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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. file index	(3pp) <i>R 12/9/05 M1468 #20</i>	n.d.	P-1 B1
2. memo	re: a three-part understanding between Iran & Israel (1p) <i>A " " #21</i>	11/4/87	P-1 B1
3. agenda	re: NSPG US policy & Gulf security (1p) <i>A " " #22</i>	5/18/87	P-1 B1
4. cable	from AmEmbassy Tel Aviv to Sec. of State re: peace debate (2pp)	5/12/87	P-1 B1
5. cable	from AmEmbassy Tel Aviv to Sec. of State re: secretary's letter and next steps (4pp)	5/11/87	P-1 B1
6. talking points	re: meeting with the President, with handwritten notations (2pp) <i>R 12/9/05 M1468 #23</i>	5/11/87	P-1 B1
7. cable	from AmEmbassy Tel Aviv to Sec. of State re: secretary's letter (4pp)	5/11/87	P-1 B1
8. memo	re: meeting with the President (1p) <i>A 12/9/05 M1468 #24</i>	5/1/87	P-1 B1
9. memo	re: meeting with the President (2pp) <i>A " " #25</i>	4/29/87	P-1 B1
10. memo	from Peter Rodman to Frank Carlucci re: Middle East developments (2pp)	4/29/87	P-1, P-5 B1
11. letter	from Mohammed Khan Junejo of Pakistan to Ronald Reagan re: military aircraft (20pp)	4/16/87	P-1 B1
12. cable	from AmEmbassy Cairo to Sec. of State re: comments on the PNC (1p)	4/27/87	P-1 B1
13. memo	re: meeting with the President (1p)	4/24/87	P-1, P-5 B1
14. telegram	re: message from the President to P.M. Shamir (2pp) <i>A 12/9/05 M1468 #26</i>	4/21/87	P-1 B1
15. memo	re: Mideast peace process outline (1p)	4/2/87	P-1 B1 <i>(12/15/00)</i>
COLLECTION: ROSS, DENNIS B.: Files			ggc
FILE FOLDER: Hill, Charlie - Meeting Folder: D. Ross [1 of 3] <i>Box 1</i>			3/6/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	4/1/87	P-1, P-5 B1
17. talking points	re: the peace process (6pp)	n.d.	P-5 open
18. memo	from R. Oakley to F. Carlucci re: US-Middle East strategy (2pp)	3/3/87	P-1, P-5 B1
19. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	3/30/87	P-1, P-5 B1
20. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	3/27/87	P-1, P-5 B1
21. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	3/26/87	P-1, P-5 B1
22. memo	from R. Oakley to F. Carlucci re: points for Shultz meeting (2pp)	3/26/87	P-1, P-5 B1
COLLECTION:			
ROSS, DENNIS B.: Files			ggc
FILE FOLDER:			
Hill, Charlie - Meeting Folder: D. Ross [1 of 3]			3/6/95

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name ROSS, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/4/2007

File Folder HILL, CHARLIE - MEETING FOLDER: D. ROSS (1)

FOIA

M03-1468

Box Number 1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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6	TALKING	RE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT	2	5/11/1987
	POINTS	WITH NOTATIONS (#23)		
8	MEMO	RE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT (#24)	1	5/11/1987
9	MEMO	RE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT (#25)	2	4/29/1987

FILE INDEX FOR CHARLIE HILL FILES

<u>NO</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
A.	3-Part Understanding between Jordan & Israel	Nov 4, 1987
1	NSPG, US Policy & Gulf Security	May 18, 1987
2	Israel: Likud Sources say US Not Committed to Conference	May 13, 1987
3	Likud Seizes the Upper Hand in Peace Debate	May 12, 1987
4	Cable: re: Peres: Secretary's Ltr & Next Steps	May 11, 1987
5	Talking Points re: Mtg w/President re: Mideast Peace Process	May 11, 1987
6	Cable: Secy's Ltr to Shamir	May 11, 1987
7	Qs&As re: Mideast Peace Process	May 4, 1987
8	Talking Points re: Mtg w/President May 1, 1987, Mideast Peace Process	Undated
9	Cable: Political Battle between Likud and Alignment Over Next Phase of Peace	Apr 29, 1987
10	Talking Points re: Mtg w/President: Middle East Peace Process	Apr 29, 1987
11	Carlucci re: Middle East Developments	Apr 29, 1987
12	Sen Humphrey Ltr re: Pakistan request for airborne warning aircraft	Apr 28, 1987
13	Israel: FM Peres Denies Mtg w/Husayn	Apr 28, 1987
14	Cable: Abdel Meguid Comments on PNC	Apr 27, 1987
15	Mtg w/President: Middle East Peace Process	Apr 24, 1987
16	Cable: Msg from the President for PM Shamir	Apr 21, 1987
17	MidEast Peace Process Developments	Apr 2, 1987
18	MidEast Peace Process	Apr 1, 1987
19	The Peace Process Talking Points	Mar 87
20	Carlucci Memo re: Public Pressures on US Middle East Strategy	Mar 31, 1987
21	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Mar 26, 1987
22	Mideast Peace Process	Mar 27, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M1468 P 20

BY 204, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

FILE INDEX FOR CHARLIE HILL FILES

(CONTINUED)

<u>NO</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
22	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Mar 27, 1987
23	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Mar 26, 1987
24	Carlucci Memo re: Points for Shultz Mtg: Middle East, Thursday, Mar 26	Mar 26, 1987
25	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Mar 24, 1987
26	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Mar 23, 1987
27	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Mar 20, 1987
28	Cable: Mar 17 Mtg w/Osama El Baz	Mar 18, 1987
29	Cable: Peace Process Mar 16-17 Disc	Mar 17, 1987
30	Cable: RIFA'I Comments on Arafat's Statements on Intl Conference	Mar 18, 1987
31	Note frm Frank to George re: \$30M	Mar 16, 1987
32	Carlucci Memo re: Middle East Peace	Mar 16, 1987
33	Special Mtg of Cabinet (Israel)	Sep 2, 1982
34	Finding \$30M for Jordan	Undated
35	Game Plan on ME Peace Process	Undated
36	Wat's Talking Points for Amman & Cairo	Undated
37	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Undated
38	Mideast Peace Process Developments	Undated
39	Signs of Change: Israel, Egypt, PLO	Undated
40	Peace Process: Issues	Undated
41	Game Plan for Trip (JPMG)	Undated
42	Jordanian Motivations	Undated
43	Peace Process	Undated
44	Cable: to Prime Minister Shamir	Undated
45	Talking Points for Shamir	Undated
46	Talking Points for Hussein	Undated

FILE INDEX FOR CHARLIE HILL FILES

(CONTINUED)

<u>NO</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
47	Talking Points re: Shamir-Hussein Mtg	Undated
48	Game-Plan on Middle East Peace Process	Undated
49	Draft Ltr to Shamir	Undated
50	Talking Points re: Conference	Undated
51	Talking Points re: Soviets	Undated
52	Pencilled Notes	Undated
53	al-Rifai bio	Undated

A

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

A THREE-PART UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL

- A. Invitation by UN Secretary General
- B. Resolutions of the International Conference
- C. The Modalities Agreed upon by Jordan-Israel

-- A. The Secretary General will issue invitations to the five permanent members of the Security Council and the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338 with the objects of bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, security to its states and to respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

-- B. The participants in the conference agree that the purpose of the negotiations is the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The conference invites the parties to form geographical bilateral committees to negotiate mutual issues.

-- C. Jordan and Israel have agreed that: (I) the international conference will not impose any solution or veto any agreement arrived at between the parties; (II) the negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees directly; (III) the Palestinian issue will be dealt with in the committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations; (IV) the Palestinians' representatives will be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; (V) participation in the conference will be based on the parties' acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism; (VI) each committee will negotiate independently; (VII) other issues will be decided by mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel.

11/4/87
London

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1468 *21

EYES ONLY

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90500

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

Monday, May 18, 1987

Situation Room

3:00 - 3:30 p.m.

(1)

U.S. POLICY AND GULF SECURITY

Agenda

- I. Opening Statement.....President
- II. Introduction.....Frank Carlucci
(3 minutes)
- III. Review of USS Stark Incident,.....Caspar Weinberger
Implications for Future Operations, (7 minutes)
and Protection of Kuwaiti Shipping
- IV. Diplomatic and Congressional.....George Shultz
Implications of USS Stark Incident (Richard Murphy)
and Report on Murphy Gulf Visit (7 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants
(10 minutes)
- VI. Summary.....Frank Carlucci
(3 minutes)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M 1468 #22

BY any, NAHA, DATE 12/2/05

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

ISRAEL: LIKUD SOURCES SAY U.S. NOT COMMITTED TO CONFERENCE

TA130720 JERUSALEM THE JERUSALEM POST IN ENGLISH 13 MAY 87 PP 1, 2

(REPORT BY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT BENNY MORRIS)

(TEXT) THE AMERICANS MADE "A GRAVE ERROR" BY TRYING TO PERSUADE PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR TO BACK FOREIGN MINISTER PERES' PEACE CONFERENCE INITIATIVE. "HAD THEY NOT PRESSED SHAMIR SO, PERHAPS HE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CONCILIATORY," SAID A SENIOR SOURCE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE YESTERDAY.

THE SOURCE SAID THAT SHAMIR'S "ANGER" AT YESTERDAY MORNING'S LIKUD KNESSET FACTION MEETING WAS IN "REACTION TO THE LEAK OF THE MESSAGE BY (SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE) SHULTZ" ON SUNDAY, WHICH URGED SHAMIR TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE INITIATIVE AS THE ONLY AVAILABLE MEANS FOR TRIGGERING DIRECT ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS. SHAMIR, SAID THE SOURCE, "WAS INCENSED BY THE LEAK." SHAMIR FEELS THAT THE RECENT SPATE OF NOTES FROM WASHINGTON, GENERALLY FAVOURING PERES' POSITION, IS AKIN TO "INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL ISRAELI AFFAIRS."

THE SOURCE SAID THAT SHAMIR WAS NOT UNDULY PERTURBED BY THE AMERICAN POSITION BECAUSE "HE FEELS THAT THE (ISRAELI) PUBLIC IS BEHIND HIM."

LIKUD SOURCES YESTERDAY SAID THAT "PERES ESSENTIALLY PUT THE AMERICANS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THE U.S. HAD LONG OPPOSED AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AS HAD PERES. SUDDENLY, PERES CHANGED HIS POSITION. THE ARAB LEADERS THEN WENT TO WASHINGTON AND SAID: 'EVERYBODY IS FOR A CONFERENCE, EVEN PERES. YOU ALONE OPPOSE IT.' SO THE AMERICANS FELT OBLIGED TO FALL INTO STEP."

THESE LIKUD SOURCES FEEL THAT AMERICA REMAINS BASICALLY AMBIVALENT ABOUT THE CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, AND THAT WASHINGTON'S SUPPORT FOR PERES' POSITION "MAY BE TEMPORARY (AND MAY VANISH) ONCE THE INITIATIVE DIES IN ISRAEL. I DON'T THINK THEY ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE," SAID THE SOURCES.

THEY ADDED THAT A MEASURE OF WASHINGTON'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD FAILED TO MEET TWO OF PERES'S "ORIGINAL SCENARIO REQUIREMENTS: THE U.S. HAD FAILED TO ADOPT THE CONFERENCE PROPOSALS AND PUBLICIZE AND BROADCAST THEM AS AN AMERICAN PLAN. WASHINGTON DID NOT PUSH THE CONFERENCE AS IT DID, SAY, THE 'REAGAN PLAN' IN 1982. AND WASHINGTON DID NOT SEND SHULTZ TO THE REGION TO CARRY OUT A SHUTTLE, WHICH PERES WANTED, TO INSTILL MOMENTUM AND EUPHORIA INTO THE PROPOSALS."

THESE AMERICAN FAILURES, SAID THE SOURCES, LEFT PERES SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATED. TRUE, THE U.S. HAS BEEN PRESSING SHAMIR TO FALL INTO LINE. BUT THEY FAILED TO GO THE EXTRA INCH, TO GIVE THE FINAL PUSH, WITHOUT WHICH PERES' (AND WASHINGTON'S) BLANDISHMENTS HAVE PROVEN USELESS."

LABOUR SOURCES HAVE STRESSED THAT WHILE "THE BOTTOM LINE" OF THE AMERICAN MESSAGES HAS BEEN SUPPORT FOR PERES. WASHINGTON HAS BEEN "VERY CAREFUL" IN COUCHING THESE MESSAGES IN TONES AMENABLE TO SHAMIR.

THE AMERICANS, FOR INSTANCE, HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUOUSLY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO DIRECT ISRAELI-ARAB TALKS AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK IS DESIGNED AS A TRIGGER TO SUCH TALKS, NOT AS AN END IN ITSELF.

MOREOVER, THE AMERICAN MESSAGES HAVE ALWAYS INCLUDED OR BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ASSURANCES THAT WASHINGTON IN NO WAY INTENDS TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL ISRAELI AFFAIRS.

~~Hill, Charles [10437]~~
~~Ross, Dennis Files~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

4-5
4-7
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-7 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS

May 11, 1987

- o The political situation in Israel may be coming to a head.
 - The Cabinet met today essentially to debate the merits of entering negotiations with Jordan via a limited international conference.
 - They adjourned without decision and will reconvene Wednesday.
 - The London Agreement--and all of the press leaks of the past two weeks--provide the backdrop.
 - Both sides are looking for an "American issue" to support their position, but we are refusing to be drawn in.
 - The Cabinet may well compromise by asking me to come to the region; we can cross that bridge if we come to it.
- o Last week I received a letter from Peres asking for a more forthcoming public line and seeking assurances on a number of issues.
 - We have responded with identical letters to Peres and Shamir reiterating existing positions which address most, but not all, of the topics Peres mentioned.
- o We do not know yet whether the meeting between Shamir and Hussein occurred this past weekend.
- o Peres is scheduled to be in Washington next Monday and Tuesday.
 - Shamir's senior staffer will also be here for a few days this week.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M 1468 #23

BY smf, NARA, DATE 12/7/05

1) Symptoms
 2)

Tom
 # work
 to move for
 after power for
 strategy session

- ① It's over -
 Don't have left
 vote - Wendy vote -
 keep it off to front. Sympt.
- ② Sympt
- ③ Still willing for unity, but not
 in region - Tom and personalty.
- ④ Leary of Gov - Sympt. Pro up
 for

-- Backgrounders
 -- Power

-> Sub-structure

~~1411, Charlie [1 of 3]~~
~~Ross, Daniel [1 of 10]~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

7

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

May 4, 1987

MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS

Q. Any comment on Prime Minister Rifai's press conference yesterday?

A. -- WE HAVE SEEN THE STORIES ARISING FROM THAT PRESS CONFERENCE, BUT I WILL HAVE NO COMMENT.

-- AS WE SAID LAST WEEK, THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE EFFORT TO ARRANGE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THAT WILL LEAD PROMPTLY TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES IN THE REGION, AND HOPE THAT THE REMAINING ISSUES CAN BE DEALT WITH IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS NEGOTIATIONS TO GET UNDER WAY IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

-- I WOULD NOTE THAT I HAVE BEGUN TO SEE STORIES SOURCED
UN-IDENTIFIED ABOUT THE STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS
TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. LET ME CAUTION YOU THAT IS
THE ONLY AUTHORITATIVE BRIEFINGS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE ON
THOSE GIVEN FROM THIS PODIUM AND BY THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SPOKESMAN. ANYTHING ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED MYDRA
UNINFORMED SPECULATION. EAST
PEACE

(8)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Meeting with the President, May 1, 1987
Mideast Peace Process

- o Pickering this morning delivered to Shamir my message refuting the points in his negative reaction to the London Agreement. (Shamir had been in Europe since Monday.)
- o The public debate in Israel continues at full boil, fueled by continual leaks to the press by both the Peres and Shamir camps.
- o In Jordan, Prime Minister Rifai is very upset by the Israeli leaks--some of which are embarrassing to Hussein--and says they could make it impossible for the King to go through with his promised meeting with Shamir.
 - The King himself, however, remains steadily on course and is looking forward to the meeting.
- o Peres is a bit frustrated that we have not been more upbeat in our public statements on his breakthrough with Hussein.
 - We began yesterday to give a somewhat more positive cast to our posture, but we will hold the line at that for now.
 - I am convinced that nothing--including sensational headlines out of Washington--should happen that might derail the Hussein-Shamir meeting.
- o That meeting is the next essential step--realistically, little further progress is possible without it.
 - Only Hussein can give Shamir the stake in the process that might overcome his current negativism.
 - We have urged both sides to proceed with the meeting as quickly as secure arrangements can be made. It could happen this weekend.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M 1465 #24

BY amf, NARA, DATE 12/9/85

ISRAEL: LEAKS SELECTED DETAILS OF U.S. DOCUMENT

TA291830 JERUSALEM TELEVISION SERVICE IN HEBREW 1800 GMT 29 APR 87

(REPORT BY POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT YIG'AL GOREN -- LIVE IN THE STUDIO)

(TEXT) THE POLITICAL BATTLE BETWEEN THE LIKUD AND THE ALIGNMENT OVER THE NEXT PHASE OF THE PEACE ~~PROCESS~~

PROCESS GROWS WORSE EACH DAY. WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER IS VISITING FRANCE, THE LIKUD TODAY FOR THE FIRST TIME REVEALED SOME DETAILS OF THE DOCUMENT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR CONVEYED TO THE PRIME MINISTER LAST WEDNESDAY. THE PREAMBLE TO THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT IT WAS WORKED OUT BY THE VICE PRIME MINISTER, IS SUBJECT TO CABINET APPROVAL, AND IS SUBMITTED TO THE TWO SIDES AS A U.S. PROPOSAL. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE DETAILS WE WILL PROVIDE THIS EVENING WERE DISCLOSED TO US UNDER THE HEADLINE -- THE ARRANGEMENT'S WEAK POINTS, AND THEY ARE AIMED AT SHOWING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE U.S. DOCUMENT.

THE DOCUMENT STIPULATES THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS TO ALLOW FOR NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HOWEVER, THE LIKUD SAYS THAT IT FAILS TO MENTION THE FACT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD ONLY SERVE AS AN OPENING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THE DOCUMENT FURTHER SAYS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE IS TO BRING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE TO THE REGION AND TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS ON THE BASIS OF UN RESOLUTION 242 AND 338. THE LIKUD SAYS THAT THIS IS A COMPLETE DEPARTURE FROM CAMP DAVID.

THE DOCUMENT ALSO SAYS THAT THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT WOULD BE INVITED TO THE CONFERENCE, BUT PEOPLE IN THE LIKUD SAY THAT IT DOES NOT SAY THAT STATES WOULD BE INVITED, THEREBY LEAVING AN OPENING FOR AN INVITATION TO THE PLO.

THE ALIGNMENT WAS FURIOUS THIS EVENING OVER THE LEAKING OF PORTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT TO THIS PROGRAM. PERES' ASSOCIATES SAID THAT RATHER THAN HOLDING A SERIOUS DEBATE IN THE INNER CABINET ON THE MATTER, UNTIL WHICH POINT THE DOCUMENT WOULD BE KEPT SECRET, AS IS THE USUAL PRACTICE, THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE DECIDED TO EMPLOY THE REPREHENSIBLE METHOD OF PUBLISHING HALF-TRUTHS.

REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE DOCUMENT THAT WERE PUBLISHED, PERES' ASSOCIATES SAY THAT THE DOCUMENT INCLUDES A SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLES OF THE FIVE SUPERPOWERS WHICH WILL BE RESTRICTED TO -- AND I QUOTE -- INVITING THE PARTIES TO BREAK INTO BILATERAL COMMITTEES FOUNDED ON A GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS TO CONDUCT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

AS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLO WOULD BE INVITED, MEMBERS OF THE ALIGNMENT REACT BY SAYING THAT THE DOCUMENT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT ANY ADDITION OF PARTICIPANTS REQUIRES THE MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE PARTIES.

THE ALIGNMENT MAINTAINS THAT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE DOCUMENT WAS COMPOSED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ, AND THE ALIGNMENT BELIEVES IT PROVIDES AN ANSWER TO ANY POSSIBLE LOGICAL OBJECTION TO IT.

THE ALIGNMENT SAYS THIS EVENING THAT THE SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE OF DETAILS FROM THE DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES THE LAST STRAW IN THE PROCESS OF BREAKING THE FRAGILE FABRIC OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PERES AND SHAMIR.

THE ALIGNMENT MEMBERS AND SENIOR PARTY MEMBERS THIS MORNING EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR SHIM'ON PERES AND ENCOURAGED HIM TO SUBMIT THE DOCUMENT TO THE INNER CABINET SOON. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, PERES WILL MAKE EFFORTS TO PERSUADE LIKUD MINISTERS TO ACCEPT HIS PROPOSAL.

10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT: MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

APRIL 29, 1987

- o I met Friday afternoon with Moshe Arens, who was acting as Prime Minister Shamir's Special Emissary.
- o Arens elaborated on Shamir's negative reaction to my earlier message on the possibilities that have opened up in the peace process.
- o Arens had three points to make.
 - First, a meeting between Shamir and King Hussein is crucial if the process is to be kept on track.
 - Second, Shamir remains convinced that an international conference can be used by the Soviets to undermine the bilateral negotiating process despite the agreement reached in London by Hussein and Peres.
 - Third, Peres negotiated that agreement without the approval of the Cabinet or the knowledge of the Prime Minister and that is having a major impact on Shamir's decision.
- o I made clear that I did not agree with the arguments Shamir had made against the London Agreement and its significance.
 - I said I considered that it reflected a possibility that never existed before.
 - Nevertheless, I accepted Shamir's negative answer, although I consider it unfortunate since the King is finally ready to engage in negotiations with Israel.
 - I told Arens I would not be coming to the Middle East early next month as I had hoped.
 - Above all, I said I understood that this would become a very contentious issue in Israel and assured him we would not interfere with their political processes.
- o I sent a message immediately to King Hussein, briefly describing my meeting with Arens and encouraging him to meet as soon as possible with Shamir. That could occur as soon as the end of this week.

- supposed to talk alone

(Shamir said Arens have under false pretenses telling Peres he was going coming for a Bonds dinner)

"But that everything would undoubtedly come out."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

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NLS M1468 # 25

BY AMF, NAME, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- o I am also responding to Shamir's message rejecting the London Agreement. I will make clear the deficiencies in his argumentation but will not try to talk him into accepting the agreement.
- o The Israeli press has begun to pick up the story of secret meetings and an agreement between Peres and Hussein, as well as Shamir's opposition.
 - In an interview last evening, Peres described the agreement as an American paper.
 - It is likely that this story will continue to build and there are all the makings here of a major political crisis in Israel.
 - We will continue to make every effort to refrain from doing anything that could be construed as taking sides, while maintaining our position in favor of forward movement in the peace process.

How do we respond to the question that an American paper -

Not comment a story coming out of Israel -- let me just say that our position on the peace process remains as what the President announced when Prime Minister Shamir was here: we believe in the

possible means

defendant to move the peace process forward. Drift will be as we's interest. Our position is a conference remains what the President declared during

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

Hill, Charles (1043)
Ross, Dennis: Files

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/29.

Herb:

Sen. Humphrey brought
them to the President
along with a map
of Afghanistan and
a model E2C !!

You may want to
send topics to Deane
Hinton.

Shinn

647-7593.

Room 5247

GORDON J. HUMPHREY
NEW HAMPSHIRE

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510
April 28, 1987

COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES
CHAIRMAN SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PREPAREDNESS

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
CHAIRMAN SUBCOMMITTEE ON
REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT

12

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Pakistan's request of you to lease an airborne warning aircraft within one month cannot be granted unless you decide to reconsider the objections of our Navy. The Navy is rightfully concerned that there are a limited number of Grumman E-2C Hawkeye aircraft used by the Navy to help protect our aircraft carriers.

I discussed this concern with President Zia Ul-Huq. He is willing to agree to return the E-2C Hawkeyes to our Navy immediately in the event of an urgent need. President Zia even offered to return the E-2C Hawkeyes to our Navy in the event of a war between Pakistan and India.

Pakistan has three concerns:

- A prompt deployment within one month.
- Pakistani markings be painted on the aircraft while it is in Pakistan.
- The aircraft must be operated safely and effectively, including American crews if necessary.

At least two options exist. First, our Navy could handle the deployment, either by ferrying the Hawkeyes from the San Diego or Norfolk Replacement Air Groups or from the May 1987 deployment of the carrier Constellation to the Indian Ocean. This would mean at least 100 Naval personnel ashore in Pakistan.

The second option is described in the attached letter from Grumman Corporation to me. Based on Grumman's experience in Egypt, Japan, Singapore and Israel, about 100 Grumman Civilian experts would deploy to Pakistan to operate and maintain two E-2C Hawkeyes. Some of the money for this operations would be accepted by Grumman as a down payment on Pakistan's purchase of Hawkeyes. This would accelerate training for Pakistan's Air Force, save Pakistan money, and reduce the need for US Navy personnel to be deployed ashore in Pakistan. Pakistan's purchase of Hawkeyes would also reduce the unit cost to our Navy of its planned future

The President
April 28, 1987
Page Two

purchases of E-2C Hawkeyes by as much as \$3 million per aircraft.

If you wish to respond quickly to Pakistan's request, I recommend that you appoint a specific NSC staff aide to work with Congress, with Pakistan and with our Navy on this issue. I would be pleased to provide additional details from my trip to the NSC staff aide you designate as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gordon J. Humphrey, USS

Hill, Charles [1 of 3]
Ross, Dennis: File

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Grumman Corporation

1000 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 2100
Arlington, Virginia 22209-2280

George E. R. Kinnear II
Senior Vice President
Washington Operations

April 24, 1987

The Honorable Gordon J. Humphrey
Hart Senate Office Building
SH-531
Washington, DC 20510-2901

Dear Senator Humphrey:

On 23 April your staff requested, as a matter of priority, information from Grumman about the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning system. This request was narrowed to details on the feasibility of contractor support of leased E-2C aircraft in Pakistan.

Grumman has produced more than 115 E-2C aircraft for the U.S. Navy and four foreign customers: Egypt, Israel, Japan and Singapore. In 1980 and 1981 Grumman operated and maintained the E-2C aircraft for extended periods of time to demonstrate the Hawkeye's capabilities to the Government of France. In these instances the E-2C aircraft were bailed by the U.S. Navy to Grumman. To support all our customers, especially the foreign operators, Grumman has undertaken a major responsibility for logistic and maintenance activities. We have responded to real world crises, as well as day-to-day operational demands. We are confident that our experience and expertise in supporting Hawkeye activities worldwide would qualify us to meet the requirement in Pakistan.

If the United States Government were to lease the E-2C to Pakistan, we would be in a position to immediately support its operations. It is our view that the U.S. Navy participation would also be essential to the success of such operations. We estimate that the total contractor strength for maintenance, training, logistics and operational coordination of leased aircraft in Pakistan would number 90-120 employees. Owing to our increasingly close relations with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) on several other programs, Grumman is confident of the technical skills represented in the PAF. It would be a pleasure for us to work even more closely with our PAF friends.

There are some issues that would have to be addressed for the lease of E-2C to Pakistan to be adequate in an operational sense. Examples are:

- in order to allow for interoperability with the Pakistan ground radar network (Project Crystal), a buffer between the Hawkeye's data link and the ground system would be required;
- the common operation of communications equipments would be essential;
- in order to take full advantage of the Hawkeye's unique Passive Detection System, the Government of Pakistan would need to develop its own radar emitter and threat library;
- until sufficient levels of expertise in the operations of the E-2C are attained by Pakistan Air Force operators, experienced U.S. operators would be essential to achieve mission success.


However, the most difficult challenge to the lease of E-2C would be to identify available aircraft. Grumman owns no Hawkeyes: all aircraft are owned by the U.S. Navy or by the foreign customer. Hawkeyes are a prime national defense asset and are always in short supply.

In the past three years, the U.S. Navy, Grumman and the Pakistan Air Force have cooperated in two extensive flight demonstrations, a technical ground school on the E-2C, and numerous briefings and discussions. Most recently, a joint U.S. Navy-Grumman team presented the PAF details of an E-2C Hawkeye "optimized" for Pakistan.

We believe that it is in the U.S. interest that the investment that Pakistan would have to make in leasing E-2C's should also serve to establish some equity in a badly needed AEW program. Grumman would be willing to apply some portion of lease payments received by us against the urgent procurement of long lead articles for a new production E-2C for Pakistan. These funds, together with a Letter of Intent to procure E-2C, would allow us to significantly accelerate the delivery and reduce the costs of the new Hawkeyes for Pakistan.

We hope this is fully responsive to your request. If we may be of further service please call us.

Sincerely,



George E. R. Kinnear II

history and U.S. Code Library References
War and National Emergency § 41.
C.J.S. War and National Defense § 49.

Items procured by Fund

A service acquired by the Secretary of Defense under any foreign country or international organization authorized by this chapter, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other law.

For the temporary use by the United States Armed Forces of defense services acquired under this subchapter prior to the country or international organization, if such is in the defense requirements and the United States Armed Forces and maintenance of such articles or services while in storage or replacement upon the termination of such use.

For other costs. In addition to the costs of the acquisition (b) of this section, the Fund may be used to pay for other costs related to the preservation and preparation of defense services acquired under this subchapter, including all as the administrative costs of the Department of Defense of such items to the extent not reimbursed by this title.

Added Pub.L. 97-113, Title I, § 108(a), Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat.

For Assistance. (a) is Pub.L. 97-113, Title I, § 108(a), Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. as amended, after 32 (sec. 108(a) complete de, see Short 1 of this title

Library References

War and National Emergency § 41, 46.
C.J.S. War and National Defense §§ 49, 61.

Congress

Under 31 of each year, the President shall submit to the report on acquisitions of defense articles and defense services. Each such report shall include—

Each contract for the acquisition of defense articles or this subchapter which was entered into during the

Each contract for the acquisition of defense articles or this subchapter which the President anticipates will be current fiscal year;

Each defense article or defense service acquired under this subchapter which is transferred to a foreign country or international organization during fiscal year; and

The impact of the utilization of the authority of this subchapter on defense production and the readiness of the United States.

Written report to the Congress required by section 139(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for each weapon system for which the President shall provide a report estimating the cost of the system through the Fund.

Added Pub.L. 97-113, Title I, § 108(a), Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat.

Delegation of Functions. Functions of the President under this section delegated to the Secretary of Defense, with provision for consultation with other federal departments and agencies, see

sections 1(o) and 2 of Ex. Ord. No. 11958, Jan. 18, 1977, 42 F.R. 4311, set out as a note under section 2751 of this title.

SUBCHAPTER VI—LEASES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES

§ 2796. Leasing authority

(a) Preconditions

The President may lease defense articles in the stocks of the Department of Defense to an eligible foreign country or international organization if—

(1) he determines that there are compelling foreign policy and national security reasons for providing such articles on a lease basis rather than on a sales basis under this chapter;

(2) he determines that the articles are not for the time needed for public use; and

(3) the country or international organization has agreed to pay in United States dollars all costs incurred by the United States Government in leasing such articles, including reimbursement for depreciation of such articles while leased, the costs of restoration or replacement if the articles are damaged while leased, and the replacement cost (less any depreciation in the value) of the articles if the articles are lost or destroyed while leased.

The requirement of paragraph (3) shall not apply to leases entered into for purposes of cooperative research or development, military exercises, or communications or electronics interface projects, or to any defense article which has passed three-quarters of its normal service life.

(b) Duration; termination

Each lease agreement under this section shall be for a fixed duration of not to exceed five years and shall provide that, at any time during the duration of the lease, the President may terminate the lease and require the immediate return of the leased articles.

(c) Applicable statutory authorities

Defense articles in the stocks of the Department of Defense may be leased or loaned to a foreign country or international organization only under the authority of this subchapter or chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [22 U.S.C.A. § 2311 et seq.], and may not be leased to a foreign country or international organization under the authority of section 2667 of Title 10.

(Pub.L. 90-629, Ch. 6, § 61, as added Pub.L. 97-113, Title I, § 109(a), Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1524.)

References in Text. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, referred to in subsec. (c), is chapter 2 of part II of Pub.L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 435, which is classified to section 2311 et seq. of this title.

Delegation of Functions. Functions of the President under this section delegated to the Secretary of Defense, with provision for consultation

with other federal departments and agencies, see sections 1(p) and 2 of Ex. Ord. No. 11958, Jan. 18, 1977, 42 F.R. 4311, set out as a note under section 2751 of this title.

Library References

War and National Emergency § 46.
C.J.S. War and National Defense § 61.

§ 2796a. Reports to Congress

(a) Not less than 30 days before entering into or renewing any agreement with a foreign country or international organization to lease any defense article under this subchapter, or to loan any defense article under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [22 U.S.C.A. 2311 et seq.], for a period of one year or longer, the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, a written certification which specifies—

(1) the country or international organization to which the defense article is to be leased or loaned;

SOVIET-DRA AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS INTO PAKISTAN

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>VIOLATIONS</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>INJURED</u>
1980	179	3	9
1981	98	7	24
1982	60	0	2
1983	70	3	9
1984	88	42 (PLUS)	60 (PLUS)
1985	251	27	73
1986	757	45	73

source: Bruce Amstutz, "Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation," and U.S. Department of State

FBIS 024 (SEE 008)

ISRAEL: FOREIGN MINISTER PERES DENIES MEETING WITH HUSAYN

TA281033 JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 1005 GMT 28 APR 87

(TEXT) VICE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHIM'ON PERES SAYS THAT IF NEED BE HE WILL OPT FOR ELECTIONS BECAUSE THE CHANCE FOR PEACE NOW IS A ONE-TIME OPPORTUNITY AND MUST NOT BE MISSED. SHIM'ON PERES MADE THESE REMARKS IN HAIFA IN A TALK WITH OUR CORRESPONDENT HAVIVA ROGER.

(BEGIN RECORDING) (ROGER) KING HUSAYN'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AFTER AN INTERNATIONAL OPENING IS NOT A SURPRISE TO ME, SAYS SHIM'ON PERES.

(PERES) I HAVE CONSTANTLY SAID -- AND NOW THE AMERICANS HAVE APPARENTLY CONFIRMED THIS -- THAT JORDAN IS PREPARED TO ENTER DIRECT, BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL OPENING -- THAT IS, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THAT WOULD HAVE NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER TO IMPOSE SOLUTIONS AND WOULD NOT REPLACE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BUT RATHER OPEN THE WAY FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

(ROGER) MR PERES NEVERTHELESS DENIES THE REPORTS CLAIMING THAT HE HELD A LENGTHY TALK WITH KING HUSAYN. HE ALSO ADDED THAT PRIME MINISTER YITZHAQ SHAMIR IS MAKING A MISTAKE IF UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE OPPOSES THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

(PERES) I THINK THAT MR SHAMIR HAS MADE MISTAKES ON OTHER OCCASIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN MR SHAMIR DISAGREED WITH MR BEGIN ON SEVERAL ISSUES, SUCH AS ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. IT IS NATURAL FOR THERE TO BE AN ARGUMENT. BUT THE ARGUMENT IS NOT OVER AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; THE ARGUMENT IS OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS IS CONSTANTLY BEING DISTORTED. WE ARE NOT FIGHTING OVER AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE AGREE TO AN INTERNATIONAL OPENING IN ORDER TO ATTAIN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON PEACE. THIS IS A VERY GREAT OPPORTUNITY, AND SHOULD NOT BE MISSED. IT GOES BEYOND ALL THE USUAL AND ACCEPTABLE PARTY SCHEMING, AND IF NEED BE, WE WILL APPROACH THE PEOPLE. (END RECORDING)

28 APR 1103Z RD

RM

GD

RS

WK

IAI

ARN

EBY

sls
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13

Hill, Charles [1017]
Ross, William [1017]

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S:CHILL
NSC

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

NLS M1468 #26

BY smf, NARA, DATE 12/7/05

DECL: OADR

PREL, IS, US

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR PM SHAMIR

REF: STATE 112143

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR. THE MESSAGE IS IN RESPONSE TO SHAMIR'S APRIL 13 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT {REF}.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR YITZHAK,

I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER TO ME SENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE CELEBRATION OF PASSOVER. I WAS REMINDED OF IT WHEN GEORGE SHULTZ RECOUNTED TO ME THE MOVING EXPERIENCE OF HIS PASSOVER SEDER IN MOSCOW.

BETTER THAN ANYTHING I CAN THINK OF, THAT EMOTIONAL EVENT CAPTURED THE THEME OF OUR MUTUAL DEDICATION TO THE AGE-OLD STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM THAT YOU EXPRESSED SO ELOQUENTLY. INDEED, IT IS THE SHARED VALUES INHERENT IN THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND IN THE DREAM OF PEACE AMONG NATIONS THAT UNDERLIE THE STRONG AND ENDURING TIES OF

RWM
JR

JR
RCC

WAK

RSS

MCH

S/S-
NSC

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PAGE 2

FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

NOWHERE IS PEACE MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IT REMAINS OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT A LASTING PEACE CAN ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT AS WE CONTINUE OUR ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OUR COMMITMENT TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IS A CONSTANT.

NANCY JOINS ME IN SENDING BEST WISHES TO YOU AND SHULAMITH.

SINCERELY,

END TEXT.

YYY

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

H. H. Charles E. Ross
Ross, Penrose

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19

3/87

Introduction

- The Middle East, as a potential source of tension, is important to us both.
- We both recognize that local conflicts, especially between Arabs and Israelis, could escalate into superpower confrontation.
- Beyond sharing an interest in managing tensions, we should therefore share an interest in working to end such conflicts through stable peace settlements.
- Let us look in depth at the most deep-rooted and dangerous one -- that between Arabs and Israelis.
- If we confine ourselves to broad principles, we will find common points in our approach.
- We share a desire to prevent war. We both support a comprehensive settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and recognition of Israel.
- But, if we get into specifics, a number of crucial questions arise. It would be all too easy for us to discuss this issue in the usual sterile terms.
- I could recite our positions and you could recite yours on all the familiar problems.
- And then we could try to score public points in our descriptions of what we had discussed.
- This is what we have been doing in successive rounds of experts' talks over the past few years. We can live with this situation.
- It does not keep us from working with the parties to advance the cause of peace. We worked with Egypt and Israel on settling the Taba dispute and on the improvement of relations that led to Foreign Minister Peres' recent visit to Cairo; we have been working with Israel and Jordan on further steps toward peace and on improving the life of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
- Above all, we are interested in getting to real negotiations leading to a viable settlement, in practical results -- not in rhetoric or political theater. We will not be rushed into moves that put this process at risk.
- We have not yet seen similar moves on your part; indeed, your friends in the region seem more interested in perpetuating the conflict than in solving it. We are looking for signs that you want to help overcome the obstacles and help create an enduring and comprehensive solution.

Transforming the Environment

- Further work can be done to create a political environment conducive to serious, productive negotiations.
- While this work is done, it is important to keep alive hope for a settlement. If hope fades among the parties, extremists and fundamentalists will profit. They feed on despair; that is their currency.
- We have done our part to maintain hope by frequently reiterating our commitment to helping the parties work for a just and lasting settlement. You should do the same.
- It is also important to seek an end to terrorism and threats of violence. These work to destroy the kind of environment we need. They encourage hard-liners on both sides to resist accommodation and resort to violence themselves, distract leaders from hard decisions, and intimidate potentially supportive, but weak, states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
- Iran, Syria, Libya, the PLO, and other groups must know that the terrorist game is over. We have worked at many levels to defeat the terrorist threat to peace. You should do likewise.
- While working to defeat the forces of violence and terror, we have also given our political support and encouragement to the moderate elements on both sides, Arab and Israeli, who look toward peace.
- But your continuing support for radical, rejectionist actors -- particularly the likes of Habash and Qadhafi -- is hard to square with your avowed support for peace. Rejectionists oppose the very concept of peace except on terms of capitulation. You should distance yourselves from such forces.
- And your continued unwillingness to normalize your relations with Israel has sown suspicion about your motives in the minds of its leadership and people.
- We are aware of your quiet discussions with Israel. We encourage you to bring these to fruition. Are there any new developments with regard to the exchange of visits by consular teams? Have you taken concrete steps to ease emigration by Jews?

Positions on a Settlement

- To be viable and lasting, the final shape of a settlement must be worked out through negotiations among the parties.
- But to the extent we define our position on the broad outlines of a comprehensive settlement, we can help improve the political environment and give the parties greater confidence that, if they take the hard decision to negotiate, a settlement that will protect their basic interests and have our support is achievable.
- We have defined our vision of a settlement in the President's September 1, 1982 initiative. You have defined yours in your proposals of July 29, 1984 and subsequent variants.
 - Your vision generally identifies with maximal Arab negotiating postures; many of its elements are properly subject to the negotiating process.
 - Our vision, we believe, reflects a "real-world" view of a just and equitable settlement based on compromise among the parties.
- Our treatment of the issue of an independent Palestinian state reflects the view that most in the Arab world, as well as Israel, recognize that such a state would not be viable and would be a source of instability.
- We know that positions need not be immutable, but can evolve. Have you thought further about the wisdom of calling for a Palestinian state? Are you prepared to recognize the utility of seeking the kinds of confederative arrangements we have espoused?

Procedural Obstacles: The Negotiating Format

- Over the years, you, we, and the various parties have identified a number of procedural obstacles to negotiations for a settlement. Chief among these are the issues of a negotiating format and of Palestinian representation.
- The positions of the parties are well known to us both. The crucial question that remains to be defined with regard to the negotiating format is the balance to be struck between a multilateral context and bilateral negotiations.
- I recognize that in 1977 you and we agreed that a Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of the representatives of all the parties, including those of the Palestinian people, was the only right and effective way to achieve a fundamental solution.
- Since then, while not discounting the value of an international context, we have also come to see that a format limited to an international conference runs the risks of degenerating into political theater and that the real work must be done in a bilateral format.
- Some way must be found to ensure that progress made in bilateral negotiations does not become hostage to a veto from other participants in an international context. This will be very difficult to do, but it is essential.
- It has been argued that this and other issues could best be addressed by a preparatory committee with the five permanent members of the Security Council. This will not work; outsiders cannot replace the parties in deciding what these parties can accept.
- We have worked hard with Jordan and Israel to try to narrow the differences on this question. Specifically, we have worked to give Jordan an appreciation of the importance of bilateral negotiations and to give the Israelis an appreciation of the importance of an international context.
- In our most recent contacts, we have stated privately and publicly that an international conference is a possible mechanism that we are prepared to explore if it can be demonstrated that it will facilitate, not obstruct, an agreement. But we remain to be convinced.
- You should look for ways to contribute to this search for a mechanism that will produce serious negotiation.
- Some Soviet representatives have suggested that bilateral committees of some kind are the answer. If they would be subject to pressures from the outside or from a plenary, this has to be avoided. Otherwise the process will not work. Do you have new ideas in this regard?
- Beyond this, the positions of Syria and the PLO on the process continue to be inflexible. Flexibility is needed if we are to find a mechanism acceptable to all. Are you prepared to urge this on your friends?

Procedural Obstacles: Palestinian Representation

- The basic issue here is the nature of Palestinian representation in the various stages of the process. Again, both of us know the positions of the various parties well.
- As far as we two are concerned, it is noteworthy that even in 1977 we refrained from specifying who the representatives of the Palestinian people should be.
- Logic would dictate that such representatives should be committed to the purposes of the negotiation -- a lasting settlement that accomodates the basic interests of the parties through compromise.
- To this day, the principal leaders of the PLO refuse to state clearly that they accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognize the existence of Israel. Beyond this, they have continued to employ forms of violence and terrorism that bring their commitment to peace into question.
- Meanwhile, Syria has threatened Jordan and worked to divide the PLO and set up a rival organization with an even more intractable leadership .
- We remain ready to see Palestinian representatives who accept the ground rules of the negotiation participate in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- Meanwhile, we have, on numerous occasions, indicated our readiness to engage the PLO in a political dialogue once its leaders have taken these minimal steps -- steps that would show they are ready and able to deliver. We have no complex about this. Likewise, we remain in touch with Syria on a wide range of issues, including the search for peace.
- Here, as with the issue of the negotiating format, you have an have an opportunity to show that your professed desire to be constructive is matched by deeds.
- You can get the PLO to face up to what it must do if it wants to join the process. If the PLO cannot do this, it ought to be able at a minimum to renounce the use of violence and terrorism and permit non-PLO leaders to represent the Palestinians, at least in the initial stages of the negotiating process.
- The same applies to Syria. We are looking for a sign that you are seriously trying and are capable of ensuring that the Syrians and rejectionist Palestinians will stop threatening those who are prepared to join in the search for peace.

The Challenge You Face

- We are doing what we can to transform the environment in which Arabs and Israelis consider the hard decisions required to reach the peaceful settlement that both of us recognize is in our interest.
- We are doing this in public statements to keep hope alive, in firm action to defeat terrorism, and in articulating a reasonable, balanced position on the general outlines of a final settlement.
- The parties themselves must come to grips first with the procedural obstacles to negotiation and then with the substantive issues they will be called upon to resolve.
- On the procedural obstacles, you can, if you wish, help the parties find ways to ensure that the essential bilateral negotiations do not become hostage to a wider multilateral context and that the issue of Palestinian representation is successfully resolved.
- You can continue your declaratory policy and avoid coming to grips with the practical needs of the search for peace, with the risk that the process will move on without you, as it already has, with visible results. We will not object.
- Or you can accept the challenge that the situation presents and take concrete steps to help create the political environment and negotiating structures required for progress.
- To the extent our overall relationship improves in the give and take of high-level visits and negotiations in other vital areas, we can envisage a deeper dialogue on this key Middle Eastern problem.
- But even before that time, there is much you can do to parallel our own efforts. The situation offers you this challenge.

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