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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. I 1/20/81 - 8/13/81 [5 of 6]
Box 91326

Date: September 3, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Richard Allen to the President re Britain drifts 1 p. (4622) <i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #99</i>	3/12/81	P1
2. memo	American embassy London to the Secretary of State re Britain drifts 2 p. <i>D 6/12/02 598-002 #100 R 6/9/10 M193 #60648</i>	7/31/81	P1
3. memo	James Rentschler to Allen re John Louis on a drifting UK 1 p. <i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #101</i>	7/31/81	P1
4. memo	annotated copy of item #1 1 p. <i>R " " #102</i>	n.d.	P1
5. cable	311655z 4 p. <i>D 6/12/02 598-002 #103</i>	7/31/81	P1
6. memo	RR to Caspar Weinberger re statutory determination on weapon design information 1 p. (4671) <i>R 2/5/03 #104</i>	8/8/81	P1
7. memo	Allen to the President re statutory determination on weapon design information 1 p. <i>R " " #105</i>	8/6/81	P1
8. memo	Chris Shoemaker to Allen thru Robert Schweitzer re statutory determination on weapon design information 1 p. <i>R " " #106</i>	8/4/81	P1
9. memo	Weinberger to RR re statutory determination on weapon design information 2 p. <i>Part 12/1/05 M1461 #2</i>	7/31/81	P1
10. determination	re statutory determination on weapon design information 2 p. <i>D 9/1/06 598-002 #108</i>	7/31/81	B1, B3
11. profile sheet	re item #10 1 p. <i>R 5/1/03 598-002 #109</i>	8/4/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. I 1/20/81 - 8/13/81 [5 of 6]
Box 91326

Date: September 3, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
12. memo	original of item #7 1 p. <i>R 7/5/03 598-002 #110</i>	8/6/81	P1 →
13. memo	for Weinberger re statutory determination on weapon design information 1 p. <i>R " " #111</i>	n.d.	P1 →
14. memo	original of item #9 2 p. <i>PART 9/1/06 598-002 #112</i>	7/31/81	P1
15. determination	same text as item #10 2 p. <i>D 9/1/06 598-002 #113</i>	7/31/81	B1, B3
16. memo	Allen to RR re Lord Carrington (Cooper dinner) 1 p. (4292) <i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #114</i>	7/16/81	P1
17. talking points →	for above 1 p. (attachment to item #16) <i>R " " #115</i>	nd	P1
18. memo	Alexander Haig to RR re your dinner this evening with Lord Carrington 2 p. <i>R 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #116</i>	7/16/81	P1
19. memo	Allen to RR re memorandum from Secretary Weinberger 1 p. <i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #117</i>	6/23/81	P1
20. memo	Weinberger to RR re meetings 2 p. <i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #118</i>	6/22/81	P1
21. profile sheet	re summary 1 p. <i>R 7/21/00 " #119</i>	6/23/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 17, 1981

Dear John:

Warm thanks for your note of July 21. I was pleased to hear that the pictures arrived intact and that you can make effective use of them.

Since that letter arrived, we have also received your London 14343, a very impressive report. Indeed, I considered this message important enough to bring to the President's personal attention. The quality of your early reporting reconfirms what all of us knew from the start: we have the right man in the right place at the right time.

Sincerely,



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable John J. Louis, Jr.
American Ambassador
London

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

4622 Redo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

August 12, 1981

INFORMATION

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Dick*
SUBJECT: Britain Drifts (U)

John Louis' first major report from his London post gives the flavor of the troubling political, social, and economic drift he discerns in Great Britain (Tab A). John's key points are these:

- Thatcher has lost her grip on the political rudder;
- The Labor Party, though increasingly fragmented, could prove harmful to our security interests even if reduced to a splinter group;
- With no British leader seeming to have a clear idea of where or how to go, some political turbulence is likely, with adverse effect on the country's reliability as a U.S. ally. (S)

John believes that a visit by you to the UK early next year could significantly strengthen both British resolve and the Western Alliance itself. I agree. (S)

cc: The Vice President
Edwin Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET WITH~~
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Review on August 5, 1987

.81 VED JS 63:50

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002 #99
BY CTS NARA, DATE 7/21/00

~~SECRET~~

60648

~~SECRET~~

COPY -- July 31, 1981

FROM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR JOHN J. LOUIS

SUBJECT: BRITAIN DRIFTS

1. Behind the ceremony and sentiment of the royal wedding -- a bittersweet valentine, Britain is troubled. The disquiet is not seismic, but it is severe enough to warrant a warning that some political turbulence likely lies ahead, though I foresee now no change of government before the regular elections of 1983/1984.
2. Beneath the surface, the mood in London is unjubilant, the wedding celebrations almost a reminder that times are lean and prospects unpromising -- economically, socially, and politically. Nor do any of Britain's leaders seem to have a clear view of sensible new directions. The end of the parliamentary session traditionally is a somber moment, with politicians aching for a rest. Nevertheless, the present unease in Westminster and the country is real.
3. The problems begin with Thatcher and her government. It has visibly lost its grip on the rudder in recent weeks. Inability to produce the promised economic turn-around has been debilitating. The recent street riots were a sharp shock. All along, the moderates in the party have insisted Thatcher was sacrificing too much to the fight against inflation. Last week, these moderates won a hard cabinet fight to achieve a youth employment package. Now they feel vindicated, but they are also frustrated: the moderates themselves have no better prescriptions than creeping reflation and more soothing rhetoric. While we may see a Tory change in public emphasis, it is probably too close to the 1983/1984 election to retool the basic strategy or remedy past oversell: all we see on the near horizon is more tinkering, including a midterm policy review and a cabinet reshuffle. But voters are probably too disillusioned now to be swayed by more words and the center swing vote that won the May 1979 election for Thatcher is deserting the Tories. Thatcher and her team seem to be living largely on a diet of hope for an economic upturn.
4. The new Social Democratic Party (SDP) is trying hard to fill the soft center the Tories abandoned for fiscal orthodoxy. It has convinced many that it can take power in alliance with the liberals, or at least achieve a coalition role. But few think that it will know what to do once in office. No more than the Government

~~SECRET~~

GDS 7/30/87

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM08-193 #60648

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

does the Social Democratic Party give evidence of being able to come to grips with a creaking social and economic system that cannot generate new employment. Overspends on social services spawns urban violence and desperately requires better trade union-management relations, better industrial management and more capital investment.

5. Meanwhile, the Labor Party is spinning toward irrelevance on the extreme left. The ideological purists of the left blame half-hearted socialism for the failures of previous Labor governments and will insist on the whole dose next time. But their program will be hard for some in the party to swallow, let alone the wider public. If Labor's policies to unilateral nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from Europe are upheld by that party in October, there will then likely be a new round of defections to the Social Democratic Party by Labor moderates. Michael Foot, the Labor leader, inspires no confidence and the trade unions are caught in a bind: Breaking with the traditional Labor Party would be a messy divorce, but the unions have grown used to power and will not be content with backing a left-wing splinter group with no real prospect of power. The trade union barons may begin to fight among themselves, and the result could be a crack-up of the old solidarity that gave Labor its muscle. It could even lead to the emergence of a new moderate Labor Party forged around Labor members of Parliament increasingly disillusioned by the power of the extra-Parliamentary Party apparatus. But the new and virulent mood in the Labor Party presents a threat to Western security interests as well: even as a minority, Labor might prove capable of touching off a European slide down the anti-nuclear chute.

6. Right across the political spectrum, things are changing here, and movement itself is unsettling in this tradition-bound land. But particularly disturbing to me is the sense that nowhere -- right, center, or left -- are new ideas coming forward that face the real problems. Instead the parties and politicians are inward-looking and self-absorbed. Perhaps this simply reflects the intransigence of a structurally weak economy. Changes may be rapid, even spectacular, but I fear they will remain superficial. We must prepare ourselves for a period in which we shall have difficulty counting fully on our usually staunchest ally, even as Thatcher will be clutching our coattails.

7. Given the drift in British politics, a visit by the President early in 1982 would go far toward strengthening Thatcher's determination to support our policies and thereby strengthen the alliance itself, both of which are in our interest.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4622 Redo
ASR

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

August 5, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *JM*

SUBJECT: John Louis Messages, etc.

At Tab I is the re-do you requested on the memo to the President summarizing Ambassador John Louis' first major political report from London. At Tab II is a letter from you to Louis acknowledging his July 21 note and informing him of the action you took in bringing his Britain Drifts report to the President's personal attention.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____; As Amended _____

2. That you sign the letter to John Louis at Tab II.

Approve _____; As Amended _____

Tab I Memo to the President

A London 14343

Tab II Letter to John Louis

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

SECRET WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

July 31, 1981

DVA HAS SEEN

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Jim*
FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER
SUBJECT: John Louis On A Drifting UK *(U)*

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002 #101
BY CAS NARA DATE 7/21/00

If you haven't seen the full text of John Louis' first major political report from Embassy London, it is worth a reading. John paints a very sobering picture of the present mood in that country and its implications for us. His view might well be of interest to the President, and with that in mind I have done a covering summary which you can forward to him (Tab I). ~~(S)~~

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ As Amended *RVR*

cc: Jim Lilley

Tab I Memo to the President
A - Cable from John Louis

SECRET WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
Review on July 31, 1987

Jim - prepare a ~~short~~ letter for me to send to Lewis after this goes forward, just letting him know that I have sent it to Denis Smith. It was a good one

SECRET

*Thanks. Good early 5H.
Send it on,
As amended,
retype cable.
Instead of underlining,
highlight with my
color of highlighter*

#4622

The cable was
to have been
retyped !!

One show to Done
process for James to
do to be to Done

RECEIVED

81 JUL 31 P 5: 17

Back to
rent solution

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

1/30

1/30

1/30

1/30

1/30

1/30

1/30

1/30

I will send it
forward, we
changed it type
The cable go

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

4622

01 '6 A10:41

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

RVA HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Britain Drifts (U)

~~Though it was briefly summarized in this week's cable round-ups,~~
~~you might care to read John Louis' first major report from his~~
London post ^{Give me} ~~for a fuller~~ flavor of the troubling political,
social, and economic drift he discerns in Great Britain (Tab A).
John's key points are these:

- Thatcher has lost her grip on the political rudder;
- The Labor Party, though increasingly fragmented, could prove harmful to our security interests even if reduced to a splinter group;
- With no British leader seeming to have a clear idea of where or how to go, some political turbulence is likely, with adverse effect on the country's reliability as a U.S. ally. (S)

John believes that a visit by you to the UK early next year could significantly strengthen both British resolve and the Western Alliance itself. I agree. (S)

Attachment

Tab A Cable from John Louis

~~SECRET WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Review on July 31, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
MLS 598002 #102
BY CTS
NARA DATE 7/21/00

~~SECRET~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 AUG 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: LOUIS, JOHN J

SOURCE: ALLEN

DATE: 17 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

LOUIS, JOHN

SUBJ: ALLEN RESPONSE TO LOUIS RPT OF JUL 31

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:

Cathy Millison
FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO LILLEY

F WH

O HW C CM

RECEIVED 31 JUL 81 16

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 31 JUL 81

By CAS

10/9/94

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

LOUIS, JOHN

SUBJECT: LOUIS RPT ON BRITAIN DRIFTS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 8/16 31 JUL 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

LILLEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC IFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

	-	8/3	RVA approved as amended		
Rentschler	S	8/3	for redo	8/6	12
Allen	X	8/05	for decision		
Pres	IP	8/12	for information		
	C	8/17	Noted by the Pres.		
	C	8/17	allen of ltr. W/ATTCH FILE		

DISPATCH

State 8/17 10/9/94

FILE

LA (A) 2

RE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1981

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design
Information ~~(U)~~

Thank you for your memorandum of July 31. In accordance with Executive Order 10956, I approve your recommendation that the United States communicate to the United Kingdom certain Restricted Data concerning US nuclear weapon designs. ~~(S)~~

Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET~~

Review July 30, 1987
Classified by SecDef

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 898-002-104
BY CRJ NARA, DATE 7/6/03

BACK FR
DARMAN w/
RR sig.

CD

#4671

81 AUG 10 P 1: 13

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

Signature
8/10/81

10 AUGUST

4671

Original of this pkg is still in Calif.
The memo to Secretary of Defense was
retyped, following the President's
approval of recom, and Darman's office
saw that it was signed.

#4671

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Darman:

The President has indicated his approval of the attached memorandum. Could you help us get the necessary signature.

Thanks.



Janet Colson

If you'll return the signed memo to us, we'll dispatch it.



MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

4671

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 6, 1981

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design Information (U)

Cap Weinberger has written to you (Tab B), recommending that you approve a more extensive dialogue with the United Kingdom on US nuclear weapon designs. This entails communication of certain Restricted Data, approval of which has to be granted by the President under the provisions of Executive Order 10956. The Secretary of Energy concurs in Cap's recommendation and has co-signed the formal notification attached to Cap's memo. (S)

The British Government has recently displayed a more active interest in its nuclear forces, and closer cooperation on weapon designs will enhance the British nuclear deterrent. It is in the interest of both the US and the UK for this cooperation to be encouraged. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Cap's proposal and sign the memo at Tab A. (U)

Approve

✓RR 8/8

Disapprove

TAB A Memorandum to Cap Weinberger
TAB B Incoming Memorandum from Cap Weinberger

cc: James Baker

~~SECRET~~

Review July 30, 1987
Classified by SecDef

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002-#105
BY CWS NARA, DATE 2/5/03

#4671

'ED

81 AUG 4 P 6: 49

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

~~SECRET~~

4671
092

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~RVA HAS SEEN~~

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ROBERT SCHWEITZER *RS*

FROM: CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design
Information (U)

Secretary Weinberger has written to the President (Tab B), recommending that the United States communicate to the United Kingdom certain Restricted Data concerning US nuclear weapon designs. This is in compliance with Executive Orders 10956 10841 and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. ~~(S)~~

Approval of this policy will allow the United States to share with the United Kingdom more extensive information on the design of nuclear weapons. This is particularly important in light of renewed British interest in a strong nuclear defense. ~~(S)~~

We should endorse Secretary Weinberger's recommendation and suggest to the President that he approve. ~~(U)~~

Kim Kimmitt and Rentschler concur. ~~(U)~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I. ~~(U)~~

Approve 8/5 Disapprove _____

TAB I Memo to the President
TAB A Memorandum to Secretary Weinberger
TAB B Incoming Memorandum from Secretary Weinberger

cc: Kimmitt
Rentschler

~~SECRET~~

Review 7/30/87

Classified by SecDef

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598 002 #106
BY CS NARA, DATE 7/5/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS M1461 #2
By CS, NARA, Date 12/7/05

31 JUL 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design
Information (U)

(U) Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, Section 144. 42 U.S.C. 2164(1976) and Executive Order 10841, the Secretary of Energy and I have made a determination that the communication to the United Kingdom of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. The complete statement of the determination is submitted for your review as required by Executive Order 10956.

(S) Cooperation with the British [REDACTED] takes place under the 1958 U.S./U.K. Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. In the years immediately following the conclusion of this agreement, nearly all information on United States and United Kingdom [REDACTED] programs was freely exchanged. Both nations had active programs and, while the British effort was significantly smaller, both benefited from the cooperative effort which tended to reduce duplication in research and development. However starting in about 1965 British interest [REDACTED] waned and the scope of the information exchanged was significantly reduced.

(S) During the past 18 months the British government has demonstrated [REDACTED]

3 3(b)(16)
Classified by: Sec Def
Review on 30 Jul 87

SEC-DEF CONTR No. X15478

Document Transmitted
Herewith Contains

2

(U) Section 144 b. and c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, require the President to determine that any

to another nation "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." Executive Order 10841 assigns the responsibility for making such Statutory Determinations to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. Executive Order 10956 requires that any determination made under Section 144.b. be forwarded to the President and, if not disapproved by him, take effect after 15 days. Therefore, unless you direct otherwise, we will place the attached Statutory Determination in effect after the mandatory 15-day review period.

Joseph W. Kintner

Copy Furnished:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Energy

3.3 (b)(6)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RECEIVED 04 AUG 81 13

TO ALLEN

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 31 JUL 81

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

598-002 #109

BY

CW

NARA, DATE

5/1/03

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

GREAT BRITAIN

LEGAL ISSUES

CM

SUBJECT: PROPOSAL FOR RELEASE OF RESTRICTED DATA INFO ON WEAPON DESIGN TO GREAT
BRITAIN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 04 AUG 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

SCHWEITZER

RENTSCHLER

KIMMITT

COLSON ~~X~~

LENZ

COMMENTS **CABINET LEVEL CORRESPONDENCE -- 3 HR TURNAROUND REQUIRED

RECD IN NSC/S 8/4

REF# 15478

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
RJA	X 8-4	For Signature	8-5	RK, DE
Pres	P 8/5	for decision		
	C 8/10	Pres appt recon & signed memo to Sec Def		SC, DE, RK under

DISPATCH

SQ 8-10

W/ATTCH FILE

RA (C) 10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25 AUGUST 1981

re: 4671

The original of this package has just been returned to us from California via Mr. Darman's office. The President approved this recom on 6 August; the memo to Secretary of Defense was subsequently retyped in Mr. Allen's office and signature was autopenned on 10 August.

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

4671

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1981

The President has seen

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design
Information ~~(S)~~

Cap Weinberger has written to you (Tab B), recommending that you approve a more extensive dialogue with the United Kingdom on US nuclear weapon designs. This entails communication of certain Restricted Data, approval of which has to be granted by the President under the provisions of Executive Order 10956. The Secretary of Energy concurs in Cap's recommendation and has co-signed the formal notification attached to Cap's memo. ~~(S)~~

The British Government has recently displayed a more active interest in its nuclear forces, and closer cooperation on weapon designs will enhance the British nuclear deterrent. It is in the interest of both the US and the UK for this cooperation to be encouraged. ~~(S)~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Cap's proposal and sign the memo at Tab A. ~~(U)~~

Approve *RR*

Disapprove _____

TAB A Memorandum to Cap Weinberger
TAB B Incoming Memorandum from Cap Weinberger

cc: James Baker

~~SECRET~~

Review July 30, 1987
Classified by SecDef


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BY *CIS* NARA, DATE *2/5/03*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design
Information (U)

Thank you for your memorandum of July 31. In accordance with Executive Order 10956, I approve your recommendation that the United States communicate to the United Kingdom certain Restricted Data concerning US nuclear weapon designs.

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Review July 30, 1987
Classified by SecDef

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NLS 598002 #11

BY CS, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31 JUL 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination on Weapon Design Information (U)

FOIA(b) (1)

(U) Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, Section 144. 42 U.S.C. 2164(1976) and Executive Order 10841, the Secretary of Energy and I have made a determination that the communication to the United Kingdom of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. The complete statement of the determination is submitted for your review as required by Executive Order 10956.

(S) Cooperation with the British [REDACTED] takes place under the 1958 U.S./U.K. Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. In the years immediately following the conclusion of this agreement, nearly all information on United States and United Kingdom [REDACTED] programs was freely exchanged. Both nations had active programs and, while the British effort was significantly smaller, both benefited from the cooperative effort which tended to reduce duplication in research and development. However starting in about 1965 British interest [REDACTED] waned and the scope of the information exchanged was significantly reduced.

(S) During the past 18 months the British government has demonstrated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NLS 398-002 #112
By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 9/4/86

33(b)(6)

Classified by: Sec Def
Review on 30 Jul 87

~~SECRET~~

SEC-DEF CONTR No. X 15478
Document Transmitted
Herewith Contains
RESTRICTED DATA

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
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(S) Implementing broader sharing of [REDACTED] requires reciprocal access by both nations to each other's most modern weapons designs. Presently the United States lacks the formal authorization to communicate our latest weapons designs to the British. The attached Statutory Determination will provide us that authority. The restrictions in the determination will both protect sensitive U.S. security [REDACTED] information and ensure that any major new concepts are reviewed prior to being shared with the British.

(U) Section 144 b. and c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, require the President to determine that any [REDACTED]

to another nation "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." Executive Order 10841 assigns the responsibility for making such Statutory Determinations to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. Executive Order 10956 requires that any determination made under Section 144.b. be forwarded to the President and, if not disapproved by him, take effect after 15 days. Therefore, unless you direct otherwise, we will place the attached Statutory Determination in effect after the mandatory 15-day review period.



Atch
Statutory Determination (SRD)

Copy Furnished:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Energy

~~SECRET~~

3.3 (b)(6)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 15
14-15 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

4292

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*
SUBJECT: Lord Carrington (Cooper Dinner) ~~(U)~~

Because UK Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington is expected to be present at John Sherman Cooper's dinner this evening, you might care to draw on the attached information and talking points (TAB A). ~~(U)~~

As you know from our discussions with him during Mrs. Thatcher's visit earlier in the year, Lord Carrington is an engaging but often opinionated and even brusque interlocutor. He is also prone to news leaks, and for that reason it will be especially important, on the eve of the Ottawa Summit, to avoid giving him any leeway for "interpreting" U.S. positions in advance of your discussions with Mrs. Thatcher and the other Summit participants. ~~(e)~~

You might find it both useful and appropriate -- particularly if Carrington gets too intensely involved in one policy subject or another -- to express sympathy for British efforts to cope with the eruption of street violence in their country. ~~(U)~~

A memorandum from Secretary Haig regarding this dinner is attached at TAB B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~
Review on July 16, 1987

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NARA, DATE

7/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S USE WITH UK
FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD PETER CARRINGTON

(Thursday, July 16, 1981)

- Summit. Confine any discussion of this broad topic to your view that the conference must be upbeat and that the industrial democracies need to demonstrate essential unity and self-confidence. (U)
- Middle East. With the UK assuming the Presidency of the EC Council during the last half of 1981, Carrington's role will be important in the context of any ongoing EC Middle East initiative. Impress upon him the importance of not undermining U.S. efforts to move the Camp David process forward. (C)
- Afghanistan. Carrington suffered a rebuff in his lead effort to enlist Soviet support for an EC resolution of the situation in Afghanistan; in principle we back that effort, but are under no illusion about its chances of bearing fruit. Should Carrington bring it up, express sympathy with his work and at the same time reiterate the need to prevent Western and Third World acquiescence in Soviet behavior. (C)
- Namibia. Emboldened by his success in Zimbabwe, Carrington has some proprietary interest in seeing progress on the issues in Southern Africa. While avoiding any detailed discussion, simply reaffirm our interest in maintaining the unity of the Contact Group Five. (C)
- "East of Suez". Should Carrington wax strategic, tell him we continue to hope that the UK can build up its ties in the small Persian Gulf states, Kenya, and Pakistan, and that we would welcome seeing a UK Gulf intervention force. (C)
- Ireland (only if raised). Confirm that Irish Prime Minister FitzGerald sent you a message on the hunger strike situation and that U.S. policy on Northern Ireland remains the same as you expressed it in your March 17 (St. Patrick's Day) statement. (C)

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BY CAS A, DAT 7/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
SUBJECT: Your dinner this evening with Lord Carrington at
the home of Senator and Mrs. John Sherman Cooper

The Foreign Secretary and I meet tomorrow for a review of issues, looking toward the Ottawa Summit. Lord Carrington and the Prime Minister are the European leaders who share most fully the ideals and goals of your administration. They have welcomed your assurances of closer consultation with our Allies. The British assumed the Presidency of the European Community(EC) for six months on July 1. They will be our primary political interlocutor with the Community.

Ottawa Summit

Margaret Thatcher anticipates a relaxed, general discussion when she meets with you at breakfast. She will probably share ideas on East/West issues, especially Poland and Afghanistan. The British are less interested in North/South than other members of the EC, but holding the Presidency gives these issues a higher profile for now.

East/West

The Thatcher government sees the early opening of arms control negotiations as important to the political management of growing neutralism in Western Europe. Tomorrow I brief Carrington on both the modernization of NATO defense capabilities and our approaches to the Soviets which, we expect, will lead to arms control talks in November or December.

We strongly support the British-led EC initiative on Afghanistan. Carrington went to Moscow early this month to sell the Soviets. While he had little success, the initiative remains before the international community.

We recognize the importance of East/West trade to our Allies, but believe such exchanges must be consistent with broad foreign policy objectives. We seek a coordinated Western economic posture toward the Soviets which will deny militarily significant goods and technology.

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BY LOS NARA DATE 6/12/02

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Middle East

We hope the EC Middle East initiative will be complementary to our efforts to move forward the Camp David Peace Process. Sadat comes in August and Begin in September to discuss the next steps.

The British have supported our efforts to defuse the crisis in Lebanon. Carrington has urged us to restrain the Israelis.

Southern Africa

The British are actively working for a Namibia settlement. We have concluded a three-month dialogue with the South Africans on this issue, and I will update Lord Carrington tomorrow on what we have gained from them. While many difficulties remain, we are cautiously optimistic about moving forward on this issue. There may be a ministerial-level dinner on Namibia at the conclusion of the Ottawa Summit.

Northern Ireland

The Irish have regretted the leak in Dublin of Irish Prime Minister FitzGerald's letter to you urging you to intervene with Prime Minister Thatcher. In your St. Patrick's Day statement you said that we are neutral in the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland while strongly condemning all violence. We hope there will be a peaceful outcome to the IRA hunger strike.

~~SECRET~~

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DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

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N.B.

*sec. Haig's memo was
added to the package which
went to (P)
(There was a TAB B)*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS~~

July 16, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *J.M.*SUBJECT: Lord Carrington (President's Dinner with
John Sherman Cooper) ~~(C)~~

Your memo to the President (Tab I) provides him with appropriate tips and talking points for use with UK Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington this evening (Tab A). ~~(C)~~

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve *50 7/16* As Amended _____cc: Jim Lilley
Chuck Tyson
Phyllis KaminskyTab I Memo to the President
A - Talking Points~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS~~
Review on July 16, 1987By *C/S**10/1/81*

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED 16 JUL 81 15

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 16 JUL 81

CS

10/9/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AP

CARRINGTON, PETER

COOPER, JOHN S

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES DURING COOPER DINNER ON 16 JUL

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 16 JUL 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT

June 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Secretary Weinberger on British
Defense Review

Attached is Cap Weinberger's summary of his recent talks
with John Nott, the British Secretary of State for Defense,
concerning the UK defense budget review.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

SECRET-SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFY JUNE 22, 1987

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
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

598-002 #118
CAS DATE 7/21/00

22 JUN 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meetings with John Nott on British Defense Review (S)

(S) The British have been conducting a review of their defense budget. While they are willing to meet a 3 percent increase in defense spending despite their declining economy, cost increases force them to make certain cuts. Hearing about possibly serious cuts in the British Navy, we were anxious to get the full story from John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defense. He met with me at a working dinner last Saturday and again on Sunday morning.

(S) Nott will now see NATO Secretary General Luns and German Defense Minister Apel and then give the results of his round of talks to his Cabinet Thursday, and make a general statement that afternoon to the House of Commons. We agreed on general language he could use about his talks with us. We both agreed on the absolute need of secrecy until he makes his general statement. If he loses over 15 votes on this issue, he said the Thatcher Government could be in deep trouble.

(S) The results of his defense review are that the UK will increase its defense budget, in full implementation of the NATO 3 percent aim, for the next four years. The UK will proceed with its strategic deterrent program (planning on the Trident, in close cooperation with us); will improve its air defense and ground force capabilities for the defense of the UK home base; and keep their Army in Germany at 55,000. The UK will also buy 60 AV-8B Harrier aircraft to replace existing Harriers in Germany.

(S) The main changes will occur in the British Naval role in the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel. They will keep only two of the new Anti-Submarine Warfare carriers in service, instead of the three, and will reduce the number of destroyers and frigates committed to NATO from at least 59 to about 50. Nott said they would speed up the design of a smaller, cheaper frigate as a replacement. Of importance to us, he will seek to improve the capability of their mine force.

(S) Of principal concern to Nott is the ability to cut back on uneconomic dockyards, that would have been used to maintain

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the larger number of destroyers and frigates. Apparently, this is a highly political problem for the British Cabinet, and hence a sensitive decision.

(S) We don't want to stand in the way of cuts the Thatcher Cabinet wants to make in uneconomic dockyard operations. However, we would like to work with the British so that they can better keep their NATO commitment in the Atlantic. In particular, we must prevent the British Naval cuts from becoming an excuse for other Allies for defense cuts and from creating problems for us on the Hill. Therefore, I mentioned to Nott several ideas that might help ease his financial pressures, including: greater US support for the Trident program, the possibility of purchasing one of their ASW carriers, and even the tentative idea of purchasing a long-term lease on Diego Garcia. (Such a lease might help protect our interests in the event Labor government came into power.) We made it clear that all these suggestions were tentative and are setting up working groups to develop further details.

cc: The Vice President

A handwritten signature, possibly reading 'Jap.', is written in dark ink.

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To Staff for
Info ; original
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President.
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TO ALLEN

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 22 JUN 81

ALLEN

23 JUN 81

S9K-002 #119

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TE 7/21/00

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

MILITARY POSTURE

NOTT, JOHN

CM

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF WEINBERGER MTG W/ UK DEFENSE SECRETARY RE BRITISH DEFENSE
REVIEW

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

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FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER ✓

SCHWEITZER ✓

BAILEY ✓

LENZ ✓

COMMENTS

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