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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BURNS, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 2/13/2018

File Folder CHRON FILE: [09/20/1988]

FOIA

M11-397/2

Box Number 5

WEINBERG

19

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
217567	MEMO	WILLIAM BURNS TO COLIN POWELL RE. MEETING WITH OMANI MINISTER OF STATE YUSUF BIN ALAWI	3	9/20/1988	B1
217568	TALKING PTS.	RE. MEETING WITH OMANI MINISTER	2	ND	B1
217569	REPORT		1	9/1/1988	B1
217570	MEMO	BURNS TO COLIN POWELL RE. LEBANON	2	9/20/1988	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 20, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS *WB*

SUBJECT: Travel Request

I will be traveling to New York City to participate in UNGA bilateral meetings with the President. I plan to depart Washington the evening of Sunday, September 25 and return late afternoon on Tuesday, September 27. NSC would cover the expenses of the trip, which will be approximately \$475.

Recommendation

That you approve my travel to New York City.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Mary Dix

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: September 20, 1988 2

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: William J. Burns
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To participate in UNGA bilaterals with the President
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington - New York City - Washington

DEPARTURE DATE 9/25/88RETURN DATE 9/27/88TIME p.m.TIME p.m.

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR X POV RAIL OTHER

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:

TRANSPORTATION \$ 116 PER DIEM \$ 252 OTHER \$ 100 TOTAL TRIP COST \$4686. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER 7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: 8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO X9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): 10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 350.0011. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): 12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: William J. Burns

13. APPROVALS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6616

September 20, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS *WJB*

SUBJECT: Letter to the Chief of Staff on Middle
East Peace Process

Ms. Bonnie Seefeldt, President of the Peace Foundation, has written to Ken Duberstein outlining her "Unity First Plan for Mideast Peace." She had earlier submitted her proposal to Howard Baker, and met separately last month with me and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bill Kirby to discuss her ideas. (Ms. Seefeldt, a former Hill staffer, is apparently an acquaintance of both Senator Baker and Mr. Duberstein.)

Ms. Seefeldt's effort is very well-intentioned, extremely ambitious -- and wildly unrealistic. In brief, she proposes that the President act this fall to win Arab support for recognition of Israel, establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and administration of Jerusalem as an international city. The President would then "persuade" Israel to accept this plan, under the broad umbrella of a "United Religions" organization that would link Christians, Moslems, and Jews.

Both Kirby and I explained carefully to Ms. Seefeldt what we found unworkable about her ideas and how the U.S. approach to the peace process was constructed. A short note from Ken Duberstein or a member of his staff acknowledging Ms. Seefeldt's letter would probably be appropriate, but nothing more is required.

Marybel Batjer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Ken Duberstein at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Powell Memo to Duberstein
Tab A Draft Reply to Seefeldt
Tab B Letter to Ken Duberstein from
Seefeldt of September 8, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NSC Whiver*
BY *RW* NARA DATE *2/13/88*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6616

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL

SUBJECT: Response to Ms. Bonnie Seefeldt

Ms. Bonnie Seefeldt, President of the Peace Foundation, has written to you outlining her "Unity First Plan for Mideast Peace." She had earlier submitted her proposal to Howard Baker, and met separately last month with Bill Burns of my staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Kirby to discuss her ideas.

Ms. Seefeldt's effort is very well-intentioned, extremely ambitious -- and wildly unrealistic. In brief, she proposes that the President act this fall to win Arab support for recognition of Israel, establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and administration of Jerusalem as an international city. The President would then "persuade" Israel to accept this plan, under the broad umbrella of a "United Religions" organization that would link Christians, Moslems, and Jews.

Both Mr. Burns and Deputy Assistant Secretary Kirby have explained carefully to Ms. Seefeldt the flaws in her approach and the logic behind our own approach to the peace process. If you or a member of your staff should wish to respond to her letter, a short draft is attached at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A	Draft Reply to Seefeldt
Tab B	Letter to Ken Duberstein from Seefeldt of September 8, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Waiver
BY RW NARA DATE 2/13/84

Dear Bonnie/Ms. Seefeldt,

Thank you for your letter of September 8. The Middle East peace proposal which you describe is clearly the product of careful consideration. As Mr. Burns of the NSC staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kirby discussed with you, your plan runs counter to U.S. policy in some respects -- in supporting creation of an independent Palestinian state, for example -- but it has given us much food for thought.

Again, I appreciate your sharing your views with us.

Sincerely,

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

6616

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)88,09,08Name of Correspondent: Bonnie Segal☒ MI Mail Report

User Codes:

(A)

(B)

(C)

Subject: Recommends the Unity First
Peace Plan for the Middle East.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PS DUBE</u>		ORIGINATOR	<u>88,09,08</u>	<u>PT</u>		<u>C 88,09,08</u>
<u>NS STEV</u>		Referral Note:	<u>12</u>			
		<u>R</u>	<u>88,09,08</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.



The Peace Foundation

6616 7
592969
815 15th Street, N.W., Suite 910
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 347-7111

September 8, 1988

Mr. Kenneth Duberstein
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Kenny:

We're counting on your and President Reagan's political antennas to recognize that his embracement of our Unity First Plan for Mideast Peace will allow him to announce his settlement of that region's ongoing crisis as early as October of this year.

The plan was first submitted by us to President Reagan through Senator Howard Baker on June 6th. Since then, we have followed up with phone calls and attended two discussion meetings, one with Bill Burns of the National Security Council, the other in late August with William Kirby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Unfortunately, these gentlemen were not inclined, as we think you will be, to recommend our Unity First approach to President Reagan as the breakthrough solution he needs for obtaining the Israeli and Arab Leaders' prior agreement to the three requirements we have identified as necessary for a Mideast Peace.

For this reason and to this end, we now call upon you to replay for us the Clark Clifford role that led to President Truman's Point Four Program. In that instance, the proposal needed only to be presented to the President by the White House Chief of Staff for it to surface unexpectedly as the fourth foreign policy point in President Truman's Inaugural Address.

Kenny, we expect President Reagan will respond similarly to our proposal and will wish to have it discreetly presented by you to the Middle East Leaders at the earliest possible time. After that, we anticipate the President will make an unexpected public announcement that he has been successful in settling the ongoing crisis in the Middle East.

With appreciation, we offer to be of all possible assistance throughout and are available to meet with you at any time. Thank you for your early and favorable reply.

Sincerely,

Bonnie Seefeldt, President
(Home phone: 703/356-9264)

A UNITY FIRST PROPOSAL FOR MIDEAST PEACE

by Bonnie Seefeldt*

- 1) **CENTERPIECE:** A United Religions (UR) counterpart to the United Nations
- 2) **HEADQUARTERS:** Jerusalem
in temporary offices with plans to construct permanent quarters duplicating the design of the United Nations Building in New York
- 3) **JUSTIFICATION:** A Unity First Framework for building a lasting world peace from religious leaders' resolution of real and perceived religious conflicts through assembly dialogue
- 4) **IMMEDIATE BENEFITS:** A Mideast Peace implemented under President Reagan's personal leadership, to include
 - a) the establishment of a United Nations recognized Palestinian State
 - b) the administration of Jerusalem as an international city
 - c) the recognition of Israel by the Arab Nations
- 5) **FAR REACHING BENEFITS:** A proliferation of unity and peace building activities in other regions of the world aided by the establishment and operation by The United Religions of
 - a) a World Religious Congress for arranging, holding and televising annual two weeks General Assembly Sessions of Representatives posted to The UR by the Heads of State of all nations and also by UR Special Invitation for world religious conflict resolution dialogue
 - b) a World Family Bank for providing non-interest bearing loans to families in developing nations, beginning with the Palestinian people and continuing with national programs submitted annually to The World Family Bank by Representatives to the World Religious Congress for in-country funding and administration from resources continually donated for all UR operations by supportive people, philanthropic organizations and nations of the world
 - c) a Museum, Library and Theatre Complex for collecting a vast variety of rare religious books and artifacts for museum display, a similarly large library collection of modern day religious works for on-site research and inter-library loan, and a complete collection of videos and documentaries on the history and teachings of the various world religions and denominations for theatre viewing and purchase, and for worldwide direct mail order
- 6) **ADMINISTRATION:** A permanent staff under the leadership of a Governing Council of Religious Scholars composed of three permanent Members from the Christian, Islamic and Jewish religious faiths and nine additional members from the world religious community chosen annually for one year terms by unanimous vote of the three permanent members

9
BONNIE SEEFELDT

6/7/88

Dear Howard:

We can have Peace in the Middle East in three weeks' time (a statement first made by President Sadat) with President Reagan's leadership of the enclosed Justification Plan for Mideast Peace.

I trust you will expedite its early approval by President Reagan so that its mediation can go forward successfully, perhaps beginning with its approval by the Arab Leaders now meeting in Algiers.

At any rate, its features offer the justification keys now missing for President Reagan's receipt of the prior approval of the requirements of Mideast Peace.

With kindest personal regards, I look forward to hearing from you.

Bonnie

10

BONNIE SEEFELDT
6455 Old Chesterbrook Road
McLean, Virginia 22101
[703] 356-9264

June 6, 1988

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

President Reagan:

The enclosed "Justification Plan for Mideast Peace" is presented to serve your Administration's need of a new approach to peace in that region that is acceptable to the Leaders of both Israel and the Arab Nations.

It derives its strength from the Oneism religious philosophy it presents as justification for the people of the Middle East to declare themselves, nations and religions united and at peace under One God, beginning with the Arab Leaders' consenting to the following political requirements of this peace process:

- 1) The Palestinian People's Proclamation of an independent Palestinian State within defined and secure borders and its early recognition by the United Nations
- 2) The United Nations Proclamation of its international administration of Jerusalem as a free city safe for all religions and people
- 3) The Arab Nation's Recognition of Israel upon completion of the above actions

My plan acknowledges valuable Jewish and Arab insights into that region's continuing crisis, beginning with the enclosed article written by Jerome Segal. Other expertise was offered by Mohamed Hakki, former Minister of Information for Presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Omer Eissa, former Ambassador to the United States, Canada and Mexico from Sudan, both friends and supporters of my Justification Plan for Mideast Peace.

They believe as I do that upon its circulation at your request to the Arab Leaders, you may expect to receive expeditiously their notification that its Oneism presentations justify their prior approval of your plans to mediate successfully the above requirements of their long sought peace. Without reservation, we remain ready to assist in all ways possible your noble efforts to achieve the urgent and now possible goal of Mideast Peace.

May God be with you always.

Sincerely,


Bonnie Seefeldt

encs.

A JUSTIFICATION PLAN FOR MIDEAST PEACE

If The Israeli and Arab People Really Want to Praise God, They Should Declare Themselves At Peace!

Since Israel was established as a State over forty years ago, many thoughtful and powerful people have given unselfishly of their time and energies to developing plans which they hoped would result in a permanent peace in the Middle East. All have been disappointed, several killed, including the much beloved President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat.

Unfortunately, none offered solutions for uniting the people, their religions and nations under One God, the requirement and justification for a regional peace to appear and stay in the Middle East. Instead, the violence has continued and escalated, intensely and needlessly.

Now, two new frameworks for building and maintaining peace in the Middle East region have appeared almost simultaneously that seem destined to succeed where all others have failed.

This is because they speak to the people and their leaders directly about how they may immediately turn their crisis into a lasting regional peace that recognizes Israel and Palestine as independent states within defined and secure borders, and Jerusalem as an internationally administered united city, free and safe for all religions and people

The other of these peace building frameworks was introduced in a May 22nd Washington Post article written by a Jewish writer, Jerome M. Segal, and titled "A Radical Plan for Mideast Peace - If Palestinians Really Want a State, They Should Declare One."

Mr. Segal follows that statement with a detailed analysis of how an independent Palestinian State with a provisional government can be established by proclamation without receiving prior Israeli approval and without the two sides convening.

His solution is premised upon an historical precedent. It is the one the Israelis envisioned in 1947 and followed in establishing Israel as a State - declaring its existence and then working for its international recognition through the United Nations.

Mr. Segal adds icing to his cake by advising his readers how one of the most troublesome of all Middle East problems can be eliminated by the implementation of his plan as envisioned. He suggests that the final act of The Palestinian Liberation Organization be the proclamation of its transformation into the provisional government of the State of Palestine.

Unfortunately, Mr. Segal's proclamation proposal is not a new idea to the Arab leaders according to Mohamed Hakki, Former Minister of Information for Presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Omer Eissa, Former Ambassador to the United States, Canada and Mexico from the Sudan.

Rather, these former top ranking diplomats of Egypt and Sudan (the only other Arab country whose leader did not outright reject the Camp David accords) advise that the proclamation proposed by Mr. Segal was presented in 1972 to the Arab Leaders by President Sadat as a possible solution to the Mideast crisis, and considered but rejected.

Perhaps history will reveal Messrs. Hakki and Eissa are correct in believing the reason President Sadat's proposal was not favorably considered by the Arab Leaders was because it did not include a method for receiving a prior agreement from the Israeli Leaders for the governing of East and West Jerusalem as an international city, a goal presented and justified by The Plan for Religious Unity detailed below.

The assertions of this framework for peace are derived from a world unifying and peace building religious philosophy which I developed and call "Oneism." Capable of bringing swift and positive benefits to the entire Middle East region, it too is built upon ideas of the past. Most important, however, it suggests and justifies an early declaration by the Israeli and Palestinian people that they are at peace, their wars behind them.

First presented in six recently published books, the Oneism religious philosophy supports these assertions:

- *the roots of all wars and poverty throughout history can be traced to yesterday's and today's incomplete understanding of God, self and others, as evidenced by the ongoing lack of unity among the teachings of the major world religions that would allow their leaders to offer the religious solutions needed today for peace and abundance to appear and stay in the Middle East and other wartorn and poverty stricken areas of the world
- *the Prophets and Masters of Judaism, Christianity, Islam and the religions of the East all believed similarly about God and the purposes of life on earth
- *they taught that God Is One; that We Are One; that one's purpose of life on earth is first to remember having lived at one with God and one another in both spiritual and physical dimensions and then unite as members of one world family under God for the purpose of regaining that original atonement (at-one-ment) on earth and all other dimensions of conscious reality.
- *they proved by example and achievements that their teachings are the truth and the way all may become free of limited thinking about God, themselves and others and regain the

power and glory of their spirit within that is strong enough when unified worldwide to stop all wars and provide all needs

- *they taught that their own great experiences and expectations could be understood and attained by one and all
- *the teachings of all religions should be recognized and honored by one and all as important contributions to their continuing pursuits of personal happiness and constant communion with God
- *God's Universal Laws govern our lives and require that all wrong thoughts and actions be understood and corrected for the repayment slate of all concerned to be wiped clean and for personal, regional, national and world peace to appear and stay

When they embrace Oneism as a commonly shared religious philosophy as envisioned, here's how the people will proceed to build their lasting peace in the Middle East:

- *they will declare themselves at peace and mean it by reaching out to one another with helpful good will toward all
- *they will remain members of their present religions and enjoy their ways of life within secure and recognized borders while working in the Middle East region united in purpose and Oneism belief and worshipping at their Holy Places free of fear and ill will
- *they will begin personal quests for understanding the Oneism foundations of all world religions which they will find scattered throughout the pages of recorded history and also collected and presented in my recently published books as clarifications of the mysteries of life on earth that link the past to the present
- *they will begin attending regularly scheduled small group meetings in their homes and offices in further support of their continuing and now understood quest of personal happiness and constant communion with God
- *they will simultaneously declare their Oneism beliefs require their recognition of Israel and Palestine as independent states within defined and secure borders and Jerusalem as an internationally administered united city, free and safe for all religions and people
- *they will receive the United Nations' assistance required for their region under President Reagan's leadership and with the help of friends in the international Jewish Community
- *they will succeed in their Mideast peace building efforts and go on to assist others in resolving similar conflicts in other regions and nations of the world ... with Unity First

... by Bonnie Seefeldt

Bonnie Seefeldt serves as Founding President of The Peace Foundation and The We Are One World Family, two non-profit organizations in Washington, D.C. She is also the author of six books titled The Theory of Incarnation; Oneism; Watching, Listening and Loving; Positive Assertions; Everyday Miracles and Dr. Inez Watercloud published and sold by direct mail order for \$52 postpaid by See More Books, Inc., Marshall, Oklahoma 73056

SUNDAY, MAY 22, 1988 C5

THE WASHINGTON POST

A Radical Plan for Mideast Peace

If Palestinians Really Want a State, They Should Declare One

By Jerome M. Segal

THE UPRISING in the occupied territories is the most important event in the last 20 years of Palestinian history. The most fundamental meaning of the uprising lies in the transformation it is bringing to virtually the entire Palestinian population of the territories. For the first time, they have fully entered history as agents of their own destiny.

Yet for all that, it is not obvious that the uprising has moved the Palestinian people any closer to attaining an independent state. It appears that Prime Minister Shamir has successfully blocked American efforts to initiate an international conference, and public opinion polls suggest that, if anything, the Israeli public has moved a bit to the right.

Inside Israel there are those who say that if no settlement is reached soon, there will be another war with the Arab countries, yet there are no Israeli leaders acting decisively for the self-interest of their own country. Inside the United States, the American Jewish community is unable to find a strong moral voice, and within the Palestinian world there seems to be a shortage of ideas as to how to move from the present situation to statehood.

It is time to rethink some of the basic premises. Up to now, Palestinians have placed tremendous support

international recognition, admission to the United Nations and effective control of territory.

There are important analogies and disanalogies here for the Palestinians. Today's military and political realities totally preclude achieving statehood through force of arms. But on the other hand, today's political, moral, economic and psychological realities offer new alternatives within the same basic concept: The Palestinians do not need advance Israeli approval to bring a state into existence, and there is no reason why they should cede such power to Israel. Indeed, to do so is inconsistent with the underlying spirit of the uprising.

An alternative strategy is possible. One which will overnight transform the political agenda, and place the two-state solution in center stage as the only peace option. Here is how the Palestinians might proceed:

■ The PLO issues a declaration of independence and statehood, announcing the existence of the State of Palestine, in the West Bank and Gaza. Simultaneously the declaration of independence and statehood is announced throughout the occupied territories.



within the territories. All the energy presently expended on peripheral matters is now concentrated on this single demand. Whereas previously Israel was occupying a territory, it is now occupying a foreign country which has declared that it is at peace. To promote withdrawal and to eliminate any excuses for a continued military presence, the provisional government announces a ban on all lethally violent attacks on Israeli soldiers. No violence is allowed against settlers except in clear self-defense. At the same time, the Palestinian people are called to enter into only symbolic, activity-directed against Israeli soldiers in the territories. Stone-throwing is permitted, but only insofar as it is undertaken symbolically, (i.e., with no lethal intent). Use of gasoline bombs is forbidden. If diplomatic efforts fail to secure either negotiations or withdrawal, an intensified campaign of international economic pressure is undertaken.

■ The real focus of energies will be on building the inner sinews of national life and statehood by the following measures: secret local elections; economic self-reliance; reopened schools or classes held in secret; social services expended on a village level; a national anthem emphasizing peace.

■ With the assistance of the Arab states the provisional government issues a new Palestinian currency. To ensure its use and value even

Burns 16
6690

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 20, 1988


Dear Professor Lepawsky,

General Powell has asked me to respond on his behalf to your letter of September 12, 1988. The ideas that you have laid out for structuring negotiations over the future of the West Bank and Gaza are obviously the product of a great deal of careful consideration. Although some of your proposals -- creation of an independent Palestinian state, for example -- run counter to U.S. policy, you have given us much food for thought.

I enclose a copy of Secretary of State Shultz's September 16 speech on the Middle East, which is the best recent statement of the Administration's approach. I hope that you will find it useful.

Thank you for your efforts to help us find a path to peace in the Middle East, and for sharing your views with General Powell.

Sincerely,



William J. Burns
Special Assistant to the
President and Senior
Director
Near East and South Asian
Affairs

Attachment

Tab A Secretary Shultz's Speech

Albert Lepawsky
Professor of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

EMBARGOED UNTIL 7:45 P.M. EDT FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1988. NOT TO
BE PREVIOUSLY CITED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

SPEECH BY

THE HONORABLE

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE AN EVENT HOSTED BY

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

WYE PLANTATION
QUEENSTOWN, MARYLAND

SEPTEMBER 16, 1988

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH
TO MIDDLE EAST PEACEMAKING

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
BEFORE THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1988

Decision time is approaching in the Middle East. In Israel and Lebanon, within the Palestinian community, and in the Gulf, choices will be made that will have a profound impact on the politics of the region and on the chances of settling conflicts peacefully. These decisions must be based on a dispassionate and cold look at reality.

For nearly nine months, the United States has highlighted a simple but far-reaching reality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The status quo between Arabs and Israelis does not work. It is not viable. It is dangerous. It contains the seeds of a worsening conflict that threatens to inflict even greater losses on all sides in the future.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is not static. Today, potentially far-reaching changes are taking place. But, the fundamental nature of the conflict, and the principles for resolving it have not changed. Indeed, continuity and constancy appear even more important in the process of resolving this conflict. The challenge facing the next Administration will be to shape change by building on the fundamental constants. This will serve U.S. interests and enhance the prospects for peace.

What is the shape of the Middle East today?

- o The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza has not altered the fundamental nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's a reminder that comprehensive peace requires peace between Israelis and Palestinians. And it's a reminder that the status quo serves the interests of no party.
- o Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank hasn't ended Jordan's involvement in the peace process.— Jordan has its own interests to pursue.

Jordan's border with Israel is the longest of any, and much of its population is related by family ties to residents of the West Bank and Gaza. The shaping of Jordan's role in negotiations and in a settlement are among the key issues that need to be assessed by all parties.

- o Israel's upcoming election only highlights the intense and continuing debate within that country about peace. People are taking a hard look at the prospects for peace, and they are asking hard questions: Should Israel trade land for peace? Will continued occupation affect the democratic and Jewish nature of the State of Israel? What should Israelis do about Palestinian rights? Are other Arabs ready to accept Israel as a neighbor and make peace?
- o The options before the Palestinians also have not changed. Palestinians are grappling with tough choices. Should they renounce terrorism and violence and choose a political course toward peace? How should they move beyond empty slogans toward realistic and responsible positions to give new life to the peace process?

- o Elsewhere in the region, change and constancy are the key words. In Lebanon, a new President is scheduled to be elected, amidst hopes that this will give a push to the process of national reconciliation. All Lebanese recognize the dangers that would result from a failure to elect a President according to the constitution.

- o Iran and Iraq are now negotiating under U.N. auspices to bring about an end to eight years of bloody and destructive war in the Gulf. The results of these talks will have a profound influence on the entire region.

- o Ballistic missiles and chemical weapons continue to proliferate. The use of chemical weapons by both sides in the Gulf war, and Iraq's use of these weapons against the Kurds, are grim reminders of the dangers these weapons pose to the conduct of international relations.

- o In Afghanistan, Soviet troops are withdrawing. The people of Afghanistan look forward to the end of Soviet intervention.

Continuity in the Midst of Change

So, the fact of change is less important than the uses made of change. The Arab-Israeli conflict does not stand still. But there are enduring realities that point to a method for resolving the conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is not intractable. Negotiations can bring about peace. No matter what new situations or difficulties Arabs and Israelis face as they approach negotiations, one thing is certain once they get there: They will confront some enduring realities that shape the rules of the negotiations and the outlines of a fair settlement that negotiations can be expected to produce.

What are the principles that underlie a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

The existence, security and well-being of Israel are the first principles of any settlement. Israel has the right to exist, and it has the right to exist in security. We will do our utmost to ensure it.

-6-

The requirements of security need to be understood clearly. These include military hardware, defensible geographic positions, and technological knowhow. The United States has cooperated with Israel on these elements, and that cooperation will continue. But these are not the only critical components of Israel's security.

Real security results from resolving political differences that continue to fuel conflict. The location of borders is important, but more important is what crosses those borders: ideas, goods and people, instead of armies and weapons. Borders need to be secure and recognized, but political differences between neighbors also need to be resolved through compromise.

Palestinian political rights must also be recognized and addressed. Palestinians want more than the basic necessities of life. They want, and they are entitled to, political participation, and influence over political and economic decisions that affect their lives. This can occur if opportunities for peace and dialogue are seized.

A third enduring reality is that the history, security and destiny of Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians and Egyptians are inextricably bound together. Jordan is a vibrant and heterogeneous society, with a strong national identity of its own. It is not a Palestinian state. An enduring settlement must reflect the reality that strong, open relations will need to exist among the Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian and Egyptian peoples.

A critical and enduring reality is that negotiations work. Ten years ago, Egypt and Israel forged a treaty of peace that has survived enormous strains. They continue to demonstrate that dialogue and negotiations resolve differences between peoples, far better than war and violence.

Translating Principles into a Negotiated Settlement

American efforts to bring about negotiations are rooted in these enduring principles. Our approach seeks a comprehensive and durable settlement, grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It calls for direct negotiations, launched, if required, through an international conference. It requires acceptance of 242 and 338 and renunciation of violence and terrorism.

As regards the West Bank and Gaza, our approach highlights the need for a transitional period to help the parties adjust to working with each other to implement an agreement. It recognizes the relationship in time and substance between the transitional period and the final status agreement. It affirms the right of Palestinians to participate actively in every stage of negotiations. And it reflects the strategic reality of Jordanian-Palestinian interdependence.

This has been the American approach to negotiations. The purposes of this effort have been clear.

First, the objective is comprehensive peace between Israel and all its neighbors, achieved through negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This will require the exchange of territory for peace. It will require recognition that sovereignty cannot be defined in absolute terms. Today, borders are porous. Openness is required for the free movement of ideas, people and goods. There will need to be a border demarcation, but not a wall established between peoples.

The territorial issue needs to be addressed realistically. Israel will never negotiate from or return to the lines of partition. But it must be prepared to withdraw -- as Resolution 242 says -- "from territories occupied in the recent conflict." Peace and security for all sides are at stake.

Second, peace between Israel and its neighbors will need time and growing mutual good will to succeed. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, this means there must be a transitional period. All sides need to deal with one another gradually in the light of an agreement freely negotiated. All need time to adjust to a new situation. Palestinians need to achieve rapid control over political and economic decisions that affect their lives. Israelis need time to adjust to a new situation, one in which Palestinians -- not Israeli military government officials -- administer the West Bank and Gaza.

The concept of transition is vital and far-reaching. Many of its elements have already been worked through and accepted by Israel. These transitional arrangements are extensive and dramatic. They can be implemented quickly.

Such transitional arrangements will benefit from the interplay with final status negotiations. Each party needs to know the principles that will define the final settlement. As those principles are hammered out in negotiations, they will enhance the transitional arrangements themselves. Each element strengthens the other. This is the essence and benefit of interlock between transitional arrangements and final status.

Direct negotiations are at the heart of this negotiating process. No party should be expected to trust its vital national security interests to any mechanism except direct talks. How better to engage an adversary, take his measure, assess intentions and probe for openings than to square off across the table? Direct talks work.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, an international conference may also be necessary to ease the entry of the parties into direct negotiations. This conference would also be in a position, at the right time, to deal with important region-wide issues, such as economic development, joint resource sharing, and humanitarian concerns. But only the right kind of conference should take place, one that helps launch and support direct negotiations without interfering in them.

Palestinian participation is required at every stage of the negotiations. Palestinians have a vital stake in the outcome of negotiations. They must have a say in the negotiations themselves, and they must approve the outcome.

Participation involves responsibility, however. There are no free rides. All parties must demonstrate their desire to make peace. They must be creative and reliable; they must adhere to internationally accepted principles and norms. For Palestinians, this means acting credibly and pursuing goals that are achievable.

No participant in a peace process can wave the flag of justice in one hand, and brandish the weapons of terrorism in the other. All participants must renounce violence and terrorism. Each must agree to negotiate on the accepted international basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

There are also no free rides for outside parties that want to play a role in settling the conflict. Both the United States and the Soviet Union consider a settlement of the conflict to be in their national interest. But, the Soviets will need to confront some difficult choices.

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There is no longer any excuse for the Soviets to avoid such important steps as resuming full diplomatic relations with Israel; nor is there justification for preventing Jews who wish to emigrate from doing so. The sooner these things are done, the better for the peace process.

Effective Policies in a Period of Change

The challenge of Arab-Israeli peace-making in a time of change is to find the right mix of fundamental realities and creative ideas. The question is how to assess some of these ideas at this time.

- o Peace cannot be achieved through the creation of an independent Palestinian state, or through permanent Israeli control or annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, each party is free to bring any position it chooses to the negotiating table. Israelis are free to argue for annexation; Palestinians are free to argue for independence. The United States will not support either of these positions during negotiations.

-13-

- o The status of the West Bank and Gaza cannot be determined by unilateral acts of either side, but only through a process of negotiations. A declaration of independent Palestinian statehood or government-in-exile would be such a unilateral act. Palestinians need to decide whether to remain a part of the problem in the Middle East, or become a part of the solution. History need not repeat itself. Practical, realistic steps by Palestinians are required.
- o An attempt by Israel to transfer Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza would also be a unilateral act to determine the status of those territories. The United States would oppose this vigorously. Such a policy does not provide a solution to the problem, nor does it bring negotiations any closer.
- o It is also not acceptable to shift the focus from what Palestinians or Israelis need to do to advance the peace process, to what the United States should do. This applies to those who urge that the United States should support Palestinian self-determination.

-14-

The United States cannot accept "self-determination" when it is a codeword for an independent Palestinian state or for unilateral determination of the outcome of negotiations. To expect the PLO to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations is not to ask it to make a concession. Those resolutions lay out basic principles which the international community has decided must be reflected in a peace settlement. In addition to these, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people -- including political rights -- must also be addressed. It is through acceptance of these principles -- not through any action by the United States -- that the Palestinians can participate fully in determining their own future.

Conditioning the Environment for Negotiations

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is no objective reality and no immutable set of circumstances that cannot be shaped by decisions for peace. During the period ahead, such decisions are required. Israelis and Palestinians themselves must condition the environment for negotiations. They can start down the road to accommodation and reconciliation.

Violence has distracted people from establishing achievable objectives. Political debate must replace violence.

Concrete actions on the ground are required. Palestinians must renounce terrorism and violence. They must accept the right of Israel to exist in peace and present themselves as a viable negotiating partner. They cannot murder or threaten other Palestinians who maintain contact with Israeli authorities.

For its part, Israel has the responsibility to maintain law and order in the West Bank and Gaza. But, Israel must also find a way to respond to expressions of Palestinian grievances. It cannot claim there is no one to talk to, while suppressing political expression and arresting or deporting those who speak out -- even those who speak in moderate terms.

There must also be actions on the regional level. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a strategic anchor of the entire peace process; it must constantly be enhanced. Relations between Israel and other Arab states must start down the road to normalization. Relations between people don't need to await the formality of a treaty. Israelis and Arabs should find ways to talk to each other now, even before treaty relations exist.

-16-

The conditions under which refugees live in the region must also be addressed. Poverty is no ally of peace. The continuing existence of refugees does not make the case for Palestinian nationalism stronger. Palestinian refugees can live in better conditions even while the search for peace continues. Arabs and Israelis, together with the international community, must shoulder this responsibility.

Finally, there must be a change of attitude throughout the region. The way people think affects the way they act. Cynicism, skepticism and pessimism about peace must be shaken. The conflict must be seen as resolvable. Once there is the will for and belief in a settlement, the benefits of peace will be seen to outweigh the real but transitory risks of achieving it.

So, fundamental realities persist, even in the midst of change. The goals of the peace process have not changed, nor have the principles of negotiations.

Indeed, the only thing that needs to change is the willingness of people in the Middle East to move the peace process forward.

Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese can make peace happen. The Egyptians are more than ready to do their part. So are we. And so are others around the world. The opportunities today are greater than before, and so are the risks of doing nothing. To make peace, the parties must exploit the new opportunities created by the current ferment. They should start now.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 19, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS *WJB*

SUBJECT: Response to Professor Lepawsky

I do not think General Powell needs to reply directly to the letter on the Middle East peace process at Tab II. Attached at Tab I is a recommended reply from me on the General's behalf.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the reply at Tab I.

Approve *SPW*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Professor Lepawsky with Enclosure
Tab II Letter from Professor Lepawsky

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
(415) 642-6323

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

12 September 1988

General Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President
National Security Advisor
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear General Powell:

Relative to President Reagan's most recent initiative on the Israel/Palestine impasse, I have been engaged in study and analysis of the Middle East situation for some time, and have drafted a possibly "negotiable plan" looking toward its solution. From among those with whom I have consulted informally and unofficially, I enclose my latest response from Uri Savir, Director, Minister's Bureau, of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Copy of his letter dated 17 August along with my response of 10 September are enclosed, together with the present redraft of my proposed plan.

The crucial characteristic of this proposal, other than its direct one-to-one relationship in the Camp David tradition without U.N. or Soviet participation, is the introduction of U.S.A. international aid and assistance for the emerging State of Palestine both during the negotiations and after Palestine's formal establishment. I regard this as essential not only for a workable negotiation but especially for the future of an integral and independent Palestine, whatever may happen to that country's relationship with Jordan.

A critical gap in this planning involves Palestine's internal security from its non-negotiating parties such as the PLO. This may require not only continuing Israeli border patrols, as provided, but also internal Palestinian security measures which remain still unforeseen. I would hope that whatever commitments the U.S.A. might undertake during this impending and delicate intermission need not call for any military action on our part.

These are matters for the future which need not interfere with early, possibly immediate, beginning of negotiations.

In the course of my unsolicited efforts, I have been able to advise in Washington only with my fellow Californian, former Defense Minister Caspar Weinberger, but now he is not available and I take the liberty of communicating directly with you.

Very sincerely yours,

Albert Lepawsky
Albert Lepawsky
Professor of Political Science



Jerusalem, 17 August 1988

*Copies for
General Panelle
from A.R.*

Dear Professor Lepawsky,

Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has received your letter of April 19, 1988, outlining a plan for negotiations concerning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. He has asked me to convey his appreciation for your initiative and readiness to devote time, energy, and thought to subjects related to our region. Mr. Peres has also asked me to reply as follows:

The differences in views within the Israeli public and leadership as to the peace process will be submitted for resolution in our upcoming elections. We hope that the situation which will crystalize following the elections will enable us to adopt a more determined and clearer Israeli initiative on the peace process in the Middle East.

Your proposal, along with many others that have been written on this subject by high calibre professionals such as you, will be of assistance when the time comes and will ultimately help us find a formula that will build a bridge to effective and constructive peace negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

Uri Savir
Director
Minister's Bureau

Dr. Albert Lepawsky
Professor Emeritus
University of California, Berkeley
Department of Political Science
210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
U. S. A.

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BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

10 September 1988

Uri Savir, Director
Minister's Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Savir:

Your 17 August letter concerning my proposed plan for Israel/Palestine Negotiations was very much appreciated. I have since then made significant changes in the earlier draft I sent you, as you will notice from my enclosed revision. Now, Vice Premier-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres' most recent announcement of his and Labour's move toward their conception of "Land for Peace" appears to be a bold and wise move, though it sharpens the issue with Likud.

I am myself still working with colleagues in Washington along these lines, although this too runs counter to Secretary of State George Shultz's approach. However, I am hoping that President Reagan's latest invitation to Peres and to the Egyptian Foreign Minister (you will recall that my proposed plan had from its inception encompassed this Egyptian/Camp David approach) will materialize.

Please let me have at your convenience whatever comments and criticisms you are able to send me, hopefully with Peres' and possibly with Defence Minister Rabin's reactions.

I hope I am not presuming too much in interposing negotiational details from this remote distance, but I am encouraged by your kind statement that this may be "of assistance when the time comes and will ultimately help us find a formula."

Sincerely yours,

Albert Lepawsky
Professor of Political Science

A NEGOTIABLE PLAN
FOR
THE PALESTINE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

Section 1. Purpose and Premise of these Negotiations

(a) The purpose of these Negotiations is to achieve:

(1) Early withdrawal of a defensible Israel from a freed and independent Palestine, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

(2) Simultaneous establishment of an independent majoritarian Government of Palestine.

(3) Eventual detente and peaceful co-existence between Israel and Palestine.

(b) These Negotiations are premised upon the right of each nation to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from acts or threats of force, and all Negotiators and Negotiations will comport with this premise.

Section 2. The Negotiating Organization and its Membership

(a) The Negotiating Organization will consist of the two Principal Negotiating Delegations of (1) Israel and (2) Palestine; and of the two Associated Negotiating Delegations of (3) Egypt, and (4) the U.S.A.

(b) The Negotiators will total 15, distributed as follows: Israel - 7, Palestine - 6 (4 from the West Bank, 2 from the Gaza Strip), Egypt - 1, U.S.A. - 1.

(c) The U.S.A. will chair but will exercise no-vote at the Negotiations, except in the event of a tie, in which case the Chairman will arbitrate the issue before casting his vote.

Section 3. The Negotiators and their Governments

(a) Negotiators will be appointed, removed, and replaced by their respective Governments, including the Palestine Administering Authority provided for in section 3 (b) below, until it is succeeded by the Government of Palestine elected in accord with section 6 (c) (8) below.

(b) The Palestine Administering Authority will consist of 7 representative Palestinians (4 nominated by Israel and 3 nominated by Egypt) subject to confirmation by a majority vote of the Negotiating Organization.

(c) The Palestine Administering Authority will commence these Negotiations and the elected Government of Palestine will complete them.

(d) The elected Government of Palestine will conform with the criterion of an "independent majoritarian Government" referred to in section 1 (a) (2) above by commanding a two-thirds vote or more in both the popular election and the parliamentary representation.

Section 4. Area Covered by these Negotiations

(a) The West Bank and Gaza Strip here negotiated are bounded by the 1949 Armistice lines drawn after the 1948 Arab invasion of Israel.

(b) The Jordan River portion of the eastern boundary of the West Bank will extend from the southern extremity of Tirat Zevi to the northern shore of the Dead Sea at Suweima, and thence southernly along the River's thalweg to the northern extremity of En Gedi.

Section 5. Place of Negotiations

(a) The Negotiations will take place in Taba at a site selected by Egypt. But at some time prior to the Election of the Government of Palestine, the Negotiating Organization will transfer

the place of Negotiations to a location in or near Nablus to be agreed upon between Palestine and Israel.

Section 6. The Agenda of Negotiations

(a) The overall Agenda of Negotiations will embrace the subjects and follow the sequence indicated in section 6 (c) below. If negotiations on any item become deadlocked, the Chairman may postpone that item for later consideration and meanwhile proceed with the remainder of the Agenda.

(b) The specific Agenda for the separate sessions of the Negotiations will be set by the Chairman after advising with the Negotiating Delegations of Egypt, Israel, and Palestine.

(c) The following will constitute the overall Agenda for the Negotiations.

(1) Confirmation and induction of Negotiators.

(2) Establishing and staffing the Negotiating Organization, including submission to the U.S.A. of a financial assistance grant request for these purposes.

(3) Facilitated border-crossing for the working and worshipping population and for visitors and tourists.

(4) Establishment of a Palestine Transit-Corridor, including a Free-Port Facility, between the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

(5) Review and improvement of local administrative and police functions and of social and educational services in the Palestine West Bank and Gaza Strip, including submission to the U.S.A. of an administrative and financial grant-in-aid request for the initial year of their operation.

(6) Amelioration and regularization of Refugee and Resettlement problems, policies and programs, and submission to the

U.S.A. of a technical assistance grant request for the necessary consultative and legal services.

(7) Analysis and recommendations for economic development and employment opportunity in the Palestine West Bank and Gaza Strip, and submission to the U.S.A. of a financial and economic assistance grant request for this purpose.

(8) Election of the Government of Palestine.

(i) After advising with the Negotiating Delegations of Israel and Egypt, the Palestine Administering Authority will set the qualifications for Palestine voters, will establish the eligibility requirements for Parliamentary candidates, will delineate the Parliamentary constituencies (single-member constituencies rather than the parliamentary-list system will be utilized since there is no pre-existing political party system), and will formulate the procedures for nominating Parliamentary candidates.

(ii) The Palestine Administering Authority will schedule and call the Election, and, through the Negotiating Organization, will submit to the U.S.A. a financial and technical assistance grant request for the conduct of the Election.

(9) Inauguration by the Palestine Administering Authority, with attendance of the other Negotiating Delegations, of the Government of Palestine; and submission to the U.S.A. of an interim grant-in-aid request pending the first year's collection of Palestine revenues.

(10) Withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces.

(i) Israeli Armed Forces will be withdrawn from the territory of the Palestine West Bank and this territory will remain demilitarized, except for:

- (a) an 8 kilometer-wide area on the West Bank of the Jordan River from the southern extremity of Tirat Zevi to the northern shore of the Dead Sea at Suweima; and
- (b) an 8 kilometer-wide area on the western shore of the Dead Sea from its northern shore at Suweima to the northern extremity of En Gedi. Israeli Armed Forces will also be withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, which will remain demilitarized, except for
- (c) a 4 kilometer-wide area adjacent to the Israel-Gaza and Egypt-Gaza boundaries.

(ii) These areas, (a),(b), and (c), will continue to be patrolled by Israeli Forces.

(iii) If there are any acts or threats of force against Israel, including acts or threats of terror, which originate on or emanate from Palestinian (including Gazan) territory, the status quo ante this Agreement will be resumed.

Section 7. Time Table

The Time Table for completion of the overall Agenda, outlined in 6 (c) (1) through 6 (c) (10) above, is estimated at 24 months, allocated as follows:

- (1) 2 weeks, (2) 1 month, (3) 1 month, (4) 1 1/2 months, (5) 3 months, (6) 4 months, (7) 2 months, (8) 6 months, (9) 1 month, (10) 4 months.

Submitted, 10 September 1988
Albert Lepawsky
Professor of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA, U.S.A. 94720

Professor Lepawsky's telephone numbers:
Home - (415) 845-6135
Office - (415) 642-6323, 642-2263

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 20, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS

SUBJECT: Update on the Status of HFAC Legislation
on Iraq CW

State met today with key HFAC staffers to discuss the Administration's views on the compromise language, based on guidance from Mike Armacost. Essentially, they made the following points:

- we don't favor sanctions now; would like 60-90 days to work with the Iraqi government on assurances;
- we would support restrictions on munition list items since they are currently in force, and would provide a letter to that effect;
- we regard Tariq Aziz' recent statement accepting the 1925 Geneva Protocol as a positive sign of Iraq's intention to refrain from further CW use both inside and outside Iraq's borders (in fact, Chuck Redman made this point today at his noon press briefing);
- this legislation could unravel US/Iraqi relations and jeopardize potential multi-billion dollar commercial opportunities;
- the proposed sanction calling for downgrading of diplomatic relations should be deleted;
- based on our consultations with our UN Security Council colleagues, it is unrealistic to ask or expect us to seek multilateral sanctions from that body.

HFAC staffers made clear that there was little flexibility in their position, saying that anything less than what they were proposing would create "massive political problems" for them given the momentum behind this issue in the Senate. While there may be a few cosmetic changes, the language won't be much better than what they have already given us.

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With regard to next steps, the Committee expects to mark up the bill this Thursday, September 22. Under consent rules it will be forwarded to the floor for full House vote next Tuesday, September 27. After that, the bill goes to Conference where we will be lucky to sustain the more flexible, albeit imperfect, language that HFAC is offering.

Prepared by: Sandra Charles

CC: Alison Fortier
Mike Andricos
Eric Melby

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19

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217567	MEMO	3	9/20/1988	B1
	WILLIAM BURNS TO COLIN POWELL RE. MEETING WITH OMANI MINISTER OF STATE YUSUF BIN ALAWI			

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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
217568	TALKING PTS. RE. MEETING WITH OMANI MINISTER	2	ND	B1

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217569	REPORT	1	9/1/1988	B1

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	Document Description			
217570	MEMO	2	9/20/1988	B1
	BURNS TO COLIN POWELL RE. LEBANON			

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NEA PRESS GUIDANCE

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988

SITUATION IN LEBANON

Q: Did Ambassador Murphy work out an agreement with the Syrians to impose Mikhail Daher as President on Lebanon?

A: --THERE IS NO US-SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO IMPOSE ANY CANDIDATE AS PRESIDENT OF LEBANON. WE HAVE HELD A LONG SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE AND THE SYRIANS ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND TO SEE IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO INSURE A SUCCESSFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. AMBASSADOR MURPHY'S RECENT VISIT WAS THE LATEST IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS. OUR GOAL WAS TO ENABLE THE LEBANESE TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND THEN MOVE ON TO REFORM.

--AFTER PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS, THE SYRIANS AGREED WITH US THAT AN ELECTION BEFORE THE END OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S SIX YEAR TERM WAS CRITICAL IF LEBANON IS TO AVOID THE PROSPECT OF VIOLENCE AND PARTITION. THE ELECTION MUST BE HELD ON TIME THIS WEEK, EVEN IF THE CHOICE IS REDUCED TO THAT OF ONE CANDIDATE OR NO ELECTION. WE WOULD VIEW ANY EFFORT TO BLOCK THE ELECTION AS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND SELF-DEFEATING.

--WE REMAIN STRONGLY COMMITTED TO LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. WE ALSO VALUE LEBANON'S SPECIAL CHARACTER AS A HAVEN FOR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES -- SOMETHING WE WILL WORK TO PRESERVE.

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Q: Any reaction to reports that Genayel might set up an transitional, Maronite Government if elections don't take place on time?

A: --NOT WISHING TO GET INTO HYPOTHETICALS, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS DEALT WITH THE LEADERS OF ALL FACTIONS IN LEBANON AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. OUR ACTIONS IN LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO BE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT LEBANON'S UNITY. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 23 IS AN IMPORTANT SYMBOL OF THAT UNITY.

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