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**Folder Title:** Germany FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] (01/01/1982-09/30/1982) (8 of 11)

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
Country File  
**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. IV 1/1/82 – 9/30/82 (8)

**Archivist:** smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-030 (Friedrich)  
**Date:** 06/06/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Rentschler to Clark re Meeting with FRG Economics Minister 1p R 6/20/01 NLSF97-030/2 #196	7/21/82	P1/F1
2. briefing paper	for Judge Clark's Meeting 1p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #191	n.d.	P1/F1
3. memo	re Polish Sanctions 1p R 6/20/01 " #192	7/16/82	P1/F1
4. cable	151935Z JUL 82 2p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #193	7/15/82	P1/F1
5. memo	Rentschler to Clark re Meeting with Berndt Von Staden 2p R 6/20/01 " #194	7/14/82	P1/F1
6. memo	Bromer to Clark re Meeting 1p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #195	7/13/82	P1/F1
7. talking points	re Meeting 5p R " " #196	n.d.	P1/F1
8. bio	1p D F97-030/2 #197 9/26/00	5/11/82	P1/F1, F3
9. memo	duplicate of document 5 2p R " #198 6/20/01	7/14/82	P1/F1
10. memo	original document 6 1p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #199	7/13/82	P1/F1
11. talking points	original document 7 5p R " " #200	n.d.	P1/F1
12. bio	1p D F97-030/2 #201, 9/26/00	5/11/82	P1/F1, F3
13. memo	Clark to RR re Credit Limitation Issue 1p R " #202, 6/20/01	6/16/82	P1/F1
14. cable	141329Z JUN 82 2p R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 #203	6/14/82	P1/F1
15. briefing paper	from Robinson re East-West credits 1p R 6/20/01 " #204	n.d.	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].  
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
Country File  
**File Folder:** Germany, FRG Vol. IV 1/1/82 – 9/30/82 (8)

**Archivist:** smf  
**FOIA ID:** F97-030 (Friedrich)  
**Date:** 06/06/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. memo	Rentschler/Robinson to Clark re Credit Restrictions 1p <i>R 6/20/01 F97-030/2 # 205</i>	6/15/82	P1/F1
17. memo	Haig to RR re Arthur Burn's letter 1p <i>R 4/30/01 F97-030/2 # 206</i>	6/15/82	P1/F1
18. letter	Burns to RR 2p <i>R 6/20/01 NLSF97-030/2 #207</i>	6/14/82	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 5/15/2007

**File Folder** GERMANY, FRG 1/1/82-9/30/82 (6)

**FOIA**

F97-030/2

### Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>1</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>RENTSCHLER TO CLARK RE MEETING WITH FRG ECONOMICS MINISTER</del>	<del>1</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>7/21/1982</del>
<del>3</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>RE POLISH SANCTIONS</del>	<del>1</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>7/16/1982</del>
<del>5</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>RENTSCHLER TO CLARK RE MEETING WITH BERNDT VON STADEN</del>	<del>2</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>7/14/852</del>
<del>9</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>SAME AS #5</del>	<del>2</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>7/14/1982</del>
<del>13</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>CLARK TO RR RE CREDIT LIMITATION ISSUE</del>	<del>1</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>6/16/1982</del>
<del>15</del>	<del>BRIEFING PAPER</del>	<del>FROM ROBINSON RE EAST WEST CREDITS</del>	<del>1</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>ND</del>
<del>18</del>	<del>LETTER</del>	<del>BURNS TO RR</del>	<del>2</del> <i>MVH 3/19/08</i>	<del>6/14/1982</del>

mw

MEMORANDUM

5031

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

*J.M.R.*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with FRG Economics Minister  
Otto Lambsdorff (Wednesday, July 21 - 3:45 p.m.)

WPC HAS SEEN

State prepared the attached material for use with your meeting today with FRG Economics Minister Otto Count Lambsdorff. It is pretty thin gruel. Rather than taking the pleading tone which State seems to suggest, I recommend you make some of the same central points you aired with von Staden and Davignon/Haferkamp last week, which Henry Nau and I have coordinated:

-- Principle and U.S. strategic responsibilities are what has driven this President on the sanctions extension decision;

-- It is not a matter of trade warfare or "normal trading relations," but a matter of remaining unified and resolved on the Poland issue;

-- In other words, the core of this issue is not commercial business as usual but human rights;

-- If Lambsdorff harps on the line that the President's decision constitutes "a particularly serious event for which there is no precedent," remind him that the pre-December liberalization process was an unprecedented event in Poland which the Soviets have brutally thwarted;

-- If allies were more willing to hang tight on grave political/security threats to stability, such as Poland, East-West economic relations would be less of a divisive issue among us.

The main item on Lambsdorff's agenda you may have to deal with is his compromise proposal concerning the rotors. I defer to the economic experts in the house on this one, but it seems to me that such a compromise would vitiate the intended effect of the President's June 18 decision. You will have to make clear to Lambsdorff that there is no accommodation possible here unless there is significant liberalization in Poland. In short, Germany will need some help from the Soviet Union. ~~(C)~~

Tab I State Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review on July 21, 1988

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 197-030/2#190  
BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/6/01

Subject: Briefing Materials for Judge Clark's meeting with Otto Count Lambsdorff, on Wednesday, July 21, at 3:45 p.m.

Within the FRG government, Lambsdorff has been the most outspoken critic of the President's June 18 decision to extend sanctions and is expected to focus on this issue during his meeting with you. In addition to explaining the rationale for the President's decision, you may wish to seek Lambsdorff's support for careful management of this issue as we seek consensus with our European Allies.

Count Lambsdorff originally scheduled his trip to the United States for a series of speaking engagements with a stop in Washington to discuss international economic policy. Since the President's June 18 decision on sanctions, Lambsdorff has focussed his attention and efforts on seeking a compromise which would allow the Europeans to export turbines using GE parts shipped to Europe prior to the imposition of sanctions on December 30, 1981. We understand that the European firms have 21 rotors out of total of 105 needed to fulfill their contracts.

Lambsdorff has described the President's sanctions decision as a "particularly serious event for which there is no precedent." The FRG's concerns include both short-term interests such as the loss of jobs at AEG/Kanis and, more important, the implications for future international business cooperation between the US and Europe. The application of US law to foreign subsidiaries and licensees could have a chilling effect on investment contracts and normal trading relations, according to Lambsdorff.

The Germans view East-West trade as one of the most important elements of their Eastern policy. Their belief that economic relations with the Soviet Union are a good thing is still an unshakable article of faith. Although they have retreated from the hopes of the 1970's for such trade, they perceive substantial benefits outside the trade area. Such benefits include increases in tourist travel, family reunification and cultural exchanges, especially with East Germany.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-1 7/19/02

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #191  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8220976

5031

July 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Materials for your Meeting with  
Otto Count Lambsdorff, Wednesday, July 21  
at 3:45 p.m.

The attached briefing materials have been prepared for  
your meeting with Otto Count Lambsdorff. We anticipate that he  
will focus his discussion primarily on the President's June 18  
decision extending sanctions related to Poland.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-1 7/19/02

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

National Security Council  
The White House

270

Package # 5031

R C ED

82 JUL 21 A10: 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[initials]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	2		
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[initials]</i>	
Judge Clark	4		<i>I</i>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

*For 3:45 mtg today*

RECEIVED 20 JUL 82 15

TO CLARK FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 20 JUL 82

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R SANCTIONS LAMBSDORFF, OTTO  
ECONOMICS AC

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR CLARK MTG W/ LAMBSDORFF ON JUL 21

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 21 JUL 82 STATUS S FILES  
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FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
RENTSCHLER BAILEY NAU KRAEMER  
MYER

COMMENTS

REF# 8220976 LOG NSCIFID ( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<u>Clark</u>	<u>IX 7/21</u>	<u>For information</u>		
<u>C</u>	<u>7/21</u>	<u>Clark noted</u>		<u>RE</u>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE WA (C)  
*PA*  
*CO*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1982

FOR: NORMAN BAILEY  
ROGER ROBINSON

FROM: JUDGE CLARK

Attached for info.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

WPG HAS SEEN

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

July 16, 1982

~~SECRET~~

*Handwritten signatures and initials, including "from [unclear]"*

Burns Expresses Concern Over Relaxation of Polish Sanctions

Ambassador Burns has asked that you be informed of his concern regarding U.S. reaction to a possible relaxation of repressive measures by the Polish regime on July 22. In the event this occurs, Burns recommends that we proceed with caution and not fall into the trap of condoning, or appearing to condone, the repressive measures that may still remain. Burns notes that the changes may:

- o Be only cosmetic, consisting of the release of a few prominent internees.
- o Fall short of the three pre-requisites the allies have agreed on for resumption of normal relations.

Burns comments that if we lift sanctions, based on only a limited Polish action, this would undermine our moral position and might weaken our political position at home and abroad. (S)

Bonn 15244 NODIS, LDX from State Dept.

~~SECRET~~  
REVIEW ON JULY 16, 2002  
CLASSIFIED BY EMBASSY BONN

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #192  
BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/6/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

15 JUL 82 19 48Z

INCOMING TELEGRAM 00 37

WPC ACK WHILE JO UP EOB  
(CHECKLIST)

~~SECRET~~

NOD246

PAGE 01 BONN 15244 151941Z  
ACTION NODS-00

COPY 4 OF 5 COPIES

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O 151935Z JUL 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8514

~~SECRET~~ BONN 15244

NODIS

FOR ACTING SECRETARY STOESEL FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 7/15/12 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) QR-M  
TAGS: GE, EEWT, ENRG, US

SUBJECT: RELAXATION IN POLAND AND THE SANCTIONS QUESTION

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS RECENTLY THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT MAY ANNOUNCE SOME LIBERALIZATION OF ITS REPRESSIVE MEASURES, TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE JULY 22ND ANNIVERSARY. SOME, PARTICULARLY IN THE PRESS, HAVE GONE ON TO SPECULATE THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD THE U.S. TO RECONSIDER ITS PIPELINE SANCTIONS AND THAT A TOTAL OR PARTIAL RELAXATION OF THESE MEASURES MIGHT ENSUE.

3. ANY SUCH RESPONSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH THE UTMOST CARE. THERE IS THE OBVIOUS DANGER THAT POLISH LIBERALIZATION, IF INDEED IT COMES, WILL CONSIST ONLY OF A FEW COSMETIC IMPROVEMENTS, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF A HANDFUL OF PROMINENT INTERNEES, WHILE BEHIND IT THE REPRESSIVE MECHANISM REMAINS ESSENTIALLY INTACT. MY REAL CONCERN, HOWEVER, GOES BEYOND THIS OBVIOUS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #193

BY Crs NARA, DATE 4/30/01

NODS-00S-NODS-00S-NODS-00S



Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

BONN 15244 151941Z

PITFALL AND PRESUPPOSES THAT THERE MAY BE SOME GENUINE LIGHTENING OF THE BURDEN THE POLISH PEOPLE MUST BEAR, FALLING SHORT, HOWEVER, OF THE THREE PRE-REQUISITES THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED ON FOR RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS. IN SUCH A CASE, OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO RESPOND BY RELAXING THE SANCTIONS DECISIONS.

4. IF WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH SUCH A SITUATION, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY. MY POINT IS MORAL AND POLITICAL. WE HAVE THUS FAR INSISTED THAT WE WILL RETAIN THE SANCTIONS UNTIL THE POLISH GOVERNMENT RESTORES A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE IT PURPORTS TO GOVERN. IF WE NOW SETTLED FOR MUCH LESS THAN FULL RESTORATION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, WE WOULD BE CONDONING THOSE ELEMENTS OF REPRESSION THAT STILL REMAIN. SUCH A COURSE WOULD UNDERMINE OUR MORAL POSITION AND IT MIGHT WEAKEN OUR POLITICAL POSITION, BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD AS WELL.

5. AS YOU KNOW, THE SANCTIONS DECISION HAS TROUBLED OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES GREATLY AND I AM HOPEFUL THAT WITH TIME WE WILL BE ABLE TO PUT IT BEHIND US. I HAVE ALREADY HAD SOMETHING TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT, AND I EXPECT TO SAY MORE WHEN I RETURN HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. FOR THE PRESENT, MY POINT IS SOLELY THAT WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS AND AVOID FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF CONDONING, OR APPEARING TO CONDONE, THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT MAY STILL RETAIN.

6. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH JUDGE CLARK. BURNS

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 14, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Berndt von Staden  
(Wednesday, July 14 - 2:45 p.m.)

WPC HAS SEEN

Von Staden's visit here coincides with a tense moment in the U.S.-German bilateral relationship, principally flavored on the FRG side by the sanctions extension decision. I recommend that you use the time with von Staden to sound two inter-related themes:

-- Pipeline and principle. Reiterate the President's principled stand on the Polish situation and the implications for U.S. credibility had he failed to take additional action six months after the imposition of the December 29 sanctions. This message is worth repeating to all Germans, particularly one as careful and conscientious as von Staden; eventually it will get across to other Germans, and the Allies at large.

-- The direction of U.S.-German relations. Elicit von Staden's views on where he sees our bilateral relationship going and what specific steps he might have in mind to improve consultative practices between us. In that connection, you can usefully remind him that President Reagan remains deeply concerned by Western actions across the board - trade, transfer of technology, easy credit terms, etc. - which enable the Soviets to defer hard internal decisions concerning allocation of resources within their society (particularly indefensible at a time when the Soviet economy is so vulnerable). This is a strategic factor of enormous significance for us, which détente-minded Germans simply have to take into account.

Von Staden may well raise the subject of a German press report which attributes Haig's resignation to a White House belief that not only was Schmidt privately disavowing the credits restriction language in the Versailles Summit communique but that he would also inevitably back off his INF commitment in order to hold the SPD together. If this topic comes up, you can dismiss it as a thoroughly muddled report.

Time permitting, you may want to bring von Staden up to speed on the situation in Lebanon and, with the Hondurans in town, developments in Central America (a continuing focal point for Socialist interest in the FRG) and the status of CBI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review on July 14, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #194

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/6/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

NB: Schmidt will be making a private visit to the U.S. later this month and reportedly has plans to meet with Secretary-designate Shultz at Bohemian Grove. Von Staden may use the occasion of his meeting with you to probe the possibilities of a Presidential meeting with the Chancellor. I would recommend that you be non-committal on such possibilities (or better yet, explicitly negative); I do not think the President needs to see Schmidt this summer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

*Kentzschler says these are fines.*

S/S 8220133

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

82 JUL 13 P 11: 01

WPC HAS SEEN

Subject: Your Meeting July 14 with Berndt von Staden,  
State Secretary, FRG Foreign Office.

SITUATION ROOM

Attached are talking points for your July 14 meeting with Berndt von Staden, the second ranking official in the FRG Foreign Office. Von Staden, a career diplomat, has risen to his present position as part of a brilliant career which has included an assignment as Ambassador to Washington and a stint in the Federal Chancellery as Foreign Affairs Advisor to Helmut Schmidt. Von Staden is a firm friend of the United States, well known for his balanced judgment and his complete discretion. He is, therefore, the ideal senior FRG interlocutor for those occasions on which we wish to speak frankly or even bluntly among friends.

We understand that von Staden intends to express his (and Chancellor Schmidt's) concern to you over reports emanating from Washington that the Chancellor bears part of the blame for Secretary Haig's departure.

At the Department of State, von Staden is meeting with Acting Secretary Stoessel, Under Secretary Eagleburger, and Assistant Secretary (Designate) for European Affairs Burt. Von Staden's schedule also includes meetings with Senators Mathias (R-Md), Roth (R-Del), and Pell (D-RI) and a speech at Georgetown University on US-German relations.

*L. Paul Bremer, II*  
L. Paul Bremer, II  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Talking Points
2. Biographic Information

~~SECRET~~

RDS-3 7/13/2001

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 #195  
BY CAS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

1. Explain US Policy on Lebanon.

o THE INTENT OF US POLICY IS TO SUPPORT THE BASIC GOALS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT: A CESSATION OF PALESTINIAN MILITARY ACTION FROM LEBANON, AN END TO THE PALESTINIAN ARMED PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND THE ABILITY OF LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY.

o DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS ARE UNDER INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION NOW IN BEIRUT. AMBASSADOR HABIB REMAINS IN LEBANON WHERE HE IS WORKING TIRELESSLY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO AVERT THE THREAT OF RENEWED VIOLENCE. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WE ARE ENCOUNTERING IS IN FINDING A COUNTRY THAT WILL ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERS AND COMBATANTS WHEN THEY LEAVE BEIRUT.

o I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT OUR GOAL TO HUMILIATE OR TO ELIMINATE THE PLO LEADERSHIP. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT DANGEROUS SITUATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF WE SUPPORT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S WISH FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND THEIR ARMED FOLLOWERS. A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS GOAL IS THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SHORT-TERM, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE FOR BEIRUT.

o OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE, WHICH THE LEBANESE SHARE, IS THAT NO FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE WILL REMAIN IN LEBANON: ISRAELI, SYRIAN OR PLO.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 1-97-030/2 #196  
BY OKJ NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

o THE US RECOGNIZES THAT THESE TRAGIC EVENTS HIGHLIGHT THE NEED FOR AN INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IT REMAINS OUR FIRM POSITION THAT THE ONLY WORKABLE WAY TO DO SO IS THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS, WHICH CALLS FOR A SOLUTION THAT RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND JUST REQUIREMENTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND ENSURES THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

o WE APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO TRY TO END THE BLOODSHED AND RESOLVE THIS VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

2. Exchange views on East-West relations, notably the President's recent decision on sanctions.

o DESPITE OUR CURRENT DISAGREEMENT ON SANCTIONS, WE BELIEVE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO GERMANY RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CONVERGENCE OF US AND FRG VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

o WE ARE NOT ENGAGING IN "ECONOMIC WARFARE" BUT RATHER SEEK TO USE OUR ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL/TECHNOLOGICAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF AN OVERALL POLICY.

o WE CAN BEST INSURE MOVEMENT TOWARD GENUINE DETENTE AS PER THE BONN NATO DECLARATION BY REMAINING UNITED, AS ALLIES, IN MAKING CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT THEIR BEHAVIOR MUST BE BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY.

o PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO WORK FOR PEACE AND FOR IMPORTANT ARMS REDUCTIONS, BUT HE WILL INSIST THAT THE SOVIETS SHOW RESPECT FOR WESTERN INTERESTS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

o POLAND IS CASE IN POINT. WE FELT IT NECESSARY TO REAFFIRM AND BROADEN OUR SANCTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN POLAND TOWARD RESTORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HOPE POLISH SATISFACTION OF THREE ALLIED CONDITIONS WILL PERMIT THEIR REMOVAL.

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o ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO WORK FOR GREATER CONVERGENCE OF US AND FRG VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS; WE MUST NOT BE PERCEIVED AS DISAGREEING ON ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL TO SECURITY OF ALLIANCE.

3. Discuss defense/arms control issues.

o PLEASED WITH BEGINNING OF START NEGOTIATIONS. WILL KEEP FRG INFORMED. START INHERENTLY LINKED TO INF NEGOTIATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

o CURRENTLY STUDYING SOVIET START AND INF PROPOSALS. IF SOVIETS SERIOUS ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, THEY NOW HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS.

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4. Exchange views on Central America.

o WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED IN THE PAST YEAR ABOUT LACK OF FRG SUPPORT FOR US POLICIES ON CENTRAL AMERICA.

o IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AFFECT FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY OF UNITED STATES AND HENCE SECURITY OF ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. HOPE FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING FRG POLICIES ON CENTRAL AMERICA INTO ACCORD WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN REALITIES AFTER SALVADORAN ELECTION AND AFTER OBVIOUS CUBANIZATION OF NICARAGUA.

o WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND FRG ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA, WHICH IS MOVING AWAY FROM DEMOCRACY, COMPARED TO THE LACK OF FRG ECONOMIC AID AND DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN EL SALVADOR, A COUNTRY MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY.

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-5-

o HOPE FRG CAN INCREASE ASSISTANCE TO COSTA RICA,  
HONDURAS, AND ELSEWHERE IN CONTEXT OF PRESIDENT'S CARIBBEAN  
BASIN INITIATIVE.

~~SECRET~~

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The White House

258

Package # 4806

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82 JUL 14 A 9: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

For today's 2:45 mtg

RECEIVED 14 JUL 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 13 JUL 82

RENTSCHLER

14 JUL 82

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By Amf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AC

VON STADEN, BERNDT

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR CLARK 14 JUL MTG W/ VON STADEN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 14 JUL 82 STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

KRAEMER

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COMMENTS

REF# 8220133

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C 7/4 Note by Clark LC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

July 14, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *J.M.R.*SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Berndt von Staden  
(Wednesday, July 14 - 2:45 p.m.)

Von Staden's visit here coincides with a tense moment in the U.S.-German bilateral relationship, principally flavored on the FRG side by the sanctions extension decision. I recommend that you use the time with von Staden to sound two inter-related themes:

-- Pipeline and principle. Reiterate the President's principled stand on the Polish situation and the implications for U.S. credibility had he failed to take additional action six months after the imposition of the December 29 sanctions. This message is worth repeating to all Germans, particularly one as careful and conscientious as von Staden; eventually it will get across to other Germans, and the Allies at large.

-- The direction of U.S.-German relations. Elicit von Staden's views on where he sees our bilateral relationship going and what specific steps he might have in mind to improve consultative practices between us. In that connection, you can usefully remind him that President Reagan remains deeply concerned by Western actions across the board - trade, transfer of technology, easy credit terms, etc. - which enable the Soviets to defer hard internal decisions concerning allocation of resources within their society (particularly indefensible at a time when the Soviet economy is so vulnerable). This is a strategic factor of enormous significance for us, which détente-minded Germans simply have to take into account.

Von Staden may well raise the subject of a German press report which attributes Haig's resignation to a White House belief that not only was Schmidt privately disavowing the credits restriction language in the Versailles Summit communique but that he would also inevitably back off his INF commitment in order to hold the SPD together. If this topic comes up, you can dismiss it as a thoroughly muddled report.

Time permitting, you may want to bring von Staden up to speed on the situation in Lebanon and, with the Hondurans in town, developments in Central America (a continuing focal point for Socialist interest in the FRG) and the status of CBI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on July 14, 1988

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #198BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/6/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

NB: Schmidt will be making a private visit to the U.S. later this month and reportedly has plans to meet with Secretary-designate Shultz at Bohemian Grove. Von Staden may use the occasion of his meeting with you to probe the possibilities of a Presidential meeting with the Chancellor. I would recommend that you be non-committal on such possibilities (or better yet, explicitly negative); I do not think the President needs to see Schmidt this summer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 13, 1982

4862  
S/S 8220133

4806

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

82 JU 1 P11 01

Subject: Your Meeting July 14 with Berndt von Staden,  
State Secretary, FRG Foreign Office.

W  
SITU

OM

Attached are talking points for your July 14 meeting with Berndt von Staden, the second ranking official in the FRG Foreign Office. Von Staden, a career diplomat, has risen to his present position as part of a brilliant career which has included an assignment as Ambassador to Washington and a stint in the Federal Chancellery as Foreign Affairs Advisor to Helmut Schmidt. Von Staden is a firm friend of the United States, well known for his balanced judgment and his complete discretion. He is, therefore, the ideal senior FRG interlocutor for those occasions on which we wish to speak frankly or even bluntly among friends.

We understand that von Staden intends to express his (and Chancellor Schmidt's) concern to you over reports emanating from Washington that the Chancellor bears part of the blame for Secretary Haig's departure.

At the Department of State, von Staden is meeting with Acting Secretary Stoessel, Under Secretary Eagleburger, and Assistant Secretary (Designate) for European Affairs Burt. Von Staden's schedule also includes meetings with Senators Mathias (R-Md), Roth (R-Del), and Pell (D-RI) and a speech at Georgetown University on US-German relations.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Talking Points
2. Biographic Information

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NLS F97-030/2 #199  
BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

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RDS-3 7/13/2002

~~SECRET~~

1. Explain US Policy on Lebanon.

o THE INTENT OF US POLICY IS TO SUPPORT THE BASIC GOALS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT: A CESSATION OF PALESTINIAN MILITARY ACTION FROM LEBANON, AN END TO THE PALESTINIAN ARMED PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND THE ABILITY OF LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY.

o DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS ARE UNDER INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION NOW IN BEIRUT. AMBASSADOR HABIB REMAINS IN LEBANON WHERE HE IS WORKING TIRELESSLY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO AVERT THE THREAT OF RENEWED VIOLENCE. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WE ARE ENCOUNTERING IS IN FINDING A COUNTRY THAT WILL ACCEPT THE PLO LEADERS AND COMBATANTS WHEN THEY LEAVE BEIRUT.

o I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT OUR GOAL TO HUMILIATE OR TO ELIMINATE THE PLO LEADERSHIP. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT DANGEROUS SITUATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF WE SUPPORT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S WISH FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND THEIR ARMED FOLLOWERS. A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS GOAL IS THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SHORT-TERM, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE FOR BEIRUT.

o OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE, WHICH THE LEBANESE SHARE, IS THAT NO FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE WILL REMAIN IN LEBANON: ISRAELI, SYRIAN OR PLO.

~~SECRET~~

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NLS  
BY CAJ #200  
NARA, DATE 4/30/61

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-2-

o THE US RECOGNIZES THAT THESE TRAGIC EVENTS HIGHLIGHT THE NEED FOR AN INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IT REMAINS OUR FIRM POSITION THAT THE ONLY WORKABLE WAY TO DO SO IS THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS, WHICH CALLS FOR A SOLUTION THAT RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND JUST REQUIREMENTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND ENSURES THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

o WE APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO TRY TO END THE BLOODSHED AND RESOLVE THIS VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

2. Exchange views on East-West relations, notably the President's recent decision on sanctions.

o DESPITE OUR CURRENT DISAGREEMENT ON SANCTIONS, WE BELIEVE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO GERMANY RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CONVERGENCE OF US AND FRG VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

o WE ARE NOT ENGAGING IN "ECONOMIC WARFARE" BUT RATHER SEEK TO USE OUR ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL/TECHNOLOGICAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF AN OVERALL POLICY.

o WE CAN BEST INSURE MOVEMENT TOWARD GENUINE DETENTE AS PER THE BONN NATO DECLARATION BY REMAINING UNITED, AS ALLIES, IN MAKING CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT THEIR BEHAVIOR MUST BE BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY.

o PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO WORK FOR PEACE AND FOR IMPORTANT ARMS REDUCTIONS, BUT HE WILL INSIST THAT THE SOVIETS SHOW RESPECT FOR WESTERN INTERESTS.

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~~SECRET~~

-3-

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TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 13 JUL 82

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

AC

VON STADEN, BERNDT

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR CLARK 14 JUL MTG W/ VON STADEN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 14 JUL 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR HELENE VON DAMM  
Director of Presidential Personnel

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Nomination for Chairman of White House Planning  
Committee -- 1983 U.S.-German Tricentennial Year

State's memorandum (Tab A) nominates former U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany Kenneth Rush as Chairman of the White House Planning Committee for the 1983 U.S.-German Tri-centennial Year and notes that ICA Director Charles Wick concurs with that recommendation. *(C)*

I believe that Ambassador Rush is well-qualified for the job; unless you perceive some objection, I would like to be able to inform State as soon as possible that he has White House approval. *(C)*

Attachment:

Tab A State's memorandum of June 8, 1982 (with bio data)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review June 23, 1988.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *smf* NARA, Date *5/30/00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 8215587

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Nomination For Chairman of White House Planning  
Committee - 1983 US-German Tricentennial Year

We have conducted a thorough review of potential nominees for Chairman of the White House Planning Committee for the 1983 US-German Tricentennial Year. We believe that former Ambassador Kenneth Rush would be an excellent choice for that position. ICA Director Wick concurs in this recommendation.

Rush served as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 to 1972 and was Principal American Negotiator of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. He currently is the Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the US, headquartered in Washington. In sum, Ambassador Rush's experience and current involvement in US-German and US-European relations makes him uniquely qualified for the role of Chairman of the White House Tricentennial Planning Committee. We have approached Ambassador Rush informally and he has consented to having his name recommended to the White House for consideration.

We also have ideas for other members of the Committee. Once the Chairman is selected, we will work with him in selecting other candidates for submission to the White House for approval.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Biographic Information on Ambassador Rush

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

by smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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AMBASSADOR KENNETH RUSH  
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Ambassador Rush was born in Walla Walla, Washington on January 17, 1910. He graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1930 and received a JD degree from Yale in 1932.

He worked for Union Carbide Corporation from 1937 to 1969, serving as President from 1966 to 1969. From 1969 to 1972, Rush was Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. He also was the Principal American Negotiator for the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. He was Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1972 to 1973 and Deputy Secretary of State from 1973 to 1974. He served as a member of both President Nixon's and Ford's Cabinets as Counsellor for Economic Policy. From 1974 to 1977, he was US Ambassador to France.

Currently, Ambassador Rush is Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 23, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Nomination for Chairman of White House Planning Committee (1983 U.S.-German Tricentennial Year)

State's memorandum (Tab A) recommends the nomination of Ken Rush as Chairman of the White House Planning Committee for the 1983 U.S.-German Tricentennial Year and incorporates relevant bio data on his background and qualifications. ICA's Charles Wick endorses that recommendation. So do I. *let*

Your memorandum to Helene von Damm (Tab I) seeks a pro forma Personnel chop. Alternatively, you may simply want to give Helene a quick phone call on the matter (or clear the nomination on your own authority). *let*

RECOMMENDATION

OK    No

       That you sign the memorandum to Helene von Damm at Tab I.

Attachments:

- Tab I      Memorandum to Helene von Damm
- Tab A      State's memorandum of June 8, with bio data on Ambassador Kenneth Rush

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review June 23, 1988

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

National Security Council  
The White House

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
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Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

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RECEIVED 10 JUN 82 09

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 08 JUN 82

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

RUSH, KENNETH

SUBJECT: NOMINATION FOR CHAIRMAN OF WHITE HOUSE PLANNING COMM - 1983 US -  
GERMAN TRICENTENNIAL YEAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 11 JUN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

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REF# 8215587

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MEMORANDUM

4153

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 16, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*  
SUBJECT: Arthur Burns on the Credit Limitation Issue

Arthur Burns' congratulatory letter (Tab A) provides a quick assessment of your European trip and concludes 1) while you may not have gotten all you hoped for at Versailles on the credit restriction issue, it is still a significant achievement; and 2) in Bonn you got even more than could have been reasonably expected.

Arthur makes a strong pitch for holding European feet to the fire on the credit restriction rhetoric and suggests making the shipment of rotors dependent on "clear evidence that the Europeans are taking seriously" the agreed language at Versailles. This suggestion is clearly one which should be worked over in the inter-agency process.

Attachments:

Tab A Burns ltr to President  
Tab B NSC Staff study

Prepared by:  
James M. Rentschler

~~SECRET~~  
Review on 6/15/88

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NLS F97-030/2#202  
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 7/6/01



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Department of State

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 6/14/12 (BURNS, ARTHUR F.) OR-M  
TAGS: GE  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. DEAR AL: I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR TRANSMITTING THE  
FOLLOWING LETTER THAT I HAVE WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT.  
WARM REGARDS. ARTHUR.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: IN REFLECTING ON THE RESULTS OF THE  
VERSAILLES SUMMIT, I AM IMPRESSED BY HOW FAR YOU GOT ON  
THE ISSUE OF LIMITING CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION. I KNOW  
THAT IT WAS NOT ALL YOU HOPED FOR, BUT IT STILL REPRESENTS  
A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE  
WORLD IS RULED BY IDEAS. GOOD RHETORIC GENERALLY PRECEDES  
GOOD POLICY ACTIONS, AND YOU CERTAINLY GOT GOOD RHETORIC  
OUT OF VERSAILLES ON THE SOVIET CREDIT ISSUE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS #97-030/2 #203

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

NOV 1982



Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BONN 12733 141333Z

4. I AM CONVINCED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW THIS UP BY PRESSING FOR COMPLIANCE BY THE SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS. WE MUST MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE TAKE THE SOVIET CREDIT ISSUE SERIOUSLY AND THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO DO SO AS WELL.

5. AS YOU KNOW, SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS ARE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESTRICTIONS WE HAVE IMPOSED ON THE SHIPMENT OF ROTORS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE ALLIANCE IF THESE RESTRICTIONS WERE REMOVED, BUT WE OUGHT NOT TO DO THAT WITHOUT OBTAINING SOME BENEFITS IN RETURN. ONCE WE HAVE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE TAKING SERIOUSLY THE VERSAILLES RHETORIC ON SOVIET CREDITS, YOU WOULD HAVE A REASONABLE POLITICAL BASIS FOR ALLOWING EXISTING CONTRACTS INVOLVING THE PIPELINE TO MOVE FORWARD. WE MIGHT EXPLAIN THIS TACTFULLY TO OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND URGE THEM TO PROCEED QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY ON THE CREDIT ISSUE.

6. THERE MAY BE BETTER WAYS TO CLEAR UP OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EUROPEANS ON THE PIPELINE, BUT THE ABOVE SUGGESTION IS MY BEST THOUGHT AT THE MOMENT.

7. A WORD, IF I MAY, ABOUT YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP. YOU GOT LESS THAN WE WANTED IN VERSAILLES, BUT I THINK YOU GOT AS MUCH AS COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED. IN BONN AND BERLIN YOU DID EVEN BETTER THAN THAT. PRESS COMMENTS ON YOUR SPEECHES HERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE AND POSITIVE. CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES, ARTHUR F. BURNS, END TEXT. BURNS

SECRET →

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: East-West Credits in Relation to December 30  
Sanctions (Arthur Burns letter of 6/14/82)

Issue

Arthur Burns' letter reviews progress achieved at Versailles on restraining credits to the Soviet Union and recommends that you indicate to the allies a willingness to lift sanctions on existing contracts for the Siberian pipeline in return for a more meaningful agreement on limiting credits.

Facts

Since the inception of the December 30 sanctions, including Versailles and your bilateral meetings with other leaders, you have conscientiously avoided linking the lifting of December 30 sanctions and the credit initiative. The only connection between these two issues has been consideration of whether or not to extend controls extraterritorially contingent on progress on credit limitation. This posture has preserved the integrity of the original purpose of the sanctions, the lifting of which is linked to the Polish authorities fulfilling the three stated preconditions which would advance reconciliation in Poland. This policy was restated this past Sunday on the occasion of the six-month anniversary of martial law.

Discussion

As you know, the allies reluctantly agreed to language on East-West credits in the Versailles communique which minimally recognized our serious concerns in this area. Your willingness to stand firm on the credit initiative provided us with an important foot-in-the-door; however, the perceptual differences that exist on credits are similar to those governing allied action on the Siberian pipeline. Although concurring with Ambassador Burns that we should now press the allies for more defined and meaningful credit restrictions, our expectations must be tempered and the inducements provided should not contravene other important East-West policy objectives. The sanctions on oil and gas equipment to the USSR are resulting in substantial delays for the pipeline project and, to a lesser extent, for Sakhalin. Both are high priority projects designed to reinvigorate a stagnant Soviet economy and enhance the USSR's geopolitical capabilities through substantial annual hard currency earnings.

Prepared by:  
Roger W. Robinson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS EQ7-030/2 # 204  
BY LOS NARA, DATE 7/6/01

~~SECRET~~

4153

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 15, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER  
ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT: Arthur Burns on Credit Restrictions

Your memo to the President (Tab I) transmits the letter which Arthur Burns has written to the President (Tab A) concerning results at the Versailles and Bonn Summits and a suggestion for follow-up steps on the credit restrictions issue. To help orient the President's thinking, your memo also provides a brief internal NSC Staff study on the issue Burns raises. (This Friday's NSC meeting may be an opportune forum in which to discuss the Burns approach, along with other relevant matters.)

RECOMMENDATION:

OK            NO

            That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments:

- Tab I        Clark memo to President
- Tab A        Burns ltr to President
- Tab B        NSC Staff study

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #205

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 7/6/01

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~NLS F97-030/2 #206~~

~~BY Cts, NARA, DATE 4/30/01~~

~~SECRET~~

Review on 6/15/88

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
SUBJECT: Arthur Burns' Letter: Versailles and Soviet Credits

Arthur Burns has asked me to forward to you the attached letter in which he discusses the outcome of our discussions at Versailles on credits for the Soviet Union.

We are following-up Versailles by informing Summit countries that we take the Communique language to limit credits seriously. We are organizing meetings with them and beginning an active exchange of information to enable us to monitor credit flows. We are establishing a process of review, as called for in the Communique. We expect that some countries will cut back on credits because of the Versailles discussions, and the strength of your views on the subject.

Attachment:  
Letter from Arthur Burns.

~~SECRET~~

XGDS-1 6/15/12

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-030/2 # 206  
BY CS NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

June 14, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

In reflecting on the results of the Versailles Summit, I am impressed by how far you got on the issue of limiting credits to the Soviet Union, I know that it was not all you hoped for, but it still represents a significant achievement. In the final analysis, the world is ruled by ideas. Good rhetoric generally precedes good policy actions, and you certainly got good rhetoric out of Versailles on the Soviet credit issue.

I am convinced that it is important to follow this up by pressing for compliance by the Summit participants. We must make it clear to them that we take the Soviet credit issue seriously and that we expect them to do so as well.

As you know, some of our European partners are greatly concerned about the restrictions we have imposed on the shipment of rotors and other equipment for the Siberian pipeline. It would be helpful to the alliance if these restrictions were removed, but we ought not to do that without obtaining some benefits in return. Once we have clear evidence that the Europeans are taking seriously the Versailles rhetoric on Soviet credits, you would have a reasonable political basis for allowing existing contracts involving the pipeline to move forward. We might explain this tactfully to our

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-030/2 #207

BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/6/01

RECEIVED 14 JUN 82 18

TO CLARK FROM RENTSCHLER  
ROBINSON  
BURNS, ARTHUR

DOCDATE 14 JUN 82  
14 JUN 82  
14 JUN 82

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By amf NARA, Date 5/30/00

KEYWORDS: FRENCH SUMMIT ECONOMICS  
EXPORT CONTROLS

SUBJECT: BURNS CABLE ON CREDIT RESTRICTION

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE: 15 JUN 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	IP 6/16	Good information		--
	c 6/18	Noted by Pres		re, ro


DISPATCH 6/16 cm W/ATTCH FILE Pa (C) ms

June 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Invitation to President Carstens of the  
Federal Republic of Germany to Visit the  
United States

The Department has recommended that the President invite President Carstens to visit the United States next year in conjunction with the German-American Tri-centennial celebration. The request has been approved; during his meeting with President Carstens in Bonn on June 9, the President will invite President Carstens to visit this country and to join the President at the Tri-centennial celebration in Philadelphia on October 6.



Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1653 Add-on

ACTION

June 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Invitation to President Carstens of the  
Federal Republic of Germany to Visit the  
United States

Attached for your signature is a memo to Jerry Bremer officially informing State that the White House has approved their recommendation to issue an invitation to President Carstens to visit this country.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

That you sign the memo to Bremer at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I

Memo to Bremer

6/1

For stepping .

f

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1653 Add-On

ACTION

June 1, 1982

*Mike... we have discussed -  
WPC*

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Invitation to President Carstens of Federal  
Republic of Germany for October 6, 1983

As you know, the President will be meeting on June 9 in Bonn with President Carstens, the ceremonial head of state of the Federal Republic of Germany. Carstens plans to visit the United States next fall, in October, 1983, to participate in festivities celebrating the Tricentennial of the first German immigrants to the United States.

I recommend that in his meeting with Carstens, the President formally invite him to the United States, including a meeting in Philadelphia on October 6, at the celebrations marking the actual day of the landing of the first immigrants. The President would also mention the invitation in his speech to the Bundestag later the evening of June 9.

The Philadelphia event would take roughly half a day of the President's time -- the trip to Philadelphia, a short speech, viewing the parade or other festivities for another half hour with Carstens, then the trip back to Washington. It would be an event like Yorktown with Mitterrand, although on a considerably smaller scale, and without the necessity for extensive substantive preparation, since Carstens is the ceremonial head of state.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

—

—

That the President extend an invitation to President Carstens to participate in festivities celebrating the Tricentennial of the first German immigrants to the United States when he meets with Carstens on June 9.

*M.K.D*

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS B. BLAIR

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

SUBJECT: Presidential Invitation to FRG  
President Carstens for October 6, 1983

President Carstens hopes to visit the United States next October as part of the tricentennial celebration of the first German immigrants to this country. The highlight of his trip would be a ceremony in Philadelphia on October 6, the actual day of the landing of the immigrants.

It would be a very positive gesture, which we would use in the President's speech to the Bundestag, if the President could formally invite President Carstens to this country next year, saying that he looks forward to meeting him in Philadelphia for the tricentennial celebration. This would be analogous to the meeting with Mitterrand in Yorktown last year although of far less substance, since Carstens is the ceremonial head of state. The occasion would take about half a day of the President's time -- a trip up to Philadelphia, a few remarks to the crowd, and the trip back.

If you approve, the attached memo to Mike Deaver at Tab I makes the recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION:OKNO    

That you sign the memo to Mike Deaver at Tab I.

## Attachment:

Tab I                      Memo to Mike Deaver

National Security Council  
The White House

182

RECEIVED

Package # 1653

MAY 19 P 2: 44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>OK</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>P</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

RECEIVED 13 MAR 82 14

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 12 MAR 82

RENTSCHLER

26 MAR 82

TYSON

26 MAR 82

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

VISIT

CARSTENS, KARL

AP

IMMIGRATION

ANNIVERSARIES

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT OF CARSTENS OCT 1983 & FORMATION OF WHITE HOUSE

PLANNING COM FOR 1983 US - GERMAN TRICENTENNIAL YEAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 26 APR 82 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

STEARMAN

KRAEMER

GUHIN

MYER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8206156

LOG

NSCIFID

( N / C )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>5/17</i>	<i>for decision</i>	<i>5/22</i>	
	<i>- 6/01</i>	<i>Clark sd</i>		
<i>Deaver</i>	<i>M 6/01</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
<i>Rentschler</i>	<i>S 6/01</i>	<i>Deaver approved further action</i>		<i>CT</i>
	<i>C 6/2</i>	<i>Wheeler of memo to Bremer</i>		<i>RE, mw, etc</i>
DISPATCH	<i>ed 6/2 md</i>			W/ATTCH FILE <i>PA (C) N</i>