

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
Country File:  
**Folder Title:** United Kingdom  
(08/01/1981-10/31/1983) [3 of 5]  
**Box:** RAC Box 20

---

To see more digitized collections visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [3 of 5]  
Box 91330 *20*

**Date:** September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	171947z 8 p. <i>D 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #481</i>	9/17/82	P1
2. cable	151146z 1 p. <i>D " " #482</i>	9/15/82	P1
3. cable	110930z 1 p. <i>D " " #483</i>	9/11/82	P1
4. cable	091757z 1 p. <i>D " " #484</i>	9/9/82	P1
5. cable	091616z 1 p. <i>D " " #485</i>	9/9/82	P1
6. cable	031827z 1 p. <i>D " " #486</i>	9/3/82	P1
<del>7. cable</del>	<del>231207z 5 p. <i>R " " #487</i></del>	<del>8/23/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
8. cable	201559z 1 p. <i>D " " #488</i>	8/20/82	P1
9. cable	171742z 1 p. <i>D " " #489</i>	8/17/82	P1
10. cable	161708z 1 p. <i>D " " #490</i>	8/16/82	P1
<del>11. cable</del>	<del>161115z 2 p. <i>R " " #491</i></del>	<del>8/16/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
12. cable	131725z 1 p. <i>D " " #492</i>	8/13/82	P1
13. cable	021903z 1 p. <i>D " " #493</i>	8/2/82	P1
<del>14. cable</del>	<del>270106z 4 p. <i>R " " #494</i></del>	<del>3/27/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>15. cable</del>	<del>240304z 5 p. <i>R " " #495</i></del>	<del>3/24/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>16. cable</del>	<del>020031z 1 p. <i>R " " #496</i></del>	<del>3/2/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
17. cable	200040z 1 p. <i>D " " #497</i>	2/20/83	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [3 of 5]  
Box 91330 *W*

**Date:** September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. cable	090503z 2 p. <i>R 6/12/82 NLSS98-002 #498</i>	2/9/83	P1
19. cable	070141z 1 p. <i>D " " #499</i>	1/7/83	P1
20. cable	161947z 2 p. <i>D " " #500</i>	12/16/82	<del>P1</del> F2
21. cable	031700z 2 p. <i>R 6/12/82 NLSS98-002 #501</i>	12/3/82	P1
22. cable	200043z 1 p. <i>R " " #502</i>	11/20/82	P1
23. cable	191912z 1 p. <i>R " " #503</i>	11/19/82	P1
24. cable	100216z 1 p. <i>D " " #504</i>	11/10/82	<del>P1</del> F2
25. cable	040356z 2 p. <i>R " " #505</i>	11/4/82	P1
26. cable	012006z 1 p. <i>D " " #506</i>	11/1/82	P1
27. cable	222302z 3 p. <i>R " " #507</i>	10/22/82	P1
28. cable	210250z 1 p. <i>R " " #508</i>	10/21/82	P1
29. cable	191837z 2 p. <i>R " " #509</i>	10/19/82	P1
30. cable	191835z 1 p. <i>R " " #510</i>	10/19/82	P1
31. cable	131618z 2 p. <i>R " " #511</i>	10/13/82	P1
32. cable	070206z 1 p. <i>R " " #512</i>	10/7/82	P1
33. cable	111845z 1 p. <i>R " " #513</i>	10/11/82	P1
34. cable	251747z 1 p. <i>D " " #514</i>	9/25/82	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. IV 8/1/82 - 10/31/83 [3 of 5]  
Box 91330 *W*

**Date:** September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>35. cable</del>	<del>190844z 1 p.</del>	<del>9/19/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
	<i>R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #515</i>		
36. cable	182105z 1 p.	9/18/82	P1
	<i>D " " #516</i>		
<del>37. cable</del>	<del>141228z 1 p.</del>	<del>9/14/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
	<i>R " " #517</i>		
<del>38. cable</del>	<del>271859z 2 p.</del>	<del>8/27/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
	<i>R " " #518</i>		
39. cable	251342z 1 p.	8/25/82	P1
	<i>D " " #519</i>		
<del>40. cable</del>	<del>192345z 1 p.</del>	<del>8/19/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
	<i>R " " #520</i>		

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-677 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



23 AUG 82 12 24z  
Department of State

# INCOMING TELEGRAM

WRC MCF JP VP Kemp ~~82~~ 82 AUG 27 PID: 26

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ NOD748

PAGE 01 LONDON 18540 01 OF 02 231213Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----322762 231217Z 142

R 231207Z AUG 82 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3577

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 18540

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, XF, JO, PEPR  
SUBJ: MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN AUGUST 22

S/S/ ONLY FOR BREMMER  
FOR SECRETARY FROM VELIOTES

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. VIETS, DCM - DJEREDIAN AND I MET WITH HUSSEIN FOR TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS ON AUGUST 23. GENERAL BIN SHAKER AND PRIME MINISTER BADRAN ALSO ATTENDED.
3. HUSSEIN IS VERY INTERESTED IN OUR PROPOSAL. HE UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR US TO MOVE QUICKLY WITH EGYPTIANS, SAUDIS AND PLO AND ASKS THAT WE KEEP IN CLOSE COORDINATION AS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION MOVES ALONG. WE AGREED THAT IN MAKING OUR APPROACHES TO OTHERS, WE WOULD INFORM THEM THAT HUSSEIN BELIEVES OUR INITIATIVE IS A SERIOUS PROPOSITION AND HE HAS IT UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. KING WANTS TO CHARACTERIZE HIS VIEWS TO OTHERS DIRECTLY.
4. HUSSEIN EMPHASIZED NEED TO KEEP PALESTINIANS OUT FRONT. HE WILL WORK ON ARAFAT TO ACCEPT OUR CONDITIONS. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTIONS, I CLARIFIED WE WOULD ONLY DEAL

~~SECRET~~

NLS 598-002 #487

BY LJS, NARA, DATE 6/12/02



*Department of State*

**INCOMING  
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

LONDON 18540 01 OF 02 231213Z

WITH PLO AS ONE IMPORTANT INTERESTED PARTY, NOT RPT NOT AS "SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE". I REAFFIRMED OUR AIM WAS TO WORK WITH AND THROUGH JORDAN IN NEGOTIATIONS.

5. KING ASKED FOR RECONFIRMATION US STILL CONSIDERED EAST JERUSALEM AS PART OF TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967 WAR. I REPLIED IN AFFIRMATIVE, CITING CARTER LETTER ATTACHED TO COAS REFERING TO YOST AND GOLDBERG STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT. BIN SHAKER INTERJECTED TO NOTE JORDAN IS IN FAVOR OF PHYSICALLY UNDIVIDED CITY. I REPLIED WE WELL AWARE OF JORDAN'S POSITION ON JERUSALEM AND WORK BEING DONE IN GOJ ON SUBJECT.

6. KING ASKED IF, IN OUR VIEW, ISRAELI-SETTLERS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING TRANSITIONAL REGIME OR HAVE VOICE IN FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID NO RPT. NO. VIETS CLARIFIED THAT IN FINAL STATUS WE WOULD SUPPORT RIGHT OF JEWS TO LIVE IN WEST BANK BUT NOT UNDER CONDITIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY. THIS POSITION WAS RECEIVED CALMLY. WE FIELDDED A COUPLE OF OTHER QUESTIONS ON SETTLEMENTS, BUT JORDANIANS NEVER RETURNED TO ISSUE OF JEWS LIVING IN WEST BANK UNDER ARAB LAW. MAIN POINT KING EMPHASIZED WAS NEED FOR US TO PREVAIL ON A GENUINE SETTLEMENTS FREEZE THAT INCLUDED NOT ONLY STOPPING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW SETTLEMENTS BUT ALSO THE THICKENING OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS. HE UNDERLINED CARTER'S VACILLATION AND ULTIMATE FAILURE ON THIS ISSUE WHICH UNDERCUT CREDIBILITY OF COAS FROM OUTSET.

7. HUSSEIN REVIEWED BIDDING RE REACTIONS OF OTHER PLAYERS. HE EXPECTED WEST EUROPEANS TO GIVE US INITIATIVE FULL SUPPORT. SOVIETS WOULD BE OPPOSED AND TRY TO USE THEIR

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

LONDON 18540 01 OF 02 231213Z

ASSETS IN AREA TO FRUSTRATE INITIATIVE. THIS MEANS SYRIA WILL NOT ONLY BE NEGATIVE BUT PROBABLY MILITARILY THREATENING TO JORDAN. IN COURSE BRIEF EXCHANGE ON SECURITY ISSUES, I ASSURED KING OF OUR SUPPORT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND EMPHASIZED POSITIVE IMPACT OUR BEING PARTNERS IN NEW PEACE VENTURE WOULD HAVE ON PROSPECTS OR HILL SUPPORT FOR UPCOMING MAJOR JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION, I RECONFIRMED PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT ON ARMS WAS FIRM.

8. HUSSEIN ASKED THAT WE CALL NEW INITIATIVE SOMETHING OTHER THAN CAMP DAVID. I AGAIN EXPLAINED WHY WE COULD NOT JUST JETTISON CDAS. HE REPLIED HE UNDERSTOOD WHY WE HAD TO OPERA IN THIS CONTEXT, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE LABEL FOR THIS INITIATIVE SHOULD - MUST - BE IDENTIFIED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. OUR INITIATIVE IS REALLY NEW, INSISTED HUSSEIN, AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS SUCH. WE LEFT IT THAT WE WOULD ALL TRY TO BE CREATIVE ON SUBJECT. I REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR LABEL COULD BE DEEMPHASIZED, PERHAPS, BUT NOT JUST DROPPED.

9. AT END OF MEETING, WE DISCUSSED MODALITIES OF MOVING AHEAD. I SAID SECRETARY SHULTZ WAS PLANNING FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOVEMENT; FOR EXAMPLE, A SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT NEXT MONTH ANNOUNCING THE INITIATIVE AND JORDAN'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE WITH US. KING CLEARLY DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THINGS IN AREA COULD BE LINED UP SO SOON. HE REEMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD TO HAVE ACTIVE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT FROM PLO, SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS. HE MUSED ABOUT PROBLEMS OF GETTING MODERATES TOGETHER ON SUCH AN INITIATIVE. I POINTED OUT THAT, ON BASIS TOO MUCH

~~SECRET~~



NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



23 AUG 82 12 24Z  
*Department of State*

INCOMING  
006766  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00749

PAGE 01 LONDON 18540 02 OF 02 231214Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----322770 231218Z /42

O 231207Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3578

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 18540

NODIS

EXPERIENCE, WE ALL KNEW HOW LONG SAUDIS COULD FEINT, BOB AND WEAVE WITHOUT ENGAGING ON TOUGH ISSUES. WE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE, THEREFORE, NEED FOR DRAMATIC EARLY STEP BY JORDAN TO GALVANIZE MODERATE SUPPORT REQUIRED.

10. THIS LED KING TO STRONG PRESENTATION ON TWO KEY POINTS:

--- HIS NEED FOR ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT THE US WOULD PERSEVERE AND SEE PROCESS THROUGH DESPITE STRONG ISRAELI REACTION AND PROBLEMS THIS COULD CAUSE ADMINISTRATION DOMESTICALLY. HE STRESSED THAT FAILURE OF US TO STAY THE COURSE COULD PROVE FATAL FOR HIM AND POLITICALLY DEVASTATING FOR THE US.

--- THE IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING THE SUPPORT JORDAN NEEDS FROM THE PLO, SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE IN PLACE BEFORE ANY ANNOUNCEMENTS OF A JORDANIAN DECISION.

11. HE SAID THAT, AT THIS POINT, HE WOULD EXPRESS HIS VIEWS DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT IN A LETTER WHICH IS EXPECTED IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



*Department of State*

**INCOMING  
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

LONDON 18540 02 OF 02 231214Z

12. COMMENT: OUR FIRST CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN WERE ENCOURAGING. I SUGGEST WE WAIT FOR HIS LETTER AND BE SURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY BEFORE WE TRIGGER THE CONTACTS IN ISRAEL, SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT (AND TUNIS). STREATOR

~~SECRET~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8-70 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 LONDON 7932 DTG: 161115Z AUG 82 PSN: 047713  
SIT786 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 228/12022

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG TEIC EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHLD #7932/01 2281118  
O 161115Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 3333

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACI IMMEDIATE 1907  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACI IMMEDIATE 4460  
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0298  
AMEMBASSY BE RUT IMMEDIATE 0018  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5373  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0586  
INCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1217  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 17932

EXDIS

E.O. 12256: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, LE, UK

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: SHIPPING DEVELOPMENTS: WEEKEND  
- UPDATE FROM LONDON

REF: (A) STATE 227368, (B) GENEVA 8361, (C) GENEVA 8360,  
- (D) HOPPER/BEERS TELCON 8/13, (E) LONDON 17679,  
- (F) STATE 228761, (G) STATE 228832

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: OUR BRITISH SHIP BROKERS HAVE MADE PROGRESS  
US TONIGHT THAT COULD REQUIRE USG COMMITMENT BY OPENING  
OF BUSINESS TUESDAY. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE HAS IDENTIFIED  
TWO OPTIONS FOR TRANSFERRING FUNDS ON WHICH THEY REQUEST  
GUIDANCE. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. ARRANGEMENTS DESCRIBED BY ICRC TRACK CLOSELY WITH  
WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY HMG DEPARTMENT OF TRADE (REFS  
D AND E). AS REPORTED IN REF D BRITISH HAVE OUTLINED  
TWO POSSIBILITIES FOR FINANCIAL TRANSFERS: A) BOARD OF  
TRADE WOULD OPEN SPECIAL SUB ACCOUNT WITH BANK OF ENGLAND'S  
FEDERAL RESERVE ACCOUNT IN NEW YORK. ICRC WOULD THEN  
TRANSFER \$2 MILLION INTO THIS ACCOUNT WHICH BRITISH  
COULD USE AS SOON AS SHIPS ARE IDENTIFIED AND TERMS  
AGREED WITH USG. THIS PROCEDURE IS PREFERRED AS IT  
WOULD SPARE BRITISH FROM THE NEED TO MAKE A SERIES OF  
TRANSACTIONS FROM DOLLARS TO POUNDS WHICH WOULD BE  
REQUIRED IN THE FOLLOWING OPTION; B) THE BOARD OF TRADE  
COULD OPEN A SUSPENSE ACCOUNT WITH THE MERCANTILE SHIP  
EXCHANGE IN LONDON INTO WHICH ICRC WOULD DEPOSIT FUNDS.  
THESE FUNDS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEPOSITED IN STERLING.

4. THE BRITISH NEED ONE QUESTION ANSWERED BEFORE THEY  
WOULD WISH TO OPEN EITHER TYPE OF ACCOUNT. WILL THE  
USG COMMIT ITSELF TO TOPPING UP THE \$2 MILLION ICRC  
DEPOSIT, AS NECESSARY AND IN CONSULTATION WITH HMG, SO  
THAT BRITISH WOULD NOT FACE IMPOSSIBLE CHOICE BETWEEN  
AN OVERDRAFT, WHICH WOULD BE AGAINST THEIR REGULATIONS,  
AND AN INABILITY TO MAKE NECESSARY PAYMENTS ON OUR BEHALF  
TO SHIPPERS. CLEARLY, THIS QUESTION IS RELATED CLOSELY  
TO THE QUESTION POSED BY THE ICRC IN GENEVA 8361.

5. ACTION BY MACCOY AND CO.: OVER THE WEEKEND MACCOY  
MADE OFFERS TO THE OWNERS OF THE VERGINA AND THE ALKYON,  
AND HAS RECEIVED MORE INFORMATION FROM THE OWNER OF THE  
SOL EXPRESS. MACCOY'S OFFER WAS MADE IN TERMS MEANT TO  
BEGIN "REAL HORSE-TRADING" AND HAS SUFFICIENT CAVEATS  
SO THAT USG COULD NOT BE BOUND BY INITIAL RESPONSE.  
MACCOY ESTIMATES THAT A COMBINATION OF TWO SHIPS WOULD  
GIVE THE USG BEST RANGE OF OPTIONS IN MEETING NEED TO  
LIFT UP TO 2500 TO POSSIBLE PORTS BEGINNING ON AUGUST 20.  
HE OFFERED US \$17,000 PER DAY FOR THE ALKYON AND US  
\$27,500 PER DAY FOR THE VERGINA. HE HAS ASKED OWNERS TO  
PAY FOR ALL FUEL, WATER AND FEEDING OF PASSENGERS. U.S.  
WOULD PAY FOR WAR INSURANCE.

6. LATE SATURDAY MACCOY WAS BRIEFED ON POSSIBLE CHANGES  
IN SCENARIO SET FORTH IN REF F. AT THAT TIME MACCOY HAD  
NOW HEARD BACK FROM VERGINA OWNER, BUT HE WAS PLEASED  
WITH OPTIONS PROVIDED BY SOLOMIDES OWNER OF SOL EXPRESS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHO HAS NOW OFFERED A COMBINATION OF SHIPS, ALL PRESENTLY  
NEAR LEBANON, WHICH COULD MEET THE EARLIER AND THE  
REDUCED CONTINGENCIES. IN CONCLUSION, MACCOY REMAINS  
CONFIDENT HE CAN STRIKE AN APPROPRIATE AND TIMELY DEAL.

7. COMMENT: FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE WOULD RECOMMEND  
STRONGLY THAT WE TRY TO NAIL DOWN ENOUGH CAPACITY SO  
THAT WE WILL HAVE ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO MEET CONCEIVABLE  
CHANGES IN THE SCENARIO -- ESPECIALLY THE NEED TO INCREASE  
LOADINGS AT THE LAST MINUTE.

8. ACTIONS REQUESTED: PLEASE TAKE STEPS TO BE IN  
POSITION TO AUTHORIZE CHARTER AGREEMENT EARLY TUESDAY IN  
RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MACCOY  
LATER TODAY. ALSO PROVIDE US WITH GUIDANCE ON FINANCIAL  
TRANSFER QUESTIONS OUTLINED IN PARAS 2 AND 3: A) CAN  
WE AGREE TO PROCEDURE UTILIZING BANK OF ENGLAND SUB

LONDON 7932

DTG: 161115Z AUG 82 PSN: 047713

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

598-002 #491

BY

10J

NARA,

DATE 6/12/02

SECRET

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
SIT504

LONDON 7932  
RECALLED

DTG: 161115Z AUG 82 PSN: 047717  
TOR: 228/1204Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
STU3931  
DE RUEHLD #7932/02 2281122  
O 161115Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3334

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 1908  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 4461  
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0299  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0019  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5374  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0587  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1218

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 17932

ACCOUNT IN NEW YORK? B) CAN WE GUARANTEE THAT FUNDS WILL  
BE TOPPED UP AS NEEDED? NOTE: WHAT THE BRITISH SEEK IS  
A MECHANISM WHICH WOULD RESTORE FUNDS TO WORKABLE LEVEL  
SUCH AS \$2 MILLION WHENEVER THEY HAD BEEN DRAWN DOWN TO  
BELOW \$ ONE MILLION. END NOTE. EEE IF YOU HAVE  
PROVIDED ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS TO THE ICRC, WE WOULD  
LIKE TO REINFORCE THEM WITH THE BRITISH.

9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. STREATOR  
BT

~~SECRET~~

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12-13 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

OUT

STATE NOD 15

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 782

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE906  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #3729 0860426  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 270106Z MAR 83  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHCE/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0453-0454 IMMEDIATE  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 3448-3449  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4827-4828  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3058-3059  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0000  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0566-0567  
ZEN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7699-7700  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 1308-1309  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 3177-3178  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 2906-2907  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE 2819-2820  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 1367-1368  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 7028-7029  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 6229-6230  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 6858-6859  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 3046-3047  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE 4826-4827  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 5237-5238  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 6569-6570  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0915-0916  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 9028-9029  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 7012-7013  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 9353-9354  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 9424-9425  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 3188-3189  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 8718-8719  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 4757-4758  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1128-1129  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8421-8422  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2294-2295  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 3466-3467  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 5807-5808  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3932-3933  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 7180-7181  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 8214-8215  
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 7965-7966  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3738-3739  
BT

STATE 083729

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLS 598-002 #494

BY H05 NARA, DATE 6/12/02



SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 083729  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UNSC, NU  
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SPEAKERS IN UNSC DEBATE ON  
----- NICARAGUA

REF: A) STATE 80244, B) STATE 81548

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL COMPLETED ITS FOURTH DAY OF DEBATE ON THE NICARAGUAN COMPLAINT, MARCH 25, WITH MOST SPEAKERS SUPPORTING NICARAGUA'S POSITION AND ONLY A FEW TAKING A MORE BALANCED APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL MEET MARCH 28 AT 11 AM TO CONTINUE THE DEBATE AND HAS SPEAKERS LISTED FROM BOLIVIA, VENEZUELA, YUGOSLAVIA, BELGIUM, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND THE FRG.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR ARE COMING TO NEW YORK TO SPEAK BEFORE THE COUNCIL ON MONDAY, MARCH 28. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO 1) OUTLINE CUBAN/NICARAGUAN DESTABILIZATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST THEIR COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION, 2) EMPHASIZE THAT THE SAN JOSE FINAL ACT ADOPTED BY THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES OF THE REGION LAST OCTOBER PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE VEHICLE FOR PEACEFUL RECONCILIATION AND 3) URGE A REGIONAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ALONG THE LINES OF THIS ACT. HAVING MADE THESE POINTS, THEY WILL ARGUE THAT THE ISSUE IS A REGIONAL ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE OAS AND OTHER REGIONAL GROUPINGS.

4. GIVEN UNBALANCED NATURE OF SC DEBATE TO DATE AND FORTHCOMING PRESENCE OF SALVADORAN AND HONDURAN MINISTERS, DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO RESTORE THE BALANCE AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORT. ADDRESSEE POSTS, EXCEPT FOR MANILA, QUITO, PANAMA, THE HAGUE, PARIS. (DELEGATIONS HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN), ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL TO URGE THAT THEIR DELEGATIONS SPEAK IN SUPPORT OF THE HONDURAN AND SALVADORAN STATEMENTS AND POSSIBLE INITIATIVE. APPROACH IN CAIRO AND RABAT SHOULD BE AT AMBASSADOR'S DISCRETION. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING POINTS CONTAINED REF A. POSTS SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

--AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK OUTLINED IN HER STATEMENT IN THE UNSC MARCH 25 (USUN 731 REPEATED TO ALL POSTS) INTER ALIA NICARAGUA'S ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE ITS NEIGHBORS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. FOR THE MOST PART, SPEAKERS IN THE UNSC DEBATE THUS FAR HAVE FOCUSSED ONLY ON ALLEGED INTERVENTION IN AND AGGRESSION AGAINST NICARAGUA, WITH ACCOMPANYING CALLS ON OTHER STATES TO REFRAIN FROM INTERVENING IN NICARAGUA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

--MOST SPEAKERS HAVE IGNORED THE FACTS CONCERNING NICARAGUA'S INVOLVEMENT IN EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE AND OVERTHROW ITS NEIGHBORS THROUGH ITS ACKNOWLEDGED SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA.

--WE URGE THAT YOUR DELEGATION, AT A MINIMUM, POINT OUT NICARAGUA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ABIDE BY THE SAME PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER OF NON INTERFERENCE, NON-INTERVENTION, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WHICH IT CLAIMS FOR ITSELF.

--THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES OF THE REGION HAVE MADE PROPOSALS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION, AND FURTHER EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM REGIONALLY.

--THE US, AS SIGNATORY TO THE SAN JOSE DECLARATION FINAL ACT, AFFIRMS THAT THE SOLUTION TO THESE REGIONAL ISSUES IS THROUGH REGIONAL APPROACHES.

5. TEGUCIGALPA 2958, BEING REPEATED TO POSTS, CONTAINS A USEFUL REVIEW OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA, INCLUDING NICARAGUA'S REFUSAL TO AGREE TO PEACE PROPOSALS OR TO MEET WITH COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON THIS AND ON AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S STATEMENTS AND THE TEGUCIGALPA REVIEW AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSING UNSC DEBATE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS.

6. FOR DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, TOKYO, RABAT, NAIROBI, CAIRO, BANGKOK: REF A BEING REPEATED TO YOU.

7. IF INSTRUCTIONS CANNOT BE SENT BY MONDAY, POSTS SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT UNSC DEBATE WILL CONTINUE BEYOND THEN AND URGE THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS INSTRUCT THEIR DELEGATIONS TO INSCRIBE THEMSELVES FOR SUBSEQUENT DAYS.  
SHULTZ  
BT

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 785

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

#3729

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 944

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE647  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHC #0244 0830555  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 240304Z MAR 83  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUESTE/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 080244

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: UNSC, NU

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SPEAKERS IN UNSC DEBATE ON  
NICARAGUA. NICARAGUAN COMPLAINT AGAINST U.S.

1. (ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE REQUESTING THAT  
AMBASSADORS URGE HOST GOVERNMENTS TO INSTRUCT THEIR  
DELEGATIONS TO MAKE STATEMENT IN THE UNSC DEBATE ON  
NICARAGUA'S COMPLAINT AGAINST THE U.S. WHICH BEGAN THIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #495

SENSITIVE

BY WOT NARA DATE 6/12/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 945

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EVENING, WEDNESDAY MARCH 23.

3. ON MARCH 22, NICARAGUA REQUESTED AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH ALLEGED MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF INSURGENT FOLLOWERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT

SOMOZA INTO NICARAGUA WITH HEAVY U.S. AND HONDURAN

SUPPORT. NICARAGUAN CHARGES, WHICH WERE SPELLED OUT IN

A PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW YRK MARCH 22 BY NICARAGUAN

VICE FORMIN TINOCO, ALSO ALLEGED THREAT OF IMMINENT

LARGE-SCALE US-BACKED INVASION BY HONDURAN FORCES.

4. WE EXPECT, BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE WITH A SIMILAR NICARAGUAN COMPLAINT AGAINST THE U.S. IN THE COUNCIL IN 1982, THAT NICARAGUA WILL ATTEMPT TO MOBILIZE A LARGE NUMBER OF RADICAL AND COMMUNIST STATES TO SPEAK ON ITS BEHALF AND TO STAGE A MAJOR PROPAGANDA SPECTACLE AGAINST THE U.S. THE NICARAGUAN ATTACK IS EXPECTED TO ALSO FOCUS ON HONDURAS AND OTHER MODERATE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WHO ARE UNSYMPATHETIC TO THE SANDINISTA REGIME. THIS EVENING, MARCH 23, AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK WILL MAKE A MAJOR U.S. STATEMENT WHICH WILL PUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NICARAGUA INTO HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND POINT OUT THE TRAGIC RESULTS WHICH VIOLENCE, REPRESSION, AND INTERFERENCE IN OTHER NATION'S AFFAIRS HAVE BROUGHT TO CENTRAL AMERICA. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BALANCE IN THE DEBATE AND REENFORCE THE APPROACH WHICH WE AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC STATES IN THE HEMISPHERE ARE PURSUING TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WE WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE AS MANY OTHER MODERATE, FRIENDLY STATES AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE STATEMENTS DURING THE DEBATE. ADDRESSEES HAVE BEEN SELECTED FOR APPROACHES ON THE BASIS OF OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THEM AND OUR BELIEF THAT THEY MAY BE INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING THE MODERATE POSITION IN THE COUNCIL AGAINST NICARAGUA. AMBASSADORS ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENT AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, IF POSSIBLE, AND URGE THEM TO INSTRUCT THEIR DELEGATIONS IN NEW YRK TO MAKE STATEMENTS, TAILORING THEM AS APPROPRIATE. DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS. (IF YOU BELIEVE THIS APPROACH WOULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE, YOU MAY, AT YOUR DISCRETION, NOT DO SO.)

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 946

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES)

-- NICARAGUA IS ATTEMPTING TO USE THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A MAJOR PROPAGANDA ATTACK ON THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA'S DEMOCRATIC NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY HONDURAS. WE PLAN TO USE THIS OCCASION TO SET THE RECORD CLEAR AND WOULD LIKE OTHER STATES WHO (AS APPROPRIATE, SHARE OUR DEMOCRATIC VALUES, AND/OR ARE CONCERNED ABOUT NICARAGUA'S BEHAVIOR) TO JOIN US IN MAKING STATEMENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- NICARAGUA'S INITIATIVE IN THE UNSC IS AN EFFORT TO SHIFT THE BLAME TO THE U.S. AND HONDURAS FOR RISING POPULAR OPPOSITION TO ITS REPRESSIVE POLICIES AT HOME AND TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS BETRAYAL OF THE ANTI-SOMOZA REVOLUTION BY THE LEADERS OF THE SANDINISTA

FRONT.

-- NICARAGUA'S ALLEGATIONS OF MASSIVE INFILTRATION BY U.S. AND HONDURAN SUPPORTED INSURGENTS AND AN IMMINENT HONDURAN INVASION ARE UTTERLY FALSE. IT IS NICARAGUA WHICH IS, IN FACT, MENACING ITS NEIGHBORS BY A STEADY BUILD-UP OF A MILITARY MACHINE, WITH HEAVY SUPPORT FROM CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS TOTALLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO NICARAGUA'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS.

-- THE SANDINISTA REGIME HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH THE UNITED STATES OR ITS CENTRAL AMERICAN NEIGHBORS. WHILE PRACTICING A POLICY OF INCREASED REPRESSION AT HOME AND BETRAYING THE IDEALS OF THE ANTI-SOMOZA DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, IT HAS SYSTEMATICALLY INTERFERED IN THE AFFAIRS OF ITS NEIGHBORS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PROJECT THE IMAGE OF A SMALL, STRUGGLING REVOLUTIONARY COUNTRY BESET BY IMPERIALISTIC AND ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

-- NICARAGUA HAS REPEATEDLY REJECTED APPROACHES DESIGNED TO REDUCE SUSPICION AND TENSION. THESE INCLUDE TWO U.S. BILATERAL APPROACHES, THE SAN JOSE FINAL ACT, THE HONDURAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE BORDER AREA, AND AN INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE JOINT HONDURAN-U.S. MILITARY EXERCISES (AHUAS TARA).

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 947

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(POINTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN ACTION ADDRESSEES:)

--THE RESULT OF NICARAGUA'S SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE, IF THERE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE, COULD BE TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM EFFORTS BY L.A. COUNTRIES, WHERE THE INITIATIVE SHOULD LIE, TO DEAL WITH THIS REGIONAL ISSUE. A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE BY THE L.A. GROUP IS IN ORDER.

--THE '5/5' CONFERENCE ITSELF COULD BE DERAILED BY NICARAGUA'S APPROACH. WE HAVE NOT OPPOSED THAT CONFERENCE, DESPITE OUR PROPOSED NON-PRESENCE. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT WORK, BUT A ONE-SIDED SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, OR A RESOLUTION IF THAT EMERGES, FOCUSING ON ONLY ONE NARROW ISSUE -- THE NICARAGUAN HONDURAN BORDER -- WOULD MAKE THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. --(FOR CARACAS) YOU HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING THE '5/5' CONFERENCE; DESPITE SOME MISGIVINGS, WE HAVE HEEDED YOUR APPEAL NOT TO OPPOSE IT. BUT NOW, THE FIRST CASUALTY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE COULD BE

VENEZUELA'S LEADERSHIP IN THE EFFORT TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

-- (FOR ALL NON-LATIN POSTS)

•  
-- THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO FINDING A SOLUTION TO THESE REGIONAL ISSUES THROUGH REGIONAL APPROACHES. ALTHOUGH NICARAGUA AND ITS RADICAL AND COMMUNIST ALLIES WILL ATTEMPT TO USE THIS SESSION OF THE COUNCIL TO HEIGHTEN TENSIONS AND MAKE PROPAGANDA, WE HOPE WE CAN COUNTER THIS BY USING THE DEBATE TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE SERIOUS EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA BEING PROMOTED BY THE DEMOCRATIC STATES OF THE HEMISPHERE.

--ALTHOUGH THE NICARAGUAN ISSUE IS PRIMARILY A REGIONAL ONE WHICH CALLS FOR A REGIONAL SOLUTION, THE ISSUES AT STAKE SHOULD BE OF INTEREST TO STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION SUCH AS YOURS, WHICH, WE BELIEVE, SHARE OUR INTEREST IN A GENUINE AND PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE.

-- WE NEITHER WANT NOR EXPECT YOU TO ENGAGE IN THE KIND OF POLEMICAL AND PARTISAN ATTACKS EXPECTED FROM NICARAGUA TO ITS SUPPORTERS. IN OUR VIEW THE MOST

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 948

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EFFECTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENTS BY MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR ADDRESSING THE NICARAGUAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES IN THE WAY PROPOSED BY THE MODERATE STATES OF THE REGION.

5. FYI: ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE UN MAY REQUEST AN OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN DEBATE BY SUBMITTING A WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, WHO IS THE UK AMBASSADOR THIS MONTH. WE UNDERSTAND MEXICO, PANAMA, HONDURAS AND MALTA ARE ALREADY ON SPEAKERS LIST, AND NETHERLANDS EMBASSY (PROTECT) HAS INFORMED US THAT ITS DELEGATION HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK. (THERE MAY ALSO BE OTHERS ALREADY ON THE LIST.) WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL, NEVERTHELESS FOR EMBASSIES THE HAGUE, TO MAKE THIS APPROACH.

6. REGRET WE UNABLE ON THIS OCCASION TO PROVIDE FRENCH OR SPANISH TRANSLATIONS OF ABOVE TALKING POINTS. SHULTZ  
BT  
#0244  
NNNN

SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6092607 DTG: 020031Z MAR 83 PSN: 068662  
SIT709 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 061/0418Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR BOV VP SIT EOB EOB SH NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #6092 0610043  
O 020031Z MAR 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9043

~~SECRET~~ STATE 056092

MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, UK, PNAT, PSDC, WA

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN  
SECRETARY PYM

1. ~~1~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELTVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE  
SECRETARY TO UK FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM. (THERE WILL BE  
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.)

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCIS:

CHET CROCKER HAS BRIEFED ME ON THE VERY USEFUL MEETING OF  
CONTACT GROUP AFRICA DIRECTORS HELD LAST WEEK IN OTTAWA.

I AM PLEASED THAT ALLAN MACEACHEN WAS ABLE TO MEET WITH THE  
GROUP AND TO LEAD A PROBING DISCUSSION OF A PROBLEM WE FACE  
IN COMMON: HOW TO MAINTAIN OUR CREDIBILITY IN AFRICA ON THE  
NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE PROCESS AT A TIME OF FRUSTRATION OVER  
THE LACK OF PUBLIC AND VISIBLE PROGRESS. WHILE WE ARE  
TAKING MUCH OF THE HEAT ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE, YOU

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND OUR OTHER CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS ARE INEVITABLY  
AFFECTED AS WELL. WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THAT. IN THESE  
CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR MANY EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT AND  
READINESS TO SEE THIS THING THROUGH HAVE BEEN GREATLY  
APPRECIATED.

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM YOUR REPRESENTATIVES, DIS-  
CUSSION IN OTTAWA ALSO FOCUSED ON HOW WE MIGHT COLLECTIVELY  
AND INDIVIDUALLY CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO KEEP  
THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVING FORWARD. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT,  
FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO PRESS FOR  
REASONABLE SOUTH AFRICAN BEHAVIOR AND RESTRAINT ON ANGOLA  
WHILE OTHER PRESSURES MOUNT ON THE ANGOLANS TO NEGOTIATE  
SERIOUSLY.

IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WE WILL BE INVOLVED ON BOTH FRONTS,  
AS WE EXPECT TO RESUME DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ANGOLANS IN  
EARLY MARCH, WHICH WILL PARALLEL TALKS AT SENIOR LEVEL  
WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IN THE COMING MONTHS, IT IS  
LIKELY THAT WE WILL COLLECTIVELY BE FACING A COMPLEX SITU-  
ATION: A POSITIVE BUT PROBABLY GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF THE  
ANGOLAN PICTURE AT THE SAME TIME AS PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC  
CRITICISM MOUNTS AT THE UN AND NON-ALIGNED MEETINGS. WE  
WILL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND WILL VALUE YOUR  
SUPPORT.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
FRANCIS PYM, M.C., P.C., M.P.,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS,  
LONDON.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 6092607 DTG: 020031Z MAR 83 PSN: 068662

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #496

BY WAT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 78676208 DTG: 221410Z FEB 83 PSN: 056530  
SIT045 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 053/1417Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG EOB EOBTP VP EOB SIT KEMP NORT  
EOB: CHECKLIST  
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAGST KLITTND WITH BRUSSELS 2629 ACTION.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7867 0531415  
O 221410Z FEB 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 8679  
ALL NATO CAPITALS  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 047867  
GENEVA FOR USINF - ANATO HANDLE AS NIACT IMMEDIATE  
E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PARM, PINS, US, UK  
SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON NUCLEAR RELEASE

REF: (A) LONDON 03761 NOTAL; (B) HARRISON-HAWES TELCON

1. LOU - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED IN RESPONSE REFTEL  
(A), WHICH IS BEING REPEATED TO INFO ADDRESSEES, AND  
APPROVED INTERAGENCY FOR USE FEBRUARY 22 BY DEPARTMENT  
PRESS SPOKESMAN. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESS GUIDANCE:

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE STATEMENTS IN THE  
LONDON TIMES BY ADMIRAL LAROCQUE THAT THE US ALLIES  
WOULD HAVE NO SAY IN THE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
BASED IN EUROPE?

A: THE STATEMENT IS UNTRUE. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS  
ALLIES HAVE ESTABLISHED AGREED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROCEDURES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN THE  
EVENT IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE USE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE PROCEDURES, WHICH HAVE PROVED  
FULLY SATISFACTORY TO SUCCESSIVE

ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, WOULD APPLY TO ANY CONSIDERATION OF  
THE USE OF US GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE AND PERSHING  
MISSILES, AS THEY WOULD TO ANY OTHER US NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
IN EUROPE. I WOULD NOTE IN THIS REGARD THAT THE UK  
GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY REAFFIRMED THE SATISFACTORY  
NATURE OF EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS IN RESPONSE TO  
QUESTIONS WHICH AROSE IN LONDON. END TEXT OF PRESS  
GUIDANCE. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

Department  
By *GLS*

21 1997  
*10/8/98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 69571 DTG: 090503Z FEB 83 PSN: 038477  
SIT704 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 040/0820Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF VP JP EOB SIT EOBT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS8 FEB DAM REPORTE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #6957 0400604  
O 090503Z FEB 83 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8041  
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0516

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE 9731  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 036957 TOSEC 010221  
NODIS  
LONDON FOR BURT WITH VP PARTY SECRETARY FOR HILL  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MN; C  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE ON TTBT/PNET  
- - - NEGOTIATIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS ISSUED GUIDANCE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS OF IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE TTBT/PNET, ACCEPTING THE IG STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SEEKING DIRECT HYDRODYNAMIC MEASUREMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS ABOVE 75 KT FOR THE TTBT AND 50 KT FOR PNES. IF THESE VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS ARE ACHIEVED, WE WILL SEEK SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT/PNET. IN A RELATED MATTER, THE IG IS ALSO TASKED TO STUDY A NEW JCS RECOMMENDATION THE TTBT BE RENEGOTIATED TO PROVIDE FOR AUTOMATIC TERMINATION RATHER THAN AUTOMATIC RENEWAL AFTER FIVE YEARS, UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WE HAVE BEGUN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS GUIDANCE. THE UK EMBASSY WAS BRIEFED THIS AFTERNOON. WE HOPE TO INFORM THE OTHER ALLIES SHORTLY (THE EUROPEANS THROUGH THE NAC, INTERESTED PACIFIC GOVERNMENTS THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES). ACDA AND STATE WILL HANDLE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS;

POWELL MOORE INTENDS TO CALL SENATOR PERCY WEDNESDAY.

4. IF THIS ISSUE IS BROUGHT UP WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT OR YOURSELF IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WE SUGGEST A RESPONSE ALONG THE LINES THAT WE ARE BEGINNING CONSULTATIONS ON OUR PROPOSAL AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES AS WE MOVE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS.

DE FILED  
NLS 598-002 #498

BY LDS NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 69571 DTG: 090503Z FEB 83 PSN: 038477

5. COPY OF CABLE TO ALLIES BEING PASSED TO YOU  
SEPARATELY.  
DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 69571 DTG: 090503Z FEB 83 PSN: 038477

~~SECRET~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 19-20 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 71734602 DTG:031700Z DEC 82 PSN: 036242  
SIT679 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 337/2141Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR HKY EOB SITOB S1TP SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHCKLISTECKLIST----- DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #7173 3371737

O 031700Z DEC 82 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 337173

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EEWT EFIN UR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER PYM

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW TO FOREIGN MINISTER PYM FROM THE SECRETARY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR FRANCIS:

LOOKING AHEAD TO OUR MEETINGS IN EUROPE AND THE SESSION OF THE NATO COUNCIL, I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON TWO OF THE KEY ISSUES BEFORE US: OUR CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION TO THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA.

ONE SUBJECT WHICH I WILL WANT TO DISCUSS BOTH BILATERALLY WITH YOU DURING MY VISIT TO LONDON AS WELL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS AT OUR DECEMBER 8 DINNER IS HOW WE SHOULD FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONSENSUS ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS CONTAINED IN THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS." AS YOU

KNOW, THIS IS A MATTER TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE, AND I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AGREE AMONG OURSELVES ON HOW WE SHOULD MOVE AHEAD IN THE VARIOUS AREAS ENUMERATED IN THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS."

WHILE I DO NOT WISH TO GO INTO THEM IN DETAIL AT THIS TIME, I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PREPARE FOR OUR MEETING IF I GAVE YOU SOME IDEA OF HOW WE ENVISAGE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS DEVELOPING. AS A GENERAL RULE, WE BELIEVE THE SEVEN-NATION GROUP, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE EC PRESIDENCY AND THE COMMISSION, WHICH WORKED

TOGETHER SO EFFECTIVELY, SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE USED IN SOME WAY TO COORDINATE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THE DESIRABILITY OF USING EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AND WE WOULD MINIMIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW INSTITUTIONS EITHER TO CONDUCT THE FOLLOW-UP WORK OR AS A RESULT OF THAT WORK.

IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY, WE PROPOSE THE CREATION OF AN AD HOC SUMMIT GROUP ON ENERGY TO CONDUCT THE ENERGY STUDY REFERRED TO IN THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS." THIS GROUP WOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OTHER DIRECTLY CONCERNED COUNTRIES. THE AD HOC GROUP WOULD COMMISSION THE OECD COMBINED ENERGY SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE THE ENERGY STUDY BASED ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND GUIDANCE FROM THE GROUP. THE GROUP WOULD DRAW POLICY CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE OECD/IEA ANALYSIS AND MEMBER COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS. WE WOULD HOPE THIS GROUP COULD BE CONVENED SOON, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15 IN PARIS, IN ORDER FOR THE GROUP TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BY EARLY MAY 1983.

ON CREDITS, WE SEEK TO BUILD ON POST-VERSAILLES PROGRESS IN THE OECD EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT AND OTHER OECD WORK TO HARMONIZE EXPORT CREDIT POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR AND ENHANCING THE TRANSPARENCY OF WESTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. WE ALSO WISH TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK WITHOUT

SECSTATE WASHDC 71734602 DTG:031700Z DEC 82 PSN: 036242  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FURTHER DELAY FOR PERIODIC EX POST REVIEW OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS WHICH WOULD DRAW ON OECD DATA AND ANALYSES. A MONITORING GROUP CONSISTING OF SUMMIT SEVEN AND EC PARTICIPATION WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST EFFICIENT BUT WE ARE OPEN TO OTHER PROPOSALS. WE PROPOSE THAT A MEETING OF THIS GROUP BE HELD EARLY IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR THE REVIEW AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER WORK ON HARMONIZATION OF EXPORT CREDIT POLICIES.

THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS" REINFORCES THE AGREEMENT AT THE JANUARY, 1982 HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO STRENGTHEN COCOM. WHAT WE NEED IS A STOCK-TAKING EXERCISE TO REVIEW WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, I PROPOSE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SEVEN MEET NEXT FEBRUARY, AT THE LEVEL OF UNDER SECRETARIES. WE SUGGEST THAT THE MEETING BE INFORMAL, AND THAT IT BE HELD WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

AT THE OPENING OF THE LIST REVIEW ON OCTOBER 4, THE US SUGGESTED THAT A SECOND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF ALL COCOM PARTICIPANTS BE HELD SOMETIME IN 1983. SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE HELD IN JULY, FOLLOWING THE SECOND ROUND OF THE LIST REVIEW. BEFORE MAKING A FORMAL PROPOSAL IN COCOM ON THIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS OUR IDEAS WITH YOU IN FEBRUARY. IN ADDITION, WE PROPOSE THAT THE FEBRUARY MEETING REVIEW THE EFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSIVENESS OF COCOM IN GENERAL AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN COCOM INSTITUTIONALLY.

ON OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FOLLOW-UP SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN STAGES. WE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE SUMMIT SEVEN GROUP AT AN EARLY DATE TO DISCUSS THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU ON THE REASONS WHY CONTROLS IN THIS SECTOR WOULD BE IN OUR MUTUAL SECURITY AND ENERGY INTEREST. WE ARE UNDERTAKING AN INTERNAL STUDY OF HOW

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #501

BY 1207 NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 71734602 DTG:031700Z DEC 82 PSN: 036242

OTHER TECHNOLOGIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY OR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OF THE USSR. WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING AT A MEETING IN FEBRUARY, WHICH COULD BE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MEETING WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ON COCOM MATTERS.

THE SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE NAC ON DECEMBER 9, WHICH WILL IN ANY CASE BE AN OCCASION FOR REVIEWING THE FULL SCOPE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA. IF THERE IS AGREEMENT THERE, THIS INITIATIVE, TOO, COULD BE INCLUDED IN OUR COMMUNIQUE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR REACTION TO THESE IDEAS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 71734602 DTG:031700Z DEC 82 PSN: 036242  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SINCERELY,  
/S/ GEORGE

END TEXT. EAGLEBURGER

TO ENSURE THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS, WE SHOULD GO FORWARD WITH OUR AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT EXPEDITIOUSLY AN OVERALL STUDY ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WE ENVISAGE THIS STUDY VERY MUCH ALONG LINES DEVELOPED IN THE "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS." I REMEMBER THAT WE ALL ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS EFFORT, AS IT WILL PROVIDE US WITH A COMMON ASSESSMENT OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THEREBY ENABLE US TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE AGREED. IN OUR VIEW, A SPECIAL GROUP SHOULD BE FORMED TO CONDUCT THIS STUDY ON THE BASIS OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. THIS GROUP COULD WELL CALL UPON THE OECD AND NATO FOR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF EXPERTISE. A SECRETARIAT ROLE FOR

SECSTATE WASHDC 71734602 DTG:031700Z DEC 82 PSN: 036242

ONE OF THESE INSTITUTIONS (OR THE TWO JOINTLY) IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY TO BE EXPLORED.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT SOME INFORMAL MECHANISM WILL BE NEEDED TO SUPERVISE THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS AS A WHOLE. THE WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP HAS SERVED WELL IN THIS CAPACITY, BUT WE MAY WANT NOW TO CONSIDER OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

I THINK YOU WILL AGREE THAT, AS FAR AS EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, WHILE MUCH OF THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS HAS CONCERNED MATTERS DEALT WITH IN OTHER BODIES, IT NEVERTHELESS IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE ON-GOING CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. ONE AREA WHERE THE RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE COULD BE PUT TO EXCELLENT USE, WITHOUT CONFLICTING WITH WORK DONE ELSEWHERE OR THE MISSIONS OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, WOULD BE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY, INCLUDING ITS ABILITY TO SUSTAIN PRESENT AND PROJECTED FUTURE LEVELS OF DEFENSE EFFORT. WE PLAN TO INTRODUCE PROPOSALS FOR THIS SPECIAL STUDY INTO THE COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING PROCESS AT NATO IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

ANOTHER THOUGHT I HAD ON WHICH I WOULD VALUE YOUR OPINION CONCERNS HOW THE ALLIANCE CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICIES POST-BREZHNEV AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR US.

SECSTATE WASHDC 71734602 DTG:031700Z DEC 82 PSN: 036242  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE AND ANDROPOV'S EMERGENCE COULD WELL MEAN THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW, AND THEIR MEANING FOR THE WEST, WILL BE HIGHLY COMPLEX. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT A NATO STUDY ON LIKELY TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICIES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, POST-BREZHNEV WOULD BE VERY TIMELY.

THIS IS AN IDEA WE MIGHT PROFITABLY DISCUSS AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER ON DECEMBER 8. IF OUR EXCHANGE SUGGESTS THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE HAS MERIT, WE MIGHT THEN INTRODUCE IT FOR MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION DURING

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6057 DTG: 200043Z NOV 82 PSN: 215941  
SIT146 DATE 11/22/82 TOR: 324 0507Z

CARGOLUX.

DISTRIBUTION: RPT /001

-- ON THOSE OCCASIONS, THE MATERIAL IN QUESTION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SHIPPED BY ANOTHER CARRIER.

THIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

-- IN THIS CONTEXT, GOL ASKED IF UF6 FEED SYS EM EQUIPMENT SEIZED BY SWISS AUTHORITIES AT ZURICH AIRPORT IN SEPTEMBER 1980 WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SHIPPED TO PAKISTAN.

SIT: WPC MCF WMLR JP VP EOB SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: --CHECKLIST--

-- THE U.S. HAS RECEIVED CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THIS SHIPMENT.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

-- DURING TRIGGER LIST UPGRADE DISCUSSIONS LAST MAY, HMG INDICATED IT PLANNED TO QUESTION SWISS ABOUT IMPOUNDED EQUIPMENT.

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

-- HAS HMG BEEN ABLE TO DISCOVER THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF UF6 FEED SYSTEM EQUIPMENT SEIZED BY THE SWISS IN 1980? SHULTZ

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #6057 3240301

O R 200043Z NOV 82

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

SECSTATE WASHDC 6057

DTG: 200043Z NOV 82 PSN: 215941

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4277

INFO AMEMBASSY BERN 9531

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1579

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3274

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 8370

BT

~~SECRET~~ DATE 11/22/82

EXDIS

E O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM TNUC, MNUC, PK

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: UF6 HANDLING EQUIPMENT

REF: STATE 126722 (NOTAL)

~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

1. ON OCTOBER 29 UF6 FEED SYSTEM EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN PAKISTAN'S UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SHIPPED FROM LUXEMBOURG TO DUBAI FOR SUBSEQUENT TRANSSHIPMENT TO PAKISTAN. THIS EQUIPMENT WAS SIMILAR TO EQUIPMENT SEIZED BY THE SWISS AT ZURICH AIRPORT IN SEPTEMBER 1980. U.S. HAS RECEIVED CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT THE EQUIPMENT WHICH WAS IMPOUNDED BY THE SWISS, INCLUDING INFORMATION THAT IT WAS SMUGGLED OUT OF SWITZERLAND AND SUBSEQUENTLY SHIPPED TO PAKISTAN VIA THE NETHERLANDS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. PARA 22 OF REFTL INDICATES THAT AS OF LAST MAY, UK HAD BEEN TOLD THAT SOME EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SEIZED BY SWISS AUTHORITIES HAD DISAPPEARED. U.S. WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF UF6 FEED SYSTEM EQUIPMENT IMPOUNDED BY THE SWISS IS "LOST" AS WELL. U.S. SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE HMG OFFICIALS, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

-- THE U.S. WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT OF LUXEMBOURG TO PREVENT THE OCTOBER 29 SHIPMENT BY CARGOLUX OF UF6 FEED SYSTEM EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN PAKISTAN'S UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

-- ONE MAJOR FACTOR IN GOL DECISION TO PERMIT THIS SHIPMENT WAS THAT IN THE PAST LOCATION OF SUCH SHIPMENTS HAD BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN GOL DECISION TO PERMIT THIS SHIPMENT.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #502

BY 105 NAME DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DISTRIBUTION: REPT 001

WATS ASS GLED DISTRIBUTION:

S T: WFC MCF JP VP SIT ECB

FOE:

WHSR COMMENT: -----FYI-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE NOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5266 3231918  
O 191912Z NOV 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WACHDC

TC AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 4224

~~SECRET~~ STATE 325266

NOD 15

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: FOR, NATO, UK, UR

REJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN SECRETARY FYM

1 E.B. SO IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
FROM SECRETARY DULTZ TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM BY OOB  
SATURDAY MORNING FEB 28.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

3. DE45 FRANCIS:

4. THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 17 ON RECENT STEPS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

5. I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO BRING OUR FRENCH FRIENDS BACK INTO LINE IN OUR EAST-WEST ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS. WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN IRONED OUT, AND ARE ANXIOUS, AS YOU, TO MOVE AHEAD TO IMPLEMENT THE STEPS AGREED UPON IN THE NON-PAPER.

6. YOUR IDEA OF A DECLARATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS AN INTERESTING ONE. I AGREED THAT WE NEED A FIRM AND POSITIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESTATEMENT OF THE BASIC WESTERN APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN DECEMBER'S NATO COMMUNIQUE, BUT I HAVE

RECEIVAT ONS ABOUT OUR EXPOSING THIS INTO A SEPARATE  
DECLARATION. IT IS CERTAINLY TOO EARLY TO DRAW ANY CON-  
CLUSIONS ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE POST-BREZHNEV ERA.  
I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT A HURRIED EFFORT TO AGREE UPON  
SUCH A DOCUMENT COULD CREATE A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DEBATE  
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WITH SOME GOVERNMENTS SEEKING TO TAKE  
A MORE HOPEFUL AND POSITIVE LINE THAN CIRCUMSTANCES YET  
DICTATE. I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT WE SHOULD IN DECEMBER  
CONTENT OURSELVES WITH A SOLID REAFFIRMATION OF WESTERN  
POLICIES, AS PUT FORWARD IN RECENT ALLIANCE DOCUMENTS,  
HOLDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A BOLDER DOCUMENT IN RESERVE  
FOR SOME FUTURE OCCASION.

7. REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, WE REMAIN READY TO MOVE TOWARD SUCH A MEETING PROVIDED THAT IT IS WELL PREPARED AND THAT THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. I DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP COULD CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE. TO BE HONEST, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN OUR EXCHANGES TO DATE WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH SUGGESTS THIS TO BE THE CASE. I THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT ANY CALL ON OUR PART FOR SUCH A SUMMIT WOULD BE PREMATURE.

8. I LOOK VERY MUCH FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH BOTH IN BRUSSELS AND FOR MORE EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON. THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER AND OUR BILATERAL TALKS WILL PROVIDE AN OCCASION TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES YOUR MESSAGE RAISES IN DETAIL, AND TO BEGIN FORGING A WESTERN STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP. AS ALWAYS, I VERY MUCH VALUE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE SUBJECTS.

9. BEST REGARDS.

10. SINCERELY,

11. GEORGE P. SHULTZ

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #503

BY LOT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

\_\_\_\_\_

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 24 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0284  
SIT144 DATE 11/04/82

DTG: 040356Z NOV 82 PSN: 047813  
TOR: 308/0523Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #0284 3080521  
O 040356Z NOV 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 310284

PASS USTR

E.O. 12356 N/A

, AGS: ETRD

SUBJECT: GATT MINISTERIAL: LETTER FROM SECRETARY  
SHULTZ TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
AFFAIRS PYM

1. THE EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING  
LETTER CONCERNING THE GATT MINISTERIAL FROM SECRETARY  
SHULTZ TO SECRETARY PYM. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE  
SECRETARY IS ALSO WRITING EC PRESIDENT THORN, AS WELL AS  
THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SEVERAL OTHER GATT-MEMBER  
COUNTRIES, INCLUDING SOME EC MEMBER-STATES, TO EXPRESS HIS  
VIEWS ON THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES FACING THE MINISTERIAL, AND  
TO URGE THAT GREATER EFFORTS BE MADE TO ASSURE A  
PRODUCTIVE MEETING.

2. TEXT OF LETTER TO PYM:

DEAR FRANCIS:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A COMMON  
INTEREST IN A STRONG AND EQUITABLE MULTILATERAL TRADE  
SYSTEM. IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE THIS SYSTEM,  
PARTICULARLY DURING THE CURRENT PERIOD OF SERIOUS TRADE

TENSION, WE ALSO HAVE A MUTUAL STAKE IN PROMOTING EFFECTIVE  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES. THE WELL-BEING OF THE INSTITU-  
TION WE COOPERATIVELY DEVELOPED TO ADMINISTER THESE RULES,  
THE GATT, IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO BOTH OF US. THESE SHARED  
INTERESTS PROMPT ME TO REQUEST YOUR PERSONAL ASSISTANCE  
IN ASSURING A PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME FOR THE GATT MINISTERIAL  
MEETING IN NOVEMBER.

I AM ENCOURAGED THAT WE ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE  
IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL MINISTERIAL. HOWEVER, WITH THE  
MEETING ONLY A FEW WEEKS AWAY, AND WITH PROTECTIONIST

PRESSURES IN MANY COUNTRIES INTENSIFYING, I AM CONCERNED  
THAT WE MUST DO MORE TO ASSURE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. IF  
THE MINISTERIAL DOES NOT ACHIEVE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL  
RESULTS, WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GATT CAN ADDRESS SOME  
OF THE TRADE SYSTEM'S PRESSING PROBLEMS, IT SEEMS TO ME  
THAT THE RISK OF A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN WORLD TRADE  
RELATIONS IS VERY GRAVE.

I AM PLEASED AT THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE TOWARD A WORK  
PROGRAM ON SERVICES. I KNOW THAT WE SHARE A STRONG  
INTEREST IN AN OPEN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR SERVICES, AND  
APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN TO OUR INITIATIVE.

THERE ARE THREE OTHER AREAS, HOWEVER, IN WHICH I BELIEVE  
IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE MINISTERIAL TO MAKE  
PROGRESS. THE FIRST IS SAFEGUARDS. WITHOUT AN UNDER-  
STANDING ON THE TYPE OF MEASURES A COUNTRY CAN LEGITI-  
MATELY TAKE WHEN ONE OF ITS INDUSTRIES FACES INJURY FROM  
IMPORTS, THE CONCEPT OF A STANDSTILL ON PROTECTIVE  
MEASURES WILL NOT FIND SUPPORT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS  
IMPERATIVE THAT WE FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF  
SELECTIVE SAFEGUARDS, WHICH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PERCEIVE  
AS A MAJOR THREAT TO THEIR MARKET ACCESS. I AM CONVINCED  
THAT UNLESS WE CONCLUDE A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH  
SELECTIVITY PROVISIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES, WE WILL LOSE THE IMPACT WE NEED FROM THE  
POLITICAL STATEMENT BY THE GATT MINISTERS. IT SEEMS TO ME  
THAT SECRETARY GENERAL DUNKEL'S PROPOSAL CONTAINS THE

SECSTATE WASHDC 0284

DTG: 040356Z NOV 82 PSN: 047813

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, AND I URGE YOU TO  
GIVE IT YOUR SUPPORT. UNILATERAL SELECTIVITY CANNOT BE  
THE BASIS OF A VIABLE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

THE SECOND AREA WHICH THE MINISTERIAL MUST ADDRESS IS  
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE USE OF  
AGRICULTURAL EXPORT SUBSIDIES. THE LONG-STANDING POLICY  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNITY  
ARE WELL KNOWN TO YOU. I APPRECIATE THAT IT WILL NOT BE  
POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES BEFORE THE

MINISTERIAL. HOWEVER, IT IS VITAL THAT WE AGREE ON A  
METHOD FOR DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITHIN THE GATT. IN  
ADDITION, WE MUST AGREE TO INITIATE GATT DISCUSSIONS WHICH  
PERMIT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLVING THESE  
PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR TERM. IF WE CANNOT TAKE  
THESE STEPS I AM CONCERNED THAT THE FRUSTRATION OF PRO-  
DUCER GROUPS WITH THE TRADING SYSTEM WILL PROVE DAMAGING  
TO US ALL.

FINALLY, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE PROGRESS  
TOWARD INTEGRATING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BETTER INTO THE  
TRADING SYSTEM. ONE ASPECT OF THIS EFFORT IS SAFEGUARDS,  
ANOTHER IS THE PROPOSAL WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD FOR A  
ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE  
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR ACTIVE SUPPORT IN DEVELOPING A  
MORE DETAILED NEGOTIATING PROGRAM AND IN PERSUADING  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH A LARGE STAKE IN TRADE THAT SUCH  
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE STRONGLY IN THEIR INTEREST.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THESE ISSUES ARE COMPLEX AND INVOLVE  
CLOSELY INTERWOVEN ASPECTS OF TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY.  
BILL BROCK, THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE HAS DISCUSSED  
THESE PROBLEMS WITH COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA  
AND IN BRUSSELS. I HAVE WRITTEN PRESIDENT THORN TO  
EXPRESS THE SAME CONCERNS WHICH I AM SHARING WITH YOU. MY  
PURPOSE IN WRITING IS TO SUGGEST THAT WE MUST CONCENTRATE  
ON THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE ECONOMIC STAKES INVOLVED

DECLASSIFIED

598-002 #505

NLS

BY WJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0284

DTG:040356Z NOV 82 PSN: 047813

IN THIS MEETING. WE CANNOT AFFORD THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF A CONTINUATION OF PRESENT TRADE TENSIONS ON OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS. THE HEALTH OF THE ALLIANCE AND OUR RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ALIKE NEED THE STABILITY PROVIDED BY A STRONG TRADE SYSTEM. I HOPE THAT GREAT BRITAIN'S INFLUENCE CAN BE USED TO ENCOURAGE OTHERS

SECSTATE WASHDC 0284

DTG:040356Z NOV 82 PSN: 047813

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO MAKE THE EFFORT NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT THE MINISTERIAL STRENGTHENS THE TRADE SYSTEM DURING THIS PERIOD OF SERIOUS STRAIN.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTE THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO AGREE ON A NEGOTIATING MANDATE ON THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL TAKE A STRONG STAND WITHIN THE EC TO ASSURE A FORTHCOMING EC POSITION AND THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S EFFORT TO ASSURE PRAGMATIC EC PARTICIPATION IN THE MINISTERIAL.  
SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 0284

DTG:040356Z NOV 82 PSN: 047813

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 26 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NO0884

PAGE 01 STATE 298314  
ORIGIN NO03-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 1000 R

COPY 12 OF 20 COPIES

DRAFTED BY EUR:TMTNILES  
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY  
EUR:RBIIRT  
P:LSEAGLEBURGER  
E:WALLIS  
S/S:LPBREMER, III  
S/S-O: TLRANDALL, JR.

0 222302Z OCT 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 298314

NO018

FOR AMBASSADOR LOUIS FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: EENT EFIN UR  
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO LA SAPINIERE

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. AT OCTOBER 21 MEETING OF UK, FRG AND FRENCH  
AMBASSADORS WITH UNDER SECRETARIES EAGLEBURGER AND  
WALLIS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT, UK  
AMBASSADOR WRIGHT, REFLECTING INSTRUCTIONS DISCUSSED IN  
LONDON 22713, PLAYED AN EXTREMELY POSITIVE ROLE. YOU  
SHOULD ARRANGE AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET  
WITH FRANCIS PYM TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION  
FOR PYM'S ROLE AND THAT OF STR OLIVER WRIGHT, AS WELL  
AS TO DELIVER MESSAGE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH THREE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #507

BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/12/02

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

STATE 298314

BELOW. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR FRANCIS:

AS I AM SURE SIR OLIVER WRIGHT HAS INFORMED YOU, THE FIRST MEETING OF THE UK, FRG AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS WITH LARRY EAGLEBURGER, ALLEN WALLIS AND RICK BURT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON PROCEEDED MORE OR LESS AS EXPECTED. WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE EXTREMELY HELPFUL POSITION TAKEN BY SIR OLIVER AT THAT MEETING. HE WAS ABLE, THROUGH HIS INTERVENTIONS IN THE DISCUSSION, TO MOVE MATTERS AHEAD AT SEVERAL POINTS, AND WE WERE VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HELP.

AS EXPECTED, THE FRENCH POSITION REMAINS THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. I AM MODERATELY ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT, AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS AT LEAST PREPARED TO ACCEPT MY NON-PAPER AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. IT IS ALSO REASONABLY ENCOURAGING THAT THE REAL STICKING POINTS WITH THE FRENCH ARE RELATIVELY FEW. SOME ARE PERHAPS SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOLUTION THROUGH MINOR WORD CHANGES. THE POINT ON CREDITS, WHERE THE FRENCH INSIST THAT THEY CANNOT IN ANY WAY AGREE TO GO BEYOND WHAT WAS DONE AT VERSAILLES IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. THEY ALSO HAVE REJECTED THE SECTION CONTAINING THE COMMITMENT NOT TO CONCLUDE NEW GAS CONTRACTS WITH THE USSR WHILE THE ENERGY STUDY IS UNDER WAY AS WELL AS THE SECTION WHICH PROVIDES FOR A STUDY ON WHETHER CONTROLS SHOULD BE ADOPTED ON STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY. NATURALLY, I WOULD WELCOME ANY HELP YOUR

~~SECRET~~





*Department of State*

**OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

STATE 298314

GOVERNMENT CAN PROVIDE IN PERSUADING THE FRENCH TO  
ADOPT A MORE REASONABLE POSITION AS WELL AS ANY IDEAS  
YOU MIGHT HAVE, AS A RESULT OF YOUR RECENT TALKS WITH  
CHEYSSON, OF THE BEST TACTICS WHICH WE MIGHT USE ON OUR  
SIDE IN DEALING WITH THE FRENCH.

AS SIR OLIVER VERY LIKELY TOLD YOU, I WILL BE MEETING  
WITH HIM AND THE OTHER TWO AMBASSADORS ON SUNDAY  
MORNING IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MY TRIP TO OTTAWA.

BEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

/S/ GEORGE

SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                    SECSTATE WASHDC 5924                    DTG: 210250Z OCT 82 PSN: 025972  
SIT902                    DATE 10/22/82                    TOR: 294/0405Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5924 2940300  
O 210250Z OCT 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2613

INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 9908  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3260  
AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 5527  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 295924  
NODIS  
LONDON FOR AF AS CROCKER  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: WA, US, PEPR, SF, TO, UN  
SUBJECT: TOGO TO PROVIDE BATTALION FOR UNTAG

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UNSR MARTI AHTISAARI INFORMED AF/S SIMPSON OCTOBER 20  
THAT UN HAD OBTAINED TOGOLESE AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE THE  
SIXTH BATTALION FOR UNTAG.

3. AHTISAARI ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD VERY  
CLOSELY SINCE THE SECRETARIAT INTENDS TO USE THIS CONCESSION  
WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS LATER THIS WEEK TO TRY TO OBTAIN  
SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT TO FINLAND'S PROVIDING A BATTALION,  
A UN DESIDERATUM AND SOUTH AFRICAN BETE NOIRE.  
SHULTZ

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #508  
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3145 DTG: 191837Z OCT 82 PSN: 025641  
SIT903 DATE 10/22/82 TOR: 292/2242Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF MR SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: SENT TO WPC

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #3145 2921844  
O 191837Z OCT 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 293145  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UK  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY  
PYM

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER LETTER IN PARA 3 BELOW TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20. LETTER RESPONDS TO MESSAGE FROM PYM TO SECRETARY CONTAINED IN PARA 4 BELOW. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR FRANCIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 19. AS YOU PREDICTED, THE DANISH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON LARRY EAGLEBURGER YESTERDAY, OCTOBER 19, TO REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE EC-10 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND TO PRESENT YOUR PROPOSAL FOR FOLLOW-UP TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DISCUSSIONS WE HAD IN NEW YORK AND AT LA SAPINIERE.

AS YOU MAY KNOW BY NOW, WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR LARRY EAGLEBURGER, ALLEN WALLIS AND RICK BURT TO MEET WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF OUR SMALLER GROUP ON THURSDAY MORNING. WE ARE ALSO ARRANGING A SUBSEQUENT MEETING ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT COUNTRIES TO WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DANISH PRESIDENCY AND THE HEAD OF THE EC COMMISSION REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON WILL ALSO BE INVITED. CONSEQUENTLY, I BELIEVE THAT IN PROCEDURAL TERMS THE FOLLOW-UP PROCESS IS WELL UNDERWAY.

I WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK, HOWEVER, IF I FAILED TO EXPRESS MY CONCERNS OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE UPCOMING MEETINGS. ALTHOUGH WE ARE AS ANXIOUS AS YOU TO

REACH AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT DISPUTE, AND TO DO SO AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, I DID NOT CONSIDER IT PRUDENT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS UNTIL WE HAD SOME IDEA OF HOW THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS WOULD REACT TO THE IDEAS WHICH I PRESENTED AT LA SAPINIERE. ALTHOUGH WE DID RECEIVE SOME INFORMAL, AND NOT TERRIBLY ENCOURAGING REACTIONS FROM THE FRENCH AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING IN PARIS, I HAVE YET TO HEAR ANYTHING CONCRETE FROM CLAUDE CHEYSSON. WHILE I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION FACING SOME OF THE AFFECTED EUROPEAN COMPANIES TO WHICH YOU ALLUDED IN YOUR LETTER, I MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT STEPS ON OUR SIDE WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO REACH A CONSENSUS ALONG THE LINES WE DISCUSSED AT LA SAPINIERE. CLEARLY, ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO ENCOURAGE CLAUDE TO TAKE A REASONABLE POSITION ON THESE ISSUES WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED AND WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING FRANCE. I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH CLAUDE DIRECTLY

MY HOPE IS THAT WHEN LARRY, ALLEN AND RICK MEET WITH THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HERE ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, WE WILL FIND A WILLINGNESS TO SET ASIDE THE QUARRELS AND BRUISED FEELINGS OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND CONCENTRATE ON REACHING AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS WAY, SOLUTIONS CAN BE FOUND BOTH TO THE VERY PRACTICAL AND IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS TO WHICH YOU REFERRED IN YOUR LETTER AS WELL AS TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE PRESSING NEED FOR A LONG-TERM, COORDINATED WESTERN STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. I HAVE INFORMED THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATUS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS AND, AS YOU KNOW, WITH THE ONE MINOR CHANGE REGARDING NATURAL GAS PURCHASES, HE FOUND THE PAPER SATISFACTORY. THIS REFLECTS HIS DESIRE TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH OUR ALLIES ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE.

END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT.

I WAS GLAD OF THE OPPORTUNITY OF A WORD WITH YOU ON THE TELEPHONE YESTERDAY. I PROMISED TO LET YOU HAVE A NOTE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MY EC COLLEAGUES THIS WEEKEND IN DENMARK.

THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT ALL MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES ARE NOW PREPARED TO MAKE PROGRESS TO FOLLOW UP THE DISCUSSIONS ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AT LA SAPINIERE. SEVERAL EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND DISMAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT SINCE THAT TIME. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE RIGHT FORUM IN WHICH TO GET THINGS MOVING WOULD BE THE SEVEN TOGETHER WITH THE EC PRESIDENCY AND THE COMMISSION. IN MY PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH GENSCHER AND CHEYSSON WE ALSO AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONTACT ON THESE MATTERS IN OUR SMALLER GATHERINGS, NOT LEAST IN THE MEETING TO BE HELD IN PARIS THIS AFTERNOON. THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER FROM WHICH YOU DREW TO SUM UP DISCUSSION AT LA SAPINIERE. THERE WAS COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT THIS PAPER WAS A GOOD AND USEFUL BASIS FOR CARRYING WORK FORWARD.

I AM THEREFORE NOW A LITTLE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH THE WORK IN HAND. YOU WILL, I THINK, SHORTLY BE RECEIVING A MESSAGE FROM THE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002-#509

BY 105 NARA DATE 6/12/82

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3145

DTG:191837Z OCT 82 PSN: 025641

PRESIDENCY CONFIRMING THESE POINTS.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO DOUBT THAT MY EUROPEAN  
COLLEAGUES WILL BE HOPING FOR AN EARLY AND POSITIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESPONSE FROM YOU. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE RIGHT

TO AIM FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE EXPLORATORY MEETING  
OF THE SEVEN PLUS TWO, IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.  
BUT IT REMAINS VERY IMPORTANT THAT AN EARLY MOVE  
SHOULD NOW BE MADE TO LIFT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST  
EUROPEAN COMPANIES, AND AS I MENTIONED IN MY MESSAGE  
TO YOU LAST WEEK, I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE  
ABLE TO HELP ME IN THIS SOON.  
END TEXT.

SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 3145

DTG:191837Z OCT 82 PSN: 025641

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      SECSTATE WASHDC 3143      DTG: 191635Z OCT 82 PSN: 023655  
SIT917      DATE 10/22/82      TOR: 292/2238Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC 3143

DTG: 191835Z OCT 82 PSN: 023855

SIT: MCF WHL JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RLEHC #3143 2921845  
O 191635Z OCT 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2499

~~SECRET~~ STATE 293143

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EEWT

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO LA SAPINIERE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DANISH AMBASSADOR, ACTING IN HIS ROLE AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EC PRESIDENCY, CALLED ON ME OCTOBER 18 TO SAY THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS BASED ON "THE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTIONS." THEY SUGGESTED THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS (THE SEVEN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES PLUS THE EC PRESIDENCY AND THE EC COMMISSION) WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE GROUP FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS. SEVERAL POINTS ARE LEFT UNCLEAR--WHETHER THE "SUGGESTIONS" MEANS THE NON-PAPER; BY WHOM THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES WILL BE REPRESENTED (A POINT LEFT, BY THE COMMUNITY, AT EACH NATION'S DISCRETION). HOWEVER, THIS MAY BE A BASIS FOR CALLING A MEETING HERE IN WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WHILE WE DESIRE TO KEEP DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE CENTRALIZED IN WASHINGTON, YOU ARE OF COURSE FREE TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR AWARENESS OF THE COMMUNITY'S MESSAGE.

YOU MAY ALSO BE ASKED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF JAPAN. IN THAT CASE, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT JAPAN HAS RESPONDED IN A GENERALLY POSITIVE WAY; THAT JAPAN DOES HAVE PROBLEMS WITH PARA 3(D) OF THE NON-PAPER (REGARDING EXAMINATION OF CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION); THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING THIS POINT FURTHER WITH THE JAPANESE. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #510  
BY HOT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      SECSTATE WASHDC 7345      DTG: 131618Z OCT 82 PSN: 016734  
SIT924      DATE 10/22/82      TOR: 287/1957Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT 001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7345/01 2871956  
O 131618Z OCT 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 2180-1 IMMEDIATE

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8154  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 287345  
NODIS  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM EAGLEBURGER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: EEW  
SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO LA SAPINIERE ON EAST-WEST  
ECONOMIC RELATIONS

REF: STATE 286020

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WANT YOU TO HAVE, SOLELY FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE NON-PAPER WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ALLIES DESCRIBED IN REFTEL. AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN THAT MESSAGE, WE WISH FOR THE TIME BEING TO CENTRALIZE DISCUSSION OF THAT DOCUMENT HERE IN WASHINGTON.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(1) OUR GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF CONDUCTING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR ON THE BASIS OF A GLOBAL AND COMPREHENSIVE POLICY DESIGNED TO SERVE OUR OWN FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY INTERESTS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR A COMMON APPROACH IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, WHERE ACTIONS MUST BE COORDINATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR GLOBAL STRATEGY. THEY ARE RESOLVED TOGETHER TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REMOVE DIFFERENCES AND TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE DECISIONS BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON THESE ISSUES ARE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AS A WHOLE, WITH DUE REGARD FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS AND IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

(2) THEY AGREE THAT THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA SHOULD

GOVERN THE ECONOMIC DEALINGS OF THEIR COUNTRIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

--THAT THEY WILL NOT UNDERTAKE TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE THE EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE MILITARY CAPACITY, ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL, OF THE USSR.

--THAT IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO CONDUCT TRADE WITH THE USSR WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF SUBSIDIZING THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

--THAT THEY WILL TAKE NO STEPS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

THEY AGREE TO EXAMINE THOROUGHLY HOW TO APPLY THESE CRITERIA, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VARIOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED, WITH THE VIEW TO AGREEING ON A COMMON LINE OF ACTION. THEY WILL PAY DUE ATTENTION IN THE COURSE OF THIS WORK TO THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO TAILOR THEIR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO THE SPECIFIC SITUATION OF EACH OF THEM.

THIS OVERALL ANALYSIS WILL TOUCH IN PARTICULAR ON THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

--STRATEGIC GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE (COCOM);

SECSTATE WASHDC 7345      DTG: 131618Z OCT 82 PSN: 016734  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

--HIGH TECHNOLOGY OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE INCLUDING OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT;

--CREDIT POLICY;

--ENERGY.

IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY, THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, AS THEY ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON IMPORTS OF ENERGY, WILL INITIATE A STUDY OF PROJECTED EUROPEAN ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT DECADE AND BEYOND AND POSSIBLE MEANS OF MEETING THOSE REQUIREMENTS. THE UNITED STATES WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. IT WILL BE PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE OECD.

(3) AS AN IMMEDIATE DECISION AND FOLLOWING DECISIONS ALREADY MADE, THEY HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THEY WILL WORK TOGETHER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE (COCOM) TO PROTECT THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE. THE LIST OF STRATEGIC ITEMS WOULD BE EVALUATED AND, IF NECESSARY, ADJUSTED. THIS OBJECTIVE WILL BE PURSUED AT THE COCOM REVIEW MEETING BEGINNING OCTOBER 4 IN PARIS. THEY FURTHER AGREE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSIVENESS OF COCOM AND TO ENHANCE THEIR NATIONAL MECHANISMS AS NECESSARY TO ENFORCE COCOM DECISIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#511

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
SIT923

SECSTATE WASHDC 7345  
DATE 10/22/82

DTG: 131618Z OCT 82 PSN: 016736  
TOR: 287/1958Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7345/02 2871956  
O 131618Z OCT 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 2180-1 IMMEDIATE

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8155  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 287345  
NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM EAGLEBURGER

(B) IT WAS AGREED AT VERSAILLES THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO PERIODIC EX POST REVIEW. THE ALLIES ARE AGREED ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH WITHOUT DELAY THE NECESSARY MECHANISM FOR THIS PURPOSE. HAVING IN MIND THE OBJECTIVE OF NOT SUBSIDIZING THE SOVIET ECONOMY, ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL ALSO ESTABLISH THE MEANS TO HARMONIZE NATIONAL POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE EXTENSION OF CREDITS, COVERING INTEREST\_RATES, MATURITIES, DOWN PAYMENTS, AND FEES.

(C) DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDY ON ENERGY, ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT ENTER INTO ANY NEW CONTRACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PURCHASE OF NATURAL GAS.

(D) ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO EXAMINE IMMEDIATELY WHETHER THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS REQUIRE CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE OF STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT, TO BE JOINTLY DETERMINED, BUT INCLUDING TECHNOLOGY WITH DIRECT APPLICATION TO THE OIL AND GAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECTOR. ACTIONS WOULD BE AGREED UPON AND IMPLEMENTED WITHIN A FRAMEWORK ASSOCIATED WITH COCOM. END TEXT  
SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 7345

DTG: 131618Z OCT 82 PSN: 016736

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      SECSTATE WASHDC 2337      DTG: 070206Z OCT 82 PSN: 006096  
SIT897      DATE 10/14/82      TOR: 280/0227Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
-----

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #2337 2800229  
O 070206Z OCT 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1852

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8119  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 282337  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, XF, UK, US, SA  
SUBJECT. FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP

REF: HOOVER/PLACKE/CLUVERIUS TELCONS

1. ~~A~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH FCO COLLEAGUES PRIOR TO PYM'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST, IF MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SHARE WITH THEM LINE WE HAVE BEEN TAKING WITH ARABS IN RECENT DAYS. POINTS IN PARA 3 BELOW HAVE BEEN MADE TO OUR ARAB FRIENDS (JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT) IN THE CONTEXT OF FORTHCOMING HUSSEIN-ARAFAT MEETING IN THE HOPE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WILL BE BASED ON A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH OUTCOMES WOULD FIT WITH OUR-- INITIATIVE AND WHICH WOULD NOT.

3. THESE ARE THE CONCERNS AND FACTS WHICH WE WOULD HOPE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HUSSEIN COULD KEEP IN MIND AS HE BEGINS THE SEARCH WITH ARAFAT FOR PLO SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN'S ROLE AS NEGOTIATOR:

-- FIRST, THE GOAL IS A NEGOTIATING POSITION THE PLO AND JORDAN CAN AGREE SHOULD BE PURSUED WITH ISRAEL, NOT

ONE WHICH IS PREDICATED ON U.S. SUPPORT OR APPROVAL AS A PRECONDITION FOR ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT'S POSITIONS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE.

-- THEY SHOULD AVOID LANGUAGE THAT ISRAEL COULD USE TO CREDIBLY ARGUE THAT HUSSEIN IS NOT A LEGITIMATE NEGOTIATOR, BUT MERELY A STALKING HORSE FOR THE PLO.

-- THE "GAME" IS STILL CAMP DAVID, WITH ITS ESSENTIAL

INITIAL FOCUS ON A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS, WITH FINAL STATUS TALKS BEGINNING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LATER THAN THREE YEARS AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEGINS (OUR VIEW IS THAT WE NEED NOT AND SHOULD NOT WAIT FOR THREE YEARS; THE SOONER THE BETTER).

-- THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD NOT PUT ALL THEIR EFFORT INTO FINAL STATUS ISSUES BUT START TO DEVELOP AS WELL A NEGOTIATING POSITION ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

-- IN DEVELOPING POSITIONS THEY WOULD BE WELL-ADVISED TO BEGIN FROM THE OUTSET TO FACTOR INTO THEIR THINKING WAYS TO MEET ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS.

-- WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY WOULD FOCUS ON THE PROCEDURES FOR INVOLVING PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS: BONA FIDE RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA CAN JOIN THE JORDANIAN AND EGYPTIAN DELEGATIONS WITHOUT ISRAELI OR U.S. VETTING. IN OUR VIEW, RECENTLY EXILED WEST BANK MAYORS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BONA FIDE. DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 2337

DTG: 070206Z OCT 82 PSN: 006096

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #5/2

BY LAT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 10 6018 DTG:111845Z OCT 82 PSN: 013292  
SIT998 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 285/1306Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP WHLR VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #6018 2841849

O 111845Z OCT 82 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2099

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6268

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9210

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3957

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 286018

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, UR, US, UK, GE, IT, FR

SUBJECT: LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTERS ON

SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETINGS

1. A - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER AFTER ADDING APPROPRIATE PERSONAL SALUTATIONS. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR -----:

.. NOW THAT I HAVE HAD TIME TO REFLECT ON MY MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO, I WANT TO GIVE YOU SOME OF MY PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS. THIS WILL SUPPLEMENT OUR RECENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONVERSATIONS AND THE DETAILED BRIEFINGS YOUR AMBASSADORS HAVE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON AND BRUSSELS.

.. BOTH MEETINGS WERE SOBER AND SUBSTANTIVE, WITH A MINIMUM OF GROMYKO'S USUAL POLEMICS. INDEED, I WAS

IMPRESSED THAT HE DID NOT PUSH ANY OF THE PROPAGANDISTIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN HIS UNGA SPEECH, AND AGREED THAT THE INF AND START TALKS ARE PROCEEDING IN A SERIOUS MANNER. NOR DID HE EVEN MENTION BREZHNEV'S SIX POINT MIDDLE EAST PROPOSAL, THOUGH HE DID SPEAK AT LENGTH ABOUT OUR ALLEGED EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE MOSCOW FROM THE AREA.

.. AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT AND I HAD DECIDED BEFORE THE MEETINGS TO PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. GROMYKO'S RESPONSE WAS PREDICTABLY HARD, EMPHASIZING THAT THE STATE HAD TO HAVE THE FINAL WORD IN

SUCH CASES. ON POLAND, AFGHANISTAN AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS WERE ALMOST ENTIRELY STANDARD FARE.

.. DURING THE SECOND MEETING, I SUGGESTED THAT WE CONCENTRATE ON TRYING TO MAKE PROGRESS IN A FEW SPECIFIC AND LIMITED AREAS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION BY OUR EXPERTS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GROMYKO AGREED TO MY PROPOSAL THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS GET TOGETHER PRIOR TO RESUMPTION OF THE MADRID MEETING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT, THE MADRID CSCE MEETING AND OTHER ISSUES.

.. AT MY SUGGESTION, GROMYKO AND I ALSO AGREED THAT US-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CONTINUE ON THE NAMIBIA/ANGOLA ISSUES. AS YOU KNOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CROCKER HAS HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS AT DEPUTY MINISTER LEVEL ON THESE ISSUES, AND WE WILL BE SUGGESTING THAT ANOTHER 'XCHANGE TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW IN NOVEMBER. I AM CONSIDERING HAVING CROCKER JOIN AMBASSADOR HARTMAN FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON A RENEWED EFFORT TO GAIN SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE CONTACT GROUP'S EFFORTS.

.. ON NON-PROLIFERATION, GROMYKO AND I DISCUSSED INTENSIFICATION OF ALREADY EXISTING US-SOVIET BILATERAL CONTACTS. AT THE RECENT IAEA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AMBASSADOR RICHARD KENNEDY SUGGESTED TO HIS SOVIET

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COUNTERPART THAT A ROUND OF EXPERT-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH. I REITERATED THIS INVITATION TO GROMYKO, AND WE AGREED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS PROPOSAL.

.. NONE OF THESE MODEST STEPS COULD BE CONSIDERED A BREAKTHROUGH; INDEED EACH OF THESE AVENUES OF DIALOGUE IS IN THE EXPLORATORY STAGE. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE THIS WILL ALLOW US TO DISCUSS A FEW AREAS WHERE PROGRESS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

.. GROMYKO AND I DID NOT DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT. WE DID CONSIDER ANOTHER MEETING BETWEEN US, BUT THIS WAS LEFT UNTIL WE SEE HOW OUR RELATIONS DEVELOP IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

.. MY OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT BOTH GROMYKO AND I WERE OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ARE LARGE AND DEEP, AND THAT PROGRESS WILL BE DIFFICULT. I THINK THIS IS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP BECAUSE OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND OUR DIFFERENCES ON SO MANY ESSENTIALS. AT THE SAME TIME, I BELIEVE GROMYKO NOW UNDERSTANDS THAT WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE OUR CURRENT COURSE, IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S AND MY CONVICTION THAT WE SHOULD EXPLORE WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP CAN BE IMPROVED IN PRACTICAL WAYS.

.. I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO CONSULT ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT. SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT. DAM

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #513

BY hst NARA DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 34 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 3795 DTG: 190844Z SEP 82 PSN: 038273  
SIT053 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 262/0856Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #3795 2620853  
O R 190844Z SEP 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 0920  
AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 5323  
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 2450  
AMEMBASSY ROME NIACT IMMEDIATE 8305  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE 2720

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0003  
WHITE HOUSE 8066  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 263795  
NODIS  
USEEC, FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE FROM EAGLEBURGER  
E.O. 12356: DECL. DADR  
TAGS: EEWTFIN SU  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON  
- SANCTIONS QUESTION

REF: STATE 257594

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 17 EVENTS IN BONN, BRITISH  
EMBASSY HAS ADVISED DEPARTMENT THAT FIVE-NATION FOREIGN  
MINISTERS MEETING COULD NOT TAKE PLACE AS SUGGESTED  
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26 BETWEEN 2:00 AND 4:00 DUE TO  
GENSCHER'S TRAVEL PLANS. BRITISH ALSO ADVISED THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CHEYSSON IS STILL RELUCTANT TO MEET DUE TO ALLEGED  
"DISCRIMINATION" AGAINST CREUSOT-LOIRE AND BECAUSE HE  
BELIEVES EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS TAKING  
INITIATIVE IN THIS MATTER. WE HAVE ASKED EMBASSY PARIS  
TO CLARIFY SITUATION REGARDING CREUSOT-LOIRE DENIAL  
ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE FRENCH THAT NO  
"DISCRIMINATION" IS INVOLVED IN NARROWING SCOPE OF  
ORIGINAL DENIAL ORDER AGAINST CREUSOT-LOIRE BUT THAT  
DELAY IN TAKING THIS ACTION RESULTED FROM LEGAL STEPS  
OF CREUSOT-LOIRE'S ATTORNEYS.

3. ON OTHER ISSUE OF WHETHER EUROPEANS SHOULD BE SEEN  
AS TAKING INITIATIVE, THE SECRETARY'S POSITION REMAINS  
THAT HE IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH HIS EUROPEAN  
COLLEAGUES FOR A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE

SANCTIONS QUESTION AND RELATED MATTERS IF THEY WISH TO  
MEET WITH HIM. HE WILL BE SEEING ALL OF THEM  
BILATERALLY DURING THE UNGA AND THERE WILL BE SEVERAL  
MULTILATERAL MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AS WELL AS THE NATO  
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AT LA SAPPINERE.  
CONSEQUENTLY, EVEN IF THERE IS NO REPEAT NO FIVE-NATION  
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE  
SANCTIONS ISSUE, THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE FULLY  
DISCUSSED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER DURING THAT PERIOD.

4. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH  
US THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM CONTINUES TO FEEL THAT A  
FIVE-NATION MEETING, PERHAPS INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE EC PRESIDENCY AND THE COMMISSION, WOULD BE  
DESIRABLE. PYM PLANS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT FURTHER  
WITH CHEYSSON AND HIS OTHER COLLEAGUES AT THE SEPTEMBER  
20 EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING; HE IS ALSO SCHEDULED  
TO MEET WITH CHEYSSON BILATERALLY ON SEPTEMBER 22. THE  
BRITISH ASSUME THAT CHEYSSON WILL NOT AGREE FINALLY TO  
A MEETING UNTIL AFTER HIS BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE  
SECRETARY, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR SUNDAY EVENING  
SEPTEMBER 26. THEY ARE PERFECTLY RELAXED ABOUT  
ALLOWING CHEYSSON TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING THE  
MEETING POSSIBLE, IF THIS IS INDEED CHEYSSON'S PLAN.

5. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SECRETARY INTENDS TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM HIS EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES  
REGARDING THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND DESIRES, AND WE DO NOT  
PLAN TO TAKE ANY STEPS TO ORGANIZE A MEETING. WHILE  
THE BRITISH ARE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL, THEY DO NOT  
WISH TO BECOME TOO EXPOSED ON THIS MATTER, WHICH IS  
QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE, AND WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE THINGS  
ANY MORE DIFFICULT FOR FRANCIS PYM IN HIS TALKS WITH  
CHEYSSON AND OTHERS. CONSEQUENTLY, IF ASKED BY THE  
PRESS REGARDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MEETING IN NEW  
YORK ON THIS SUBJECT WITH THE OTHER FOUR FOREIGN  
MINISTERS, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TO  
SAY THAT DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 26 TO ROUGHLY  
OCTOBER 6 THE SECRETARY WILL BE SEEING HIS EUROPEAN  
COUNTERPARTS BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY IN NEW YORK  
AND LA SAPPINERE AND THAT IT IS POSSIBLE DURING THIS  
PERIOD THAT SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE ORGANIZED. THE US  
IS NOT TAKING THE INITIATIVE, HOWEVER, TO ORGANIZE SUCH  
A MEETING. AT THIS POINT, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT  
WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, THE CHANGES IN THE FRG GOVERNMENT

WILL HAVE ON EUROPEAN INTEREST IN A MEETING. ON THIS  
ISSUE, OUR POSITION IS THAT ANY CHANGES IN BONN ARE  
STRICTLY A GERMAN INTERNAL MATTER AND THAT WE  
ANTICIPATE NO CHANGES IN US-FRG RELATIONS.

6. THIS MESSAGE IS FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS INFORMATION  
ONLY, AND POSTS SHOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVES WITH HOST  
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES REGARDING PROPOSED MEETING  
UNLESS INSTRUCTED SEPARATELY. FOR THE TIME BEING,  
DEPARTMENT WOULD PREFER TO HANDLE CONTACTS ON THIS  
ISSUE WITH UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON, WHICH HAS BENEFITS OF  
AVOIDING MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MAINTAINING OUR POSITION  
THAT BRITISH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANIZING A MEETING,  
IF ONE IS TO BE HELD. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 3795

DTG: 190844Z SEP 82 PSN: 038273

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #515

BY *WAT*

*6/12/82*

## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER <sup>36</sup>~~113~~ LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 7379 DTG: 141228Z SEP 82 PSN: 030918  
SIT065 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 257/1255Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7379 2571252  
O 141228Z SEP 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0614  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2025  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5079  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2556  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ STATE 257379  
E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: AINF  
SUBJECT: UPGRADING HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS  
REF: LONDON 19521

1. HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR REFTEL ARE UPGRADED TO NODIS.  
PLS RECALL ALL COPIES AND REISSUE WITH NEW MARKINGS.

2. THIS DOES NOT RPT NOT CONSTITUTE AUTHORITY FOR LATERAL  
TRANSMISSION OF FUTURE QUADRIPARTITE TELEGRAMS.

SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #517

BY LDT, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1756  
SIT086 DATE 10/12/82

DTG: 271859Z AUG 82 PSN: 007889  
TOR: 239/2208Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #1756 2391918  
O 271859Z AUG 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0000  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000  
USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY PRAIA IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 241756

MODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM AF ASSIST. SEC. CROCKER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TAGS: PEPR, AO, US

SUBJECT: WHERE WE ARE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

REF: (A) PRAIA 1600, (B) DAKAR 7743

1. A - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES FOR AMBASSADORS' BACKGROUND ONLY WHERE WE ARE IN OUR ANGOLA/NAMIBIA INITIATIVES SO THAT YOU WILL BE IN AN INFORMED POSITION TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT AS APPROPRIATE. END SUMMARY.

3. AS WE MOVE INTO WHAT CAN BE THE FINAL, DECISIVE WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ANGOLA/NAMIBIA QUESTION, I WANT TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHERE WE ARE SO THAT

YOU WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS. OVER THE PAST MONTH THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE INTENSIFIED ON ALL FRONTS: WITH THE ANGOLANS, WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) AND THE UN IN NEW YORK, AND WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. EVENTS WILL MOVE EVEN MORE QUICKLY IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD. THE PHASE II DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FLS AND UN IN NEW YORK HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY COMPLETED. FINAL DETAILS REGARDING UNTAG COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT

REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM FINESSE MUST BE WORKED OUT, BUT THESE ARE NOT MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE CONTACT GROUP (CG) COULD BE READY TO SEEK WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS A RESOLUTION FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 435, IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WITH THE ANGOLANS ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. THE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORTS, THEREFORE, IS ON OBTAINING AN ACCEPTABLE COMMITMENT FROM THE MPLA ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL DURING PHASE III.

4. THE TWO MISSIONS BY GENERAL WALTERS TO ANGOLA IN JUNE AND JULY AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN BUILDING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. THOSE MISSIONS UNDERLINED U.S. SERIOUSNESS IN WORKING WITH THE MPLA TO FIND A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE WITHDRAWAL PROBLEM.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WALTERS MOVED THE DISCUSSIONS BEYOND EXPLORATION AND SPARRING TO A FRANK AND HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. WALTERS' PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AS THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FORCED THE MPLA INTO A MORE INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE ON ITS BOTTOM LINE ON WITHDRAWAL. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS APPARENTLY EMERGED WITH A PARTY MANDATE TO PURSUE THE DISCUSSIONS WITH US SEEKING TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE. WHILE SOME WITHIN THE MPLA ARE EXTREMELY NERVOUS ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, WHICH COULD THREATEN THEIR PERSONAL POSITIONS (I.E. THE HARDLINE MULATTOS AND TRADITIONAL ALLIES OF THE SOVIETS), DOS SANTOS APPEARS TO BE OPERATING ON THE BASIS OF A BROAD MANDATE FROM THE PARTY AS A WHOLE AND HIS STRENGTH AS A CONSENSUS LEADER MAKES HIM A CREDIBLE NEGOTIATOR.

5. THE MISSION WHICH MY SENIOR DEPUTY FRANK WISNER LED TO ANGOLA AUGUST 17 TO 20 MADE PROGRESS ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. THE FACT THAT DOS SANTOS MET WISNER FOR TWO HOURS, THE WARMTH OF THE RECEPTION, AND SIX HOURS OF FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT'S SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER CARLOS FERNANDES AND FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE ALL SIGNALLED MPLA READINESS FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. JORGE'S PRESENCE AT ALL THE MEETINGS PRESENTED A UNITED MPLA FRONT.

6. WISNER CARRIED A TOUGH INTRODUCTORY MESSAGE WHICH LEFT DOS SANTOS WITH NO DOUBT THAT THE DECISIVE MOMENT IN THE NEGOTIATION HAD ARRIVED. HE REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF OUR GOOD FAITH EFFORTS THROUGH A YEAR OF DIALOGUE TO WORK OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE

WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. WISNER WENT ARMED WITH FRESH IDEAS ON HOW ANGOLA'S SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED AS CUBAN WITHDRAWAL TAKES PLACE. DOS SANTOS UNDERLINED THAT ANGOLA WANTS TO MAKE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE AND APPRECIATES THE URGENCY INVOLVED.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #518

~~SECRET~~

RV hat

6/12/82

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1756

DTG: 271859Z AUG 82 PSN: 007889

7. THE SECURITY GUARANTEE PACKAGE WHICH WISNER OUTLINED WOULD INVOLVE A FRAMEWORK OF INFORMAL RECIPROCAL

SECSTATE WASHDC 1756

DTG: 271859Z AUG 82 PSN: 007889

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSURANCES GIVEN BY ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA RESPECTIVELY TO THE U.S. ANGOLA WOULD COMMIT ITSELF TO WITHDRAWAL DURING PHASE III AND WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE TIMING AND NUMBERS; SOUTH AFRICA WOULD PLEDGE RESPECT FOR ANGOLA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. BOTH SIDES WOULD PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO ABIDE BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN FOR NAMIBIA. THE ANGOLANS TOOK THE POINT THAT THE DETAILED SCENARIO FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA WOULD RESULT IN A NEW, IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION ON THE GROUND FOR ANGOLA. SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO BASE; THE SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE IS SPECIFIED; A CEASEFIRE WILL BE IN PLACE; AND A FULL UNTAG FORCE WILL BE DEPLOYED. THE US-PROPOSED CEASEFIRE BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION WHICH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF IMPLEMENTATION WOULD ALSO CREATE AN IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION. THE CBI WOULD REQUIRE, AMONG OTHER ELEMENTS, SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND THE CESSATION OF ALL CROSS-BORDER HOSTILITIES.

8. WE MADE CLEAR TO THE MPLA THAT MOVEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD MEAN STEADY PROGRESS TOWARDS THE GRADUAL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. THE U.S. WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH OTHER POTENTIAL DONORS IN A BROAD-BASED EFFORT TO ASSIST THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANGOLA. THIS WAS NOT A CARROT-WAVING SESSION. HOWEVER, THE ANGOLANS DID NOT PRESS US FOR MORE DETAILS.

9. INSTEAD, THE MPLA FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERNS. THEY SOUGHT CLARIFICATION ON THE CONTENT OF A POSSIBLE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY GUARANTEE, BUT DID NOT QUESTION THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING IT. IN ANOTHER APPARENT INDICATION THAT THE MPLA IS THINKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL, JORGE AND DOS SANTOS PROBED ON THE UNITA QUESTION. WE URGED JORGE TOWARDS A REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL APPROACH, NOTING THAT THE CHANGED SITUATION ON THE GROUND AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN WILL INEVITABLY

MODIFY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND UNITA

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHICH THE MPLA ALLEGES TO EXIST. INTER ALIA, WE UNDERSCORED THE POINT THAT UNITA WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE EVEN IF SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORT IS REDUCED OR ENDED AND THAT THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY OF RESOLVING THAT PROBLEM IS THROUGH AN INTERNAL ACCOMMODATION. JORGE LISTENED CLOSELY AND TOOK THE POINTS ON UNITA.

10. THE ANGOLANS HAVE PROMISED TO GET BACK TO US ON AN URGENT BASIS WITH MORE DETAILED IDEAS ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THE NAMIBIA PROCESS WOULD BOG DOWN IF PROGRESS IS NOT MADE SOON ON THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. THIS, WE POINTED OUT, WAS NOT A THREAT OR A DEADLINE BUT SIMPLY THE REALITY -- WE CANNOT KEEP THE PARTIES, ESPECIALLY SOUTH AFRICA, ENGAGED MUCH LONGER

IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT ON ANGOLA'S PART. THERE IS, IN EFFECT, A CRACK IN THE ANGOLAN POSITION -- THEY HAVE MOVED BEYOND THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE ANGOLA-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 4, 1982 WHICH STATED THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL COULD OCCUR ONLY AFTER A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. THE MPLA IS NOW ACTIVELY CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL DURING PHASE III.

11. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS. THE MPLA HAS NOT YET MADE ANY COMMITMENT ON NUMBERS OR TIMING. DOS SANTOS FRANKLY SAID THAT ANGOLA WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THE FLS AND ITS FRIENDS (I.E. THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS) AND ARRIVE AT AN INTERNAL CONSENSUS. IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD THERE MAY BE INTENSIFIED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE MPLA NOT TO COMPROMISE. SOME OF THIS MAY BE DONE THROUGH DISINFORMATION EXACERBATING MPLA SECURITY CONCERNS. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO PLAY ON THE CONCERNS OF THOSE WITHIN THE PARTY, ESPECIALLY THE PROMINENT MULATTO HARDLINERS AND THOSE BLACKS WHO HAVE BEEN OPENLY ALIGNED WITH THE SOVIETS, FOR WHOM CUBAN WITHDRAWAL COULD SPELL PERSONAL LOSS OF POWER.

12. AS THE MPLA WORKS TO DEVELOP CONCRETE IDEAS ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL QUESTION AND ARRIVE AT WHAT WILL BE THE MOST POLITICALLY SENSITIVE DECISION EVER TAKEN BY THE PARTY, DOS SANTOS AND THE REST OF THE MPLA LEADERSHIP WILL NEED ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT. THE FLS, OUR CG

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTNERS, AND OUR OTHER INFLUENTIAL EUROPEAN ALLIES MUST PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS. YOU SHOULD ALL BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS AS THE SITUATION UNFOLDS.

13. THE PORTUGUESE HAVE PLAYED A PARTICULARLY HELPFUL ROLE IN URGING THE ANGOLANS TOWARDS FLEXIBILITY ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL QUESTION. A HIGH-LEVEL MISSION SENT TO LUANDA ON THE EVE OF WISNER'S VISIT INFLUENCED THE POSITIVE TONE OF DOS SANTOS' DISCUSSIONS WITH WISNER.

14. THE MPLA HAS NOT BACKED AWAY FROM INFLEXIBILITY ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. TACTICALLY, WE ARE CONCENTRATING OUR EFFORTS ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE; CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IS CLEARLY A PREREQUISITE FOR RECONCILIATION. RECONCILIATION REMAINS A KEY OBJECTIVE; OUR ASSESSMENT CONTINUES TO BE THAT THE REALITY OF A CONTINUING CIVIL WAR WILL FORCE THE MPLA TO SEEK AN ACCOMMODATION WITH UNITA. WHILE WE DO NOT WANT TO PRESS THE RECONCILIATION THEME AT THIS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT ANY INITIATIVE WHICH MAY BE LAUNCHED BY OTHER AFRICANS OR THE MPLA ITSELF.

15. FOR DAKAR, ABIDJAN, PRAIA, LIBREVILLE. IN ADDITION TO OUR SPECIFIC WORK WITH THE CG AND FLS, WE WANT TO KEEP THE MODERATE AFRICANS INFORMED. YOU MAY DRAW VERY CAREFULLY ON SEPTEL TALKING POINTS FOR FLS IN ORDER TO BRIEF AT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 1756

DTG: 271859Z AUG 82 PSN: 007889

~~SECRET~~

## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 39 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 3812 DTG:192345Z AUG 82 PSN: 053243  
SIT106 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 232/0528Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

SECSTATE WASHDC 3812

DTG:192345Z AUG 82 PSN: 053243

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #3812 2320011  
O 192345Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9332

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 233812

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EFIN EEWT

SUBJECT: UK PROPOSAL FOR HIGH-LEVEL STUDY OF EAST-  
WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

REF: LONDON 18182

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT STUDY WHICH PYM PROPOSED TO THE SECRETARY AT THEIR JULY 27 MEETING AND WHICH UK POLITICAL DIRECTOR BULLARD MENTIONED TO CHARGE AUGUST 17 (REFTEL) IS POTENTIALLY A VERY USEFUL INITIATIVE. YOU SHOULD INFORM BULLARD THAT OUR REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL REMAINS POSITIVE AND SUGGEST THAT HE PLAN TO RAISE IT, AS A UK IDEA, AT THE NEXT QUAD POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY INDICATIONS BRITISH MIGHT HAVE REGARDING LIKELY FRENCH REACTION TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE NOTHING AGAINST IT AND WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN WHETHER UK SHARES THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE FRG POSITION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. AS FAR AS MODALITIES ARE CONCERNED, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY THOUGHTS BULLARD MIGHT HAVE ON HOW SUCH A STUDY WOULD BE CONDUCTED AND THE TIMETABLE HE ENVISAGES. WE SHARE UK THINKING THAT, ASSUMING AGREED PAPER CAN BE DEVELOPED IN THE QUAD, NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR ONE OF THE QUAD COUNTRIES TO TABLE STUDY IN NATO OR OTHER APPROPRIATE FORUM AND SEEK ALLIED CONSENSUS. LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD, WE CAN SEE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF THIS STUDY FOR NEXT ECONOMIC SUMMIT. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

598-002 #520

BY WOT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~