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Collection Name ROSS, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 1/4/2010

File Folder LEBANON

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3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
82263	FILE INDEX	<i>R</i> 3/26/2010 <i>M08-097 #55299</i>	1	ND	B1
82264	MEMO	DENNIS ROSS TO DR. IKLE RE LEBANON <i>D</i> 1/29/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	1	10/5/1983	B1
82265	PAPER	RE LEBANON (ATTACHMENT TO 82264) <i>D</i> 1/29/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	8	9/30/1983	B1
82266	PAPER	RE LEBANON <i>D</i> 1/29/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	8	9/25/1983	B1
82267	MEMO	ROSS TO IKLE RE SYRIANS <i>D</i> 1/29/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	1	9/15/1983	B1
82268	PAPER	RE SYRIA (ATTACHMENT TO 82267) (ANNOTATED) <i>D</i> 6/20/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	7	9/15/1983	B1
82269	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 82667 <i>D</i> 1/29/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	1	9/15/1983	B1
82270	PAPER	ATTACHMENT TO 82269 AND SAME TEXT AS 82268 UNANNOTATED <i>D</i> 6/20/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	7	9/15/1983	B1
82271	MEMO	ROSS TO IKLE RE LEBANON AND CONGRESS <i>D</i> 1/29/2013 <i>M258/1</i>	1	9/13/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
82272	PAPER	RE LEBANON D 1/29/2013 M258/1	6	9/9/1983	B1
82273	PAPER	RE IRAQ D 1/29/2013 M258/1	2	ND	B1
82274	PAPER	RE LEBANON PAR 11/16/2010 M258/1	7	ND	B1
82275	PAPER	RE MNF R 9/13/2010 M258/1	5	ND	B1

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This map of Lebanon illustrates its administrative districts and the distribution of various religious communities. The districts are color-coded and some are marked with specific patterns to represent different groups. Major cities and towns are labeled, along with international borders and surrounding bodies of water.

Religious Communities and Districts:

- Maronite:** Light tan color.
- Greek Orthodox:** Dark brown color.
- Greek Catholic:** Medium brown color.
- Mixed Maronite and Greek Catholic:** Diagonal hatching.
- Shia Muslim:** Dark green color.
- Sunni Muslim:** Light green color.
- Druze:** Pink color.
- Mixed Druze and Greek Orthodox:** Red diagonal hatching.

Other Features:

- District (qaḡā') boundary:** Solid black line.
- District center:** Small black circle.
- UNDOF Zone:** Indicated in the south near the Israeli border.
- Golan Heights (Israeli occupied):** Labeled in the south.
- Surrounding Areas:** Syria to the north and east, Israel to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west.

Legend:

- Maronite
- Greek Orthodox
- Greek Catholic
- Mixed Maronite and Greek Catholic
- Shia Muslim
- Sunni Muslim
- Druze
- Mixed Druze and Greek Orthodox
- District (qaḡā') boundary
- District center

DISTRICT NAMES: A district is named only when its name differs from that of its center.

Scale: 0 to 20 Kilometers.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

The National Pact

At the time of independence in 1943, Lebanese leaders formulated a National Pact to guarantee the sectarian rights within the diverse population of Lebanon. An unwritten agreement, the Pact allocates political and administrative offices equitably among the recognized confessional groups according to the percentage of each in the total Lebanese population. Using the 1932 census as a base (none has been taken since then), the Presidency traditionally goes to a Maronite Christian, the prime ministership to a Sunni Muslim and the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shia Muslim. The 99 seats of the Chamber are also allocated proportionately among the religious communities.

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Where Do We Go From Here in Lebanon?

Begin's resignation will increase political turmoil in Israel, add to uncertainty in Lebanon, and further confirm Syria's view that events are moving its way. While a new context for action has been created, the challenge we face in Lebanon -- as revealed by the events of the last few days -- remains basically unchanged. As we respond to the events of the moment, we need to be aware of what's possible in Lebanon and of the importance of keeping our political involvement in line with the military commitments we are prepared to make. The two go hand-in-hand, with deepening political involvement building inevitable pressures to assume a larger military role in Lebanon.

Near Term Needs, Longer Term Problems

Clearly, the next few weeks in Lebanon are critical. If we can not stop the current fighting and also manage the process of Israeli withdrawal out of the Shuf and Alayh, Lebanon may well come apart. Given all we have politically invested in Lebanon over the last 14 months, that would damage us at home, in the region, and, to some extent, with our allies.

At home, the shibboleth of Administration incompetence in foreign affairs would be raised with new fervor and perhaps erode the credibility of other Administration policies, e.g., in Central America. In the region, even Western-oriented Arab regimes might push for bringing the Soviets back onto center stage, given the "proof" that the Soviets are capable (given their Syrian tie) of frustrating US designs and of making life very difficult for those who embrace US initiatives. Finally, our allies' willingness to follow our lead (and defer their independent approaches) in the Middle East would surely diminish.

All this argues for taking bold steps to hold things together. While injecting ourselves into Lebanese confessional politics and extending the MNF into the Shuf and Alayh may be necessary to manage the near term problem, these steps cannot offer any real guarantee about the future. Initial success on these points might only be followed in a month or two by a new explosion with our interests and our forces even more exposed. A clear and realistic view of where things are headed in Lebanon is, thus, necessary not only for crafting internal agreements among Lebanese groups that have some prospect of holding but also for thinking about reducing our exposure over time if that proves necessary.

With that in mind, it is useful to look at the factors that are likely to influence behavior in Lebanon, Israel and Syria, what they tell us about how events may unfold, and what we should be doing.

Lebanese Behavior

Part of our problem in trying to prevent disintegration in Lebanon is that we must try to influence not only the government, but the leaders of the different clans. At this point, convincing them that partition is not inevitable (and that, therefore, they should not be taking military steps that make this a self-fulfilling prophecy) is one of our major tasks.

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The Amin government believes that arresting the partition/disintegration tide depends on getting public Israeli agreement to a notional time-table for withdrawal. While this would demonstrate both GOL clout with us and our ability to produce Israeli concessions -- something that might increase hopes about eventual Syrian concessions -- it probably would not materially alter Lebanese expectations about eventual partition. After all, how many Lebanese believe the Syrians will get out if the Israelis do? More importantly, how many Druze, Shia, Sunnis, and other non-Maronites really believe that President Gemayel -- notwithstanding some limited symbolic efforts -- is capable of working toward anything but a Phalange dominated state, even while he hedges his bets and lays the ground work for a Christian mini-state? This problem -- which is unrelated to the Israeli timetable for withdrawals -- requires us to do what we can to broaden the base of the government and to press for negotiations between the GOL and leaders of the major confessional groups. Thus, the current strategy of trying to forge interconfessional entente is right.

But what kind of inter-confessional entente can we plausibly press for? Does Lebanese "reconciliation" imply a recreation of the old division of spoils along confessional lines, but with a new National Pact that reverses the 6:5 ratio in favor of the Muslims? Does it mean forging a new deal between major groups in the expectation that the minor groups will go along (while the original National Pact was between the Maronites and the Sunnis, a new deal might be between the Maronites and the numerically dominant Shias)? Does it require that Syrian oriented Sunni areas in the Bekaa and northeast be ceded to Syria (as Emile Edde suggested to the French in 1942)? Or does it mean something more like confederation, where the major groups would have general autonomy or home rule while the central government would have responsibility for foreign policy, national security, banking and economic development, etc.?

Ultimately a confederation of sorts, with local autonomy, local responsibility for security, and an ethnically mixed central government, may prove to be the only workable arrangement in Lebanon. After all, a confederation takes account of what appears to be an unshakeable fact in Lebanon: namely, that confessionalism and clannishness remain the motor that drives politics and life. In the absence of new leaders and a strong, politically meaningful consensus favoring a new, more fully "national" Lebanon, this is the reality with which we must cope.

There is, after all, no Ataturk in Lebanon. Bashir might have been -- that was his intent -- but the younger leaders like Amin Gemayel and Walid Jumblatt have no such vision -- nor for that matter the kind of charisma and ruthlessness that would be required. Rather in temperament, style and approach, they reflect the old Lebanese political order while the older leaders and notables like Wazzan, Salim, Shayhk Pierre, Chamoun, Franjiyeh, Karami, etc., still embody it.

That being the case, we must recognize that we cannot fashion a new Lebanese nation; Lebanon's reconciliation must reflect not our vision of the kind of reconciliation that is desirable, but the kind that is possible given the Lebanese order. Even then, we must recognize that movement toward a more stable, enduring internal arrangement will be gradual and halting -- even if we succeed in getting the foreign forces out -- because each group will look to see how it is doing in comparison to others; will

assume all agreements will collapse and therefore facts must be created on the ground; and will gain confidence in co-existence only as the "facts" warrant it.

In the near term, the logic of the internal situation suggests working out a deal between the GOL and the Druze. If Jumblatt believes that the deal is part of a larger process aimed eventually, if gradually, at providing for local autonomies and a central government in a confederated context, he is more likely to compromise now, reduce his demands, and accept LAF entry. The specific terms of the deal now could include a Druze commander for the LAF brigade introduced into the Shuf; increased government support and provision of local services to the Druze; and a GOL commitment to appoint -- as was traditionally the case -- a Druze as Defense Minister.

Such an arrangement would set a precedent for the kind of relationship that could be fashioned between the central government and each of the major ethnic groupings. From a longer-term perspective, what is more important than the appearance of GOL authority being extended to the Shuf is the appearance of partnership being forged between the government and one of the major communities.

Given what is happening with the Shia Amal, that is especially important now. Unless the Shias and others believe partnership is possible and can be worked out politically, they will take military steps (as the Amal is doing) either to create a position of independence or to force the the government to accept them as equals -- or to raise the costs to us so we will force the government to be responsive.

In shaping near-term proposals which are most likely to lay a foundation for eventual stability, we need to start drawing out from the various confessional leaders what they expect to happen; what they want to happen; what kinds of near term steps or agreements would be most reassuring and most helpful in paving the way to a more stable future. Assuming we are prepared and determined to continue to play a major mediating role, the GOL and the various confessional leaders should not see us as passive in this process -- but should see us as willing to use our leverage to support what we believe to be a reasonable outcome.

Israeli Behavior

Begin's resignation will make total withdrawal from Lebanon almost a certainty by next spring or summer. Even with his detachment and growing disinterest, Begin remained the most significant impediment to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon that was not conditioned on Syrian withdrawal. He more than others (with the possible exception of Shamir) psychologically and politically needed to have something to show for all the sacrifices Israel has made during and after "Operation Peace for Galilee."

In the coming year, perhaps the most significant pressure on Israel to get out of Lebanon -- regardless of whether the Syrians withdraw -- will come from the military. The recent MOD budget cut slated to be spread over the next two years, the continuing O&M costs of being in Lebanon, the continuing adverse effects on training, and the deferred modernization and weapons buys that have already been imposed by the military presence, will increasingly convince the IDF/MOD that Israeli security is being harmed

and not served by a continuing stay in Lebanon. As this military view becomes more pronounced and visible, the political costs of not withdrawing will go up dramatically.

Labor has already staked out a position in favor of a staged withdrawal, not linked to Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. If Labor is restored to power without an election taking place, the new government -- especially with religious support -- may go ahead and gradually (e.g., 2-4 months) implement this approach. (Or, to bolster what would surely be a weak political position initially, the new coalition might defer withdrawal and call for an election or referendum on withdrawal from Lebanon -- knowing that this would work for them and against Likhud.)

Notwithstanding increasing pressures to get out of the Lebanese quagmire, if a Likhud coalition remains in power, Likhud party politics will militate against anything but a partial withdrawal in the near term. No one will gain support within Likhud now unless he appears true to Begin's politics and program; and all of Begin's potential successors understand that Sharon is still able to arouse emotions and mobilize political support (especially within the Herut) and will oppose anyone who looks soft on Lebanon (or on US requests for a timetable).

Nevertheless, the political costs to Likhud -- and Begin's successors -- will almost certainly require Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon by next year. At that point:

- casualties will continue even after redeployment and build public demands for getting out;
- the military's misgivings about the costs of remaining in Lebanon will become stronger; and
- the conviction will grow within Israel that the Syrians will not get out of Lebanon soon, that it is too costly to drive them out (particularly given the uncertain gains), and that, in any case, expelling the Syrians from Lebanon was never an avowed aim of the war.

Some of these pressures -- especially from the military -- are likely to be felt sooner rather than later, and result in another partial withdrawal from the Al-Awwali to the Zahrani. In that case, the Israelis and Lebanese may press for MNF deployments to help fill the gap. This is something we need to be thinking about in terms of internal Lebanese needs and in terms of influencing Syrian behavior.

The Syrians

Assad sees things going his way. Lebanon is on the verge of disintegration and the Lebanese are clearly more sensitive to the futility and danger of opposing Syrian interests; notwithstanding Israeli rhetoric, war-weariness and the Soviet military presence seem to rule out Israeli military actions against Syria and domestic pressures, more generally, seem certain to force the Israelis out of Lebanon; US impatience with stalemate (and growing fears of Lebanese disintegration) already have forced us to recognize Syria's special importance and are bound to make us more responsive to

Syrian interests. Arab -- i.e., Saudi -- attitudes toward the Lebanese agreement have changed and now seem more directly to reflect the Syrian position -- indicating growing Syrian leverage in the region.

With things seemingly moving in his direction, Assad has little reason to change course. If anything, he has an interest in doing more to raise the costs to us of being in Lebanon because, in his eyes, he risks little and increases our need to accommodate him. Our efforts to use the leverage of the Israeli position in Lebanon against him will be unavailing because he's convinced they will get out. (Begin's resignation will remove any doubts he might have had about this.) Our attempts to bring Arab pressure to bear in support of a GOL request to withdraw the ADF may create some discomfort, but he knows it is not likely to come before an Israeli commitment to a specific timetable for withdrawal; is certain to erode with the passage of time; will not involve any sanctions; and can be used by him to exact a price at a point when he chooses to withdraw his forces from Lebanon.

And that point is likely to come after the Israelis get out. Assad knows that he doesn't need to maintain the costly presence of his forces in Lebanon to achieve his aims there. (As Abrasha Tamir once said, "we have one Haddad in Lebanon, Assad has forty.") But that doesn't mean he will withdraw them before a time when he can (1) maximize the appearance that he prevailed over the Israelis and (2) exact the most political and economic concessions from the Lebanese and Saudis in return for getting out.

That suggests that following a "decent interval" after Israeli withdrawal -- e.g., 6-12 months -- Assad probably will withdraw, too, once he's won Lebanese acceptance of Syria's special political, economic and military interests in Lebanon and probably also an additional cash subsidy from the Saudis.

While we want a Syrian withdrawal, we do not want an outcome that looks like a major Syrian victory, especially because it will be seen as having been made possible by the Soviets. After previous Arab-Israeli wars, the superpower that has been seen as being most responsible for the outcome has benefitted in its regional position.* Thus, our approach to Israeli-Syria withdrawal should be guided by our need to achieve a certain kind of withdrawal.

With the Israelis, this means doing all we can to influence the timing of their withdrawals (assuming here that there will be one or two more withdrawals) so that new instability isn't unleashed in Lebanon -- and so that each withdrawal becomes an opportunity to work out internal understandings between the government and the clans.

With the Syrians, it means being sure that we retain a presence in Lebanon after they get out (to emphasize that we and not they have shaped the outcome); that we support the Lebanese in resisting Syrian demands for extensive residual rights in Lebanon; and that we make the Syrians worry

*Even though the US forced the British, French and Israelis to get out of Sinai following the 1956 war, the perception in the area was that Soviet threats and pressure had forced us to act -- and the Soviets, and not we, were the big beneficiaries as a result. Paradoxically, Soviet support, resupply and threats of intervention during the 1973 war didn't payoff because we were seen as the only one capable of stopping the Israelis and then delivering on Israeli withdrawals.

about the dangers of staying in Lebanon.

Implications

The inherent messiness and intractability of Lebanese politics suggests that we should hedge our bets -- i.e., while trying to shape things in a manner that serves our basic objectives (stabilizing Lebanon, and getting the Israeli and Syrian forces out in a way that serves our regional interests), we should begin gradually to reduce our own exposure.

With the Lebanese, therefore, we should:

- Draw out the real "bottom lines" in the major communities of what it will take to meet their needs in the near and longer term.
- Make clear what we can and can not accept -- in terms of exaggerated or unreasonable demands -- and whom we will stand by and back up.
- Let Gemayel know there is a limit to our patience and if he isn't forthcoming in a way we deem to be reasonable, we will begin to disassociate ourselves from the process.

With the Israelis:

- Make clear that the climate of our relations will be affected by the pace and timing of their withdrawals and the degree to which they coordinate these with us. (The implication ought to be that things that are very important to the Israelis -- like the loan to grant ratio and FMS convertibility, both of which will become far more important given their economic crunch -- can be considered favorably only if the climate between us is good.)

With the Syrians:

- Make it clear that we won't retreat from our strategy or reward Syrian intransigence and that the Syrians may find that it is dangerous to extend their stay in Lebanon. Here it is essential that Assad believe that we won't react passively to problems he creates for us -- both to deter Syrian-inspired threats against U.S. forces in Lebanon in the first instance and later on to minimize the political price he's willing to accept for getting out of Lebanon.

- This means putting pressure on him in a way that makes him believe that it is costly to remain in Lebanon. Because we can't credibly use the "Israeli military club" against him now, we need to play on his internal vulnerabilities. While some will argue that Assad isn't that vulnerable now to the Ikhwan and others, what matters here is not whether we believe he is vulnerable to sectarian strife and the corruption of his brother, but whether he believes he is -- and his behavior over the years suggests that he is hypersensitive to any indication of trouble. Launching a [REDACTED] propaganda campaign that plays up and exaggerates Syrian casualties in Lebanon -- especially among Sunni troops -- the booming drug business in the Bekaa and how it is profitting Rifaat Assad, etc., may be an especially good way of signalling him that far more serious efforts to de-stabilize him may be in store if he overplays his hand and pushes us or the Lebanese too far.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

With others:

- Seek additional contributors to MNF, especially with participants from Third World (Brazil might be a good candidate), as a way of gradually reducing our presence and responsibilities.
- Inform the Saudis that it is up to the Arabs to put the Lebanese house in order, and that we should not be expected to do their job for them.
- To reinforce this message, they might also be told that the MNF is not an internal gendarme, but rather is responsible for dealing with external aggression and infiltration and its presence may be shifted accordingly.
- Play on French "responsibility" and interest in doing more in concert with the Saudis (an impulse that has increased with growing Iraqi indebtedness to the French) to see if they will increase their presence (especially in the Shuf) and do more to work out inter-confessional agreements.

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MNF OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT

This paper outlines four different approaches to the question of what to do with our Marines:

- Option 1 is to tough-it-out, maintaining roughly present deployment.
- Option 2 is a partial drawdown to 800 to 1,000.
- Option 3 is total withdrawal of the MAU onto ships coupled with a security umbrella over Beirut.
- Option 4 is a simple total withdrawal onto ships.

OPTION 1: TOUGH IT OUT

The arguments for maintaining our present Marine deployment at BIA are well known:

- A withdrawal of the MAU would have a major symbolic impact signifying abandonment of U.S. commitment to its goals in Lebanon.
- A withdrawal of the MAU thus risks a psychological blow to GOL morale and would embolden the Syrians.
- Overthrow of an American client would be a blow to U.S. credibility.
- Overthrow of a moderate Arab government that negotiated with Israel would be a severe blow to Mideast peace process. Jordan would be much less willing to risk Syrian response to its joining peace process.
- Current "entente" of moderate Arab states which is developing to counter Syrian-Iranian axis could weaken.
- Saudi Arabia and others would be unwilling to stand up to Syrian objections to reentry of Egypt to Arab world.
- Gulf states would doubt U.S. commitment to their security.
- Major victory of a Soviet client would enhance Soviet status in the region.

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/13/10

There is merit in all these arguments. One fundamental problem is that our policy, even if valid, is being undermined at home:

- Such a policy requires, above all, staying power and, even more important, the demonstration of staying power.
- It requires discipline in the U.S. government.
- It cannot possibly succeed if key institutions in U.S. national security machinery do not believe in it and are lobbying against it in the Congress and the press:
 - It cannot succeed if the intelligence community is unanimously agreed that the situation is hopeless.
 - It cannot succeed if institutions like the Long Commission are permitted to make policy judgments that are beyond their purview, fueling public and Congressional pressures.
 - It cannot succeed with a publicly divided Administration; it must be a Presidential policy, not a DOS policy.
- To maintain the present course would require Executive Branch discipline, firm leadership, and a decisive defeat of Congressional challenges to it, including a private decision to be willing to use the Presidential veto power.
- Even with the required discipline and leadership, the present policy has no guarantee of success, given Syrian pressures and the precariousness of the situation on the ground.

If it is concluded that these requirements cannot be met, then the inescapable conclusion is that the current U.S. policy cannot be executed and a change in approach is required.

So, the U.S. should be affirmatively looking for an opportunity to withdraw the Marines, for the following reasons:

- Accomplishment of our long-term goals in Lebanon is not within reach, given the lack of credibility of U.S. policy, existing constraints on use of force by Israel and U.S., and absence of those restraints on Syria.
- Underlying problems in Lebanon--deep communal differences--are unlikely to be resolved.

- Lebanon itself is of little intrinsic strategic value; main U.S. strategic interest now is in not being humiliated as we disengage.
- Marine presence on the ground is main U.S. vulnerability in Lebanon, distorting our Lebanon policy and adding a source of fragility to entire U.S. Middle East position.
- Potential remains for conflict with Syria or the Soviets in disadvantageous circumstances.
- MNF allies' support will certainly continue to collapse.
- Not clear that opportunities will be better in the future concerning honorable Marine withdrawal.

However, it remains true that a precipitate U.S. withdrawal that undermined the GOL would be damaging to U.S. interests for all the reasons listed. Therefore, we would need a Congressional strategy that blocked any moves for precipitate withdrawal and instead allowed the Executive Branch to decide the timing, extent, manner, and context of any MAU withdrawal. This means, under any option:

- There is advantage in the President's announcing his own plan and privately deciding he will veto unacceptable Congressional resolutions. If the President's plan is substantially responsive to public concerns, this strategy should deflate Congressional initiatives. This would be preferable, both substantively and constitutionally, to the alternative of haggling with Congress over terms of new War Powers resolution. (Though, under certain options, War Powers issues may remain.)
- Military say that the number of Marines really needed to perform their mission (presence, tripwire for naval/air power, etc.) is small. Theories of "organizational integrity" may be reexamined.
- There is broad public support for keeping naval/air presence (see Mondale speech) as well as OMC personnel for training the LAF. President should pledge/insist on maintaining these. FASTABS must remain. Any MAU withdrawal should be to ships, where they can remain as surge capability and come ashore for patrolling if desired.
- All options should be buttressed by all-out accelerated program to strengthen the LAF.
- In all cases, TARPS should continue, with vigorous naval/air response if fired upon.

- Continue discreet efforts to explore options for expanded UNIFIL/UNTSO role for certain areas (refugee camps, etc.).
- Most of these options run risk of having negative impact in the area. The gamble is that if Congressional situation stabilizes in one or two months, U.S. staying power may be visibly restored. This would restore balance to the bargaining situation and improve chances of achieving some of our objectives in Lebanon and the Middle East.
- The GOL has to be on-board and primed to take self-confident line to the effect that the change strengthens its position.

Among withdrawal options that could be considered are the following:

OPTION 2: PARTIAL DRAWDOWN

- Essence of the option: an immediate drawdown of MAU to the level of 800-1000 men over a period of a month or two. (Variant: drawdown to a company.)
- Further drawdowns possible if conditions warrant, but no commitment or deadline.
- Offshore naval/air power retained, as is full complement of personnel associated with FASTABS and OMC. MAU retained on ships as surge capability, and could come ashore for patrolling. TARPS to continue, with vigorous response if fired upon.
- In Lebanon, challenge will be to parlay enhanced staying power due to drawdown into a strength that compensates for psychological blow of MAU drawdown.
- Could be linked to security plan, if achieved, to limit psychological damage of MAU departure.
- Domestically, may buy more time for our Lebanon policy, particularly if President and his Administration sell it aggressively. But public pressures may build up again to remove forces that remain.

OPTION 3: RESHUFFLING THE DECK

-- Essence of the option:

- Announcement of total or near-total pull-out of Marines from onshore positions, coupled with:
 - A bold announcement of a security umbrella for Beirut area: i.e., that U.S. offshore naval/air will respond vigorously to any shelling in greater Beirut area and to attacks on U.S. (and MNF) military or civilian personnel.
- Drawdown to support group of 100-300 at heavily protected SW corner of BIA, which could be Army Rangers. LAF protects rest of BIA. (Variant: Drawdown to a company.)
- Offshore naval/air retained, as is full complement of personnel associated with FASTABS and OMC. MAU retained on ships as surge capability, and could come ashore for patrolling. TARPS to continue aggressively, with vigorous response if fired upon.
- Insert Delta teams for anti-terrorist and Embassy-protection purposes.
- Syrians to be told they must remove their artillery that threatens Beirut, or the U.S. security umbrella will mean vigorous response to any shelling in Beirut area.
- Israelis to declare red-line against any movement forward of Syrian forces following MNF/IDF withdrawals in Lebanon.
- Israel to continue air attacks on PLO and terrorist centers.
- MNF partners would be urged to stay (though we might be better off without British). French should be encouraged to join us in joint security umbrella; French forces could move to East Beirut and come under protection of security umbrella. (Variant: Implement unilaterally if French leave or refuse to cooperate.)
- UNIFIL should be invited to protect refugee camps, etc.
- Domestically, there should be enough support for retention of naval/air, OMB, and addition of Delta teams.
- 18-month War Powers authorization and limitations (signed October 12, 1983) apply only to onshore MAU presence, but new War Powers issue is likely to arise. President should be in good position to strike new political bargain: expanded ROE in exchange for total MAU withdrawal.