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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM J.: Files

Archivist: kdb

File Folder: Gulf War [2] Box 91852

Date: January 12, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Robert B. Oakley to Frank C. Carlucci, re U.S.-Soviet Relations and Persian Gulf (w/notations), 1p	3/20/87	P1 P5
2. memo	re Persian Gulf (w/notations), 2p <i>PART. 11/22/02 F96-122 #38</i>	3/19/87	P1, <i>B3</i>
3. talking points	re status of U.S. relations in Persian Gulf, 3p <i>D</i>	3/19/87	P1, <i>B3</i>
4. scheduling memo (2960)	Grant S. Green to Frederick J. Ryan Jr., re Photo Opportunity with Arab League Delegation on Gulf War (w/highlighting), 2p <i>R, 6/8/00 NLS F96-122 #40</i>	n.d.	P1
5. memo	Melvyn Levitsky to F. Carlucci, re Proposed Presidential Photo-Op with Arab League Delegation, 1p <i>" " " #41</i>	4/20/87	P1
6. memo (3143)	Oakley to Carlucci, re Arab League Delegation on Gulf War (w/notations), 2p <i>" " " #42</i>	4/27/87	P1
7. memo (3328)	Oakley to Carlucci, re Murphy Mission and Presidential Letters to Gulf Leaders (w/notations), 1p <i>" " " #43</i>	5/1/87	P1
8. HOS corresp.	RR to King Fahd, 4p <i>" " " #44</i>	5/5/87	P1
9. HOS corresp.	RR to Sultan Qaboos bin Said (Oman), 2p <i>" " " #45</i>	5/5/87	P1
10. HOS corresp.	RR to Saddam Hussein, 3p <i>" " " #46</i>	5/5/87	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
11. HOS corresp.	RR to Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa (Bahrain), 2p <i>R, 6/8/86 NLSF 96 122 #47</i>	5/5/87	P1
12. HOS corresp.	RR to Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahayyan (United Arab Emirates), 3p <i>" " " #48</i>	5/5/87	P1
13. HOS corresp.	RR to Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani (Qatar), 3p <i>" " " #49</i>	5/5/87	P1
14. HOS corresp.	RR to Sheikh Jabir Al Abdullah al Sabah (Kuwait), 3p <i>" " " #50</i>	5/5/87	P1
15. notes	re attached letters to Arab heads of state, 2p <i>" " " #51</i>	n.d.	P1
16. memo	Carlucci to RR, re Letters to Gulf Leaders (w/notation), 2p <i>" " " #52</i>	5/4/87	P1
17. memo (2960)	Oakley to Carlucci, re President's Photo Opportunity with Arab League Delegation (5/8/87, 10:40-10:45am) (w/notations), 1p <i>" " " #53</i>	5/6/87	P1
18. sched. memo	from Carlucci, re same topic as item #17 (w/notations), 2p <i>" " " #54</i>	5/6/87	P1
19. talking points	for President's photo op w/Arab League delegation, 1p <i>" " " #55</i>	n.d.	P1
20. bio	(1p) <i>D. "1/22/02 F96-122 #56</i>	7/23/85	P1, 33
21. bio	(1p) <i>D. " " " #57</i>	4/29/87	P1, 33
22. bio	(1p) <i>D. " " " #58</i>	5/5/87	P1, 33

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
23. cable	300156Z JUN 88 p 2-7 (w/notations), 6p R, 6/30/00 NLSF 96-122 #59	6/30/88	P1
24. cable	page 1 of item #23 (w/notations), 1p " " " #60	6/30/88	P1
25. memo (5329)	Peter W. Rodman to Powell, re ramifications of end of Iran-Iraq War (w/notations), 3p	7/20/88	P1 P5

RESTRICTION CODES

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NLS F96-122 #38

By CIS, NARA, Date 4/22/00

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

- 750 -

National Intelligence Council

19 March 1987.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
Director, Middle East and South Asia
National Security Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: US Interests in the Persian Gulf

1. In accordance with your request through Bill Burns, I asked CIA/NESA to prepare a summary list of issues and events affecting our interests in the Persian Gulf. Their response is attached and you will find it a useful review of relevant developments. I would like to add my own two cents to CIA's summary.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Attachment:
As stated

2

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

13

PRESIDENT'S PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH ARAB LEAGUE
FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

PRESS POINTS

- o President reaffirmed strong commitment to promptest possible negotiated settlement of Iran-Iraq war. Also stressed U.S. commitment to security of friends in region and free flow of oil through Strait of Hormuz.
- o We support and applaud Arab League's initiative to help end war ... reinforces our own efforts.
- o U.S. ready in principle to support application of appropriate enforcement measures against either party which refuses to cooperate with formal Security Council efforts to end war.
- o We are pursuing Operation Staunch vigorously to try to bring Iran into negotiations with Iraq, which has made clear its willingness to negotiate.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

February 25, 1987

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

On January 23, while the Iranian assault against Iraqi forces was especially intense, I reiterated the deep concern of the United States at the suffering and instability which the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the Gulf region. Since that time, although Iraq has stopped the Iranian attack east of Basra and pushed it back somewhat, the fighting in this tragic conflict has continued on the ground, in the air, and at sea.

Clearly, the peoples of the region cannot rest secure until there is a negotiated end to the conflict. We have frequently called on Iran's leaders to join in working toward a negotiated settlement, as the Iraqis have repeatedly offered to do. Regrettably, the Iranian government has so far proved unresponsive in the face of all efforts to encourage reason and restraint in its war policy. It has also persisted in its efforts to subvert its neighbors through terrorism and intimidation.

We continue to work for a settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. Toward that end, I have asked Secretary of State George Shultz to take the lead in an international effort to bring Iran into negotiations. Secretary Shultz has recently named Under Secretary-designate Ed Derwinski to be responsible for our Operation Staunch. This effort has my full support.

As I emphasized in January, this conflict threatens America's strategic interests, as well as the stability and security of all our friends in the region. We remain strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region, and recently moved naval forces in the Persian Gulf to underpin that commitment. We also remain strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, we are determined to help bring the war to the earliest possible negotiated end. With that goal in mind the United States calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, negotiations, and withdrawal to borders. I urge the international community, in the appropriate fora and through the appropriate mechanisms, to cooperate in the endeavor. The time to act on this dangerous and destructive war is now.

#

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2960

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

REQUEST: Photo Opportunity with Arab League delegation on Gulf War

PURPOSE: To reaffirm U.S. commitment to prompt negotiated settlement of Iran-Iraq war and security of Gulf Arabs

BACKGROUND: The Arab League is sending high-level delegations to each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to press for strong action to end the Iran-Iraq war. The visit of the delegation to Washington, headed by the Bahraini and Yemeni Foreign Ministers, provides a vital opportunity to stress the President's personal support for firm UNSC action and for the security of our friends in the Gulf. The Arab League's envoys have been received at the highest levels in other capitals (Gorbachev met with them in Moscow); a brief meeting with the President would help greatly to reassure our friends and counter Soviet and Iranian efforts to discredit us.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President met with a similar Arab League delegation on the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1982.

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, May 7 or Friday, May 8
(Secretary Shultz will meet the delegation at 9:45 a.m., May 7, and the Vice President will meet the group in the Roosevelt Room at 3:20 p.m. that same day. A presidential photo opportunity/drop by in connection with the Vice President's meeting would be ideal).
DURATION: 5 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office /Roosevelt Room

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F96-122#40

BY

dlk

NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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-2-

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, the Chief of Staff, Mr. Carlucci, plus Arab League delegates.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity

RECOMMENDED BY: George Shultz, Frank Carlucci

OPPOSED BY: None

Attachment

Tab A List of Participants

~~SECRET~~

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

For Oval Office Photo Proposal

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
The Chief of Staff
Mr. Carlucci
Robert Oakley, NSC

Arab League Delegation

Bahraini Foreign Minister Khalifa
Yemeni Foreign Minister Iryani
Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Zahawi

- - - - -

For Drop By in Roosevelt Room

U.S.

Same as above

Arab League Delegation

Full delegation of 10 members



United States Department of State

2960

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Photo Opportunity with Arab
League Delegation

At its meeting in Tunis earlier this month, the Arab League authorized its Follow-up Committee (FC) on the Gulf war to visit the capitals of U.N. Security Council members to press for UNSC action on the war. The first round of visits, which the FC hopes to complete before Ramadan begins on April 28, will include delegations to the five permanent UNSC members.

Bahraini Foreign Minister Khalifa and Yemeni Foreign Minister Iryani are planning to lead the FC delegation to Washington, within the next two weeks if possible. (We will provide more precise dates as soon as they are available.) In presenting the FC's proposals on the war, Khalifa and Iryani would be joined by Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Zahawi, and probably the resident Ambassadors of the five other FC members -- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco.

In part, the FC visits are a response to our suggestion that the Arab League take a more active role in supporting the President's diplomatic initiative on the war. A round of demarches by the Arab League, reinvigorated by its first-ever unanimous resolution on the war, may give our own diplomatic efforts a boost. Even if the FC demarches fail, at least the Arab states will understand clearly that they should blame the Soviets and others for the UNSC's indecisiveness, not the U.S.

The FC visit will be a prime opportunity to reassure our friends in the Gulf region of the steadiness of U.S. policy. Building on the President's statement of February 25, we should seize this opportunity to emphasize concern, at the highest levels, for the security of the Gulf Arab states.

We have therefore proposed a meeting between the Vice President and the FC delegation. We also recommend that the President agree to drop by the Vice President's meeting with the delegation for a photo opportunity.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

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F96-122 #41

BY

NARA, DATE 6/6/00

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DECL: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 27, 1987

14

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: Arab League Delegation on Gulf War

The schedules of the President and Vice President for May are already full, yet there is an important need for this Arab League delegation to have a photo op with the President and a 15-20 minute meeting with the Vice President. The general lines of Administration policy toward the Gulf were approved by the President at the February 12 NSPG meeting on the Middle East, spelled out in his February 25 statement on Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf, and reaffirmed at the March 23 NSPG on US Policy and Gulf Security. The policy gave effect to a series of actions involving the Vice President (e.g. meeting with Iraqi Ambassador), Secretary of State (e.g. revitalizing Operation Staunch), Secretary of Defense/JCS (e.g. stepped-up naval activities in Gulf) and our Ambassador to the UN (e.g. Security Council consultations). We have made some progress in restoring our credibility and Gulf stability in face of threats from Iran and the USSR. However, both these governments are stepping up the pressure on the Gulf States in an effort to discredit us and strengthen their own positions; and Iran shows no sign of weakening in pursuit of the war against Iraq.

Under these circumstances, Iraq and the Gulf States, including the Saudis, are more worried and are taking actions to express their concern and seek greater reassurance/assistance. Foremost among these was a decision by the Arab League (agreed to by Syria as a result of Saudi pressure) to send delegations to each of the five permanent members of the Security Council. They will push for an early, tough resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq war and an end to arms deliveries to whichever government does not comply. The substance of our position on all points is good but it has been undercut somewhat by propaganda from the USSR, PRC, and others who have been put on the spot and want to shift the heat elsewhere. Moreover, the aftereffects of the Iran arms affair upon our credibility have not completely dissipated -- in Egypt and Jordan as well as the Gulf.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS F96-122 #42BY alb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

This situation plus the Arab propensity for overvaluing appearances means that the symbolism of the Arab League delegation will be as important as the substantive discussions. If they are not seen in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world as received by the President and Vice President, it will undermine whatever they hear from you and the Secretary of State. The delegation coming here includes the Bahrain and Yemeni Foreign Ministers plus high-ranking Iraqi and Saudi representatives. They will come anytime between May 10 and 28 which is convenient for those who will see them but an answer on dates is needed very soon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you do whatever you can to obtain approval of the photo op with the President and brief meeting with the Vice President, and have their schedules coordinated with the Secretary of State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

3328

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 1, 1987

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Murphy Mission and Presidential
Letters to Gulf Leaders

Dick Murphy plans to visit Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq between May 7 and May 15. His trip provides an important opportunity to review and reinforce the careful diplomatic and military steps we have been taking in recent months to put our policy in the Gulf back on the right track, and to counter recent efforts by the USSR and Iran to discredit us. His discussions will serve as a reply to the recent visit by a Soviet envoy to the Gulf, Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky, and to a high-level Iranian emissary to Kuwait -- both of whom spread disinformation about the President's policies.

Given the importance of sustaining and building upon our recent gains in the Gulf, we agree that Murphy should undertake his mission on behalf of the President, and be armed with Presidential letters to the Heads of State of each of the countries he will visit.

Speechwriters have cleared the attached letters. Bill Cockell *RO* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *RO* Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President
Tabs A-G Letters to Heads of State

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BY *dlh* NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


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Received SS
3328
1987 MAY -4 PM 4:13

May 4, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 
SUBJECT: Letters to Gulf Leaders

Issue

Whether to sign letters to the Heads of State of Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.

Facts

Assistant Secretary of State Murphy plans to travel to the Gulf May 7-15 to consult with local leaders about our continuing efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and bolster the security of our friends in the area. The trip provides an important opportunity to reinforce gains we have made in the Gulf over the past three months and counter recent Soviet and Iranian attempts to discredit the U.S. Murphy would carry letters from you to the Heads of State of each of the Gulf countries he plans to visit.

Discussion

Building on your February 25 statement, the letters highlight your personal support for the diplomatic and military steps we have been taking over the last few months to enhance Gulf security, deter Iranian aggression, ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and hasten a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. The letters also emphasize our continuing commitment to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and self-determination for the Afghan people.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President

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NLS F96-122 #52

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BY dlb NARA DATE 6/8/02

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the attached letters.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to King Fahd
Tab B	Letter to Sultan Qaboos
Tab C	Letter to President Saddam Hussein
Tab D	Letter to Shaikh Isa Al-Khalifa
Tab E	Letter to Shaikh Zayid Al Nahayyan
Tab F	Letter to Shaikh Khalifa Al Thani
Tab G	Letter to Sheikh Jabir Al Sabah

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Official

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Dear King Fahd:

It is with a sense of deep concern that I write to you about the suffering and instability the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the Gulf region and the possibility that the hostilities could spread. I am determined that the United States will use its influence vigorously and with clear purpose to seek a resolution of the conflict and to reassure our friends of our support. Accordingly, we have taken a number of recent actions toward these objectives.

I have asked Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy to visit the region and consult with you and other leaders about the war, elaborate the initiatives we have taken, seek your counsel, and explore other avenues that might help us achieve our common purpose. We will benefit from your insight and advice and I look forward to Assistant Secretary Murphy's report.

Let me briefly mention some of the elements of the broad strategy we are pursuing. In widely publicized statements in January and February, I reaffirmed our conviction that an expansion of the war would be a threat to the interests of the United States as well as to the nations of the region. I reiterated our commitment to support the self-defense efforts of your nation and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. I restated that we would ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. We have also warned Iran against using its Silkworm missiles, acquired from China, against shipping in the Strait or elsewhere. Our messages were unambiguous, and they have been heard.

Because Iran remains the intransigent party, unwilling to negotiate a peace without victor or vanquished, I have directed a more intensified

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BY dlh, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

international effort to persuade other countries not to sell weapons to Iran. This effort is having more success than most would have predicted last fall, but not nearly enough. It is very important that countries such as the USSR and China adopt new policies restricting the flow of not only their own weapons but those of and through other countries to Iran.

We are working to restore a sense of urgency to diplomatic activity on the war. In discussions at the UN and elsewhere, with my full support, we have argued that the time has come for concrete, effective international action on the war, imposing genuine penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or accept mediation. We fully support the current initiative undertaken by the Arab League to press for similar action, reinforcing our own efforts.

As you know, because Kuwait was specially targeted for attacks by Iran, I authorized our extraordinary offer to collaborate in protecting a number of its oil tankers. I saw this action as providing firm reassurance--to our friends and adversaries--of the strength of our commitments that I had spelled out in my public statements in January and February. The technical talks to reflag Kuwaiti-owned tankers and provide them protection are proceeding rapidly. It is our hope that Kuwait and other GCC states will not feel it necessary to call upon the Soviet navy for such purposes, nor grant it facilities or other assistance.

I am also firmly determined to move forward toward the goal of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East--a goal which I know you share. For some time, the United States has been actively engaged in an effort to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements for beginning a new stage in the process. Our immediate objective has been agreement by the parties to enter into face-to-face negotiations leading to peace between Israel and all of its

neighbors. Experience has shown that only through the give and take of direct, bilateral negotiations will they be able to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the problems facing them.

We have been considering whether an international conference can contribute to this objective. A conference would certainly not be an end in itself but would facilitate direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties leading to a peaceful settlement. Our efforts in exploring the conference have not yet achieved all that we consider necessary for success, but important progress has been made. We intend to continue discussing this and other pertinent issues with the governments directly involved and would welcome your views. We shall not be daunted by those who resist or reject movement toward peace, and are confident we can count upon your help.


Another important issue to both of us is the future of Afghanistan. Secretary of State Shultz recently told the Soviet leadership directly that we seek only peace and genuine self-determination for the proud people of that country, and are prepared to work with the USSR to that end. President Zia tells us he has delivered a similar message. We believe that the Soviets are beginning to feel the military pressures of the Resistance and the political pressures from many governments, to which you have made such important contributions. However, they are not yet prepared to withdraw and leave the Afghan people to determine their own fate. Rather they have greatly increased military, terrorist and political pressures upon Pakistan. The next several months may be decisive for this long struggle, so I urge you to join us in doing still more to support both the Resistance and Pakistan.

I am pleased with the progress of our joint efforts to intensify bilateral security cooperation. Much useful work has been achieved in our military contingency talks and Secretary

Weinberger looks forward to his meeting in June with Defense Minister Sultan to review this work and the direction for future endeavors.

Assistant Secretary Murphy's visit serves once more to emphasize the importance I attach to our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the value I place on your counsel. Reassured by the tradition of cooperation and friendship that exists between our countries, I am certain we will together meet and overcome the difficult challenges facing our nations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Riyadh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Your Majesty:

The warm and very close relations which our two nations have enjoyed over the years are very special. Our regular discussions of bilateral and multilateral issues, in which Assistant Secretary Murphy will participate, provide an excellent forum for frank, cordial, and substantive discussion of our views on issues of mutual interest.

High on our agenda are regional issues which I know deeply concern you and your government. One, the Iran-Iraq war, has been a destructive and potentially destabilizing issue in your immediate region for the past seven years. As you know, it is an issue which has greatly concerned us as well. I want to take this opportunity to personally assure you that the United States remains strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region; to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; and to bringing the Iran-Iraq war to the earliest possible negotiated end.

We are working to restore a sense of urgency to diplomatic activity on the war. In discussions at the UN and elsewhere, at senior levels with my full support, we have argued that the time has come for concrete, effective international action on the war, imposing genuine penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or accept mediation. We fully support the current initiative undertaken by the Arab League to press for similar action.

At the same time, we are mindful of the importance of long-term relations with Iran. We are prepared to have a constructive dialogue with Iran when Iran demonstrates its support for the normal principles which govern good relations between countries.


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BY dlh NARA, DATE 6/8/00

Another issue on which we mutually agree is the search for peace between Israel and its neighbors. I am also firmly determined to move forward toward the goal of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East--a goal which I know you share. For some time, the United States has been actively engaged in an effort to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements for beginning a new stage in the process. Our immediate objective has been to find a formula whereby the parties can enter into face-to-face negotiations leading to peace between Israel and all of its neighbors, and a just solution to the Palestinian issue. Experience has shown that only through the give and take of direct, bilateral negotiations will they be able to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the problems facing them.

We have been considering whether an international conference can contribute to this objective, not as an end in itself but to facilitate direct negotiations. We intend to continue discussing this and other pertinent issues with the governments directly involved and would welcome your views on how we might best proceed.

I have a high regard for the excellent cooperation that exists between our two countries. Our candid consultations on political, security and economic issues of mutual interest are an integral part of our friendship. I look forward to strengthening and deepening our relationship through this important and constructive dialogue.

Sincerely,



His Majesty
Sultan Qaboos bin Said
Sultanate of Oman
Muscat

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

I have asked Assistant Secretary Murphy to visit Iraq and the Gulf region as my special emissary to consult about the terrible war which has caused such suffering for the peoples of the region. My Administration is determined to use the influence of the United States vigorously and with a clear sense of purpose to seek a resolution of this conflict. We are committed to help deal with the negative effects of Iran's intransigent pursuit of the war, its threat to the security of the Gulf countries, and its threat to freedom of navigation in the Gulf, along the lines set forth in my February 25 statement.

As you have by now observed, that statement of February 25 accurately defines both the policies and the actions of my Administration. We have been very active over the past three months in pressing for concrete international action, focused at present upon the United Nations, to bring Iran to join in a ceasefire, withdrawal, and negotiations leading to a just settlement of the war. We have pursued energetically a rejuvenated initiative to persuade third countries not to sell arms to Iran. It is also our judgment, which we have made clear to others, that there should be penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or to accept mediation, notably an embargo upon the supply of arms.

While we have made some headway with these policies, it has not been enough to achieve our common goals. One of my objectives in sending Ambassador Murphy on this trip is to seek advice and cooperation from those whom he will meet on how to enhance the effectiveness of our own efforts and to get others to assist us.

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

For example, the Soviet Union has proved reluctant to join us in forging an effective international effort, despite direct appeals by Secretary of State Shultz and other senior officials. China has also rejected our high-level demarches, while its military equipment continues to flow into Iran.

We were pleased at the success of your diplomacy in persuading the Arab League to constitute a Follow-up Committee which is visiting the permanent members of the UN Security Council. It is our hope that these visits will complement our own efforts to get other governments to stop the supply of their arms to Iran. In addition, these visits may also be useful for getting others either to undertake their own version of Operation Staunch or join in a Security Council resolution calling for a mandatory international ban on the supply of arms for this purpose.

We will continue to work with you in the pursuit of an honorable peace. However, as important as our shared interest in peace is, there is more than that to our relationship.

I have been pleased at the growing economic ties between Iraq and the United States, especially in the agricultural sector. I hope that trade between us in other sectors will soon regain momentum, as well. We are ready at any time to proceed with the formal signing of the Commercial Agreement discussed between our governments in 1985 and 1986. I know, too, that our governments are nearing completion of a cultural agreement, so that we may be seeing more Iraqis at American universities and more American academics in Iraq -- a valuable investment in the future of both our countries.

In traditional diplomatic channels, as well, we have arrived at a measure of cooperation that would have seemed most unlikely ten years ago.

Nevertheless, there are matters, some of them of great importance, on which we differ, and Ambassador Murphy will discuss those in a spirit of frankness and openness during his visit. I hope you will offer Ambassador Murphy your views on how we can strengthen and extend our relationship, building on the cooperation which we have already achieved in important areas.

I await Ambassador Murphy's report on his discussions with great interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, prominent "R" at the beginning.

His Excellency
Saddam Hussein
President of the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Your Highness:

I want to take this opportunity to convey to you my personal greetings and to let you know the great value the United States places on the warm relationship we have with your government and the people of Bahrain. Our relationship spans many years and embraces important political, economic, and security dimensions of mutual interest. We value your insight and wisdom and welcome opportunities to consult on issues of major concern to both our nations.

It is for this reason that I have asked Assistant Secretary Murphy to consult with you. The Gulf war is now in its seventh year without any sign it might end soon. I have made clear most recently in my public statement of February 25, and through a series of careful military and diplomatic steps, that the United States remains strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region; to deterring Iranian aggression; to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; and to bringing the Iran-Iraq war to the earliest possible negotiated end.

We have begun a process in the UN among the five permanent members of the Security Council seeking to restore a sense of urgency to the diplomatic activity to end the war. We have argued that the time has come for concrete, effective international action on the war, imposing genuine penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or accept mediation. We fully support the current initiative undertaken by the Arab League to press for similar action, and are grateful for the visit of your Foreign Minister to Washington to follow up this important effort.

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At the same time, I have directed a more intensified effort to persuade other countries not to sell weapons to Iran. Our diplomats have been very active in the past weeks and, in some cases, successful in stemming the flow of arms to Iran. Additionally, we have made clear to Iran and China our concern about the new threat to shipping posed by Iran's recently acquired Silkworm missiles, and have urged others to make similar protests.

On another subject, which is perhaps equally important to stability in the region, the process of finding peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, I am also firmly determined to move forward toward the goal of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East -- a goal which I know you share. For some time, the United States has been actively engaged in an effort to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements for beginning a new stage in the process. Our immediate objective has been agreement by the parties to enter into face-to-face negotiations leading to peace; for it is only through the give-and-take of direct, bilateral negotiations that they will be able to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the problems facing them.

We are now considering whether an international conference can contribute to this objective. A conference would certainly not be an end in itself, but might facilitate direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties. We intend to continue discussing this and other pertinent issues with the governments directly involved and would welcome your views on how we might best proceed.

Your Highness, Bahrain has a special place in our considerations and you can be sure of our continued close cooperation.

Sincerely,



His Highness
Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Amir of the State of Bahrain
Manama

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Your Highness:

I am sending Assistant Secretary Murphy to you to follow up my invitation of several weeks ago to visit the United States to discuss urgent matters concerning security in the Gulf and, more specifically, U.S. cooperation with the UAE.

I am deeply concerned about the rising threat which Iran poses to the security of the Gulf region and in particular to the UAE following the attack on Abu al-Bakkush oil field in November 1986. In order to show our concern about the security implications of that attack, we dispatched immediately to the UAE an expert team of air defense technicians to advise you on air defense procedures. I want you to know that we stand ready to assist you with both materiel and personnel as detailed in the survey report which the team submitted. I can assure you that the United States will continue to work closely with you on these and related issues.

The threat to Kuwait has also been of concern to the United States. Kuwaiti ships were the target of numerous attacks by Iran in an attempt to intimidate and reduce its support for Iraq. Kuwait, fearing its life line threatened, approached the Soviet Union and the United States in an attempt to protect this life line. Enhancing the role of the Soviet Union in the Gulf causes us great concern. As you know, Mr. President, in addition to the security threat posed by the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. perceives an interest in assuring that the states of the area do not fall victim to any outside domination.

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BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/8/00

The Soviet Union has long sought greater influence in your vital area of the world in pursuit of both strategic and economic gains. As a result, I took the extraordinary step of agreeing to protect Kuwaiti tankers so that Kuwait would not need to turn to the Soviet Union, and, thereby, give the Soviets an opportunity to seek the kind of access and influence it has long been frustrated in obtaining. I know, Mr. President, that you share my view that the Soviet Union must be prevented from gaining any further access in the Gulf and I am pleased that we are cooperating so closely in this regard.

At the same time, I realize that the cause of instability in the area, that is the continuation of the war, must be resolved. For this reason, I have taken two initiatives in which I request your cooperation.

First, we began a process in the UN among the five permanent members of the Security Council seeking to restore a sense of urgency to the diplomatic activity to end the war. We have argued that the time has come for concrete, effective international action on the war, imposing genuine penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or accept mediation. We fully support the current initiative undertaken by the Arab League to press for similar action. As a member of the Security Council, we look to the UAE to assist us in this process.


At the same time, I have directed a more intensified effort to persuade other countries not to sell weapons to Iran. Our diplomats have been very active in the past weeks and, in some cases, successful in stemming the flow of arms to Iran. Additionally, we have made clear to Iran and China our concern about the new threat to shipping posed by Iran's recently acquired Silkworm missiles, and have urged others to make similar protests.

On another subject, which is perhaps equally important to stability in the region, the process of finding peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, I am also firmly determined to move forward toward the goal which I know you share. For some time, the United States has been actively engaged in an effort to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements for beginning a new stage in the process. Our immediate objective has been agreement by the parties to enter into face-to-face negotiations; for it is only through the give and take of direct, bilateral negotiations that they will be able to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the problems facing them.

We are now at the point of considering whether an international conference can contribute to this objective. A conference would certainly not be an end in itself. However, we have been exploring how it might facilitate direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties. We intend to continue discussing this and other pertinent issues with the governments directly involved.

In closing, Mr. President, I want to assure you that the U.S. takes seriously its long-term commitment to the stability of the Gulf region and considers the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz to be a vital interest. In pursuing this commitment, the U.S. will pay close attention to the security needs of the UAE, as well as the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, of which Your Excellency is effectively serving as the President. In doing so, we hope to create a strong and viable guard against instability or subversion from any source.

Sincerely,



His Highness
Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan
President of the United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Your Highness:

I am grateful for the cooperation which exists between our two countries. It is in this spirit of cooperation that I have asked Assistant Secretary Murphy to consult with you.

There is no sign that the Gulf war, now in its seventh year, might end soon. I have made clear many times, most recently in my public statement of February 25, and through a series of careful military and diplomatic steps, that the United States remains strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region; to deterring Iranian aggression; to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; and to bringing the Iran-Iraq war to the earliest possible negotiated end. The recent visit of Admiral Bernsen and the USS Lasalle underscores our commitment to the peace and stability of the Gulf region.

In pursuit of these goals, we have begun a process in the UN among the five permanent members of the security council seeking to restore a sense of urgency to the diplomatic activity to end the war. We have argued that the time has come for concrete, effective international action on the war, imposing genuine penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or accept mediation. We fully support the current initiative undertaken by the Arab League to press for similar action.

At the same time, I have directed a more intensified effort to persuade other countries not to sell weapons to Iran. Our diplomats have

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

been very active in the past weeks and, in some cases, successful in stemming the flow of arms to Iran. Additionally, we have made clear to Iran and China our concern about the new threat to shipping posed by Iran's recently acquired Silkworm missiles, and have urged others to make similar representations.

On another subject, which is perhaps equally important to stability in the region, the process of finding peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, I am also firmly determined to move forward toward the goal of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East--a goal which I know you share. For some time, the United States has been actively engaged in an effort to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements for beginning a new stage in the process. Our immediate objective has been agreement by the parties to enter into face-to-face negotiations; for it is only through the give and take of direct, bilateral negotiations that they will be able to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the problems facing them.

We are now at the point of considering whether an international conference can contribute to this objective. A conference would certainly not be an end in itself. However, we have been exploring how it might facilitate direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties. We intend to continue discussing this and other pertinent issues with the governments directly involved.

In closing, Your Highness, the stability of the Gulf region and the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz constitute a vital interest of the United States. The U.S. will continue, therefore, to value cooperative relations with Qatar and to bolster the defensive capabilities of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

In doing so, we hope to create a strong and viable defense against instability or subversion from any source.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Highness
Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani
Amir of the State of Qatar
Doha

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

Your Highness:

Last year we celebrated the silver jubilee of relations between the United States and Kuwait. Our long relationship is based on mutual trust and the shared goals of peace and stability for Kuwait and the Gulf region. If we are to continue successfully to seek our common goals, we must resolve that our relationship will be marked by the candor and frankness which has been the hallmark of our exchanges in the past.

It is in this spirit that I am sending Assistant Secretary Murphy to you. The war between Iran and Iraq, which takes its terrible human toll and also threatens the security and stability of Kuwait, must be resolved. I pledge to you that the United States will work diligently in order to bring about a peaceful, negotiated settlement of this conflict, as set forth in my public statement of February 25.

It is for this purpose that I began a Security Council initiative to seek the basis for UN action to end the war. We are working to restore a sense of urgency to diplomatic activity on the war in this forum. In discussions at the UN and elsewhere, at senior levels and with my full support, we have argued that the time has come for concrete, effective international action on the war, imposing genuine penalties for refusal to enter negotiations or accept mediation. We fully support the current initiative undertaken by the Arab League to press for similar action.

Regrettably, Iran remains the intransigent party, unwilling to negotiate a peace without victor or

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vanquished. Therefore, I have directed a more intensified international effort to persuade other countries not to sell weapons to Iran. This effort is having more success than most would have predicted last fall, but more needs to be done. We also have made clear to Iran and China our concern about the new threat to shipping posed by Iran's recently acquired Silkworm missiles, and have urged others to make similar protests.

At the same time we are working on another issue of importance to both of us. I am firmly determined to move forward toward the goal of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East--a goal which I know you share. For some time, the United States has been actively engaged in an effort to assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable arrangements for beginning a new stage in the process. Our immediate objective has been agreement by the parties to enter into face-to-face negotiations leading to peace between Israel and all of its neighbors. It is only through the give and take of direct, bilateral negotiations that they will be able to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to the problems facing them.

We have been considering whether an international conference can contribute to this objective, not as an end in itself but in facilitating direct, bilateral negotiations between the parties leading to a peaceful settlement. We intend to continue discussing this and other pertinent issues with the governments directly involved and would welcome your views on how we might best proceed.

Your Highness, you are aware that Secretary Weinberger has conveyed on my behalf to Defense Minister Salem our willingness to assist Kuwait to protect its oil lifeline from attack by Iran. We did so because we consider the free flow of

oil from the Gulf to be a vital interest and attach great importance to the security of our friends in this important yet troubled area. I am pleased with the cooperation we are establishing in this area but we remain concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence and presence in the Gulf. I believe you share this concern with me. Assistant Secretary Murphy will be prepared to discuss with you the whole range of issues involving future security cooperation between the U.S. and Kuwait, as well as other Gulf states.

I look forward to Assistant Secretary Murphy's report of his conversation with you and to hearing your ideas about how we can extend our cooperation into the future.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Highness
Sheikh Jabir Al Abdullah Al Sabah
Amir of the State of Kuwait
Kuwait

① cleared Afghan A in Fahd letter
w/ FVE? (LBO will do)

② cleared references to China
Silk worm missile w/ JAK? (LBO will do)

③ cleared reference to Weinberger
in Fahd letter and Kuwait letter
w/ DOJ? (LBO will do)

④ TAB & redo

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- ① cleared Afghan A in Fahd Ltr
w/ FVE? (LSD will do)
- ② cleared references to China
Sikh woman missile w/ JAK?
(LSD will do)
- ③ cleared reference to Weinberger
in Fahd letter and Kuwait letter
w/ to J? (LSD will do)
- ④ TAB & redo

5 May 87

Burns will
handcarry Pres letters.

Ante

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2960
Add-On

May 6, 1987

146
SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT: President's Photo Opportunity with Arab League
Delegation, Friday, May 8, 10:40 - 10:45 a.m.

As we have discussed, the President's brief meeting with the Arab League delegation will underscore our determination to hasten the end of the Iran-Iraq war and enhance the security of our friends in the region. It will also help counter Soviet and Iranian efforts to discredit us.

Paul Thompson concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the briefing memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *WHP per* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biographies

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BY *dlb* NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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President has seen 5/8

2960
Add-On

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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RR

May 6, 1987

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION
ON GULF WAR

DATE: May 8, 1987
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:25 - 10:30 a.m.

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI *FC*

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm commitment to prompt negotiated settlement of Iran-Iraq war and security of Gulf Arabs.

II. BACKGROUND

The Arab League is sending high-level delegations to each of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to press for strong action to help end the Iran-Iraq war. The Bahraini and Yemeni Foreign Ministers, who head the delegation visiting Washington, will ask for U.S. support for a Security Council resolution with teeth in it -- calling for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal to internationally recognized borders, and an international arms embargo against whichever belligerent refuses to comply.

Since your February 25 statement on the Gulf, we have taken the lead in the Security Council in pressing for precisely the kind of resolution that the Arab League is seeking. We have recently made some progress towards that goal, despite foot-dragging by the Soviets and the Chinese. At the same time, we have revitalized Operation Staunch, reiterated our commitment to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, agreed to help protect Kuwaiti shipping, intensified contingency planning talks with Gulf states, and reinforced our naval presence in the Gulf. Assistant Secretary of State Murphy is traveling in the Gulf as your representative to discuss these issues.

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cc Vice President
Chief of Staff

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The Vice President and George Shultz will discuss in detail with the Arab League delegation ways in which we can work together. Your brief meeting will underscore your personal commitment to our friends in the Gulf and help counter Soviet and Iranian efforts to discredit us.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity in Oval Office.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

o Photo Opportunity -- 10:25 - 10:30 a.m.

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points with 3x5 card
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Biographies

SECRET

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
WITH ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION

- Very pleased to see you. I fully support Arab League's initiative to help end Iran-Iraq war, which reinforces our own efforts at UN Security Council. Iraq has made clear its readiness to negotiate; if Iran continues to refuse to do so, international community should impose concrete penalties against it.

- United States remains deeply committed to supporting self-defense of our friends in Gulf, deterring Iranian aggression, and ensuring free flow of oil through Strait of Hormuz. Hope we can continue to work closely together.

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
The Vice President
Acting Secretary of State Whitehead
The Chief of Staff
Frank Carlucci
Ken Duberstein
Robert Oakley, NSC

Arab League Delegation

Bahraini Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa
Yemeni Foreign Minister al-Iryani
Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Wissam Zihawi

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~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM DICK MURPHY

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NEA AND DOD/ISA (ARMITAGE) ONLY;

PLEASE REPEAT TO THE SECRETARY (AS TOSEC)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XF, US, OTRA (MURPHY, RICHARD W.)
SUBJECT: MY JUNE 16-30 TRIP TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
AND IRAQ

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

SUMMARY

2. CONCERN ABOUT THE GULF WAR AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION
IN IRAN DOMINATED MY DISCUSSIONS IN YEMEN, IRAQ AND THE
SIX GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC) COUNTRIES. NONE OF
THE LEADERS, INCLUDING IRAQIS, HAD ANY FRESH IDEAS ABOUT
ON HOW THE GULF WAR MIGHT BE CONCLUDED. IRAQ IS
CONCENTRATING ON A MILITARY SOLUTION, ARGUING THAT THE

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BY alb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00



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Department of State

PAGE 03 OF 07 RIYADH 06483 00 OF 03 011252Z C13/19 004357 NOD960
"WILL FOR PEACE" DOES NOT EXIST IN TEHRAN AND WILL NOT
UNTIL IT IS FURTHER PUNISHED MILITARILY. WHILE THE
LEADERS OF THE COUNTRIES I VISITED ARE INTENSELY
INTERESTED IN IRANIAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, IT IS
STRIKING HOW FEW INSIGHTS THEY THEMSELVES HAVE.

3. I ALSO FOUND GREAT INTEREST IN OUR PERSPECTIVES ON
THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND YOUR TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN
EARLY JUNE. PLO SPOKESMAN BASSEM ABU SHARIF'S RECENT
WRITINGS, WHICH THE PRESS RAISED REPEATEDLY WITH ME AND
WHICH WE HAVE DESCRIBED AS CONSTRUCTIVE IN TONE, HAVE
STIMULATED REGIONAL HOPES THE U.S. WOULD NOW MEET WITH
THE PLO. ANOTHER TOPIC OF CONCERN WAS AFGHANISTAN POST
SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. I URGED THAT ARAB COUNTRIES
CONTRIBUTE TO U.N. RECONSTRUCTION AND REPATRIATION
EFFORTS. FINALLY, I FOUND MORALE AT OUR EMBASSIES TO BE
GOOD, ALTHOUGH SOME ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS EXIST. END
SUMMARY.

4. BETWEEN JUNE 16-30 I MET WITH THE LEADERS OF YEMEN,
THE GCC COUNTRIES (SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, OMAN, QATAR, KUWAIT
AND BAHRAIN) AND IRAQ. I RECEIVED A WARM RECEPTION IN
ALL OF THE COUNTRIES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF IRAQ, WHICH
WAS STILL SMARTING OVER OUR RECEPTION AT THE DEPARTMENT
OF KURDISH REBEL LEADER JALAL TALABANI. MY VISIT
OVERALL, HOWEVER, WAS PARTICULARLY WELCOME AS THE FIRST
HIGH-LEVEL STATE DEPARTMENT TOUR OF THE REGION IN
THIRTEEN MONTHS (DICK WALTERS, AS EVER, EXCEPTED). IN
CONTRAST, MANY HIGH-RANKING DOD, MILITARY AND
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN TO THE GULF SINCE THE
NAVAL ESCORT REGIME BEGAN. MY INTERLOCUTORS WERE
APPRECIATIVE OF THE READ-OUTS ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND
YOUR TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE.

IRAN/IRAQ: WHAT NEXT?

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 04 OF 07 RIYADH 06483 00 OF 03 011252Z C13/19 004357 NOD960

5. NOT SURPRISINGLY, WORRY ABOUT THE GULF WAR STILL PREOCCUPIES MOST GULF LEADERS. WHEN IRAQ IS LOSING, THE GCC STATES WORRY; LIKEWISE WHEN IT IS WINNING. MY DISCUSSIONS IN BAGHDAD SHARPLY UNDERSCORED THE FACT THAT WHILE IRAQ'S MILITARY MAY SOON SUCCEED IN CLEARING THE FEW REMAINING POCKETS OF IRANIAN OCCUPATION, IRAQ DOES NOT HAVE A VIABLE POLITICAL STRATEGY TO END THE WAR. IF ANYTHING, THE FLUSH OF ITS MILITARY SUCCESS SEEMS TO HAVE REDUCED IRAQI POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY. TARIQ AZIZ, IRAQ'S FOREIGN MINISTER, TOLD ME THAT BAGHDAD WOULD RECONSIDER ITS POLITICAL STRATEGY ONCE IT HAD REGAINED ALL OF THE TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY IRAN. FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER, IT WOULD SIMPLY STICK WITH ITS DEMAND THAT IRAN ACCEPT UNSC RESOLUTION 598. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION, BUT I HAD HOPED TO HEAR SOME FLEXIBILITY OR MORE IMAGINATION IN PRIVATE. I FOUND NONE. THE IRAQIS ARE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS AN INDIVIDUAL. THEY THINK HE WAS CONNED BY THE IRANIANS LAST FALL AND IS READY TO COMPROMISE THE INTEGRITY OF 598. BASICALLY, THEY SUSPECT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE IS PREDISPOSED TO FAVOR IRAN AND IS LIKELY TO BE SEDUCED BY IRANIAN MANEUVERS. THUS, THEY CURRENTLY SEE NO POINT IN WORKING ACTIVELY WITH THE U.N.

6. THE GCC LEADERS APPLAUDED IRAQ'S MILITARY SUCCESSES BUT DID NOT HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS HOW PURSUIT OF A

DIPLOMATIC TRACK MIGHT SPEED THE WAR'S END. WHILE ALL RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA HAVE BEEN OBSTINATE ON AN ARMS EMBARGO, SOME EXPRESSED THE (TYPICALLY ARAB) THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. AND USSR COULD END

THE WAR "IF THEY REALLY WANTED TO." THE GCC STATES REMAIN DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF IRAN; WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SAUDI ARABIA, HOWEVER, THEY ARE ALL INTERESTED IN A BETTER DIALOGUE WITH IRAN, AND HAVE PUT OUT FEELERS.

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Department of State

PAGE 05 OF 07 RIYADH 06483 00 OF 03 011252Z C13/19 004357 NOD960
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR PROXIMITY TO, AND CONTACTS WITH,
IRAN, IT WAS STRIKING HOW LITTLE UNDERSTANDING THEY HAVE
FOR THAT COUNTRY'S INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS. THEY ARE
AT A LOSS AS TO HOW TO INTERPRET RAFSANJANI'S APPOINTMENT
AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND UNEASY ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS
OF IRAN'S RECENT MOVES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH FRANCE, THE
UK AND CANADA.

7. PERSONALLY I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT RAFSANJANI IS GOING
TO SIT BACK AND ACCEPT A STRING OF MILITARY SETBACKS, BUT
IRAN'S NEXT STEPS ARE, AS EVER, UNPREDICTABLE. IT COULD
BE MORE A VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE.
IRANIAN OVERTURES TO THE EUROPEANS MAY PRESAGE AN
INITIATIVE TOWARD THE U.S. IF AND WHEN IT COMES, WE
SHOULD REACT VERY CAUTIOUSLY, DESPITE THE INEVITABLE
CLAMOR TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE NAME OF WINNING
"THE BIG STRATEGIC PRIZE." THE IRANIANS HAVE
DEMONSTRATED THEIR SKILL AT MANIPULATING THE WEST,
INCLUDING OURSELVES, AND ARE LIKELY TO TRY AGAIN,
ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE INCREASINGLY ON THE ROPES
MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY. IN ANY EVENT THE LOGIC OF
THE IRAQI VIEW--THAT THE IRANIANS UNDERSTAND FORCEFUL
RESPONSES (SUCH AS THE APRIL 18 OPERATION IN THE
GULF)--SWAYS ME MORE AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE THAN THE
SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT WE MUST TREAT IRAN AS AN ANIMAL THAT
IS MOST DANGEROUS WHEN WOUNDED.

8. GIVEN THEIR STRONG SUSPICION OF IRAN, IT IS NO
SURPRISE THAT THE GCC DEEPLY APPRECIATES OUR NAVAL

PRESENCE. THE WARMING UP OF OUR RELATIONS IS MOST
DRAMATICALLY ON DISPLAY IN KUWAIT. AT THE SAME TIME, ALL
OF OUR NAVY'S CONSIDERABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE NOT--AND
NEVER WILL--WIPE OUT THE INSECURITIES OF THE RICH BUT
SMALL AND WEAK GCC STATES. PROMINENT ON THEIR WORRY LIST
ARE IRAQ'S POST-WAR INTENTIONS. I SENSED THEIR
INSECURITIES, AND THE FRAGILITY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS

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Department of State

PAGE 06 OF 07 RIYADH 06483 00 OF 03 011252Z C13/19 004357 NOD960
WITH BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN. IN THEIR PERSISTENT QUESTIONING
ME ABOUT THE TALABANI AFFAIR: I WAS ASKED REPEATEDLY IF
THE U.S. IS CHANGING ITS POLICY OF NEUTRALITY TO ONE OF
TILTING TOWARD IRAN. IN RETROSPECT, THE MEETING IN NEA
IN EARLY JUNE WITH TALABANI PRODUCED A SHORT-TERM LOSS
FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ WITHOUT ANY REAL GAIN. MY
MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD MAY, IN THE LONGER RUN, HAVE SERVED
TO CLARIFY OUR POLICY OF KEEPING AN OPEN DOOR TO
DISSIDENTS. BUT THE BARRAGE OF ATTACKS ON US CIRCULATING
RIGHT NOW IN BAGHDAD ARE OBVIOUSLY BEING PUBLISHED ON
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INSTRUCTIONS. WE DON'T UNDERSTAND EACH
OTHER WELL AND MUST CAREFULLY WEIGH THE BENEFITS AND
LOSSES BEFORE AGAIN OPENLY RECEIVING TALABANI OR HIS
ASSOCIATES. I MADE IT CLEAR TO THE IRAQIS THAT THE U.S.
WILL NOT CEASE TO CRITICIZE HARSHLY IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL
WARFARE.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

9. I HEARD LITTLE NEW IN MY DISCUSSIONS OF THE PEACE
PROCESS. PLO SPOKESMAN BASSEM ABU SHARIF'S STATEMENTS
PROMPTED GULF LEADERS TO PRESS US TO OPEN DIRECT
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO; I EXPLAINED THAT WHILE ABU
SHARIF'S TONE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE, HIS STATEMENTS WERE NOT
AUTHORITATIVE AND IN ANY CASE DID NOT FULFILL U.S.
CONDITIONS FOR SUCH CONTACTS. IN MY PRIVATE SESSION WITH
KING FAHD, HE TOLD ME THAT ARAFAT HAD APPROACHED HIM

DISCRETELY AT THE ALGIERS SUMMIT WITH A PLEA HE INTERCEDE
WITH US TO ARRANGE A MEETING. IN GENERAL, I HEARD
SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE
PEACE PROCESS BUT LITTLE INTEREST IN OPERATIONAL DETAILS
SUCH AS HOW AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE COULD BE
STRUCTURED.

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Department of State

PAGE 07 OF 07 RIYADH 06483 00 OF 03 011252Z C13/19 004357 NOD960

AFGHANISTAN

10. IN SEVERAL MEETINGS I HEARD EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE SOVIETS COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE SPECTRE OF A FUNDAMENTALIST REGIME COMING TO POWER, NEXT DOOR TO IRAN, TROUBLES THE GULF STATES. THIS CONCERN PROVIDED A GOOD SPRINGBOARD FOR ME TO REQUEST PLEDGES FOR THE U.N.'S REPATRIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, A PITCH WHICH WAS RECEIVED SYMPATHETICALLY IN SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND QATAR.

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

11. COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR EMBASSIES AND OUR MILITARY REMAINS CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE. DESPITE CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS (E.G., DELAYS IN CLEARING HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS THROUGH CUSTOMS), I FOUND MORALE AT OUR EMBASSIES FAIRLY HIGH. OUR STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ARE STRETCHED THIN, BUT ARE DOING AN OUTSTANDING JOB. I WISH I COULD SAY THE

SAME OF FBO. I FOUND SERIOUS DESIGN PROBLEMS AT THE CONSTRUCTION OF OUR EMBASSIES IN SANAA AND MUSCAT, SOME CAUSED BY THE LATEST IN A LONG SERIES OF CHANGES IN SECURITY REGULATIONS. THE NEW EMBASSY IN SANAA IS GROTESQUELY OSTENTATIOUS, GIVEN THE LIMITED NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH NORTH YEMEN. EMBASSIES KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD FEEL THEY ARE NOT RECEIVING ADEQUATE SUPPORT FROM FBO. WE NEED TO DO BETTER. DUNFORD**

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PAGE 01 OF 07 RIYADH 06483 00 OF 03 011252Z C13/19 004357 NOD960

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RESPONSES BY THE PRESIDENT
TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY AL-QABAS

Q: Mr. President, you are determined to protect the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, some say your administration is not doing anything about bringing to an end the major cause of the threat, namely the Gulf War. There is a conviction in the area that your administration is taking advantage of that war in order to secure military facilities. Do you think that this reflects the reality of the American attitude?

THE PRESIDENT: For more than six years, the war between Iran and Iraq has gone on, resulting in tremendous suffering and cost to Iran and Iraq, as well as bringing instability to the Gulf region. As I have said many times, the United States is deeply concerned over the war's continuation. We are strongly interested in seeing it brought to a speedy conclusion through negotiations which will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. Through our campaign to slow down and shut off the military supply pipelines to Iran, through our support of mediation efforts by the appropriate international organizations, we are working with many other governments in seeking to create a situation where the parties will sit down and negotiate.

At the same time, we also have a well-known policy regarding the Gulf. We are firmly committed to assisting our friends there with their collective and individual self-defense efforts. We are also strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and hold as a very important tenet the principle of freedom of navigation in international waters.

In brief, we want to see this long, costly, destabilizing, and tragic war brought to a negotiated end in the quickest time possible.

Q: You acknowledged your mistake in the secret dealings with Iran, and you said that the Arab countries understand the implications behind this; the consequences of the deal are still reverberating within your Administration and on the battleground of this war. Therefore, may we frankly know from you your exact policy towards both Iran and Iraq?

THE PRESIDENT: The United States is neutral in the Iran-Iraq war. We do not now ship weapons to Iran or Iraq, nor do we intend to do so. This policy is firm.

Through Operation Staunch we try to persuade third countries not to supply Iran with arms, munitions, and dual-use items it needs to continue fighting. Operation Staunch is not directed towards Iraq -- that country for some time has agreed to negotiate a settlement to the war. Iran remains the intransigent party and is occupying Iraqi territory and trying to take more.

The United States has taken an active role in searching for a peaceful solution to this tragic war. We want neither victor nor vanquished and continue to work for a settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. I have urged the international community, in the appropriate fora and through the appropriate mechanisms, to work

for an immediate cease-fire, negotiations, and withdrawal to borders. In line with this general policy, we have been actively consulting with other interested governments regarding efforts to bring the war to a negotiated end. I have asked Assistant Secretary Murphy to visit the Gulf to consult on this and other important issues of mutual interest.

We believe the U.N. Security Council has an important role to play in the effort to end the Gulf war and would strongly support effective action by the United Nations to end this conflict. We have been consulting closely with the Arab League in efforts to gain support from other members of the Security Council. We welcome the effort by the Arab League in this regard.

Q: A lot of talk is being heard about adopting the idea of holding an international conference attended by all of the parties concerned to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless the American attitude is not clear. Would the U.S. agree to participate in such a conference if it is going to lead to the formation of two independent states, Israel and Palestine; and what would Arafat's role be?

THE PRESIDENT: We remain committed to a negotiated peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors. To this end, we have stated our willingness to explore all possibilities, including an international conference, that might lead to direct negotiations and a peaceful settlement. Such a conference must lead promptly to direct negotiations and must not interfere with those negotiations.

In recent weeks, this process of exploration has produced what we believe to be significant progress toward negotiations which would offer serious prospects of reaching agreements between the parties on peace. Much remains to be done before one can safely express optimism on further developments, but we are encouraged and will continue our efforts.

As I stated in my September 1, 1982, peace proposal, we firmly believe that self government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace. We have always recognized that Palestinians should participate at every stage of the peace process. The form that Palestinian representation takes is a question that must be resolved by the parties to the conflict.

The actions of the recent Palestine National Congress in Algiers indicate a negative, unrealistic attitude toward the peace process.

Q: The USSR gave Egypt the means for settling her debts and granted her easy loans, although the relations between the two countries are relatively poor. But even though you consider Egypt as a friendly state, you refuse to reschedule her military debts and you impose stringent conditions on financial aid. Is this in your opinion "friendship" or are you aiming at some other objectives with this ambivalent attitude?

THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing ambivalent about our friendship for Egypt or our commitment to help meet Egypt's security requirements and development needs. We have a record unmatched by any other country. Since 1974, the United States has provided Egypt over \$22 billion in economic and military assistance. Despite sharp reductions in our global foreign assistance budget, we have maintained funding for our Egypt program at \$2.3 billion this year.

We work closely with the Egyptian government to ensure that our economic aid contributes effectively to Egypt's development goals. Our assistance has brought improvements in health, education, housing, and other basic needs, while also providing crucial balance of payments support to counter the effects of declining oil revenues and other external events.

I have been concerned about the burden placed on key friends like Egypt by military loans extended in past years with interest rates higher than current levels. We have taken a number of important steps during my Administration to provide relief:

- Since 1985, Egypt has been one of only two countries to receive large amounts of U.S. military assistance on all-grant terms.
- In December, 1986, I authorized a restructuring of our military loan program, which would offer Egypt immediate relief on its military debt by allowing deferral of a substantial part of interest payments falling due in coming years. The terms of this restructuring are limited by legislation and guidelines which apply to all foreign military loans and all other borrowings from the Federal Financing Bank.
- We have expressed our intention to support a generous multilateral rescheduling of Egypt's military and other official debt in the context of the program the Egyptian government is negotiating with the International Monetary Fund.

Our assistance to Egypt is just one aspect of the special relationship that exists between our two countries. I am committed to working with President Mubarak to see our relationship expand and flourish.

Q: Your bitter experience in Lebanon pushed America to refrain from interfering in Lebanese affairs; have you now entered into a new deal, a part of which contains a solution to the Lebanese problem or will you leave local parties to solve it and what could such a proposal be after 13 years of civil war?

THE PRESIDENT: United States policy in Lebanon has for many years been based on support for Lebanon's unity, sovereignty and independence, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The United States continues to support an end to fighting in Lebanon, the restoration of a political dialogue that could lead to national reconciliation and political reform, the strengthening of Lebanon's legally constituted central government, dissolution of illegal militias and the extension of its effective authority throughout the country.

The lessons of Lebanon's eleven years of strife are clear, however; no outside power, however well-intentioned, can be a substitute for efforts by the Lebanese themselves, nor can Lebanon's political problems be solved by force. We and others are ready to help, but without initiative and effort by the Lebanese themselves, the assistance of foreign powers will be fruitless.

Q: Every people in the world has its own state -- the British have Britain, and Americans have America. Where is the state of the Palestinian people?

THE PRESIDENT: We believe that any negotiations designed to lead to a Middle East peace must address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, together with the security of all states in the region. We have always recognized that Palestinians should participate at every stage of the peace process. Any agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza should receive the prior consent of the inhabitants of those territories.

We will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, nor will we support annexation or permanent control by Israel. As I stated in my September 1, 1982, peace proposal, it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

Q: Gorbachev rejected your invitation to visit Washington, D. C., on the grounds that he does not want to waste his time. Does your Administration feel that, as a result of the Iran-Contra affair, it has lost the international stature it needs to carry on strategic debates with Moscow?

THE PRESIDENT: The U.S.-Soviet relationship is fundamentally competitive and will likely remain that way. At the same time, the U.S. seeks to ensure that this competition remains peaceful and as stable and predictable as possible.

We have established a framework, based on realism and political and military strength, that provides the basis for a productive U.S.-Soviet dialogue in all areas of concern to us: arms control, bilateral exchanges, human rights and regional issues.

Through this dialogue, including two meetings between myself and General Secretary Gorbachev, the U.S. has made progress in a number of areas, including arms control. But in other areas, such as regional conflicts, we remain very far apart.

My invitation to General Secretary Gorbachev remains open. We're ready for hard and fruitful work ahead. I hope the Soviets are as well.

Q: The State of Kuwait is a firm believer in neutrality and maintains a policy of balance between East and West in her international relations. Her position on the battlefield between Iran and Iraq has exposed her to further difficulties and dangers. What is your evaluation of Kuwait's role in that conflict within the overall relationship between our two countries?

THE PRESIDENT: We have had long and harmonious relations with Kuwait and all the Gulf states. With Kuwait our relationship goes back to the early days of its independence some twenty-six years ago. We admire Kuwait's many achievements. Because of our strong ties with Kuwait and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and the common interests we share in stability in the region, we have been in close discussions for some time with all the GCC states on the war and the dangers it poses. I have made clear on numerous occasions that the United States would regard an expansion of the war as a major threat to its interests as well as to that of its friends in the region. We understand the difficult situation in which Kuwait has been placed by the pressures stemming from the Iran-Iraq conflict. We admire the courage and diplomatic skill with which Kuwait has met these pressures.

Q: Mr. President, capitalism and free enterprise are well-established principles in the West. You are an advocate of non-intervention by states in the functions of the private sector. Aren't western governments denying these principles in their efforts to keep the price of oil low?

THE PRESIDENT: The United States and other western governments represented in the International Energy Agency continue to emphasize the importance of market forces and sound energy policy in achieving supply/demand balance. We do not work toward maintaining oil prices at any level, whether high or low. We have no preconceived notion of where world or individual countries' production or pricing levels should be. We continue to believe these should be determined by the free market, operating without government interference or any other form of market manipulation.

Q: Recent events have proven that foreign investments in the USA are not immune from political considerations, although the free market economy of the U.S. is supposed to be free of state intervention. Investments by Iran, Argentina and Libya are examples. Mr. President, do we as Arabs with some of our surpluses invested in the USA, have to think twice about whether our investments are safe and not subject to being frozen?

THE PRESIDENT: The United States remains the most open and flexible capital market in the world, and the United States Government remains committed to the preservation of this openness. Responsible foreign governments, and investors from their countries, need not fear that their assets will be affected by U.S. political goals. Statistics clearly show that we continue to hold the confidence of foreign investors. Total foreign investment in the United States -- including direct investment, portfolio investment, and foreign government holdings -- more than doubled from just over \$500 billion in 1980 to \$1.3 trillion by the end of 1986.

With respect to the three countries you mention, let me clarify a few points:

- The United States did not freeze Argentine assets: we merely suspended programs of the Export-Import Bank with regard to that country for a limited period.
- The Iranian case was extraordinary in that it involved a government which had committed flagrant violations of well-established principles of international law. Iran was holding U.S. diplomats hostage.
- Libya directly supports international criminals who perpetuate senseless acts of terror not only against Western and African countries but also against countries in the Gulf and other Moslem states. As a direct response to Libyan terrorist attacks against the United States, Libyan government assets in the U.S. were frozen: interest on those assets continues to accrue to the accounts of the Libyan government. Investments by private Libyan citizens have not been affected.

No responsible nation should feel threatened by sanctions taken in such circumstances: in fact, we believe they should support them.

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