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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IZ, US
SUBJECT: MURPHY/OKUN FEB. 19 MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN
- MINISTER

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN HIS FEBRUARY 19 NEW YORK MEETING WITH
NEA A/S MURPHY AND ACTING PERMREP OKUN, TARIQ AZIZ
PAINTED AN UPBEAT PICTURE OF IRAQ'S MILITARY PROSPECTS AT
THE SAME TIME THAT HE EXPRESSED IRRITATION AT WHAT HE SAW
AS THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE UNSC TO PUT SIGNIFICANT
POLITICAL PRESSURE ON IRAN. AZIZ ASKED FOR U. S. SUPPORT
IN THE ONGOING UNSC DEBATE, ENCOURAGED THE U. S. TO SPEAK
EARLY IN THE DEBATE AND SHOWED A FIVE-POINT DRAFT
"ELEMENTS" WHICH MIGHT FORM THE BASIS OF A RESOLUTION.
SAYING HE EXPECTED "NO TROUBLE" FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE
UNSC, AZIZ FINGERED THE BRITISH AS A POSSIBLE PROBLEM
BECAUSE OF "EXCESSIVE" INTEREST IN THE CHEMICAL WARFARE
ISSUE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE CW ISSUE COST IRAQ
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SUPPORT, THE IRAQI
NEVERTHELESS URGED THE U. S. TO CONSIDER CW "IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE NEED TO END THE WAR AND WITHDRAW TROOPS."
BILATERAL ISSUES COVERED SEPTEL (NOTAL). END SUMMARY.

3. MILITARY SITUATION: PRESUMABLY DETERMINED TO CONVEY
IRAQI DETERMINATION AND CALM PURPOSEFULNESS, AZIZ GAVE AN
OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN
THE AL-FAW REGION. IRAQI COLUMNS ARE ADVANCING ON THE
IRANIANS "SLOWLY BUT STEADILY." BAD WEATHER HAD
INHIBITED THE FULL USE OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE FOR THREE
DAYS; DURING SUCH TIMES ONLY HELICOPTERS CAN BE USED.
IRAQ'S "NORTHERN COLUMN," IN AN AREA CALLED AL-MUHAMMARAH
WILL SOON MOVE MORE EFFECTIVELY AS IT WAS FIGHTING ON
FIRM GROUND (VICE THE SURROUNDING MARSH AREA) AND TANKS
COULD BE USED. DESCRIBING THE INITIAL FOUR IRANIAN
THRUSTS, AZIZ SAID THE TWO NEAREST BASRA WERE "EXTREMELY
DANGEROUS" BECAUSE THEY WERE LOCATED SO CLOSE TO THAT KEY
CITY. THE MOST NORTHERLY ATTACK WAS REBUFFED
IMMEDIATELY, BUT IT TOOK THE IRAQIS THREE DAYS TO PREPARE
FOR ITS COUNTER-ATTACK AT AL-FAW. DURING THAT TIME
WINDOW, THE IRANIANS REINFORCED THEIR POSITION BUT HAVE

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SINCE BEEN ENCIRCLED, AND THE IRAQIS ARE NOW SLOWLY "SQUEEZING" THE IRANIANS. THE IRANIAN ATTACKS WERE INITIATED BY "LIGHT FORCES" FOR PURPOSES OF SURPRISE. ONE OR TWO REVOLUTIONARY GUARD DIVISIONS LAUNCHED THE OFFENSIVE, BUT THEY WERE QUICKLY REINFORCED. THE IRANIANS USED THEIR BEST COMBAT FORCES AT AL-FAW AND HAVE NOW COMMITTED THEIR BEST LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY. THUS IT APPEARS CLEAR TO IRAQ THAT THERE WILL BE NO NEW MAJOR IRANIAN EFFORT IN THE MAJNOON/HAWIZEH MARSH AREA. IF THE IRANIANS HAD MEANT TO LAUNCH SUCH AN ATTACK, THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO THREE OR FOUR DAYS AFTER THE PROBES ALONG THE SHATT AL-ARAB RIVER. THE IRANIANS HAVE MORE THAN 30,000 TROOPS IN THE AL-FAW SALIENT AND ANOTHER THREE DIVISIONS AT KHORRAMSHAHR. AZIZ STATED THAT IRAN CONTROLLED ONLY FORTY SQUARE KILOMETERS IN AL-FAW.

4. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FAW: ACCORDING TO AZIZ, THE IRANIAN GOAL OF THE PAST THREE YEARS HAS BEEN TO CUT OFF IRAQ FROM THE GULF. THUS THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN WAS A CONTINUATION OF, NOT A DEPARTURE FROM, IRANIAN STRATEGY. WHAT WAS NEW WAS AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE MARSHY LOCALE, RAIN AND MUD WORKED TO THE IRANIAN BENEFIT. CASUALTIES WERE "NOT VERY HIGH, BUT SERIOUS" FOR IRAQ WHILE THEY WERE "VERY, VERY HIGH" FOR IRAN--PERHAPS, HE THOUGHT, AS MANY ALREADY AS IN THE MARCH 1985 OFFENSIVE. HE ESTIMATED "AT LEAST" 5,000 IRANIAN CASUALTIES DAILY.

5. GOVERNMENT IN EXILE?: IN RESPONSE TO MURPHY'S QUERY WHETHER THE IRANIANS MIGHT NOT ENCOURAGE THE DECLARATION OF AN ISLAMIC (SHIA) REPUBLIC BASED IN AL-FAW, AZIZ DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY. HE DERISIVELY RECALLED THAT

IRAQI-SHIA EXILE LEADER BAKR HAKIM HAD BROADCAST TO THE ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT THEIR SECURITY COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED IF THEY ATTENDED THE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD LAST WEEK. AZIZ SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT HAKIM BE "INVITED" TO COME TO AL-FAW AND MAKE IT HIS CAPITAL, AND IRAQI RADIO HAD BROADCAST SUCH A CHALLENGE. "IT IS HELL" IN AL-FAW AND WILL GET WORSE AS THE IRAQI COUNTER-OFFENSIVE PROCEEDS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, HE ASSERTED.

6. ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORT: AZIZ REPORTED "TOTAL" SUPPORT FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE OF SEVEN. HE SAID THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC) MEMBERS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN "EXTREMELY SHOCKED" BY THE PROXIMITY OF IRANIAN TROOPS TO KUWAIT. "THEY (THE GCC) HAD THOUGHT THEY COULD INDUCE IRAN TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT WE TOLD THEM IT WOULDN'T WORK." THE OFFENSIVE ON THE GULF HAD PROVEN IRAQ'S POINT. AZIZ NOTED THAT "IN THEIR ATMOSPHERE OF ECSTASY" AFTER THEIR INITIAL SUCCESSES AT AL-FAW THE IRANIANS HAD "SAID EVERYTHING" ABOUT THEIR REAL INTENTIONS. THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S COMMENT THAT IRAN NOW HAD "NEW NEIGHBORS" WAS VERY HELPFUL TO IRAQ.

7. SECURITY COUNCIL GOALS: MURPHY PARRIED THE IRAQI'S "WHAT WILL YOU DO FOR US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL?" WITH THE QUESTION "WHAT ARE YOU ASKING OF US?" AZIZ SAID THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE GROUP WANTED TO "SEE WHAT WAS POSSIBLE." HE WORRIED THAT THE CHEMICAL WARFARE ISSUE MIGHT "DIRECT ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN ISSUES" AND SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH SUCH A MOVE. AMBASSADOR OKUN SAID THAT THE SYG IS READY TO SEND

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A SCIENTIFIC/MEDICAL TEAM TO BOTH SIDES TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF CW USE. AT THE FEBRUARY 18 UNSC CONSULTATIONS THERE WAS WIDELY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE CW ISSUE.

8. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION THE IRAQIS PRESENTED A FIVE-POINT PAPER, TITLED "ELEMENTS," OF THEIR GOALS. THE PAPER REITERATES MOST ASPECTS OF PREVIOUS UNSC RESOLUTIONS 514 AND 540 ON THE WAR AND ENDS WITH A FINAL POINT THAT IMPLIES THAT CHAPTER 7 SANCTIONS WOULD BE MANDATED AGAINST ANY PARTY WHICH REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE RESOLUTION. IRAQI PERMREP KITTANI NOTED THAT ABOVE ALL IRAQ WANTED TO AVOID

DISASTER IN THE UNSC--A DEFEAT OR WITHDRAWAL OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD BE SUCH A DISASTER. THUS THE NEED FOR AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE UNSC MOOD. KITTANI SAID THAT IRAQ HAD "LIKED" THE U. S. STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 11

AND WANTED THE U. S. TO SPEAK EARLY IN THE DEBATE. AZIZ STATED THAT THE SOVIETS AND FRENCH WERE "READY TO HELP," THAT A THURSDAY U. S. STATEMENT "WOULD BE VERY AGREEABLE" AND THAT HE HAD CHIDED SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WITH A COMPARISON OF THE SOVIET AND U. S. STATEMENTS ON THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE. HE STATED THAT HE WORRIED ABOUT THE BRITISH POSITION--THEY SEEMED TOO INTERESTED IN WOOING THE IRANIANS.

9. SYRIAN POSITION: IRAQI AMBASSADOR AL-QAYSI NOTED A STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, URGING ALL PARTIES TO WORK FOR PEACE. MURPHY ASKED HOW THE SYRIANS WERE DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF IRANIAN OCCUPATION OF ARAB LAND--IN LIGHT OF THEIR LONGHELD POSITION THAT IRAN HAD NO INTENTION TO OCCUPY ARAB LAND AND THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT SUPPORT SUCH OCCUPATION SHOULD IT OCCUR. AZIZ REPORTED THAT THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITI MINISTERS HAD FOUND "A BETTER ATMOSPHERE" IN DAMASCUS, BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THIS REFERRED TO.

10. SOVIET ROLE AND ARMS: MURPHY ASKED AZIZ IF HE HAD RAISED THE ARMS ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS DURING THIS BRIEF TRIP TO MOSCOW. THE IRAQI REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE BUT CITED HIS LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE DURING IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW IN DECEMBER. AT THAT TIME AZIZ SAID HE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT 80-90 PERCENT OF IRANIAN ARMS NOW COMES FROM "EASTERN" SOURCES. THE SOVIETS HAD SAID THAT A POLICY DECISION, IN THE WARSAW PACT CONTEXT, HAD BEEN TAKEN NOT TO SUPPLY ANY ARMS TO IRAN. THE CZECHS HAD TOLD IRAQ THE SAME THING. BOTH RECOGNIZED THAT SOME SHIPMENTS TO SYRIA HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO IRAN--THE SOVIETS EVEN SAID THAT SUCH ARMS HAD SURFACED WITH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. AZIZ SAID HE TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD ASSIGNED A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO MONITOR THE ARMS FLOW QUESTION--WHY DIDN'T THE SOVIETS DO THE SAME? SHEVARDNADZE'S ATTENTION HAD BEEN "DIVERTED" BY THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS DURING THEIR ONE-HOUR CONVERSATION, ACCORDING TO AZIZ. EVEN SO, IRAQ HAD "NO CONCERN" ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION. EVEN THE RECENT KORNIENKO VISIT TO TEHRAN "DIDN'T HAVE SUCCESS," THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADDITIONAL TRADE BETWEEN IRAN AND THE USSR. AZIZ SAID HE POINTED OUT TO KORNIENKO, WHO WAS PRESENT AT HIS MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, THAT THE IRANIANS HAD LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK ON IRAQ IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS VISIT. "DO YOU THINK I PARTICIPATED IN PLANNING THE ATTACK?" KORNIENKO REJOINED.

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11. ON DEALING WITH IRAN: AZIZ DESCRIBED HIS VIEW OF

THE LESSONS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEARNED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE UNSC LAST SPRING IN DEALING WITH THE IRANIANS. IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVES HAD IMPLIED TO THE SYG THAT IF IRAN WERE "GIVEN SOMETHING ON CHEMICAL WARFARE" IT WOULD RECONSIDER ITS BOYCOTT OF THE UNSC. IRAN WAS GIVEN THE REPORT ON CW BUT THEN DECLARED THAT IT WAS "NOT ENOUGH." IN FACT, THE IRAQI SAID HE "KNEW" THERE WERE SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS WHO FAVORED PARTICIPATING IN THE UN PROCESS, BUT THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAD "CUT THEM SHORT." THE MORAL OF THAT LESSON WAS FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO PRESS THE IRANIANS NOW POLITICALLY AS IRAQ WAS DOING MILITARILY. WHEN IRAN LOSES THE CURRENT ROUND OF FIGHTING, IT WILL HAVE VERY LIMITED CAPACITY TO EXPORT OIL--SINCE IRAQ WILL CONTINUE ITS ATTACKS ON KHARG ISLAND AND OTHER ECONOMIC FACILITIES. ONE OF THE BENEFITS IRAN WOULD REAP FROM A SUCCESSFUL CUTTING OFF OF IRAQ FROM THE GULF WOULD BE THE RESULTANT INHIBITION OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE; IT WOULD NO LONGER HAVE THE ABILITY TO ATTACK KHARG AND OTHER CRITICAL TARGETS, AZIZ NOTED). WITH THE FALL IN OIL PRICES IRAN WILL BE BADLY IMPACTED. (AZIZ ESTIMATED MAXIMUM IRANIAN EXPORTS COULD BE KEPT TO 700,000 BPD WHICH WOULD RESULT IN AN INCOME "INSUFFICIENT TO FEED THE IRANIAN PEOPLE."). IN THAT CONTEXT, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UNSC TO PASS THE "FRAMEWORK," AS DESCRIBED IN THE "ELEMENTS" PAPER, WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN "AFTER THEY LOSE." AND IRAQ WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ORIGINATION OF THE WAR AND REPARATIONS INCORPORATED INTO THE "ELEMENTS." HOWEVER, THE CEASEFIRE COULD NOT BE CONDITIONED ON EITHER OF THESE, AS THE IRANIANS INSIST. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, IRANIAN SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

12. CHEMICAL WARFARE: WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE UNSC HAS ALREADY BEEN CONFRONTED WITH ALLEGATIONS OF CW USE BY BOTH SIDES, AND IT WAS THUS AN IMMEDIATE ISSUE, AZIZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CW WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH. HE STATED THAT IT COULD BE MENTIONED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AND REMINDED THE GROUP THAT THE USE OF CW AROSE BECAUSE OF THE WAR AND THUS TREATMENT OF IT COULD NOT BE DIVORCED FROM TREATMENT OF THE WAR. MURPHY TOLD THE IRAQIS THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ WOULD BE TESTIFYING TO THE CONGRESS FEBRUARY 19 AND PROBABLY WOULD BE PRESSED TO COMMENT ON THE CW ISSUE. THE U. S. WOULD REITERATE ITS LONG-ESTABLISHED CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF CW, WHEN SUCH USE WAS CONFIRMED.

12. PARTICIPANTS: IRAQ: FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ, PERMREP KITTANI, AMBASSADOR AL-QAYSI AND NOTETAKER.

U. S.: ACTING PERMREP OKUN, A/S MURPHY, NEA DAS CREEKMORE AND NEA/NGA DIRECTOR BURLEIGH (NOTETAKER). SHULTZ
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