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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Country File

Archivist: lov

File Folder: ITALY 9/1/81---12/31/81 ~~VOL H-147~~
[Memos] Box ~~91326~~ 15

Date: May 20, 1999

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	141949Z SEP 81, 1p	9/14/81	P1/F1
2. cable	draft message for item #1, 1p	n.d.	P1/F1
3. note	Sit Room Note, re Libya, 1p	9/9/81	P1/F1
4. report	"Current Reports", 1p	9/10/81	P1/F1
5. memo [5757]	James Rentschler through Tyson to Allen, re Fanfani, 1p	10/1/81	P1/F1 P5
6. memcon [6000]	Meese and Petronani on 10/8/81, 2p	n.d.	P1/F1
7. summary	"General Dozier's Kidnapping: An Update", 5p P F97-051 #7 8/2/00	12/31/81	P1/F1, F3
8. memo	James Nance to the President, re Dozier Kidnapping, 1p D 5/25/00 NLS F97-051 #8	12/28/81	P1/F1
9. memo	Nance to the President, re update on kidnapping of General Dozier, 1p R " 11 #9	12/18/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. Tyson

Subj: Columbus Day

Chuck, I checked
with State on the Gantani
thing; attached memo
reflects relevant views
which Dick needs to
know. J

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 201 5/20/99

ID 8105757

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 02 OCT 81 19

TO ALLEN .

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 01 OCT 81

TYSON

02 OCT 81

KEYWORDS: ITALY

FANFANI, AMINTORE

SUBJECT: FANFANI AT 12 OCT COLUMBUS DAY RECEPTION

ACTION: OBE PER TYSON

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES

PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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D

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

PA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


October 28, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of Counselor Meese's Meeting
with Italian Ambassador Petrignani

Attached for your information and use with Embassy Rome is the approved memorandum of conversation covering Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III's October 8 meeting with Italian Ambassador Petrignani.



Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Memo to Bremer Transmitting Meese-Petrignani
Memcon

Your memo to Bremer (Tab I) transmits for State information and dispatch to the field the approved version of the memcon from Ed Meese's October 8 meeting with Italian Ambassador Petrignani (both Meese and Dick Allen, as per indication at Tab II, have approved release to State).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Bremer at Tab I.

Approve_____ As Amended_____

Tab I Memo to Bremer
A - Memcon

Tab II Memo approving release to State

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

OCT 14 1981

MEMORANDUM

6000

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

Tab II

ACTION

October 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

FROM: DICK ALLEN *Dick*
SUBJECT: Memcon of Your Meeting with Petrignani

Attached for your review is a memorandum of conversation summarizing your October 8 meeting with Italian Ambassador Rinaldo Petrignani (Tab A). It would be useful to share this material with State.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached memcon and clear it for release to State.

Approve ✓ As Amended

Attachment

Tab A Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6000
91

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

October 10, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN


FROM: JAMES M.  RINTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Memcon Covering Meese-Petrignani Meeting

Your memo to Ed Meese (Tab I) transmits a memorandum of conversation summarizing his October 8 meeting with Italian Ambassador Rinaldo Petrignani (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Ed Meese at Tab I.

Approve  As Amended _____

Tab I Memo to Ed Meese
A - Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

#6000

RECEIVED

81 OCT 26 A 6:48

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

*Back from
Ed Mease*

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8106000

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 13 OCT 81 15

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOC DATE 10 OCT 81

KEYWORDS: ITALY

PETRIGNANI, RINALDO

MEESE, E

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF MEESE OCT 8 MTG W/ PETRIGNANI

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 15 OCT 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC IF ID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Meece	P 10/14	for decision		
	10/27	These appt memcon		
KE	S 10/27	Memo Lenz to Bremer	10/28	
	C 10/28	Lenz Stal memo to Bremer		2C ✓

DISPATCH

HW. 10/28

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

4

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~~NO FOREIGN~~

National Foreign Assessment Center


31 December 1981

General Dozier's Kidnapping: An Update

Two weeks after the kidnapping, the Red Brigades have issued two communiques but as yet have made no demands on the US or Italian governments for Dozier's safe return. The communiques suggest that the Brigades have expanded their political objectives to include European security issues as well as "class war" against the Italian establishment. Italian security forces have made some arrests in the case, but to date have no firm leads as to Dozier's whereabouts. The pace of the incident continues to suggest that the kidnapping will be a protracted affair designed to achieve maximum publicity for the Brigades.

(S/NF)

This memorandum was prepared for the Office for Combatting Terrorism, State Department by



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

BY CAS F97-051 A-7
NARA, Date 8/22/00

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The Communiques

Some Italian terrorist experts believe that the language of the communiques suggest they were prepared by members of the Venetian column of the Brigades. The vituperative tone and the references to General Dozier as a "pig" resemble the Venetian column's communiques during the kidnapping and eventual murder of Italian businessman Taeliercio this spring. ~~(S/NF)~~

The communiques represent a continuation of a shift away from focus on the class struggle within Italy and towards more international topics. A Brigades' propaganda pamphlet earlier this fall critiqued such issues as TNF and neutron bomb production and went into some detail as to how the Brigades perceived Italy's NATO role. While the most recent communique is more polemical than the earlier document, the basic anti-NATO thrust of the Brigades' current operating strategy is clear. ~~(S/NF)~~

Like the RAF in West Germany, the Brigades have obviously been impressed by the size and intensity of the "peace movement" in Western Europe and are seeking to capitalize on it. By publicly identifying itself with such a mass movement, the Brigades are attempting to usurp a leadership position within the movement. Like the RAF, the Brigades believe that terrorist acts against NATO targets will gain them new followers and are acceptable acts to elements of the peace movement. ~~(S/NF)~~

Both Brigades communiques call for uniting all revolutionary groups into one movement, and the first communique specifically calls on the Provisional IRA and the Basque ETA to join with the Brigades and the Red Army Faction in fighting imperialism. This is a departure from previous Brigades' propaganda and the statements of imprisoned Brigades members, which categorized ETA and PIRA as fighting wars of national liberation rather than engaging in class warfare. The Brigades have evidently decided that a pan-European front should be established to fight imperialism and are calling on ETA and PIRA to add their considerable resources to the struggle. It seems unlikely, however, that either ETA or the Provos would find much to gain in such an alliance. While it is known that the Brigades and the other three groups have at least passing contacts with one another, it is doubtful that any serious coordinated action by all these groups is feasible. ~~(S/NF)~~

While it is dangerous to read too much into what is essentially a propaganda broadside, the second communique implies that the Brigades have decided to suspend operations against domestic Italian targets and move against US and other NATO targets. The communique suggests some structural changes to the

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Brigades' table of organization, but it is unclear how the renaming of the group and any change in organization will affect future operations. (S/NF)

The Search

Despite some speculation that General Dozier might have been moved to a neighboring country, Italian authorities believe that the General is in Italy, perhaps in the Milan-Verona-Venice area. We have no evidence that the Brigades in the past have tried to move kidnap victims across national boundaries. The "peoples' prison" where Aldo Moro was held has never been located, but most security experts believe that Moro was never far from Rome, and may have been kept within Rome itself. (S/NF)

The police have made several arrests in the case, including one key member of the Milan column. The massive and inclusive nature of the search makes it likely that the authorities will apprehend more Brigades members and sympathizers. Thus, the case will have the side-effect of seriously disrupting the organization and its support apparatus. Although none of those arrested to date appears to have first-hand knowledge of the Dozier case, offers of rewards for information and an increased effort by police and security authorities may finally establish some firm leads. (S/NF)

Despite earlier allegations by SISMI chief Lugaresi and some Italian political leaders that the Dozier kidnapping had a "foreign hand" including possible Libyan, Soviet, or Palestinian involvement, they have been unable to produce any evidence to back these statements. There are some fragmentary reports which



Concerns were raised during the Moro kidnapping that the RAF had played an operational role in that case. While no evidence was ever produced to sustain that theory, there was one report earlier this fall stating that the RAF and the Brigades had operational contacts and that the Brigades had provided some assistance to the RAF during their attacks on US targets in West Germany this past summer. (S/NF)

Near Term Prognosis

The Brigades are likely to continue to prolong the case in order to milk the case of its maximum publicity value. Future

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communiqués will probably become more focused on specific demands on the US and Italian government, including termination of agreements to station cruise missiles in Italy, reduction of the US military presence in Italy, an end to the stationing of the Sixth Fleet in Naples, and a demand that Italy not involve itself in theater nuclear force modernization. (S/NF)

Brigades' references to "prisons" in their communiqués may foreshadow demands for blanket amnesty for imprisoned members or the release of key group leaders. The group may also demand that the Italian media publish Brigades' propaganda. (S/NF)

We believe there are several factors now militating against his safe return:

- The Venetian column, which apparently provided most of the operational assets for the kidnapping, murdered its last kidnap victim.
- The Brigades may decide that Dozier's murder would be a major blow, destabilizing the Italian government and resulting in massive governmental overreaction, including suspension of civil liberties. In such a scenario, terrorist theoreticians posit a massive spontaneous "peoples' uprising."
- The Brigades may calculate that the public would regard the release of Dozier unharmed as a defeat in light of the firm, no-concessions stand by the government.
- The accidental discovery of the "peoples' prison" and an immediate assault by security forces. In such an unstructured incident, the Brigades are likely to resist, and Dozier's chances for survival would be minimal. (S/NF)

Factors favoring Dozier's safe return include the following:

- Senior members of the Brigades may believe that killing the General would create public revulsion on a scale as large or larger than the murder of Moro. Most senior Brigades members believe that Moro's murder was a mistake, and that favorable publicity gained during the operation was lost when Moro was murdered.
- The Italian government might make concessions short of giving in to Brigades' demands on NATO issues. In the cases of Judge D'Urso and Cirillo, the Italian government quietly acceded to some demands for the safe release despite public pronouncements of no concessions.

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--The Brigades may believe that the murder of General Dozier would cause a crack-down on such a scale and with such intensity that the group could not survive. The Brigades, like other terrorist groups, are aware of the demise of the Uruguayan Tupamoros after they murdered US AID official Daniel Mittrione.

Given the probable long duration of this case, other factors may arise that would have a bearing on the chances for General Dozier's safe return. At the moment the initiative is with the Brigades, and they will continue to control the pace of the incident unless the Italian government is able to modify the scenario. One way might be to implement plans to cut off communications between imprisoned Brigades' leaders and their at-large members. Other options would include warnings of draconian reprisals should the General be murdered, solicitation of the help of illegal entities such as the Mafia, and an expanded "internationalization" of the search effort. These efforts might help the government regain the initiative and put the Brigades on the defensive. In such a scenario, the Brigades would have to alter their plans; once they have diverted from their carefully thought out game-plan, the chances for a Brigades' mistake increase. (S/NF)

There is a strong possibility that the Brigades will try to kidnap another US official or attack a NATO installation in the near term to increase the pressure on the Italian government. Recent information from SISDI warns of an attack against a US target by the Naples column of the Brigades, an attack that could occur in the next few days. The Brigades also may have decided to attack senior Italian politicians. Communique number two singles out Socialist Party Secretary Craxi several times. (S/NF)

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Rev 5/20/99

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

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DEX #

TTY #

8

PAGES

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RELEASER

DA

DTG 31 DEC 28 17 50

FROM/LOCATION/

1. Adm. James Nance

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Dave Fischer for the President / EA / Ranch TOT: 281758Z DEC 81

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____
2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

81 DEC 28 P 1: 01

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1981

182

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Ed*
SUBJECT: Update on Kidnapping of General Dozier

General Dozier's kidnappers telephoned a communique to an Italian press service this morning which:

- Attributes the kidnapping to the Red Brigades.
- Claims General Dozier is "locked in a peoples' jail and will be subjected to a judgement of the proletariat."

The Italian civilian police are conducting the investigation and have not requested U.S. assistance as yet. Prime Minister Spadolini met with Ambassador Rabb this morning and told him the case was being handled as though it involved an Italian general. The prime minister has taken personal charge of the Italian response.

CC: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-051 #9
BY MSJ NARA, DATE 5/25/00

~~SECRET~~

Review on December 18, 1987

.91 018 2:30

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

December 17, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *B.L.* *PR*
SUBJECT: Kidnapping of U.S. General in Italy

Mrs. Dozier, wife of General Dozier who was kidnapped in Verona, Italy was tied up by the kidnappers and left at the Dozier home. It took her almost six hours to free herself, thus the delay in reporting the kidnapping. Mrs. Dozier speaks Italian fluently. She reports that from the conversations of the kidnappers, it appears that they were members of the Red Brigade. Italian authorities are on scene. (U)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

.81 13 18
UNCLASSIFIED

The President has seen _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

December 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *J.W.N.*
SUBJECT: U.S. General Kidnapped in Italy *PS*

The National Military Command Center reports that Brigadier General Dozier, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration in Verona, Italy was kidnapped from his home at 1700 local today (1100 EST). At present the group which stormed his home and tied up his wife have not been identified, nor have any demands been received. (U)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

.81 613 62:35

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