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Country File:
Folder Title: United Kingdom
(09/01/1981-03/31/1982) [3 of 4]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. II 9/1/81 - 3/31/82 [3 of 4]
Box 91326 *76*

Date: September 4, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	241054z 4 p. <i>D 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #169</i>	9/24/81	P1
2. cable	181718z 2 p. <i>D " " #170</i>	9/18/81	P1
3. cable	181145z 2 p. <i>D " " #171</i>	9/18/81	P1
4. cable	091914z 2 p. <i>D " " #172</i>	9/9/81	P1
5. cable	041116z 1 p. <i>D " " #173</i>	9/4/81	P1
6. cable	031652z 2 p. <i>D " " #174</i>	9/3/81	P1
7. cable	021412z 1 p. <i>R " " #175</i>	9/2/81	P1
8. cable	021241z 1 p. <i>R " " #176</i>	9/2/81	P1
9. cable	291136z 1 p. <i>R " " #177</i>	8/29/81	P1
10. cable	311802z 2 p. <i>R " " #178</i>	3/31/82	P1
11. cable	180347z 2 p. <i>R " " #179</i>	3/18/82	P1
12. cable	220214z 3 p. <i>D " " #180</i>	1/22/82	P1
13. cable	051442z 1 p. <i>R " " #181</i>	1/5/82	P1
14. cable	050057z 2 p. <i>R " " #182</i>	1/5/82	P1
15. cable	0122127z 4 p. <i>R " " #183</i>	1/1/82	P1
16. cable	041515z 2 p. <i>R 9/24/02 NLSS98-002 #184</i>	12/4/81	P1
17. cable	230620z 2 p. <i>R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #185</i>	11/23/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. II 9/1/81 - 3/31/82 [3 of 4]
Box 91326 *20*

Date: September 4, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. cable	201855z 2 p. <i>R 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #186</i>	11/20/81	P1
19. cable	170659z 2 p. <i>R " " #187</i>	11/17/81	P1
20. cable	062050z 2 p. <i>R " " #188</i>	11/6/81	P1
21. cable	032128z 2 p. <i>R " " #189</i>	11/3/81	P1
22. cable	261623z 4 p. <i>R " " #190</i>	10/26/81	P1
23. cable	220141z 3 p. <i>R " " #191</i>	10/22/81	P1
24. cable	202331z 2 p. <i>R " " #192</i>	10/20/81	P1
25. cable	171444z 2 p. <i>R " " #193</i>	10/17/81	P1
26. cable	230229z 2 p. <i>R " " #194</i>	9/23/81	P1
27. cable	150113z 3 p. <i>R " " #195</i>	9/15/81	P1
28. cable	051720z 2 p. <i>R " " #196</i>	9/5/81	P1
29. cable	011910z 4 p. <i>R " " #197</i>	9/1/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-6 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 61

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATAGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE764

UTS8438

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHLD #6629 245141Z

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 021412Z SEP 81

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0338

BT

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 16629

NODIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 9/2/01 (STREATOR, EDWARD J.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, UK, IS, EG, US

SUBJECT: MFO: A FORMAL APPROACH TO HMG

REF: STATE 233653

1. ~~IS~~ I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO CALL ON CARRINGTON TO
DELIVER MESSAGE AND MAKE THE POINTS CONTAINED IN REFTEL
ON SEPTEMBER 3. LOUIS

BT

#6629

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #175

BY WOT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 62

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE714
UTS8296
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHLD #6610 2451241
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021241Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0332
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 16610
NODIS
E.G. 12065 RDS-1 9/2/01 (STREATOR, E.J.) ORIM
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO CONTACT FOREIGN
MINISTER
REF: STATE 234075
MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL DELIVERED TO FCO AT 1215 P.M.
LONDON TIME. LOUIS
BT
#6610
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #176

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 69

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE634
STUB969
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHLD #6497 241113Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 291136Z AUG 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0266
BT

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 16497

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 8/29/01 (STREATOR, E.J.) OR-M
TAGS: AD, WA, SF, MOPS, EUR, UK
SUBJECT: REPORT OF SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS IN ANGOLA
REF: STATE 231143
REFTEL DELIVERED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE (FCO) AUGUST 29, LOUIS
BT
#6497
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#177

BY NOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

OUT

STATE NODIS

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5529
SIT150 DATE 04/06/82

DTG: 311802Z MAR 82 PSN: 019878
TOR: 090/2302Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5529 0901850
O 311802Z MAR 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2341

INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 4664
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 085529
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2 3/30/12 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)
TAGS: US, UK, AR, FA
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO LORD CARRINGTON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE CONVEY IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
THE SECRETARY TO LORD CARRINGTON.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PETER,

I KNOW THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS ONE OF THE FIRST
ISSUES YOU RAISED WITH US AS FOREIGN SECRETARY. THE
SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS ON SOUTH
GEORGIA ISLAND IS INDEED SERIOUS, AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW
THAT WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ASSIST IN ITS
RESOLUTION. I AM INSTRUCTING OUR AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AIRES TO CONVEY MY CONCERN TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTER AND TO URGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT TAKE NO STEPS
WHICH WOULD AGGRAVATE THE PRESENT CRISIS. FURTHERMORE,
I AM URGING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO ABIDE BY
EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING
REGULARIZING THE STATUS OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS ON SOUTH

GEORGIA ISLAND.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE A GREATER CHANCE OF INFLUENCING
ARGENTINE BEHAVIOR IF WE APPEAR TO THEM NOT TO FAVOR ONE
SIDE OR THE OTHER. WE WILL CONTINUE QUIETLY TO TRY AND
MOVE THE ARGENTINES AWAY FROM TAKING FURTHER STEPS WHICH
WOULD MAKE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT TO
ACHIEVE. I BELIEVE THAT YOU KNOW TOM HAYWARD, OUR
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. HE ARRIVES IN BUENOS AIRES

DE A IED

NLS 598-002#178

~~SECRET~~

BY hAT, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5529

DTG: 311802Z MAR 82 PSN: 019878

ON MARCH 31 ON A LONG-STANDING INVITATION, AND WILL DO
WHAT HE CAN TO BE HELPFUL.

LET ME KNOW, PETER, IF YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE
MIGHT HELP DEFUSE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS THROUGH THE USE
OF OUR GOOD OFFICES.

I ADMIRE YOUR PATIENCE IN THIS SITUATION.

SINCERELY,

AL.

END TEXT.

4. INSTRUCTION TO AMBASSADOR SCHLAUDEMANN IN BUENOS
AIRES SENT SEPTTEL. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 5529

DTG: 311802Z MAR 82 PSN: 019878

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CJS

10/9/91

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8022 DTG: 241554Z MAR 82 PSN: 010206
SIT822 DATE 03/26/82 TOR: 083/1843Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP RENT TYSN SIT STUD EOB SITT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: FYI

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8022 0831635
O 241554Z MAR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 078022

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 3/24/12 (HOLMES, H. A.)

TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), UK

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO LONDON: THATCHER DECISION
OF VENUE FOR SPEECH

REF.: LONDON 6501

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUGGESTED HMG CHANGES (REFTEL) HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED
IN WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON VENUE OF LONDON SPEECH.
3. WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT WILL NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL
EMBASSY CONFIRMS THAT HMG HAS MADE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WILL BE MADE IN THE ROYAL
GALLERY.
HAIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6651
SIT444 DATE 03/29/82

DTG: 231757Z MAR 82 PSN: 008726
TOR: 082/2059Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP TYSN SITT STUD RENT SIT EOB MR
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6651 0821759
O 231757Z MAR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 1898

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 076651

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 3/23/12 (HOLMES, H. A.)

TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), UK

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO LONDON: THATCHER DECISION
ON VENUE FOR SPEECH

REF: LONDON 6363

--
.. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. CHARGE SHOULD INFORM APPROPRIATE HMG AUTHORITIES THAT
THE WHITE HOUSE AGREES TO THE ROYAL GALLERY VENUE FOR THE
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

3. HERE FOLLOWS A DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE USED WITH THE
PRESS HERE, BUT ONLY AFTER THE BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT ON
MARCH 24.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TODAY ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT
REAGAN IS BEING INVITED TO ADDRESS PARLIAMENT IN THE
ROYAL GALLERY DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO LONDON.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE PRESIDENT LOOKS FORWARD TO ADDRESSING THE MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT AND, AS WE MADE CLEAR WHEN WE WERE CONSULTED IN

ADVANCE, HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO SO IN THE VENUE SELECTED
BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

END TEXT. HAIG

CS

1 1997
10/9/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6651

DTG: 231757Z MAR 82 PSN: 008726

SECSTATE WASHDC 6651

DTG: 231757Z MAR 82 PSN: 008726

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1544
SIT452 DATE 03/29/82

DTG: 180347Z MAR 82 PSN: 001420
TOR: 077/0353Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1544 0770352
O 180347Z MAR 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1661

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7280
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 071544

NODIS
LONDON FOR LANPHER/FRASURE/CROCKER ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 (3/17/02) (SIMPSON, D.)
TAGS: SF, US, PEPR, WA
SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~ TEXT OF SOUTH AFRICAN "935" PAPER

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOUTH AFRICAN "UNTAG" PAPER
PRESENTED FEBRUARY 22.

3. QUOTE: A. FUNCTIONS OF UNTAG

-- UNTAG WILL HAVE A MONITORING FUNCTION ONLY. MONITOR-
ING OF SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS WILL IN ITSELF NOT BE ENOUGH.
IF IT IS TO ENSURE THAT VISIBLE PEACE PREVAILS, IT WILL
ALSO BE NECESSARY FOR UNTAG TO MONITOR SWAPO PERSONNEL
IN HOST COUNTRIES.

-- WHEN THE CITIZEN FORCE AND THE COMMANDOS ARE DEMOBILIZED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNTAG'S RESPONSIBILITY IN THAT REGARD IS TO MONITOR THE
MILITARY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT HANDED IN AND TO ENSURE THAT
THE CITIZEN FORCE AND THE COMMANDOS DO NOT MOBILIZE.

-- IN PERFORMING ITS MONITORING FUNCTION UNTAG WILL HAVE
TO ENSURE THAT SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS AND SWAPO PERSONNEL

DO NOT LEAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE BASES, OTHER THAN FOR
REASONS AGREED UPON BEFOREHAND.

-- THE PREVENTION OF INFILTRATION AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE
(PARA. 21 OF UN DOC. S/12827) DOES NOT APPLY, SINCE UNTAG
HAS NEVER BEEN INTENDED TO BE A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AND
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEAL THE BORDER EFFECTIVELY, EVEN
WITH INCREASED NUMBERS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #179

~~SECRET~~

BY WOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1544

DTG: 180347Z MAR 82 PSN: 001420

-- IN RESPECT OF AIR TRANSPORT AND LIAISON TEAMS THE SADF CAN POSSIBLY BE OF ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS IN PROVIDING LOGISTICS AND OTHER SUPPORT SERVICES, SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL AID, ETC. THE LATTER MAY, ALTERNATIVELY, BE PROVIDED BY LOCAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS.

B. PROPOSED UNTAG DEPLOYMENT

1. IN ORDER TO MONITOR SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS, UNTAG WOULD REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING BASED ON THE FIVE CATEGORIES OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY LOCATIONS AND BASES PRESENT IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA WHICH HAVE BEEN EVALUATED IN TERMS OF SIZE (PERSONNEL AND AREA), LAY-OUT AND SURROUNDING ENTRENCHMENTS (DEFENCES):

-- VERY BIG BASES
OSHIKATI
ONDANGWA
GROOTFONTEIN EQUAL 180

-- BIG BASES E. G.
RUNDU
KATIMA MULILO
MPACHA EQUAL 150

-- MEDIUM BASES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FIVE AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS EQUAL 75

-- SMALL BASES
COMPANY SIZE AND SMALLER EQUAL 220

-- CLUSTER UNITS
CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SMALL UNITS AND HEADQUARTERS
SITUATED IN WINDHOEK AND AT EROS AIRFIELD EQUAL 180

2. TO ENSURE THAT NO MOBILIZATION BY THE CITIZEN FORCE AND COMMANDOS TAKE PLACE AT THE VARIOUS LOCATIONS WHERE THEY ARE MONITORED - EQUAL 40

3. TO VERIFY THE CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILE ACTS BY TEAMS DEPLOYED AT DIFFERENT BASES - EQUAL 50

4. TO ENSURE THAT REFUGEES RETURN IN PEACE THROUGH DESIGNATED POINTS OF ENTRY - EQUAL 40

TOTAL - 935. UNQUOTE. STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 1544

DTG: 180347Z MAR 82 PSN: 001420

~~SECRET~~

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1543 DTG: 051442Z JAN 82 PSN: 019588
SIT848 DATE 01/12/82 TOR: 005/1451Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB: POAT, RENT
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1543 0051452
O 051442Z JAN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8413

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7038
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 001543
NODIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 1/4/88 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO LORD CARRINGTON

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO LORD CARRINGTON
FROM THE SECRETARY: BEGIN TEXT: DEAR PETER: AT THE
RISK OF OVER-USING MY DIRECT CHANNEL TO YOU, I JUST
WANTED TO EXPRESS MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE STRONG
AND VITAL ROLE YOU PLAYED IN YESTERDAY'S EC MINISTERIAL.
WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME, AND WE KNOW THAT IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN BETTER HAD YOU HAD YOUR WAY. BE-
CAUSE OF YOUR EFFORTS, IT SHOULD NOW BE CLEAR TO OUR
RESPECTIVE PUBLICS AND TO THE EAST THAT THE ALLIANCE IS
WORKING TOGETHER. I AM COUNTING ON YOUR CONTINUED
EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND LEADERSHIP AS WE MOVE TOWARD NEXT
WEEK'S NATO MINISTERIAL. SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
END TEXT HAIG

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #181

BY WJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1280
SIT850 DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 050057Z JAN 82 PSN: 019095
TOR: 005/0359Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1280 0050240
O 050057Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8396
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6140
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 6260
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 4963
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 001280
NODIS
CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/4/02 (CROCKER, CHESTER A.)
TAGS: PEPR, SF, WA, AO

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND ANGOLANS

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE IN MIND THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONAL SCHEDULE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER'S JANUARY 13-14 LONDON MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE JANUARY 15-16 PARIS SESSION WITH THE ANGOLANS. THE LONDON PORTION HAS BEEN LARGELY AGREED WITH SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR SOLE HERE IN WASHINGTON WHO IS IN TOUCH WITH THE SA AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. EMBASSY PARIS SHOULD PROPOSE THE ANGOLAN SCHEDULE TO DE ALMEIDA.

3. JANUARY 13 - WEDNESDAY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

0640 ARRIVE LONDON (HEATHROW) VIA TWA 700 (CROCKER, N. PLATT, D. MC ELHANEY, R. FRASURE, N. ELY AND A. KEYES)

1300 FIRST SESSION WITH SAG (SOUTH AFRICA HOUSE)

1630 CROCKER MEETING WITH CARRINGTON (FCO)

1930 DINNER FOR SAG HOSTED BY USG (EMBASSY)

JANUARY 14 - THURSDAY

0900 SECOND SESSION WITH SAG

1200 LUNCH HOSTED BY SAG

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#182

BY h05, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1280

DTG: 050057Z JAN 82 PSN: 019095

1400 THIRD SESSION WITH SAG

1930 CROCKER DINNER WITH DEREK DAY AND LEN ALLINSON

JANUARY 15 - FRIDAY

0830 DEPART FOR PARIS VIA BA-304

1030 ARRIVE PARIS (CHARLES DE GAULLE)

1400 FIRST SESSION WITH ANGOLANS

JANUARY 16 - SATURDAY

1000 SECOND SESSION WITH ANGOLANS

1400 THIRD SESSION WITH ANGOLANS

JANUARY 17 - SUNDAY

1200 DEPART FOR NYC VIA TWA 803, CONNECTING WITH
PA-111 TO WASHINGTON

4. LANNON WALKER AND MICHAEL RANNEBERGER WILL ARRIVE IN
PARIS ON THURSDAY MORNING. FLIGHT DATA WILL FOLLOW
SEPTTEL. FIVE OF THE LONDON PARTY WILL CONTINUE ON TO
PARIS. (PLATT WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON VIA PA-107 ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRIDAY.) ALL OF THE PARIS PARTY WILL RETURN ON TWA-803
ON SUNDAY. PLEASE MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS ACCORDINGLY.

5. ON PARIS 72, YOU SHOULD TELL DE ALMEIDA THAT WE PRE-
FER THE MEETING NOT BE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. WE WILL, HOW-
EVER, INFORM THE FRENCH HERE LATER THIS WEEK AFTER THE
VENUE PROBLEM IS SOLVED. ON VENUE, YOU SHOULD SUGGEST
THE US EMBASSY, NOTING THAT WE PREFER THE SUBSTANCE OF
THE CONVERSATION TO BE KNOWN ONLY TO THE USG AND THE
GOA. IF DE ALMEIDA RESISTS AND DECLINES TO REFER IT TO
LUANDA, YOU SHOULD TELL HIM YOU WILL HAVE TO REPORT TO
THE DEPARTMENT BEFORE CONSIDERING OTHER SITES. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0668
SIT856 DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 012212Z JAN 82 PSN: 016578
TOR: 002/1413Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0668 0012310
O 012212Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 000668
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/31/01 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)

TAGS: PEPR PO UK

SUBJECT: POLAND -- LETTER TO CARRINGTON

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.
2. PLEASE DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW TO LORD CARRINGTON FROM THE SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN SATURDAY JANUARY 2. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR PETER:

I WANTED TO WRITE TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE BEEN MAKING WITH REGARD TO POLAND. THE EC-10 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IS OF COURSE WELCOME. YOUR SUPPORT FOR A NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING HOPEFULLY ON JANUARY 11TH, HAS BEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TERRIBLY IMPORTANT. AND WE ARE MOVING AHEAD TOGETHER TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF CSCE.

AS WE HEAD INTO THESE CRITICAL MEETINGS, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SET FORTH WESTERN OBJECTIVES AS WE

SEE THEM, AND TO CONSIDER HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN GENERAL TERMS.

WE BELIEVE WESTERN OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE MODERATE AND PRACTICAL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT POLISH AND SOVIET REALITIES AS WELL AS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. THE FOLLOWING FIT THESE CRITERIA:

- 1) RELEASE OF THE DETAINEES;

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#183

BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0668

DTG: 012212Z JAN 82 PSN: 016578

2) LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW;

3) INITIATION OF A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION AMONG THE CHURCH, SOLIDARITY AND THE GOVERNMENT.

WE ARE NOT SAYING WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE -- THAT IS INDEED THE BUSINESS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE. BUT WE HAVE A RIGHT -- EVEN AN OBLIGATION --- UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS TO ACT TO ENSURE THAT A PROCESS SUPPORTED BY THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE POLISH PEOPLE IS RESUMED. IN PARTICULAR WE HAVE AN - OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES TO CRUSH THIS PROCESS ARE OFFSET BY PRESSURES FROM THE WEST ON THE SIDE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE - - THEMSELVES.

THIS IS NOT AN UNREALISTIC OBJECTIVE. JARUZELSKI OR ANY FUTURE LEADERSHIP NEEDS AT LEAST MINIMAL SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE TO PUT POLAND BACK ON ITS FEET. HE ALREADY IS PAYING LIP SERVICE TO THIS NEED. BUT THE WEST HAS AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN INCREASING HIS INCENTIVES FOR MEANINGFUL ACTS OF ACCOMODATION. WE ALSO HAVE A CRITICAL ROLE TO PLAY IN MAKING CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THE CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS OF THEIR CONTINUING TO PREVENT A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FAILURE TO ACT VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS COULD BE EVEN MORE COSTLY IN TERMS OF BROAD EAST-WEST RELATIONS THAN A FAILURE TO TAKE MEASURES DIRECTED AT JARUZELSKI.

FIRST, WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT A REPRESSED POLAND IS A FACTOR FOR STABILITY IN EUROPE. THERE MUST BE A PROCESS OF REFORM AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING FOR ANY GENUINE AND DURABLE STABILITY TO EMERGE, AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE BROUGHT TO RECOGNIZE THIS FACT. OTHERWISE WE ARE HEADED FOR A PERMANENT ARMED-CAMP AND ULTIMATE PROSPECT OF VIOLENT REVOLT IN THE EAST. IN

SUM, GRADUAL REFORM AND MODERNIZATION WITHIN THE EAST IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- INDEED IT IS ONE OF THE PREMISES OF IMPROVED RELATIONS AND GREATER STABILITY IN EUROPE

SECOND, A FAILURE TO ACT WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF FORCE TO STOP 18 MONTHS OF ENTIRELY PEACEFUL DIALOGUE IN POLAND -- ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POSTWAR WORLD -- WOULD SEND THE SOVIET UNION THE WRONG SIGNAL ABOUT OUR REACTIONS TO FUTURE EVENTS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. TO AVOID FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD LEAD TO DISASTER, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TRYING TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREDICTABLE, THAT THERE WILL BE BOTH NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES DEPENDING UPON THEIR CONDUCT. WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DO THIS EARLY ON SO THAT THERE WILL NOT BE MISTAKES LATER.

HANS-DIETRICH EXPRESSED THE PRESENT DANGER VERY WELL IN HIS STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 29TH: "THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOW FULLY APPRECIATE THAT ITS CONDUCT TOWARDS POLAND WILL BE OF NO LESS THAN HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT SHOULD NOT CONFUSE THE WEST'S STRICT POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH INDIFFERENCE, AND IT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THE WEST'S RETICENCE AS POLITICAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0668

DTG: 012212Z JAN 82 PSN: 016578

ABSTINENCE." WE BELIEVE THIS IS PRECISELY THE DANGER AND THAT THE SOVIETS DEFINITELY WILL INTERPRET CONTINUED EUROPEAN INACTION AS INDIFFERENCE OR STILL WORSE AS WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF COVERT AND OVERT INTERVENTION.

SECSTATE WASHDC 0668

DTG: 012212Z JAN 82 PSN: 016578

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS BRINGS ME TO MY SECOND POINT -- THE ACTIONS THE WEST SHOULD BE TAKING. IT IS CRITICAL FOR OUR OBJECTIVES IN POLAND, OUR LARGER EAST-WEST OBJECTIVES, AND FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE THAT OUR PUBLICS AND THE SOVIETS SEE A DRAWING TOGETHER OF OUR POSITIONS. WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE FOCUS TO SHIFT FROM REPRESSION IN POLAND TO DISARRAY IN THE WEST. BUT WE ARE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO THAT POINT RIGHT NOW.

IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR, WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF, AND TRIED TO ACCOMMODATE, THE CONCERNS OF OUR NATO ALLIES. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY SUCCEEDED. NOW WE FACE AN ISSUE OF TRANSCENDANT IMPORTANCE AND THERE MUST BE A SENSE THAT THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IS MORE THAN A ONE-WAY STREET. WE UNDERSTAND EUROPEAN DESIRES TO PRESERVE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THAT IS

ALSO OUR OBJECTIVE. YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THAT WE HAVE GRADUATED OUR RESPONSE -- KEEPING LARGE AND IMPORTANT ELEMENTS FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION.

BUT IF THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE CREATES AN IMPRESSION OF WEAKNESS BY TAKING NO ACTIONS OF THEIR OWN AND EVEN HELPING TO CIRCUMVENT OUR STEPS, THIS WILL UNDERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR MEASURES. THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED FURTHER. YOU CAN EITHER STRENGTHEN THE WEST'S POSITION WITH A SOLID FRONT OF MODERATE BUT SPECIFIC ACTIONS, OR BY LEAVING THE UNITED STATES ALONE, REQUIRE THAT WE TAKE MORE DRASTIC MEASURES THAN OTHERWISE WOULD BE NECESSARY. OF COURSE THE CONSEQUENCES WILL NOT BE BORNE BY THE UNITED STATES ALONE.

IN THIS LETTER I DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO SPECIFIC MEASURES. BUT I DO WISH TO UNDERLINE IN ALL SERIOUSNESS THE NEED FOR MORE THAN RHETORIC FROM EUROPE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO. THERE MUST BE AT LEAST SOME SPECIFIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEASURES AND THEY MUST BE DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS POLAND. IN ADDITION WE NEED TO AGREE UPON SOME GUIDELINES TO GOVERN OUR ACTIONS OVER THE MONTHS AHEAD.

WE WANT TO CONDUCT THE MOST INTENSE CONSULTATIONS WITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

YOU IN THE DAYS AHEAD TO BRING OUR POSITIONS TOGETHER AND TO DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT IS POSSIBLE.

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
LORD CARRINGTON, K. C. M. G., M. C., P. C., M. P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT,
LONDON. STOESSEL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0668

DTG: 012212Z JAN 82 PSN: 016578

SECSTATE WASHDC 0668

DTG: 012212Z JAN 82 PSN: 016578

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1273
SIT486 DATE 12/07/81

DTG: 041515Z DEC 81 PSN: 037597
TOR: 338/2301Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1273 3381527
O 041515Z DEC 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7245

~~SECRET~~ STATE 321273

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 12/3/01 (VELIOTES, N. .
TAGS PPDC, US, UK

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER FROM THE
PRESIDENT

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. PLEASE DELIVER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT:
BEGIN TEXT - DEAR MARGARET:

I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGES OF OCTOBER 31 AND NOV-
EMBER 4. THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTENTS WERE HEARTENING AND
REINFORCED MY RENEWED HOPE FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLE-
MENT. THESE MESSAGES, ALONG WITH THE EARLIER VIEWSCON--
CERNING ARAB ATTITUDES WHICH YOU WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO SHARE
WITH ME IN YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 1, ATTEST -TO THE CONTINU-
ING VALUE OF OUR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE AREA AND TO THE
STRENGTH OF OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP.

IT WAS GOOD TO HAVE YOUR CONGRATULATIONS ON THE AWACS
OUTCOME. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE SALE WILL DIRECTLYCON-
TRIBUTE TO GREATER STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE-EAST-AND TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BROADENING THE BASIS ON WHICH A GENUINELY-EVEN-HANDED RE-
SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS THERE CAN BE FOUND. IN THAT CON-
NECTION, I AM PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR DECISION TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. I KNOW HOW DIFFICULT THIS
DECISION WAS FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT, AND I FULLYUNDERSTAND
THE APPROACH YOU PLAN TO TAKE PUBLICLY; SHOULD YOU-BE PRESS-
ED FOR EXPLANATIONS IN PARLIAMENT.

I AM ALSO EXCEEDINGLY GRATEFUL FOR THE INFORMATION YOU
PASSED ON CONCERNING YOUR TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN IN
LONDON, WHICH I MADE GOOD USE OF DURING HIS VISIT HERE.

I BELIEVE MY TALKS WITH THE KING WERE SUCCESSFUL. WE
CERTAINLY GOT ALONG VERY WELL. WE DID EXPRESS GREAT-CON-
CERN OVER HIS SEEMINGLY IRREVOCABLE DECISION TO BUY SOVIET
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. IN REPLY, HE WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS-

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #184

~~SECRET~~

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 9/24/02

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1273

DTG: 041515Z DEC 81 PSN: 037597

TO EXPLAIN TO US THAT HE DIDN'T REALLY WANT TO DO THIS BUT THAT HE FOUND HIMSELF IN A BIND, THAT THE DEED WAS DONE, BUT THAT HE WOULD KEEP TO A MINIMUM THE NUMBER OF RUSSIANS IN JORDAN AND THAT, IF HE COULD GET U.S. OR WESTERN COUNTERPARTS ON SATISFACTORY TERMS, HE WOULD GET-RID OF THE SOVIET WEAPONS AND PROBABLY SELL THEM TO IRAQ.

WEAPONS ASIDE, THE MAIN PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP WAS TO FIND OUT IF WE STILL SUPPORTED THE INTEGRITY OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM AND WHAT OUR VIEWS ON THE PEACE PROCESS ARE. I THINK WE MANAGED TO CONVINCE HIM RATHER WELL. IN FACT- HE SAID THAT HIS MEETINGS HAD BEEN THE MOST SUCCESSFUL HE HAD HAD IN WASHINGTON. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT I THINK HE LEFT CONVINCED THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO ABANDON HIM. I BELIEVE HE IS ALSO CONVINCED THAT OUR INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242 IS ONE THAT ANTICIPATES WITHDRAWAL; FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE AS THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. - - -

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT TIME IS PRESSING UPON US. NEVERTHELESS, I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK AND THAT YOUR OWN INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE HAS GREATLY IMPROVED OUR PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUAL SUCCESS.

SINCERELY, RONALD

THE RIGHT HONORABLE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MARGARET THATCHER, M. P.
PRIME MINISTER
LONDON

END TEXT.

3. DEPARTMENT IS POUCHING SIGNED ORIGINAL TO EMBASSY LONDON.

4. IN DELIVERING LETTER, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN IT WAS SIGNED BEFORE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS RE MFO SO THIS PART IS A BIT OUT OF DATE. STOESSEL

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1335
SIT853 DATE 11/23/81

DTG: 230620Z NOV 81 PSN: 022044
TOR: 327/0934Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #1335 3270624
O O 230620Z NOV 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 6631

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 7189
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4594
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 311335
EXDIS, FOR AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 11/22/01 (HAIG, A. M.)

TAGS: US, UK, XF, PEPR

SUBJECT: EC-4 PARTICIPATION IN MFO

1. (- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO
LORD CARRINGTON ASAP.

BEGIN TE" T

DEAR PETER:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR NOTE OF YESTERDAY INCORPORATING THE
FINAL STATEMENT OF THE EC-FOUR DECLARATION OF PARTICI, ATION
IN THE SINAI PEACEKEEPING FO, CE. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT
YOUR LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE ISRAELIS DID REFER TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY, AND THIS SHOULD BE HELPFUL.
AS WE APPROACH THE FINAL COUNTDOWN ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT
ISSUE, I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PASS ON THE LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS IN BOTH CAIRO AND JERUSALEM AS REPORTED BY
OUR AMBASSADORS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE MEETING OF THE FOUR AMBASSADORS WITH
BOUTROS GHALI WENT VERY WELL, AS EXPECTED. SUBSEQUENTLY,
WE WERE INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS SENDING A
PERSONAL APPEAL TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN URGING A QUICK
AND POSITIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE. THIS 'ILL HELP.

IN ISRAEL, WE UNDERSTAND THE RESPONSE BY THE DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY IN HIS MEETING
WITH THE FOUR AMBASSADORS WAS CAUTIOUS AND NONCOMMITTAL,
WITH THE FOCUS ON THE NATURE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#185

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LDI

NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1335

DTG: 230620Z NOV 81 PSN: 022044

AND ON THE REMARKS OF HMG ON MONDAY BEFORE PARLIAMENT. THIS WAS CONFIRMED IN AMBASSADOR LEWIS' S SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH SHAMIR. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT AMBASSADOR LEWIS MADE A VERY STRONG PRESENTATION IN FAVOR OF EC FOUR PARTICIPATION, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS POSTURE WITH BEGIN AND THE OTHER ISRAELI LEADERS IN THE DAYS AHEAD IN ORDER TO ELICIT A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE ISRAELI CABINET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE SOME UNCERTAIN AND DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD IN JERUSALEM.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE EC-TEN STATEMENT WILL BE RELEASED ON MONDAY, I KNOW YOU RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANT IMPACT THE REMARKS OF YOUR PARLIAMENTARY SPOKESMAN WILL HAVE ON OUR MUTUAL GOAL OF ASSURING EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. IN THIS RESPECT, OUR CURRENT PLANS ARE TO RESPOND TO PRESS QUERIES FOLLOWING YOUR PARLIAMENTARY PRESENTATION IN A UPBEAT AND FORTHCOMING A MANNER AS POSSIBLE.

LET US CONTINUE TO BE IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH, INCLUDING THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV, AS THINGS MOVE ALONG TO ENSURE OUR ACTIONS ARE AS MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE AS POSSIBLE.

END TEXT

3. IN COURSE OF EXCHANGE WITH FCO RE DELIVERY OF MESSAGE,

SECSTATE WASHDC 1335
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 230620Z NOV 81 PSN: 022044

YOU SHOULD GET OVER THE CLEAR IDEA THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR THE UK REMARKS TO BE AS BRIEF AND NONCONTROVERSIAL AS POSSIBLE WITH AT LEAST MENTION OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN TREATY. WE RECOGNIZE DELICACY OF OFFERING SUCH ADVICE TO SISTER, SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY BUT ASSUME YOU CAN FIND A WAY TO GET THE THOUGHTS OVER WITHOUT GIVING OFFENSE. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 1335

DTG: 230620Z NOV 81 PSN: 022044

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9077
SIT885 DATE 11/23/81

DTG: 201855Z NOV 81 PSN: 019504
TOR: 324/2200Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9077 3242019
O 201855Z NOV 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6515

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5936
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 309077
EXDIS
E.O. 12065 RDS-3 11/19/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR)

TAGS: PARM, PSDC, UK
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
CARRINGTON

1. (A - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO FM
CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIMILAR LETTERS BEING
SENT TO FONMINS OF BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND THE FRG.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR PETER:

AS WE LOOK TOWARD THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS IN GENEVA ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES
AT THE END OF THIS MONTH, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COOPERATION, WISE COUNSEL, AND SUPPORT ON THE CRITICAL
EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES WHICH WE TOGETHER HAVE FACED-
WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE
MATTERS, AND I THINK THE PROCESS HAS TAUGHT SOMETHING
ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE AND OF THE VALUES WE
SHARE.

INITIAL REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NOVEMBER 18
SPEECH GIVE US HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HAS
BEEN HEARD CLEARLY. ALL FOUR OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH
THE PRESIDENT MADE ARE SERIOUS ONES, AND WE MEAN TO
RESIST ANY SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO UNDERCUT THEIR STRENGTH
OR QUESTION THEIR SINCERITY. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS
EFFORT.

THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL GIVE US NO CAUSE TO

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #186

~~SECRET~~ BY h01 NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 9077

DTG: 201855Z NOV 81 PSN: 019504

REST ON OUR OARS. ON THE CONTRARY, WE MAY BE CERTAIN THAT CONTINUED SOVIET EFFORTS TO SOW DISSENSION AND SPLIT THE ALLIANCE WILL REQUIRE CLOSER COOPERATION AND CONSULTATIONS THAN EVER. ON OUR SIDE, WE WILL NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY WHILE FIRMLY REPELLING ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO MUDDY THE NEGOTIATING WATERS. WE WILL NOT PERMIT THEM TO BRING OTHER NATIONAL DETERRENTS INTO THE DISCUSSION. WE WILL REJECT ANY FALSE BALANCE CLAIMS BY GETTING THE FACTS ON THE RECORD. IN THE ALLIANCE CONTEXT, IT WILL BE CRUCIAL TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO HOPE FOR SUCCESS ON THE ARMS CONTROL TRACK OF THE DUAL THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DECISION UNLESS THE DEPLOYMENT TRACK PROCEEDS ON SCHEDULE.

AGAIN, THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU SOON IN BRUSSELS, AND TO OUR CONTINUED COOPERATION IN SUSTAINING BOTH TRACKS OF THE ALLIANCE DUAL DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979.

SINCERELY
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
END TEXT. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 9077

DTG: 201855Z NOV 81 PSN: 019504

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5152
SIT093 DATE 11/23/81

DTG: 170659Z NOV 81 PSN: 014812
TOR: 321/2217Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: .

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5152 3210711
O 170659Z NOV 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 6312
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT/IMMEDIATE 5453
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 305152
NODIS
BRUSSELS FOR EAGLEBURGER/PRICE
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 11/16/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, US, UK, EEC
SUBJECT: MFO: OUR REACTION TO THE REVISED TEXT AND
ANNOUNCEMENT PROCEDURES
REF: LONDON 22436 NOTAL

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY
TO LORD CARRINGTON:

DEAR PETER:

I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING WITH ME THE REVISIONS
MADE IN THE STATEMENTS ANNOUNCING AND ENDORSING EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE ;ULTINATIONAL FORCE -
AND OBSERVERS. THE CHANGES MADE SINCE YOU ,RESENTED YOUR
FIRST DRAFT REPRESENT A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF SINCERE AND
GOOD WORK ON YOUR PART AND THAT OF YOUR COLLEAGUES. - I
APPRECIATE THAT THIS HAS NOT BEEN AT ALL EASY FORYOU
AND AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS. -

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVING COME THIS FAR, WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW FOR ANYTHING
OTHER THAN SUCCESS. IT IS WITH THIS UPPERMOST IN MIND
THAT I WRITE YOU. DESPITE ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED,
THERE REMAIN SOME PITFALLS IN THE TWO STATEMENTS AS-NOW-
DRAFTED WHICH I AM AFRAID - -
WILL CAUSE A REJECTION OF YOUR PARTICIPATION. I KNOW AT
THIS LATE DATE IT IS NOT EASY TO EFFECT CHANGES IN THE
STRUCTURING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OR IN THE TEXTS, BUT I
WOULD BE REMISS IF I DID NOT REQUEST YOU TO RECONSIDER
ONE LAST TIME SOME CHANGES THAT MAY MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

IF YOU WILL RECALL, LAST WEEK I TOLD NICHOLSON AND HIS
COLLEAGUES THAT TO SELL THIS TO THE ISRAELIS WE NEEDED ONE
OF THREE POSSIBLE CHANGES MADE IN DESCENDING ORDER OF

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #187

~~SECRET~~

BY LOS NA DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5152

DTG: 170659Z NOV 81 PSN: 014812

PREFERENCE: (A) NO EC STATEMENT; (B) A FAIRLY LENGTHY TIME ELEMENT BETWEEN YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT AND THAT OF THE TEN; OR (C) AMENDMENT OF THE LAST SENTENCE. I REALIZE THAT YOU ACCEPTED MY LAST SUGGESTION BUT AT THE SAME TIME YOU HAVE CHANGED OR DELETED TWO OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PHRASES IN THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR, THEREBY GREATLY REDUCING MY CHANCES FOR SUCCESS WITH ISRAEL (I.E., REPLACING "HAVE DECIDED" BY "ARE READY"; AND DELETING REFERENCE TO THE TREATY OF PEACE).

SINCE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FEEL THAT A STATEMENT OF THE TEN CANNOT BE DISPENSED WITH, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT YOU REINSTATE THE LANGUAGE DELETED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR PRESENTED TO US LAST WEEK (I.E., THAT THE STATEMENT IS A "DECISION" OF THE FOUR, AND THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE TREATY OF PEACE). THIS WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT YOU WOULD BE PARTICIPATING ON THE BASIS OF A DOCUMENT WHICH IS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF AUTHORITY FOR THE FORCE; THIS WOULD ALSO CUSHION SUBSEQUENT REFERENCE TO THE VENICE DECLARATION IN THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN. MOREOVER, YOU SHOULD DELAY THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN BY AT LEAST SEVERAL DAYS (TO NOV 23) AND HAVE IT ISSUED FROM BRUSSELS, THEREBY REDUCING ITS VISIBILITY AND LINKAGE WITH YOUR EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT. NONETHELESS, I MUST WARN YOU THAT EVEN WITH ALL THESE CHANGES MY CHANCES OF SUCCESS ARE LESS THAN 50-50.

PETER, I REALIZE WHAT A DIFFICULT TASK IT MUST BE TO

SECSTATE WASHDC 5152
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 170659Z NOV 81 PSN: 014812

ACHIEVE ALTERATIONS UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOW SO CLOSE TO WHAT I BELIEVE IS CRUCIAL GOAL FOR ALL OF US THAT I BELIEVE THE EFFORT MUST BE MADE.

BEST REGARDS, SINCERELY,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 5152

DTG: 170659Z NOV 81 PSN: 014812

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 77

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE076
OO RUEHC RUEHLD RUFHOL RUFHFR RUDKGPQ RUJDSNQ RUDKPNQ
RUEHKO RUEHDT RUDKFMQ
DE RUEHC #6805 3102110
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 062050Z NOV 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5870
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2824
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2928
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 7290
RUJDSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 4667
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 9623
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1019
INFO RUFHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2670
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3562
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 296805
E.O. 12065 GDS 10/30/87 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: PARM, UNGA, UK, GE, FR, NO, DA, JA, NL

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
REQUESTING ASSISTANCE TO UN INVESTIGATION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE

1. (\ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO HOST GOVERNMENT FOREIGN
MINISTERS. FIRST NAMES SHOULD BE USED IN LETTERS TO
BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:

I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY DEEP CONCERN OVER THE
REPORTS AND RECENT EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF TOXINS AND
OTHER LETHAL AND INCAPACITATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
AFGHANISTAN, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA AND ENDORSE THE NEED FOR
STRICT ADHERENCE TO EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW PRO-
HIBITING THE USE IN WAR OF THESE WEAPONS.
THE INVESTIGATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE BY THE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #188

SENSITIVE

BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GROUP OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED, WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVE SUPPORT, BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST YEAR IS AN IMPORTANT INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA. THIS INVESTIGATION IS CRITICAL TO OUR COMMON EFFORT TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, AND IT ACTS AS A DETERRENT TO THE USE OF THESE TERRIBLE WEAPONS. WE HOPE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL RENEW THE EXPERTS GROUP'S MANDATE THIS FALL SO THAT IT CAN CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY ITS INVESTIGATION. WE LOOK FORWARD ONCE AGAIN TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOUR DELEGATION TO THE UN IN OBTAINING THIS IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED TO THE UN EXPERTS SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN AFGHANISTAN, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA, INCLUDING RECENT EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF LETHAL MYCOTOXINS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ADDITIONAL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE THAT WILL FURTHER CONFIRM THE NEED FOR THE EXPERTS TO CONTINUE THEIR WORK WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. WE ARE ALSO SEEKING TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO HAVE RECENTLY BEEN IN THE REGIONS IN QUESTION, WHO COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION FIRSTHAND ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS.

I WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST THE UN INVESTIGATION IN ITS FURTHER WORK BY ALSO MAKING A NEW EFFORT TO OBTAIN AND PROVIDE TO THE UN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE FROM SOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOUR GOVERNMENT. SUCH NEW INFORMATION AND NEW ANALYSIS OF EXISTING INFORMATION, AS WELL AS YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR RENEWING THE MANDATE OF THE UN GROUP OF EXPERTS, WOULD PROVIDE VALUABLE AND NEEDED IMPETUS TO THIS IMPORTANT UNDERTAKING.

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT. HAIG

BT

#6805

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE945
DD RUEHC RUEHLD RUEHJI RUQMYA
DE RUEHC #3209 3072146
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Q 032128Z NOV 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5685
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3606
RUQMYA/USLD RIYADH IMMEDIATE 6516
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 293209
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADORS FROM SECRETARY
E.O. 12065: R DS-1,3 11/4/01 (VELIUTES, N. A.)

TAGS: PEPR, US, XF, SA,

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO LORD CARRINGTON

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO LORD CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. EMBASSY LONDON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH EMBASSY JIDDA TO ENSURE THE MESSAGE IS DELIVERED. PLEASE ADVISE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PETER: I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE SOME OF OUR CONCERNS WITH YOU REGARDING THE RECENT SPATE OF INORDINATE PUBLIC COMMENT BOTH FROM ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA CONCERNING THE SAUDI EIGHT POINTS. OUR PUBLIC POSTURE ON THE EIGHT POINTS HAS BEEN CAREFULLY CALIBRATED TO AVOID TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE NEGATIVITY WHILE MAKING CLEAR OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE AUTONOMY TALKS UNDER THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. PERHAPS SOME STATEMENTS OF LAST WEEK BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY BOTH ISRAELIS AND SAUDIS. IN ANY EVENT BOTH SIDES HAVE EMBARKED ON PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS, ONE GOAL OF WHICH APPEARS TO BE TO ELICIT PUBLIC VIEWS FROM US MORE CONGENIAL TO THEIR OWN

VIEWS: THE ISRAELIS CLEARLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A PUBLIC U.S. REJECTION OF THE SAUDI PROPOSAL WHILE THE SAUDIS SEEM INTENT ON TRYING TO ELICIT A MORE FAVORABLE U.S.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #189

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PUBLIC ATTITUDE. WE HAVE DECIDED NOT TO MAKE FURTHER PUBLIC EXPOSITIONS OF OUR POSITION ON THE EIGHT POINTS AND WE ARE INFORMING BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE SAUDIS THAT IT IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST FOR THEM CONTINUALLY TO PUT US IN THE POSTURE OF HAVING TO RESPOND TO HIGH VISIBILITY OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH AT LEAST BY IMPLICATION PROFESS TO ADDRESS THE AMERICAN POSITION.

YOUR CURRENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL KEEP A PUBLIC FOCUS ON THE EIGHT POINTS. I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP IN MIND OUR VIEWS AND IF APPROPRIATE REINFORCE THEM WITH OUR SAUDI FRIENDS.

IN THIS RESPECT, OUR EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT THE MOOD IN ISRAEL IS ABOUT AS BLACK AND THREATENING AS IT EVER HAS BEEN. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DOING OUR UTMOST TO CALM THE ISRAELIS AND TO ENSURE THAT THIS MOOD DOES NOT TRANSLATE INTO HARMFUL INITIATIVES OR UN-ANTICIPATED SURPRISES. (YOU ARE AWARE OF MY LONG-STANDING CONCERN OVER A POSSIBLE ISRAELI MOVE INTO LEBANON.) IN THIS RESPECT, I BELIEVE IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT, WHATEVER YOUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS MAY BE ON FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS, THESE PROPOSALS NOT BE REFLECTED OR LINKED IN ANY WAY TO THE FORTH-COMING STATEMENT CONCERNING EC PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE. AT THIS POINT, SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD MAKE THE VOLATILE ISRAELI SITUATION EVEN MORE UNPREDICTABLE.

I DO HOPE YOU HAVE USEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS AND WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF YOUR VISIT. END TEXT.

HAIG
BT
#3209
NNNN

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 251

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/A309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA566
DD RUFADWW
DE RUEHC #5070/01 2991639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O O 261623Z OCT 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 5244
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG NIACT IMMEDIATE 6990
INFO RUFHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6120
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3996
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2220
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7831
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 7151
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2257
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3553
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 7387
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 4273
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3470
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6936
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 285070
NODIS
E.O. 12065:RDS-1 10/26/01

TAGS:EEPR, EG, IS, U.S., UK, EEC

SUBJECT: THE MFO: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO CARRINGTON
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSIES LONDON AND LUXEMBOURG SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO LORD CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE HOPES THAT IT WILL ARRIVE IN TIME TO INFLUENCE DELIBERATIONS AMONG THE FOUR CONCERNED EC STATES. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PETER:

AFTER THINKING OVER OUR DISCUSSION IN CANCUN ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO), I MUST STILL CONCLUDE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UK JOIN IN THIS UNDERTAKING IF IT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD DIRECTLY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, AND THE NETHERLANDS THAT THEY ARE READY TO COME IN, BUT THEIR DECISION IS CLEARLY LINKED TO YOUR OWN. THE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #190

BY h05 NARA DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/1309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND PROBABLY NEW ZEALAND AS WELL WILL JOIN IF BRITAIN AND ANOTHER MAJOR EC STATE ARE ALSO PRESENT.

~~SECRET~~

2

ALTHOUGH I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR MISGIVINGS, THE PROBLEM IS THE NATURE OF THE UK INTERCONNECTING VETO OVER THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OTHERS. THEREFORE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU MAKE IT CLEAR TO YOUR EC COLLEAGUES THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IF A CREDIBLE FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY OF PEACE IS TO BE ESTABLISHED. IT WOULD BE A MAJOR SETBACK TO THE WEST IF, FOLLOWING SADAT'S DEATH, WE WERE UNWILLING TO SUPPORT A TREATY OF PEACE FOR WHICH HE RISKED SO MUCH AND WHICH MANY THOUGHT COULD NEVER BE ACHIEVED. AS FOR YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT ARAB REACTIONS, CROWN PRINCE FAHD HIMSELF TOLD ME THAT NEITHER SAUDI ARABIA NOR OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST THOSE STATES PARTICIPATING. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL RECOVERY OF SINAI FOR THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP AND RECOGNIZES THE CRITICAL ROLE THAT THE MFO PLAYS IN THIS. OUR OWN SOUNDINGS IN THE PAST 48 HOURS IN THE CAPITALS OF MODERATE ARAB STATES INDICATE THAT WHILE THE ARAB LEAGUE HAS TRIED TO STIMULATE REACTIONS FROM ITS MEMBERS, MOST OF THE MODERATES WOULD PREFER TO LOOK THE OTHER WAY ENTIRELY OR TO CONFINED THEMSELVES TO VERY PRO FORMA REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE. CLEARLY, WHAT THEY DON'T WANT IS TO BE ASKED DIRECTLY BY EUROPEAN STATES OR AUSTRALIA ABOUT THEIR POSITION SINCE, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND IN A NEGATIVE VEIN WITHIN THE ARAB CONSENSUS. IF WESTERN STATES MOVE RESOLUTELY TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE THERE WILL BE NO REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE ARAB STATES.

YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE LEARNED FROM ARAFAT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WILL BREAK DOWN. THEY ARE LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY CAN EXPLOIT TO FURTHER THIS GOAL. THUS, ANY FURTHER WAVERING ON OUR PART CAN ONLY FURTHER ENCOURAGE THEM IN THIS DIRECTION. LET ME ASSURE YOU, PETER, IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE WE WILL BE VERY CAREFUL IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS NOT TO CHARACTERIZE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EC PARTICIPATION AS ANYTHING MORE THAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY OF PEACE. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT CHARACTERIZE IT AS AN EC UNDERWRITING OF THE ENTIRE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. LET US AGREE TO DISAGREE ABOUT THE

ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE A PEACE PROCESS IN ANY FORM.

IN YOUR CURRENT DELIBERATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG, I HOPE YOU AND YOUR EC COLLEAGUES WILL FULLY TAKE THE FOREGOING INTO CONSIDERATION. IF YOU DO, I THINK YOU WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT NOT TO TAKE A POSITIVE DECISION FOR PARTICIPATION IN A MANNER THAT WILL PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE TREATY SIGNATORIES. AS I TOLD YOU AT CANCUN, IF ALL OTHERS AGREE TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT BRITAIN, THIS WOULD BE FINE WITH US; BUT MY SOUNDINGS SINCE OUR DISCUSSIONS AT CANCUN CLEARLY INDICATE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE.

BT

#5070

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PAGE 1 - 249

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA567
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #5070/02 2991639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O O 261623Z OCT 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 5245
RUEHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG NIACT IMMEDIATE 6991
INFO RUEHFG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6121
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3997
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2221
RUEHRD/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7832
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 7152
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2258
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3554
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 7388
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 4374
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3471
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6937
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 285070
NODIS

IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY ANY OTHER MATTERS RELATING
TO THIS UNDERTAKING, WE HAVE AGREED WITH YOUR PEOPLE
THAT NICK VELIOTES WILL ARRIVE IN LONDON LATER THIS
WEEK. HE CAN GIVE YOU ANY FURTHER DETAILS YOU REQUIRE
ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE MFO AND WHAT WE HAVE
LEARNED FROM OUR SOUNDINGS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND ELSE-
WHERE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AFTER YOUR MEETINGS
CONCLUDE IN LUXEMBOURG.

WITH BEST REGARDS,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

END TEXT.

HAIG
BT
#5070
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE386

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHC #1073 2950155

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 220141Z OCT 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHLA/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 281073 TOSEC 120022

EXDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM VELINTES

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/21/81 (VELINTES, NICHOLAS)

TAGS: OVIP HAIG, IS, EG, XF, UK, MARO

SUBJECT: DEALING WITH CARRINGTON ON THE MFO

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CARRINGTON HAS SPOKEN OF A "SMALL PRICE" HE WILL WANT IN RETURN FOR BRITISH AND EC PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT HIS PRICE WILL BE TOO HIGH. WE WANT CARRINGTON TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOME THINGS CANNOT OR SHOULD NOT BE DONE RELATIVE TO EC PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO SINCE THEY ARE (A) EITHER NOT CONSONANT WITH RESPONSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OR (B) BECAUSE THEY SHOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS AND, THEREFORE, DISTRUCTIVE OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH.

3. THE ESSENTIAL TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY WILL BE THE DEGREE TO WHICH CARRINGTON WISHES TO MAKE EC PARTICIPATION CONDITIONAL UPON FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IN MOST CASES WE WOULD NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE EC STATES EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION WOULD FACILITATE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS; ON THE OTHER HAND WE WOULD FIND IT UNACCEPTABLE TO HAVE THEM LINK THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION TO THE MEETING OF CERTAIN GOALS OR TARGETS. FINALLY, WE MUST BE VERY WARY ABOUT THE SORT OF STATEMENTS THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT WANT US TO MAKE IN WELCOMING THEIR PARTICIPATION. WE SUGGEST THAT STATEMENTS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE EC STATES JOINING THE FORCE.

A. EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTABLE EC STATEMENTS:

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #191

SENSITIVE

BY LOS NARA DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT PARTICIPATION WOULD LEAD TO GREATER PROGRESS TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

-- REITERATION OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE EC INITIATIVE WITH CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS FOR PEACE.

-- POINTING OUT THAT MFO PARTICIPATION IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF CONTRIBUTION THE EC IS CAPABLE OF MAKING IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AND THEREBY IMPLYING THE EC SHOULD HAVE A GREATER ROLE TO PLAY IN THE FUTURE.

B. EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTABLE US RESPONSES (BEYOND WARMLY WELCOMING EC PARTICIPATION):

-- RECOGNITION THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS MAKING A SINCERE AND HONEST EFFORT TO FACILITATE MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS.

-- EXPRESSING THE HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT FORMATION OF THIS FORCE WILL NOT ONLY CONSOLIDATE PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL BUT LEAD TO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.

-- RECOGNIZING THAT THERE ARE HONEST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EC'S APPROACH AND OUR OWN BUT THAT WE ARE BOTH SINCERELY SEEKING TO REACH THE SAME GOAL - A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 (THIS FORMULATION MIGHT MEET REPORTED DESIRE BY CARRINGTON THAT WE "RECOGNIZE" THE EC INITIATIVE EVEN WHILE DISAGREEING WITH IT).

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, STATEMENTS OF CONDITIONALITY RELATING TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. ISRAEL WOULD RESPOND BY WITHDRAWING ITS AGREEMENT TO EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO.

A. EXAMPLES OF UNACCEPTABLE EUROPEAN STATEMENTS WOULD BE THOSE WHICH CONDITION PARTICIPATION ON ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:

-- FURTHER, SPECIFIC PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS BY THE PARTIES.

-- COOPERATION WITH THE EC INITIATIVE OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE VENICE DECLARATION.

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/A309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- U.S. RECOGNITION OF FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS (ISRAEL WOULD REGARD THIS AS U.S. ABANDONMENT OF CAMP DAVID).

B. EXAMPLES OF U.S. RESPONSES WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE

-- ENDORSEMENT IN ANY FORM OF THE EC INITIATIVE, EVEN IF ONLY AS A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD THEY FAIL.

-- IMPLICATION THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE EC INITIATIVE (E.G. BY DELIVERING ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR PALESTINIAN RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST) OR ANYTHING THAT WOULD IMPLY A WEAKENING OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

5. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND AUSTRALIANS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY INCLINED TO ASK FOR ANYTHING IN RETURN FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THIS FORCE. HOWEVER, CARRINGTON, RECOGNIZING BRITAIN'S PIVOTAL ROLE, IS ATTEMPTING TO ENSURE A COMMON EC POSITION THAT WILL PLACE EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON AN ALL-OR-NONE BASIS. THE DANGER IS THAT HE WILL SET THE PRICE FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION SO HIGH THAT HE COULD ENDANGER THE VERY TREATY THAT WE ARE TRYING TO UPHOLD.

CLARK
BT
#1073
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE957
OO RUEHC RUEHLD
DE RUEHC #9946 2932354
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 202331Z OCT 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5008
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 279946
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/20/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER)
TAGS: PEPR, UK, IS, EG

SUBJECT: MFO: A MESSAGE TO CARRINGTON FROM THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 277291

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT DELIVER THE MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTEL.
3. INSTEAD, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONTACT PETER CARRINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO CONVEY MY PERSONAL MESSAGE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- I APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUED POSITIVE CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) AND IN PARTICULAR YOUR DESIRE TO DISCUSS WITH US SOME OF THE DETAILS CONCERNING THE IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR DECISION AND THE MANNER IN WHICH IT MIGHT BEST BE ANNOUNCED. WITH THIS IN MIND, I HAVE ASKED ASSISTANT SECRETARY NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES TO TRAVEL TO LONDON WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK AND TO DISCUSS THESE AND RELATED MATTERS WITH YOU ON MY BEHALF.

-- YOU HAVE MENTIONED TO ME YOUR DESIRE THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE DELIBERATIONS BY THE UK OR ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS CONCERNING THE MFO UNTIL FINAL DECISIONS ARE MADE. IN THIS LIGHT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED BY THE STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING HIS VISIT IN THIS COUNTRY ALTHOUGH WE, OF COURSE, WELCOME IT AS AN INDICATION OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH FRENCH ATTITUDES ARE MOVING.

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SENSITIVE

NLS 598-002 #192

BY LOS

TE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- I CANNOT EMPHASIZE ENOUGH THE IMPORTANCE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN ATTACHES TO THE FORMATION OF A CREDIBLE MFO AND ESPECIALLY TO EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION THEREIN,

4. THE DETAILS OF VELIOTES' ITINERARY AND PLANS WHILE IN LONDON WILL FOLLOW SEPTTEL. HAIG

BT

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE024
DD RUEHC RUEHLD
DE RUEHC #7291 2901453
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
D 171444Z OCT 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4899
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 277291
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/16/81 (S:

TAGS:UK, US, PSDC

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO LORD CARRINGTON

1. PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
SECRETARY HAIG TO LORD CARRINGTON:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PETER,

YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN FAVOR OF
BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO IS GRATIFYING. ONE
OF THE GRACES OF OUR RELATIONSHIP IS THAT WE CAN DISAGREE,
EVEN WHILE WINCING. YOUR REASONS FOR YOUR INITIAL--
RELUCTANCE ABOUT BRITISH PARTICIPATION WERE GIVEN--THE
CLOSEST CONSIDERATION HERE.

BUT AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED, WE ATTACH THE HIGHEST
PRIORITY TO MOVING TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH
A CREDIBLE MFO, AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE
MFO IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS GOAL. OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE--
IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE THE PARTICIPATION OF AUSTRALIA. A
MFO LACKING A WEST EUROPEAN AND AUSTRALIAN PRESENCE COULD
ENJOY ONLY A REDUCED CREDIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND

THE LARGER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

IT IS FOR THESE REASONS WE HAVE PERSISTED IN SEEKING
YOUR SUPPORT AND WHY WE ARE SO PLEASED THAT WE WILL HAVE
YOU BY OUR SIDE IN THE SINAI.

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DE 0
NLS 598-002 #193
BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

--- WITH BEST PERSONAL WISHES,

--- SINCERELY,

--- AL

END TEXT. HAIG

BT

#7291

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SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

--- WITH BEST PERSONAL WISHES,

--- SINCERELY,

--- AL

END TEXT. HAIG

BT

#7291

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE034

DD RUEHC RUEHLD RUFHNA RUEHDT RUDORRA

DE RUEHC #3742 2660323

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O P 230229Z SEP 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3724

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4605

INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1215

RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 253742

EXDIS USUN FOR EAGLEBURGER/PRICE ONLY

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/22/87 (DAVID C. GOMPERT)

TAGS: NATO, MPOL, UK

SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~ DEFENSE BUDGET EFFECTS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT) MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD TAKE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO
CONTACT HIGH LEVEL MOD OFFICIALS TO DELIVER
FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR REVIEW OF THE CHANGES IN THE
DEFENSE BUDGET MADE NECESSARY BY OUR NEED TO LIMIT
GROWTH IN OVERALL FEDERAL SPENDING. THE REVIEW
HAS AFFECTED TWO US-UK COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, AND
WE WANTED TO INFORM YOU OF THIS BEFORE IT BECAME
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. SLIPPAGE WILL OCCUR IN TWO
JOINT PROGRAMS: THE AV-8B HARRIER AND THE RAPIER
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. OUR ORIGINAL HARRIER BUY
OF 24 AND 36 AIRCRAFT IN FISCAL YEARS 1983 AND 1984,
RESPECTIVELY, HAS BEEN REDUCED BY 6 AIRCRAFT IN
EACH OF THOSE YEARS; POST-1984 LEVELS REMAIN AS
ORIGINALLY PLANNED, HOWEVER. THE US RAPIER BUY
WILL ALSO BE STRETCHED OUT BY REDUCING THE NUMBER
OF FIRE UNITS PURCHASED IN FISCAL YEAR 1982
FROM 12 TO 8 AND IN FISCAL YEAR 1983 FROM 8 TO 4;

WE WILL PROCURE THE EIGHT ADDITIONAL FIRE UNITS IN
FISCAL YEARS 1985 (FOUR UNITS) AND 1986 (FOUR
UNITS).

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NLS 598-002 #194

BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WE REGRET THAT FISCAL CONSTRAINTS HAVE MADE THESE
ACTIONS NECESSARY.

3. FOR USNATO: AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER
ABOVE MESSAGE TO UK PERMREP.

CLARK
BT
#3742
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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE544
DD RUEHC RUEHLD RUEHFR RUEHOL RUEHNA
DE RUEHC #5349 2580215
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 150113Z SEP 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3339
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9947
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0712
INFO RUEHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4448
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 245349
NODIS
USNATO FOR ASSTSEC EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/14/01 (HOLMES, H.ALLEN)

TAGS: PEPR, CY

SUBJECT: ~~U.S.~~ U.S. VIEWS ON CYPRUS

REFS: A) NICOSIA 2468 B) STATE 240772 C) ATHENS 14835

1. (1-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. PARA 3 OUTLINES OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF CYPRUS SITUATION AND SUGGESTS LINE QUAD MINISTERS MIGHT FOLLOW IN NEW YORK DISCUSSIONS WITH WALDHEIM (E.G. SEPTEMBER 22 WALDHEIM LUNCHEON WITH SEC., CARRINGTON AND CHEYSSON) AND GREEK AND TURKISH SIDES. POSTS SHOULD SEEK INITIAL REACTIONS ON OUTLINE BEFORE DISCUSSION AT FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, QUAD POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING.

3. -- WE CONTINUE TO HAVE AN UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITY -- WHICH WILL NOT LAST INDEFINITELY -- TO MAKE A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM;

- BOTH TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE RECENTLY TABLED PROPOSALS SHOWING SOME MOVEMENT IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND SAY THEY ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE

FURTHER.

- THE CURRENT GOT WANTS A SOLUTION AND HAS INDICATED FURTHER FLEXIBILITY ON THE TURKISH SIDE.

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6/12/02 BY 105
598-002-#195
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

- THE CURRENT GOG WANTS A SOLUTION AND SAYS IT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN VISIBLE PROGRESS NOW BECAUSE OF THE OCTOBER 18 ELECTIONS.

- THE US AND KEY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED AND ACTIVE IN PROMOTING PROGRESS AND READY TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE.

- THE UN HAS AN ENERGETIC AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ISLAND (GOBBI) READY WITH IDEAS THAT COULD FACILITATE A SOLUTION.

- THE KEY NOW IS PROMPT AND VIGOROUS UN ACTION (SOLIDLY BACKED BY ALL ELEMENTS INCLUDING UN SECRETARIAT) TO INTRODUCE THE IDEAS (PROPOSALS) GOBBI HAS DEVELOPED AND DISCUSSED WITH BOTH SIDES INTO THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, AS A BASIS FOR BRIDGING DIFFERENCES AND NEGOTIATING A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

---TURKS SAY THEY WILL WORK WITH UN IDEAS AND WANT TO SEE THEM PROMPTLY INTRODUCED.

---GREEK CYPRIOTS VIEW NOT DETERMINED, BUT THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE (ATHENS WILL SUPPORT).

---NO OTHER WAY TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM; EACH HAVING JUST TAKEN A STEP, NEITHER WILL BE READY TO TAKE FURTHER INITIATIVE SOON.

-- FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT, WALDHEIM SHOULD PERSONALLY LAUNCH AND ENDORSE THE IDEAS WITH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH.

- VISIBLE AND VIGOROUS UN/WALDHEIM ROLE WILL GIVE IDEAS SPECIAL PUSH WITH BOTH SIDES. -

-- US AND KEY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD INDICATE HIGH LEVEL SUPPORT FOR UN ACTION TO UN, PARTIES AND ATHENS AND ANKARA.

4. BARTHOLOMEW WOULD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE BULLARD/DAUNT AND PFEFFER VIEWS.

HAIG

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE002
PP RUEHC RUEHCE
DE RUEHC #9039 2482231
ZNY CCCCC Z7H
P 051720Z SEP 81 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCE/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3009 PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0443
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9580
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 239039
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 9/4/2001 (THE SECRETARY), S

TAGS: PEPR, PK, IN

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY
CARRINGTON, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, AND FOREIGN MINISTER
CHEYSSON

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING IDENTICAL MESSAGES FROM THE
SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY CARRINGTON, FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER, AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON:

QUOTE: PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER SHAHI, IN NEW YORK FOR THE
NAMIBIA DISCUSSIONS, PAID AN URGENT CALL ON ME SEPTEMBER 2
AT THE REQUEST OF PRESIDENT ZIA TO PASS-ON PAKISTANI CONCER
ABOUT POSSIBLE PRESSURES FROM INDIA. ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE
HE CITED--REPORTS FROM JOURNALISTS, DIPLOMATS AND THE LIKE
WAS FAIRLY SLIM, IT WAS CLEAR THAT BOTH HE AND ZIA

ARE WORRIED ABOUT SOME INDIAN PRESSURE OR ACTION. ZIA
HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITY TO AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK DURING HER VISIT TO
ISLAMABAD. I TOLD SHAHI THAT WE HAD NO INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS INDICATING SUCH INDIAN INTENTIONS BUT THAT WE
WOULD WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY. I ASSURED HIM THAT
WE WOULD FIND WAYS OF GETTING ACROSS TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA THE MESSAGE THAT ANYTHING THAT WOULD DISTURB
THE PEACE IN THE AREA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

IN VIEW OF OUR SHARED SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE REGION,

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NLS 598 002 #196

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BY 101 NARA, DATE 10/12/02

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

I THOUGHT I SHOULD PASS THIS INFORMATION ON TO YOU. I
WOULD WELCOME ANY APPRECIATION WHICH YOU MAY HAVE OF
INDIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD PAKISTAN. SHOULD WE HAVE DOUBTS
AT ANY TIME ABOUT THOSE INTENTIONS, WE ALL MIGHT WISH TO
URGE RESTRAINT ON INDIA. IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL PRESUMABLY
ALL BE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER RAO AT THE UNGA,
PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE WE
ATTACH TO GOOD INDO-PAK RELATIONS. END QUOTE. STOESEL

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE534
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHC #3653 2441930
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
U 011910Z SEP 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRD/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0000
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 233653
NODIS
E.O. 12065: XDS-3 8/24/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER, M.)

TAGS: PEPR, UK, IS, EG, US

SUBJECT: MFO: A FORMAL APPROACH TO HMG

REFS: (A) LONDON 15850; (B) STATE 219995; (C) LONDON 15978

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR THOUGHTFUL RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL AND WE WILL PROCEED ALONG THOSE LINES.

3. YOU SHOULD MAKE AN APPOINTMENT WITH CARRINGTON AND DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO HIM FROM THE SECRETARY.

4. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR PETER: AS YOU KNOW, FOR SOME MONTHS WE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON BEHALF OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO ESTABLISH A MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) IN SINAI. WE HAVE COMMITTED OURSELVES FULLY TO THIS --UNDER-- TAKING BECAUSE OF ITS CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WHICH WE ALL AGREE IS A MAJOR AND NECESSARY MILESTONE ON THE WAY TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- AS YOU ARE UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SECURING AN INFANTRY BATTALION EACH FROM COLOMBIA AND FIJI TO SERVE ALONGSIDE OUR OWN BATTALION IN THE MFO. HOWEVER,

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NLS 598-002#197

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BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THEIR PARTICIPATION ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A FORCE THAT HAS INTERNATIONAL STATURE AND CREDIBILITY. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD ALSO JOIN WITH US IN THIS UNDERTAKING BY CONTRIBUTING SMALL, BUT ESSENTIAL, SUPPORT UNITS TO THE MFO.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES WE APPROACHED INITIALLY AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND. MORE RECENTLY WE ASKED THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY, WHICH IN APRIL VOLUNTEERED TO HELP US WITH THIS EFFORT. TO DATE, THREE OF THESE FOUR COUNTRIES (CANADA BEING THE EXCEPTION) CONTINUE TO GIVE OUR REQUEST VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. WE HAVE MANAGED, I BELIEVE, TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH MOST OF THE CONCERNS WHICH THEY HAVE RAISED.

-- HOWEVER, ONE MAJOR EXTERNAL OBSTACLE REMAINS FOR BOTH AUSTRALIA AND ITALY WHICH JEOPARDIZES OUR CHANCES OF OBTAINING THEIR ASSENT TO PARTICIPATION. PRIME MINISTER FRASER HAS TOLD US AND RECENTLY HAS AFFIRMED TO A UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION THAT HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SERVE WITH US IN THE ABSENCE OF A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY I AM SURE, WISHES TO FULFILL ITS PREVIOUS OFFER TO US BUT DOES NOT FEEL IT CAN WITHSTAND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION UNLESS ANOTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN STATE HAS ALSO AGREED TO JOIN.

-- IN THIS REGARD, BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL RECOGNIZE THE PIVOTAL ROLE YOU HAVE TO PLAY IN THE FORMATION OF THIS FORCE AND HAVE ASKED US TO REQUEST FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT THE CONTRIBUTION OF A SMALL COMMUNICATIONS UNIT WHICH WE ESTIMATE WILL NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 150 MEN. I AM CONVINCED THAT IF YOU AGREE TO PROVIDE THIS UNIT, THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED WITH THE OTHER ALLIES MENTIONED WILL BE OVERCOME.

-- IT HAD BEEN OUR HOPE THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO ASK YOU TO TAKE WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT GIVEN THE LEADERSHIP YOU ARE EXERCISING WITHIN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNCILS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AND YOUR CURRENT PRESIDENCY THEREOF. I WOULD NOT HAVE BURDENED YOU WITH A REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE, IF I HAD NOT DETERMINED IT ESSENTIAL TO THE FORMATION OF THIS FORCE AND WERE NOT SO MUCH RIDING ON ITS OUTCOME.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- ALTHOUGH WITHIN THE SPIRIT OF OUR EXTREMELY CLOSE AND LONGSTANDING RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE OCCASIONALLY DISAGREED ON THE NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, WE BOTH SHARE A COMMON AND DEEP COMMITMENT TO THAT PROCESS AND TO THE TREATY OF PEACE. I KNOW YOU WILL WEIGH HEAVILY THIS FACTOR IN REACHING YOUR DECISION.

-- WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON AMELIORATING ANY PROBLEMS WHICH YOU MAY BE CONCERNED WILL ARISE FROM YOUR PARTICIPATION. ALONG THESE LINES-- YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER ARAB MODERATES HAVE FORTHRIGHTLY INDICATED THAT THEY WILL NOT TAKE ACTIONS ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS. IN EUROPE, JOINT UNITED KINGDOM AND ITALIAN PARTICIPATION SHOULD PROVE TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL THE EC'S FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY WITHOUT DETRACTING FROM YOUR EFFORTS TO FIND WAYS OF BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN THE OTHER ARAB AND ISRAELI POSITIONS. IN THE ARAB WORLD, IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT WHATEVER TACTICAL DIFFERENCES THERE MAY BE BETWEEN THE WESTERN ALLIES ON ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE, THESE CANNOT BE EXPLOITED TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE PEACE TREATY OR THE PEACE PROCESS ITSELF.

-- I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. WITH BEST REGARDS. SINCERELY,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT

5. IN DISCUSSING THIS MESSAGE WITH CARRINGTON YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE POINTS WHICH YOU HAVE SUGGESTED TO US (I.E., THE ESSENTIALITY OF U.K. PARTICIPATION AND THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO SUCCESSFUL FORMATION OF THE MFO AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS BY THE ADMINISTRATION.) WE TRUST THAT YOU HAVE SUFFICIENT REPORTING TELEGRAMS AVAILABLE TO YOU TO ANSWER MOST QUESTIONS THAT CARRINGTON MIGHT INITIALLY RAISE; WE WILL RESPOND PROMPTLY TO ANY QUERIES WHICH YOU JUDGE MAY NEED MORE DETAILED ANSWERS.

6. ADDITIONALLY, YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO CARRINGTON THE UNDESIRABILITY OF HAVING U.S. FORCES IN SINAI WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER WESTERN ALLIES TO DILUTE OUR PRESENCE AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DESPITE SOVIET OPPOSITION THE WEST IS COMMITTED TO HELPING EGYPT AND ISRAEL ACHIEVE A VIABLE PEACE BETWEEN THEM. FINALLY, CARRINGTON SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE HOPING FOR A QUICK RESPONSE GIVEN THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK FACING US IN ESTABLISHING AND

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DEPLOYING A FORCE TO SINAI BY MARCH 20, 1982.

7. FYI: AFTER YOU HAVE REPORTED ON YOUR APPROACH, WE WILL CALL IN AMBASSADOR HENDERSON AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL TO UNDERSCORE THE MESSAGE AND YOUR PRESENTATION IF FURTHER STEPS PROVE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A FAVORABLE U.K. RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER, WE ARE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND IT. ALSO, WE WILL INFORM AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND ITALY OF YOUR APPROACH AND URGE THEIR SUPPORT FOR IT.

8. CONCERNING REF (C), WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY CAIRO AND TEL AVIV VIEWS.

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#3653
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