

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
**Country File:**  
**Folder Title:** United Kingdom  
(08/01/1981-10/31/1983) [1 of 5]  
**Box:** RAC Box 20

---

To see more digitized collections visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/22/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM VOL. IV 8/1/82-10/31/83 (1)

**FOIA**

M08-221

**Box Number** 91330

COLLINGS

1

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description   | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 62016 | CABLE    | 061551Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #404</b>                    | 2           | 4/6/1983  | B1           |
| 62017 | CABLE    | 051158Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #405</b>                    | 2           | 4/5/1983  | B1           |
| 62018 | CABLE    | 301802Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #406</b>                    | 2           | 3/30/1983 | B1           |
| 62019 | CABLE    | 301214Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #407</b>                    | 1           | 3/30/1983 | B1           |
| 62020 | CABLE    | 281146Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #408</b>                    | 5           | 3/28/1983 | B1           |
| 62021 | CABLE    | 291158Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #409</b>                    | 1           | 3/29/1983 | B1           |
| 62022 | CABLE    | 251918Z<br><b>PAR 6/12/2002 F98-002 #410; R 1/23/2012 #62022</b> | 3           | 3/25/1983 | B1           |
| 62023 | CABLE    | 241804Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #411</b>                    | 1           | 3/24/1983 | B1           |
| 62024 | CABLE    | 241802Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #412</b>                    | 3           | 3/24/1983 | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/22/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM VOL. IV 8/1/82-10/31/83 (1)

**FOIA**

M08-221

**Box Number** 91330

COLLINGS

1

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description                          | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 62025 | CABLE    | 221934Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #413</b> | 2           | 3/22/1983 | B1           |
| 62026 | CABLE    | 211805Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #414</b> | 1           | 3/21/1983 | B1           |
| 62027 | CABLE    | 201301Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #415</b> | 1           | 3/20/1983 | B1           |
| 62028 | CABLE    | 210246Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #416</b> | 5           | 3/20/1983 | B1           |
| 62029 | CABLE    | 192138Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #417</b> | 7           | 3/19/1983 | B1           |
| 62030 | CABLE    | 141307Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #418</b> | 3           | 3/14/1983 | B1           |
| 62031 | CABLE    | 101209Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #419</b> | 1           | 3/10/1983 | B1           |
| 62032 | CABLE    | 101055Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #420</b> | 2           | 3/10/1983 | B1           |
| 62033 | CABLE    | 091157Z                                       | 1           | 3/9/1983  | B1           |
| 62034 | CABLE    | 081604Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #421</b> | 2           | 3/8/1983  | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/22/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM VOL. IV 8/1/82-10/31/83 (1)

**FOIA**

M08-221

**Box Number** 91330

COLLINGS

1

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description                          | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 62035 | CABLE    | 031713Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #422</b> | 5           | 3/3/1983  | B1           |
| 62036 | CABLE    | 281751Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #423</b> | 3           | 2/28/1983 | B1           |
| 62037 | CABLE    | 221042Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #424</b> | 1           | 2/22/1983 | B1           |
| 62038 | CABLE    | 181226Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #425</b> | 1           | 2/18/1983 | B1           |
| 62039 | CABLE    | 171703Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #426</b> | 2           | 2/17/1983 | B1           |
| 62040 | CABLE    | 151752Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #427</b> | 5           | 2/15/1983 | B1           |
| 62041 | CABLE    | 141916Z<br><b>D 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #428</b> | 4           | 2/14/1983 | B1           |
| 62042 | CABLE    | 101516Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #429</b> | 7           | 2/10/1983 | B1           |
| 62043 | CABLE    | 091824Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #430</b> | 2           | 2/9/1983  | B1           |
| 62044 | CABLE    | 091643Z<br><b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #431</b> | 5           | 2/9/1983  | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [1 of 5]  
Box 91330

**Date:** September 7, 1998

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE  | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|--|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. cable              | 061551z 2 p.<br>D 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #404                        | 4/6/83             | P1            |
| 2. cable              | 051158z 2 p.<br>D " " #405                                       | 4/5/83             | P1            |
| 3. cable              | 301802z 2 p.<br>D " " #406                                       | 3/30/83            | P1            |
| <del>4. cable</del>   | <del>301214z 1 p.<br/>R " " #407</del>                           | <del>3/30/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 5. cable              | 281146z 5 p.<br>D " " #408                                       | 3/28/83            | P1            |
| <del>6. cable</del>   | <del>291158z 1 p.<br/>R " " #409</del>                           | <del>3/29/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>7. cable</del>   | <del>251918z 3 p.<br/>P " " #410; R 1/23/12 M08-221 #62022</del> | <del>3/25/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 8. cable              | 241804z 1 p.<br>ED " " #411                                      | 3/24/83            | P1            |
| 9. cable              | 241802z 3 p.<br>ED " " #412                                      | 3/24/83            | P1            |
| 10. cable             | 221934z 2 p.<br>ED " " #413                                      | 3/22/83            | P1            |
| <del>11. cable</del>  | <del>211805z 1 p.<br/>R " " #414</del>                           | <del>3/21/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>12. cable</del>  | <del>201301z 1 p.<br/>R " " #415</del>                           | <del>3/20/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>13. cable</del>  | <del>210246z 5 p.<br/>R " " #416</del>                           | <del>3/20/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>14. cable</del>  | <del>192138z 7 p.<br/>R " " #417</del>                           | <del>3/19/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 15. cable             | 141307z 3 p.<br>D " " #418                                       | 3/14/83            | P1            |
| <del>16. cable</del>  | <del>101209z 1 p.<br/>R " " #419</del>                           | <del>3/10/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 17. cable             | 101055z 2 p.<br>D " " #420                                       | 3/10/83            | P1            |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [1 of 5]  
Box 91330

**Date:** September 10, 1998

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------|---------------|
| 18. cable             | 091157z 1 p.  | 3/9/83             | P1, P5        |
| <del>19. cable</del>  | <del>081604z 2 p.</del><br><i>R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #421</i> | <del>3/8/83</del>  | <del>P1</del> |
| 20. cable             | 031713z 5 p.  | 3/3/83             | P1            |
|                       | D " " #422  |                    |               |
| 21. cable             | 281751z 3 p.  | 2/28/83            | P1            |
|                       | D " " #423  |                    |               |
| 22. cable             | 221042z 1 p.  | 2/22/83            | P1            |
|                       | D " " #424  |                    |               |
| 23. cable             | 181226z 1 p.  | 2/18/83            | P1            |
|                       | D " " #425  |                    |               |
| 24. cable             | 171703z 2 p.  | 2/17/83            | P1            |
|                       | D " " #426  |                    |               |
| 25. cable             | 151752z 5 p.  | 2/15/83            | P1            |
|                       | D " " #427  |                    |               |
| 26. cable             | 141916z 4 p.  | 2/14/83            | P1            |
|                       | D " " #428  |                    |               |
| <del>27. cable</del>  | <del>101516z 7 p.</del><br><i>R " " #429</i>                | <del>2/10/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>28. cable</del>  | <del>091824z 2 p.</del><br><i>R " " #430</i>                | <del>2/9/83</del>  | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>29. cable</del>  | <del>091643z 5 p.</del><br><i>R " " #431</i>                | <del>2/9/83</del>  | <del>P1</del> |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [1 of 5]  
Box 91330 *20*

**Date:** September 7, 1998

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                    | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|--|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. cable              | 061551z 2 p.<br><i>D 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #404</i> | 4/6/83             | P1            |
| 2. cable              | 051158z 2 p.<br><i>D " " #405</i>                | 4/5/83             | P1            |
| 3. cable              | 301802z 2 p.<br><i>D " " #406</i>                | 3/30/83            | P1            |
| <del>4. cable</del>   | <del>301214z 1 p.<br/><i>R " " #407</i></del>    | <del>3/30/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 5. cable              | 281146z 5 p.<br><i>D " " #408</i>                | 3/28/83            | P1            |
| <del>6. cable</del>   | <del>291158z 1 p.<br/><i>R " " #409</i></del>    | <del>3/29/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 7. cable              | 251918z 3 p.<br><i>P " " #410</i>                | 3/25/83            | P1            |
| 8. cable              | 241804z 1 p.<br><i>ED " " #411</i>               | 3/24/83            | P1            |
| 9. cable              | 241802z 3 p.<br><i>ED " " #412</i>               | 3/24/83            | P1            |
| 10. cable             | 221934z 2 p.<br><i>ED " " #413</i>               | 3/22/83            | P1            |
| <del>11. cable</del>  | <del>211805z 1 p.<br/><i>R " " #414</i></del>    | <del>3/21/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>12. cable</del>  | <del>201301z 1 p.<br/><i>R " " #415</i></del>    | <del>3/20/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>13. cable</del>  | <del>210246z 5 p.<br/><i>R " " #416</i></del>    | <del>3/20/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>14. cable</del>  | <del>192138z 7 p.<br/><i>R " " #417</i></del>    | <del>3/19/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 15. cable             | 141307z 3 p.<br><i>D " " #418</i>                | 3/14/83            | P1            |
| <del>16. cable</del>  | <del>101209z 1 p.<br/><i>R " " #419</i></del>    | <del>3/10/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 17. cable             | 101055z 2 p.<br><i>D " " #420</i>                | 3/10/83            | P1            |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [1 of 5]  
Box 91330 *W*

**Date:** September 10, 1998

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE   | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|---|--------------------|---------------|
| 18. cable             | 091157z 1 p.  | 3/9/83             | P1, P5        |
| <del>19. cable</del>  | <del>081604z 2 p.</del><br><i>R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #421</i> | <del>3/8/83</del>  | <del>P1</del> |
| 20. cable             | 031713z 5 p.  | 3/3/83             | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #422</i>   |                    |               |
| 21. cable             | 281751z 3 p.  | 2/28/83            | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #423</i>   |                    |               |
| 22. cable             | 221042z 1 p.  | 2/22/83            | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #424</i>   |                    |               |
| 23. cable             | 181226z 1 p.  | 2/18/83            | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #425</i>   |                    |               |
| 24. cable             | 171703z 2 p.  | 2/17/83            | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #426</i>   |                    |               |
| 25. cable             | 151752z 5 p.  | 2/15/83            | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #427</i>   |                    |               |
| 26. cable             | 141916z 4 p.  | 2/14/83            | P1            |
|                       | <i>D " " #428</i>   |                    |               |
| <del>27. cable</del>  | <del>101516z 7 p.</del><br><i>R " " #429</i>                | <del>2/10/83</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>28. cable</del>  | <del>091824z 2 p.</del><br><i>R " " #430</i>                | <del>2/9/83</del>  | <del>P1</del> |
| <del>29. cable</del>  | <del>091643z 5 p.</del><br><i>R " " #431</i>                | <del>2/9/83</del>  | <del>P1</del> |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-3 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE937  
STU7885  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHLD #6740 0891214  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 301214Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1595  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 06740  
EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: NATO, PARM, UK  
SUBJECT: INF: PUBLIC HANDLING OF PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL  
REF: (A) STATE 085838, (B) STATE 085997  
1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE PASSED CONTENTS OF REFTELS TO FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY DAVID GILLMORE, WHO SAID FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM WILL ISSUE A STRONG SUPPORTIVE STATEMENT LATE TODAY, MARCH 30. PYM WILL ALSO MEET WITH THE MEDIA MARCH 31. IN ADDITION, DEFENSE SECRETARY HESELTINE WILL APPEAR ON INDEPENDENT TELEVISION TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER WILL SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT MARCH 31. STREATOR  
BT  
#6740  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #407  
BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE602  
VSK292 510 STU4820  
00 RUEHC RUEHSD  
DE RUEHLD #6650 0881158 CCY ADOO1330 510 MCN NAR  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 291158Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1538  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 06650  
NODIS  
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y MRN (06650 VICE 16650)  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF, UK  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON INF  
REF: STATE 84709  
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT  
2. WE DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO NUMBER 10 AT  
OOB MARCH 29.  
3. JOHN COLES OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND FCO  
ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY DAVID GILLMORE, WITH WHOM WE  
DISCUSSED MATTER, READILY AGREED TO TRY TO ARRANGE  
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS BY THATCHER AND PYM. THEY NOTED  
THAT OUR ISSUING PUBLIC STATEMENT ON WEDNESDAY WOULD  
MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO GET SUPPORTING STATEMENTS INTO THE  
BRITISH PRESS BEFORE THE EASTER BREAK. GILLMORE ASKED  
THAT WE PROVIDE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE FINAL  
TEXT OF THE SCG CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND OUR Q'S AND A'S,  
INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR WHAT WE WOULD SAY PUBLICLY ABOUT  
WHY NUMBERS WERE NOT INCLUDED. STREATOR  
BT  
#6650  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #409  
BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/12/02

62022

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 801

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE703  
UTS6077  
RR RUEHC RUEHDD  
DE RUEHLD #6533/01 0841920  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 251918Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1468  
INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 2954  
RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7628  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 06533  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, UK

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REACTIONS IN BRITAIN TO THE  
PRESIDENT'S ABM PROPOSALS

1. ~~(c)~~ SUMMARY: INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S  
ABM PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN LARGELY NEGATIVE -- SOMETIMES  
HARSHLY SO. SO FAR HMG HAS NOT COMMENTED OFFICIALLY.  
BUT IT ALREADY CLEAR THAT WE WILL HAVE TO MOUNT A MAJOR  
EFFORT QUICKLY IF WE ARE TO WIN THE PUBLIC DEBATE  
ON THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN. END SUMMARY

2. SO FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL REACTION TO THE  
PRESIDENT'S ABM PROPOSALS FROM THE PM. BUT ELSEWHERE  
IN WHITEHALL -- AND IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE -- THOSE  
PROPOSALS ARE THE SUBJECT OF LIVELY AND LARGELY  
CRITICAL DISCUSSION. ALTHOUGH HMG SOURCES ARE INCLINED  
TO WAIT AND SEE IF THE PROPOSALS ARE HERE TO STAY  
("WE NEED TO KNOW WHETHER THIS WILL BE ANOTHER SPACE  
PROGRAM OR ANOTHER DENSEPACK", ONE SOURCE SAID)  
THEIR PRELIMINARY AND INFORMAL COMMENTS REPEATEDLY  
EMPHASIZE:

- THE SEEMING INDIFFERENCE TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE
- ABM TREATY, WHICH WILL FEED PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF U.S.  
CALLOUSNESS TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL.
- IN SPITE OF DISCLAIMERS, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT PUBLICS
- WILL SEE THE PROPOSALS AS INDICATIVE OF A 'FORTRESS
- AMERICA' MENTALITY -- AND THAT THE BETTER INFORMED
- WILL CONSIDER THEM DE-LINKING.
- THE IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION THAT CONFRONTATION WITH THE
- SOVIETS IS INEVITABLE, SOMETHING EUROPEANS TEND

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-221#62022

BY RW

NARA DATE 1/23/12

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 802

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

- TO REJECT.
- THE EFFECT IN DISTRACTING THE PUBLIC DEBATE AT A
- CRUCIAL POINT FOR START AND INF.
- THE DIFFICULTIES THE PLAN RAISES FOR THE "MINIMAL
- DETERRENCE" THEORY WHICH SUPPORTS BRITISH TRIDENT
- PLANS.

ON THIS LAST POINT, THE MOD HAS ALREADY RECEIVED A BARRAGE OF INQUIRIES. THE RESPONSE THEY WILL USE IS THAT USED BY HESELTINE DURING HIS GREENHAM COMMON NEWS CONFERENCE MARCH 24 WHEN HE REMARKED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ARE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, TRIDENT FOR THIS.

3. ~~(S)~~ OUR WHITEHALL CONTACTS ALSO COMPLAIN ABOUT LACK OF CONSULTATION. A HIGH-LEVEL MOD SOURCE TELLS US, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE BRITISH WERE SHOCKED AND DISAPPOINTED NOT TO BE BRIEFED ON THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AT THE NPG MEETING, ESPECIALLY SINCE THIS WAS THE APPROPRIATE NATO BODY TO DISCUSS SUCH THINGS. OUR SOURCE NOTED WRYLTY THAT NONE OF THE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS OVERSIGHT WERE ESPECIALLY REASSURING.

4. ~~(S)~~ PRIVATE REACTION FROM OUR CONTACTS IN LONDON'S COMMUNITY OF DEFENSE EXPERTS HAS BEEN OUTSPOKINGLY CRITICAL. PROFESSOR LAURENCE FREEDMAN, WHO HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST ELOQUENT SUPPORTERS OF NATO NUCLEAR POLICY, TOLD US HE CONSIDERED THE PROPOSALS "DANGEROUS, UNWORKABLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE", ADDING THAT THEY MAKE A NONSENSE OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS BY RAISING DE-LINKAGE TO A PRINCIPLE OF U.S. POLICY. FREEDMAN NOTED THAT EUROPEANS WILL QUICKLY SEE THAT OUTER SPACE DEFENSE IS WORTHLESS AGAINST THE KIND OF NON-BALLISTIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THREATEN THEM.

5. ~~(S)~~ FREEDMAN WILL REPEAT THESE ARGUMENTS IN A NEW YORK TIMES OP ED PIECE WHICH SHOULD APPEAR IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

6. ~~(S)~~ OTHER EXPERTS HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CRITICAL. IISS DEPUTY DIRECTOR JONATHAN ALFORD SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS WOULD BE SHORT-LIVED. ONE OF HIS COLLEAGUES AT IISS, WHO IS STRONGLY PRO-

BT

#6533

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 800

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE706  
STU8277  
RR RUEHC RUEHDD  
DE RUEHLD #6533/02 0841921  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 251918Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1469  
INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 2955  
RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7629  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 06533

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, UK

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REACTIONS IN BRITAIN TO THE  
AMERICAN, ARGUED THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD EITHER BE  
DISMISSED OUT OF HAND OR -- WORSE -- TAKEN SERIOUSLY,  
WITH THE ATTENDANT PROBLEMS FOR WEST/WEST RELATIONS.

7. ~~(C)~~ FINALLY NEWSPAPER COVERAGE HAS BEEN HEAVY AND  
MOSTLY -- BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY -- NEGATIVE. SAMPLE

COMMENTS:

- THE DAILY MAIL: "THERE HAS BEEN IN MANY QUARTERS  
- AN UNDULY CRITICAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S  
- PLAN...IT WOULD BE BETTER SEEN AS THE MEANS BY WHICH  
- THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST MAY BE BROUGHT TO  
- AN END.
- THE TIMES: "RESEARCH SEEMS SENSIBLE ENOUGH (BUT)  
- IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE WISE.  
- ITS INFLUENCE WOULD BE DESTABILIZING, CONTRIBUTING  
- TO UNCERTAINTY AND SUSPICION..."
- THE GUARDIAN: "RONALD REAGAN FRIGHTENS ORDINARY  
- PEOPLE...MR. REAGAN'S BENIGN VISION OF THE OUTER LIMITS  
- OF INGENUITY DOES NOT REASSURE; IT CHILLS."
- THE EVENING STANDARD: "THE STUFF ABOUT LASER RAYS...  
- WOULD BE UNCONVINCING AS SCIENCE FICTION. AS A CONSIDERED  
- STATEMENT FROM THE LEADER OF THE WEST...IT IS  
- DISASTROUS." STREATOR

BT

#6533

NNNN

SENSITIVE

## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8-10 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 6076 11712 DTG: 211805Z MAR 83 PSN: 021526  
SIT811 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 080/2009Z

ARAFAT CONVERSATION TOMORROW DURING OUR FLIGHT BACK TO  
AMMAN. STREATOR

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP

EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTSTKLST-----N

LONDON 6078

11712

DTG: 211805Z MAR 83 PSN: 021526

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHLD #6078 0801805

O 211805Z MAR 83

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1237

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1362

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2865

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0210

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3828

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1554

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5823

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 0953

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4212

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 06078

EXDIS

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM VIETS

E. O. 12356: DECL: 3/21/13

TAGS: PREL, JO, SA, PLO

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I TALKED TWICE WITH KING HUSSEIN TODAY, MARCH 21.

3. WALID KHALIDI'S TRIP TO TUNIS WAS DELAYED AND HE DID NOT RETURN TO LONDON UNTIL THE EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING. HUSSEIN MET WITH HIM THIS AFTERNOON FOR A DEBRIEF. KHALIDI REPORTED THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT ARAFAT "IS READY TO DO BUSINESS" DURING HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH HUSSEIN, NOW RESCHEDULED FOR MARCH 27 IN AMMAN.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. HUSSEIN SAID KHALIDI REPORTED THERE WERE TWO PRINCIPLE REMAINING CONCERNS THAT SURFACED DURING HIS FOUR-HOUR TALK WITH ARAFAT: (1) ARAFAT HAS BEEN CONVINCED BY KING HASSAN THAT BASED ON ASSURANCES ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED FROM KISSINGER, THE U. S. IS POISED TO IMPROVE ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION REGARDING THE PLO; AND (2) BANDAR'S PROMISE CONCERNING CONFEDERATION AND AN INDEPENDENT STATE IS STILL LOOMING LARGE IN ARAFAT'S VISION OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

5. FOR HABIB: CONTRARY TO THEIR ASSURANCES NEITHER PRINCE SAUD NOR PRINCE BANDAR HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HUSSEIN SINCE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM LONDON ON SATURDAY.

6. KING HUSSEIN WAS PRESSED TO MEET A DOCTOR'S APPOINTMENT AND PROMISED TO GIVE ME A FULL READOUT ON THE KHALIDI-

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #414  
BY LDS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5974 09962 DTG: 201301Z MAR 83 PSN: 020114  
SIT847 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 079/1500Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLE KEMP EOBJP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTDTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #5974 0791302  
O 201301Z MAR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1197

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 05974  
NODIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, JO, SA, US, XF  
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING FAHD

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. DURING OUR TALK LAST NIGHT (LONDON 5973)  
KING HUSSEIN MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR OUR ASSISTANCE IN  
PERSUADING THE SAUDIS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH  
ARAFAT TO FACILITATE JORDAN'S ENTRY INTO THE NEGOTIATING  
PROCESS. HE STRESSED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE "DEFINITELY  
THE KEY" TO CONVINCE ARAFAT TO FULFILL THE COMMITMENTS  
HE HAD GIVEN HUSSEIN BEFORE ALGIERS.
3. ACCORDINGLY, I BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE THAT A  
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BE SENT TO KING FAHD PROMPTLY URGING  
HIM IN EXPLICIT TERMS TO LEAN ON ARAFAT TO REDEEM HIS  
PLEDGE TO HUSSEIN. HUSSEIN FEARS THAT WITHOUT INTER-  
VENTION FROM THE PRESIDENT OUR PLANS MAY COME TO NOUGHT.  
WITH FULL SAUDI POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL BACKING, HUSSEIN  
IS OPTIMISTIC THAT HE CAN SHORTLY TAKE THE STEP WE ALL  
ARE AWAITING. STREATOR

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-007 #415  
BY 205 NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5973 09962 DTG: 201246Z MAR 83 PSM: 020101  
SIT852 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 079/1451Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP EOBJP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTDTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHD #5973/01 0791258  
O 201246Z MAR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1192

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 05973

NODIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, SA, JO, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,  
- MARCH 19

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR ONE HOUR MARCH 19 TO BRIEF HIM ON THE STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AND TO FIND OUT WHERE HE STOOD ON THE PEACE PROCESS. ON LEBANON, I EXPLAINED THAT THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF LEBANON'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT EITHER A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON OR THE RETENTION OF HADDAD. I SAID THAT WE HAD PRESENTED IN WASHINGTON AN ALTERNATIVE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO STRENGTHEN THE CAPABILITY OF THE LAF. WHILE LEBANON ACCEPTED THESE PROPOSALS, ISRAEL'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS STILL INCORPORATED ELEMENTS WHICH LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT. NEVERTHELESS, SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN WASHINGTON, AND I WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENTERING THEIR FINAL STAGE. HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH THE DEGREE OF US SUPPORT IN THE WASHINGTON TALKS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NEVERTHELESS, HUSSEIN REITERATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO MOVE QUICKLY TO RESOLVE THE LEBANON ISSUE, BECAUSE THE ARABS VIEWED IT AS A TEST OF US COMMITMENT. HE SAID THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF SYRIA WHICH, HE ADDED, ACCEPTS THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS SYRIAN/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

3. ON THE PEACE PROCESS, HUSSEIN IS OBVIOUSLY STILL VERY COMMITTED TO ENTERING THE NEGOTIATIONS, PROVIDED HE HAS THE REQUISITE PLO ACQUIESCENCE. HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THAT HE IS INSISTING UPON A SECRET, WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT CONCERNING PLO SUPPORT FOR HIS DECISION TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAYS THAT ARAFAT AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE DURING THEIR LAST SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS A MONTH AGO, BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IN THE INTERIM ARAFAT MAY HAVE BACKED AWAY. HUSSEIN IS CLEARLY VERY

FRUSTRATED WITH THE SAUDIS, WHO CONTINUE TO PRESS HIM TO ADOPT IMPOSSIBLE STANCES (SUCH AS THE ENDORSEMENT OF FEZ AS THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND A PRE-COMMITMENT TO CONFEDERATION). I SAID THAT WE HAD MADE A MAJOR EFFORT RECENTLY TO STRAIGHTEN THE SAUDIS OUT. HUSSEIN SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE WE DO MORE, AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD.

4. HUSSEIN USED THE MEETING TO COMPLAIN ABOUT SEVERAL OTHER EPISODES WHICH HAVE MADE HIS TASK MORE DIFFICULT, INCLUDING:  
- -- THE CONTENTS OF THE REAGAN/FAHD LETTER, WHICH HE BELIEVES OFFERED A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SAUDIS AND PLO TO MIS-INTERPRET THE US POSITION;  
- -- THE US RESPONSE TO THE DETAILED JORDANIAN POSITIONS, WHICH HE CLAIMED WAS PREPARED BY JUNIOR OFFICIALS WHO RETREATED FROM THE POSITIONS ENUNCIATED BY THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT;  
- -- THE MOROCCAN CLAIM THAT THE US WAS PREPARED FOR QUADRIPARTITE (US, ISRAEL, JORDAN, PLO) NEGOTIATIONS. HUSSEIN SAID THAT ALL OF THESE, BUT IN PARTICULAR THE SAUDI STANCE, HAD DELAYED THE PROCESS.

5. I PRESSED HUSSEIN FOR HIS CURRENT THINKING ABOUT THE TIMING OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE IS NOW AIMING FOR THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL. I EXPLAINED OUR THOUGHTS CONCERNING A POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR HIS ANNOUNCEMENT, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF US/

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JORDAN COORDINATION IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE ITS IMPACT. HUSSEIN AGREED COMPLETELY. END SUMMARY.

6. I MET WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR ONE HOUR, MARCH 19, TO INFORM HIM OF WHERE WE STOOD ON LEBANON AND TO HEAR HIM OUT ON WHERE HE STOOD ON THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS. THE KING WAS ALONE; I WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR VIETS, KRECZKO, AND HOOPER.

7. I BEGAN OUR MEETING BY GIVING HUSSEIN THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT. HE READ THE LETTER VERY SLOWLY, THANKED ME FOR IT, AND COMMENTED ONLY THAT IT WAS A "VERY NICE LETTER." I EXPLAINED THAT I WANTED TO COVER TWO GENERAL ISSUES IN OUR MEETING: (1) WHERE WE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #416

BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5973 09962 DTG: 201246Z MAR 83 PSN: 020102  
SIT851 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 079/1453Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF EOB P EOBJP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTDTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #5973/02 0791259  
O 201246Z MAR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1193

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LONDON 05973

NODIS  
FROM HABIB  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, SA, JO, XF  
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,  
STOOD IN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS; AND (2) WHERE THE  
KING STOOD CONCERNING HIS ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

8. LEBANON. I EXPLAINED IN GENERAL TERMS THE MEETINGS WHICH WE RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN WASHINGTON WITH THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE MAIN ISSUE HAD BEEN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND ISRAEL HAD PUT FORWARD ITS POSITION, WHICH INVOLVED BOTH A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND A MAJOR ROLE FOR HADDAD. I EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON FOUND BOTH OF THESE POSITIONS UNACCEPTABLE. THE US HAD SUPPORTED LEBANON BECAUSE THE ISRAELI POSITIONS WERE INCONSISTENT WITH LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND JEOPARDIZED SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. WITH LEBANON, WE HAD PRODUCED AN ALTERNATIVE SECURITY PACKAGE WHICH WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON IMPROVING THE CAPABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN IT. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT LEBANON HAD BEEN VERY REASSURED BY THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT SHOWN BY BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE SECRETARY. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE COULD CONFIRM THIS ON THE BASIS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FONMIN SALEM YESTERDAY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

9. HUSSEIN ASKED WHERE WE STOOD NOW IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED A PRELIMINARY ISRAELI RESPONSE TO OUR MOST RECENT SECURITY SUGGESTIONS WHICH CONTINUED TO SEEK A PROMINENT ROLE FOR HADDAD. WE HAD ALREADY TOLD ISRAEL THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND I WOULD BE GOING TO ISRAEL TOMORROW TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELI RESPONSE. HUSSEIN REMARKED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT HE HAD HEARD OF ONE COUNTRY DICTATING TO ANOTHER WHO SHOULD BE THE OFFICERS IN ITS ARMY.

10. HUSSEIN PRESSED FOR SOME INDICATION OF A TIME FRAME FOR RESOLUTION OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT WE ARE HOPEFULLY IN THE LAST STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD IMPRESSED ON FONMIN SHAMIR THE URGENCY OF WRAPPING UP THE NEGOTIATIONS AND

HAD ALSO INDICATED FIRMLY THAT THE BASIC US POSITION WOULD NOT CHANGE. THE US SUPPORTED A SOVEREIGN LEBANON, THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. I HOPED TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND TO THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEN MOVE THE PACKAGE TO THE FORMAL (KHADAH/NETANYA) TALKS FOR ENDORSEMENT. HUSSEIN AGAIN PRESSED FOR A TIME FRAME. I SAID THAT THE PACKAGE COULD BE COMPLETED IN TWO WEEKS, BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT WE WOULD KNOW AT THE END OF THE UPCOMING WEEK "WHETHER THE THING WAS GOING TO MOVE OR NOT". HUSSEIN POLITELY REMARKED, "IT BETTER MOVE." I REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT LEFT ANY DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE ISRAELIS CONCERNING THE US POSITION AND OUR SENSE OF URGENCY. I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. (HUSSEIN AGAIN STATED THAT SALEM FELT VERY OPTIMISTIC AFTER THE WASHINGTON SESSION.) VIETS CAUTIONED THE KING ABOUT LOOKING FOR TOO MUCH IMMEDIATE PROGRESS ON LEBANON, SINCE THE ISRAELIS KNEW THE KING WAS IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING HIS DECISION AND MIGHT NOT WANT TO FACILITATE IT. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY, BUT ADDED THAT IN ANY EVENT WE SHOULD KNOW WHERE WE STOOD WITHIN A WEEK OR SO.

11. HUSSEIN SAID THAT EVERYONE IN THE ARAB WORLD WAS WATCHING AND WAITING TO SEE THE US PERFORMANCE ON LEBANON. SYRIA IN PARTICULAR WAS DRAWING ATTENTION TO LEBANON.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN HIS MEETING THIS MORNING WITH KHADDAM, KHADDAM HAD REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT LEBANON WAS A TEST OF US WILL. IN THIS CONTEXT, HUSSEIN REMARKED THAT KHADDAM HAD USED THE TERM "SIMULTANEOUS" WITHDRAWAL IN THEIR TALKS AND THAT HE THOUGHT THIS CONTINUED TO REPRESENT THE SYRIAN POSITION. HE SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD DONE VERY WELL AS PRESIDENT. GEMAYEL MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION IN INDIA. HUSSEIN SAID HE TOLD GEMAYEL THERE THAT JORDAN WAS WILLING TO ASSIST LEBANON HOWEVER IT COULD. IN PARTICULAR, JORDAN WAS PREPARED TO OFFER TRAINING FACILITIES FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY.

12. PEACE PROCESS. HUSSEIN THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, AND WHERE THINGS STOOD CONCERNING HIS ENTRY INTO THE PROCESS. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THINGS HAD GOT VERY CONFUSED, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THERE WERE TOO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5973 09962 DTG: 201246Z MAR 83 PSN: 020105  
SIT850 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 079/1456Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF EOB P EOBJP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTDTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #5973/03 0791300  
O 201246Z MAR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1194

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 LONDON 05973

NODIS  
FROM HABIB  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, SA, JO, XF  
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,  
MANY DIFFERENT ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE GAME. HE SAID THAT  
"THINGS HAD GONE HAYWIRE TO A DEGREE".

13. HUSSEIN EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD SEEN ARAFAT JUST BEFORE ALGIERS AND HAD SECURED HIS AGREEMENT TO THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO: HE AND ARAFAT COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING A FUTURE JORDAN/WEST BANK RELATIONSHIP; ARAFAT WOULD SUPPORT HUSSEIN'S ENTRY INTO NEGOTIATIONS; HUSSEIN WOULD ANNOUNCE HIS DECISION; HE AND ARAFAT WOULD WORK OUT THE QUESTION OF NON-PLO PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ON HIS DELEGATION; THEY WOULD AWAIT THE RESOLUTION OF THE LEBANON SITUATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE PRIOR TO ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS; NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF SCRES 242 AND 338 AND THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. HUSSEIN SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD ACCEPTED ALL OF THIS PRIOR TO THE ALGIERS MEETING.

14. HUSSEIN COMPLAINED THAT THINGS HAD THEN BEGUN TO UNRAVEL, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE SAUDIS. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE US LETTER TO KING FAHD WAS NOT HELPFUL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(BECAUSE IT LEFT AMBIGUITY CONCERNING WHAT THE US BELIEVED WAS POSSIBLE). AT THIS POINT, ARAFAT BEGAN TO CHANGE COURSE, BECAUSE HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE US HAD GIVEN ITS BLESSING TO CONFEDERATION, WHICH ARAFAT UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WHICH WOULD THEN JOIN WITH JORDAN. HUSSEIN MENTIONED THAT HE ALSO WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE US RESPONSE TO THE JORDANIAN POSITION PAPER. HE HAD HOPED THAT ALL US ACTIONS WOULD BE BASED ON THE CONVERSATIONS WHICH HE HELD WITH THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT. THE US RESPONSE, HOWEVER, WAS CLEARLY DRAFTED BY "JUNIOR OFFICIALS" AND HAD BACKED AWAY FROM WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE US VIEWS.

15. HUSSEIN SAVED HIS MOST STRENUOUS CRITICISMS FOR THE SAUDIS. HE SAID THAT BANDAR HAD COME TO HIM BEFORE

HIS MOST RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND SAID THAT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE FEZ. HUSSEIN TOLD BANDAR FLAT OUT THAT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE; IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE US COMMITMENT, AND PRECLUDE ISRAELI NEGOTIATION. I INTERJECTED THAT I HAD MET TWICE WITH BANDAR RECENTLY IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THAT THIS APPROACH WAS A NON-STARTER. WE HAD EXPLAINED THAT FEZ COULD BE A NEGOTIATING POSITION BUT NOT REPEAT NOT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVED THAT BANDAR (AND FAHD) NOW UNDERSTOOD THIS CRITICAL DISTINCTION. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THIS INTERLUDE HAD PUT US BACK AND LOST TIME. I ASKED WHETHER HUSSEIN BELIEVED ARAFAT WAS BEHIND THE SAUDIS' PITCH. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHETHER BANDAR WAS REPRESENTING THE SAUDI POSITION OR WHETHER THE SAUDIS WERE BEING MANIPULATED BY ARAFAT. IN ANY EVENT, IF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WERE THE ANSWER, HUSSEIN WAS NOT NEEDED AND THE PALESTINIANS COULD NEGOTIATE FOR THEMSELVES. HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD NOT SIGN ANY GUARANTEES IN ADVANCE ABOUT CONFEDERATION BECAUSE IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE WHOLE PROCESS AND PROVIDE THE ISRAELIS AN EXCUSE FOR AVOIDING NEGOTIATIONS.

16. HUSSEIN SAID THAT ANOTHER COMPLICATING FACTOR WAS HE MOROCCAN MESSAGE, CONVEYED TO HIM AT NEW DELHI, THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT QUADRIPARTITE (US, ISRAEL, PLO, JORDAN) NEGOTIATIONS. HUSSEIN WAS STUNNED AND ASKED THE MOROCCANS NOT TO TELL THE PALESTINIANS THIS UNTIL HE HAD VERIFIED IT WITH US, BECAUSE IT WOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IMMEDIATELY AND IRREVERSIBLY DAMAGE HIS CREDIBILITY WITH THEM. WHILE HUSSEIN REALIZES THAT THIS IS NOT, AND NEVER WAS, OUR POSITION, HE VIEWS THE EPISODE AS ANOTHER COMPLICATING EVENT.

17. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN ASKED TO GO FROM LONDON TO MOROCCO TO REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE OF 7. THE PALESTINIANS HAD ARGUED THAT ARAFAT NEEDED THIS TO COVER HIS ACCEPTANCE OF HUSSEIN'S ENTRY INTO NEGOTIATIONS. HUSSEIN HAD REFUSED, SAYING THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS FOR ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN TO AGREE AND INFORM THE OTHERS. THEY WOULD FALL IN LINE. HUSSEIN WAS SUCCESSFUL IN AT LEAST DEFERRING THE IDEA. ARAFAT WILL BE IN AMMAN ON MARCH 26, AND THE TRIP TO MOROCCO WAS POSTPONED UNTIL AT LEAST APRIL 3.

18. HUSSEIN SAID THAT IN VIEW OF ALL OF THESE EPISODES, HE HAD HAD AN EXTREMELY TOUGH TALK WITH SAUD AND BANDAR

LONDON 5973 09962 DTG: 201246Z MAR 83 PSN: 020105

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5973 09962 DTG: 201246Z MAR 83 PSN: 020106  
SIT849 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 079/1458Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /B01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF EOB P EOBJP VP EOB SIT KEMP

EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTDTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHLD #5973/04 0791301

O 201246Z MAR 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1195

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 LONDON 05973

NODIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, SA, JO, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN, LAST NIGHT (MARCH 18). SAUD HAD ASKED HUSSEIN NOT TO MEET WITH ME UNTIL AFTER SAUD GOT BACK TO HUSSEIN (PRESUMABLY TOMORROW) BECAUSE THE KING'S MESSAGE WAS SO TOUGH THAT SAUD WAS AFRAID HUSSEIN WAS GOING TO TELL ME THAT HE HAD HAD IT WITH THE WHOLE PROCESS. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT WE HAD NOT CHANGED OUR POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD NOT CHANGED HIS IDEAS, HERE OR ON LEBANON, AND REMAINED COMPLETELY COMMITTED TO HIS INITIATIVE. ANYONE WHO TOLD HUSSEIN THAT POLITICS WOULD CHANGE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT.

19. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WAS NOT GIVING UP, BUT TO THE CONTRARY WAS TRYING HIS VERY BEST. HE EXPECTED A MESSAGE FROM THE SAUDIS TOMORROW. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID VERY BLUNTLY, "YOU PROMISED HELP WITH THE SAUDIS AND YOU ARE NOT HELPING." I DISAGREED VIGOROUSLY. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT WE HAD NOW MADE CLEAR OUR POSITIONS, WHICH WERE HUSSEIN'S POSITIONS, CONCERNING THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WEST BANK AND JORDAN (THAT THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEES IN ADVANCE), THE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, AND THE NEED FOR THE PLO NOT TO INSIST ON A JOINT PLO/JORDAN ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE.

20. HUSSEIN ALSO ASKED ABOUT SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT. I SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THE SAUDIS WERE MOVING TO DO SOMETHING ON THIS AS WE HAD BEEN URGING. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE RECEIVED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM BANDAR, BUT THAT BANDAR INVOKED ABDALLAH AS THE OBSTACLE. HUSSEIN WAS WILLING TO TALK WITH ABDALLAH IF THIS WERE THE PROBLEM. HUSSEIN MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS EXASPERATED WITH THE SAUDIS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE SAUDIS WOULD EITHER SAY SOMETHING TO HUSSEIN TOMORROW CONCERNING FINANCIAL HELP, OR ELSE RE-INVITE BIN SHAKIR TO SAUDI ARABIA. HUSSEIN SAID THIS WOULD BE GOOD, BUT IT STILL DOES NOT

GO TO THE BASIC ISSUE OF SAUDI POLITICAL SUPPORT. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NEVERTHELESS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SAUDIS UNDERSTOOD THEIR RESPONSIBILITY.

21. IN THE COURSE OF THESE REMARKS, HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS SEEKING A SECRET, WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT CONCERNING PLO SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN'S DECISION. HUSSEIN SAID THAT ARAFAT AGREED. (HUSSEIN WAS DISMISSIVE OF THE IDEA OF HAVING THE SAUDIS HOLD THE AGREEMENT.) HUSSEIN SAID THAT ARAFAT WAS SEEKING A SECRET WRITTEN AGREEMENT CONCERNING CONFEDERATION, BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO THIS.

22. I THEN TOLD HUSSEIN THAT I WANTED TO SHARE WITH HIM OUR THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE SCENARIO OF EVENTS, ONCE HE HAD ACHIEVED ARAFAT'S AGREEMENT AND DECIDED TO ENTER. FIRST, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE NOT BE A JOINT PLO/JORDAN ANNOUNCEMENT. SECOND, THE WORDING OF THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS IMPORTANT. WHILE IT WAS HUSSEIN'S DECISION, WE HOPED THAT HE WOULD CONSULT US IN ITS DRAFTING. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS ANNOUNCEMENT, WE PLANNED A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT AND THAT STATEMENT WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CONTENT OF HUSSEIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT. HUSSEIN READILY AGREED TO COORDINATE HIS STATEMENT WITH US. I SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE NOT TO NAME THE PALESTINIAN MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENT. HE AGREED, SAYING THAT DESIGNATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE DELEGATION MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME ANYWAY. I SAID THAT 242, 338 AND THE REAGAN INITIATIVE SHOULD BE INDICATED AS THE BASES FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I ALSO SAID THAT AFTER HUSSEIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT, WE PLANNED AN EARLY TRIP TO THE REGION BY THE SECRETARY, WITH STOPS IN JORDAN (FIRST), ISRAEL, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA AND PERHAPS LEBANON. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT HIS STATEMENT, AND US AND PLO STATEMENTS, COULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN INDUCING A CHANGE IN THE CURRENT ISRAELI ATTITUDE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, WE DID NOT WANT THE STATEMENTS TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH ANY EXCUSE FOR REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE. I SAID VIETS WOULD BE CONSTANTLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION DURING THE PREPARATION OF STATEMENTS AND THAT HE MIGHT BE ASSISTED BY SOMEONE FROM WASHINGTON.

23. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH MY PROPOSED SCENARIO.

LONDON 5973

09962 DTG: 201246Z MAR 83 PSN: 020106

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5973 09962 DTG:201246Z MAR 83 PSN: 020112  
SIT848 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 079/1459Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF EOBP EOBJP VP EOB SIT KEMP

EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTDTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHLD #5973/05 0791302

O 201246Z MAR 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1196

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 LONDON 05973

NODIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, SA, JO, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN,

24. I ASKED HUSSEIN BLUNTLY HOW HE ASSESSED THE CHANCES OF GETTING ARAFAT'S ACQUIESCENCE. HE REPEATED THAT HE HAD IT AT ONE TIME. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE CONTINUED TO BE BLUNT WITH ARAFAT, EMPHASIZING THAT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY AND THAT HUSSEIN WOULD PLACE THE BLAME SQUARELY ON THE PLO IF THE OPPORTUNITY WERE MISSED. HE MENTIONED THAT ARAFAT HAD ASKED HUSSEIN TO PROMISE THAT HE WOULD SEEK MORE FOR THE PALESTINIANS THAN THE REAGAN PLAN OFFERED. I ASKED IF ARAFAT MEANT BEFORE HUSSEIN ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS. HUSSEIN SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD SAID "THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS". I SAID THAT THIS IN ITSELF WAS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. I THEN ASKED WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP HUSSEIN IN THE NEXT TWO-THREE WEEKS. HUSSEIN REPEATED THAT WE MUST WORK ON THE SAUDIS. HUSSEIN ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE EXPECTED A MESSAGE FROM ARAFAT TOMORROW, VIA WALID KHALIDI WHO WOULD BE RETURNING FROM TUNIS. HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD BRIEF VIETS ON THIS MESSAGE, AS WELL AS ANY PROMISED SAUDI MESSAGE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

25. I PRESSED HUSSEIN FOR SOME INDICATION OF THE TIME FRAME THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING FOR HIS DECISION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CONTEMPLATING THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL. HE HAD WANTED TO ANNOUNCE IN THE FIRST WEEK OF MARCH, BUT SAUDI AND MOROCCAN MANEUVERING DESCRIBED ABOVE HAD PREVENTED THIS. I STRESSED THAT IT WAS TIME TO PRESS AHEAD "FULL SPEED". THE KING AGREED.

26. SYRIA. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, HUSSEIN MADE SEVERAL INTERESTING REFERENCES TO SYRIAN BEHAVIOR. FOR EXAMPLE, HE NOTED THAT KHADDAM HAD APPROACHED HIM TODAY CONCERNING A MEETING OF INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS, WHICH HE HAD APPROVED. THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK IN DAMASCUS. VIETS ASKED HOW HE EXPLAINED THIS SYRIAN ATTITUDE, AS WELL AS THE APPARENTLY REASONABLE SYRIAN APPROACH ON LEBANON. HUSSEIN CAUTIONED US TO BE

SUSPICIOUS OF SYRIAN STATEMENTS ON LEBANON (I AGREED), BUT SAID THAT THE SYRIANS PERHAPS ARE BECOMING CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE ISOLATION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND ABOUT EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ARAB WORLD.

27. COMMENT: I FOUND KING HUSSEIN VERY DETERMINED CONCERNING ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT EQUALLY CONCERNED OVER FLAGGING SAUDI SUPPORT. AS THE KING ENTERS THE HOME STRETCH, I BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE SEND FAHD A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE UNDERSCORING THE NEED FOR UNAMBIGUOUS SAUDI ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING ARAFAT AROUND. (SEE SEPTEL.) END COMMENT.

28. REQUEST DEPARTMENT PASS AMMAN, JIDDA AND RIYADH. STREATOR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5972 29962 DTG: 192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019473  
SIT865 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 078/2211Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: GKLS KEMP EOBJP VP SIT EOB KEMP

EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHLD #5972/01 0782147

O 192138Z MAR 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1188

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4208

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1358

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0206

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2861

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3823

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1550

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8513

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0947

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5817

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 05972

EXDIS

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER  
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN  
- SALEM, MARCH 19

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: FONMIN SALEM PROVIDED ME MARCH 19 WITH  
A READ-OUT ON HIS TALKS WITH HUSSEIN, PYM, KHADDAM AND  
PALESTINIAN WALID KHALIDI OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS.  
HIS TALK WITH HUSSEIN WAS BRIEF AND GENERAL, ALTHOUGH  
HE DESCRIBED IN VERY POSITIVE TERMS TO HUSSEIN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON IN THE RECENT WASHINGTON SESSIONS.  
HE SAID HUSSEIN APPEARED PLEASED BY WHAT HE HEARD.  
SALEM PROVIDED PYM WITH A MUCH MORE THOROUGH BRIEFING  
OF THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING AGAIN A  
POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS. IN  
DISCUSSIONS OF THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS, PYM HAD LEFT  
SALEM WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UK BELIEVED THE US  
WAS PUSHING HUSSEIN "TOO FAR, TOO FAST". ACCORDING TO  
SALEM, PYM WAS VERY PROTECTIVE OF HUSSEIN AND QUESTIONED  
WHETHER HUSSEIN SHOULD STEP FORWARD WITHOUT SOMETHING  
MORE TANGIBLE IN HAND.

3. SALEM HAD A MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIVE, AND USEFUL,  
EXCHANGE WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM. KHADDAM REPEATED  
UNAMBIGUOUSLY AND EMPHATICALLY THAT SYRIA WILL  
WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL.

KHADDAM REFUSED TO COMMENT ON PLO WITHDRAWAL, SAYING  
IT WAS MATTER EXCLUSIVELY FOR ARAFAT. KHADDAM ADDED  
THAT SYRIA WILL NOT TAKE ANY PLO FIGHTERS. SALEM  
HAD ALSO USED THE MEETING TO STRESS THAT LEBANON  
MUST MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON  
NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.  
HE PROVIDED KHADDAM WITH A VERY GENERAL READ-OUT OF  
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND KHADDAM DID  
NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS. SALEM ALSO RAISED THE  
PRISONER ISSUE, BUT KHADDAM DID NOT COMMENT. A  
SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH PALESTINIAN WALID KHALIDI  
PRODUCED, IN SALEM'S WORDS, "NOTHING NEW". KHALIDI  
REPEATED THAT THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS ARE PREPARED  
TO LEAVE LEBANON, BUT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL  
DETAILS.

4. I PROVIDED SALEM WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS  
IN WASHINGTON SINCE HIS DEPARTURE. I SAID THAT WE HAD  
RECEIVED A PRELIMINARY ISRAELI RESPONSE TO OUR NON-  
PAPER, AND THAT ISRAEL CONTINUED TO SEEK SOME RESIDUAL  
ISRAELI PRESENCE AND THE RETENTION OF HADDAD IN  
SOUTHERN LEBANON. WE HAD ALREADY RESPONDED IN A  
PRELIMINARY FASHION WHICH INDICATED THE UNACCEPTABILITY  
OF EACH OF THESE, AND I WOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUES IN  
MORE DETAIL WITH THE ISRAELIS. I SAID OUR FOCUS  
WOULD REMAIN THE SECURITY PROPOSALS DEVELOPED IN  
WASHINGTON, WHICH SALEM CONFIRMED ARE ACCEPTABLE TO  
LEBANON. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. I MET WITH FONMIN SALEM FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS,  
MARCH 19 IN ORDER TO HEAR HIS ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS  
IN LEBANON AND TO BRIEF HIM ON EVENTS IN WASHINGTON  
FOLLOWING HIS DEPARTURE. SALEM WAS ACCOMPANIED BY  
LEBANON'S AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, AND HIS PERSONAL  
ASSISTANT. AMBASSADOR VIETS, KRECZKO AND HOOPER WERE  
WITH ME.

6. HUSSEIN. SALEM MET BRIEFLY WITH KING HUSSEIN ON  
MARCH 18 IN ORDER TO BRIEF HIM ON THE STATUS OF THE  
ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AND THE RECENT MEETINGS IN  
WASHINGTON. SALEM KEPT HIS BRIEFING OF HUSSEIN VERY  
GENERAL. HE WAS VERY POSITIVE IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF  
THE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, AND SAID THAT THE US  
PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR ANY  
RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON, WERE AIMED AT  
INCREASING THE COMPETENCE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE LAF.

LONDON 5972

29962

DTG: 192138Z MAR. 83 PSN: 019473

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #417

BY: LOS NARA DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5972 29962 DTG:192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019481  
SIT864 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 078/2215Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF EOBWHLR JP VP SIT EOB KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTSTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #5972/02 0782148  
O 192138Z MAR 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1189

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4209  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1359  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0207  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2862  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3824  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1551  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8514  
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0948  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5818  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 05972

EXDIS  
CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER  
FROM HABIB  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF  
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN  
7. UK. SALEM ALSO MET WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY  
PYM ON MARCH 18. HE PROVIDED PYM WITH A DETAILED  
BRIEFING OF THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND THE STATUS OF  
THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD THANKED THE UK FOR ITS  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF, BUT HAD NOT REQUESTED AN  
ENLARGEMENT OR EXTENSION OF THE CONTINGENT. SALEM  
BELIEVED THAT IN VIEW OF THE UK'S DIFFICULTY IN  
DECIDING WHETHER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MNF, IT WAS  
BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL IT WAS CLOSER TO THE TIME FOR A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UK DECISION AND THERE WAS DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS IN  
THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ASKING FOR AN EXTENSION IN THE  
UK CONTRIBUTION.  
8. SALEM ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR KING HUSSEIN'S  
ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS WITH PYM. ACCORDING TO  
SALEM, PYM'S MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES  
WAS PUSHING HUSSEIN TOO HARD, TOO FAST. PYM HAD  
SUGGESTED THAT HUSSEIN SHOULD ASK FOR SOME QUID FROM  
ISRAEL IN ADVANCE OF JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN  
GENERAL, SALEM SAID THAT PYM'S ATTITUDE WAS VERY  
PROTECTIVE OF HUSSEIN. (COMMENT: AS REPORTED SEPTEL,  
I PROBED, SOMETIMES RATHER BLUNTLY, WITH SIR JOHN  
LEAHY FOR CONFIRMATION OF THIS UK ATTITUDE. LEAHY  
MAINTAINED THAT UK SUPPORT FOR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE  
WAS SOLID AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THE UK WAS CONSISTENTLY  
TELLING THE ARABS THAT THEY COULD NOT EXPECT ANY

CHANGES, SUCH AS ENDORSEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-  
DETERMINATION, IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
INITIATIVE. END COMMENT.)

9. SYRIA. SALEM MET WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM THIS  
MORNING. SALEM DESCRIBED THE MEETING AS VERY GOOD. HE  
HAD CONCENTRATED ON TWO GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING  
THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. FIRST, SALEM TOLD  
KHADDAM THAT THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATION IS  
EXCLUSIVELY A LEBANESE MATTER. AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF  
HAVING THE ARABS TAKE DECISIONS IN LEBANON, LEBANON  
WOULD DECIDE ITS OWN FUTURE. LEBANON WOULD GO AS FAR  
AS IT JUDGED NECESSARY TO END THE OCCUPATION OF ITS  
COUNTRY. SECOND, SALEM TOLD KHADDAM THAT NEVERTHELESS,  
LEBANON WOULD KEEP SYRIA'S INTERESTS IN MIND AND WOULD  
NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD THREATEN SYRIAN SECURITY.  
SALEM SAID THAT KHADDAM CONCEDED THAT SECURITY WAS  
SYRIA'S SOLE LEGITIMATE INTEREST. SALEM DID NOT  
DETAIL THE CONTENTS OF US SECURITY PROPOSALS,  
DESPITE KHADDAM'S REPEATED QUESTIONS. SALEM STUCK TO  
THE GENERAL LINE THAT THE US PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED  
TO STRENGTHEN THE COMPETENCE OF THE LAF IN SOUTHERN  
LEBANON IN ORDER TO RENDER ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE  
UNNECESSARY. SALEM ALSO TOLD KHADDAM THAT THE US HAD  
BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE IN THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS OF  
LEBANON'S POSITION THAT ISRAELI BASES IN LEBANON AND  
RETENTION OF HADDAD IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WERE EACH  
UNACCEPTABLE.

LONDON 5972 29962 DTG:192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019481  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

10. SALEM ASKED KHADDAM IN VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD TERMS  
ABOUT SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON.  
KHADDAM WAS UNAMBIGUOUS AND EMPHATIC: ONCE LEBANON AND  
ISRAEL REACH AGREEMENT CONCERNING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL,  
SYRIA WILL DECIDE "WITHIN ONE-HALF HOUR" TO WITHDRAW.  
SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL, AND  
NOT "IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" AS CONTEMPLATED  
IN THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE. (SALEM SAID THAT HE PRESSED  
KHADDAM TO REPEAT THIS AND THAT KHADDAM DID NOT  
HESITATE TO DO SO.) SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW AND IS EAGER  
TO DO SO. WHEREAS SYRIA'S ORIGINAL PRESENCE IN  
LEBANON HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY THE LEBANESE, THIS WAS NO  
LONGER THE CASE. NEITHER SYRIA NOR ANY OTHER ARAB  
STATE WOULD DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD PROVIDE  
AN EXCUSE FOR ISRAEL TO REMAIN IN OCCUPATION OF

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 LONDON 5972  
SIT127 RECALLED

DTG: 192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019490  
TOR: 078/2221Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001  
-----

OP IMMED

STU3356

DE RUEHLD #5972/03 0782150

O 192138Z MAR 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1190

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4210

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1360

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0208

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2863

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3825

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1552

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8515

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0949

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5819

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 LONDON 05972

EXDIS

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER  
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN  
LEBANON.

11. SALEM ASKED KHADDAM ABOUT THE PLO'S WILLINGNESS  
TO WITHDRAW. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT THIS DECISION  
WAS EXCLUSIVELY ARAFAT'S. KHADDAM SPOKE DERISIVELY

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 LONDON 5972

DTG: 192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019490

OF ARAFAT, AND SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY OF THE PLO FIGHTERS FROM LEBANON. ACCORDING TO KHADDAM, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A PRESENT OF THESE INDIVIDUALS TO SOME OF "HABIB'S FRIENDS".

12. I ASKED IF SALEM HAD BRIEFED KHADDAM ON THE MUTUAL RELATIONS ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD KHADDAM THAT THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS, SINCE THIS NOW SEEMED TO BE THE PREDOMINANT ISRAELI CONCERN. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, SALEM HAD EXPLAINED THE CONCEPT OF A SIX MONTH DEFERRAL OF THE NEGOTIATION OF ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT AND OF ITS NEGOTIATION IN A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE (US/ISRAEL/LEBANON). KHADDAM WAS VERY CURIOUS ABOUT THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE; SALEM HAD SAID US PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY TO OFFSET ISRAELI DEMANDS AND HAD COMPARED THE STRUCTURE TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS. SALEM HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON'S POSITION IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SIX MONTHS WILL DEPEND UPON EVENTS IN THE AREA. LEBANON WILL EXPAND OR CONTRACT ITS POSITIONS IN VIEW OF THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT. SALEM DID NOT REPEAT NOT INFORM KHADDAM OF THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS.

13. SALEM SAID THAT KHADDAM DID NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING WHICH SALEM SAID. SALEM'S GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT SYRIA WILL BE UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANON'S DECISIONS, UNLESS THOSE DECISIONS INTERFERED WITH THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE AREA. IN SALEM'S VIEW, SYRIA WILL ONLY OBJECT IF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS EXPOSE SYRIAN DEFENSES. SALEM SAID THAT THE ONLY ARRANGEMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED TO DO SO WOULD BE ISRAEL/LEBANON INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION, BUT SALEM STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY HIS OWN GUESS AND THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED BY KHADDAM.

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 LONDON 5972

DTG: 192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019490

EX  
DIS

14. I AGREED THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO CAREFULLY INFORM SYRIA OF THE GENERAL CONTENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SO THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT HAVE ANY EXCUSES CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL. I ASKED IF SALEM HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI PRISONERS AND BODIES HELD BY THE SYRIANS OR PLO. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD, THAT KHADDAM WAS AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE, BUT THAT HE HAD GOTTEN NO REAL COMMENT FROM KHADDAM (OTHER THAN TO DERIDE PLO EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PALESTINIAN STATE IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ISRAELI PRISONERS WHICH THEY HELD).

EX  
DIS

EX  
DIS

15. PALESTINIANS. SALEM ALSO HAD A BRIEF MEETING WITH WALID KHALIDI, WHICH HE SAID PRODUCED NOTHING NEW. KHALIDI SAID THAT THE GEMAYEL/ARAFAT MEETING HAD BEEN GOOD. KHALIDI THOUGHT THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE READY TO LEAVE LEBANON. SALEM ALSO DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT KHALIDI WAS PUTTING A VERY POSITIVE FACE ON THE ALGIERS MEETING, INCLUDING PUBLICLY. SALEM REFERRED TO KHALIDI'S MARCH 18 INTERVIEW ON BBC, IN WHICH KHALIDI HAD SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS ACCEPTED THE NOTION OF CONFEDERATION AT ALGIERS AND ALSO OBJECTED TO PARTS OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, WITHOUT REJECTING IT.

EX  
DIS

16. I THEN GAVE SALEM A VERY BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN WASHINGTON SINCE HIS DEPARTURE. I SAID THAT WE HAD  
BT

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 LONDON 5972  
SIT126 RECALLED

DTG: 192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019485  
TOR: 078/2219Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001  
-----

OP IMMED

STU3358

DE RUEHLD #5972/04 0782152

O 192138Z MAR 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1191

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4211

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1361

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0209

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2864

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3826

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1553

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8516

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0950

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5820

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 LONDON 05972

EXDIS

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER  
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN

RECEIVED PRELIMINARY ISRAELI COMMENTS ON THE NON-  
PAPER WHICH WE HAD PROVIDED SALEM. THIS PRELIMINARY  
RESPONSE HAD AGAIN SUGGESTED RETENTION OF HADDAD IN  
SOUTHERN LEBANON AND SOME ISRAELI PRESENCE THERE.

WE HAD RESPONDED IN A PRELIMINARY FASHION AND CLEARLY

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 5972

DTG: 192138Z MAR 83 PSN: 019485

EXDIS  
STATED THAT BOTH THE RETENTION OF HADDAD AND A RESIDUAL  
ISRAELI PRESENCE WERE UNACCEPTABLE. I WOULD ARRIVE  
IN ISRAEL EVENING OF MARCH 20 TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS  
MORE DETAILED COMMENTS ON THEIR PRELIMINARY RESPONSE.  
I EMPHASIZED THAT THE NON-PAPER WHICH WE PUT FORWARD  
IN WASHINGTON REMAINED THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE WOULD  
DISCUSS. SALEM RECONFIRMED THAT THESE PROPOSALS  
WERE ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. I SAID THAT WE WOULD  
DISCUSS ANY DEVIATIONS IN THESE PROPOSALS WITH LEBANON  
AND THAT I EXPECTED TO BE IN LEBANON ON MONDAY OR  
TUESDAY, FOLLOWING MY INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS IN ISRAEL.

EXDIS  
17. I MENTIONED TO SALEM THAT TUENI HAD RAISED WITH  
ROSS THE POSSIBILITY OF CANCELING MONDAY'S SCHEDULED  
NEGOTIATIONS IN NETANYA. SALEM AGREED WITH OUR  
JUDGMENT THAT THIS WOULD BE A MISTAKE, AND UNDERTOOK  
TO SO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT.

EXDIS  
18. SALEM ENDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT HE WAS  
VERY PLEASED BY THE EXTENT OF US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON  
WHICH HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER,  
IF THE LATEST US PROPOSALS WERE NOT ACCEPTED BY  
ISRAEL, HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT  
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IS NOT THE REAL ISSUE, AND THAT  
ISRAEL IS STALLING FOR "OTHER REASONS". STREATOR  
BT

~~SECRET~~

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 18 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 5186 16362 DTG:101209Z MAR 83 PSN: 005207  
SIT082 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 069/1218Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBWHLR JP VP MCM SIT EOBP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTCKLISTST-----ACTION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #5186 0691210  
O 101209Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0777

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 05186

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UK, US  
SUBJECT: DENIS HEALEY, LABOR DEPUTY LEADER'S WASHINGTON  
VISIT, MARCH 11  
REF: (A) STATE 58461, (B) LONDON 4058, (C) LONDON 5010

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HEALEY SAYS HE IS VISITING WASHINGTON TO LISTEN, AND THAT HE EXPECTS TO BE CHALLENGED. HE IS VERY PLEASED WITH HIS APPOINTMENTS AT STATE AND HOPES HE CAN MEET WITH JUDGE CLARK AS WELL. IN ADDITION TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, HEALEY WANTS TO HEAR OUR LATEST VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN, HOPES FOR SUSTAINED ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AND PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. ON THE LATTER, HEALEY WILL PROBABLY BE QUITE CRITICAL; PARTLY BECAUSE HE IS CONVINCED WE ARE MISPLAYING OUR HAND WITH THE NICARAGUANS, BUT ALSO BECAUSE HE NEEDS TO PLACATE THE LABOR LEFT BY CRITICIZING THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS OF ALL THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA EXCEPT FOR COSTA RICA.

3. IN DEALING WITH HEALEY, KEEP IN MIND THAT HE HAS MADE A STRIKING COMEBACK WITHIN THE LABOR PARTY. EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO HE WAS BEING PUBLICLY BOOED BY LABORITES AND ALMOST LOST THE DEPUTY SLOT TO TONY BENN.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOW, HE IS THE HEIR APPARENT -- SHOULD FOOT GO. KEY FACTORS IN THIS TURNABOUT ARE:  
-- MICHAEL FOOT'S WEAKNESS, THE LACK OF OTHER STRONG CANDIDATES, AND THE DESPERATION OF MANY MODERATES. HEALEY IS WELL POSITIONED TO REPLACE FOOT IN THE NEAR TERM, IF ANOTHER BY-ELECTION DEBACLE SHOULD FINALLY CONVINCE FOOT TO STEP DOWN. THE BETTING IS STILL THAT FOOT WILL SURVIVE AND THAT HEALEY WILL SERVE AS HIS LOYAL DEPUTY THROUGH THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION.  
-- HEALEY PROJECTS STRENGTH. WITH THATCHER, HE IS PROBABLY THE MOST ENERGETIC, SELF-CONFIDENT AND INTELLIGENT POLITICIAN ON THE STAGE IN BRITAIN TODAY. AS BOTH DEPUTY LEADER AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN HE HAS MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC. AS A FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND FORMER CHANCELLOR, HE HAS THE BACKGROUND TO STATE HIS CASE WITH GREAT

AUTHORITY ON SECURITY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

-- HEALEY HAS BEEN WILLING TO SWALLOW LABOR PROGRAMS WHICH COMPROMISE HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AND THE SOLID DEFENSE POLICIES HE USED TO CAMPAIGN. THEREIN LIES THE PROBLEM FOR US.

4. HEALEY HAS ONE OF THE MOST AGILE MINDS IN THE WEST AND CAN CONCOCT A RATIONALE TO EXPLAIN ALMOST ANYTHING. FOR EXAMPLE, HE CLAIMS THAT SINCE FB-111S AND THE POLARIS BASE IN SCOTLAND WILL BE OBSOLETE WITHIN FIVE YEARS, THE U.S. SHOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE THEIR GRACEFUL DEPARTURE WITH A LABOR GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CAUSING HARM TO THE EAST-WEST BALANCE. HE HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT LABOR'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROGRAM WILL REMAIN AS DRAFTED (REF C), BUT HE TAKES CREDIT FOR THE CAVEATS ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES AND ARGUES THAT A LABOR GOVERNMENT IN WHICH HE WAS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT A SANE FOREIGN POLICY.

5. IN WASHINGTON, HEALEY WILL WANT TO FUDGE ALL THIS. BUT HE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH THAT. WE SHOULD:

-- GIVE HIM A CLEAR WARNING ON WHERE AND HOW LABOR'S PROSPECTIVE POLICIES HARM AMERICAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS. THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO DETER HIM AND THE LABOR PARTY FROM MOVING ANY FURTHER LEFTWARD TOWARDS UNILATERALISM.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- PROVIDE HIM WITH ARGUMENTS THAT HE CAN CARRY BACK TO LONDON TO USE AS AMMUNITION IN INTERNAL PARTY DEBATES AND IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

-- BUT OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE, MAKE CLEAR TO AND THROUGH HIM THAT DESPITE AMERICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT LABOR PARTY POLICY, WE WISH TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY. STREATOR

LONDON 5186 16362 DTG:101209Z MAR 83 PSN: 005207

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #419  
BY WJS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 17418 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 4940 92362 DTG:081604Z MAR 83 PSN: 002312  
SIT112 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 067/1743Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SITPKMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #4940/01 0671607  
O 081604Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0647

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 04940  
NODIS  
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: 3/8/13  
TAGS: SF, WA, AO  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SAVIMBI'S EMISSARY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MARCH 8, WE MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH SAVIMBI'S EMISSARY MAJOR TITO CHINGUNJI AND REVIEWED THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. TITO CAME TO LONDON ON SATURDAY AFTER TWO MONTHS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

3. TITO WAS BULLISH ON THE MILITARY SIDE AND SAID UNITA IS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN EVER BEFORE. HE SAID SAVIMBI NOW HAS ABOUT 15,000 QUASI REGULAR TROOPS AND 25,000 GUERRILLA AUXILIARIES. HE CLAIMED THAT SAVIMBI EXERCISES VIRTUAL CONTROL OVER AN AREA RUNNING FROM THE CUNENE NORTH TO OUTSKIRTS OF MENONGUE ON TO THE OUTSKIRTS OF BIE AND ALONG THE BENGUELA RAILROAD TO THE ZAMBIAN BORDER. IN THE SOUTH, THERE ARE BESIEGED FAPLA GARRISONS IN THREE PLACES INCLUDING CUITO CUANAVALA. FURTHER NORTH, THERE ARE STILL SIX FAPLA OUTPOSTS, FIVE OF THEM IN THE MOXICO PANHANDLE. TITO SAID UNITA IS NOW OPERATING ACTIVELY AROUND HUAMBO TOWN.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. ON LEVELS OF MILITARY SUPPORT, TITO SAID THAT UNITA RECEIVES "ENOUGH" FROM THE SADF. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAD RECENTLY GOTTEN A LOAD OF SAM-SEVENS WHICH HAVE PROVEN MOST USEFUL PARTICULARLY IN REDUCING MPLA AIR SUPPORT FOR THE VARIOUS BESIEGED OUTPOSTS IN THE SOUTHEAST AND THE EAST. HE SAID THAT UNITA AND SWAPO STILL GENERALLY AVOID EACH OTHER.

5. TITO SAID THAT THE BENGUELA RAILROAD IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES CLOSED FROM HUAMBO TO THE ZAMBIAN BORDER. TO ILLUSTRATE THAT FACT, THEY RECENTLY DROVE TWO ENGLISH JOURNALISTS ALONG THE RAIL LINE. THE RAILROAD FROM HUAMBO TO LOBITO IS PERIODICALLY OPEN HOWEVER. UNITA BELIEVES THAT FIFTEEN BRAZILIAN LOCOMOTIVES HAVE

BEEN RECENTLY DELIVERED TO THE LINE AND PLANS TO DESTROY THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. TITO CONTINUED THAT THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE DECLINE IN FAPLA MORALE OVER THE PAST YEAR. THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE HALF-HEARTED. AS A RESULT, THE CUBANS HAVE CHANGED THEIR DEPLOYMENT PATTERN AND ARE NOW PUTTING 200 TO 500 MAN UNITS IN FAPLA BASES TO STIFFEN THEM UP. UNITA BELIEVES THERE ARE ABOUT 37-40,000 CUBANS OF ALL DESCRIPTIONS IN ANGOLA PRESENTLY. DESPITE THE MILITARY SUCCESS, TITO SAID SAVIMBI CONTINUES TO BELIEVE A COMPLETE MILITARY VICTORY IS NOT POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY IF THE CUBANS REMAIN IN ANGOLA. NONETHELESS, HE FEELS THE LONG TERM BALANCE IS SLOWLY SHIFTING TO UNITA WHICH IS BENEFITTING FROM THE MPLA'S INABILITY TO GOVERN AND FEED THE COUNTRY.

7. TITO SAID THAT SAVIMBI IS COMPLETELY UNINFORMED ABOUT THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARTICULAR THE SOUTH AFRICAN/MPLA TALKS IN CAPE VERDE. ACCORDING TO TITO, SAVIMBI FINDS IT ESPECIALLY "WORRISOME" THAT THE SAG HAS TOLD THEM NOTHING ABOUT CAPE VERDE. HE SAID A UNITA SPY IN LUANDA PROVIDED THEM WITH A COPY OF THE SA CAPE VERDE ONE PROPOSALS AND THAT HAD PROVOKED SOME CONCERN AMONG UNITA. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, WE GAVE HIM A COMPLETE READOUT ON THE CAPE VERDE TALKS STRESSING THAT THE TWO SIDES SEEMED TO HAVE HAD TWO DIFFERENT AGENDAS; IN PARTICULAR THE MPLA HAD HOPED TO CIRCUMVENT US ON THE

LONDON 4940 92362 DTG:081604Z MAR 83 PSN: 002312  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CUBAN TROOP ISSUE. WE TOLD TITO THAT LUANDA HAS NOW HOPEFULLY HAD ITS ILLUSIONS ON THAT SCORE DISPELLED AND WE STAND READY TO HAVE FURTHER TALKS. (WE DID NOT MENTION THE UPCOMING KITO/WISNER SESSION.)

8. ON THE BROADER POLICY, TITO SAID SAVIMBI CONTINUES TO AGREE WITH US THAT THE PRIMARY ISSUE IS CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THE MANNER AND FORM OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION ON RECONCILIATION IS SOMETHING FOR ANGOLANS TO DECIDE. SAVIMBI IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HIS PROSPECTS UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND BELIEVES IDEALLY THAT THE ORIGINAL OAU DECISION ON FREE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. NEVERTHELESS, ACCORDING TO TITO, SAVIMBI ACCEPTS REALISTICALLY THAT A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD MAY BE REQUIRED. TITO SAID, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE PERIODIC PRESS STORIES, THERE IS NO CONTACT BETWEEN UNITA AND MPLA MODERATES IN LUANDA, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD HOPED SOME MIGHT DEVELOP FOLLOWING THE SAVIMBI TRIP TO WASHINGTON IN 1981. THAT HAD NOT HAPPENED HOWEVER.

LONDON 4940 92362 DTG:081604Z MAR 83 PSN: 002312

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

598-002 #421

BY

205

NARA, DATE

6/2/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      LONDON 4940                      92362                      DTG: 081604Z MAR 83 PSN: 002314  
SIT111                      DATE 03/25/83                      TOR: 067/1744Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SITPKEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #4940/02 0671609  
O 081604Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0648

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 04940  
NODIS  
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER

9. AFTER OUR SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY ON ANGOLA, TITO SAID  
UNITA WANTSTO COOPERATE WITH US AND, IN PARTICULAR, DOES  
NOT WANT TO COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS  
ON WHICH SAVIMBI UNDERSTANDS WE MUST TAKE THE LEAD.  
TITO STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT SAVIMBI'S SOURCES OF INFORMATION  
ARE LIMITED AND WHEN HE IS NOT INFORMED ABOUT WHAT IS  
HAPPENING, CAPE VERDE FOR EXAMPLE, UNEASINESS IS BOUND  
TO DEVELOP.

10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO CAPE TOWN AND LUSAKA.  
STREATOR

~~SECRET~~

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 20-26 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

PAGE 1 - 279

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE764

STU5446

OO RUEHC

DE RUEHLD #3051/04 0411541

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 101516Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9675

RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2638

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5126

RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 2348

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8383

RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 3489

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1124

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0021

RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0420

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 LONDON 03051

STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK

FROM AMBASSADOR LOUIS

MEDIA PRODUCTS.

-- 8) AND CERTAINLY THE MOST IMPORTANT MEDIA PRODUCT WHICH WE NEED--AND ONE WHICH COULD HAVE ENORMOUS PUBLIC IMPACT--WOULD BE A SERIES OF 15 OR 20 PHOTOGRAPHS OF SOVIET SS20'S IN THEIR BASES, TRAVELLING DOWN SOVIET ROADS AND DEPLOYED ON PRACTICE ALERTS IN THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE. THIS WOULD SHOW BRITISH AUDIENCES GRAPHICALLY, DRAMATICALLY AND WITH THE NEED FOR LITTLE FURTHER EXPLANATION JUST WHAT THE DANGER IS.

STREATOR

BT

#3051

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE775  
UTS5703  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHLD #3051/02 0411534  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 101516Z FEB 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9673  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2636  
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5124  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 2346  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8381  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 3487  
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1122  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0019  
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0418  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 03051  
STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK  
FROM AMBASSADOR LOUIS  
FOR "SUPERIORITY" HAVE HURT US WITH BRITISH AUDIENCES. WE  
SHOULD STRESS THE IDEAS OF BALANCE, STABILITY, VERIFI-  
BILITY AND DETERRENCE ALONG THE LINES OF RECENT STATEMENTS  
BY THE VICE PRESIDENT.

-- 3) THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE UNITY: NATO STILL ENJOYS  
WIDE SUPPORT HERE. WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO SUS-  
TAIN THE POLITICAL WILL TO PUT INTO EFFECT PROGRAMS WHICH  
NATO HAS DETERMINED ARE NECESSARY FOR OUR SECURITY.

-- 4) MORALITY: THE ZERO OPTION, PROPOSING THE ABOLI-  
TION OF A WHOLE CLASS OF WEAPONS, IS A STRONGLY MORAL  
POSITION.

C. TARGET AUDIENCES

-- 1) THE LABOR PARTY: THE PARTY IS SPLIT; A SIGNIFI-  
CANT MINORITY (PARTICULARLY IN THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY)  
ARE MULTILATERALISTS. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE LABOR  
UNIONS WHICH SUPPORT THE PARTY ALSO TAKE A MORE MODERATE  
VIEW THAN THE VOCAL LEFT.

-- 2) THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC-LIBERAL ALLIANCE IS PRO NATO  
BUT AMBIVALENT ON CRUISE. OUR GOAL IS TO HOLD THE SDP FOR  
CRUISE AND THE DUAL TRACK DECISION. THAT AMBIVALENCE IS  
SYMPTOMATIC OF THE UNCERTAINTY AND ANXIETY BEING FELT BY  
THE MIDDLE GROUND. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT AUDIENCE WHICH  
CAN BE SWUNG ESPECIALLY BY DEMONSTRATING COMMITMENT TO  
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND FLEXIBILITY IN APPROACH.

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- 3) THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO NATO'S TWO TRACK DECISION AND EFFECTIVELY LED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. THE TORIES ARE OUR MAIN RESOURCE.

-- 4) THE PRINT PRESS IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE BUT NOT UNCRITICAL OF US/UK POLICY. THE POPULAR PRESS AND THE LOCAL PRESS ARE PRIME TARGETS.

-- 5) TELEVISION HAS BEEN GENERALLY EVENHANDED ALTHOUGH TENDING RECENTLY TOWARD REPORTS FAVORABLE TO CND.

-- 6) PEACE GROUPS. WE BELIEVE THAT EFFORTS WILL BE MUCH BETTER SPENT AMONGST THE "UNDECIDEDS" THAN WITH MEMBERSHIP OF GROUPS SUCH AS CND AND END HERE. BUT THESE SHOULD BE ENGAGED PUBLICLY (BY THEIR OWN COUNTRYMEN) IN ORDER TO PUBLICLY CONFRONT THE ARTICULATE OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS. (FYI: WOMEN AND YOUNG PEOPLE ARE ESPECIALLY PREVALENT IN THESE GROUPS, BUT MEMBERSHIP IS QUITE BROADLY BASED. THE CND'S LEADERSHIP E.G. PROFESSOR E.P. THOMPSON AND MONSIGNOR BRUCE KENT ARE ARTICULATE AND RESPECTED.) PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO COUNTERING THE "WOMEN OF GREENHAM COMMON" WHO HAVE HELPED FORM ANTI-NUCLEAR FEELING AMONG WOMEN NATIONWIDE.

-- 7) CHURCH GROUPS. THE ETHICAL AND MORAL DILEMMAS POSED BY DEFENSE ISSUES HAVE RECENTLY COME TO A HEAD WITH THE PUBLICATION OF A CHURCH OF ENGLAND WORKING PARTY REPORT, THE CHURCH AND THE BOMB, WHICH ADVOCATES UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. PRO MULTILATERALIST STATEMENTS BY CHURCHMEN WOULD BE A HELPFUL RESPONSE.

## D. COOPERATING HOST COUNTRY ORGANIZATIONS

-- THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS THE KEY UK ORGANIZATION WITH WHICH WE COORDINATE AND COOPERATE IN THIS AREA. THE MOD USES GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND OTHER RESOURCES SUCH AS THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION TO FUND SUPPORTIVE GROUPS, (E.G. ATLANTIC COMMITTEES, YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS, ETC) AND TO PRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE VARIOUS MATERIALS (E.G. PAMPHLETS, VTRS, FILMS, AND AUDIO TAPES) IN SUPPORT OF UK POLICY ON THIS ISSUE. WE SHARE RAW MATERIAL WITH THEM AND CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR THINKING REGARDING PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS. A VARIETY OF ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS BRITISH ATLANTIC COMMITTEE (BAC); YOUTH FOR MULTILATEEAL DISAAMENT; COMMITTEE FOR PEACE WITH FREEDOM (CPF); COUNCIL FOR ARMS CONTROL (CAC); CAMPAIGN FOR DEFENSE AND MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT (CDMD); LABOR COMMITTEE FOR TRANSATLANTIC

BT

#3051

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE761  
UTS5709  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHLD #3051/03 0411536  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 101516Z FEB 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9674  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2637  
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5125  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 2347  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8382  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 3488  
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1123  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0020  
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0419  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 LONDON 03051  
STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK  
FROM AMBASSADOR LOUIS  
UNDERSTANDING (LCTU) ARE ENGAGED IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEPLOYMENT. THEY OFFER CHANNELS  
AND VENUES WHICH ARE OF POTENTIAL UTILITY  
E. KEY DATES TO WATCH FOR  
-- FEBRUARY 10 - CHURCH OF ENGLAND SYNOD TO CONSIDERE  
WORKING PARTY REPORT.  
-- FEBRUARY 22 - MAJOR CND LOBBY OF PARLIAMENT AGAINST  
CRUISE AND PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS;  
-- MARCH 6 - WEST GERMAN ELECTIONS ARE BEING WATCHED WITH  
ESPECIALLY KEEN INTEREST;  
-- END OF MARCH - PUBLICATION OF BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON  
DEFENSE;  
-- APRIL 1-4 - CND MARCH FROM BURFIELD AND ALDERMARSTON  
TO GREENHAM COMMON AND BACK;  
-- MAY 7 - FOURTH CND FESTIVAL IN BROCKWELL PARK, LONDON;  
-- MAY - NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP AND DEFENSE MINIS-  
TERS' MEETINGS.  
-- MAY 21 - CND "PEACE PENTECOST" MARCH TO UPPER HEYFORD;  
-- END OF MAY - EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGNERS  
HOLD PROTEST IN BERLIN;  
-- MAY WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT - (IMPORTANT TO SECURE STATE-  
MENT ON WESTERN PREPAREDNESS IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE);  
-- LATE SEPT/EARLY OCTOBER - ANNUAL PARTY CONFERENCES.  
COULD BE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO A GENERAL ELECTION AND WILL

SENSITIVE



SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THEREFORE PROVIDE AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT PLATFORM FOR CAMPAIGNING POSITIONS.

## F. USIA SUPPORT REQUIRED

- 1) SPEAKERS WHO CAN DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SOPHISTICATED WELL INFORMED UK AUDIENCES WOULD BE MOST USEFUL. BUT WE NEED SPECIFIC KINDS OF PEOPLE FOR SPECIFIC TARGETS. TO WIT--FOR WOMEN'S GROUPS, SOMEONE LIKE MILLICENT FENWICK--FOR CHURCH GROUPS, COUNTERPART US CHURCHMEN, WHO HAVE WRESTLED WITH SIMILAR MORAL DILEMMA IN THE US--FOR CAREFULLY SELECTED LABOR GROUPS WE NEED SPOKESPERSONS WITH ESTABLISHED REPUTATIONS IN US ORGANIZED LABOR--FINALLY REPUTABLE SPEAKERS WHO ARE EXPERT IN EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS WHO CAN DISCUSS SOVIET INTENTIONS AND STRATEGIC THINKING IN AN APPROPRIATE HISTORICAL CONTEXT.
- 2) IV PROGRAMS IN THIS FIELD REMAIN ONE OF OUR MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SHAPING AND INFLUENCING OPINION. ANY INCREASE WOULD BE WELCOME.
- 3) RELATIVELY SHORT WIRELESS FILE BYLINERS WOULD BE USEFUL FOR PROBABLE PLACEMENT IN LOCAL PAPERS. EAGLEBURGER'S RECENT PIECE IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE WAS VERY USEFUL.
- 4) CONTINUING CHRONOLOGIES AND BACKGROUND ON US ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES WHICH THE POST CAN USE IN ITS SEGULAR OUTREACH PROGRAM TO KEY OPINION LEADERS.
- 5) A REVISED AND SHORTER VERSION OF THE NATO SOURCE COMPARISON PAPER WOULD BE OF GOOD USE.
- 6) INCREASED QUALITY BRIEFINGS IN WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER AND WITH INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS FOR RESIDENT CORRESPONDENTS WOULD BE HELPFUL.
- 7) STOCK FOOTAGE ON CRUISE SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OTHER TV MATERIAL AND PHOTO AND TEXT WOULD BE APPRECIATED HERE FOR PASSING TO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR THEIR POSSIBLE USE AS THEY PRODUCE THEIR OWN PAMPHLETS, FILMS, AND OTHER

BT

#3051

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE757  
STU5424  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHLD #3051/01 041153Z  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 101516Z FEB 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9672  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2635  
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5123  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 2345  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8380  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 3486  
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1121  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0018  
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0417  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 03051  
STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK  
FROM AMBASSADOR LOUIS  
E.O. 12356: DNG: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PROP, PEPR, NATO, UR  
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS HANDLING OF SECURITY AND  
-- ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

REF: STATE 27312

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THERE IS A PUBLIC TREND IN BRITAIN AGAINST INF DEPLOYMENTS, FUELED IN PART BY A LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE US. IN A RECENT POLL 91 PERCENT QUESTIONED THE JUDGMENT OF US LEADERS, AND 60 PERCENT OPPOSED CRUISE DEPLOYMENTS.

3. HOWEVER, THATCHER IS GEARING UP A MAJOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT, AND WE EXPECT THE FORTHCOMING PUBLIC DEBATE TO YIELD A MORE REALISTIC PUBLIC MOOD.

4. WE CAN ASSIST THAT DEVELOPMENT BY AN APPROACH TO INF WHICH IS MORE POSITIVE, LESS REACTIVE, AND WHICH STRESSES THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM FOR PEACE. THE THEMES STRUCK BY THE VICE PRESIDENT IN RECENT DAYS--OUR DESIRE FOR BALANCE, STABILITY AND NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS--ARE THE RIGHT ONES TO EMPHASIZE.

5. WE CAN REINFORCE THAT APPROACH BY NOT BEING IMMEDIATELY DISMISSIVE OF NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES. A SHOW OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IS USEFUL, EVEN IF WE HAVE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS WELL PREPARED.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #429

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

6. FINALLY, WE SHOULD LEAVE THE FIGHT TO THATCHER IN BRITAIN, SEEKING BRITISH ADVICE ON HOW WE CAN HELP. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO MOUNT A CAMPAIGN TO GIVE THE TORIES MORE SUPPORT THAN THEY WANT OR NEED. END SUMMARY.

## A. OBJECTIVES:

- 1) TO PRESENT A MORE POSITIVE IMAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM FOR PEACE IN EUROPE
- 2) TO INCREASE AWARENESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA
- 3) TO DISSEMINATE HISTORICAL AND FACTUAL MATERIAL WHICH WILL PUT CRUISE DEPLOYMENTS IN CONTEXT, AND EXPLAIN THEIR RATIONALE
- 4) TO ENSURE PRESENTATION OF DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN AS A BRITISH DECISION SERVING BRITISH SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE NATO CONTEXT

THE "PEACE" MOVEMENT HAS SOUGHT TO PORTRAY DEPLOYMENTS, WITH SOME SUCCESS, AS A SUPER-POWER QUARREL. THATCHER HAS TAKEN THE LINE THAT DEPLOYMENTS ARE NECESSARY TO BRITAIN'S SECURITY, IF NO GENEVA AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED. AN OBTRUSIVE US PRESENCE IN THE BRITISH DEBATE TENDS TO UNDERCUT THAT APPROACH.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE UK GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN EXPLAINING THE NATO DOCTRINE AND SUPPORTING THE NATO DECISION. PRIMARILY, OUR ROLE IS TO PROVIDE FULL BACK-UP AND SUPPORT TO A VARIETY OF OFFICIAL AND QUASI-OFFICIAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE TAKING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE.

WE SHOULD AVOID A HARSHLY ANTI-SOVIET THEME IN OUR STATEMENTS ABOUT CRUISE. ASIDE FROM STRENGTHENING IMPRESSIONS OF A CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH, SUCH A PUBLIC LINE TENDS TO DETRACT FROM THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF US POLICIES BY MAKING THEM SEEM REACTIVE TO SOVIET ACTIONS/INITIATIVE. OUR STRESS SHOULD BE ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, AND HIS VISION OF EUROPE'S FUTURE--PRESENTING AN IMAGE OF LEADERSHIP AND CONCERN FOR PEACE.

## B. EFFECTIVE THEMES

- 1) NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS: THE PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED THE MOST SWEEPING NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS IN HISTORY. THIS FACT NEEDS TO BE HIGHLIGHTED IN ALL OUR STATEMENTS.
- 2) STABILITY AND BALANCE: PERCEPTIONS OF US DESIRE

BT

#3051

NNNN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 288

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE729  
STU2642  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUEHLD #2978 0401825  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 091824Z FEB 83  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9650  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2838  
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1041  
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0187  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3767  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1526  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1337  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5701  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH 0843  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4181  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 02978

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: 2/9/13

TAGS: PREL, JO, UK, US, XF

SUBJECT: BRITISH SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN ENTRY INTO MIDDLE  
EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

1. A - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING RECENT TALKS WITH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS WE  
HAVE TRIED TO FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION AWAY FROM CONTINUED  
PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE VISIT TO CONTINGENCY  
PLANNING FOR KING HUSSEIN'S POSSIBLE ENTRY INTO PEACE  
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.  
THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT BRITAIN WILL SUPPORT THE KING IF  
HE OBTAINS A GREEN OR YELLOW LIGHT FROM THE PALESTINE  
NATIONAL CONGRESS MEETING IN ALGIERS. MOREOVER, IF THE  
PLO TRIES TO VETO A JORDANIAN ROLE BUT HUSSEIN WANTS TO  
RISK A FORWARD MOVE NONETHELESS, THE BRITISH WILL STAND BY  
HIM. HOWEVER, THE FCO HAS STRESSED THAT THEY WILL NOT TRY  
TO TURN THE KING AROUND IF HE RECEIVES A RED LIGHT FROM  
THE PLO AND CHOOSES TO ACCEPT THAT VERDICT.

3. THEIR CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SUPPORTING THE KING INCLUDE:  
-- A STRONG MESSAGE FROM THATCHER AFTER THE PNC MEETING  
URGING THAT HUSSEIN DECLARE HIS WILLINGNESS TO JOIN THE  
PEACE PROCESS AND PLEDGING HER FULL SUPPORT IN THE DIFFICULT  
ROAD AHEAD.

-- IF THE KING DECIDES TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON TO ANNOUNCE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #430

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/21/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 289

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE TALKS, HE WILL BE INVITED TO  
STOP IN LONDON ON HIS RETURN TRIP AND GIVEN FULL ACCESS  
TO THATCHER, PYM, AND THE IMPRESSIVE MEDIA FACILITIES  
AVAILABLE IN LONDON. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO PROJECT A  
SENSE OF MOMENTUM AND COMMITMENT TO PEACE. LOUIS

BT

#2978

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA807

OO RUEADWW

DE RUEHLD #2947/01 0401646

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 091643Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9627

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION C1 OF 02 LONDON 02947

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), IT, US

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO ROME: MEETING  
WITH PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC PERTINI, FEBRUARY 7.

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT PERTINI FOR A PRIVATE MEETING AT THE QUIRINALE BEFORE THE OFFICIAL LUNCHEON; ALTHOUGH THE MEETING WAS SCHEDULED TO LAST FIFTEEN MINUTES, IT LASTED FROM 1305 TO 1349. PRESIDENT PERTINI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO, AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON PETRIGNANI, AND DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR ATTOLICO. THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR RABB, ADMIRAL MURPHY, CHAIRMAN FELDSTEIN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT, AND BRIDGES (NOTETAKER).

3. AFTER AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, PRESIDENT PERTINI SAID HE WANTED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO VISIT JORDAN IN MARCH, RETURNING A VISIT WHICH KING HUSSEIN AND HIS BROTHER HAD MADE TO ROME. PERTINI SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST PROPOSALS VERY WISE, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE NOT IN CONTRADICTION WITH HUSSEIN'S OWN VIEWS. HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OPINION.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO EXPRESS THANKS FOR PRESIDENT PERTINI'S SUPPORT FOR THE REAGAN PROPOSALS FOR PEACE AND FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. WE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT HUSSEIN JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS, ALTHOUGH THIS APPEARED

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #431

BY LOTS NARA, DATE 6/2/02

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DIFFICULT AS LONG AS FOREIGN FORCES REMAINED IN LEBANON. WE WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FACILITATE THE EXODUS OF FOREIGN FORCES, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE PRESIDENT PERTINI'S OWN VISIT MORE PRODUCTIVE. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH HIS OWN TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN IN THE UNITED STATES, AND WE FELT THAT HE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT BUOYED UP ON HIS DEPARTURE. WE KNEW HOWEVER THAT HE WAS NOW CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS ON LEBANON, AND CONCERNED ABOUT HOW MUCH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH.

5. PRESIDENT PERTINI CONTINUED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD ALSO VISITED ROME, AND HAD TOLD PERTINI THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO VISIT LEBANON OFFICIALLY BUT HE COULD CERTAINLY VISIT THE ITALIAN MNF CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT AND COME TO LUNCH WITH GEMAYEL. PRESIDENT PERTINI CONTINUED THAT HE WANTED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO BE AWARE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ARAFAT SOMETIME AGO. HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT LIKE THE ISRAELIS, THE PALESTINIANS MUST HAVE A HOMELAND, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE PALESTINIANS MUST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. ARAFAT HAD NOT REJECTED THE IDEA, AND PERTINI SAID HE HAD THE FEELING HE HAD CHANGED HIS POSITION AND MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL.

6. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT WE AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME CHANGE IN ARAFAT'S POSITION. THE BEST THING THAT ARAFAT COULD IN FACT DO FOR HIS OWN STANDING AND FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WOULD BE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RES. 242, WITH NO STRINGS ATTACHED. SOME OF OUR ARAB FRIENDS SAID THAT THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO ARAFAT PLAYING HIS LAST CARD, BUT THE VICE PRESIDENT DID NOT AGREE AND THOUGHT RATHER THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY VALUABLE STEP FOR HIM TO TAKE. HE SHOULD OF COURSE ALSO RENOUNCE THAT PART OF THE PLO CHARTER WHICH CALLED FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. THIS WOULD DO MUCH FOR HIS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE.

7. PERTINI SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ARAFAT ALONE, AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT IF HE WANTED HELP FROM OTHERS, A BASIC CONDITION WAS THAT HE RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. ARAFAT, WHILE NOT SAYING NO, SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE ONCE THE PALESTINIANS HAD A HOMELAND. HE THEN ADDED THAT HIS ADVERSARY HABBASH REFUSED TO CONSIDER SUCH RECOGNITION, BUT THAT, AGAIN, ONCE THEY HAD A HOMELAND IT COULD BE DONE. PRESIDENT PERTINI ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 340

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE POSSIBILITY THAT WHEN HE VISITED JORDAN, HUSSEIN  
MIGHT ARRANGE FOR HIM TO SEE ARAFAT AGAIN.

8. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER  
OF REPORTS ABOUT ARAFAT TAKING A MORE MODERATE LINE, FOR  
EXAMPLE SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAD MET HIM HAD

BT

#2947

NNNN

SENSITIVE



SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA808

OO RUEADWW

DE RUEHLD #2947/02 0401648

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 091643Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9628

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 02947

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

SAID SO. HOWEVER, ARAFAT'S OVERALL IMAGE REMAINED THAT OF A TERRORIST LEADER WHO WANTED TO LIQUIDATE A STATE AND PEOPLE. HIS APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, TOTING A PISTOL AND LOOKING UNSHAVEN, HAD HAD AN IMPORTANT NEGATIVE EFFECT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. HE NEEDED TO CHANGE THIS NEGATIVE IMAGE FOR THE SAKE OF THE PALESTINIANS' OWN CAUSE. AGAIN, AS THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD KING FAHD, HE REALLY THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD NOT LOSE ANYTHING BY RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IF PRESIDENT PERTINI SHOULD SEE ARAFAT AGAIN, IT COULD BE OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE FOR PERTINI TO URGE THIS ON HIM AGAIN.

9. PRESIDENT PERTINI SAID HE WOULD IN FACT STRESS THIS, IF HE SAW ARAFAT. PERTINI THEN NOTED THAT IN HIS SPEECH AT THE ROME IPU MEETING, HE HAD STRESSED THAT THERE COULD BE NO MIDDLE EAST PEACE IF KILLINGS CONTINUED. HE HAD BEEN REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO THE MASSACRES IN BEIRUT, COMMITTED NOT BY PALESTINIANS BUT UNDER THE EYES OF THE ISRAELIS. 400,000 ISRAELIS HAD DEMONSTRATED IN ISRAEL AGAINST THESE MASSACRES WHICH HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY BEGIN. BEGIN WANTED TO DEFEND HIS OWN HOMELAND; HE MUST GRANT OTHERS A SIMILAR RIGHT. GREAT DISHONOR LAY ON BEGIN AND SHARON BECAUSE OF THE MASSACRES. PRESIDENT PERTINI SAID HE AGREED WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE NEED FOR PALESTINIAN RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL; BUT UNTIL THERE WAS A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS, THERE WOULD NOT BE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO ITALY BECAUSE IT WAS NEAR THE MIDDLE EAST. AGAIN, PRESIDENT PERTINI SAID, HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS WERE WISE ONES, AND HE HAD SENT THE PRESIDENT A MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS. PERTINI ADDED

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA, HE THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS PERHAPS THE WISEST LEADER.

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT PERTINI ON HUSSEIN. HE WANTED PRESIDENT PERTINI TO UNDERSTAND, WITH REGARD TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN LEBANON, THAT WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAELI ACTIONS, AS WELL AS ABOUT ACTIONS OF THE SYRIANS AND PLO.

11. PERTINI RESPONDED QUICKLY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS PERFECTLY, AND HE THOUGHT THAT U.S. ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE MUCH TO THE CREDIT OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH OBVIOUSLY WAS WORKING FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WORLD. IN THIS REGARD, HE THOUGHT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT TRIP WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL. SPEAKING OF PEACE, HE SAID THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH HIS SOCIALIST COMRADE MITTERRAND THE RANGE OF THE FRENCH FORCE DE FRAPPE. MITTERRAND HAD SAID THAT THE FRENCH MISSILES COULD REACH AT LEAST TO EASTERN GERMANY; PERTINI HAD RESPONDED THAT SOVIET MISSILES COULD REACH BEYOND THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR. PERTINI ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THE FRENCH COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR, OF EXCESSIVE PRIDE. THE VICE PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT MITTERRAND HAD HOWEVER MADE A GOOD SPEECH IN GERMANY ON INF. PERTINI SAID THAT HE NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH STILL NEEDED TO BE CONVINCED THAT, AS PERTINI HAD SAID IN WASHINGTON, THE AMERICANS HAD COME TO EUROPE IN TWO WORLD WARS NOT FOR CONQUEST BUT TO DEFEND LIBERTY IN EUROPE. IF THE AMERICANS HAD NOT COME IN 1917, EUROPE WOULD STILL BE UNDER THE DOMINION OF THE CENTRAL POWERS. PERTINI CONCLUDED THAT IF THE AMERICANS HAD NOT COME IN WORLD WAR II, HE WOULD STILL BE IN JAIL OR EXILED ON SOME ISLAND, LOOKING EVEN OLDER THAN HE DID NOW. AS THE PARTIES ROSE TO GO TO LUNCH, PRESIDENT PERTINI ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO SEND PRESIDENT REAGAN HIS WARMEST WISHES. LOUIS

BT  
#2947  
NNNN