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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: ROSS, DENNIS: Files

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File Folder: Chron File May 1988 Box 91594

Date: May 29, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Robert Oakley to Colin Powell re meeting 1 p. (3405) <i>D 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #144</i>	5/4/88	P1
2. paper	re shaping the next discussions with the Soviets 8 p.	5/4/88	P1, P5
3. memo	Oakley to Powell re USSR 1 p. (3542) <i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #145</i>	5/10/88	P1
4. paper	later draft of item #2 4 p. (attachment to item #3)	5/10/88	P1, P5
5. memo	Ross to the record re meeting with businessmen 3 p. <i>D 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #146</i>	5/11/88	P1
6. talking points	re Middle East peace process 3 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #147</i>	5/12/88	P1
7. briefing memo	re meeting with Foreign Minister Peres of Israel 3 p. (3648) <i>D 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #148</i>	5/17/88	P1
8. talking points	re President's one-on-one meeting with Peres 5/17 11:30 - 11:40 1 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #149</i>	5/17	P1
9. note cards	same text as item #8 1 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #150</i>	n.d.	P1
10. talking points	for plenary meeting with Peres 5/17 11:40 - 12:00 2 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #151</i>	n.d.	P1
11. note cards	same text as item #9 2 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #152</i>	n.d.	P1
12. memcon	re one-on-one meeting with Reagan and Peres 2 p. (3648) <i>D 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #153</i>	5/17/88	P1
13. talking points	re middle east peace process 4 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #154</i>	5/24/88	P1
14. talking points	revised pp. 3 4 of item #12 2 p. <i>R 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #155</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

FILE INDEX FOR CHRON FILES FOR MAY 1988 FOR DENNIS ROSS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Shaping the Next Discussions w/Soviets	May 4, 1988
2	Powell Memo re: Mtg w/Edgar Bronfman, May 5	May 4, 1988
3	Powell Memo re: The USSR & US Middle East Peace Initiative	May 10, 1988
4	Memo for Record re: Mtg w/Businessman Who Have Had Discussions w/Libyan Officials	May 11, 1988
5	State Draft Report on SJR 305 re: US Presence in Persian Gulf	May 12, 1988
6	Middle East Peace Process	May 12, 1988
7	Stevens Memo re: President's Mtg w/Peres	May 13, 1988
8	Powell Memo re: Peres Visit, Tuesday, May 17	May 13, 1988
9	Talking Points re: Foreign Minister	May 16, 1988
10	Stevens Memo re: Travel to Middle East May 25-Jun 3	May 17, 1988
11	Stevens Memo re: Reply to Guilford Glazer	May 17, 1988
12	Stevens Memo re: WH Statement on Reagan Mtg w/Peres	May 17, 1988
13	Stevens Memo re: MemCon on Reagan One-on-One w/Peres, May 17	May 18, 1988
14	Talking Points re: Middle East Process	May 24, 1988

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1988

3542

Oakley

B
GA DR
(2) PW--
file



Verif
F. L.
A

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: The USSR and US Middle East Peace Initiative

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Attached is an excellent paper Dennis Ross did -- at State's request and with their input -- explaining where the US and USSR stand on the Middle East peace process. We at the NSC continue (even after Fritz' departure) to try and dispel illusions about what can be expected from the Soviets. In this case, GPS found Dennis' paper so lucid and cogent that State sent it to our Ambassadors in the region. Some of them had very unrealistic impressions, almost as bad as the governments to which they are accredited. (Hussein is the worst, with Peres a close second.) Skillful Soviet propagandizing has exacerbated wishful thinking in creating this situation.

Attachment

Tab A Shaping the Next Discussions with
the Soviets

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F 94-038/3 #195

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~SECRET~~

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

3582

May 12, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*
SUBJECT: State Draft Report on S.J.Res. 305
Regarding U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf

Attached at Tab I is a memo to Ronald Peterson informing him that the NSC approves of State's draft report on S.J.Res. 305, as amended.

MA for *N/A* *DR*
Alison Fortier, Bill Cockell and Daniel Levin concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to Ronald K. Peterson.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Ronald K. Peterson
Tab A State Draft Report

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3582

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on S.J. Res. 305

The NSC endorses State's report on S.J.Res. 305 (as amended)
regarding U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf.

Attachment

Tab A State Draft Report



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

3582
URGENT

May 12, 1988

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

Department of Defense (Brick 697-1305)
Department of Justice (Perkins 633-2113)
National Security Council

06
17

SUBJECT: State draft report on S.J.Res. 305 regarding U.S.
presence in the Persian Gulf.

NOTE: This is scheduled for Senate Floor action tomorrow
May 13th so your immediate response is essential.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
4:30 P.M., TODAY, MAY 12, 1988.

Questions should be referred to Sue Thau/Annette Rooney
(395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: B. Howard
N. Moore
J. Eisenhower

URGENT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We understand that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee intends to consider S.J. Res. 305 this week. This letter sets forth our views on this matter.

Preliminarily, we welcome ^{the} congressional support expressed for a continued U.S. presence in the Gulf. In this respect, the preamble of ^{the} bill reflects what we believe to be a consensus in Congress, shared by the Administration, on the importance of protecting vital U.S. and free world interests in the region. As you know, the Administration has consulted regularly with Congress since well before escort operations began last summer, and consistently has found broad support for the escort program.

Nevertheless, S.J. Res. 305 poses difficulties by explicitly linking the U.S. presence in the Gulf to the divisive issue of the War Powers Resolution. Section 3 of the bill purports to authorize a U.S. presence in the Gulf under the terms of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, to which the Executive Branch has ~~traditionally~~ ^{consistently} objected on constitutional and policy grounds. In addition, the bill makes findings under the War Powers Resolution and contemplates the possibility of a joint resolution of Congress ordering the withdrawal of forces. The Administration does not share the ^{factual} assumptions underlying the bill and believes that, if passed, it would unnecessarily reopen the divisive debate regarding the wisdom and constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

In addition, the bill purports to create a deadline by which U.S. armed forces would have to cease convoying or escorting certain vessels, including vessels covered by our current program. We believe that the current escort program has been successful in promoting U.S. interests in the region, and that creating a deadline as contemplated in S.J. Res. 305 would encourage hostile forces to wait us out, reinforce Iran's assertion that the United States is unreliable, and undermine the positive contribution that the program has made to U.S. interests in the Gulf and worldwide. The Administration therefore strongly opposes the proposed resolution.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

100TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 305

Providing specific authorization under the War Powers Resolution for the continued use of United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf, consistent with the foreign policy objectives and national security interests of the United States.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 25), 1988

Mr. ADAMS introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Providing specific authorization under the War Powers Resolution for the continued use of United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf, consistent with the foreign policy objectives and national security interests of the United States.

Whereas keeping the Persian Gulf searoutes open to international commerce and preserving the free flow of oil is critical to the national security of the United States;

Whereas beginning in July 1987 the United States Armed Forces began the convoying and escorting in the Persian Gulf of vessels formerly owned by Kuwait or Kuwaiti nationals which had been reregistered under the flag of the United States;

Whereas on April 14, 1988, the U.S.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts was severely damaged while in international waters of the Persian Gulf by a mine laid by Iran;

Whereas on April 18, 1988, United States warships in the Persian Gulf attacked Iranian platforms in the southern Gulf in retaliation for the April 14, 1988, mine explosion;

Whereas on April 18, 1988, Iran responded to the destruction of their oil platforms by the United States with a series of naval and aerial attacks on the United States naval fleet, on commercial shipping in the Gulf, and on an oil platform operated by a United States company in the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates;

Whereas on April 18, 1988, United States forces responded to attacks on the United States naval fleet and commercial shipping and operations with attacks on two Iranian patrol boats and two Iranian frigates;

Whereas the attacks by Iran and the United States on each other between April 14 and April 18 clearly indicates a situation of hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities by the United States forces, as contemplated by section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(1)); and

Whereas section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(1)) requires that United States Armed Forces may not be introduced into hostilities or into situations in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances for longer than the sixty-day period described in section 5(b) of such Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)) without the specific authorization of Congress, a declaration of war, or other extenuating circumstances: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This joint resolution may be cited as the "Persian Gulf
5 Policy Act of 1988".

6 **SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL DETERMINATION AND INTENT.**

7 (a) The Congress determines that the requirements of
8 section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became opera-
9 tive on April 14, 1988.

10 (b) The Congress intends this joint resolution to consti-
11 tute the necessary specific statutory authorization under the
12 War Powers Resolution for continued use of the United
13 States Armed Forces as provided for in section 3.

14 **SEC. 3. SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION.**

15 The President is specifically authorized, for purposes of
16 section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, to continue to
17 deploy United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf,
18 except that the use of United States Armed Forces to convoy
19 or escort vessels owned by any government or national of a
20 country bordering the Persian Gulf as of June 1, 1987, may
21 continue only until the date which is three months after the
22 expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b) of
23 the War Powers Resolution, as calculated with respect to the
24 Congressional determination made by section 2(a).

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 12, 1988

5

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on S.J.Res. 305
Regarding U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf

Attached at Tab I is a memo to Ronald Peterson informing him that the NSC approves of State's draft report on S.J.Res. 305, as amended.

MA for *N/A* *OK*
Alison Fortier, Bill Cockell and Daniel Levin concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to Ronald K. Peterson.

Approve *RB* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Ronald K. Peterson
Tab A State Draft Report

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

88 MAY 12 12:07 **URGENT**

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: **3582**

ACTION OFFICER: **BURNS**

DUE: **1500, TODAY, 12 MAY**

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☒ Prepare Memo Stevens to Peterson / Murr

☐ Prepare Memo For Powell/Negroponete

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo _____

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. **5194**

FYI

- ☐ Andricos
- ☐ Batjer
- ☐ Brooks
- ☐ Burns
- ☐ Childress
- ☐ Cobb
- ☒ Cockell
- ☐ Cohen
- ☐ Collins
- ☐ Curtin
- ☐ Danzansky
- ☐ Dean
- ☐ Dekok
- ☐ Donley
- ☐ Douglass
- ☐ Ermarth
- ☐ Farrar
- ☐ Flower
- ☒ Fortier
- ☐ Frazier

FYI

- ☐ Grimes
- ☐ Heiser
- ☐ Henhoeffter
- ☐ Herbst
- ☐ Jameson
- ☐ Kelly, B.
- ☐ Kelly, J.
- ☐ Kimberling
- ☐ Ledsky
- ☐ Levin
- ☐ Lewis
- ☐ Linhard
- ☐ Mahley
- ☐ McCue
- ☐ McNamara
- ☐ Melby
- ☐ Miskel
- ☒ Oakley
- ☐ Paal
- ☐ Perina

FYI

- ☐ Popadiuk
- ☐ Porter
- ☐ Reger
- ☐ Rodman
- ☐ Rosenberg
- ☒ Ross
- ☒ Rostow (Levin)
- ☐ Saunders
- ☐ Scharfen
- ☐ Seiber
- ☐ Snider
- ☐ Sorzano
- ☐ Steiner
- ☐ Tahir-Kheli
- ☐ Tice
- ☐ Tillman
- ☐ Tobey
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____

INFORMATION

☒ Stevens

☐ Powell (advance)

☒ Perito

☐ Negroponete (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐ _____

COMMENTS

Logged By **DP**

Return to Secretariat

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Clakley
3582

DR
chron

May 12, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *PS*

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on S.J. Res. 305

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Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
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Enclosures

cc: B. Howard
N. Moore
J. Eisenhower

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With best regards,

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

100TH CONGRESS
2D Session

S. J. RES. 305

Providing specific authorization under the War Powers Resolution for the continued use of United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf, consistent with the foreign policy objectives and national security interests of the United States.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

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Whereas on April 18, 1988, Iran responded to the destruction of their oil platforms by the United States with a series of naval and aerial attacks on the United States naval fleet, on commercial shipping in the Gulf, and on an oil platform operated by a United States company in the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates;

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Whereas the attacks by Iran and the United States on each other between April 14 and April 18 clearly indicates a situation of hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities by the United States forces, as contemplated by section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(1)); and

Whereas section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(1)) requires that United States Armed Forces may not be introduced into hostilities or into situations in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances for longer than the sixty-day period described in section 5(b) of such Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)) without the specific authorization of Congress, a declaration of war, or other extenuating circumstances: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This joint resolution may be cited as the "Persian Gulf
5 Policy Act of 1988".

6 **SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL DETERMINATION AND INTENT.**

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8 section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became opera-
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11 tute the necessary specific statutory authorization under the
12 War Powers Resolution for continued use of the United
13 States Armed Forces as provided for in section 8.

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16 section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, to continue to
17 deploy United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf,
18 except that the use of United States Armed Forces to convoy
19 or escort vessels owned by any government or national of a
20 country bordering the Persian Gulf as of June 1, 1987, may
21 continue only until the date which is three months after the
22 expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b) of
23 the War Powers Resolution, as calculated with respect to the
24 Congressional determination made by section 2(a).

○

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

5-12-88

DR Johnson

(DR-edited
version for
Summit
press briefing
book)

General

- o Secretary returned from Moscow April 23. Soviets say an international conference should have an active and substantive role in negotiations. We understand the need for an international conference, but not a plenipotentiary one. That will make bilateral negotiations--the only kind that can produce a settlement--impossible. The conference must be a mechanism for facilitating, not supplanting such negotiations.
- o Secretary travelled to Middle East in early April. Stops included Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Reemphasized our commitment to the peace initiative. No one has said yes to our proposal, but no one said no. All encouraged us to continue our efforts.
- o Our proposal is only realistic and workable approach available. It is an integrated package--no part can be removed without destroying its essential balance. Not Israelis, not Arabs, and not the Soviets. President Reagan said, "The U.S. will not slice this initiative apart and will not abandon it."
- o Our initiative emphasizes an interlocking mechanism between transitional arrangements and final status negotiations.
- o Negotiations must start on transitional arrangements to avoid driving each party to its most extreme positions; to move quickly to end Israeli military occupation; to grant Palestinians the right of self-rule; and to establish basis for the final status talks.
- o The fundamental objectives of a negotiated settlement remain security for all states in the region, including Israel, and the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Neither of these central objectives is possible over the long term without a settlement.
- o Three issues are central to process of bringing about negotiations between Israel and its neighbors: a properly structured international conference, Palestinian representation and the meaning of UNSC Resolution 242.

International Conference

- The conference some are opposing is not the conference we are proposing.
- Under procedures set out in our proposal, parties move quickly to direct negotiations within a properly structured international conference.

DECLASSIFIED / Released

NLS #94-03813 #147

BY Amf NARA, DATE 5/18/00

- The conference we propose would not impose solutions or veto agreements. It would launch direct negotiations, and would receive reports from the parties to the negotiations, in a manner to be agreed.
- Those invited to the conference must accept UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of negotiations, and must renounce violence and terrorism.

Palestinian Representation

- o Everyone agrees that the Palestinians are a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict who must be represented at every stage of the negotiating process.
- o Everyone also agrees that a settlement must address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people--in the same way that it must address the legitimate rights of the other negotiating parties.
- o Palestinian representatives will participate in negotiations as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- o Those who come to negotiate must be of good will and committed to peace. People must not be selected who would drive away the representatives of another party.
- o Insistence on visible PLO participation from the outset will mean no conference, no process.

The Meaning of 242

- o This is the primary substantive issue confronting the parties. Important because parties must understand accepted basis for negotiations and must share essentially the same view of what the parameters of a final settlement might be.
- o Clearly, one of 242's central principles is negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. U.S. position: in return for peace, withdrawal provision of 242 applies to all fronts, including West Bank, Gaza and Golan Heights.
- o All attempts to avoid or reinterpret 242 are bound to fail. Arabs cannot avoid peace; Israel cannot avoid withdrawal.
- o In our proposal, Resolution 242 enshrined as basis of negotiations, and all its provisions and principles will apply in each of the negotiations undertaken between Israel and its neighbors.
- o Much scope remains for negotiations. In our view, extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by extent of true peace and normalization, and the security arrangements offered in return.

- o Summary: U.S. proposal is a carefully thought-out plan which addresses the fundamental substantive issue--land for peace--and which provides a way to deal with the two key procedural problems--the conference and Palestinian representation. The sooner decisions are made, the sooner parties can move to the negotiating table.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3622

②

DR chron

May 13, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*
SUBJECT: White House Statement on President's
Meeting with Peres

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to Rhett Dawson, forwarding the White House Statement on the President's meeting with Peres on May 17.

Marybel Batjer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Dawson at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Rhett Dawson
Tab A White House Statement

cc: Marlin Fitzwater

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

3622

MEMORANDUM FOR RHETT DAWSON

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: White House Statement on President's
Meeting with Peres

This memorandum forwards the NSC-drafted White House statement on the President's meeting with Peres on May 17.

Attachment

Tab A White House Statement

White House Statement on President's Meeting with Peres

Today President Reagan met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The President and the Foreign Minister discussed bilateral issues, the upcoming U.S.-Soviet Summit, and the urgent need to make progress toward peace in the Middle East.

The President told Foreign Minister Peres that he takes great pride in the development of U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations and the emergence of meaningful strategic cooperation between our two countries. He remarked that the progress we've made together--embodied in the recently signed MOA--owed much to Shimon Peres' efforts, both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister.

The Foreign Minister reported on talks he has recently had with Soviet and Hungarian officials, and raised a number of questions about the Summit. The President spoke of our four-part agenda--bilateral relations, human rights, arms reduction, regional conflicts--and emphasized that we will, as always, press for the unimpeded right of Soviet Jewry to emigrate.

The Foreign Minister told the President how much Israel appreciated our efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry and in the service of world peace. He hoped the President's efforts in the Summit would be crowned with success and the cause of global peace would be advanced.

The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his comments and thanked him also for his efforts in behalf of peace in the Middle East. He said no one questions Shimon Peres' commitment to peace. While being steadfast in his commitment to Israeli strength and security, the Foreign Minister has a vision for the future, recognizes the increasing danger of the status quo, and understands the negative consequences of passivity and delay in the search for a settlement. The Foreign Minister has also repeatedly demonstrated his creativity in probing paths toward peace, having the courage and wisdom to say yes when legitimate opportunities arise.

The President said that such a positive attitude toward peace is essential for both Israeli and Arab leaders if there is to be a comprehensive settlement in the region. Such a settlement must be grounded on the realistic basis of UNSC Resolution 242 and its call for an exchange of territory for peace. Those leaders who are negative, consistently reject new ideas, and fail to exploit realistic opportunities to bring about negotiations, make progress impossible. In the end, they will have to answer to their own people for the suffering that will inevitably result.

The President also told the Foreign Minister that Secretary of State Shultz would be going to the Middle East after the Summit to pursue our initiative, an initiative that we continue to believe offers the only realistic basis on which to make progress toward peace. The alternative is a drift toward a much graver future in the region. Extremist forces will gain strength at the expense of moderates at the very moment that proliferating ballistic missiles and chemical weapons are creating a far more ominous military environment.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER PERES
MAY 17, 11:30 - 11:40 A.M., OVAL OFFICE

- Always good to see you. We've always found it easy to work together. I highly value your efforts, your ideas and your creativity. You have been a major help to us as we've worked in peace process.
- Know it's difficult to make progress now, but we must continue to try. Regional trends are worrisome; can't imagine anyone feeling complacent now.
- It's in our mutual interest to build up moderates in the region, not give them a cause for despair. The status quo is dangerous.
- If its allowed to continue, radicals and fundamentalists will gain strength at the very time that ballistic missiles and chemical weapons are proliferating in the areas. Tensions between Israel and its neighbors will increase. That's a very ominous combination.
- Time is not on the side of those who favor peace and stability. Interested in your views on what's happening in the territories and what might be done on the peace process.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F94-038/3 #149

BY smf NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~SECRET~~

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PERES
MAY 17, 1988, 11:30 - 11:40 A.M., OVAL OFFICE

- ALWAYS GOOD TO SEE YOU. WE'VE ALWAYS FOUND IT EASY TO WORK TOGETHER. I HIGHLY VALUE YOUR EFFORTS, YOUR IDEAS AND YOUR CREATIVITY. YOU HAVE BEEN A MAJOR HELP TO US AS WE'VE WORKED IN PEACE PROCESS.
- KNOW IT'S DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS NOW, BUT WE MUST CONTINUE TO TRY. REGIONAL TRENDS ARE WORRISOME; CAN'T IMAGINE ANYONE FEELING COMPLACENT NOW.

~~SECRET~~

2

- IT'S IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO BUILD UP MODERATES IN THE REGION, NOT GIVE THEM A CAUSE FOR DESPAIR. THE STATUS QUO IS DANGEROUS.
- IF IT'S ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, RADICAL AND FUNDAMENTALISTS WILL GAIN STRENGTH AT THE VERY TIME THAT BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE PROLIFERATING IN THE AREAS. TENSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS WILL INCREASE. THAT'S A VERY OMINOUS COMBINATION.

~~SECRET~~

3

- TIME IS NOT ON THE SIDE OF THOSE WHO FAVOR PEACE AND STABILITY. INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE TERRITORIES AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F94-038/3 #150

BY smf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
PLENARY MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER PERES
MAY 17, 11:40 A.M. - 12:00 NOON, CABINET ROOM

SUMMIT

- The Middle East peace process will be discussed at the Summit. Our agenda will cover regional conflict, human rights, bilateral relations, and arms reduction.
- Our many intensive discussions with the Soviets on the Middle East over the last several months have not indicated much movement in their position on key issues or much responsiveness to our concerns.
- We'll be looking for signs of positive movement, not just variations of the same position. I hope we see them on Palestinian representation, the authority of the plenary, and other issues.
- I can assure you we'll press them on restoring relations with you; we will also press on Soviet Jewry, both with regard to emigration and with regard to liberalizing the constraints on the practice of Judaism within the Soviet Union.
- There may be some movement on religious rights in general in the Soviet Union; again, we're hopeful, but we'll see.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 194-038/3 #151

BY anf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

SHULTZ MISSION

- As you know, George will be going to the Middle East after the Summit. The main purpose of his trip will be to press acceptance or at least concrete movement on the initiative. Also need to sharpen the focus on those who resist progress toward peace.

- Recognize the difficulties but have to inject urgency into our efforts, particularly in advance of Arab Summit. No one should believe that we will let the peace process fail.

- What are your thoughts on how to proceed over the next six months? How can we move to a dialogue with the Palestinians?

~~SECRET~~

PLENARY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PERES,
MAY 17, 11:40 A.M. - 12:00 NOON, CABINET ROOM

SUMMIT

- THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT. OUR AGENDA WILL COVER REGIONAL CONFLICT, HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND ARMS REDUCTION.
- OUR MANY INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAVE NOT INDICATED MUCH MOVEMENT IN THEIR POSITION ON KEY ISSUES OR MUCH RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR CONCERNS.

~~SECRET~~

2

- WE'LL BE LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF POSITIVE MOVEMENT, NOT JUST VARIATIONS OF THE SAME POSITION. I HOPE WE SEE THEM ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, THE AUTHORITY OF THE PLENARY, AND OTHER ISSUES.
- I CAN ASSURE YOU WE'LL PRESS THEM ON RESTORING RELATIONS WITH YOU; WE WILL ALSO PRESS ON SOVIET JEWRY, BOTH WITH REGARD TO EMIGRATION AND WITH REGARD TO LIBERALIZING THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE PRACTICE OF JUDAISM WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION.

~~SECRET~~

3

- THERE MAY BE SOME MOVEMENT ON RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN GENERAL IN THE SOVIET UNION; AGAIN, WE'RE HOPEFUL, BUT WE'LL SEE.

SHULTZ MISSION

- AS YOU KNOW, GEORGE WILL BE GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE SUMMIT. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP WILL BE TO PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OR AT LEAST CONCRETE MOVEMENT ON THE INITIATIVE. ALSO NEED TO SHARPEN THE FOCUS ON THOSE WHO RESIST PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F94-03813 #152

BY anf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~SECRET~~

4

- RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES BUT HAVE TO INJECT URGENCY INTO OUR EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY IN ADVANCE OF ARAB SUMMIT. NO ONE SHOULD BELIEVE THAT WE WILL LET THE PEACE PROCESS FAIL.

- WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS? HOW CAN WE MOVE TO A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS?

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3648

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DR
chron

May 13, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY 
SUBJECT: Visit of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres,
Tuesday, May 17, 1988,

Attached is a memorandum to the President on his meeting with Foreign Minister Peres on May 17.

Marybel Batjer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Talking Points with 3x5 cards
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Biography of Foreign Minister Peres

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By 6/29/98 NARA, Date 6/29/98

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Brief One-on-One and Photo Opportunity -- 11:30 - 11:40 a.m.
(Oval Office)

United States

The President
Dennis Ross (notetaker)

Israel

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
Nimrod Novik (notetaker)

Plenary Meeting -- 11:40 a.m. - 12:00 noon (Cabinet Room)

United States

The President
Secretary of State Shultz
The Chief of Staff
Kenneth Duberstein
Colin L. Powell
Richard W. Murphy
Robert Oakley
Dennis Ross (notetaker)

Israel

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
Ambassador Moshe Arad
Yossi Beilin, Director General, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Nimrod Novik, Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister
Uri Savir, Media Advisor to the Prime Minister
Oded Eran, DCM, Israeli Embassy

TAB C - BIO

(To Be Provided)

9

5/16
DR chron

- Pleasure to be here to honor the Foreign Minister, a leader of extraordinary stature and accomplishment. A leader who is a determined advocate for his country, and a tireless worker for peace.
- We're glad you're here now, not just because this is a pivotal time in the Middle East. It surely is. But also because it's a pivotal time internationally.
- We look forward to the Summit where we hope for progress in several areas--in human rights, arms reduction, and in settling regional conflicts. We're hopeful, but realistic.
- We go in with our eyes open, prepared to work with the Soviets where they show a genuine commitment to cooperation. We're waiting to see signs that such a spirit--in deeds, not merely words--is guiding them on the Middle East. And is guiding them also on human rights and Soviet Jewry.
- We've seen some glimmers of hope but more concrete movement is needed. We'll press for that. Your visit provides us a good opportunity to discuss these issues with you and to receive your judgment and wisdom.

-- We value your views very highly. You are a leader who combines creativity and tenacity in the search for peace and I'm honored to be here today to acknowledge that and to offer a toast to you, Sir.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3720

10

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chron

May 17, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *Rob*
SUBJECT: NSC Staff Travel

Dennis Ross will be travelling with the official party to the Moscow Summit o/a May 25 - June 3 (orders already issued). He will then split off and travel with Secretary Shultz to the Middle East (June 3 - 8). This is to request travel orders for the Middle East portion of his trip. NSC would cover the expenses of the trip.

Per diem and miscellaneous expenses would be about \$1,500. Attached is a copy of the travel authorization form and a proposed memorandum to the State Department Executive Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the above travel request.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to State
Tab A NSC Staff Travel Authorization

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Dennis B. Ross
Director of Near East and South Asia Affairs

Purpose of Travel: Following the Moscow Summit, to travel with
Secretary of State Shultz to the Middle East on or about
June 3 - 8, 1988.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
June 3	Cairo	Egypt	Meetings
June 4	Amman	Jordan	Meetings
	Damascus	Syria	Meetings
June 5	Tel Aviv	Israel	Meetings
June 6	Cairo	Egypt	Meetings
June 7	Madrid	Spain	Split off from Secretary's party
June 8	Washington	D.C.	Arrive

Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: May 17, 1988

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Dennis B. Ross
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Following the Moscow Summit, to
travel with Secretary of State Shultz to the Middle East
on or about June 3-8, 1988
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): _____
(See attached memo to State)

DEPARTURE DATE June 3, 1988RETURN DATE June 8, 1988TIME ?TIME 4:00 p.m.

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR X COMMERCIAL AIR X POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:

	\$954	\$500	\$46	\$1,500
TRANSPORTATION	PER DIEM	OTHER	TOTAL TRIP COST	

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC
- X
- OTHER _____

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO
- X

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
-
- Describe Source and Arrangements): _____

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$
- 400

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
-
- Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):

(All travel will be done on Shultz' government-furnished
aircraft except for the return flight from Madrid to
Washington, D.C.)

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:
- Dennis B. Ross

13. APPROVALS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3387

11

DR.
chron

May 17, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKELY *Rob*
SUBJECT: Reply to Guilford Glazer

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to John Tuck forwarding an NSC draft reply to Mr. Guilford Glazer, who writes concerning peace between Israel and its neighbors.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to John Tuck
Tab A	Letter to Mr. Glazer
Tab B	Letter to Ken Duberstein from Mr. Glazer and enclosed video tape

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3387

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN TUCK

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS
SUBJECT: Reply to Guilford Glazer

This memorandum forwards for signature an NSC-drafted reply (Tab A) to Guilford Glazer, who writes concerning peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mr. Glazer
Tab B Letter to Ken Duberstein
from Mr. Glazer and enclosed
video tape

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Gil:

Thanks for your thoughtful letter. You are right that a giant push is needed if we are to create a breakthrough to negotiations. Secretary Shultz is working hard, but the realities in the region make movement difficult now. George's efforts and long discussions with Shamir indicate the Prime Minister's willingness to negotiate, but unfortunately, on terms that Hussein cannot accept.

The King has made it clear that Shamir's opposition to the principle of "territory-for-peace" and his opposition to an international conference make it impossible for him to negotiate with a Shamir-led government. He believes Shamir is only interested in negotiating limited autonomy for Palestinians and nothing more. That has added to his belief that he must have an international conference to legitimize any negotiations; bilateral, direct negotiations would require an explicit commitment to return of territory. Last fall we tried the Summit idea as a way of overcoming the gap between Shamir and Hussein and found it didn't work. There is no reason to think it would be acceptable now.

At this point, the King--who is feeling less able to be flexible now because of the trouble in the territories--believes that Shamir is unyielding on both the substance of negotiations and their format. (His view of Peres is different.)

We are continuing to press our initiative, and that's why George Shultz is going back to the region. Notwithstanding the difficulties, we are determined to maintain our efforts on the peace process. We will be raising the Middle East at the Summit, but the Soviets do not hold the key to movement toward peace and are not willing to modify their positions on the central issues so that they could be acceptable to Israel. The parties in the region do hold the key to peace, and we are going to try to overcome the obstacles that are blocking movement. Even if we can't break through to negotiations, the President and the Secretary believe strongly that we must build a framework for making future progress and pass it on to the next Administration.

I wish I could give you more hopeful news now. I wish also the Summit idea had worked to overcome the obstacles to negotiation. It didn't. Still, I'm grateful for your thoughts and your suggestions and the tape of Diane's interview with Prime Minister Shamir.

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President

Mr. Guilford Glazer
1901 Avenue of the Stars
Century City
Los Angeles, California 90067

GUILFORD GLAZER
1901 AVENUE OF THE STARS - CENTURY CITY
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067
(213) 277-3511

April 25, 1988

Dear Ken,

Subject: Peace Between Israel and Its Neighbors

At the State Department luncheon for Gorbachev last December, Gorbachev repeated to me three times:

"The Soviet Government bears no enmity to Israel."

I am in close touch with Prime Minister Shamir. George Shultz is doing the best job possible in the Middle East situation, however, one giant push is needed to supplement Shultz's work and to get the ball rolling quickly. President Reagan is the one man who can do so. Please consider the following:

1. Ask the President to look at the enclosed tape of my wife, Diane's exclusive interview with Prime Minister Shamir. One is 3/4" and one 1/2". These are sent to you in duplicate to work on whichever machine the President uses.
2. Shamir gave no other interview while here. Diane's tape will give the President a very important sense of Shamir's position not generally known before. Many who were opposed to Shamir lined up with Shamir after they saw this interview.
3. In the Shamir-Diane Glazer interview, Shamir said that he didn't need China, France and Britain in negotiating meetings. Shamir did say that the U.S. was welcome and could help very much in Arab-Israeli talks. Shamir is not keen on the Soviets, but Shamir recognizes that the Soviets are a factor.
4. Suggestion: Gorbachev and Reagan to invite to a meeting in Moscow in and around the time of the Summit the following:

Shamir
Hussein
and any other leader of an Arab nation
who will come.
(Shamir will not meet with Arafat or any
PLO leader.)

5. If nothing else, Gorbachev and Reagan together will break the ice so Shamir and Hussein can talk. Assad has enormous economic problems to the extent that he is now willing to give up his dreams of making Lebanon part of Syria. Assad wants to bring his troops home. Assad's situation will now make it easier for Hussein to make a deal with Israel. (Assad will probably not talk with Israel, but I don't want to be negative on that possibility.)

Probably only now could the above be pulled off! A U.S. - Soviet peace conference would be a good compromise as compared to a conference with the entire Security Council. This is a "window" that should not be lost.

Only Shamir (a Conservative) could bring Israel to do what is needed to get peace. I am close to Shamir and I can tell you that Shamir is more tractable than is generally known. President Reagan is the dearest friend to Israel and the Jewish people. I believe he is the one person now needed to make all this work. He has already given the world a giant step toward peace with the I.N.F. Treaty, the Afghanistan pull-out, and the improvement in U.S. - Soviet relations. If Middle East peace could be facilitated by the meeting in Moscow as mentioned above, just having the meeting would be a monumental step.

Please remind the President:

"GOD BLESSES THE PEACEMAKERS"

Cordially,

Guilford

P.S. If Howard and you will "back" the above ideas, please let me come to Washington to help in any way possible. Congress, all Jewish organizations, and the American public will overwhelmingly welcome this initiative. I believe the Soviets will like it also. I have a very special relationship with Shamir. I THEREFORE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SHAMIR WILL APPROVE WHAT I HAVE SAID IN THIS LETTER.

Mr. Ken Duberstein
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

13

3622 Add-On

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 17, 1988

DR
chron

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RBO*

SUBJECT: White House Statement on President's
Meeting with Peres

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to Rhett Dawson, forwarding an inter-agency coordinated White House statement on the President's meeting with Peres, which will be issued today.

Marybel Batjer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Dawson at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Rhett Dawson
Tab A White House Statement

cc: Marlin Fitzwater

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3622 Add-On

MEMORANDUM TO RHETT DAWSON

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: White House Statement on the President's
Meeting with Peres

This memorandum forwards an inter-agency coordinated White House statement on the President's meeting with Peres. We would like it issued today.

Attachment

Tab A White House Statement

White House Statement on President's Meeting with Peres

Today President Reagan met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The President and the Foreign Minister discussed bilateral issues, the upcoming U.S.-Soviet Summit, and the urgent need to make progress toward peace in the Middle East.

The President emphasized the value of deepening U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations and the emergence of meaningful strategic cooperation between our two countries. He remarked that the progress we've made together--embodied in the recently signed MOA--owed much to Shimon Peres' efforts, both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister.

In discussing the Summit, the President spoke of our four-part agenda--bilateral relations, human rights, arms reduction, regional conflicts--and emphasized that we will, as always, press for the unimpeded right of Soviet Jewry to emigrate.

The President also spoke of our determination to make progress toward Middle East peace. He thanked Foreign Minister Peres for his efforts in behalf of peace and his continuing commitment to negotiate it. While being steadfast in his commitment to Israeli strength and security, the Foreign Minister has a vision for the future, recognizes the increasing danger of the status quo, and understands the negative consequences of passivity and delay in the search for a settlement. The Foreign Minister is creative and has the courage and wisdom to say yes when real opportunities arise.

Such a positive attitude toward peace is essential for both Israeli and Arab leaders if there is to be a comprehensive settlement in the region. A settlement must be grounded on the realistic basis of UNSC Resolution 242 and its call for an exchange of territory for peace. Those leaders who are negative, consistently reject new ideas, and fail to exploit realistic opportunities to bring about negotiations, make progress impossible. In the end, they will have to answer to their own people for the suffering that will inevitably result.

The President also told the Foreign Minister that Secretary of State Shultz would be going to the Middle East after the Summit to pursue our initiative, an initiative that we continue to believe offers the only realistic basis on which to make progress toward peace. The alternative is a drift toward a much graver future in the region. Extremist forces will gain strength at the expense of moderates at the very moment that proliferating ballistic missiles and chemical weapons are creating a far more ominous military environment.

Foreign Minister Peres agreed that regional trends should add to our collective sense of urgency in pursuing Middle East peace. He also thanked the President for his efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry and world peace.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3648 Add-On

May 18, 1988

13

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's
One-on-One Meeting with Foreign Minister Peres,
May 17, 1988

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of conversation of President Reagan's one-on-one meeting with Foreign Minister Peres of Israel on May 17, 1988, at 11:30 a.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memorandum of conversation for record purpose.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

Prepared by:
Dennis B. Ross

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CAS* NADA, Date *5/21/98*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 3 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

14
5/24/88

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- Been talking together over the last several months about the Middle East peace process.
- At level of general principles, we've agreed a comprehensive peace settlement is the goal. We've agreed that an international conference is a mechanism for starting bilateral negotiations that move us toward that goal. We've agreed that participants to a conference must accept SC Resolutions 242 and 338. We've agreed also that a settlement can only be just and enduring if it meets Israel's security needs and satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.
- Unfortunately, we begin to diverge when we start translating these general principles into operational content. For example, we continue to disagree about the role of the plenary. We can accept the principle of regular meetings, but we've explained at some length why we believe an active plenary making proposals and recommendations will supplant bilateral negotiations (the only kind that produce agreements.)
- Similarly, we disagree on PLO participation in a conference. Here again, while acknowledging that the Palestinians must take part in every part of the process, we've pointed out there will be no process or conference if the PLO leadership insists on a direct, visible role. We think concrete,

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Released

NLS F94-038/3 #154

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

- Our disagreement extends to the symbolism of making self-determination one of the general principles on which a conference is based. Self-determination is a codeword for an independent Palestinian state. Insisting on it as a principle, rather than discussing its meaning in the context of negotiations, dooms us to a continued stalemate.

- At a time when the region is becoming more dangerous with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, we should both be interested in progress, not stalemate.

- Presently, the trends favor the rejectionists, not the moderates. If we are to forestall or preempt that trend we must create hope that a settlement is possible.

- I'll be going to the Middle East to try to maintain momentum toward peace. It would be good if the parties in the area could see that our dialogue on the area seems to be productive.

- I hope I will be able to report that it is. That would be possible if, in fact, we were working to reduce the gaps in our present positions.

- We have heard from others that in meetings with them your positions on the plenary, the PLO, self-determination, and even on the question of Israeli withdrawal, have been far more flexible than anything we have heard directly from you. As a result, we've been told that the gaps between us are not as pronounced as we might think.

- Perhaps, but we need to see such flexibility in our discussions. And we haven't. All too often we've heard slogans or ritualistic positions on the plenary or the PLO.

- Indeed, we have yet to hear any serious acknowledgement or responsiveness to the concerns we've raised about the plenary and the probability that it will quickly give the parties an excuse not to negotiate.

- If you think there's a way to ensure the bilateral negotiations against intrusion by a plenary making proposals and recommendations, tell us. What are your ideas for insulating the bilateral negotiations? What responsibilities would you give the bilateral negotiating forum?

- Similarly, how would you meet our concern on the PLO participation? Telling us they must be there or that there should be a unilateral Arab delegation tells us little. What are your ideas for managing this issue in a way that makes negotiations possible?

- The same question applies to the codeword self-determination. We think the Palestinians must be able to take part in determining their own future, without at the same time determining Israel's or Jordan's future. Our task is not to get so hung up on a codeword or a symbol that we make negotiations impossible. That will perpetuate the Palestinian tragedy, not produce their political salvation.

- In all the areas where we have voiced concerns, we are looking for an indication that you've thought about what we've said and have ideas that can ameliorate the problems we've identified. That would be encouraging and would undoubtedly contribute to a reduction of the gaps that separate us.

These are
Bob Oakley's
revisions.

- We have heard from others that in meetings with them your positions on the plenary, the PLO, self-determination, and even on the question of Israeli withdrawal, have been far more flexible than anything we have heard directly from you. As a result, we've been told that the gaps between us are not as pronounced as we might think.

- Perhaps, but we need to hear such positive ideas set forth precisely in our discussions. We also need consistency. We have not heard it. All too often we've heard slogans or ritualistic positions on the plenary or the PLO. Moreover, we hear reports of different positions you have taken with different parties.

- If you think there's a way to ensure the bilateral negotiations against intrusion by a plenary making proposals and recommendations, tell us. What are your ideas for insulating the bilateral negotiations? What responsibilities would you give the bilateral negotiating forum?

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- Similarly, how would you meet our concern on the PLO participation? Telling us they must be there or that there should be a unilateral Arab delegation tells us little. What are your ideas for managing this issue in a way that makes negotiations possible? Do you want the symbolism more than a negotiation in which the Palestinians will be properly represented?

- The same question applies to the codeword self-determination. We think the Palestinians must be able to take part in determining their own future, without at the same time determining Israel's or Jordan's future. Our task is not to get so hung up on a codeword or a symbol that we make negotiations impossible. That will perpetuate the Palestinian tragedy, not produce their political salvation.

- Even more important than your providing precise, positive ideas on these points is your basic attitude. Do you want to work with us for peace, even if it means taking an unpopular position as we have done in advocating an international conference and a central role for Palestinians? Or do you want to project the appearance of engagement, while actually taking no risks for peace, preserving your relations with the parties while the situation on the ground gets worse?