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Folder Title: United Kingdom
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer DLB 10/20/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (03/16/1983-04/14/1983) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

FOIA F02-071/1 COLLINS

Box Number 20

63

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29128	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET R 2/2/2010 F02-071/1	1	3/18/1983	B1
29129	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #29118; #161340Z MAR 83; LETTER - SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO LARRY EAGEBURGER D 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	3	3/16/1983	B1
29130	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET R 2/2/2010 F02-071/1	1	3/28/1983	B1
29131	CABLE	#281825Z MAR 83; LETTER - DAVID GOODALL TO LARRY EAGELBURGER D 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	2	3/28/1983	B1
29132	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET R 2/2/2010 F02-071/1	1	3/30/1983	B1
29133	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR TO BUD MCFARLANE, RE: YOUR MEETING WITH DAVID GOODALL, 3:00PM, MARCH 30, 1983 R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1	1	3/30/1983	B1
29134	PAPER	BIO	1	3/30/1983	B1
29135	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET R 2/2/2010 F02-071/1	1	4/6/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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FOIA F02-071/1 COLLINS

Box Number 20

63

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29136	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, RE: US-UK REVIEW ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	4/6/1983	B1
29137	LETTER	LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO DAVID GOODALL, EDITED ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	3	ND	B1
29138	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR/BOB LINHARD/DON FORTIER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: US-UK REVIEW ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	2	4/6/1983	B1
29139	MEMO	LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, FRED IKLE, RE: US-UK REVIEW ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	4/5/1983	B1
29140	LETTER	CLEAN COPY OF 29137 ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	3	ND	B1
29141	CABLE	#311502Z MAR 83; LETTER - DAVID GOODALL TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER ***D 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1***	2	3/31/1983	B1
29142	MEMO	EDITED DRAFT VERSION OF #29136 ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	ND	B1
29143	LETTER	ORIGINAL OF PAGE 2 OF #29137 ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	ND	B1

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FOIA F02-071/1 COLLINS

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
29144	NOTE	"BUD" MCFARLANE TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: EAGLEBURGER -- GOODALL DIALOGUE ON UPDATING US-UK ***R 2/2/2010 F02-071/1***	1	4/5/1983	B1	
29145	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET ***PAR 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	4/14/1983	B1	B3
29146	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO [THE PRESIDENT], RE: MEETING WITH U.K. AMBASSADOR SIR OLIVER WRIGHT ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	ND	B1	
29147	PAPER	MEETING WITH UK AMBASSADOR SIR OLIVER WRIGHT ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	ND	B1	
29148	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SIR OLIVER WRIGHT ***R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1***	1	4/14/1983	B1	

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NSC/S PROFILE TOP SECRET ID 8390327

RECEIVED 18 MAR 83 12

TO EAGLEBURGER, L FROM ARMSTRONG, ROBERT DOCDATE 16 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: MSG TO EAGLEBURGER RE LORD LEWINS 9 MARCH LTR TO LONDON TIMES

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F02-071/1 #29128
BY RW NARA DATE 2-3-10

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390113 8390138 NSCIFID (B / B)

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DISPATCH MAR 18 1983 W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 90327

Date: MAR 1 8 1983

Subject: ARMSTRONG MESSAGE

AL OF dlb 10/20/06

Classification: ☐ Top Secret ☒ Secret ☐ Confidential ☐ Unclassified

ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ADDRESSES SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESSES AND ROOM NUMBER TO INSURE PROMPT/APPROPRIATE DELIVERY:

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DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO:
BT MERCHANT
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 90327 3

Date: MAR 1 8 1982

Subject: ARMSTRONG MESSAGE dtb 10/20/06

Classification: ☐ Top Secret ☒ ~~Secret~~ ☐ Confidential ☐ Unclassified

ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ADDRESSES SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESSES AND ROOM NUMBER TO INSURE PROMPT/APPROPRIATE DELIVERY:

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
29129	CABLE DUPLICATE OF #29118; #161340Z MAR 83; LETTER - SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO LARRY EAGEBURGER	3	3/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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29130

NSC/S PROFILE ~~TOP SECRET~~ ID 8390378

RECEIVED 28 MAR 83 17

TO EAGLEBURGER, L FROM GOODALL, DAVID DOCDATE 28 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: GOODALL MSG TO EAGLEBURGER

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

BLAIR

FORTIER

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F02-071/1 #29130
BY RW NARA DATE 2-3-10

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390300 NSCIFID (B / B)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90378 8

Date MAR 2 8 1983

Subject: GOODALL MSG TO EAGLEBURGER db 10/20/06

CLASSIFICATION: ☒ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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____ Sit. Room	____ Mr. Helm	____ Mr. McGaffigan	____ Ms. Reger	____ Mr. Weiss
____ Mr. Bailey	____ Mr. Kemp	____ Mr. McMinn	____ Mr. Robinson	____ Mr. Wettering
1 Cmdr. Blair	____ Mr. Kimmitt	____ Mr. Morris	____ Col. Russell	____ Col. Wheeler
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UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR,JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1300 Wilson Blvd. #1051, Arlington, VA				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), 8th & SO Courthouse Rd, Arlington, VA				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

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Box Number
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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
29131	CABLE #281825Z MAR 83; LETTER - DAVID GOODALL TO LARRY EAGELBURGER	2	3/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
RW 2/3/10

2913

NSC/S PROFILE ~~TOP SECRET~~ ID 8390400

RECEIVED 30 MAR 83 10

TO MCFARLANE FROM BLAIR DOCDATE 30 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS GOODALL, DAVID

ARMSTRONG, ROBERT

SUBJECT: MTG W/ GOODALL ON 30 MAR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F02-071/1 #29132
BY RW NARA DATE 2-3-10

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390113 8390138 NSCIFID (B / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
C	MAR 31	McFarlane noted		DS

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

12

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90400

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	1	RCM HAS SEEN	
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

COMMENTS

For meeting today at 3:00.

29133

SYSTEM II:
90400

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with David Goodall, 3:00 p.m., March 30, 1983

David Goodall has taken Robert Wade-Gerry's place as deputy to Sir Robert Armstrong. He comes from the job of DCM in the U.K. Embassy in Bonn. (Wade-Gerry has gone on to be the High Commissioner in New Delhi.) ~~(U)~~

The purpose of the meeting is to establish the personal link with you that Wade-Gerry had. It appears that Goodall will be handling the same sensitive Anglo-U.S. projects, and it is a good idea for each of you to know the face on the other end of the cabinet line. In addition, the Brits know that on most of these projects the President has the final word, and they therefore wish to talk to the President's man. ~~(S)~~

The specific subjects for discussion are:

-- Updating Murphy-Dean Agreement. Goodall will want to impress on you that Mrs. Thatcher needs to have a veto over dispersion of GLCMs from their U.K. bases. Hopefully by the time of your meeting we will have worked out a mutually acceptable formula. I will let you know before the meeting. ~~(TS)~~

-- Further discussions on the dual-key issue. Mrs. Thatcher has informed us that she wants to discuss the "larger nuclear control issue," when the Murphy-Dean agreement has been updated. We need to know what is on Mrs. Thatcher's mind - is she interested just in working out a new public line, or is she actually interested in some tighter form of control than the current arrangements? ~~(TS)~~

-- The "Star Wars" speech. When I spoke with Goodall briefly yesterday, he was wringing his hands about the damage done in the U.K., and Europe generally, by the President's defense speech. I went through the rationale for intensive research on ABM, but Goodall may want to hear it from you. ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F02-071/1 #29133
BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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29134	PAPER BIO	1	3/30/1983	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE ~~TOP SECRET~~ ID 8390431

~~RDS 2/9/10~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 06 APR 83 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM BLAIR DOCDATE 06 APR 83

FORTIER 06 APR 83

LINHARD 06 APR 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: US - UK REVIEW OF MURPHY DEAN AGREEMENT

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F02-071/1 #29135
BY RW NARA DATE 2-3-10

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390300 NSCIFID (B / S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90431 16

Date APR 0 6 1983

Subject: US – UK TALKS

APPROVAL OF CLASSIFICATION db 10/20/04

CLASSIFICATION: ☒ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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___ Adm. Poindexter	___ Mr. Guhin	___ Mr. Martin	___ Mr. Reed	___ Mr. Tyson
___ Sit. Room	___ Mr. Helm	___ Mr. McGaffigan	___ Ms. Reger	___ Mr. Weiss
___ Mr. Bailey	___ Mr. Kemp	___ Mr. McMinn	___ Mr. Robinson	___ Mr. Wettering
3a Cmdr. Blair	___ Mr. Kimmitt	___ Mr. Morris	___ Col. Russell	___ Col. Wheeler
___ Mr. Boverie	___ Mr. Kraemer	___ Ltc. Myer	___ Col. Rye	#3 NSC Secretariat XXXXX XXXXXXX
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___ Cmdr. Dur	3c Ltc. Linhard	___ Mr. Pollock	___ Mr. Sommer	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	#1/ORIGINAL	4/6/83	1612	
THE SECRETARYOF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	#2	6 Apr 83	15:56	
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THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR,JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1300 Wilson Blvd. #1051, Arlington, VA				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), 8th & SO Courthouse Rd, Arlington, VA				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET

No. 90431

dlb 10/20/06

COPY #3 (NSC)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
APR 0 6 1983	[signature]		

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

29136

THE WHITE HOUSE

II-90431

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: US-UK Review of Murphy-Dean Agreement ~~(TS)~~

We believe that we can be somewhat more forthcoming in meeting British concerns than the reply which you propose to David Goodall. We see no harm in the British noting that the arrangements with the United States have been reconfirmed by the current heads of government. Attached is an annotated version of your proposed letter to David Goodall, with suggested changes along these lines. ~~(TS)~~

for Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Tab A - Suggested Revised Reply

cc: Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Department of Defense

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F02-071/, #29136
BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

NSC

~~TOP SECRET~~

29137

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Dear David,

Thank you for your March 31 message reiterating your views on public handling of the nuclear control issue.

As I noted in our very useful discussions on March 30, the public line you have proposed raises serious problems for us. I recognize the political difficulties faced by HMG in managing this issue. At the same time, I am sure you understand and share our equally serious concerns about the impact this issue could have on the credibility of our deterrent and our relationship with other Allies.

It is perfectly natural for the British public, which is accustomed to the UK being an independent nuclear power, to expect that their government has special bilateral procedures in force with the United States regarding release of nuclear weapons. However, highlighting such arrangements with the UK could lead other Allies to demand analogous bilateral arrangements for themselves, or leave them in the politically difficult position of having to explain and defend to their publics the absence of such arrangements.

Any public suggestion that the unique American-British understandings had been extended, modified, or updated subsequent to elaboration of the NATO procedures would simply be intolerable to other Allies -- and especially to other INF basing countries. In this context, even drawing attention to the unclassified 1952 Truman-Churchill communique and its references to "joint decision" presents problems, despite the fact that the understanding in the communique significantly pre-dates Alliance-wide arrangements such as the Athens guidelines and subsequent statements.

In formulating my comments below, I have tried to take full account of your own concerns, as well as our own. I know you will accept them in that spirit.

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

NSC

heads of government had reaffirmed them

With regard to the first "element" noted in your letter -- public acknowledgement that existing procedures had been updated -- the U.S. would not be able to agree to any language which implied the existence of formal bilateral agreements beyond the 1952 communique and subsequent NATO arrangements. Unfortunately, a statement that procedures had been updated would do just that. However, we would have no difficulty with a statement which suggests that existing arrangements had been reviewed, [~~and~~] found fully satisfactory. [~~a characterization which I believe accurately describes our recent discussions concerning the 1958 Murphy-Dean agreement.~~]

(Not accurate we protested privately, but did not contradict publicly)

On your second element, we could accept a statement which made clear that existing arrangements would apply to cruise missiles based in the UK, whether on- or off-base.

On your last element, the U.S. consistently has sought to discourage even public reference to the joint decision formula contained in the 1952 communique, for the reasons I described above. [~~Nevertheless, we have in the past reluctantly acquiesced in its use during periods of public pressure on HMG.~~] However, we would have great difficulty with any formula which went beyond it.

In light of these concerns, I would suggest for your consideration an HMG statement along the following lines:

"In light of the planned deployment of United States ground-launched cruise missiles, the United Kingdom and United States have reviewed existing arrangements for United States use of bases in the UK, and U.S. forces to be deployed there. [~~They agreed that~~] these arrangements, which have been satisfactory to all British governments for the last three decades, [would] they apply fully to U.S. cruise missiles based in the UK, whether those systems were on- or off-base. The Government of the United Kingdom is therefore fully assured that use of these systems would be in accordance with the understanding contained in the 1952 Truman-Churchill communique.

In addition, I could envision an American spokesman acknowledging, at an appropriate time, that existing arrangements for control of United States nuclear systems based in the United Kingdom had been reviewed, and confirming that

The Prime Minister and the President of the United States reaffirmed

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

NSC

they would apply to ground-launched cruise missiles. I do not believe that we could go beyond this, however, without raising the prospect of an intra-Alliance debate on nuclear control that would add substantially to our difficulties on INF and perhaps do lasting damage to the credibility of our deterrent.

As always, I appreciate the candor and spirit of cooperation that have marked our discussions. I look forward to your reaction to my suggestions and to prompt agreement on how to handle public discussion of this sensitive issue in a manner which best serves our mutual concerns.

With warm regards,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

NSC

608

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90431

APR 0 6 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	J	A
Bud McFarlane	separate copy		D
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		D
Sit Room			APR 0 6 1983

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

COMMENTS

Send via courier to the Embassy.
ASAP.

29138

SYSTEM II:
90431

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~ **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL** SENSITIVE

ACTION April 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR/~~BOB~~ LINHARD/DON FORTIER SIGNED

SUBJECT: U.S.-U.K. Review of Murphy-Dean

Larry Eagleburger has sent you a memorandum (Tab B) proposing a reply to David Goodall's recent message (Tab C). Goodall asked for U.S. comments on his suggested "elements" of a public line for the British government to take on the question of control of the ground-launched cruise missiles. The British government expects there to be a parliamentary debate on this question as early as next week. ~~(S/S)~~

In general, Eagleburger's reply is not very forthcoming. We believe that it is to our advantage to give the Brits a little more latitude to talk about existing arrangements if it will help them effectively turn off future public debate on the subject. In addition, the British government has in fact already stated publicly these "elements" either in the heat of parliamentary debate, or in response to press questions in recent months. What they propose now is to bring them together in a single coherent statement. If we withhold approval of these elements, it is likely that the Brits will use them anyhow. ~~(S/S)~~.

The primary danger in this exercise is that other nations, particularly INF basing nations, will ask for the same control over their nuclear weapons that the British have, and will ask for the same public acknowledgement. Blair and Linhard have not yet seen any indication from another NATO country that would support this "domino theory." Because they have their own nuclear deterrent, and because of their long history of nuclear cooperation with the United States, the British are regarded as different. Fortier is more concerned about this problem, and believes that the current environment is so fluid and volatile as to make the traditional acceptance of other countries a weak guide for the future. ~~(TS/S)~~

We would therefore propose two additions to the proposed statement which is offered in the Eagleburger letter: (S/S)

-- All three of us would support the inclusion of an acknowledgment that the existing arrangements have been reaffirmed by the current U.S. President and U.K. Prime Minister (the British have already stated this on several occasions, and it gives a flavor of Mrs. Thatcher's personal role, which is important in the public debate);

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

-- Blair and Linhard recommend a specific statement that the use of the bases and systems would be a matter of joint decision between the governments (the current proposed wording merely refers to the 1952 Truman-Churchill communique). Fortier opposes going this far at this time, and believes instead that we should wait to see if parliamentary interest in this question doesn't further subside. We have just tabled a new negotiating proposal for INF which should help us regain the offensive; what limited additional options we have for forging a consensus should be used sparingly and only when essential. ~~(S/S)~~

The Defense Department believes that we should go no further than the language in Eagleburger's proposed reply. In addition to the "domino theory" considerations, they also have a frustrated feeling that the British are going soft on nuclear questions, and that we need to hold the line. ~~(S/S)~~

If you concur that we should be somewhat more forthcoming with the Brits along the lines we suggest, attached at Tab I is a note from you to Eagleburger to that effect, forwarding a marked-up copy of his reply to Goodall. ~~(C)~~

RECOMMENDATION

OK	NO	
__	__	That you sign the memorandum to Larry Eagleburger at Tab I (as amended, if necessary, to delete the authorization for public disclosure of our joint-decision framework).

Tab I	Memo to Eagleburger
Tab A	Eagleburger proposed letter to Goodall
Tab B	Eagleburger memo to McFarlane & Ikle
Tab C	Cable to Eagleburger from Goodall

B

29139

SUPER SENSITIVE
8310126

United States Department of State

SYSTEM II
90431

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

April 5, 1983

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council

Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Department of Defense

Subject: US-UK Review of Murphy-Dean Agreement

In follow up to our March 30 meeting, David Goodall has written to me to reiterate British views on public handling of the ongoing review and updating of the Murphy-Dean agreement. He has asked for a prompt response in order to help prepare HMG for renewed questioning on the nuclear control issue when Parliament resumes on April 11.

A proposed response to Goodall is attached for your review. The letter reiterates our concerns about the British desire to indicate publicly that special bilateral procedures for joint US-UK decision on nuclear control had been reviewed and updated. In addition, to help shape British thinking on a public line--and to make clear what we could or could not accept--the letter contains a proposed text for a British statement on the subject. At the same time, it offers a future U.S. acknowledgment that we had reviewed existing understandings, without, however, suggesting that we had "updated" specific bilateral control procedures.

I would appreciate your comments no later than 10:00 a.m. April 6, so that the response to Goodall can be transmitted early enough to provide time for resolving any differences before Parliament resumes next week.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Attachments

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

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NLRR F02-071/1 #29139
BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Dear David,

Thank you for your March 31 message reiterating your views on public handling of the nuclear control issue.

As I noted in our very useful discussions on March 30, the public line you have proposed raises serious problems for us. I recognize the political difficulties faced by HMG in managing this issue. At the same time, I am sure you understand and share our equally serious concerns about the impact this issue could have on the credibility of our deterrent and our relationship with other Allies.

It is perfectly natural for the British public, which is accustomed to the UK being an independent nuclear power, to expect that their government has special bilateral procedures in force with the United States regarding release of nuclear weapons. However, highlighting such arrangements with the UK could lead other Allies to demand analogous bilateral arrangements for themselves, or leave them in the politically difficult position of having to explain and defend to their publics the absence of such arrangements.

Any public suggestion that the unique American-British understandings had been extended, modified, or updated subsequent to elaboration of the NATO procedures would simply be intolerable to other Allies -- and especially to other INF basing countries. In this context, even drawing attention to the unclassified 1952 Truman-Churchill communique and its references to "joint decision" presents problems, despite the fact that the understanding in the communique significantly pre-dates Alliance-wide arrangements such as the Athens guidelines and subsequent statements.

In formulating my comments below, I have tried to take full account of your own concerns, as well as our own. I know you will accept them in that spirit.

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

With regard to the first "element" noted in your letter -- public acknowledgement that existing procedures had been updated -- the U.S. would not be able to agree to any language which implied the existence of formal bilateral agreements beyond the 1952 communique and subsequent NATO arrangements. Unfortunately, a statement that procedures had been updated would do just that. However, we would have no difficulty with a statement which suggests that existing arrangements had been reviewed and found fully satisfactory, a characterization which I believe accurately describes our recent discussions concerning the 1958 Murphy-Dean agreement.

On your second element, we could accept a statement which made clear that existing arrangements would apply to cruise missiles based in the UK, whether on- or off-base.

On your last element, the U.S. consistently has sought to discourage even public reference to the joint decision formula contained in the 1952 communique, for the reasons I described above. Nevertheless, we have in the past reluctantly acquiesced in its use during periods of public pressure on HMG. However, we would have great difficulty with any formula which went beyond it.

In light of these concerns, I would suggest for your consideration an HMG statement along the following lines:

"In light of the planned deployment of United States ground-launched cruise missiles, the United Kingdom and United States have reviewed existing arrangements for United States use of bases in the UK, and U.S. forces to be deployed there. They agreed that these arrangements, which have been satisfactory to all British governments for the last three decades, would apply fully to U.S. cruise missiles based in the UK, whether those systems were on- or off-base. The Government of the United Kingdom is therefore fully assured that use of these systems would be in accordance with the understanding contained in the 1952 communique."

In addition, I could envision an American spokesman acknowledging, at an appropriate time, that existing arrangements for control of United States nuclear systems based in the United Kingdom had been reviewed, and confirming that

they would apply to ground-launched cruise missiles. I do not believe that we could go beyond this, however, without raising the prospect of an intra-Alliance debate on nuclear control that would add substantially to our difficulties on INF and perhaps do lasting damage to the credibility of our deterrent.

As always, I appreciate the candor and spirit of cooperation that have marked our discussions. I look forward to your reaction to my suggestions and to prompt agreement on how to handle public discussion of this sensitive issue in a manner which best serves our mutual concerns.

With warm regards,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger


C

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Collection Name
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Withdrawer
DLB 10/20/2006

File Folder
UNITED KINGDOM (03/16/1983-04/14/1983) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

FOIA
F02-071/1
COLLINS

Box Number
20

63

ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29141	CABLE #311502Z MAR 83; LETTER - DAVID GOODALL TO LARRY EAGLEBURGER	2	3/31/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

29142

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II:
90431

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: U.S.-U.K. Review of Murphy-Dean Agreement

~~I~~ We believe that we can be somewhat more forthcoming in meeting British concerns than the reply which you propose to David Goodall. ~~It seems to me that other NATO countries realize that the U.S. nuclear weapons relationship with the United Kingdom is unique, and that we therefore do not risk great adverse consequences if the British emphasize the "joint decision" formulation, as they have been doing in recent months. In addition,~~ We see no harm in the British noting that the arrangements with the United States have been reconfirmed by the current heads of government. Attached is an annotated version of your proposed letter to David Goodall, with suggested changes along these lines. (TS)

Robert C. McFarlane

Tab A Suggested revised reply

cc: Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Department of Defense

~~TOP SECRET~~
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NLRR F02-071/1 #29142
BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

and that the current heads of government had reaffirmed them

29143

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

With regard to the first "element" noted in your letter -- public acknowledgement that existing procedures had been updated -- the U.S. would not be able to agree to any language which implied the existence of formal bilateral agreements beyond the 1952 communique and subsequent NATO arrangements. Unfortunately, a statement that procedures had been updated would do just that. However, we would have no difficulty with a statement which suggests that existing arrangements had been reviewed, ~~and~~ found fully satisfactory, ~~a characterization which I believe accurately describes our recent discussions concerning the 1958 Murphy-Dean agreement.~~

(Not accurate - we protested privately, but did not contradict publicly)

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In addition, I could envision an American spokesman acknowledging, at an appropriate time, that existing arrangements for control of United States nuclear systems based in the United Kingdom had been reviewed, and confirming that

The Prime Minister and the President of the United States reaffirmed

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

Brian 29144

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 5, 1983

SECRET/SENSITIVE

John Poindexter

Subject: Eagleburger--Goodall Dialogue on Updating US-UK Nuclear Relaease Procedures

Last night after you left, we received the attached proposal from Larry containing a draft reply from him to Goodall on how to proceed with respect to UK public treatment of the state of the agreement for control of nukes in the UK.

I think it is very tough and rightly so. I have no problem with it.

Please give it to Dennis and Don Fortier and ask that one of them get back to Larry (or Arnie Kanter who works it for him) and give him our concurrence unless Dennis and Don see some problem I have missed. Then, if Larry has received Fred Ikle's concurrence, we should go ahead to send it from here to Goodall by Cabinet line.

Larry is looking for our position by 10:00am Wednesday .

Many thanks

Bud

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NLRR F02-071/1 #29144
BY RW NARA DATE 2/3/10

29145

NSC/S PROFILE ~~TOP SECRET~~ ID 8390484

RECEIVED 14 APR 83 16

TO CLARK FROM BLAIR DOCDATE 14 APR 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WRIGHT, OLIVER

SUBJECT: TALKERS PRES APR 14 MTG W/ AMB WRIGHT RE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROL PROCEDURES

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE: STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

CLARK

FOIA(b)(1)
(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRRF02-071/#29145
BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390431 NSCIFID (C / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	IP 4/15	[redacted]		
	C APR 20 198			DBW

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE SI (C)

29146

SYSTEM II:
90484

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEETING WITH U.K. AMBASSADOR SIR OLIVER WRIGHT

DATE: April 15, 1983
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:35 p.m.
FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK WPC WPR

I. PURPOSE

To receive a letter from Mrs. Thatcher delivered by Sir Oliver Wright on the subject of nuclear weapons control procedures. ~~(U)~~

II. BACKGROUND

Sir Oliver will be presenting to you a letter from Prime Minister Thatcher on the subject of control procedures for the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to be stationed in the United Kingdom. Mrs. Thatcher will be asking for your approval in saying more openly that she has a veto over the use of those weapons. ~~(TS)~~

As you know, under the terms of a 1952 agreement which you (like all your predecessors) reaffirmed on taking office, you will seek Mrs. Thatcher's agreement before using nuclear weapons stationed in the U.K. However, most of our other Allies in Europe do not have this same veto on our nuclear weapons and so we have attempted to keep it secret. We have not been entirely successful, and this agreement is now a "semi-secret." Mrs. Thatcher would like to make it an "open secret" because she feels the British public will be more supportive of the weapons if they know there is a British finger on the trigger. ~~(S)~~

So far we have resisted British requests to acknowledge the secret agreement and have insisted that they not go public. When Sir Oliver delivers this latest request, you will want to say that we feel the agreement should be kept secret, but will review Mrs. Thatcher's request and respond to it. ~~(S)~~

III. PARTICIPANTS
President
William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane
Sir Oliver Wright

IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
1:35 p.m. - 1:45 p.m. Oval Office meeting.

~~TOP SECRET~~
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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

-- THE SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR CONTROL IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, AND WE KNOW YOU APPRECIATE THE NEED TO HANDLE IT DELICATELY.

-- BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON OTHER ALLIES, AND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE, WE HAVE OPPOSED OPEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SECRET U.S.-U.K. NUCLEAR CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.

-- I KNOW MRS. THATCHER'S RESOLUTION ON ATLANTIC DEFENSE AND HER STAUNCH SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES.

-- I WILL STUDY MRS. THATCHER'S MESSAGE CAREFULLY, AND WILL RESPOND PROMPTLY.

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

National Security Council
The White House

622

Package # 90484

40

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	1	VM	A
Jacque Hill	2		
Judge Clark	3		
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

Either Judge - you should seek a moment alone with Pres on this or put this in book for 9:30.

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Mtg has just been ret. 4/15 01:35pm
We need to get to Dawson
ASAP

~~Pls make copies for~~ WPC & RCm

043

29148

SYSTEM II
90484

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ SIGNED

ACTION April 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sir Oliver Wright
1:35 p.m., Friday, April 15, 1983

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the President to prepare him for his meeting tomorrow with Sir Oliver Wright to receive a message from Mrs. Thatcher on the subject of nuclear weapons control procedures.

RECOMMENDATION

OK	NO	
—	—	That you send the memo at Tab I to the President

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F02-071/1 #29148
BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11