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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
Country File:  
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(11/01/1983-06/30/1984) [2 of 3]  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 10/23/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM 11/1/83-6/30/84 (2)

**FOIA**

M08-244

**Box Number** 20

JONES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
78369	CABLE	291239Z <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #574</b>	6	2/29/1984	B1
78370	CABLE	101850Z <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #575</b>	2	2/10/1984	B1
78371	DRAFT LETTER	BUD TO SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #576</b>	1	ND	B1
78372	MEMO	PETER SOMMER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH NEIL KINNOCK <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #577</b>	1	1/10/1984	B1
78373	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE ABOVE (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM 78372) <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #578</b>	1	ND	B1
78374	DRAFT LETTER	RON TO MARGARET (ATTACHMENT TO 78372) <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #579</b>	1	ND	B1
78375	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST FOR A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT BY KINNOCK (ATTACHMENT TO 78372) <b>R 6/12/2002 NLRRS98-002 #580</b>	1	12/17/1983	B1
78376	CABLE	16180Z <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #581</b>	2	1/16/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
78377	MEMO	COPY OF ITEM 78373 <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #582</b>	1	1/10/1984	B1
78378	MEMO	UNANNOTATED COPY OF ITEM 78373 <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #583</b>	1	ND	B1
78379	DRAFT LETTER	ANNOTATED COPY OF ITEM 78371 <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #584</b>	1	ND	B1
78380	DRAFT LETTER	COPY OF ITEM 78374 <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #585</b>	1	ND	B1
78381	MEMO	COPY OF ITEM 78375 <b>R 6/12/2002 NLRRS98-002 #586</b>	1	12/17/1983	B1
78382	CABLE	ROME 9324 (150020Z) <b>D 6/12/2002 98-002 #587; R 8/6/2010 M08-244 #78382</b>	7	2/15/1984	B1
78383	CABLE	161100Z <b>D 6/12/2002 98-002 #587; R 8/6/2010 M08-244 #78383</b>	4	1/16/1984	B1
78384	NSC PROFILE SHEET	RE BRITAIN <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #589</b>	1	12/5/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
78385	MEMO	SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE BRITISH REQUEST <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #590</b>	1	12/5/1983	B1
78386	MESSAGE	FROM GEOFFREY HOWE <b>D 6/12/2002 NLRRS98-002 #591</b>	2	12/2/1983	B1
78387	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE BRITAIN <b>R 6/12/2002 NLRRS98-002 #592</b>	1	12/5/1983	B1
78388	CABLE	STATE 322709 (110202Z) <b>D 6/12/2002 NLRRS98-002 #593; R 2/18/2011 M08-244 #78388</b>	4	11/11/1983	B1
78389	CABLE	LONDON 01107 (161657Z) <b>D 6/12/2002 98-002 #594; PAR 2/18/2011 M08-244 #78389</b>	2	1/16/1984	B1
78390	CABLE	190511Z <b>D 6/12/2002 NLRRS98-002 #595; R 2/18/2011 M08-244 #78390</b>	14	1/19/1984	B1
78391	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO MCFARLANE RE YOUR PHONE CALL <b>PAR 8/5/2010 M244/1</b>	1	11/9/1983	B1
78392	NOTE	MCFARLANE TO SIR OLIVER <b>R 7/21/2000 NLRRS98-002 #596</b>	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
78393	MEMO	SOMMER, JACK MATLOCK, TYRUS COBB TO MCFARLANE RE THE MOOD IN EUROPE <i>R 8/5/2010 M244/1</i>	2	11/2/1983	B1
78394	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE THE ALLIES AND GRENADA <i>R 6/12/2002 NLRS98-002 #597</i>	2	11/2/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. V 11/1/83 - 6/30/84 [2 of 3]  
Box 91331

**Date:** September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	291239z 6 p. R 7/21/00 598-002 #574	2/29/84	P1
2. cable	101850z 2 p. R " " #575	2/10/84	P1
3. draft letter	Bud to Sir Robert Armstrong 1 p. R " " #576	nd	P1
4. memo	Peter Sommer to Robert McFarlane re possible Presidential meeting with Neil Kinnock 1 p. (9173) " " #577	1/10/84	P1
5. memo	McFarlane to the President re above (attachment to item #4) 1 p. " #578	nd	P1
6. draft letter	Ron to Margaret 1 p. (attachment to item #4) 1 p. R " " #579	nd	P1
7. memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane re request for a call on the President from Neil Kinnock 1 p. (attachment to item #4) R 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #580	12/17/83	P1
8. cable	161807z 2 p. Z 7/21/00 598-002 #581	1/16/84	P1
9. memo	copy of item #4 1 p. " #582	1/10/84	P1
10. memo	unannotated copy of item #5 1 p. " #583	nd	P1
11. draft letter	annotated copy of item #3 1 p. " #584	nd	P1
12. draft letter	copy of item #6 1 p. " #585	nd	P1
13. memo	copy of item #7 1 p. " #586 R 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #586	12/17/83	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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**Archivist:** cas/cas

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Box 91331

**Date:** September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. cable	150020z 7 p. D 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #587	2/15/84	P1
15. cable	161100z 4 p. D " " #588	1/16/84	P1
16. profile sheet	re Britain 1 p. R 7/21/00 598-002 #589	12/5/83	P1
17. memo	Sommer to McFarlane re British request 1 p. R " " #590	12/5/83	P1
18. message	from Sir Geoffrey Howe 2 p. D 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #591	12/2	P1
19. memo	Hill to McFarlane re Britain 1 p. R " " #592	12/5/83	P1
20. cable	110202z 4 p. D " " #593; R 2/18/4	11/11/83	P1
21. cable	161657z 2 p. D " " #594; PAR "	1/16/84	P1
22. cable	190511z 14 p. D " " #595; R "	1/19/84	P1
23. memo	John Poindexter to McFarlane re your telephone call 1 p. (8381)	11/19/83	P1, P5
24. note	McFarlane to Sir Oliver 1 p. R 7/21/00 598-002 #596	nd	P1
25. memo	Sommer, Jack Matlock, Tyrus Cobb to McFarlane re mood in Europe 2 p. (7753)	11/2/83	P1, P5
26. memo	Hill to McFarlane re the allies and Grenada 2 p. R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #597	11/2/83	P1

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 LONDON 4678  
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TOR: 060/2152Z

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SECDEF WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 04678

EXDIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MILI, US, UK  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MEETING WITH PRIME  
-- MINISTER THATCHER FEBRUARY 27

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. DURING SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S FEBRUARY 27 CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, SHE DISCUSSED WITH HIM AND THE AMBASSADOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF, AND TOUCHED AS WELL ON CENTRAL AMERICA, EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.
3. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID AT THE OUTSET THAT BILATERAL US-UK RELATIONS WERE SOUND, THAT CONSULTATIONS HAD IMPROVED AND WERE WORKING WELL, AND THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY

EXDIS

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CAS 7/21/00



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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 291239Z FEB 84 PSN: 008291

IN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.

EXDIS  
4. CENTRAL AMERICA:

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, SECRETARY WEINBERGER REVIEWED THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WE FACE IN EL SALVADOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON OUR FUNDING, THE SUPPORT NICARAGUA WAS RECEIVING FROM THE SOVIETS AND LIBYANS AND OUR PROBLEMS IN WORKING WITH THE GUATEMALANS IN VIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THERE.

EXDIS  
5. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:

SECRETARY WEINBERGER REVIEWED THE OBJECTIVES OF US POLICY, ASSURING THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE WERE SEEKING ONLY TO BLOCK THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY THAT WOULD BE USED AGAINST US. HE SAID OUR CONCERNS WERE OFTEN MISREPRESENTED AS BEING AN EFFORT ON OUR PART TO FAVOR US FIRMS, AND HE WANTED TO REASSURE THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THIS ABSOLUTELY WAS NOT THE CASE. IT WAS ONLY USED TO BLOCK THE SOVIETS.

EXDIS  
6. EAST/WEST RELATIONS:

THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT HER TRIP TO HUNGARY AND TO THE USSR FOR ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL. SHE SAID THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SOVIETS HAD BOTH BEEN VERY CRITICAL OF THE US IN COMMENTS TO HER, WITH THE SOVIETS ARGUING THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS WITH THE US, SINCE THE US HAD NOT CARRIED THROUGH ON ITS COMMITMENT TO RATIFY SALT II. HOWEVER, SHE HAD WANTED THE SOVIETS AND HUNGARIANS TO UNDERSTAND THE GENUINE US DESIRE FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS.

EXDIS  
7. CHINA:

RESPONDING TO THATCHER'S QUERY ON CHINA, SECRETARY

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 291239Z FEB 84 PSN: 008291

WEINBERGER SAID THE CHINESE HAD BEEN VERY CORDIAL DURING HIS VISIT, THEY HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN OUR TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE, AND IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE SOME FOR MODERNIZATION OF THEIR MILITARY OF A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER. THE CHINESE CONTINUED TO LECTURE US ON TAIWAN BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THE REAL THREAT TO THEM COMES FROM THE NORTH. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT THE CHINESE WERE TYING DOWN 80-PLUS SOVIET DIVISIONS, AND THAT IN ANY EVENT IT WAS VITAL TO KEEP CHINA MORE OR LESS ON OUR SIDE.

### 8. AFGHANISTAN:

THE AFGHANS WERE DOING WELL AGAINST THE SOVIETS, SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID, AND, IN FACT, AT THIS STAGE THE SOVIETS CONTROL LESS OF THE LAND AREA OF AFGHANISTAN THAN THEY DID WHEN THEY FIRST INVADED. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE USING THEIR OWN TROOPS TO SUBDUCE THIS VITAL AREA INDICATED THAT THEY SAW IT AS A ROUTE THROUGH WHICH THEY COULD MOVE TOWARD THE OIL FIELDS OF THE GULF, SHOULD THEY CHOOSE TO DO SO.

### 9. LEBANON:

THATCHER SAID THE POSITION OF THE MNF HAD BECOME UNTENABLE. SECRETARY WEINBERGER AGREED AND  
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 LONDON 4678  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4076  
SECDEF WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 04678

EXDIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MILI, US, UK  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MEETING WITH PRIME  
REVIEWED OUR POSITION ON REDEPLOYING THE MARINES  
OFFSHORE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, ALTHOUGH EQUIPMENT  
WAS EN ROUTE TO ASSIST IN RETRAINING THE LAF, OUR  
ABILITY TO DO THIS WAS CONTINGENT UPON EVENTS AND  
THE ARMY REMAINING MULTICONFESSIONAL. HE POINTED  
OUT THAT THE MNF HAD GONE INTO BEIRUT TO BE AN INTER-  
POSITION FORCE FOR TROOPS WE HOPED WOULD BE WITH-  
DRAWING, AND TO PROVIDE SOME SECURITY AFTER THE PLO  
WITHDREW. WHILE THE MARINES COULD NOT FULFILL THIS  
ORIGINAL PURPOSE ANY LONGER, WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THEM  
OFFSHORE. THATCHER SAID THERE WAS A LIMIT ON HOW LONG  
TROOPS COULD STAY ON SHIPS, WHICH LAY BEHIND HMG'S  
DECISION TO TRANSFER THE UK CONTINGENT TO CYPRUS.

10. ARAB-ISRAEL:

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 291239Z FEB 84 PSN: 008297

EXDIS

THATCHER ASKED ABOUT ISRAELI VIEWS AND POLICIES, NOTING THAT THE SHAMIR GOVERNMENT APPEARED SHAKY. SHE WONDERED WHETHER ISRAELI POLICIES WERE ACCEPTABLE TO AMERICAN JEWISH OPINION. SHE RECALLED THAT THE SABRA/SHATILA MASSACRES HAD CAUSED BEGIN TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. SHE REMARKED THAT, WHENEVER THERE WAS A PROBLEM, IT SEEMED THAT ISRAEL ANNEXED WHAT IT WANTED. SHE URGED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REAPPRAISAL OF ISRAELI POLICY. SHE DREW THE SECRETARY'S ATTENTION TO ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

EXDIS

11. THATCHER SAID WE ABSOLUTELY HAVE TO SUPPORT KING HUSSEIN. MOREOVER, SHE FELT THAT THE WEST BANK MUST BE FOR THE PALESTINIANS, NOT THE PLO. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE WEST MUST SUPPORT HUSSEIN, AND OUTLINED US EFFORTS TO PROVIDE HUSSEIN THE SUPPORT HE REQUIRES, INCLUDING THE JLP. THATCHER AND WEINBERGER AGREED THAT JORDAN MUST BE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE THREAT FROM THE SYRIANS. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE SAUDI ELEMENT OF THIS EQUATION.

EXDIS

EXDIS

12. IRAN-IRAQ WAR:  
THATCHER SAID THE WAR WAS VERY WORRISOME. SHE NOTED THAT THE WEST DID NOT NEED MORE SUCCESSES BY MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS. SHE STRESSED THAT THE UK WAS NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAN EXCEPT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS CONTRACTS. SHE SAID BRITAIN ABSOLUTELY WAS NOT SUPPLYING ENGINES FOR CHIEFTAIN TANKS. SHE POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL, SYRIA AND NORTH KOREA WERE SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAN.

13. SHE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LIKELY, THAT IRAN WOULD CLOSE THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. RETURNING TO HER EARLIER THEME, SHE REITERATED THE DANGER TO SOME OF THE SMALLER GCC

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STATES IF KHOMEINI SUCCEEDED IN THE GULF. HOWEVER,  
SHE POINTED OUT THAT FANATICAL MUSLIMS SUCH AS  
KHOMEINI ALSO REPRESENT A THREAT TO COMMUNISTS.  
SHE SUGGESTED THAT, IF IT BECAME NECESSARY TO  
TAKE ACTION TO REOPEN THE STRAIT BY MILITARY  
MEANS, MAYBE THE WEST SHOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH THE  
SOVIETS IN ADVANCE, MAKING IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT  
MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF  
SECURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF, NOT TO  
WIDEN THE CONFLICT OR CAUSE A SUPERPOWER CONFRONTA-  
TION. PRICE  
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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 LONDON 5051  
SIT314 DATE 03/06/84

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MESSAGE:

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FM LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 101850Z FEB 84 VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS  
FM AMBASSADOR PRICE - LONDON  
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN - THE WHITE HOUSE  
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

FROM MY PERSPECTIVE ON THIS SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC, LET ME  
STRONGLY URGE YOU TO ATTEND THE FUNERAL OF ANDROPOV. THE  
EFFECTS OF SUCH A TRIP WOULD BE EXTREMELY BENEFICIAL IN MY  
VIEW FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.

1. THE TRIP WOULD GREATLY ADVANCE YOUR PERCEPTION IN  
EUROPE AS A MAN WHO SEEKS PEACE, UNDERSTANDING AND A  
REDUCTION IN TENSION BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR.
2. AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE UNEASY ABOUT SUCCESSION  
THIS GESTURE WOULD ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS ONE OF GOOD WILL.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #575

CLS

7/21/00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 5051

5

DTG: 101850Z FEB 84 PSN: 055945

3. BY A DEMONSTRATION OF SUCH GOOD WILL, IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE STALLING THE RESUMPTION OF INF AND START TALKS.

4. IT WOULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH A NUMBER OF SOVIET LEADERS, ONE OF WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ANDROPOV'S SUCCESSOR.

5. IT WOULD GIVE YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFORMALLY MEET SOVIET LEADERS WITHOUT THE FORMALITY OR EXPECTATIONS OF A SUMMIT.

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8309173

RECEIVED 19 DEC 83 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 17 DEC 83

By C15

10/8/98

KEYWORDS. GREAT BRITAIN

AP

KINNOCK, NEIL

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR KINNOCK W/ PRES DURING 11 - 25 FEB

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO RYAN DUE: 21 DEC 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

MATLOCK

TYSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8338424

LOG

NSCIFID

( HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Mcfarlane	X	1/11	For Decision		
Sommer	S	JAN 13 1984	for redo	1/13	
Mcfarlane	X	1/13	For Decision	1/13	
Kimmit	X	JAN 20 1984	for signature		
		JAN 20 1984	Kimmit spl SP		PS
DISPATCH	ed	mm			

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MK



943

RECEIVED  
National Security Council  
The White House  
84 JAN 20 P 4: 39

System # I  
Package # 9173 Add-on #2

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WPh</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>✓</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>JAN 20 1984</u>	<u>D/Handcarry</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information   A = Action   R = Retain   D = Dispatch   N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

RECEIVED  
National Security Council  
The White House  
84 JAN 11 AM 11: 29

System # I  
Package # 9173

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WPh</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>		
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		
Situation Room			

9:30 A  
[Signature]

I = Information   A = Action   R = Retain   D = Dispatch   N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Route to Sommer for further action.  
Cable to Armstrong due today 1/13/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

White House Cl.  
By CS

10/8/91

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9173 Add-On

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 20, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Rh*

REQUEST: Meeting between the President and British  
Labor Party Leader Neil Kinnock

PURPOSE: To exchange views on world affairs.

BACKGROUND: The previous Labor Leader, Michael Foot, made  
a conscious effort not to come to the U.S.  
Kinnock, who wishes to return to a more  
traditional Labor Party relationship with the  
U.S., will be in Washington in February, and  
has asked to meet with the President. Past  
Presidents, including Nixon, Ford and Carter  
have traditionally met with British  
opposition leaders. Mrs. Thatcher, while in  
opposition, met with both President Carter  
and Ford.

PREVIOUS: None.  
PARTICIPATION:

DATE AND TIME: February 13 or 14, 1984 DURATION: 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President, Robert C.  
McFarlane, Secretary Shultz; Neil Kinnock, 2  
members of his delegation.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Twenty minute meeting with photo opportunity.

REMARKS REQUIRED: NSC to provide briefing papers.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity at beginning of meeting.

RECOMMENDED BY: State.

OPPOSED BY: None.

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert Kimmitt/Charles Tyson/Peter Sommer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

B, OLS \_\_\_\_\_ August 28, 1987  
to 10/8/98 January 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Neil Kinnock

Pursuant to our conversation, attached at Tab I is a scheduling proposal for British Labor Party Leader, Neil Kinnock.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve *K* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Schedule proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

9173

9137 Add-On

ACTION

January 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Meeting with Neil Kinnock

Pursuant to the instructions I received, attached for your signature is a private message from you to Sir Robert Armstrong concerning the possibility of a Presidential meeting with British Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize release of the message at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab A      Message to Armstrong

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CABINET OFFICE

FOR SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

Dear Sir Robert:

Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock will be in the U.S. in February and is seeking an appointment with the President. The President is not inclined to meet with him. The Labor Party has increasingly taken positions inimical to our interests. Moreover, the President's schedule is full.

During Kinnock's Washington visit, he will, I understand, be meeting with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger. The Vice President, who often meets with opposition leaders, will either be out of town or just returning during Kinnock's visit.

By not meeting with Kinnock, we do not wish to create a political controversy in Britain. Therefore, if Mrs. Thatcher believes that the President should agree to see him, please let me know. I am very pleased that our close relations makes it possible to pose such frank and direct questions.

We are delighted that George Shultz will have an opportunity to review matters of mutual interest with Mrs. Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe on his way to Stockholm.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Bud

DEC 10 1976  
598-002 /RE/LEASED  
4576  
C48 7/21/08

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

January 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PR*

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Meeting with Neil Kinnock

In response to our overview memo on European visitors during the first half of 1984, you indicated that the President would not be keen on meeting with British opposition leader Neil Kinnock and suggested a back-channel to Mrs. Thatcher seeking her views (NSC Log 9407 redo).

Both Embassy London and State have strongly endorsed a Presidential meeting, albeit I am sure they would settle for a brief one (Tab II). Their major argument is that in seeking a Presidential meeting Kinnock has made a deliberate gesture to overturn the practice of former Labor leader Michael Foot, who bragged that he had not been in the U.S. in over twenty-five years. State also claims that Labor was cooperative in setting up a Presidential appointment for Mrs. Thatcher when she was in opposition.

Kinnock has reportedly now agreed to address the Carnegie Endowment on February 13 so we must either regret or accept his request to meet with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you sign the memo at Tab I, forwarding for the President's consideration a private message to Mrs. Thatcher concerning the Kinnock visit.

Approve ☒ *JSM*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Jack Matlock concurs.

Tab I Memo to the President  
 Tab A Private Presidential message to Mrs. Thatcher  
 Tab II State's recommendation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

*CHS**598-062 #577**7/2/00*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9173

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*  
SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Meeting with Neil Kinnock

British Labor party leader Neil Kinnock will be in the U.S. during the first part of February and has asked to meet with you. Both our Embassy in London and the State Department have endorsed his request. Their major argument is that in seeking a Presidential meeting Kinnock has made a deliberate gesture to overturn the practice of former Labor leader Michael Foot, who bragged that he had not visited the U.S. in over twenty-five years.

I suspect that you would not be keen to meet with him. I am concerned that Kinnock would use the meeting for his own purposes. In recent years the Labor party has taken stances inimical to our interests, particularly on nuclear, defense, and broader East-West issues. I doubt very much that even your persuasive powers will change his views. Previous Presidents, however, have often met with British opposition leaders. To overcome our quandary, I suggest that you send a private message to Mrs. Thatcher seeking her views.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>NO</u>
—	— <i>✓</i>
	That you approve the message to Mrs. Thatcher at Tab A.

Tab A      Message to Mrs. Thatcher

cc: The Vice President  
Michael Deaver

*President wants Bud to go to Sir Robert Armstrong  
Modify cable accordingly.  
J*

Prepared by:  
Peter R. Sommer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*CS*      *598-002 # 578*  
*7/21/00*



FROM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO THE CABINET OFFICE

Dear Margaret:

My staff tells me that Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock will be in the U.S. in February and that he is seeking an appointment with me. I am not inclined to meet with him. The Labor Party has increasingly taken positions inimical to our interests. Moreover, my schedule is full.

During his Washington visit, he will, I understand, be meeting with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger. The Vice President, who often meets with opposition leaders, will either be out of town or just returning during Kinnock's visit.

By not meeting with Kinnock, I do not wish to create a political controversy in Britain. Therefore, if you believe that I should agree to see him, please let me know. I am very grateful that our close personal relations makes me feel free to pose such frank and direct questions.

I look forward to seeing you in June. I am absolutely confident that the London Summit will be a splendid success under your firm leadership.

With warm and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ron

The Right Honorable  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

DE  
594-002  
BY CAS  
120/ASD  
#579  
7/21/00





8338424

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9173

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for a Call on the President from British Labor  
Party Leader Neil Kinnock

Neil Kinnock, new leader of the British Labor Party, would like to make his first trip to the United States in that capacity sometime between February 11-15, 1984 or February 21-25, 1984 to meet with the President. Mr. Kinnock has made clear that he wants to turn the page on the immediate past period of Labor Party leaders who did not visit Washington. We believe it is in our interest to respond positively to Kinnock's desire to return to the more traditional Labor Party relationship with the US through visible consultations with Britain's key NATO ally.

We expect Mr. Kinnock will have speaking invitations from the Carnegie Endowment, the National Press Club, and one of the major TV networks. He would also like to meet with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Regan, Secretary Weinberger and Congressional leaders.

We recommend that the President meet with Neil Kinnock in February for half an hour, with a photo opportunity included. There are numerous precedents for British opposition leaders calling on US Presidents, including Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

Coney

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biography of Neil Kinnock

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #580  
BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8309173

RECEIVED 19 DEC 83 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 17 DEC 83

SOMMER

11 JAN 84

SOMMER

14 JAN 84

By CAS

FILED  
August 28, 1997  
Date 10/14/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AP

KINNOCK, NEIL

SUBJECT APPT REQUEST FOR KINNOCK W/ PRES DURING 11 - 25 FEB

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO RYAN DUE: 16 JAN 84 STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

MATLOCK

TYSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8338424

LOG

NSCIFID

( HW HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
—	1/14	MCFarlane Approved Recurr		
C	1/16	MSG Sent via <del>able</del> cable		P. Jan

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

Natio

**National Security Council**  
**The White House**

84 JAN 13 P 3: 37

System #



Package #

9137

Add ON  
Ra

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

## DISPOSITION

## Bill Martin

1

WTm

**Bob Kimmitt**

✓

к

## John Poindexter

3



**Wilma Hall**

**Bud McFarlane**

4

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "W". It is written above a horizontal line.

A

**Bob Kimmitt**

NSC Secretariat

## Situation Room

60 one  
50 MR

**I = Information**

**A = Action**

**R = Retain**

**D = Dispatch**

**N = No further Action**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

## COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

I recommend revision of Tab A as indicated.  
As originally written, it appears to answer the  
question we are asking.  
NSC/S - cable sent agree

DE ED

34 JAN 1955 P 5: 09

931

# National Security Council The White House

84 JAN 13 P 3: 37

System #

II

Package #

9137

Add ON  
Pa

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	WEM	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	J	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	60		
Situation Room	50		

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

I recommend revision of Tab A as indicated.  
As originally written, it appears to answer the  
question we are asking.  
NSC/S - cable sent agree

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0360 DTG: 161807Z JAN 84 PSN: 056988  
SIT282 AN001347 TOR: 016/1721Z

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DISTRIBUTION: KIMM RLPH /002  
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OP IMMED  
DE WTE #0360 0161721  
O 161807Z JAN 84  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH00360

FOR SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

JANUARY 16, 1984

DEAR SIR ROBERT:

OPPOSITION LEADER NEIL KINNOCK WILL BE IN THE U.S. IN FEBRUARY AND IS SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT. DURING KINNOCK'S WASHINGTON VISIT, HE WILL, I UNDERSTAND, BE MEETING WITH SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER. THE VICE PRESIDENT, WHO OFTEN MEETS WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS, WILL EITHER BE OUT OF TOWN OR JUST RETURNING DURING KINNOCK'S VISIT.

WHILE THE PRESIDENT IS NOT INCLINED TO MEET WITH KINNOCK, WE DO NOT WISH TO CREATE A POLITICAL CONTROVERSY IN BRITAIN. THEREFORE, IF MRS. THATCHER BELIEVES THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD AGREE TO SEE HIM, PLEASE LET ME KNOW. I AM VERY PLEASED THAT OUR CLOSE RELATIONS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO POSE SUCH FRANK AND DIRECT QUESTIONS.

NLS 598002 #581  
BY CAS 7/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0360 DTG: 161807Z JAN 84 PSN: 056988

WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT GEORGE SHULTZ HAD AN OPPORTUNITY  
TO REVIEW MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH MRS. THATCHER AND  
GEOFFREY HOWE ON HIS WAY TO STOCKHOLM.

WITH BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,

BUD

0220

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

73  
9137 Add-On

ACTION

January 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PR Sommer*

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Meeting with Neil Kinnock

Pursuant to the instructions I received, attached for your signature is a private message from you to Sir Robert Armstrong concerning the possibility of a Presidential meeting with British Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize release of the message at Tab A.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*as mod*  
Tab A Message to Armstrong



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

January 10, 1984

SUSPENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PR*

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Meeting with Neil Kinnock

In response to our overview memo on European visitors during the first half of 1984, you indicated that the President would not be keen on meeting with British opposition leader Neil Kinnock and suggested a back-channel to Mrs. Thatcher seeking her views (NSC Log 9407 redo).

Both Embassy London and State have strongly endorsed a Presidential meeting, albeit I am sure they would settle for a brief one (Tab II). Their major argument is that in seeking a Presidential meeting Kinnock has made a deliberate gesture to overturn the practice of former Labor leader Michael Foot, who bragged that he had not been in the U.S. in over twenty-five years. State also claims that Labor was cooperative in setting up a Presidential appointment for Mrs. Thatcher when she was in opposition.

Kinnock has reportedly now agreed to address the Carnegie Endowment on February 13 so we must either regret or accept his request to meet with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you sign the memo at Tab I, forwarding for the President's consideration a private message to Mrs. Thatcher concerning the Kinnock visit.

Approve         Disapprove         

*JM*  
Jack Matlock concurs.

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Private Presidential message to Mrs. Thatcher
Tab II	State's recommendation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

598-002 #582

C/S

TE 7/21/00

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

9173

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Meeting with Neil Kinnock

British Labor party leader Neil Kinnock will be in the U.S. during the first part of February and has asked to meet with you. Both our Embassy in London and the State Department have endorsed his request. Their major argument is that in seeking a Presidential meeting Kinnock has made a deliberate gesture to overturn the practice of former Labor leader Michael Foot, who bragged that he had not visited the U.S. in over twenty-five years.

I suspect that you would not be keen to meet with him. I am concerned that Kinnock would use the meeting for his own purposes. In recent years the Labor party has taken stances inimical to our interests, particularly on nuclear, defense, and broader East-West issues. I doubt very much that even your persuasive powers will change his views. Previous Presidents, however, have often met with British opposition leaders. To overcome our quandary, I suggest that you send a private message to Mrs. Thatcher seeking her views.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

NO

— That you approve the message to Mrs. Thatcher at Tab A.

Tab A Message to Mrs. Thatcher

cc: The Vice President  
Michael Deaver

Prepared by:  
Peter R. Sommer

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

598-002

#583

CLS

7/21/00

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CABINET OFFICE

FOR SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

Dear Sir Robert:

Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock will be in the U.S. in February and is seeking an appointment with the President. ~~[The President is not inclined to meet with him. The Labor Party has increasingly taken positions inimical to our interests. Moreover, the President's schedule is full.]~~

During Kinnock's Washington visit, he will, I understand, be meeting with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger. The Vice President, who often meets with opposition leaders, will either be out of town or just returning during Kinnock's visit.

~~While the President is not inclined to meet [By not meeting]~~ With Kinnock, we do not wish to create a political controversy in Britain. Therefore, if Mrs. Thatcher believes that the President should agree to see him, please let me know. I am very pleased that our close relations makes it possible to pose such frank and direct questions.

We are delighted that George Shultz <sup>had</sup> ~~will have~~ an opportunity to review matters of mutual interest with Mrs. Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe on his way to Stockholm.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Bud

41  
598-002 / 2E/CASED  
#584  
7/2/00

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO THE CABINET OFFICE

Dear Margaret:

My staff tells me that Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock will be in the U.S. in February and that he is seeking an appointment with me. I am not inclined to meet with him. The Labor Party has increasingly taken positions inimical to our interests. Moreover, my schedule is full.

During his Washington visit, he will, I understand, be meeting with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger. The Vice President, who often meets with opposition leaders, will either be out of town or just returning during Kinnock's visit.

By not meeting with Kinnock, I do not wish to create a political controversy in Britain. Therefore, if you believe that I should agree to see him, please let me know. I am very grateful that our close personal relations makes me feel free to pose such frank and direct questions.

I look forward to seeing you in June. I am absolutely confident that the London Summit will be a splendid success under your firm leadership.

With warm and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ron

The Right Honorable  
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

598-002 # 585



8338424

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9173

**CONFIDENTIAL** December 17, 1983MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Request for a Call on the President from British Labor  
Party Leader Neil Kinnock

Neil Kinnock, new leader of the British Labor Party, would like to make his first trip to the United States in that capacity sometime between February 11-15, 1984 or February 21-25, 1984 to meet with the President. Mr. Kinnock has made clear that he wants to turn the page on the immediate past period of Labor Party leaders who did not visit Washington. We believe it is in our interest to respond positively to Kinnock's desire to return to the more traditional Labor Party relationship with the US through visible consultations with Britain's key NATO ally.

We expect Mr. Kinnock will have speaking invitations from the Carnegie Endowment, the National Press Club, and one of the major TV networks. He would also like to meet with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Regan, Secretary Weinberger and Congressional leaders.

We recommend that the President meet with Neil Kinnock in February for half an hour, with a photo opportunity included. There are numerous precedents for British opposition leaders calling on US Presidents, including Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

Covey

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biography of Neil Kinnock

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 598-002 #586  
BY L05 NARA, DATE 6/12/02**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECL:OADR

~~SECRET~~

78382

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 4127  
SIT444 AN009082

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 052044  
TOR: 046/0816Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF KIMM VP SIT EOB /008 DEVER  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

OP IMMED  
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DE RUEHRO #4127/01 0460024

O 150020Z FEB 84

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9324

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 04127

NODIS

S/S-0 PLEASE PASS BY IMMEDIATE TO NSC FOR GEOFF KEMP  
AND WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP;

DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO LONDON, PARIS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,  
DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), U.S., UK, PREL

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

- THATCHER ON LEBANON

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE TETE-A-TETE SESSIONS  
WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, THE VICE PRESIDENT MET ON  
FEBRUARY 12 AT CHEQUERS FOR DISCUSSION WITH ADDITIONAL  
ADVISORS. EAST-WEST PORTION OF CONVERSATION REPORTED  
SEPTEL.

ON LEBANON THATCHER CALLED FOR SETTING ASIDE MAY 17  
AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PROGRESS AND FOR  
POSSIBLE EXPANDED UN ROLE IN BEIRUT. END SUMMARY.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M08-244#78382  
BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 4127

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 052044

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3. PRESENT WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER WERE FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE, DEFENSE MINISTER HESELTINE, FOREIGN OFFICE UNDER SECRETARY ACLAND, CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE STAFF BROMALL AND MRS. THATCHER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY JOHN COLES. ON THE U.S. SIDE IN ADDITION TO THE VICE PRESIDENT WERE AMBASSADOR PRICE, ADMIRAL MURPHY (CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE VICE PRESIDENT), DONALD GREGG, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, JOHN KELLY (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS), GEOFFREY KEMP AND PETER SOMER, BOTH SENIOR STAFF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

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4. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN BEIRUT HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY IN THE LAST TEN DAYS. THE U.S. HAS BEGUN REDEPLOYMENT, NOT WITHDRAWAL, AND WE ARE NOT MOVING THE FLEET. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED MR. KEMP TO OUTLINE U.S. VIEWS.

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5. KEMP STATED THAT WE AGREE WITH THE UK ON THE TACTICAL OBJECTIVES IN BEIRUT. THE SITUATION HAS BEEN ALTERED BY THE ENTRY INTO BEIRUT THROUGH THE GAP IN THE SHUF OF PALESTINIAN, IRANIAN AND OTHER RADICAL ELEMENTS WHICH ARE CHALLENGING THE MODERATE SHIA LEADERSHIP. THE QUESTION FOR THE GOL WAS WHETHER TO CLOSE THE GAP BY MILITARY MEANS OR TRY TO DEAL WITH ANBIH BERRI.

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6. KEMP CONTINUED THAT MOST OF THE MOSLEM LEADERS EXCEPT FOR JUMBLATT AND BERRI CAN LIVE WITH GEMAYEL. BUT GEMAYEL IS AT HIS WEAKEST POINT. HOWE INTERRUPTED THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT GEMAYEL WILL GET ANY STRONGER SO HE OUGHT TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT BEFORE HE IS FURTHER WEAKENED.

7. KEMP OBSERVED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY IS NOT YET FATALLY WEAKENED. MOSLEM ELEMENTS COULD RETURN AFTER A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED. KEMP STATED THAT THOSE WHO CALL

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 4127

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 052044

FOR THE ABROGATION OF THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT MUST ANSWER THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE SYRIANS WOULD THEN BE REASONABLE.

8. MRS. THATCHER SAID THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HOLD UP RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION. HOWE SUGGESTED THAT GEMAYEL COULD SAY THAT MAY 17 IS "INOPERABLE". AT THE FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE GEMAYEL AGREED TO SET ASIDE MAY 17 BUT HE THEN PULLED BACK.

9. MRS. THATCHER SUGGESTED THAT MAY 17 COULD BE "RECONSIDERED" THE MOSLEM PARTIES WILL COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE U.S. COULD EXPLAIN THIS TO ISRAEL AND THE UK WOULD SUPPORT THE U.S. FOR SHAMIR. HOWE AGREED AND SAID THAT ASSAD KNOWS THIS AND THUS PLAYS A WAITING GAME WHILE THE MNF POSITION ERODES. KEMP NOTED THAT ASSAD HAS HIS OWN PROBLEMS: ARAFAT HAS BEEN TO CAIRO AND KING HUSSEIN AND MUBARAK WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

10. MRS. THATCHER OBSERVED THAT GEMAYEL IS YOU LITTLE EXPERIENCE. HOWE CONTINUED THAT GEMAYEL WOULD NEED TO KNOW THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WOULD GO ALONG WITH SETTING ASIDE MAY 17. MRS. THATCHER SAID WE SHOULD GIVE GEMAYEL "A NOD AND A WINK" AND TELL HIM THAT ANY REQUEST HE MAKES ON MAY 17 WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT ANSWERED THAT WE WOULD, OF COURSE,

CONVEY THE BRITISH VIEWS TO WASHINGTON BUT THAT THE CURRENT ANARCHY DOES NOT NECESSARILY ARGUE FOR SETTING

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 4127  
SIT445 AN009083

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 051770  
TOR: 046/0505Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

OP IMMED

STU7087

DE RUEHRO #4127/02 0460025

O 150020Z FEB 84

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9325

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 04127

NODIS

S/S-0 PLEASE PASS BY IMMEDIATE TO NSC FOR GEOFF KEMP  
AND WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP;

DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO LONDON, PARIS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,  
DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), U.S., UK, PREL

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER  
THATCHER ON LEBANON

ASIDE MAY 17.

12. HOWE THEN STATED THAT NAVAL BOMBARDMENT FROM THE  
BATTLESHIP NEW JERSEY IS INFLECTING SEVERE DAMAGE ON  
CIVILIAN LOCATIONS AND IS ENORMOUSLY RESENTED AMONG THE  
MOSLEMS AND IN SYRIA. IN DAMASCUS THIS COULD LEAD TO A  
POPULAR EXACTION WHICH COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL AND  
THREATEN OUR EMBASSIES. IT ALSO MAKES THE RESUMPTION OF  
NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT. NO ONE CHALLENGES THE RIGHT  
OF SELF-DEFENSE BUT INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING WORSENS THE  
SITUATION.

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 4127

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 051770

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13. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED FIRMLY THAT OUR NAVAL GUNFIRE IS NOT INDISCRIMINATE. WE ARE RESPONDING TO SHELLING OF THE MNF OR THE U.S. EMBASSY. WE WILL SHOOT BACK WHEN SOMEONE SHOOTS AT US. OUR GUNFIRE HAS HAD A DETERRENT EFFECT. RECONNAISSANCE OF 50 PCT OF OBSERVABLE TARGETS INDICATES NO DAMAGE TO TOWNS OR RESIDENTIAL AREAS.

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14. MRS. THATCHER AGREED THAT SELF-DEFENSE IS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT. THE VICE PRESIDENT REITERATED THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. HOWE RESPONDED THAT THE UK DEFENSE ATTACHE IN DAMASCUS REPORTED THAT IN ONE VILLAGE THIRTY-FIVE CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED. DEFENSE MINISTER HESELTINE STATED THAT U.S. GUNFIRE HAD INCREASED AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT LAST TUESDAY. IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OCCUR IF THEY HAVE NOT ALREADY. THE VICE PRESIDENT ANSWERED THAT IF ONE DID NOTHING WHEN OUR POSITIONS ARE SHELLED TO DEFEND OUR TROOPS, THAT WOULD NOT BE MORAL. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED RHETORICALLY IF ONE SHOULD SAY TO GEMAYEL "JUST PUT ON A FLACK JACKET AND GO OFF TO SYRIA." MRS. THATCHER SAID THAT THERE IS A PERCEPTION OF INCREASED U.S. FIRE BUT AGREED THAT FIRING IN SELF-DEFENSE IS JUSTIFIED. SHE STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DIFFERENCE ON THIS MATTER IN THE TWO LETTERS SHE HAD RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN.

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15. ACLAND ASKED WHETHER SELF-DEFENSE MEANS FIRING TO PROTECT THE U.S., THE MNF, GEMAYEL, OR THE MARONITE FORCES. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID WE ARE PROTECTING THE MNF AND GREATER BEIRUT. KEMP STATED THAT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE HAD BEEN SHELLED FOR THREE DAYS. WE HAVE FIRED 200 ROUNDS IN RESPONSE TO 2,000 ROUNDS. HESELTINE WONDERED IF WE HAVE EMBARKED ON A ROAD WITHOUT AN END. MRS. THATCHER SAID THERE IS A POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE A NEGOTIATION WITH THE MOSLEM LEADERSHIP. IF THE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 4127

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 051770

SHOOTING STOPPED, NEGOTIATIONS COULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE. KEMP STATED THAT AFTER THE SUNNI LEADERS VISITED DAMASCUS THEY DID NOT DEMAND THE REMOVAL OF GEMAYEL. WE WILL NOT ABANDON GEMAYEL OR THROW IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT.

16. HOWE SAID THAT WE MUST ADDRESS ISRAEL AND ITS SECURITY NEEDS ON THE NORTHERN BORDER. PERHAPS WE NEED AN EXTENDED UN ROLE IN THE SOUTH AND ALONG THE GREEN LINE IN BEIRUT. ACLAND SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAVE GENERAL IDEAS FOR THE UN BUT NO SPECIFICS. THE UK HAS SUGGESTED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT:

- A. THE OBSERVER FORCE DOES NOT NEED A NEW MANDATE,
- B. WE SHOULD EXPAND THE ROLE OF UNIFIL, AND
- C. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD SEND A PERSONAL EMISSARY TO BEIRUT.

17. MRS. THATCHER ASKED IF THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY STUMBLING BLOCK. SHE WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT GEMAYEL WOULD REALLY SHARE POWER WITH THE MOSLEMS. KEMP STATED THAT AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT EVERYTHING IS ON THE TABLE BUT THE SYRIANS CONTINUE TO NIGGLE OVER ANY MOVEMENT.

18. IN SUMMING UP, MRS. THATCHER SAID THAT WE NEED NEW CROSSING PLACES ON THE GREEN LINE; THUS A CHANGE IN THE UN OBSERVER ROLE. WE ALSO NEED A UNIFIL EXPANSION AND A PERSONAL EMISSARY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. ACLAND ADDED

THAT WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE GEMAYEL TO GIVE SOME SIGNAL ON BT

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
SIT446

ROME 4127  
AN009084

DTG: 150020Z FEB 84 PSN: 051772  
TOR: 046/0506Z

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DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST  
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OP IMMED

UTS3778

DE RUEHRO #4127/03 0460025

O 150020Z FEB 84

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9326

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 04127

NODIS

S/S-0 PLEASE PASS BY IMMEDIATE TO NSC FOR GEOFF KEMP

AND WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP;

DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO LONDON, PARIS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,

DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), U.S., UK, PREL

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

THATCHER ON LEBANON

THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT TO ENCOURAGE THE MOSLEMS. THE VICE  
PRESIDENT WAS NOT SURE THAT THAT WOULD PRODUCE ANY RESULTS,  
NOTING THAT JUMBLATT HAD CALLED FOR EITHER GEMAYEL'S  
SUICIDE OR HIS ASSASSINATION.

19. THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT  
IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO SIDES TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

78383

PAGE 01 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY AIR50004 DTG: 161100Z JAN 84 PSN: 055924  
SIT315 DATE 03/06/84 TOR: 016/1137Z

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS VP SIT EOB R

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHAI #0004 0161100

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T SECTO 01005

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - LONDON

WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT

DEPARTMENT FOR S/S ONLY

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

I ARRIVED IN LONDON SUNDAY MORNING FOR DAY OF RELAXED AND  
PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH. THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MDR-244 #78383

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BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY AIR50004 DTG: 161100Z JAN 84 PSN: 055924

WERE EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE FORMER, I BRIEFED MRS. THATCHER AND GEOFFREY HOWE ON YOUR SPEECH AND PROVIDED COPIES OF THE TEXT, ALONG WITH YOUR LETTER TO MRS THATCHER. MRS. THATCHER IN PARTICULAR WAS PLEASED WITH THE THRUST OF YOUR SPEECH--THAT REALISM AND STRENGTH CREATE THE BASIS FOR DIALOGUE--WHICH COINCIDES VERY MUCH WITH HER THINKING. WE AGREED THAT WHILE THERE WAS NO GREAT PORSPECT OF BREAKTHROUGHS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE SEEN TO BE TAKING THE OFFENSIVE AND MAKING THE EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE ALSO AGREED THAT IT IS USEFUL BOTH TO GET MORE SOVIET LEADERS TO VISIT THE WEST, TO GIVE THEM MORE EXPOSURE TO OUR SOCIETIES, AND TO UNDERTAKE MORE VISITS TO MOSCOW, TO MEET A BROADER RANGE OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OTHER THAN GROMYKO. MRS. THATCHER SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SHE WILL NOT BE GOING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO MOSCOW, SHE WILL BE VISITING BUDAPEST SHORTLY. ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, THE BRITISH SUPPORTED THE NEED TO FEND OFF SOVIET PROPAGANDISTIC PROPOSALS AND TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. WE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH THE QUESTION POSED BY THE TRANSIT OF US RDF TROOPS THROUGH EUROPE, WHICH THE BRITISH AND THE GERMANS ARGUE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION UNDER THE MEASURES WHICH THE WEST WILL PROPOSE AT THE CONFERENCE. I EXPLAINED OUR STRONG OPPOSITION TO ANY SUCH NOTIFICATION, NOTING THAT IT COULD ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO ACHIEVE A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER OUR FLEXIBILITY TO MOVE MILITARY FORCES TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF. I BELIEVE MY ARGUMENTS HAD SOME EFFECT. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, I HAD A LONG PRIVATE TALK WITH HOWE AND A SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE WITH MRS. THATCHER. DESPITE BRITISH CONCERNS FOR THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR SMALL FORCE IN BEIRUT, THEY RECOGNIZE THE RISKS OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MNF, AND APPEAR RECONCILED TO REMAINING IN BEIRUT FOR THE TIME BEING. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN PUSHING FOR SOME FORM OF UN PRESENCE IN BEIRUT WHICH COULD PERMIT THE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY AIR50004 DTG: 161100Z JAN 84 PSN: 055924

MNF TO WITHDRAW IN GOOD ORDER. I CAUTIONED THAT WE HAD TO CONSULT CAREFULLY AND WARNED THAT THERE WERE GREATER DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING A UN PRESENCE, AND MORE COMPLEXITIES OF TIMING AND TACTICS THAN THEY THOUGHT. I STRESSED, AND THEY AGREED, THAT WE COULD NOT RISK CREATING A DESTABILIZING POWER VACUUM AROUND BEIRUT. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT TALKING TOO MUCH ABOUT A UN ROLE IN PUBLIC WOULD MAKE THE GOAL EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, BECAUSE IT WOULD SUGGEST TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE WEST LACKED STAYING POWER. HOWE, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH ASSAD LAST WEEK, REPORTED THAT THE SYRIANS STILL BELIEVE THEY CAN WAIT US OUT, THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST WILL FORCE THE MNF STATES TO WITHDRAW. WITH REGARD TO THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, MRS. THATCHER SHARES OUR VIEW THAT HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO RE-CONVENE THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT OFFERS INTERESTING OPPORTUNITIES, BUT SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE TO HUSSEIN'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS FOR HIS OWN VULNERABILITY.

I GAVE COPIES OF THE KISSINGER REPORT TO HOWE AND THATCHER. THE PRIME MINISTER, COMMENTING ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FUNDING RECOMMENDED, NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT THE REPORT HAS RECEIVED.

OVERALL. THE LONG AND INTIMATE DISCUSSIONS WITH HOWE AND MRS. THATCHER SEEM TO HAVE RE-ESTABLISHED THE SENSE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED THE US-UK RELATIONSHIP, AND HELPED HEAL THE BRUISED UK FEELINGS OVER GRENADA. ALTHOUGH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE DID NOT DISCUSS GRENADA SPECIFICALLY, MRS. THATCHER, FOLLOWING HER RECENT ATTENDANCE AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, SEEMED PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PROBLEMS FACED BY MICRO-STATES, MANY OF WHICH ARE FORMER BRITISH COLONIES. WE AGREED THAT WE SHARE A VERY STRONG INTEREST IN MAINTAINING SECURITY AND OUR ACCESS TO THE NEWLY-INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE CARIBBEAN, THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND THE PACIFIC.

I ALSO HAD A USEFUL SESSION WITH PETER CARRINGTON, THE NEW

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY AIR50004 DTG: 161100Z JAN 84 PSN: 055924

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL - ELECT. CARRINGTON WAS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT YOUR SPEECH. HE EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE FOR THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE LINKS WITH US WHEN HE ASSUMES HIS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES NEXT JUNE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE PLANS TO VISIT ALL NATO CAPITALS BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE. I SAID I LOOLED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~



NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8308792

RECEIVED 05 DEC 83 11

TO

MC FARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 05 DEC 83

URGENT

KEYWORDS. GREAT BRITAIN

ARGENTINA

HOWE, GEOFFREY

ARMS TRANSFERS

SUBJECT: BRITISH NEED FOR ONE-DAY POSTPONEMENT OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF ARGENTINA  
CERTIFICATION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 05 DEC 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

LILAC

MENGES

LS 598-002 #559

EY. GJS

DATE 7/2/00

COMMENTS

REF# 8337276

LOG 8307600

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( HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

**National Security Council  
The White House**

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

cc    Sims                  Sommer  
       Menges               Cobb  
       North  
       Raymond

## MEMORANDUM

SECRET

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

PETER R. SOMMER *Peter**CS**7/21/00*

SUBJECT:

British Request One Day Postponement of  
Argentine Certification Announcement

State has forwarded a memo conveying HMG request that we delay announcement of Argentine certification from December 7 to December 8. Thursday, December 8 is Prime Minister question-time in Parliament and the British believe that an announcement on the same day will help spare Mrs. Thatcher from pressing questions. Furthermore, since Howe will be meeting with Shultz on Wednesday evening, December 7, in Brussels, the British would feel more comfortable in stating to Parliament on Thursday that Howe had personally discussed this matter with Secretary Shultz.

I see no problem and understand that ARA did not resist the State memo forwarding the British request (Tab I).

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to inform Charles Hill orally that we agree to the one day announcement delay.

Approve *RHK*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*per JMD.*

*AK* Bob Lilac and Constantine Menges concur. *CM*

Tab I British request

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

*BMC/Kimley*  
informed 12/5,  
1700 hrs. I  
also told him that  
a delay till 12/9  
was possible, to  
guard against the  
possibility of a  
day-before leak. State  
will get back to us  
on 12/9. 12/8 is  
current date of  
announcement.

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 18 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



Following is the text of an answer given in Parliament on 22 November by the Leader of the House of Commons. (in the Prime Minister's absence) to a Parliamentary question by Mr Michael Latham MP.

This asked what representations the Prime Minister had made to President Reagan about the possible resumption of American arms sales to Argentina in advance of a formal agreement to end hostilities by the Argentine Administration.

Begins.

I have been asked to reply. As the House knows, my Right Honourable Friend made our position very clear to the President when she saw him in September. The United States Administration is very well aware of our concern. We have been glad to note the remarks by the United States Defense Secretary that the United States would exercise caution about the resumption of major new supplies.

Ends.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: British Need for a One-Day Postponement  
of the Announcement of Argentine  
Certification.

When Assistant Secretary Burt called in British Charge Robin Renwick December 3 to give him a copy of the President's letter to Prime Minister Thatcher on Argentine certification, Renwick asked if the announcement could not be postponed one day, i.e., until December 8. The Prime Minister has to respond to Parliamentary questions on December 8. She will be hit hard by the opposition if the announcement is made the preceding day. Secondly, Sir Geoffrey Howe will be seeing the Secretary on the evening of December 7. Given how badly Howe was pilloried about lack of consultations after his House of Commons statement on Grenada, he would be much more comfortable if he could say that he and the Secretary had personally discussed the matter prior to the announcement. Attached is the letter from Howe to the Secretary delivered on December 3rd requesting talks on Argentina on the margin of the NATO Ministerial.

*Bmetmday*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
as stated

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #592

BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/12/02~~SECRET~~

70388

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PAGE 1 - 592

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #2709 3150236

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 322709

NODIS

GENEVA FOR USINF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF, UK

SUBJECT: LETTER TO HOWE FROM SHULTZ

1. EMBASSY IS ASKED TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO FOREIGN MINISTER SIR GEOFFREY HOWE IN RESPONSE TO AN OCTOBER 13 LETTER FROM HOWE TO SHULTZ REGARDING INCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES IN INF/START. THERE IS NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. TEXT OF THE ORIGINAL LETTER FROM HOWE TO SHULTZ FOLLOWS IN PARA 4 BELOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF SHULTZ LETTER TO HOWE:

DEAR SIR GEOFFREY:

. -- IT WAS A PLEASURE TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 13 CONCERNING THE BRITISH NATIONAL DETERRENT AND ITS PLACE IN ARMS CONTROL. WE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION YOUR SEPTEMBER 28 STATEMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN WHICH YOU RESTATED THAT WHILE IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR BRITISH FORCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MIGHT RECONSIDER THAT POSITION IN LIGHT OF SIGNIFICANT US-USSR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.

. -- AS YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE IT ENTIRELY INAPPROPRIATE FOR BRITISH OR FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN EITHER INF OR START, AND WE HAVE STATED CLEARLY TO THE SOVIETS THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE STRICTLY BILATERAL. SOVIET INSISTENCE ON COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES IS NO MORE THAN A PRETEXT FOR

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NLRR M08-2441 #78388

BY RW NARA DATE 2/18/11

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 593

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUBSTANTIAL MONOPOLY  
OF LRINF MISSILES.

. -- AS WE MOVE INTO A CRITICAL PERIOD FOR BOTH THE  
NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE, THERE CAN BE  
NO DOUBT IN ALLIED DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH BOTH.  
SOVIET TACTICS OF DIVERTING ATTENTION TO THE UNRELATED  
ISSUE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NATIONAL DETERRENTS HAS NOT  
WEAKENED THE RESOLVE OF THE ALLIANCE TO MEET ITS  
LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS. EVEN AS DEPLOYMENT BEGINS,  
HOWEVER, WE MUST EXPECT CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURE ON  
THIS ISSUE, PRESSURE WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO FIND SOME  
RESONANCE IN SOME QUARTERS IN THE WEST. WE WILL WANT,  
THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO  
SUSTAIN ALLIANCE UNITY IN THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY  
BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR AS A BASIC PREREQUISITE FOR  
ANY NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENT.

SINCERELY YOURS, GEORGE P. SHULTZ

END TEXT.

3. FOR EMBASSY'S BACKGROUND, THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT  
OF THE ORIGINAL LETTER FROM HOWE TO SHULTZ WHICH  
PROMPTED THE ABOVE RESPONSE.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR GEORGE:

. -- WHEN I WAS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE PRIME MINISTER  
I PROMISED TO LET YOU HAVE A NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF  
THE BRITISH STRATEGIC DETERRENT IN RELATION TO ARMS  
CONTROL. SINCE THEN YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF MY  
STATEMENT ON 28 SEPTEMBER TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY, THE KEY PASSAGE IN WHICH WAS AS FOLLOWS:

. -- "WE HAVE NEVER SAID 'NEVER'. ON THE CONTRARY, WE  
HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF SOVIET AND US STRATEGIC  
ARSENALS WERE TO BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED AND IF  
NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES HAD OCCURRED IN SOVIET DEFENSIVE  
CAPABILITIES, BRITAIN WOULD WANT TO REVIEW HER POSITION  
AND TO CONSIDER HOW BEST SHE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO ARMS  
CONTROL IN THE LIGHT OF THE REDUCED THREAT."

. -- AS YOUR PEOPLE ARE AWARE, THE PRIME MINISTER USED

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PAGE 1 - 594

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AN ALMOST IDENTICAL FORMULATION IN HER REPLY TO ANDROPOV'S MESSAGE OF 27 AUGUST. I THINK IT LIKELY THAT WE SHALL WISH TO REST ON THIS FORMULATION FOR SOME MONTHS, BARRING MAJOR UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN PATIENTLY IN PARLIAMENT AND TO PUBLIC OPINION THE MANY STRONG ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS POSITION. WE SHALL ALSO MAKE THESE AVAILABLE TO OUR ALLIES. THE THREE ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO ME PARTICULARLY TELLING ARE:

- . -- (A) THE PRESENT SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION MEANS THAT THE RUSSIANS CLAIM A CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO HAVE AS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS ALL THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS PUT TOGETHER, AND THUS MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS INHERENTLY UNDESIRABLE, AND ANY AGREEMENT CONCLUDED ON THIS BASIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE RATIFIED BY THE US CONGRESS.
- . -- (B) IT IS VERY MUCH A (BEGIN UNDERSCORE) JOINT ALLIANCE INTEREST (END UNDERSCORE) TO PREVENT THE RUSSIANS FROM ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVE BY DRAGGING THE RED-HERRING OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NATIONAL DETERRENTS INTO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. FOR IT IS THE SECURITY OF (BEGIN UNDERSCORE) ALL (END UNDERSCORE) THE ALLIES THAT THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE DEFENDS. THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, IN EUROPE IS THE VISIBLE REMINDER OF THAT GUARANTEE, WHICH IT IS SOVIET POLICY TO SEEK TO ATTENUATE.
- . -- (C) BRITISH WARHEAD NUMBERS ARE REALLY INSIGNIFICANT IN RELATION TO SOME 9,000 STRATEGIC SOVIET WARHEADS, NOT TO SPEAK OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET INF NUCLEAR ARSENAL. THAT THE RUSSIANS, ARMED WITH SUCH NUCLEAR OVERKILL, DESERVE COMPENSATION FOR WHAT ANDROPOV HIMSELF HAS ACKNOWLEDGED IS A BRITISH "DETERRENT" FORCE IS PLAINLY ABSURD. SOVIET NUMBERS WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED DRASTICALLY FIRST THROUGH INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS, BEFORE THE TIME COULD COME FOR THE UK TO CONSIDER WHAT CONTRIBUTION SHE COULD MAKE TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.
- . -- I THINK IT WORTH ADDING, AS OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUES HAVE RECENTLY POINTED OUT, THAT ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE US TO SAY EXACTLY HOW AND WHEN IN FUTURE HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS COULD ENTER INTO ARMS CONTROL, ARE LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE MORE

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PAGE 1 - 595

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PRECISE WE HAVE TO BE ABOUT SPECIFYING THE EXACT  
CONDITIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE MORE NEGATIVE THE  
ANSWER IS LIKELY TO SOUND.

. -- WE SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO KEEP THESE MATTERS  
UNDER THE CLOSEST REVIEW IN LONDON, PARTICULARLY AS WE  
BEGIN TO THINK IN GREATER DETAIL ABOUT THE LONGER TERM  
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE UK TRIDENT PROGRAMME.  
YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT WE SHALL ALSO CONTINUE TO  
KEEP YOU CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH OUR THINKING.

GEOFFREY HOWE

END TEXT OF HOWE LETTER.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 LONDON 1107  
SIT583 AN001631

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TOR: 016/1958Z

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DISTRIBUTION: MCF /003  
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DE RUEHLD #1107 0161657  
R 161657Z JAN 84  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2225

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 01107

NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: 1/16/14  
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UK, ZP  
SUBJECT: FURTHER BRITISH PREPARATIONS FOR EXPANSION OF  
-- GULF WAR

1. (CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FCO MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT HEAD KEITH HASKELL  
MADE FOLLOWING POINTS TO VISITING CENTCOM POLAD LOWRIE  
AND EMBOFF JANUARY 11 RE UK PREPARATIONS TO COPE WITH  
POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDED IRAN-IRAQ HOSTILITIES:  
-- UK MILITARY CHIEFS HAD MET PREVIOUS DAY TO  
DISCUSS DETAILS OF POTENTIAL BRITISH ASSISTANCE  
IN THE GULF. THEY DECIDED TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS IN  
FIELD OF MINE COUNTER-MEASURES;  
-- HMG IS EXPLORING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN PROVIDING  
SECURITY FOR OFFSHORE OIL FACILITIES IN THE GULF,  
SINCE BRITAIN HAS TRAINED COMMANDOS TO DEAL WITH  
NORTH SEA OIL RIG SECURITY EMERGENCIES;

[REDACTED]

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1) (b)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRN M082441 #78389  
BY PW NARA DATE 2/18/14

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 161657Z JAN 84 PSN: 059114

[REDACTED]

AND

-- MOD OFFICIALS WILL BE VISITING ABU DHABI SOON TO OBTAIN FROM SHAIKH ZAYID A CLEARER IDEA OF HIS REQUIREMENTS FOR BRITISH MILITARY SUPPORT. HASKELL RECALLED THAT ZAYID HAD TOLD FCO MINISTER OF STATE RICHARD LUCE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT HE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO COUNT ON DESPATCH OF BRITISH TROOPS TO THE UAE AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE IN A CRISIS.

--

3. HASKELL ADDED THAT THE FCO WAS ABOUT TO PURPOSE TO IRANIANS THAT ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY STEPHEN EGERTON VISIT TEHRAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRICE  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0360 DTG: 190511Z JAN 84 PSN: 064242  
SIT170 AN002191 TOR: 019/1012Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP VP SIT EOB /008  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

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DE RUDKFMQ #0360/01 0190512

O 190511Z JAN 84 ZFF-4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8859

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SECTO 1035

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,  
15 JANUARY

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN ANIMATED CONVERSATION OF NEARLY TWO HOURS, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND MRS THATCHER DISCUSSED LATIN AMERICA, LEBANON, MIDDLE EAST PEACE, CYPRUS, AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ON BELIZE SHE CONFIRMED THAT UK FORCES WOULD STAY UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION. THEN, HOWEVER, THE UK WOULD NEED TO CONSULT WITH US ON WHERE THEIR FORCES COULD MAKE THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION. SHE STRESSED THE NEED TO DEFEND VARIOUS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT BUT VULNERABLE ISLAND AREAS AROUND THE WORLD. ON

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NLRR M08-2441 #78390  
BY RW NARA DATE 2/18/01

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0360 DTG: 190511Z JAN 84 PSN: 064242

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LEBANON, MRS THATCHER UNDERLINED CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR MNF UNIT AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED NOT TO BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE. IF SOMETHING UNTOWARD HAPPENED TO THE MNF, THEY WOULD NEED TO CONSULT CLOSELY AND THEN AFTER AN INTERVAL, SEEK A UN ROLE. SHE RECOGNIZED THE DANGERS OF LEAVING A VACUUM AS WELL AS THE DIFFICULTIES OF OBTAINING UN INVOLVEMENT IN UNSTABLE CONDITIONS. ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS SHE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET EMPHASIS ON WAR IN ITS PROPAGANDA AND THE GENERAL DRIFTING APART, AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR MORE REGULAR AND WIDE RANGING CONTACTS. PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING WERE PM THATCHER, THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR PRICE, BURT, AND HOWE. END SUMMARY.

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3. LATIN AMERICA. EARLY IN THEIR MEETING THE SECRETARY HANDED OVER A COPY OF THE KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT ON CENTRAL AMERICA, NOTING THAT IT WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE BIPARTISAN CONTRIBUTION. MRS. THATCHER OBSERVED THAT BIPARTISAN SUPPORT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. RECALLING A VISIT MORE THAN FOUR YEARS AGO TO THE UNITED STATES, SHE MENTIONED THAT SHE HAD BEEN ASKED MORE QUESTIONS ON EL SALVADOR THAN ANYTHING ELSE. PEOPLE THEN COULDN'T SEE ITS IMPORTANCE. SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED THAT THE REPORT WAS A FIRST STEP, AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED THROUGH THE CONGRESS. IN RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE AMOUNTS OF MONEY INVOLVED, THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT DLS 8 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AID FOR THE REGION OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED. NICARAGUA WOULD HAVE TO MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AND GUATEMALA'S ROLE WAS UNCERTAIN. IN EL SALVADOR WE HOPED TO ENCOURAGE IMPROVED CONDITIONS WITH ELECTIONS AND A SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ON A SOUNDER BASIS. MRS. THATCHER MENTIONED THAT WHEN DUARTE HAD COME TO LONDON FOR A VISIT LAST JULY, SHE HAD ASKED HIM TO ASSESS HIS CHANCES. DUARTE FELT THEY WERE QUITE GOOD BUT WARNED THAT WHOEVER CAME TO POWER AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTION

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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HAD TO GET ON TOP OF THE SITUATION AND RESTORE ORDER. IF NOT, THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR WILL LOSE ALL FAITH IN DEMOCRACY. IF THE GUERILLAS REMAIN OUT OF CONTROL AND PEOPLE LIVE IN FEAR, THEY WILL WANT A STRONGMAN TYPE GOVERNMENT. AGREEING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOW THROUGH, SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATED THE TURNOUT FOR THE ELECTION WOULD PROBABLY BE SMALLER COMPARED TO THE LAST. MRS. THATCHER INDICATED SHE WAS NOT SURE OF THE THE CURRENT SITUATION. SHE HAD SEEN REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS, DESTROYED BRIDGES, ETC. IT WAS HARD TO SORT OUT PROPAGANDA FROM FACT. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME UNFORTUNATE INCIDENTS RECENTLY, AND THAT THERE WAS PLENTY OF WORK TO BE DONE. MURDERERS HAD TO BE PROSECUTED. HE NOTED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE THAT DUARTE WOULD WIN. THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM IF D'AUBUISSON WON, BUT IF HE DOES IN A FAIR ELECTION, HE MUST BE ABLE TO EXTEND AUTHORITY ACROSS ALL THE POPULATION FAIRLY. RECALLING THE ZIMBABWE EXPERIENCE, MRS THATCHER AGREED THAT WHOEVER WINS HAS TO BE SUPPORTED. SHE HOPED THERE WOULD BE A GOOD TURNOUT WITH ENOUGH OBSERVERS; THE UK HAD PROVIDED THE ONLY OBSERVERS FROM EUROPE DURING THE PREVIOUS ELECTIONS. THE SECRETARY ASSURED THERE WOULD BE SWARMS OF OBSERVERS FROM THE PRESS--NOTING THAT WE WERE VERY UNINHIBITED IN TELLING EL SALVADOR HOW TO RUN THEIR COUNTRY.

4. TURNING TO BELIZE, MRS THATCHER SAID THAT AFTER

THE ELECTION THERE THEY WOULD HAVE TO SEE WHERE THEIR FORCES COULD MAKE THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE AREA. ONCE THE ELECTION WAS BEHIND THEM, SHE WAS NOT SURE WHAT WOULD BE THE BEST DISPOSITION. WHATEVER THE UK DID ABOUT REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES, IT WOULD BE IN CONSULTATION WITH US. BOTH BELIZE AND GUATEMALA WANT THE UK TO STAY. ONE REASON GUATEMALA WANTED THE UK TO STAY WAS THEY

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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O 190511Z JAN 84 ZFF-4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8860

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 SECTION 1035

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,  
WOULD CONSIDER IT A POINT OF HONOR TO ATTACK BELIZE  
AFTER UK FORCES DISAPPEARED. IT WAS A DIFFICULT  
SITUATION TO SOLVE, BUT ONE DAY THEY MUST SETTLE THE  
BORDER DISPUTE. SHE THEN REAFFIRMED THAT THE UK  
WOULD STAY UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION BUT THEN WOULD  
HAVE TO LOOK WITH US ON WHERE UK FORCES COULD BEST  
MAKE A CONTRIBUTION. AT THE MOMENT IT WAS A  
BASTION OF STABILITY.

5. THE SECRETARY THEN DESCRIBED THE CARIBBEAN  
INITIATIVE, NOTING IT WAS DESIGNED TO LET SMALL  
COUNTRIES TAP INTO OUR LARGE MARKET. NORMALLY HE  
FAVORED CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PEOPLE CAN  
DO FOR THEMSELVES RATHER THAN DEPENDING ON MASSIVE  
AID, BUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND



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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THEY CLEARLY NEEDED HELP. MRS. THATCHER THEN REFERRED TO UK FRUSTRATIONS IN PROVIDING AID TO ANTIGUA. THEY HAD HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY OPERATING POWER GENERATORS. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THE OBSTACLES, EACH COUNTRY HAD TO DO THE BEST IT COULD TO HELP.

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6. SMALL ISLAND CONCERNS. MRS. THATCHER THEN OBSERVED THAT PINDLING HAD MADE SEVERAL IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCES. WITH REGARD TO DEFENDING SMALL ISLANDS, HE HAD SAID, "IF WE CAN'T MAKE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUR DEFENSE, THEN WE MUST QUESTION OUR RIGHT TO BE INDEPENDENT." WHEN THE COLONIAL POWERS PULLED BACK (E.G. IN MIDDLE EAST AND INDIA) ALL THE UNDERLYING CONFLICTS EMERGED

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AGAIN. IT HAS HAPPENED IN VARIOUS SPHERES OF THE WORLD AND LEFT THEM WITH FRAGMENTED CONFLICTS. THAT IS WHY THE UK IS LOOKING AT DEFENSE OF OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND STRATEGIC STAGING POSTS SUCH AS ASCENSION ISLAND, ST. HELENA, AND DIEGO GARCIA.

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THEY ARE ALSO LOOKING AT THEM BECAUSE OF TERRORISTIC THREATS. MAURITIUS, FOR EXAMPLE, WANTS TO GET DIEGO GARCIA BACK. IF THE PANAMA CANAL OR SUEZ WERE CLOSED, THEN CAPE GOOD HOPE AND CAPE HORN WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. THAT FACT HAD BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN DECIDING ABOUT THE FALKLANDS. COMMAND OF THE SEAS AROUND CAPE HORN HAD BEEN CRITICAL TO VICTORY IN WORLD WAR I. IN ANTARCTICA THERE WERE SOVIET BASES AND OVERLAPPING CLAIMS. THE UK STILL HAD MANY ISLANDS AND THAT IS WHY THEY ARE LOOKING AT THEIR DEFENSIVE NEEDS. IF THE ISLANDS ARE NOT STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT THAT IS ONE THING. IF THEY ARE, THE UK MUST SEE IF THEY ARE IN THE AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND OR U.S. SPHERES. IN THIS CONTEXT THE BRITISH WERE LOOKING AT THE BEST USE OF THEIR FORCES IN BELIZE AND THEIR CARIBBEAN ISLAND

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RESPONSIBILITIES. RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY'S OBSERVATIONS THAT PINDLING'S REMARK WAS STRIKING, MRS. THATCHER NOTED THAT PINDLING HAD ALWAYS HAD A LOT TO CONTRIBUTE IN ECONOMICS BUT NOW THIS OTHER SIDE HAD COME OUT. AS A FORMER COLONIAL POWER IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE UK TO SAY SUCH THINGS. TWO YEARS FROM NOW THERE WOULD BE A REPORT TO THE COMMONWEALTH ON THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES, BUT THEY WOULD BE TAKING STEPS IN THE INTERIM.

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LEBANON. FOREIGN MINISTER HOWE THEN CITED LEBANON AS A DISINTEGRATED COUNTRY. MRS. THATCHER SAID THAT SHE WORRIES ABOUT DOMESTIC POLITICS. YOU CAN'T PULL OUT INTENTIONALLY UNLESS SOMETHING ELSE IS THERE. THERE WOULD BE A TERRIBLE SLAUGHTER. SHE NOTED THAT CERTAIN U.S. SENATORS (E.G. PERCY) SEEMED TO FAVOR PULLING OUT. SECRETARY SHULTZ OBSERVED THAT SENATORS TOWER AND WARNER RECENTLY HAD LEFT FOR LEBANON UNCERTAIN, BUT HAD RETURNED WITH A VERY CLEAR, FORCEFUL AND UNAMBIGUOUS MESSAGE THAT WE MUST STAY. IN THE U.S. THERE WAS A SPATE OF PEOPLE CALLING OUT, INCLUDING DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE MONDALE, BUT THE PENDULUM SEEMED TO BE SWINGING BACK. THE PRESIDENT WAS FIRM AND OTHERS WERE LABELING THE MONDALE APPROACH THE "CUT AND RUN OPTION." THE CLIMATE OF OPINION SEEMED TO BE SHIFTING. STILL IT WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

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MRS. THATCHER THEN SAID THAT WE CAN'T STAY INDEFINITELY OR LET THE GOL USE OUR PRESENCE AS AN EXCUSE FOR INACTION. WE ALSO HAD THE PROBLEM OF SYRIA WHICH WAS MORE POWERFUL THAN IT HAD BEEN FOR SOME TIME. MINISTER HOWE NOTED SYRIA'S ABILITY TO RESIST MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE. SECRETARY SHULTZ THEN DESCRIBED HOW GRAPH-PLOTTING SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE VERSUS THE PUBLICLY PERCEIVED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8861

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05. SECTO 1035

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,

COMMITMENT OF THE MNF CONGRESS WOULD MAKE AN

INTERESTING CHART. WHEN THERE IS A SENSE OF U.S.

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITMENT (E.G. WHEN THE 18 MONTH

RESOLUTION WAS PASSED AND THE BATTLESHIP NEW JERSEY

IS IN ACTION), THE SYRIANS ARE MORE WILLING TO BE

ACCOMMODATING. WHEN THERE IS TALK OF PULLOUT OF THE

MNF, SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE RISES. WHAT WE NEED IS

STEADFASTNESS. SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM IS

TELLING PEOPLE THAT THE MNF IS SHORT OF BREATH.

MINISTER HOWE SAID KHADDAM SEEMED TO HAVE THE

CAPACITY TO TAKE A LONGER VIEW. THE MNF IS

REDUCING. SYRIA CAN WAIT. BUT THE MNF CAN'T PULL

OUT AND LEAVE A VACUUM. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A SENSE

OF RECURRENT UNEASE AND WE NEED TO LOOK FOR A WAY.

MRS. THATCHER UNDERLINED THAT SHE DIDN'T WANT

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ANOTHER TRAGEDY. THE BRITISH WERE ACTUALLY PATROLLING THROUGH BEIRUT AND PROTECTING THE SITE OF THE SECURITY TALKS. IT MAY DAWN ON SOMEONE TO ATTACK THE UK SINCE THEY ARE QUITE VULNERABLE. IN GOING TO THE UN ONE NEEDS A REQUEST FROM THE HOST COUNTRY. THE QUESTION IS WHEN. THERE HAS TO BE PRESSURE ON GEMAYEL TO INVITE THE UN IN. IT COULD BE TOO COZY FOR GEMAYEL. HOWE INTERJECTED THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE AN INTEREST IN GETTING THE MNF OUT. SECRETARY SHULTZ OBSERVED THAT LIFE WAS NOT COZY FOR GEMAYEL. HIS LIFE WAS THREATENED AND HE HAD SHOWN A LOT OF SPUNK. MRS. THATCHER AGREED BUT NOTED THAT GEMAYEL'S OPTIMISM WAS GREATER THAN HERS.

9. SECRETARY SHULTZ THEN OPINED THAT LEBANON WOULD BLOW IF STABILITY WAS NOT MAINTAINED. IF THERE WERE SAYS TO DEPLOY THE MNF THAT WERE LESS VULNERABLE, THAT WAS WORTH TALKING ABOUT. WE THINK THE MARINES ARE NOW MORE SECURE THAN THEY WERE, BUT WE ALL NEED TO THINK ABOUT IT. HOWE INTERJECTED THAT ASSAD SAW THE MOVE OF THE MARINES INTO THEIR BUNKERS AS AN EROSION OF THEIR DURABILITY. THATCHER SAID THAT WE ALL KNOW THE REASONS WHY WE STAY, BUT WE HAD TO CONSIDER THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BLOW UP AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY ONE OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS. ATTACK ON THE MNF TROOPS OR SHIPS COULD CHANGE THE SITUATION DURING THE U.S. ELECTION YEAR. THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE TO DO SOMETHING. THE ONLY THING TO DO IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE WOULD APPEAR TO BE A QUICK APPROACH TO THE UN. THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS WOULD THEN BE A FACTOR. THE UK DOES NOT WANT TO BE SURPRISED. THE FRENCH BACK UNIFIL. THE UK IS VERY HIGH PROFILE, ISOLATED, AND VULNERABLE. AT THE SAME TIME PEOPLE IN LEBANON SEEM TO RESPECT WHAT THE UK IS DOING. THE PEOPLE OF BEIRUT WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE THE UK LEAVE, BUT THE UK DOES NOT WANT TO BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE.

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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10. MINISTER HOWE THEN DISCUSSED THE NEED TO DEFINE A NEW ROLE FOR THE UN, PERHAPS AROUND THE REFUGEE CAMPS. MRS. THATCHER EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION. NEVERTHELESS, WE CAN'T WITHDRAW RIGHT AFTER SOMETHING HAPPENS. HOWE NOTED THAT WHAT WE NEEDED WAS WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, THE PLO AND THE MNF, BUT THE SYRIANS WERE INTRANSIGENT AND THERE WOULD BE NO RECONCILIATION AS LONG AS THERE WAS A MAY 17 AGREEMENT. MRS. THATCHER SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHAT MIGHT MOVE SYRIA, CARROTS OR STICKS. HOWE SAID WE MUST HAVE THE UN FOR THE MNF TO DEPART. MRS. THATCHER REMARKED THAT THE ISRAELIS DON'T WANT TO KEEP THEIR FORCES THERE NOW AND MAY PULL SOME OUT. PERHAPS, SHE SPECULATED, UNIFIL

COULD EXPAND INTO THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED AREA. SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE WILLING TO PULL OUT FROM THE AREA NEAR THE COAST, BUT WOULD INSIST THAT THE LAF SHOW THEY CAN MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THE AREA FIRST. THERE HAS TO BE STABILITY OR THEY WON'T LEAVE; THEY DO NOT INTEND TO REPEAT THE SHUF EXPERIENCE. THE ISRAELIS ALSO MIGHT RUN PATROLS TO ENSURE THE PLO IS NOT INFILTRATING. THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT DID NOT GIVE THEM THE RIGHT TO SEND PATROLS INTO LEBANON, BUT THEY DID HAVE A RIGHT TO SEND IN OBSERVATION TEAMS. THE ISRAELIS WILL

EXACT A PRICE BEFORE WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY CAUTIONED THAT HE DID NOT ADVOCATE THROWING AWAY HARD WON GAINS. SAUDI ATTITUDES FLUCTUATE ON THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. AT ONE TIME THEY SAY ABROGATE. AT ANOTHER JUST IGNORE. ONE OF THEIR IDEAS IS TO NEGOTIATE WITHDRAWAL NOW AND LET NORMALIZATION COME INTO FORCE AFTER WITHDRAWAL TAKES PLACE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8862

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 SECTO 1035

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,  
MRS. THATCHER ASKED IF THE LAF COULD KEEP ORDER IN  
SHIITE AREAS IF THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW. SECRETARY  
SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT THE GOL IS READY TO EXTEND THE  
LAF OVER UNITS ALREADY THERE. IN SOUTHERN LEBANON  
THEY WOULD RECRUIT BATTALIONS FROM THE LOCAL  
POPULATION SO THAT LOCAL PEOPLE WOULD BE TRYING TO  
MAINTAIN ORDER. THE ISRAELIS ALSO HAVE SOME ABILITY  
TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION.

11. THE SECRETARY THEN DESCRIBED A NUMBER OF  
EXAMPLES OF IMPROVED ISRAELI COOPERATION, SUBSEQUENT  
TO THE SHAMIR VISIT TO WASHINGTON, WHICH HAD NOT  
RECEIVED MUCH RECOGNITION. MRS. THATCHER THEN  
RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN  
BY SURPRISE IF SOMETHING BAD HAPPENS TO THE MNF. IF

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0360 DTG: 190511Z JAN 84 PSN: 064257

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IT DID, THEY WOULD GET IN TOUCH. THEN THEY WOULD GO TO THE UN BUT NOT IMMEDIATELY SINCE IT WOULD THEN APPEAR THAT THEY HAD BEEN FORCED OUT. SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT IF STABILITY WERE CREATED, THEN THERE WOULD BE CONDITIONS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT. WE DON'T WANT THE UN TO MOVE INTO A SITUATION OF TURMOIL. MRS. THATCHER THEN NOTED SHE WOULD HAVE TO BE ANSWERING QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT ON TUESDAY AND THURSDAY, OBSERVING WE CAN'T STAY INDEFINITELY IN LEBANON BUT MUST TRY SOME STEP AND SEE IF IT WORKS.

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12. MIDDLE EAST PEACE - TURNING TO THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, MRS. THATCHER EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S HEALTH. SHE BELIEVES THAT WHEN IN JORDAN HE BROODS AND BOTTLES THINGS UP AND THAT IS WHY HE COMES OVER TO LONDON FREQUENTLY. THE KING'S RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS ARE NOT THAT GOOD, AND HE WANTS TO TAKE STEPS TO SOLVE THE FUNDAMENTAL ISRAELI-ARAB PROBLEM. THERE HAVEN'T BEEN GENUINE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE ISRAELIS WON'T LET A WEST BANK BODY DEVELOP. HOWE INTERJECTED THAT THE EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS HOPED ARAFAT MIGHT NOW HELP. A DISCUSSION OF THE PLO SITUATION THEN ENSUED. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD WOULD BE VISITING EACH MNF CAPITAL AND THE UN WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL BUT AT THIS POINT THEY HAVE NO WAY TO HANDLE IT.

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13. CYPRUS - MRS. THATCHER THEN RAISED THE CYPRUS ISSUE, OBSERVING THAT THE GREEKS DIDN'T ALLOW THE TURKS A QUOTA IN PARLIAMENT SO THEY WITHDREW. SHE SAID WHEN THE GREEKS HAD COME TO SEE HER SHE HAD REVIEWED HOW THEIR EARLIER ACTIONS HAD PRECIPITATED TURK ACTIONS. TURKEY WAS OF FAR GREATER STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. THE GREEKS SAY THEY WON'T SIT DOWN WITH THE TURKS, BUT WHEN

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0360 DTG: 190511Z JAN 84 PSN: 064257

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MRS. THATCHER ASKED PAPANDREOU IF HE WANTED HER TO SAY SO, HE SAID NO. MRS. THATCHER CONTINUED THAT WE HAVE A DEFACTO PARTITION. UK BASES ON CYPRUS WERE CRITICAL, BOTH MILITARILY AND FOR INTELLIGENCE. SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATED HE WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT CYPRUS AND U.S. ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AID TO TURKEY. MRS. THATCHER REITERATED THAT THE UK MUST KEEP THE SOVEREIGN BASES AND CAUTIONED THAT ONE MUST NEVER FORGET THE MILITARY STRATEGY BEHIND FOREIGN POLICY. THE PROBLEM NEEDED TO BE SOLVED, BUT IF THEY DON'T TALK, THERE WILL BE PARTITION.

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14. EAST-WEST RELATIONS - MRS. THATCHER THEN TURNED TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SECRETARY HAD GIVEN HER A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND A COPY OF THE SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING.) NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE EXTREMELY RIGID AND HAVEN'T CHANGED THEIR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES, SHE EXPRESSED GENERAL CONCERN. THEIR LATEST PROPAGANDA APPEARED DESIGNED TO STIR UP FEAR OF WAR AMONG THE SOVIET PEOPLE. A BRITISH ACADEMIC HAD RECENTLY TAKEN A RELIGIOUS GROUP TO RUSSIA. HE HAD WRITTEN TO HER THAT EVEN THE DISSIDENTS WERE BECOMING WORRIED. HIS GROUP FELT THAT PROPAGANDA CONCERNING IMMINENT WAR AND THE RIGIDITY OF CONTROL WERE MUCH WORSE. OUR OWN PEOPLE ALWAYS SEEM TO BE AFRAID THAT SOMETHING MAY HAPPEN BECAUSE WE HAVEN'T

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BEEN DIALOGUING. WE HAVE TO TRY, WITHOUT EXPECTATIONS, TO GET THE WORD OUT. INTERESTINGLY, THE  
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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02    USDEL SECRETARY IN 0360    DTG: 190511Z JAN 84    PSN: 064258  
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 05 OF 05 SECTO 1035

NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,  
RUSSIAN PEOPLE LISTEN TO VOA AND BELIEVE BBC. (BBC HAS  
MAINTAINED ITS CREDIBILITY). ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS  
LARE STILL IN AFGHANISTAN, WE HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO  
TALK REGULARLY. TURNING TO MINISTER HOWE, SHE ASKED  
WHETHER HE WOULD SEE GROMYKO IN MOSCOW OR LONDON.  
HE ADVANTAGE TO MOSCOW WAS HE MIGHT SEE ANDROPOV.  
WE NEED REGULAR AND MORE WIDE-RANGING CONTACTS. WE  
HAVE TO CHANGE TACTICS WITHOUT GIVING UP ANYTHING.  
ONLY THE STRONG CAN TALK. THE BASIS IS MUTUAL  
STRENGTH AND MUTUAL RESPECT. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID  
SOVIET TACTICS MAY HAVE BACKFIRED AND THEY MAY BE  
BACK-PEDALLING. IT IS BETTER TO GO TO MOSCOW THEN TO  
SEE GROMYKO SOMEWHERE ELSE. IN THE LATTER CASE, HE  
BECOMES THE GATEKEEPER. ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
MOTIVES IN GIVING HIS SPEECH IS THAT HE KNOWS

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0360 DTG: 190511Z JAN 84 PSN: 064258

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EVERYONE IN THE KREMLIN WILL HAVE TO READ IT. MRS. THATCHER SAID THE FOLLOW-UP WOULD BE INTERESTING. THE SOVIETS HAD "HIJACKED THE WORD PEACE FOR THEMSELVES" AND THEN WALKED OUT OF ARMS CONTROL. THEY WERE FOCUSSED ON WAR OR THE THREAT OF WAR.

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15. IN CONTINUING ON THE THEME OF THE NEED FOR COMMUNICATION, MRS. THATCHER SUGGESTED THAT WE NEEDED TO GET THE YOUNGER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OVER. IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES TO TALK. WE ARE DRIFTING TOO FAR APART. THE SECRETARY THEN DESCRIBED THE PRINCIPAL THEMES IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, NOTING HE HAD GIVEN A COPY TO DOBRYNIN EARLY SO THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE HAD TIME TO ABSORB IT. THEIR RESPONSE WILL BE INTERESTING. THE PRESIDENT CHALLENGES THEM TO CONSTRUCTIVE COMPETITION. WE ARE READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. MRS. THATCHER SAID THE SPEECH WOULD BE VERY SUCCESSFUL IF IT GETS A LITTLE PROGRESS, AND THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO KEEP EXPECTATIONS MODEST. SHE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSISTENCE. THE SECRETARY, IN THAT VEIN, COMMENDED MRS. THATCHER'S UPCOMING TRIP TO HUNGARY. THE MEETING ENDED ON A CORDIAL NOTE WITH MRS. THATCHER APOLOGIZING FOR KEEPING THE SECRETARY SO LONG. SHULTZ  
  
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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM POINDEXTER

DOCDATE 09 NOV 83

By <sup>W</sup>CIS

10/6/98

KEYWORDS. GREAT BRITAIN

GRENADA

DAM, K

LEBANON

INTELLIGENCE

THATCHER, MARGARET

WRIGHT, OLIVER

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE CALL RE DAM RETURN TO LONDON

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ACTION: NOTED BY MCFARLANE

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

## COMMENTS

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## DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *Jeh*

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Your Telephone Call Last Night on Ken Dam  
Returning to London

Larry and I discussed whether Ken should return to London to discuss the hard [REDACTED] data that we have. Both Larry and I think that would not be a very good idea. Instead we have agreed that the VP should call in Sir Oliver Wright this afternoon and take a rather tough line with him on Grenada and the situation in Beirut. He knows Sir Oliver quite well and speaks very frankly to him. The VP wants to do it. Also, I am meeting with Bob Gates this afternoon along with Bill Casey later in the day. [REDACTED]

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] data should help alleviate that concern.

New subject: State is working on a cable to you on the Arafat situation. All of us here think we should stay out of it other than taking a strong position publicly against the slaughter in Tripoli, which we will do.

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NLRR M08-244#78391  
BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

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FAX # 93

FROM/LOCATION/

1. ADM. POINDEXTER / W.H.

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ROBERT KIMMITT / TOYKO

TOR

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOR / 092049Z NOV 83

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM WRIGHT, OLIVER

DOCDATE 27 OCT 83

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KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

GRENADA

HOWE, GEOFFREY

SUBJECT TRANSMITS SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SPEECH TO HOUSE OF COMMONS 26 OCT

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE 04 NOV 83 STATUS S FILES

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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COMMENTS

TO NSC/S Please advise. No need to provide an answer at this time. OBE. Please provide me a copy of the package. Peter Sommer

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( MR )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Kimmit ☒ 11/3 Noted by Ponderexter w/ comment

Menges ☒ 11/3 For Further Action

Kimmit ☒ 11/3 Comments to Kimmit 11/4

Ponderexter ☒ 11/3 For Further Action

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Sommer ☒ 11/12 For Further Action 11/18

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National Security Council  
The White House

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SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary

John Poindexter

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

Executive Secretary

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COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

Bud,  
I don't see that this needs to be answered based on your cable to Sir Robert and VP meeting with Wright today.  
11/9

National Security Council  
The White House

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John Poindexter

Wilma Hall

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John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

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Executive Secretary

C. Menges

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COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

Bob,  
I don't think Constantine would clear last paragraph of note to Sir Oliver. Please run on this.  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 4, 1983

NOTE FOR BOB KIMMITT

FROM: CONSTANTINE MENGES *cm*

SUBJECT: The Mood in Europe

Re request for comments to you--this  
office concurs with the proposed letter  
to Sir Oliver Wright as written.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Sir Oliver:

Thank you for sending me Geoffrey Howe's House of Commons statement on Grenada. As the President told the Prime Minister, we regret that we caused your government some embarrassment in Parliament. Absolute secrecy, as I am sure you will understand, was essential. The concern over leaks was on our end, not yours, but we needed to take all possible precautionary measures to protect the lives of our troops.

While the regional states will be taking the lead, we look forward to working closely with your government on the important task of restoring democracy in Grenada. Thank you again for bringing your government's views to my direct attention.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Sir Oliver Wright  
Embassy of Great Britain  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

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CAS 7/21/00

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MEMORANDUM  
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ACTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER  
 JACK MATLOCK  
 TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: The Mood in Europe

British Ambassador Wright has provided you Foreign Minister Howe's statement during the House of Commons October 26 emergency debate on Grenada (Tab II). While Howe did not condemn our actions, he did note HMG's view that military intervention was not required. The British public response is fairly indicative of Europe's reaction, which we would characterize as disappointing, but not unexpected. Indeed, a number of our European Allies, notably France, criticized us in considerably harsher terms than did the British.

European criticism has focused on the legality of our assistance; more pointedly, did the OECS really ask for our help or did we prod them into asking, and did Scoon formally appeal for U.S. intervention, or was this done after the fact? The one-page fact sheet that State sent to all diplomatic posts does not answer these questions with specific data, and in fact Scoon's role is not even addressed. Our vague reply, coupled with our less than precise and uniform public statements, have also hurt us domestically.

We have been working informally with Constantine and Walt to strengthen our public diplomacy presentation (particularly in Mrs. Kirkpatrick's statement at the UN today), and ask that you weigh in, perhaps with Eagleburger, on the need to give uniform and precise answers with regard to both the OECS and Scoon appeals. A chronological fact sheet for distribution in the field would help immensely, particularly if it could be augmented by intelligence information on threats to the students and the extent of Cuban/Soviet infiltrations.

On the positive side, Grenadians and the American students speaking out to the press on their fears and desire for freedom, plus the positive statements coming from the region are helping us in Europe, and should be further encouraged.

There are two immediate policy issues on which we ask you to consider European concerns. In our view, when and if we retaliate against the Beirut bomb attack, we should do so, to the

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Declassify on: OADR

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 NLRR MOD-244#78393  
 BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

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extent feasible, in concert with the other MNF countries. At a minimum we should give them advance warning of our plans. On a separate but related matter, now, in our view, is not the time to declare Argentina eligible for arms sales. This would turn British public opinion, with a strong assist from HMG, completely sour. Should we decide we have to make a move, it should only be done following direct high level consultations with HMG.

Subsequent to our drafting of this memo, at our private suggestion State has forwarded you a short paper (Tab III) outlining their efforts to minimize fallout in Europe from our actions in Grenada. State's emphasis is on working constructively with our European Allies, especially the British, in restoring democracy to Grenada. State also is working hard via our Ambassadors to limit the spillover onto our other objectives in Europe, especially INF. In order to present our case directly to skeptical European governments, Secretary Shultz is sending Ken Dam to Europe next week for consultations in key capitals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you a) give a strong push to Grenada public diplomacy efforts and praise State's efforts to prop up our European Allies; b) keep our MFN partners in mind with regard to retaliation, and c) consider the impact on our relations with the UK in reviewing Argentine certification.

That you sign the polite reply to Ambassador Wright at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I        Letter to British Amb.  
Tab II      Letter from British Amb.  
Tab III     State memo

cc: Constantine Menges  
Walt Raymond

~~SECRET~~



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FROM THE AMBASSADOR

7753

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

27 October 1983

The Honorable  
Robert C McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
WASHINGTON DC

*Dear Bud,*

I enclose a copy of the statement which Sir Geoffrey Howe made in the House of Commons yesterday opening the emergency debate on Grenada.

As you will see, he declined to condemn the US intervention and he expressed the wish that the operation would have a speedy and successful outcome that would pave the way for genuine elections in Grenada for the first time in many years.

As the US Embassy in London has no doubt reported, HM Government had a pretty rough ride in the House of Commons yesterday. The important thing however is that nothing was said or done to prejudice the objectives we share - even if we disagree about the means - namely the restoration of constitutional government to Grenada. On this the independent position of the Governor General will be crucial.

*Yours ever,*

Oliver Wright

Mr Green  
Mr Pellew  
Mr Anson  
Mr Gray  
Mr Ellacott

VERBATIM SERVICE 090/83 WEDNESDAY 26TH OCTOBER 1983  
(PRODUCED BY THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION PRESS SERVICE)

GRENADA EMERGENCY DEBATE.  
SIR GEOFFREY HOWES OPENING SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS THE OPENING SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE IN THE COMMONS EMERGENCY DEBATE ON GRENADA TODAY 26 OCTOBER 1983 A

MR SPEAKER WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I WILL TO BEGIN IF I MAY BY BRINGING THE HOUSE UP-TO-DATE WITH THE SITUATION IN GRENADA.

THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND

THE POSITION IS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE NOW SECURED BOTH THE AIRPORTS ON THE ISLAND AT PEARLS AND SALINES, AS WELL AS THE RADIO STATION, AND FORT RUPERT. BUT FIGHTING IS APPARENTLY CONTINUING AT FORT FREDRICK AND ELSEWHERE. SEVERAL UNITED STATES SERVICEMEN HAVE BEEN KILLED, THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT TWELVE CUBANS HAVE BEEN KILLED DURING THE FIGHTING. THERE IS NO FIRM INFORMATION AT PRESENT OF ANY OTHER CASUALTIES. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF SOVIET NATIONALS MAY HAVE BEEN DETAINED., AND RUMOURS THAT MR BERNARD COARD ONE OF THE LEADERS OF LAST WEEKS COUP HAS SOUGHT SANCTUARY IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THAT.

BRITISH CITIZENS

THE LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY BRITISH CASUALTIES. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO EVACUATE UK CITIZENS TO BARBADOS AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ALLOW. HMS ANTRIM REMAINS READY TO BE CALLED UPON IN CASE OF NEED. AND WE ARE ALSO MAKING CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATION BY AIR BY BRITISH AIRCRAFT. A CONSULAR MISSION FROM THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN BRIDGETOWN IS STANDING BY TO GO TO GRENADA AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE TO ESTABLISH HOW MANY BRITISH CITIZENS MAY WISH TO BE EVACUATED. THE MAJORITY OF THEM ARE LONG TERM RESIDENTS OF GRENADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

I AM GLAD TO BE ABLE TO INFORM THE HOUSE THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, SIR PAUL SCOON, IS SAFE. (HON MEMBERS: WHERE?). IT WOULD NOT BE SENSIBLE OR HELPFUL FOR HIS SAFETY TO GIVE THAT INFORMATION IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE MAY HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA. HE REPRESENTS ONE OF THE FEW ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY IN GRENADA AT PRESENT. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION ARE AWARE OF THIS CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AND HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO RESPECT IT.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

THE HOUSE MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO BE REMINDED OF THE EVENTS WHICH HAVE LED UP TO THE PRESENT SITUATION.

WHEN GRENADA ACHIEVED FULL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM ON 7 FEBRUARY 1974, IT WAS AS A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH. THE PRIME MINISTER, SIR ERIC GAIRY, GOVERNED THE COUNTRY UNTIL MARCH 1979 WHEN HE WAS OVERTHROWN AS THE RESULT OF A COUP DETAT MOUNTED BY THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT. A PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT WAS SET UP, LED BY A MARXIST, MR MAURICE BISHOP, WHICH SUSPENDED THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNED BY PROMULGATING SO-CALLED PEOPLES LAWS.

THAT WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIME AND IT LASTED UNTIL THE 13TH OF THIS MONTH, WHEN MR BISHOP WAS IN TURN OUSTED BY HIS DEPUTY, MR BERNARD COARD, A MORE RADICAL MARXIST. AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF CONFUSION, A REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WAS CONSTITUTED ON 18 OCTOBER, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF GENERAL HUDSON.

WITH SOME OF HIS CLOSE SUPPORTERS. THERE HAS BEEN NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF THESE KILLINGS, WHICH HAVE BEEN RIGHTLY AND VERY WIDELY CONDEMNED. AFTER THE KILLINGS, A TWENTY-FOUR HOUR CURFEW WAS DECLARED WHICH THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED WOULD LAST UNTIL 24 OCTOBER.

ON 20 OCTOBER, THE DAY AFTER MR BISHOP'S DEATH, GENERAL AUSTIN CALLED ON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, AND TOLD HIM THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WAS IN CONTROL, AND THAT HE INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE THE COMPOSITION OF A NEW CABINET THREE DAYS LATER. HE LATER EXTENDED THAT TO TWO WEEKS. ON THE SAME DAY, 20 OCTOBER, THE GRENADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO UNDERLINE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY.

ON 21 OCTOBER, THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BARBADOS LEARNED THAT SOME CARIBBEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WERE PRESSING THEIR COLLEAGUES IN THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY TO ASK FOR MILITARY HELP IN RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA. WE PROMPTLY INSTRUCTED OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO ASCERTAIN HOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT RESPOND TO SUCH AN APPROACH.

ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, SATURDAY, 22 OCTOBER, THE UNITED STATES DIVERTED TOWARDS GRENADA A CARRIER GROUP, LED BY USS INDEPENDENCE. THEY STATED THAT THIS WAS A SIGNAL TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF US CITIZENS ON THE ISLAND. WE WERE INFORMED ON THE SAME DAY, SATURDAY 22 OCTOBER, THAT THE SEVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES HAD DECIDED TO PUT TOGETHER A MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND TO CALL UPON FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO HELP RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA.

LATE THAT EVENING WE WERE INFORMED BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A FIRM REQUEST FROM THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THAT ORGANISATION TO HELP RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA. THE US GOVERNMENT TOLD US ON THE EVENING OF 22 OCTOBER THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON HOW TO RESPOND, AND THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY. THEY HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST IF ONE WERE MADE TO US.

ON 23 OCTOBER, THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN BARBADOS WAS INFORMED THAT A FORMAL REQUEST FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD PROBABLY BE HANDED OVER LATER IN THE DAY. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN, BUT WE RECEIVED LATER THAT DAY THE CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING HELD IN TRINIDAD OF ALL COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES EXCEPT OF COURSE GRENADA DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST GRENADA.

WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT 23 OCTOBER AND TWO US CONSULAR OFFICIALS HAD ACCOMPANIED OUR DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER TO GRENADA OVER THE WEEKEND THE PURPOSE OF THAT VISIT WAS TO FORM A FIRST-HAND ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS TO BRITISH AND AMERICAN CITIZENS. WE WERE ASSURED BY THE US GOVERNMENT THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTED IMMEDIATELY IF THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO TAKE ANY ACTION, AND INFORMED THAT A UNITED STATES EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR MCNEIL, HAD BEEN SENT TO BARBADOS TO CONFER WITH CARIBBEAN LEADERS.

IT WAS ALSO ON 23 OCTOBER THAT HMS ANTRIM WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAIL FROM CARTAGENA IN COLOMBIA TO THE VICINITY OF GRENADA, IN CASE THE EVACUATION OF BRITISH NATIONALS PROVED NECESSARY. I WISH TO EMPHASISE THAT THAT WAS A PRECAUTIONARY MOVE, WHICH WAS ENTIRELY UNRELATED TO THE SUGGESTION OF SOME CARIBBEAN LEADERS THAT A MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.



TO GRENADA TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. FROM THE BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BRIDGETOWN. FOLLOWING THAT MEETING, OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WAS INSTRUCTED TO PUT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FACTORS WHICH WOULD HAD TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED BEFORE FIRM CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED. I SHALL COME BACK TO THESE LATER.

(INTERVENTION): ON 23 OCTOBER THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BRIDGETOWN WAS TOLD THAT THE FORMAL REQUEST BY THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST GRENADA WOULD BE HANDED OVER THAT NIGHT. THAT DID NOT HAPPEN.

ON MONDAY EVENING WE RECEIVED IN LONDON THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES WHICH HAD BEEN HANDED TO THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN BARBADOS, INFORMING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AMONG OTHERS, OF THE ORGANISATIONS INTENTION OF TAKING ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1981 TREATY OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, FOR THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, AND REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS.

ALSO ON MONDAY EVENING PRESIDENT REAGAN INFORMED MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND, THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT HE WAS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE REQUEST FROM THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES AND WOULD WELCOME HER THOUGHTS. HE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND IN ADVANCE OF ANY DECISION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES.

WHILE OUR RESPONSE TO THAT MESSAGE WAS BEING CONSIDERED, A SECOND MESSAGE ARRIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT SAYING THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE REQUEST THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO HIM. MINISTERS MET IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND, SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON MONDAY 25 OCTOBER, MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND SENT A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT IN WHICH, AS SHE TOLD THIS HOUSE YESTERDAY, SHE REITERATED THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE HAD ALREADY PUT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE PREVIOUS DAY AND EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AT THE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH HE WAS CONTEMPLATING.

SHE ALSO PHONED THE PRESIDENT - AND I AM NOT PREPARED TO DISCLOSE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSION - TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE SHE ATTACHED TO THE MATTER. EARLY ON TUESDAY MORNING MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN INFORMING HER THAT HE HAD WEIGHED THE ISSUES RAISED IN HER MESSAGE VERY CAREFULLY BUT HAD DECIDED THAT UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD, NEVERTHELESS, GO AHEAD.

THAT THEN IS THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO YESTERDAYS MILITARY INTERVENTION.

AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE HOUSE, HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT DIRECTED THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO CERTAIN FACTORS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. SOME OF THESE INCLUDED THE SAFETY OF OUR OWN COMMUNITY., THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL., AND THE FACT THAT THE CARICOM COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH AGREED ON THE NEED FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES, WERE DIVIDED ON THE ADVISABILITY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND A NUMBER OF COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES TOOK THE VIEW THAT NO ACTION OF THIS KIND WAS REQUIRED. THE UNITED STATES AND SOME COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN TOOK THE OTHER VIEW OF THE RISK TO WHICH THE CITIZENS WERE EXPOSED AND OF THE ACTION WHICH WAS CALLED FOR.

REGRET, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE A MATTER FOR SURPRISE. WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE AMERICANS ON EVERY ISSUE, ANY MORE THAN THEY ALWAYS AGREE WITH US. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT TO. ON SOME ISSUES OUR PERCEPTIONS AND THOSE OF THE AMERICANS ARE BOUND TO BE DIFFERENT.

IN THIS CASE THE UNITED STATES HAD PARTICULAR REASON TO CONSULT MOST CLOSELY WITH THOSE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAD CALLED ON IT TO HELP RESOLVE THE CRISIS. NEVERTHELESS THE EXTENT OF THE CONSULTATION WITH US WAS, REGRETTABLY, LESS THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED. BUT, IN THE COURSE OF THEM, MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE PRIME MINISTER MADE PERFECTLY PLAIN THE VIEW WHICH WE TOOK.

AN HONOURABLE MEMBER: DO YOU CONDEMN THE ACTION?

THE US TOOK ONE VIEW, THE UK ANOTHER. IT IS NO MORE FOR ME TO CONDEMN THEM THAN IT IS FOR THEM TO CONDEMN US.

INTERRUPTION ...

IN AFGHANISTAN, FOREIGN TROOPS HAVE OCCUPIED THE COUNTRY AND REMAINED THERE. IN GRENADA, THE AIM IS A WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND FREE ELECTIONS.

AN HONOURABLE MEMBER: I CAN UNDERSTAND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S RELUCTANCE TO DAMAGE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. I CAN UNDERSTAND HIS RELUCTANCE TO USE THE WORD CONDEMN BUT HE HAS A DUTY TO THE HOUSE TO SAY, AS HE WILL HAVE TO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHETHER HE THINKS THIS ACTION WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE OECs TREATY).

ON A MATTER OF THIS KIND IT IS POSSIBLE FOR MORE THAN ONE VIEW TO BE HELD BUT WHEN MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, NOTHING COULD BE MORE UNHELPFUL THAN TO CONDEMN THE UNITED STATES.

TO RETURN TO THE CARIBBEAN. IT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT SEVEN INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES HAVE JOINED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THIS INTERVENTION, INDEED THEY HAVE URGED IT ON THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOT PERHAPS SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNISED THAT, ALTHOUGH THESE ISLANDS ENJOY FULL INDEPENDENCE, THE ISLANDS OF THE CARIBBEAN HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN MOST OF THESE ISLANDS VERY RECENTLY. THEY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES WITHIN THE REGION.

THIS IS WHY THE ORIGINAL COUP OF 1979 IN GRENADA WAS SO DISTURBING, AND WHY THE BLOODY EVENTS OF LAST WEEK SO DEEPLY AFFRONTED THEM. THE BREAKDOWN OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE RULE OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS, WAS PERCEIVED AS A DANGEROUS DISRUPTION BY THE COUNTRIES IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY.

NOT ONLY WAS THAT THE CASE, BUT WE MUST REMEMBER THAT JUST AS THE UNITED STATES HAD SOME 1000 CITIZENS IN GRENADA, SO THE OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WHO HAVE INTERVENED HAVE NATIONALS OF THEIR OWN ON GRENADA AND HAVE GRENADANS IN THEIR OWN ISLANDS. THIS IS A VERY CLOSE FAMILY OF STATES.

JUST AS THAT FACT EXPLAINS MUCH OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED, SO ALSO IT PERHAPS PROVIDES THE KEY TO THE WAY AHEAD. COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE PRESENT OPERATION WILL BE WELL PLACED TO ASSIST THE GRENADANS TO RESTORE AND SET UP THE NECESSARY MACHINERY TO ENSURE AN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY AND DEMOCRACY.

HOLD ELECTIONS AND WAS HIMSELF THE VICTIM OF VIOLENT OVERTHROW.

THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE INTERVENED ARE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. THEIR STATED OBJECTIVE IS TO RESTORE DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE ISLAND. THAT IS AN OBJECTIVE WE FULLY SHARE. IT MAY BE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE FOR OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES TO PLAY A PART IN THAT PROCESS. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS ABOUT THAT AND WE WELCOME THE WILLINGNESS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HELP TOWARDS THAT END. THE AMERICANS, AS THE HOUSE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS, HAVE MADE PLAIN THEIR WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GRENADAN SCENE AT THE EARLIEST REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY.

MEANTIME, THEIR FORCES AND THOSE OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES INVOLVED ARE EXPOSED TO GREAT DANGER. WE SHALL DO NOTHING TO MAKE THEIR TASK MORE DIFFICULT. WE MUST ALL WISH FOR A SPEEDY AND SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. ONE THAT WILL QUICKLY PAVE THE WAY FOR GENUINE ELECTIONS IN GRENADA, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS.

THE WHOLE HOUSE WILL HOPE THAT GRENADA WILL ONCE AGAIN BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE PATH OF DEMOCRACY. THAT WILL IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE THROUGHOUT THE CARIBBEAN. SOMETHING OF REAL VALUE WILL THUS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE VS090/83

COI LONDON

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The Allies and Grenada

Our action in Grenada threatens to have an impact on core alliance interests. As a result, we have pursued a two-pronged strategy designed to (1) consult the allies, and in particular the British, whenever possible in a positive, constructive way on future actions affecting Grenada and (2) minimize fallout from the invasion on our agenda in Europe, and more specifically on INF deployment.

While the allied attitude toward our intervention varies from country to country, there has been widespread criticism of the U.S. failure to consult adequately in advance. We have also been reprimanded for using military force to resolve the problem, although privately officials in several countries have acknowledged the value of the decisive action taken. We have also been vulnerable on the international legal justifications of the invasion. Finally, European leaders, frustrated about their lack of input in our decision, do not feel particularly well disposed toward efforts to dispel popular criticism, and therefore have not been terribly effective domestically in keeping Grenada separate from INF and Lebanon.

In order to present our case directly to skeptical European governments, Secretary Shultz is sending Ken Dam to Europe next week for consultations in key capitals. He will begin in London, and proceed on to Rome, Paris, Bonn, The Hague and Brussels, where he hopes to address the NATO Council. He will be prepared to discuss other issues the allies are concerned about, including Lebanon and INF. Throughout the crisis, we have used our ambassadors to explain our policy, and our posts have been lobbying with appropriate officials in an attempt to forestall U.N. General Assembly action inimical to our interests. We have also been encouraging our allies to get involved, where possible, in the economic and political reconstruction of the island. To the extent that the allies are so involved they will be less likely to criticize us.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASIFIED

NLS 598-002 #597

BY WOS NARA DATE 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

As you know, the most serious repercussions have affected our relationship with the British. Mrs. Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe have been hurt domestically by what appears to many in the U.K. to have been our failure to consult adequately with Her Majesty's government. Although the U.K. abstained in voting for the U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the U.S. action, they remain publicly critical of our decision. The invasion provoked a parliamentary debate over INF on October 31st, and last weekend a poll showed that three-quarters of the British people would not trust the United States to consult before pulling the nuclear trigger on dual-key systems. The Deputy Secretary's trip will, we hope, patch up some of the misunderstandings. In the meantime, we have been talking with the British on a daily basis about our efforts, and hope they will participate actively in our ongoing endeavor to restore democracy to Grenada.

Underlying our effort is our concern that the Grenada experience could, if mismanaged, do considerable damage to our interests in Europe. It has made it more difficult for our staunchest supporters (Thatcher and Kohl) to convince their publics of the reliability of the United States. That said, we believe that with time and an ongoing conscientious effort on our part to share information on our findings and outlook on Grenada, we will be able to limit the spillover onto our objectives in Europe this autumn. (Much will depend on how fast we are able to disengage our forces from Grenada and on whether we leave behind a stable and improved situation.) Similarly, close consultations on Lebanon with our MNF partners and on INF with the deployment countries will also be essential in this regard.

  
for Charles Hall  
Executive Secretary

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**National Security Council  
The White House**

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	1	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	<i>m</i>	<i>A</i>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	5		<i>A</i>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_  
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11/9 (Date/Time)  
Bud, I don't see that the memo to be answered based on your note to be about and VP meeting next night today.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 4, 1983

NOTE FOR BOB KIMMITT

FROM: CONSTANTINE MENGES *com*

SUBJECT: The Mood in Europe

Re request for comments to you--this  
office concurs with the proposed letter  
to Sir Oliver Wright as written.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>IK</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			
<u>C. Manges</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>

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**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Bob,  
I don't think Constantine  
would clear last paragraph of  
note to Sir Oliver. Please run  
by him. J