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Collection Name CANNISTRARO, VINCENT: FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 1/27/2009

File Folder IRAN (2)

FOIA

F01-135/1

Box Number B1 1 *Box 1*

MITCHELL, R

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
62549	REPORT	RE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (W/NOTATIONS)	4	4/7/1986	B1	B3
62550	NOTE	TO CANNISTRARO RE THE ATTACHED (W/NOTATIONS)	1	12/16/1985	B1	B3
62551	NOTE	TRANSMITTAL SLIP	1	12/16/1985	B1	
62552	REPORT	RE IRAN-IRAQ WAR	5	12/16/1985	B1	B3
62553	BRIEFING PAPER	RE IRAN (W/NOTATIONS) (INCLUDING BLANK PAGES) R 11/2/2012 M393/1	7	9/5/1985	B1	B3
62554	ROUTING SLIP	PHOTOCOPY OF NSC ROUTING SLIP (W/NOTATIONS)	1	ND	B1	
62555	MEMO	V. CANNISTRARO AND KENNETH DEGRAFFENREID TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE THE ATTACHED	1	4/22/1985	B1	
62556	MEMO	FROM MCFARLANE RE REPORT ON IRAN	2	5/1/1985	B1	
62557	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #62555	1	4/22/1985	B1	

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
62558	MEMO	UNDATED COPY OF DOC #62556	2	4/22/1985	B1
62559	CABLE	201556Z APR 85 (W/NOTATIONS)	1	4/20/1985	B1
62560	CABLE	231544Z APR 85 (W/NOTATIONS)	2	4/23/1985	B1
62561	REPORT	RE IRAN	2	ND	B1
62562	MEMO	RE IRAN	1	11/24/1979	B1
62563	LIST	RE NAMES/ADDRESSES/PHONE NUMBERS	1	ND	B1 B3

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निकट पूर्व/दक्षिण एशिया विश्लेषण कार्यालय
ادارة التحليل لشؤون الشرق الاوسط وجنوب آسيا
המחלקה לניתוח המזרח התיכון ודרום אסיה
اداره تجزيه و تحليل خاور ميانه و جنوب آسيا
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence

16 December 1985

FILE: *jam*

Mr. Vincent Cannistraro
Director of Intelligence Programs
National Security Council

Vince,

Attached is the memorandum you requested on Iraqi morale. It discusses declining civilian and military spirits and their implications for the Iran-Iraq war and Iraqi stability.



Chief, Persian Gulf Division

13526
E.O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.5(c)

Copy sent to Jack

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NLRR M393 #62550

BY 191 NARA DATE 1/15/13

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62551

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 16 Dec 1985
TO: Mr. Vincent Cannistraro		
ROOM NO. 300	BUILDING 01d EOB	
REMARKS:		
FROM: DDI/NESA/PG		
ROOM [REDACTED]	BUILDING [REDACTED]	EXTENSION [REDACTED]

FORM NO.
1 FEB 56 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

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BY KNL NARA DATE 1/16/13

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

16 December 1985

13526

E. O. 12958

~~As Amended~~

~~Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(6),~~

3.5(c)

Iraq: The Threat from Declining Morale [REDACTED]

Summary

Baghdad's inability to end the five-year-old war with Iran is sapping Iraqi morale on the home front and battlefield. Unless this situation is reversed, it will lead to discontent and perhaps even a partial military collapse on the front. Efforts by military or civilian leaders to oust Saddam, however, are likely only if his popularity declines sharply and they conclude that he is leading Iraq to certain defeat. The downturn in Iraqi morale is more a result of war weariness than any military defeats. It probably would be reversed if Baghdad showed a willingness to strike Iran hard. [REDACTED]

* * * * *

Iraqis are increasingly frustrated by their inability to end the war with Iran and are less certain than before that they have an effective strategy for doing so. In early 1985 they were convinced that by pressing

This memorandum was requested by the Director of Intelligence Programs, NSC, and was prepared by [REDACTED] the Persian Gulf Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA, [REDACTED]

NESA M 85-10231

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[REDACTED]

Iran on the military, economic, and diplomatic fronts, they would force Tehran to the bargaining table. During the past year, however, Iraqi "successes" have not produced the desired results:

- The blunting of a major Iranian ground offensive in March failed to dissuade Iran from continuing its war of attrition and preparing for another offensive.
- The bombing of Iranian cities from March to late June probably increased popular unrest and antiwar sentiment in Iran but never seriously threatened the clerical regime.
- Attacks against Khark Island since mid-August have not reduced Iranian oil revenues significantly and have led Iran to seek alternative export routes for its oil, making further attacks less effective.

In short, repeated escalation has failed to budge Iran, and the Iraqis are running out of fresh ideas. [REDACTED]

Declining Morale

Popular morale is sagging over the prospect that the war will continue indefinitely. We estimate that Iraq has suffered 350,000 missing, wounded, and killed, the equivalent of 5 million casualties for a population as large as that of the United States. Although the regime has sheltered its citizens from many economic hardships, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] civilian morale at its lowest point in two years. [REDACTED] civilians are making critical comments about the regime as well as jokes about Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The US Embassy in Baghdad observes that the annual Babylon Festival in September was a noticeably less spirited event than last year. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We believe that military morale has not improved since the March offensive. An army general recently told the US Defense Attache that his troops were tired. The US Embassy reports that military deserters were executed publicly in Baghdad in mid-November, suggesting concern about a

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[REDACTED]

possible rise in desertions and draft dodging. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Iraqis are increasingly trying to escape military service, particularly in the militia. Ba'thist officials are accepting bribes to keep conscripts away from the front. The US Embassy says that although most Iraqis still oppose Iran, they want someone else to do the fighting. [REDACTED]

Casualties from increased fighting with Kurdish guerrillas are also harming morale somewhat but are unlikely to weigh as heavily as losses on the front. The Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have increased their control over the mountainous border regions north of Mosul, Irbil, and Kirkuk and have conducted operations within these cities, according to the US Embassy. Baghdad has responded with harsh repression, which has caused resentment among the town Kurds. In October, demonstrations erupted in the Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah. According to Embassy reporting, martial law was imposed on this city and nearby Irbil. [REDACTED]

Elsewhere in the country, the effective and ruthless security services thought they had eliminated or cowed most opposition activity by Shia dissidents. But, there is evidence that some Shias once again are becoming a thorn in Baghdad's side. [REDACTED] dissidents battled elements of the Republican Guards Division in early October near Al Khalis--the most significant unrest outside Kurdistan in several years. [REDACTED]

Prospects

The regime's grip on power through the security services and the Ba'th party is still strong, and we believe most Iraqis still possess the will to resist the Iranian threat. The regime faces increasing challenges, however, and the Iraqis are prosecuting the war with less vigor than they once did. We agree with a US Embassy assessment that the longer the war drags on, the more likely an Iraqi military--and possibly political--collapse becomes. [REDACTED]

At least some elements of the Iraqi military appear to share this view and are concerned about an impending major Iranian ground offensive. [REDACTED] earlier this month that Iraq is generally confident of its ability to defend Iraqi territory but is concerned about being overwhelmed at one sector of the front, such as the marshes in the south. The Iranian offensive last March temporarily gained control of a main road in the marshes that connects Baghdad to Al Basrah, Iraq's second largest city. The Iraqis have had similar worries in the past, but they usually put on an optimistic face to foreigners. [REDACTED]

A complete collapse of Iraq's military is unlikely, but declining morale is increasing the chance that Iran will achieve a significant breakthrough, gain considerable Iraqi territory, and partially isolate Al Basrah before Iraqi troops regroup. Such a development would further erode Iraqi morale and increase the unhappiness of military and civilian leaders about Saddam's conduct of the war. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] To date, Ba'thist civilian and military officers have remained united behind Saddam, because of fear of his security forces and a belief that factionalism would weaken Iraq's ability to resist Iran. The regime has promoted a cult of personality to unite the country behind Saddam as the symbol of Iraqi nationalism. Therefore, senior officials in the regime are likely to try to oust Saddam only if his popularity greatly diminishes and they conclude that he was leading them to defeat. [REDACTED]

Trying to Break Iranian Morale

A significant drop in Iranian fortunes--suggesting an end to the war was in sight--would stiffen Iraq's resolve. The Iraqis have some cause for hope. We believe the Iranians have suffered considerably more economic hardships than have the Iraqis. [REDACTED]

Nonetheless, Baghdad is far from winning a contest of morale against Iran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which is assuming a bigger role in of Tehran's war effort, continues to exhibit a high degree of tenacity and fanaticism. The lack of significant organized opposition within Iran means that even increased hardships for the populace are not likely to lead to a change in the Iranian regime or its war policy. Finally, Iraq has not shown it is willing to strike blows against Iran that are hard enough and continuous enough to disrupt the Iranian economy or war effort:

- Baghdad's concern over the questionable morale of its own troops and the prospect of heavy losses has led it to assume a defensive posture on the front.
- Iraq has shown it can reduce temporarily Iranian oil exports from Khark Island, but it has not made enough low-level bombing raids to achieve this result for more than a few days at a time. Iraq's reasons for not doing so are unclear, but Iraqi leaders have expressed concern that stepped up attacks might unite the Iranian population behind the clerics and create hostility that would long outlast the war. We believe Iraqi fear of losing pilots and planes is equally telling.

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--Iraq could resume bombing Iranian cities without losing many aircraft, but it would risk Iranian retaliation with Scud missiles provided by Libya. (Iran attacked Baghdad with Scuds last June.) The Iraqis probably suspect that their own civilians' morale would suffer more than that of the Iranians in such an exchange.

--Iraq is also capable of bombing Iranian industrial facilities, such as fuel oil refineries and electricity plants, in an effort to disable them and greatly increase civilian hardship. Once again, however, Iraq's leaders appear to fear that major attacks would be counterproductive by uniting Iranians around their leaders.

Requests for US and Soviet Assistance

Baghdad's concerns have made it eager to secure foreign, particularly superpower, support. The Iraqi general who expressed concern over an Iranian breakthrough stressed to the [REDACTED] the need for the US to take whatever action was necessary to assure Iraq's ability to defend itself. Saddam almost certainly is making a similar appeal to the Soviets during his present visit to Moscow. Soviet and Iraqi contacts are increasing as Baghdad tries to strengthen relations with the USSR and its East European allies as part of an effort to stem the flow of arms to Iran and to get help in prodding Syria and Libya to end their support for Tehran.

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DEB-70-85
5 Sep 1985



Defense Estimative Brief



Iran: The Next Year (U)

Key Judgments

(S/NOFORN) Khomeini will remain firmly in charge of Iran over the next year. Should he die within this time, his successor will most likely be Ayatollah Montazeri.

(S/NOFORN) The disorganized opposition groups will not be able to capitalize on the growing popular disillusionment with the war and a tottering economy.

(S/NOFORN) Khomeini's preoccupation with the Iraq war will continue to play havoc with Iranian economic policy. Even if the war ended, prospects for any quick improvements in the economy are poor.

(S/NOFORN) Khomeini is unlikely to accept an end to the war until Iraq's President Saddam Husayn is replaced. Iran sporadically will interdict shipping in the Persian Gulf and conduct small-scale ground attacks against Iraq. Tehran will refrain from taking any military action that would internationalize the conflict.

(S/NOFORN) Iranian foreign policy will remain centered on exporting their Islamic Revolution. Regionally, Tehran will cultivate ties with Gulf Shia Muslim populations and will seek to splinter the Gulf Cooperation Council, using unattributable terrorist incidents periodically to increase the pressure.

(S/NOFORN) Antipathy toward Communism will not bar improved relations with the Soviet Union. However, Iran is unlikely to make concessions necessary for the Kremlin to abandon Iraq and provide Tehran the quantities of military equipment it desires.

(S/NOFORN) While the West will remain Iran's principal trading partner, Iran--even under a successor regime--will continue its anti-US rhetoric despite concern about Soviet intentions.

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NR 70-85/1 #62553

BY GN NARA DATE 11/2/12

Discussion

1. (S/NOFORN) Regime Secure. Khomeini will remain firmly in charge of Iran over the next year despite factionalism among the ruling clergy. Several major economic and military calamities--deemed unlikely over that time frame--would have to occur to regenerate any large-scale anti-regime opposition, be it led by secular liberals, Islamic socialists, or Communists either inside or outside Iran.
2. (S/NOFORN) Growing popular disillusionment with lack of progress in the war, mounting casualties, and a tottering economy will generate more anti-regime demonstrations. Nevertheless, opposition groups lack leadership and are likely to remain disorganized and ineffective. Any opposition groups which start to form within Iran will be ruthlessly suppressed by the regime. As a result, attacks against the regime will continue to take the form of random individual retaliation against local government officials and Revolutionary Guards.
3. (S/NOFORN) Orderly Succession Likely. If Khomeini dies within the next year, the succession process will be relatively bloodless and controlled by the Iranian clerical establishment. Ayatollah Montazeri, judged to be Khomeini's hand-picked successor, has the best chance to become Iran's next spiritual leader. The longer Khomeini lives the better Montazeri's prospects will become. Additionally, Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Majlis (parliament), will be a dominant figure and will likely be a member of a collective leadership in the event Montazeri is unable to garner enough support to be Khomeini's sole successor.
4. (S/NOFORN) Even though jockeying for power will result in vicious behind-the-scene power struggles, there is a slim chance that Iran, after a year or so, will become less radical under Montazeri or a collective clerical leadership. The role of spiritual leader will become less powerful, as none of the probable successors will have Khomeini's mass appeal. However, the less radical clergy, who have thus far been relegated to the sidelines, will not jeopardize their position by pressing for moderation until they are sure of popular support. At the same time, the new leadership will be under strong pressure from the Revolutionary Guards and other militants to demonstrate its revolutionary credentials.
5. (S/NOFORN) The Revolutionary Guard will play a key role in succession politics. Though factions within the Guards will remain and could splinter the organization, it is slowly developing its organizational and combat capabilities. A possibility exists that clerical rivalry after Khomeini's death could produce a violent confrontation between elements in the regular military and the Revolutionary Guard. It is more likely, however, that the Guard will rally, at least initially, behind the individual(s) selected to be Khomeini's successor.

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6. (S/NOFORN) Iraqi War Negates Economic Planning. Khomeini's preoccupation with the war against Iraq will continue to play havoc with any efforts to develop a coherent economic policy. Economic programs will hinge on providing a minimum of essential goods and services for the population while obtaining materiel to prosecute the war--currently the military consumes about 30 percent of Iran's national budget.

7. (S/NOFORN) Even though Iraq periodically may disrupt Iranian oil shipments, Tehran probably will be able to maintain oil shipments of about 1.5-1.7 million barrels per day (MBD). Nevertheless, Iran will have to further tighten import policies to safeguard dwindling foreign exchange reserves (approximately \$4 billion) and to seek additional oil markets. External sources are unlikely to bail Iran out of any foreign exchange crisis.

8. (S/NOFORN) Even if the war ends, prospects for any quick improvements in the economy are poor. Despite its 2.3-2.8 MBD export capacity, oil markets are expected to remain soft over the next few years. Moreover, the regime's goal of industrial diversification will remain tied to oil revenues which account for over 90 percent of Iran's foreign earnings. It will take years, even with the reappointment of experienced technocrats, to repair the damage done by the war and the maladministration of Iran's economy since the revolution began.

9. (S/NOFORN) War with Iraq to Continue. Regardless of the domestic impact, Khomeini most probably will not accept an end of the war until Iraq's President Saddam Husayn is replaced. Moreover, the regime will be able to count on the majority of Iranians who feel they are fighting a just and holy war. Nevertheless, lack of military resupplies and previous experiences will dictate that Iran continue to emphasize small-scale ground attacks, though it would conduct a large-scale offensive to take advantage of any Iraqi weakness in the south opposite Basrah. These attacks will be designed to erode Iraqi support for Saddam by illustrating Iraq's vulnerability to Iranian pressure and by exploiting chronic Iraqi sluggishness in counterattack type operations. Iran's small surface-to-surface (Scud) missile inventory will be used against Baghdad in retaliation for any Iraqi resumption of bombing of Iranian cities.

10. (S/NOFORN) Iran will continue interdicting shipping near the Strait of Hormuz in its efforts to stem the supply of Iraqi war material. Tehran also will conduct retaliatory strikes in response to Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil shipments to increase the cost to moderate Arab Gulf states for supporting Baghdad. Iran might conduct a small-scale air strike against a moderate Gulf State--most likely Kuwait. Such an attack would be designed to minimize the probability that the United States would be called to intervene in the Gulf.

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11. (S/NOFORN) Foreign Policy Centers on Exporting the Revolution. Iranian clerics remain united in their belief that the Islamic Revolution should be exported. Their ultimate goal is the establishment of a federation of Islamic states independent of both the East and the West. Nevertheless, they differ on how this goal should be achieved. As a result, this policy will be filled with contradictions and generate internal political conflicts. Moderate Arab regimes, however, will be principal targets of Iranian plots to right the world. Beside cultivating ties with Gulf Shia populations, Tehran will seek diplomatically to splinter the Gulf Cooperation Council, using unattributable terrorist incidents periodically to increase the pressure.

12. (S/NOFORN) Elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran will remain active in Lebanon. Although it will not challenge Syria directly for dominance, Tehran will attempt to exploit any opportunity to further its own objectives there. Iran will also continue to cultivate Libya to obtain military hardware, primarily by exploiting Qadhafi's hunger for Islamic leadership. At the same time, Tehran will pursue regional cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey to shore up the Iranian clerical regime and to place added pressure on Iraq.

13. (S/NOFORN) Soviet Ties Unlikely to Improve Significantly. Iranian antipathy toward Communism will not necessarily be a barrier to improved relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. Tehran will continue its diplomatic efforts to press Moscow to reduce its military sales to Baghdad and to allow Soviet Bloc states to sell more equipment to Iran. For its part, the Soviets will explore ways to increase their leverage over Iran. Moscow probably will not consider any major improvements in relations until Iran halts anti-Soviet propaganda, significantly reduces its aid to Afghan rebels, and eases pressure on the banned Tudeh (Communist) Party. Even in the unlikely event Iran acquiesced to these concessions, Moscow probably would not directly provide Iran the quantities of military equipment requested.

14. (S/NOFORN) Lacking significant concessions by Iran, the Soviets will continue to take a long-term view of the Iranian revolution. Exploiting anti-US orientation, Moscow will seek opportunities to expand Soviet influence. To this end, the Soviets may ease restrictions somewhat on their allies economic and military ties to Iran. Moscow also will continue to reject the Iranian regime's abrogation of the 1921 Treaty which gives the USSR the right to intervene in Iran should the Soviets feel threatened by events in that country.

15. (S/NOFORN) Implications for the United States. While the West will remain Iran's principal trading partner, Iran--even under a successor regime--will continue its anti-US rhetoric despite any concern about Soviet intentions. Anti-Americanism

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will remain more than superficial with some Iranians condemning the United States for its support to the Shah, others for having allowed Khomeini to take power, and still others because they believe the propaganda that Washington is the source of all Iran's ills.


16. (S/NOFORN) Until Khomeini leaves the scene and more moderate elements gain control, Iran will support radical states and groups who share the regime's perceptions about US imperialism. Tehran will continue to use US relationships with regional governments to discredit moderate governments and deter them, with some success, from seeking American assistance.

17. (S/NOFORN) Although the smaller Gulf states are concerned that Iran might lash out at them in retaliation for Iraq's bombing of Kharg Island, these states are not likely to request publicly US military intervention. They will rather suffer a few attacks on industrial facilities and shipping, if they perceive the attacks are of limited scope, before asking for outside assistance. The Arab Gulf states will welcome, at least privately, US actions to keep the Straits of Hormuz open in the unlikely event Iran attempts to close them.

Prepared by:

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Approved by:


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with regards

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ASSAD HOMAYOUN

In this fifth year of stalemate in the Iraqi-Iranian War, two salient facts are apparent: as the Ayatollah Khomeini's tenure draws to an end, the army, despite heavy losses and lack of significant progress in the war, is still intact and retains the respect and support of the Iranian masses.

These two realities have special significance for Iran's political future and the strategic balance in the Persian Gulf region. It is the contention here that because of its mass support and its status as a symbol of Iranian nationalism, the army will play an extremely critical role in the nature, structure, and direction of post-Khomeini Iran. It is further contended that the army will seek a more moderate, and indeed democratic government, having experienced the reign of terror and despotism of the current regime.

Thus, it would be to the national security interests of the United States and other Free World nations for the Iranian armed forces to emerge from this conflict intact. It follows that the current attitude and actions of the United States toward the Iranian army in its struggle against Iraq will be most critical to the ability of the army to play a decisive role in Iran's future evolution to a moderate and democratic government.

Until recently the U.S. government has remained neutral in the Iran-Iraq war; now there are some indications that the United States might be tilting toward Iraq by providing some material assistance to that country. Delivery of such assistance to Iraq, instead of bringing peace to the area, would create a new offensive capability for Iraq, thus contributing to changing the regional strategic equilibrium, thus creating new opportunities for Soviet intervention in the area. The best prospects for peace in the Persian Gulf lie in maintaining a balance of forces and respect for

Iran's murky political future

A critical role foreseen for the army

territorial integrity of both combatants without further weakening the Iranian armed forces.

Post-Khomeini domestic and foreign policy directions will depend on the supportive role of the armed forces in the eventual struggle in Iran for political control. It is highly likely that more moderate and conservative members of the armed forces will contest the effort of the Khomeini factions to continue their extremism and totalitarian rule. The extent and degree to which the army can effect its influence and authority will largely depend on the people's perception of its credibility and representation as an honorable spokesman for Iran's national interests and historic traditions. The most favorable public acceptance will be obtained if the army is seen to emerge from this war as a staunch defender of Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Iran's current regime has based its rule on three questionable pillars:

1. The personality of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who is 86, with all the frailties of old age, and who is not likely to survive much longer.

2. The transformation of the mosque from a sacred religious center, to a center of political power and control. The mosque is losing its appeal, and many people are keeping their distance from it.

3. The revolutionary guard, which represents the "fang of the python," is becoming more and more unpopular, with personal and ideological rivalry among its members increasing in intensity. With the factions supported by rival groups of clergy, when the Ayatollah Khomeini leaves the scene a struggle for power will intensify and most of the guards are likely to merge with the army.

The other emerging force that

could significantly influence the situation and fill the political vacuum and challenge the army is that of the Communists, both overt and covert cadres. The Communist organization has had more than four decades of experience in Iran and the support of an all-powerful Soviet intelligence apparatus in building its cadre strength underground and abroad.

The only national institution that remains unified and enjoys prestige is the armed forces. It still is filled with national pride, tradition, and patriotism. The military leadership has been out of politics since the revolution. In spite of the decimation of its officer corps, destruction of its command and control, mismanagement of the war, and interference by religious commissars, it has managed to survive and to defend the territorial integrity of Iran.

Now that Iraq has a tank superiority of 5-to-1 and combat aircraft superiority of 8-to-1 over Iran and does not hesitate to use chemical weapons, it would be counter to America's security interests to tilt toward Iraq by providing help to King Hussein. It will not bring stability and peace to the Gulf; it could push Iran's Islamic Jacobins into Soviet arms. It could weaken the Iranian armed forces, which are the only bulwark against a possible Soviet advance to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union has close to 30 divisions in the three military districts of Trans-Caucasus, North Caucasus and Turkestan, which border Iran, as well as forces in Afghanistan. With the occupation of Afghanistan, there is a nearly 2,000-mile frontier with the U.S.S.R. This represents a serious threat to Iran's security and internal stability.

A U.S. tilt toward Iraq because of Iran's present anti-American policy of promoting terrorism and export-

ing fundamentalism is understandable.

However, we should bear in mind that the policy of the present regime lacks a national political base and does not appreciate Iran's leading role in regional and global military balance and geo-politics. Therefore, the interest of the United States and the West should be the preservation of Iran's independence and integrity and the cohesiveness of its armed forces. Defeat and neutralization of Iran's army could open the way for chaos and disintegration in Iran.

Furthermore, the demise of Iran's armed forces would be a catastrophe not only for Iran but also for the region, since Iran is a land bridge between the Soviet Union and the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and East Africa. Communist control of Iran would give the Soviet Union unprecedented strategic advantage.

If the Iranian army is defeated or weakened or if a peace without honor is concluded with Iraq, then the road for Communists coming to power in Iran will be much easier, as in Russia in 1917 and nearly in Germany and Hungary after World War I. Iran's military integrity will serve as an effective barrier against Soviet encroachment and will directly increase the security status of Turkey, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf states.

In conclusion, it would be the army that could restore peace, order, and political stability and pave the way for an elective, democratic government. The Iranian people do not desire the totalitarian rule of the clerics and public opinion has turned against their repressive rule. Iran and the Iranian people will survive these troubled times as they survived many invasions and internal crises and disasters. Normal and friendly relations between Iran and the United States will be forthcoming if one does not make the mistake of alienating the Iranian people and Iran's armed forces.

Dr. Assad Homayoun is professorial lecturer of international affairs at George Washington University.

National Security Council
The White House

MB

(154)

62554

System # 14
Package # 400422

173^x

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson		<u>—</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K9</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>DZ</u>
Situation Room	<u>Please send Eric's list to Casey and/or McMahon</u>		

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action
Whoever is here.

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other J

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

Iran SNIE

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National Security Council
The White House

142

System # 10

Package # 400432

179

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Bob Pearson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	<i>Q</i>	
John Poindexter	3	<i>J</i>	
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5		A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	<i>2A/3B</i>		<i>reads</i>
<i>Norie</i>	2	<i>done</i>	<i>into</i>

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(Date/Time)

Bob K.

Please have Ken get
Don's chops. I would like
to get this out ASAP.

Ken —
one small fix on
p. 2. then let's
talk. DM

[Signature]

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62555	MEMO V. CANNISTRARO AND KENNETH DEGRAFFENREID TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE THE ATTACHED	1	4/22/1985	B1

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62556	MEMO FROM MCFARLANE RE REPORT ON IRAN	2	5/1/1985	B1

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3			
4			
5			
6			

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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			

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
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62557	MEMO SAME MEMO AS DOC #62555	1	4/22/1985	B1

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62558	MEMO UNDATED COPY OF DOC #62556	2	4/22/1985	B1

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USCINCCENT FOR J2.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ WNIINTEL

DIST: 20 APRIL 1985

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJ: ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITY IN TEHRAN

TEXT: 1. SINCE EARLY APRIL 1985, THERE HAVE BEEN A SERIES OF ANTI-WAR AND ANTI-REGIME DEMONSTRATIONS IN TEHRAN. THE FIRST AND LARGEST DEMONSTRATION OCCURRED IN MID-APRIL, IN SOUTH TEHRAN.

THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS SPARKED BY IRAQI BOMBING OF SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH DESTROYED UP TO FORTY HOUSES. PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEMONSTRATION ESTIMATED THAT AT LEAST 2,000 PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED. THE DEMONSTRATION, WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SPONTANEOUS, CONSISTED OF DEMONSTRATORS CHANTING ANTI-KHOMEINI AND ANTI-WAR SLOGANS. THE SLOGANS INCLUDED "DEATH TO KHOMEINI." WHEN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (IRGC) UNITS WERE CALLED IN TO BREAK UP THE DEMONSTRATION, RIOTING BROKE OUT AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATORS AND AT LEAST FOUR IRGC MEMBERS WERE KILLED. THE CROWD MUTILATED THE BODIES

ACTION DIA(1) (U,6,7)
INFO CJCS(4) NIDS(1) J5(2) SECDEF:(1) SECDEF(9) USDP(11)
ASD:PA&E(1) USDP:ISA(1) USDP:NESA(3) USDP:DSAA(4)
DR(1) DD(1) ED(1) DI-1(1) NMIC(1) RTS 2B(1) OS-1C(1)
OS-1B(1) NWS(1) AT-6(1) DIO(1) DE-4(1) DB-8C(3)
DB-5D1(1) DT-1(1) DT-5(1) DB-6D2(1) DC-4A6(1)
D900(1)
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+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+CMC WASHINGTON DC
+HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
+SAFE

2. SINCE THE SOUTH TEHRAN DEMONSTRATIONS, THERE HAVE BEEN ALMOST DAILY ANTI-KHOMEINI AND ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT TEHRAN. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY CONSIST OF GROUPS OF 50 TO 100 PEOPLE WHO CHANT "DEATH TO KHOMEINI" AND ANTI-WAR SLOGANS. THE DEMONSTRATORS HAVE TEMPORARILY BLOCKED STREETS AS WELL AS FORCED PASSING VEHICLES TO TURN ON THEIR CAR LIGHTS AS A SIGN OF OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN CASES WHERE THE DEMONSTRATORS HAVE STOPPED CARS AND DEMANDED THAT THE OCCUPANTS JOIN THE DEMONSTRATION. ON 14

APRIL, A BUS COMING INTO TEHRAN FROM TEHRAN PARS ENCOUNTERED AN ANTI-KHOMEINI DEMONSTRATION AND THE PASSENGERS INSISTED THAT THE BUS DRIVER STOP THE BUS SO THEY COULD JOIN THE DEMONSTRATION. AFTER CHANTING A FEW SLOGANS, THE PASSENGERS REBOARDED THE BUS AND CONTINUED ON THEIR WAY.

3. DURING THE NIGHT OF 16 APRIL, AN UNIDENTIFIED GROUP BROKE THE WINDOWS IN APPROXIMATELY 30 SHOPS ALONG SALTANATABAD STREET. LEAFLETS WERE THROWN IN THE SHOPS SAYING THAT THE WINDOWS WERE BROKEN BECAUSE THE OWNERS HAD PICTURES OF KHOMEINI PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED.

4. SINCE EARLY APRIL, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF BOMBINGS IN TEHRAN. IN ONE INCIDENT, A WOULD-BE BOMBER APPARENTLY BLEW HIMSELF UP WHILE ARMING A BOMB ON THE FOURTH FLOOR OF A BUILDING ON TAKHT-E TAVUS STREET. IN ANOTHER INCIDENT, A BOMB WENT OFF IN A PHONE BOOTH ON ISTANBUL STREET.

5. DURING THE LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL BLACKOUTS OF TEHRAN CAUSED BY IRAQI BOMBING, TEHRAN RESIDENTS USED THE DARKNESS TO GO UP TO THEIR ROOFS AND CHANT ANTI-KHOMEINI AND ANTI-WAR SLOGANS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF "DEATH TO KHOMEINI" SLOGANS APPEARING ON THE WALLS ALONG TEHRAN STREETS. IN MOST CASES, THE SLOGANS ARE WRITTEN DURING THE NIGHT, AND PAINTED OUT DURING THE DAY BY AUTHORITIES.

6. DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE IRAQI BOMBING, LARGE NUMBERS OF TEHRAN RESIDENTS LEFT TEHRAN AT NIGHT. THE PEOPLE WOULD SPEND THE NIGHT SLEEPING IN TENTS, CARS, OR IN THE OPEN.

DISSEM:

USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT,

USNMR SHAPE (FOR GENERAL ROGERS), USCINCCENT, COMIDEASTFR, USCINCPAC, IPAC, WESTCOM, PACAF, PACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF WESTPAC, JSOC.

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62560	CABLE 231544Z APR 85 (W/NOTATIONS)	2	4/23/1985	B1

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13526
E.O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

62561

28

1. [REDACTED] the regime may fragment earlier than previous forecasts suggested (see attachment).
2. We need a two-fold plan of action.
 - First, what near-term preparations can we make to improve our capability to deal with instability within Iran if the regime fragments soon, i.e., within the next 60 days?
 - Second, if the regime holds together in the short term, what measures can we undertake to improve our ability to induce Iranian foreign policies more favorable to U.S. interests in the region?
3. Near-term issues (0-60 days):
 - If the Khomeini government fragments soon, what channels of communication do we have to senior Iranian military leaders? Clerics? Are we in a position to send authoritative statements of U.S. policy through [REDACTED] third parties, etc. to these men? If not, how can such channels be established quickly?
 - Have we exploited the [REDACTED] fully as a quick way of improving our knowledge of the important active and potential leaders in Iran? What can we do to expand [REDACTED]
 - Will we be able to detect Soviet efforts in support of separatist activity in Iran in a timely fashion, i.e., so that U.S. counter-measures vis-a-vis the Soviet Union can be made before the activity has proceeded beyond recall? If not, how can we put ourselves in a position to obtain this timely notice quickly?
 - What [REDACTED] diplomatic preparations have we made with friendly Islamic states to respond to a collapse of the Khomeini government? In particular, what forms of Islamic assistance should be available to the more moderate factions in Iran as they struggle for power? How can we ensure that Libya or other support is not made available to the most anti-American factions?

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- What U.S. military exercises and/or deployments in the region should be prepared in the region to deter Soviet action and to give us some leverage on the Iran-Iraq war if the Khomeini government fragments in the short term?

4. Long-term issues (60 days - 4 months):

- Improved intelligence collection and analysis of post-Khomeini politics is crucial if we are to be able to adopt [REDACTED] positions towards the various factions that will be competing for power after Khomeini dies, or perhaps even sooner. [REDACTED]

A plan of action for developing an improved understanding of the political situation on the ground in Iran should be prepared and submitted to the NSC by the third week in April. It should be a plan that can be completed by July 1.

- In order to guide U.S. policy before the completion of our intelligence review a statement of U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Iran should be developed and issued by the first week in May.
- After we have improved our intelligence posture and defined our objectives, a strategy that creates incentives for a post-Khomeini regime to accept international norms of behavior and to develop a relationship with the U.S. that contains Soviet influence in the region should be developed and be ready to implement by mid-July.

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62562 MEMO

1 11/24/1979 B1

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