urban migration took place, particularly if we mention also high rates of population growth. The process of industrialization was mainly based on the economic and human exploitation of the agricultural sector. As a result of this the economic and social gap between the rural and urban area has been relatively increased. If we add the different efforts for development of the socialist sector in agriculture like progressive taxes and obligatory marketing, limited investment and lack of political and social perspectives there were no effective initiatives for improving the agrarian structure. Thus, during this long period of over 35 years there were no intensive changes in the agrarian structure except an increasing number of small farms with an area to 2 hectare and a decreasing number of medium size farms of 2 to 7 hectare.

2.2 Basic informations on Polish agriculture

(1) In the total area of the country of 31.267 thousand hectare the land used agriculturally represents 19.151 thousand hectare (61.2%). Forests take 8.631 thousand hectare (27.6%), the remaining 11.2% consist of waters, unused areas or used for other purposes. The area used

agriculturally is composed of 14.700 thousand hectare (76.9%) of arable land, 4.000 thousand hectare (20.9%) meadows and pastures and 250 thousand hectare (1.3%) orchards. Calculated per one inhabitant the area of agriculturally used land is 0.56 ha. and 0.45 ha. of arable land per person. This is three times more than in the Netherlands, nearly the same as in Denmark and three times less than in the United States and in the Soviet Union. The climatic conditions can be described as a typical temperate climatic zone. The soils are relatively poor, about 60% of the agricultural land are light and sundry soils which require good agro-technics and intensive fertilization. The main group of crops cultivated are grains which cover roughly 52.6%, potatoes 17% and sugar beet 3.8% of arable land. During the last three years the average yields were as follows: grains 26 q per hectare, potatoes 170 and sugar beet 280. Thus, the average yields are roughly one third lower than in the most Western European countries. Respectively in animal production, the number of animal heads per hundred hectare of agriculturally used land are as follows: cattle 67, porks 110 and horses 10. The average milk production per cow is only 2750 liters per year.

In summary it should be stressed that the physical and biological features of Polish agriculture represent very high potentials which are presently not fully used.

- (2) In Polish agriculture there are three forms of ownership of the production means, namely private, state and cooperative ownership. At present ca. 80% of the agricultural land is used by the private sector, 18.5% by the state and 1.5% by cooperative farms.

- (3) The private sector amounts 2.9 million farms (over 0.5 hectare with an average size of 4.8 hectare 6.7 hectare if the farms of 2 hectares are excluded. The farms from 0.5 to 2 hectare amount ca. 1.5 million and most of them are kept by part-time farmers. Only less than 0.5 million farms (15%) have more than 10 hectare of land; this is an area which in Polish conditions secures full employment for the average families labor force as well as the proper level of income.
- (4) The population of Poland increased from 23.6 million in 1946 to 35.5 million in 1980. That is a growth of twelve million or 50%. Such large growth was the result of a high birth rate and a decrease of infant mortality. During this period large internal migrations took place. In 1966 the urban population for the first time equalled the rural population. Presently 58% of the population is urban. The economically active population amounts to about 16.5 million people and 4.3 million people or 26% work in agriculture.
- (5) The main social economic features of Polish agriculture mentioned above indicate the tremendous needs for rationalization but also the possibility of increasing productivity. This sector of economy and the rural society could be the main forces of economic and social recovery.

2.3 Main barriers of agricultural development

In spite of the great national and human potentiality Polish agriculture did not achieve the level which could satisfy the country needs.

The main barriers of its development were as follows:

- (1) Inadequate supply of necessary means of production and particularly such as pesticides, agricultural machines and tools, fertilizers, qualified seeds, veterinary medicines and others.
- (2) Even those available means were often used ineffectively because of inadequate development of technical and social infrastructure like roads, drainage and supply of water, transportation, storage and food processing, but also farmers' organization and consulting service.
- (3) The lack of prospectives for the future development of family farms caused negative selection of young, better educated and active people.
- (4) Unrational agrarian structure and lack of land consolidation program, where emotional reservations against the consolidation of arable land etc. also played a role.
- (5) The low rentability of agricultural production caused a lack of initiatives for increasing productivity.
- (6) Bureaucratic and centralized system of management.
- (7) Ineffective and underdeveloped system of agricultural education and consulting service.

2.4 The outlines of the assistance program

- (1) Taking in account the above factors there is strong believe that at the present situation Polish agriculture and the other private sectors such as handicraft and services, private business and small scale industry urgently need an extensive economic help.
- (2) The main objective of such a help should be the implementation of the long term program of economic

and social development of private economy with special emphasis on agriculture.

- (3) As a result of the agreement between the Trade Union of Individual Farmers, "Solidarity", and the government, recently a new amendment for the Civil Codex has been approved by the parliament. The amendment guarantees equal economic and social conditions for all sectors of economy. Thus, the private sector in agriculture is considered as a permanent component of the political and economic system.
- (4) The funds of the program should be particularly used for supplying and improving the following items:
 - import or help for developing the production in the country of those means of production which presently are in short such as pesticides, machines and spare parts, qualified seeds, veterinary medicines and others;
 - to ensure donation and credits for improving agricultural infrastructure and particularly transport, storage and food processing;
 - to make available credits for improving the agrarian structure and for a land consolidation;
 - to ensure special initiatives for young farmers;
 - to support new professional organizations and institutions;
 - to support the improvement of agricultural education and consulting service.

3. Strategy of the program including a cost estimate for a five-year program

The basic ideas of the program and its starting point is the activation of suitable farm enterprises (of 10 hectare and more in size). From this activation will result the necessities of accompanying and supporting measures (setting up of infrastructures, organizational aid, capacity of skilled workers), which have to be set proportionally to the activation measures in the select enterprises. The speed of the course of the entire activation program depends on the available means and on the capacity of the organizations executing it.

3.1 Activation of the enterprises from 10 hectare onwards

- (1) The activation of the private farm enterprises of a minimum size of 10 hectare shall be made by the allocation of working credits, an improvement of their equipment with machines and technical devices, an improvement of their infrastructures, as well as by consulting. As a result automatic impulses (job offer, search for services, motivation effect) will start out from these activated enterprises to the great number of smaller farms. The minimum size of 10 hectare is a necessary precondition since only from 10 hectare onwards an appropriate use of money and labour will be possible under the given conditions.
- (2) There are about 500.000 of such enterprises which would come into consideration as starting point. When calculating with 10.000 German Marks per hectare on the country average for this intensive impulse and when starting with about 10 per cent of the enterprises a capital of 500 mill. German Marks will be required which will be allocated as graded medium-term credits. Later on further enterprises will be activated with the help of the refluxes.

- (3) Due to the fact that these refluxes will start after three years at the earliest, a continuation of the credit granting of the initial amount will be necessary also in the second and third year. Accordingly, during the first three years about 1.5 thousand million Marks should be available for these activation measures. Therewith about 30% of the farms coming into consideration would be reached. Beginning with the fourth year the further activation of additional farms should be possible with the help of the refluxes of the revolving-fund to be created.
- (4) It is easily possible that a more modest beginning (about 2 or 3 per cent of the enterprises instead of 10 per cent in the first year) and later on a more rapid increase of the quota would be better. (Capacity of the organizations involved). In this connection it may not, however, be overlooked that this activation must have a certain minimum size also in the beginning, in order to call forth a distinct motivation effect. That is to say, also a more modest beginning would not alter the necessary total amount.

3.2 External accompanying measures

- (1) It will be probably necessary to combine the activation of the enterprises with an improvement of the external infrastructure.
- (2) What seems particularly important is the improvement of the storage capacity, i.e. for the distribution of the working means as well as for an improved marketing handling.
- (3) Due to the fact that at the moment the entire service sector in the rural areas is inexistent, it will be necessary to re-establish the corresponding plants (workshops etc.) and to staff them.

- (4) On the whole a total sum of 50 per cent of the activation costs at least will be necessary for the external measures, i.e. about 750 mill. German Marks during the first three years.

3.3 Training of skilled workers

- (1) The internal measures as well as the infrastructural ones require the training of the corresponding skilled workers. In the present state of considerations it will be difficult to estimate the means being necessary for this sector. They surely will, however, amount to about 500 mill. German Marks for a five-year program.
- (2) It is a precondition for this relatively low amount for consulting and training, that informal education measures will be executed for which no extra infrastructures have to be established. Besides, in the present situation in Poland non-formal consulting and training programs would be more appropriate.
- (3) What will be very important furthermore is the training of the skilled workers of the cooperative societies - a necessity for a program that is conceived as 'help for self-help'.

3.4 Cost estimate

If beginning with the fourth year the activation of the appropriate fields can be met out of a revolving fund to be established until then and if, however, the development of the infrastructure and the training measures have to be met during the entire five years by lost contributions, theoretically financial requirements of 3.25 thousand million German Marks have to be expected. De facto, however, the financial requirements will be higher, since in addition thereto one has to reckon with considerable costs for advance financing, allocation of working funds, transport,

planning, etc. Moreover, a certain reserve has to be guaranteed when doing the financial planning.

For a five-year program one probably can start out from financial requirements of about 5 thousand million German Marks.

July 14, 1982

"Theses of the Social Council with the Primate on the question about a social understanding."

The decisions of December 13, 1981 have created a new historical situation in Poland. In the period following August 1980 a feeling full of hope had characterized the Polish society: looking forward hopefully that our state - within the framework of the existing political system and the binding international agreements - will become a country in which society regains its subject character, takes active interest in public life, exerts real influence on the functioning of state, have the possibility to supervise the state's actions and after August 1980 to make use of the enlarged field of civil liberties. The proclamation of martial law as well as the suspension of basic civil rights for the great majority of the Polish population has been the breakdown of this hope and has resulted in bitterness and a state of depression. As always under similar historical circumstances society expects Church to give spiritual help, moral consolation and the protection of the cultural traditions of our nation.

The Polish bishops who had convened on the 183th Plenary Commission, in their communiqué of February 26, 1982 - deeply concerned about the nation's fate - referred to the necessity to come to a social understanding. This communiqué has been accepted by the Poles with deep emotion. They consider it an orientation and an indication to a possible way out.

The Social Council with the Primate has been called together by Primate Józef Glemp with reference to an old tradition that dates back to the time of Primate Hlond. The main tasks of this council are to give expert opinions and to serve the Primate of Poland to whom it presents the results of his work.

The episcopacy's idea of a new, internal social understanding - after the example of the social contract of August 1980 - has to be developed and put into more concrete terms. The Social Council with the Primate offers its proposals to this question.

1. If this social agreement, the understanding between state and society, shall represent a way out of the present political deadlock it has to find general acceptance by society. This acceptance will only be reached if society gets convictions and guarantees that its hope has not totally been destroyed once and for all. This social contract could be concluded between state power and the corresponding independent representation of organized social groups. The setting up of these agreements shall be jointly made by the representatives of real social and opinion leading forces, i.e. representatives of the trade unions - and here particularly those of the numerically most influential one, the independent self-governing union 'Solidarność', those of the Farmers' Union and of the Handicraft Union, representatives of science and culture, the associations of those engaged on the cultural sector and of the youth. Under our special conditions it will be necessary that Church too takes part in the setting up of these agreements,

The subject-matter of a national understanding or detailed agreements - which will make up this understanding - must be conditions, method and date for the reactivation of the suspended unions and other organizations, conditions, method and date for the lifting of the present restrictions of the state of war and for the restoration of civil rights, some important legislative proposals, as well as a general programme for the reform and renewal of social and economic life.

The political and legal importance as well as the form of such agreements would be of a special kind; they would be atypical and unusual acts and - as required - they could comprise a broader or a smaller field. They don't have to regulate everything. But it has to be pointed out particularly that the situation in Poland is an extraordinary and tragic one. It requires extraordinary means. The deep and still deepening splitting between state power and society, the expansion of signs of hostility and even hate in the situation of a severe crises require the form of a social agreement, that convinces people and guarantees the process

On the other hand, such an understanding should strengthen the position of state power and enable it to fight successfully against the crisis. In this connection it has to be stated that the state of war has been caused especially by the weakness and the threatening to the structures of state and system, though this had not been the only possibility to save it and though it had caused a lot of evil.

To be effective, a social agreement should comply with the following two conditions:

- a) it must be concluded between state power and people of social authority, who in this case also have the meaning of a symbol as well as represent serious social groups.
- b) As a result, facts have to be established and guarantees have to be presented that the way of agreement and of national understanding will be a lasting factor for the normalization of life in Poland.

An important precondition for the effectiveness of the agreement must be a declaration stating that all social agreements concluded in 1980 will be performed; otherwise the negotiation on a new understanding would be absolutely untrustworthy. In his speech of December 13, 1981 the Chairman of the Military Council for National Rescue (WRON) underlined the respect for these agreements; the same did the 'Sejm' of the People's Republic of Poland in its resolution of January 25, 1982.

2. It must be the basis of an understanding that state power recognizes the subject character of society, that it respects the fact of the existence of an independent public opinion; that state power understands and acknowledges that there is no way out of the crisis unless one comes to a dialogue and an understanding with society about the most important questions.

On the other hand it is an indispensable precondition for internal stabilization that society understands the requirements of the system and the objective situation of the country, as well as its determinacy by the existing international

treaties. The communiqué of the 183th meeting of the Bishops' Conference speaks of the necessity to be realistic in judging the consequences of the geopolitical situation of our country. These are words of great importance. The real problems of the Polish nation have to be solved within the framework of the historical conditions. No state power in Poland would be absolutely free in solving its problems; the present government too does not have this freedom, a fact that must dictate deliberation and visual estimate to society.

3. In the communiqué of the 183th meeting of the Polish Bishops' Conference urgent demands of society have been mentioned in detail which definitely represent essential preconditions for internal peace. An indispensable condition is the fast continuation in releasing the internees, as well as a guarantee for free return to those persons who hide themselves for fear of political repressions.

Society expects an amnesty for those persons who have been condemned for acts that cannot be find in the penal code, which, however, after the introduction of the state of war have been treated as 'offering of resistance'.

The personal repressions and the loss of job due to one's personal conviction or one's membership in 'Solidarność' quite naturally contradict the demand for a social agreement and the requirement of justice. Such repressions, wherever applied, have to stop and be forbidden; those who have lost their job for this reason have to return to their working place. And what is to be contradicted furthermore are all those printing attempts which shall make people leave their country, especially when being given to internees - meaning that there were an alternative: emigration or loss of liberty.

Essential steps into the direction of a normalization of state life must be the restoration of a free working of the cultural, creative and scientific associations. What has to be restored furthermore is the freedom of action for all

clubs of the Catholic intelligentsia, which have existed on December 13, 1981; and one has to allow the republication of all organs of the Catholic press which have existed on that day. A solution as it has been applied to the Polish Association of Journalists contradicts the demands for a social reconciliation and deepens embitterment.

4. A basic goal of a social understanding must be the removal of barriers which exist between state power and society. Provided a social agreement will be reached there will be the question of social structures which would lead to an increased participation of the people in the decisions concerning public affairs and to a contact between state and society.

Within the framework of an increased participation of the social factor in state life the creation of consulting organs with the government or the Sejm might be useful, provided that such commissions consist of people who have been delegated by independent social organizations and have a guaranteed right to express their opinions in the mass media without any restrictions.

Further necessities are a reorientation of society as well as a presentation of perspectives, the demonstration of a new kind of civil activity and a democratic direction of changes. This can only be self-government in the comprehensive and full understanding of this term.

A starting point could be elections to the national councils at the lowest level. Such elections must have the character of self-government in its full sense and may not be politically determined. Therefore it would not be wise to combine these elections with those to the Sejm or the vaivodeships where the political element cannot be eliminated.

The population must get the possibility to choose its local authorities without any restrictions. Therefore the possibility to nominate a candidate must be given. And it had to be a principle of social understanding that the political element will be eliminated in these elections.

These elections for self-government should be combined with the lifting of the state of war. Yet, one has to make decisions and preparations on this matter already now.

5. A dangerous phenomenon that poisons the life of the Polish nation is the spread of hate. There is no justification for hate and there never will be one, not even in those cases where understandable traumata and anger have come into existence. All Christians, and above all the clergy, have to stand up against it.

Social resistance in the face of the state of war can take the form of acts of violence, which might lead into the vicious circle of terror and repressions. These acts have to be thoroughly condemned. Attempts to work against them will be successful if at the same time a process of internal easing of tension and national understanding can be initiated. A basic precondition for a successful fight against hate and the traumata on both sides is a fundamental change in the orientation of the official propaganda in the mass media, which by fighting against all phenomena and achievements of the broad movement of renewal of the last months, offends society and sets it against state power.

6. The moral problems resulting from the present situation are particularly experienced by the Polish youth. The failure of hope and the fact that no way out of the crisis is in sight leads to rebellion.

In its great majority the youth shows an oppositional attitude, is embittered and driven by the fever of action. Methods of repression cannot do anything against it. Therefore, the Polish Bishops' Conference with good reason has raised the problem of autonomous youth associations. A very urgent matter is the setting up of independent organizations of the students, above all self-help organizations. The lacking of special organizations is one of the main reasons for the unrest among the young people.

7. One of the most important fields waiting for positive solutions is the trade union movement. In the general opinion of the Polish society there won't be any preconditions for a realization of a social understanding and an effective fight against the crisis without the reactivation of the existing unions, above all, the Independent Self-governed Union 'Solidarność', which enjoys the broad support of the population. It seems, however, that at the present moment the authorities do not have a clear concept of action with regard to 'Solidarność', and the Committee of the Council of Ministers for Union Questions has not made any constructive proposals concerning this question. The text published by the committee gives the impression that one evades the social dialogue on a national understanding. It is an urgent necessity this question will be dealt with.

In the opinion of broad social circles there is no other way to come to an understanding than the performance of the social contracts concluded in 1980. The first key point of the social contracts had been the establishment of independent trade unions which work within the framework of the constitution of the People's Republic of Poland. On this basis, in accordance with the Convention No. 87 of the International Labour Organization, 'Solidarność' has been founded and established. Already in the period of the state of war representatives of the authorities several times had assured representatives of the episcopacy that it was suitable and necessary when 'Solidarność' was acting under the terms of the statutes.

8. Under the conditions which have been created by the proclamation of the state of war the reactivation of the trade unions in an authentic form and corresponding to the wishes of the unionists can only be realistic when critically judging the situation in Poland as it had been before December 13, 1981.

It is beyond doubt that without the labor protest, without the agreements of Gdansk, Szczecin and Jastrzebie, without the subsequent establishment of the Independent Self-governed

Union 'Solidarność' as well as without other similar social and professional organizations the achievement of the renewal movement had not been possible.

A result of all this was the beginning of the economic reform, the development of the workers' self-government, the tackling of legislative activities (among other things the provision relating to censorship) and the democratization of numerous social organizations. Great success has been achieved in the field of defence of the rights of the working population and social policy. In spite of all difficulties the country was filled with a new hope for a better tomorrow. 'Solidarność' has not been the only factor but certainly the most important one.

By rejecting the great number of untrue, exaggerated and unjustified reproaches with which 'Solidarność' had been confronted, one has to acknowledge, however, that in connection with the broad influence which it exerts on social life, 'Solidarność' too has to bear a certain responsibility for the severe crisis that has stricken the country.

'Solidarność' had made efforts to restrict its own actions, to avoid numerous conflicts, to guarantee control of the union bulletins which pretty often dealt with political propaganda, as well as to separate the union distinctly from the activities of oppositional groups. It furthermore had strived to curb the enormous pressure of demand exerted by the union masses, especially in the field of ontic demands (wages and supply), and to calm down the unionists. The activities were, however, clearly insufficient. Although the situation had been very difficult there was a growing distrust of state power and anger about the more and more aggravating economic situation and many conflicts had been provoked. It was difficult to direct this young mass movement. 'Solidarność' should have defended the idea of an understanding on a limited program of social and union ideas in a more determined and consequent way.

In the situation of a decaying economy, in the crisis of a weakening state power (threatening the fundamental principles of the system), as well as being faced with the expectations of the allies which were more and more concerned about the situation of the country, only mutual understanding and the co-operation between society and state power offered a chance for an outlasting and the safeguarding of the achievements of renewal.

This understanding and this good will, yes, even the imaginative faculty and the courage were lacking on both sides. The elementary and spontaneous reactions by members of the union to conflicts and blatant unjust decisions - which very often resulted from old injustices that have accumulated for many years - have made it more difficult - as Cardinal Wyszynski put it - 'to combine the noblest enthusiasm of 'Solidarity' with the welfare of the Republic'. The union's work required and still requires the policy of 'small steps', i.e. the policy of a gradual achievement of the goals aimed at in the spirit of deliberation, patience and courage.

It won't be easy to talk about these questions without mutual reproaches and accusations. It will be, however, necessary to demonstrate a maximum of unobtrusiveness; at the same time 'Solidarność' must try to see its work and experience critically. One can start out from the fact that a great number of the unionists will be prepared to do this.

9. The unions have to preserve not only their independence of the administration and the state employer, as had been laid down by the Committee of the Council of Ministers for Union Questions but also of political organizations. Pope John Paul II has put it as follows:

"On the other hand it is not the task of the trade unions to make politics in today's sense of the word. The unions don't have the position of political parties, which struggle for power and they shall not be subordinated to the decisions of the political parties or be too closely connected

with them. Otherwise they very easily could loose the contact with their actual task, i.e. to safeguard the rightful claims of the employees within the framework of the welfare of the whole country, and instead would become a tool for other purposes" (Laborem exercens No. 20).

Such an unpolitical attitude of the unions can and must be brought in accordance with the respect for the constitution and the first terms of the Gdansk Agreement. This, on the one hand, would require a clear limitation of the work of 'Solidarność' and on the other hand the safeguard of the union's autonomy of the political authorities.

10. The proposals concerning the question of the union movement which have been published by the Council of Ministers for Union Questions presuppose the discussion about the organized reorganization of the union movement in accordance with the "will of the working class and the entire working population". In connection therewith it is urgently necessary:

- to accept the principle of pluralism which during the past ten months has been clearly expressed by the working population of Poland by means of establishing various trade union organizations - no other principle will be accepted by the working class;
- to enable all those interested to take part in the discussion. We take the view that all union organizations and the Polish working population must be able to express their opinion about the reactivation of their unions.

In this connection we would like to point out that already last year the draft of the Union Act had been discussed by all sides and that it had been accepted by the commission of the Council of State in which - in addition to the representatives of the unions - also the President of the Sejm took part. Therefore it can be said that the principles that had been accepted in this draft were based on a binding understanding.

When expressing these views and wishes we are aware of the fact that their realization won't be easy. It can be expected that they will meet with opposition from those forces in the ruling camp which consider violence as the only adequate measure and refuse a compromise with society. Just so they might cause opposition in various circles of society which - deeply hurt by the use of violence - should not accept any agreement under the state of war.

Nevertheless we consider it appropriate to express our opinion, driven by the feeling of being responsible for the common fate of all Poles. We won't improve this fate by complaining about violence and by cursing it. One cannot count on a change of the situation as long as we have not done everything in our power. We have to fight against fatalism. A way out will only be found by mobilizing our forces and by means of joint efforts - provided that this is suitably and wisely used. Therefore demands must be made on the authorities, and just so every member of the union has to make demands on himself. Demands that are not abstract but will be fulfilled under our conditions and on Polish soil.

Warsaw, April 5, 1982

**National Security Council
The White House**

207

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RECEIVED

Package #

82 AUG 7 P 2: 59

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	1	in	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Hold copy of Tab I for
Judge Clark
done 8/7 K.S.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

August 6, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT:

Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner's Letter to
the President

Attached at Tab II is a memorandum to you from Jerry Bremer forwarding an undated letter to the President (Tab B) from Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner, President of the German Bishops' Conference, and three papers on Poland. On July 22, I sent you the telegraphic copies from Embassy Bonn of two of the papers and a summary of the Cardinal's letter. The first paper drafted by the Cardinal (Tab C - "On the Situation in Poland") is an account of his extensive discussions with the Polish Primate on current Polish developments and the need for an assistance program for private sector agriculture. The other two papers were drafted by the Polish Episcopate. One (Tab D - "Assistance Program") assesses the impact of U.S. sanctions on Poland, evaluates the situation of the Polish private agricultural sector and related economic fields, and recommends a five-year \$2.02 billion "Poland Recovery Plan" to aid private agriculture. The other paper (Tab E - "Theses of the Social Council with the Primate on the Question about a Social Understanding") does not deal with the proposed recovery plan but rather outlines the Church's position on how to resolve the current political/economic crisis in Poland and how to achieve "a social understanding between society and government."

Your memorandum to the President (Tab I) synthesizes the content of the Cardinal's letter and the three attached papers, briefly informs the President that a unilateral U.S. initiative to assist the Polish private sector is being developed and forwards a suggested response (Tab A). Speechwriters have cleared the text.

Norman Bailey concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve / Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

Classified by State
Declassify on: OADR.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2#188

BY WJS NARA, DATE 7/6/01

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter for Presidential signature
Tab B	Letter from Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner
Tab C	"The Situation in Poland"
Tab D	"Assistance Program"
Tab E	"Theses of the Social Council..."
Tab II	State's memorandum of August 4, 1932.



~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

222672

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

5463

August 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from the Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner to
the President

Attached is the signed original of a letter to the President from the Reverend Joseph Cardinal Hoffner, President of the German Bishop's Conference, which refers to a conversation held between the President and the Cardinal on June 9 and encloses three documents outlining suggestions received from the Polish Episcopacy on the development of the private sector in Poland.

The letter and accompanying documents were delivered to and have been forwarded by Ambassador Burns in Bonn. Telegraphic copies have been received earlier by the Department of State and the National Security Council staff.

In its statement, the Polish Episcopate suggests a multinational five year program to revitalize Polish private agriculture at an estimated cost of approximately five billion DM (\$2.02 billion), to be provided 25 percent by church contributions in this country and in Europe, 25 percent by private contributions and 50 percent by governments. The funds would be controlled and administered by a new organization made up of representatives of the Polish farmers themselves with the participation of academic and other agricultural experts and would function "under the responsible cooperation of the episcopacy." The program would finance material inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, veterinary medicines, seeds, machines and spare parts); provide investment in agricultural infrastructure such as transportation, storage facilities and food processing; credits for structural improvements, and education and training exchanges and programs.

We propose to analyze the Polish Church's proposals in an interagency group to determine their feasibility and compatibility with suggestions originating in the NSC for a unilateral U.S. program along similar lines which are already receiving interagency consideration. Budgetary costs would be carefully evaluated as well as the compatibility of such a program with economic sanctions against Poland currently in force.

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-030/2 #189
BY Q4J NARA, DATE 4/30/01

Attached at Tab A is a suggested draft of an interim letter of response to the Cardinal from the President.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab A - Proposed interim reply

Tab B - Letter from Cardinal with attachments

LETTER REMAINS SENSITIVE UNTIL DELIVERY

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO CARDINAL HOFFNER

Dear Cardinal Hoffner:

I recall with pleasure our conversation at Bruhl last June and wish to thank you for your kindness in forwarding to me the most interesting proposal from the Polish episcopate for a multinational program designed to reinvigorate Polish private enterprise in agriculture and other fields.

Despite the economic sanctions which we and our Western European friends have found it appropriate to impose on the Polish and Soviet Governments in the wake of the events of last December 13, we have, as you are aware, maintained an active program of humanitarian aid to the Polish people financed both by the United States Government and by individuals and organizations who share our concern for their welfare in these difficult times. The proposal which you have forwarded to revivify and develop the private sector in Polish agriculture and service trades and industries may lend itself to consideration in this same humanitarian context.

His Excellency
Joseph Cardinal Hoffner,
President of the German
Bishops' Conference,
Bonn.

I have asked that the documents you sent me be given careful study and analysis within our Government to determine both the economic feasibility of the proposed program in this period of severe constraint on U.S. Government expenditures and the practical problems of organization and administration which such an international effort might entail.

I will write to you again when we have completed our study of the proposed program. Please accept my sincere best wishes and my thanks for your courtesy in developing the ideas we discussed at Bruhl.

Sincerely,

Dana Rohrer

LETTER REMAINS SENSITIVE UNTIL DELIVERY

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Man

(Paula Dobriansky)

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO CARDINAL HOFFNER

Dear Cardinal Hoffner:

I recall with pleasure our conversation at Bruhl last June and wish to thank you for your kindness in forwarding to me the ~~most~~ interesting proposal from the Polish episcopate for a multinational program designed to reinvigorate Polish private enterprise in agriculture and other fields.

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His Excellency
Joseph Cardinal Hoffner,
President of the German
Bishops' Conference,
Bonn.

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I will write to you again when we have completed our study of the proposed program. Please accept my sincere best wishes and my thanks for your courtesy in developing the ideas we discussed at Bruhl.

Sincerely,

RECEIVED 04 AUG 82 17

TO

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 AUG 82

HOFFNER, JOSEPH

PRESIDENT

11 AUG 82

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS

POLAND

AGREEMENT

SANCTIONS

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES & DRAFT REPLY TO POLISH EPISCOPACY RE PRIVATE SECTOR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 11 AUG 82 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

NAU

ROBINSON

MCGAFFIGAN

PIPES

BAILEY

MYER

COMMENTS DUE TO SENSITIVE NATURE THIS PUBLIC MAIL IS NOT BEING FWD

TO SALLY KELLY

REF# 8222672

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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	<u>Q</u>	<u>7/16</u>	<u>Pres iyal Ltr</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>Same</u>

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