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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Ross, Dennis: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Chron File July 1988 *Box 9*

Date: 1/28/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. appointment request	re Meetings with Morris Abram and Abe Foxman (partial 1p)	7/15/88	P6 B6
2. memo (5094)	Robert Oakley to Colin Powell re Salvaging the Kuwaiti Sale (2p) <i>R, 6/6/00 NLSF96-119 #82</i>	7/12/88	P1

*WBS
12/15/00*

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

FILE INDEX FOR CHRON FILES FOR JULY 1988 FOR DENNIS ROSS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Overview first session	Undated
2	Realism & Hope: A U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1990s	Undated
3	Powell Memo re: Mtgs w/Abram and Foxman	Jul 12, 1988
4	Bfg Memo for VP re: Defense Issues Meeting	Undated
5	Powell Memo re: Salvaging Kuwaiti Sale	Jul 12, 1988
6	Negroponte Memo re: VP Presentation to UN	Jul 7, 1988

①

OVERVIEW FIRST SESSION

- At the Summit raised a number of issues (Conference, Palestinian representation, withdrawal) on which others have reported Soviet positions that suggest the gaps between us are less than we think.

- You said the regional working group at the Summit was not the appropriate forum to get into these issues, the exports' group would be. We're prepared for such a discussion, presume you are as well.

- Before we do get into these issues and the peace process, I think it's useful first to talk a little about the regional setting. To go through the regional context in which efforts to move the peace process must take place.

- Key regional developments:
 - o Proliferation of missiles, use of chemicals. Threaten to change the military situation as we've known it, making wars more costly and difficult to contain. Serious problem; international in scope; slogans won't deal with it. Must start with a diagnosis of the problem and think about the steps we might take in parallel or jointly to try to halt the flow. Having the head of the chemical warfare branch of the Soviet military visit Damascus sends wrong signal. In any case, experts discussions will begin in September; we will come prepared to outline our view of the

character and scope of the problem. Hope Soviet side will come prepared to give us their serious assessment of what's happening, who's most active in supplying, who's trying hardest to acquire, who's farthest along in missiles and chemicals, where we have the best prospect to slow the pace of development and acquisition, etc.

- o Shift in the Iran-Iraq War. While the prolongation of the war offers unfortunate lessons for others on the use of missiles and chemicals, the current turn in the war may begin to sober the Iranians. We don't see an immediate end to the war, but it is possible that the enduring stalemate, failure in the war, and Khomeini's passing from the scene will tarnish the Iranian revolutionary model. That could, in time, begin to diminish the appeal of fundamentalism in the region. For now, however, this appeal - as well as the appeal of extremism more generally -- is not declining. That unfortunate reality makes the possibility of achieving peace more difficult, more distant. The ongoing stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war, the continuing debacle in Lebanon and the intifada all may eventually reveal the futility of extremism and fundamentalism. For the near term, however, they all seem to be fostering the impulse to struggle, not to reconcile.

- o Division and weakness of local leaderships. Political paralysis in Israel is marked by reluctance of Arab governments to take bold steps for peace. Deepens sense of drift; difficulty of creating movement. Have to try to break out of this cycle. If can't do it diplomatically, pressure to do it militarily will grow. Unfortunately, if that happens, it will occur in an environment that is far more dangerous given the weapons in the area. Missiles and chemicals together could produce a war unlike any we've seen before. Don't think either of us should feel complacent or that time will improve our respective positions or options.

REALISM AND HOPE: A U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1990s

-- We face a world of hope and challenges in the 1990's.

- o Hope, that the emerging framework of U.S.-Soviet relations makes it possible to reduce the danger of war, while promoting a more peaceful and stable future.
- o Hope, that the growth of democratic forces -- seen in our hemisphere, in Asia, and elsewhere - makes it clear that democracy and freedom are the wave of the future. They, not statist or authoritarian regimes are the models of success, the models of development.
- o Hope, that the appeal of market economies and the recognition of the value of individual initiative will continue to foster reform and change in Eastern bloc countries.
- o Hope, that the continued economic growth among our allies in Europe, Japan and Asia will make it possible for us to do more collectively to deal with Third World debt and the root causes of poverty, famine and disease in the developing world.

-- We have reason to be hopeful. We have successes to build on. Our alliances remain strong, and the resources and means of our key friends and partners have grown relative to ours.

- That is a measure of our success, not our decline. It is not bad that our friends have an increasing role to play on the world stage. It is symptomatic of change.
- And change is taking place globally. We are moving into a period of transition where the challenges of tomorrow will be different than the ones we've faced in the past.
- We need not fear this new era. Americans have dealt with periods of dramatic change before. We adapted to a new and far more dangerous world after World War II and assumed an unsought, but necessary, role of leadership.
- As we approach a new period of transition and global challenge, we have much to work with and to build on. We can cope with the changes that are emerging internationally. But we must be realistic. We must see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.
- We can ill afford on-the-job training and amateurism or wishful thinking on how to respond to a world where the landscape is far less familiar.

World of the 1990s

- As we approach the 1990's we see a world where some of the old verities are giving way to new realities:

- o Diffusion of Power: A world dominated exclusively by the superpowers is a vestige of the past. The U.S. and USSR remain the dominant military powers, and the Soviets will continue to pose the main military threat to us. But others wield increasing influence on world affairs. And neither we nor the Soviets individually or in tandem can simply impose our will.

- o New International Economic Order: We are entering a new economic era; one in which the international economy is far less susceptible to our direction at a time when we find our own economic well-being and health increasingly influenced by economic forces from the outside.

- o Proliferation of Advanced, Dangerous Military Technologies: The spreading of ballistic missiles and chemicals in such tinderboxes as the Middle East and South Asia may be the single most dangerous development we face. Conflict in these areas is all-too-thinkable, and is on the verge of becoming far more costly, dangerous, and difficult to contain. The specter of a Khomeini or Qadhafi regime having long-range ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads is a frightening one -- imposing new demands on our diplomacy, intelligence requirements, and military capabilities.

- o Ferment in the Soviet Bloc. Remarkable, largely unpredicted changes are taking place in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. They reflect responses to the failure of Socialist economy and organization. We can not know where the current process of change will lead, whether it will succeed, and what implications it will have for Soviet foreign policy. We can be hopeful, but must remain vigilant, and maintain our strength, resisting the temptation to disarm unilaterally and to assume a different Soviet posture toward the outside world until we've seen rhetoric and slogans matched by concrete deeds and behaviors.

- o Scourge of Drugs and Terrorism on Broader International Plane. Regional and international networks are becoming more sophisticated in their support of drug trafficking and the use of terrorism. At some point these networks intersect; at others they exist independently. Each presents a formidable challenge that must be addressed with new awareness and creativity.

Responding to the Environment:

- Some see or recognize aspects of this new environment and favor a kind of U.S. disengagement from global

responsibility. We are told that the UN or institutions like the world court can take our place and relieve us of the burdens of leadership.

- Simply put, that's naive. As someone who has served at the UN, I know the strengths and weaknesses of that body. It has a useful role to play in problems of international health, refugees, and, in select cases, peace-keeping.
- But any institution that remains almost reflexively anti-American at times and continues to believe that "Zionism is racism" is not a body that can be trusted to safeguard the vital interests of the United States. Let's understand what the UN and other multilateral organization can do and not burden them with requirements they can not meet.
- Others, looking for ways to reduce the burdens on U.S., feel that we must get our Allies to be more helpful in responding to a world that is more varied and whose power is more diffuse. Fair enough, but we won't reduce the burden and share the load by following their prescription: dictating to our Allies what they must do. Burden-sharing by U.S. fiat won't work.

- Still others seem to prefer to have the U.S. go it alone. Reflecting one stream of traditional isolationism, they prefer American unilateralism, leaving U.S. unbound by alliance obligations and the concerns of our Allies.
- However, going it alone is just as unrealistic as putting our fate in the hands of international institutions. We are facing a world in transition with more subtle and complex challenges. But the threats to our security remain real, and our alliances have helped keep the peace for 40 years.
- They must remain strong if we are to continue to keep the peace and build Soviet incentives in negotiations and stability. A world where U.S. Alliances appear vulnerable or weakened would be a far more dangerous one, fueling Soviet and others' troublemaking instincts.
- The traditional need for NATO and our other alliances remains as strong as ever. Indeed, given the new realities of the international environment, we may have even more of a need to work closely with our friends and allies.
- The simple fact is we can't go it alone. We can't manage, much less solve, the emerging global problems by ourselves. We can neither insulate ourselves from these problems nor be the world's policeman.

- We need to work with others who have both the means and the interests to be helpful, to share the responsibility for dealing with problems like ballistic missile proliferation, drugs, terrorism, etc. that are international in scope and require multinational responses.
- The issue is not whether we should work with others to tackle these problems. Rather the issue is how best to ensure a division of labor approach. Abdicating our responsibilities by dictating to our allies or by turning to the UN will not work. It will have the opposite effect. Others will not join with us in these circumstances.
- On the contrary, others will only join with us if they see that we are prepared to exercise leadership. Allies, friends, and even neutral countries must see an America prepared to take the lead before they will expose themselves to the risks of action. We've seen this phenomenon in the Gulf where 5 European navies have joined US and local states have provided far more material support for our presence than ever before.
- Pressing our allies to take the lead or for the UN to assume the responsibility will signal a new American retreat, creating problems with our friends as well as adversaries.

-- So we can not disengage nor retreat from our responsibilities if we are to cope with new realities, deter threats, and forge a coalitional strategy for dealing with the challenge of the 1990's. Forging such a strategy must be a high priority for the next Administration.

Agenda for the Future

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5124

3 Oakley

July 12, 1988

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *Rob*
SUBJECT: Meetings With Morris Abram and Abe Foxman

Morris Abram and Abe Foxman (head of the Anti-Defamation League) have made separate requests to see you this week. Abram would like to come in and speak to you about the bureaucratic problems that are holding up the issuance of visas at the Moscow Embassy. Foxman will be in town this week and is interested in a meeting primarily to become better acquainted. (He had a similar meeting with Frank last year).

The timing of the meetings, particularly if held this week, could be very useful to our F-18 arms sale strategy. Both Abram and Foxman were helpful in putting pressure on AIPAC to compromise on the Saudi arms sale package last fall. They both have been very committed to the notion that there should be no surprises in the Administration-Jewish Community relationship. In light of that, we should use the meetings to inform them of AIPAC's maneuver with DeConcini, something that betrayed assurances to us and surprised us as well as Congressmen like Mel Levine and Howard Berman.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you meet with Morris Abram this week. (Abram will be in the White House tomorrow afternoon for other meetings.)

Approve 4:30 7/13 Disapprove

2. That you meet with Abe Foxman on Friday of this week.

Approve 4:00 7/15 Disapprove

7. 4:00. 7/15 X F schedule permits - 15 mins each

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: WH Guidelines, 8/28/97
BY: *smf*, NARA, Date: 1/28/98

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Wednesday, July 13, 19 88

for Dennis Ross of NSC :
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DOB</u>
ABRAM, Morris	12/19/18
CARDIN, Shoshana	10/10/20
LEUCHTER, Ben	12/11/26
LEVIN, Mark	5/6/55
SAPERIA, Phillip	12/11/45
WITMAN, Ellen	11/7/50

MEETING LOCATION

Building OEOB
Room No. 351
Time of Meeting 3:30 p.m.

Requested by Barbara Browne
Room No. 351 Telephone 3552
Date of request 13 Jul 88

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, July 15, 19 88

for LtGeneral Powell of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSN</u>	<u>DOB</u>
LEVINSON, Burton		6/8/31
HORDES, Jess		1/22/43
FOXMAN, Abraham		5/1/40
BRODY, David		6/24/16

LIMO WILL COME IN NORTHWEST GATE.

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House Requested by Barbara Browne
Room No. Gen Powell's office Room No. 351 Telephone 3552
Time of Meeting 4:00 p.m. Date of request 15 Jul 88

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

4

DRAFT

BRIEFING MEMO FOR THE
VICE PRESIDENT

DEFENSE ISSUES MEETING

DATE: JULY 14, 1988
TIME: 11:00 a.m.
LOCATION: WEST WING

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER

I. PURPOSE/BACKGROUND

This meeting has been set up at the suggestion of Bob Teeter to talk about important defense issues.

Points to Raise:

- o We need to think about the key defense priorities we are going to have in an era of shrinking dollars and of reduced or falling defense spending
- o A series of issues that I would like us to address today:
 - o defense procurement and reorganization (how we respond to this; what are the key problems we are going to have to confront);
 - o strategic force modernization (how do we resolve the question of road ~~vs.~~ mobile and MX vs. midgetman);
 - o determining^{ing} the right offense/defensive^e mix (how should we be approaching SDI and the whole concept of strategic defense);
 - o relationship of our strategic posture and START (how do we ensure greater stability and deterrence with^h START numbers);
 - o refining^{our} ~~are~~ approach to verification (how do we make sure that verification is consistent with our strategic needs);
 - o conventional force modernization (what are the key priorities in Europe and elsewhere);

- o force projection needs (do we need to think differently about light forces and special operational forces at a time when third world countries have acquired increasingly sophisticated and lethal military needs)

II. PARTICIPANTS

John McCain
Dan Quayle
Paul Stevens
Donald Rumsfeld
John Tower
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Teeter
Dennis Ross

III. PRESS PLAN

Staff photographer

IV. SEQUENCE

Photo upon welcome
General discussion

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5094

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 12, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*
SUBJECT: Salvaging the Kuwaiti Sale

Notwithstanding the action by the Senate on the Maverick D's and G's (and AIPAC's obvious inspiration of it), we think a deal can still be put together. Mel Levine and the people in the House were just as surprised by the Senate's action as we were.

Dennis and Mel have been talking and Mel is prepared to try to work out a deal on the House side that would offset the Senate's action. It's complicated because Larry Smith may push his own resolution now given DeConcini's amendment. Nevertheless, Levine thinks that he, Torricelli, and Howard Berman can hold the line, if we can get some limited concessions from Kuwait. The deal would be along the lines that we had been talking about before; changing the ratio and numbers of D's and G's; assurances on use and deployment of the F-18's.

With regard to the assurances, the Kuwaitis have given us something to work with. They have told us that they would be prepared to send a letter on assurances to the Administration for use with Congress, provided they have assurances the DeConcini amendment will not become law. We could parallel the Kuwaiti letter with one of our own, explaining our understanding of these assurances. (Levine likes this approach).

There's one additional point that we can use to demonstrate our responsiveness to Hill concerns. You will recall Larry Smith's argument on the numbers of F-18's and his desire to see only 31 F-18's, plus attrition aircraft go to Kuwait. Here, too, we may have something to work with. Recall that our sale to Kuwait calls for 40 aircraft, but the breakdown is 32 fighters and 8 trainers. We could emphasize this breakdown of aircraft as part of our packaging of the deal with the Hill. (Here, too, Levine thinks that gives him something to use.)

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F96-119 #82

BY *dlh* NARA, DATE *6/6/00*

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At this point, our strategy should emphasize trying to cut a deal with Levine et al. The letter to Representatives Smith and Levine could also specifically spell out the 32 aircraft and 8 trainers distinction. This could be interpreted by those who seek a compromise as a victory.

Although the most promising strategy on the F-18's at this point looks to be one which emphasizes the House, we cannot afford to neglect the Senate. A quick Senate vote on a resolution of disapproval would make it much more difficult for the House not to follow suit. Therefore, it may be necessary for you to meet again with a small group of Senators toward the end of this week before the Congress recesses.

For now, Levine will be talking to Larry Smith, Dine, and DeConcini to hold the line and see if there is any change of heart. Dennis will meet with Levine today to see if a deal is possible. If it is -- and we are assured it is precooked -- we would then want to talk to the Kuwaitis. You may have to meet with the Crown Prince. If the Kuwaitis are willing to agree, we would probably need you also to meet with Levine et al to finalize the deal on the House side.

We'll keep you informed as this soap-opera plays out.

de m
Rick Saunders and *de m* Alison Fortier concur.

cc: Ty Cobb

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July 7, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RBO*

SUBJECT: VP Presentation to the UN

The Vice President's interest in going to the Security Council next week could be a useful device for energizing a new effort at pushing through 598. With George Shultz out of the country, we would have a built-in explanation for the Vice President's presenting our position.

That said, we would need to prepare the ground well. Much as we did in advance of George Shultz's presentation to the Security Council last year, we would want a Presidential letter to go to the Security Council members, Allies, and key friends in the region emphasizing the need, "given events in the Gulf", to push hard to begin implementing Security Council Resolution 598 with a ceasefire on air, land, and sea. Thus it would not be directly linked to the Iran Air incident. To that end, the President's letter would explain that the Vice President would be going to the Security Council to re-energize the diplomatic effort to end this senseless war. This could not be done by Tuesday, but we could set a date such as July 20.

Clearly, if the Vice President is to do this, he must also have a serious, substantive statement to make. He must present not simply a defense of our position -- but also he must outline everything we've done over the last year to move the diplomatic approach through the UNSC. His speech must be designed to raise the profile of our efforts and put pressure on those (e.g., Soviets) who have effectively blocked a follow-on resolution. In effect, his statement will provide a new call to action.

The issue is not whether the Vice President should make such a statement; rather it's whether there is sufficient time before the Security Council debate to prepare the ground and set the stage for the Vice President to go to the UN. If there isn't, the better approach might be to use the UN debate to renew our diplomatic efforts and to build to a Vice Presidential speech on July 20, the anniversary of reflagging effort.