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Collection: Teicher, Howard J.: Files

Folder Title: Iran – Sensitive (4 of 4)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 8/15/2007

File Folder IRAN-SENSITIVE (4)

FOIA

M2007-075

Box Number 91671

BATTLE

48

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
40477	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 40475 W/ANNOTATIONS PAR 6/20/2013 M075/1	1	2/27/1986	B1
40478	TALKING POINTS	DUPLICATE OF 40476 D 2/6/2017 M075/1	2	ND	B1
40479	LETTER	PERES TO RR D 8/9/2010 MR075/1	2	2/28/1986	B1
40480	MEMO	TEICHER/CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE MEMORANDUM D 7/26/2012 M075/1	1	3/1/1986	B1
40481	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO CASEY D 7/26/2012 M075/1	2	ND	B1
40482	MESSAGE	RE DON GREGG'S MEETING	2	ND	B1
40483	TRANSMITTAL	RE MEETING	1	4/8/1986	B1
40484	OUTLINE	RE US-IRAN DIALOGUE R 8/9/2010 MR075/1	3	ND	B1
40485	COVER SHEET	FOR MEMO R 8/9/2010 MR075/1	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
40486	MEMO	NORTH/TEICHER TO POINDEXTER RE HOSTAGES <i>D 3/6/2013 M075/1</i>	2	7/15/1986	B1
40487	CABLE	030619Z JUL 86 <i>PAR 8/9/2010 MR075/1</i>	7	7/3/1986	B1
40488	OUTLINE	DUPLICATE OF 40484 <i>R 8/9/2010 MR075/1</i>	3	ND	B1

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40477

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

HOWARD R. TEICHER *HR 1*
VINCENT M. CANNISTRARO *W*

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, Firday,
February 28, 1986, 4:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

Sensitive
Iran

This memo provides you with background and talking points for the subject meeting.

Background

Bakhtiar is extremely pleased that you have agreed to meet with him. We recommend you see him privately, without any of his advisors to ensure that he speaks as freely as possible.

Your meeting can achieve several objectives:

- An opportunity for you to establish a personal relationship with Bakhtiar and candidly appraise our ability to work together.
- To hear Bakhtiar's personal assessment of the evolving internal situation in Iran and prospects [REDACTED]
- Determine whether he is satisfied with our cooperation.
- If a decision has been made, indicate you will shortly send an emissary to Crown Prince Abdallah.

Taken together with Thursday evening's discussion with Bill Casey on Iran [REDACTED] you should be thoroughly briefed on the Agency's assessment of Bakhtiar's prospects.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw from the talking points at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR MD7-075# 40477
BY RW NARA DATE 6/20/13

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40478	TALKING POINTS DUPLICATE OF 40476	2	ND	B1

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REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: ⁴
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on February 28, 1986
for John M. Poindexter of NSC :
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Shahpour Bakhtiar
Mehrdad Khonsari
General Shardar

Howard Teicher
Vince Cannistraro

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing Requested by Howard Teicher
Room No. Poindexter's Office Room No. 348 Telephone 5650
Time of Meeting 4:00 p.m. Date of request 2/28/86

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

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TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

40479 LETTER

2 2/28/1986 B1

PERES TO RR

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40480 MEMO

1 3/1/1986 B1

TEICHER/CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE
MEMORANDUM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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40481	MEMO POINDEXTER TO CASEY	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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40482	MESSAGE RE DON GREGG'S MEETING	2	ND	B1

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40483	TRANSMITTAL RE MEETING	1	4/8/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SENSITIVE

U.S.-Iran Dialogue

40484

I. BASIC PILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- The President represents and embodies America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- Most important, he has restored American will and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. They are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- At the same time, they are prepared to resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- They see many international trends -- economic, technological, and political -- working in their favor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.

- The U.S. views the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock back.
- The present U.S. attitude toward Iran is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- The U.S. sees Iran's activity in many parts of the world, including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But Iranian subversion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- U.S. assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making. The U.S. believes the Soviets are fully prepared to intervene militarily to prevent an Iraqi defeat.

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SENSITIVE

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RT6, FBI
4-6-87
HT52-1-14

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-275 #40484
BY RW NARA DATE 8/2/10

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. The U.S. regards the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- B. Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests.
 - Despite fundamental conflicts, the U.S. perceives several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests. They propose to explore these areas.
 - First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
 - Second, the U.S. has no interest in an Iraqi victory over Iran. The U.S. had no relationship with Iraq when the war began and, in fact, had worked with Iran against Iraq in earlier periods. The U.S. seeks an end to this conflict and wants to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.
 - Third, the U.S. and Iran have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is naked aggression, a threat to all in the region. Mutual friends -- China and Pakistan -- are threatened. The U.S. has ties with different elements of the Mujahideen -- but the objective is the same: the Soviets must get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.
- C. U.S. Objective Today.
 - The U.S. has no illusions about what is possible in a bilateral relationship. Perhaps a direct meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Perhaps more. The U.S. is prepared either way.
 - In essence, the U.S. is prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with the U.S.

III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran. The U.S. believes that Moscow will intervene to prevent an Iranian victory over Iraq. The Soviets' Arab equities are too important.
- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.

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SENSITIVE

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3

SENSITIVE

- There are significant Soviet capabilities along the border and inside Afghanistan which threaten Tehran.
- U.S. is aware of Soviet activity in Baluchistan, air strikes and military threat to Pakistan.
- Soviets have been preparing for invasion of Iran if necessary.
- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Nicaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship more difficult.
- U.S. is willing to help Iran cope with Soviet threat.

IV. AFGHANISTAN

- There is real value in Iran and U.S. cooperating against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- U.S. can provide humanitarian assistance for refugees as well as military aid for Mujahideen.
- The U.S. is willing to work quietly with Iran to devise a strategy to exploit Iranian contact with certain elements of the Afghan Mujahideen.

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SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	R. C. McFarlane		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☒	ACTION	☐	FILE
☒	APPROVAL	☐	INFORMATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	DIRECT REPLY	☒	RETURN
☐	DISPATCH	☒	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

~~TOP SECRET~~


40485

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 402010COPY NO. 1 OF 3

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-075 #40485

BY RW NARA DATE 8/9/10

National Security Council
The White House

(210)

II

IV

System #

Package #

~~402010~~

90656 1812
1817

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2 3</u>		
Paul Thompson	<u>3 4</u>		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>4 5</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Teicher	<u>2/6</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>PLS redo per nom (9) change VAB A 3, 5 redo</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Bud,
Recommend you send this out
with the modified cover memo.
J

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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NLRR 1007-075 #40407

BY RA NARA DATE 8/9/00

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

File 1 Hostages
North —
C E

PAGE 01 OF 04 TOKYO 2946
SIT773

DTG: 030619Z JUL 86 PSN: 062
TOR: 184/1755Z

DISTRIBUTION: VP PUBS NORT SIT /005

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DE RUEHKD #2946/01 1840621

O 030619Z JUL 86

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8124

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 12946

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, JA, IR, IZ, XF

SUBJECT: MOFA DIRGEN MIYAKE'S TALKS IN TEHRAN, JUNE 27-29:

- DISCUSSION OF HOSTAGES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS CABLED TO JAPANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON A FULL ACCOUNT OF DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS WASUKE MIYAKE'S DISCUSSIONS IN TEHRAN, JUNE 27-29, AND HAS INSTRUCTED THAT THIS BE SHARED WITH THE DEPARTMENT PROMPTLY.

[REDACTED]


SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 TOKYO 2946

DTG: 030619Z JUL 86 PSN: 062

NO
DIS



NO
DIS

3. MOFA SECOND MIDDLE EAST DIVISION DIRECTOR WATANABE AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR SUZUKI, WHO PREPARED THE BRIEFING BOOKS FOR DIRGEN MIYAKE'S TRIP TO TEHRAN AND WHO HELD A COMPLETE SET OF MINUTES FROM MIYAKE'S DISCUSSIONS, SHARED HIGHLIGHTS WITH THE EMBASSY ON JULY 3 (FOLLOWING A REVIEW OF KEY POINTS AND IMPLICATIONS WITH MIYAKE HIMSELF, WHO HAD PERSONALLY INSTRUCTED THAT JAPANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON BE PROVIDED A FULL AND PROMPT READOUT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE DEPARTMENT).

NO
DIS

NO
DIS



Did they get pictures...
☺

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 TOKYO 2946

DTG: 030619Z JUL 86 PSN: 0622

NO DIS

[REDACTED]

THUS

IRANIAN POLICY CANNOT CHANGE." TAKING A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT, AND SEEMINGLY MORE CONCILIATORY TACK, HOWEVER, SORAJANI NOTED THAT IRAN WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET ADVANCE INTO THE REGION. IN RESISTING THAT ADVANCE, HE CONTINUED, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SHARED A COMMON STRATEGIC GOAL WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THUS, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN CLOSE, COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND PAKISTAN -- A FACT WHICH THE U.S. NEED ONLY ANALYZE TO "UNDERSTAND THE REALITY OF IRANIAN POLICY AND INTENTIONS."

NO DIS

[REDACTED]

NO DIS

NO DIS

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 TOKYO 2946

DTG: 030619Z JUL 86 PSN: 0622

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 TOKYO 2946
SIT774

DTG: 030619Z JUL 86 PSN: 062
TOR: 184/1757Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TOKYO 12946

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, JA, IR, IZ, XF

SUBJECT: MOFA DIRGEN MIYAKE'S TALKS IN TEHRAN, JUNE 27-29:

[REDACTED] VELAYATI DID
NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO ANY OF THIS, DECLARING SIMPLY THAT
"THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN IS NOTHING MORE THAN A
DEMONSTRATION OF ANTIPATHY. SO LONG AS THIS ATTITUDE
REMAINS, IRAN WILL DO NOTHING." AT THIS JUNCTURE,
HOWEVER, VELAYATI AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT MIYAKE RAISE THE
SUBJECT WITH RAFSANJANI.

[REDACTED]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 030619Z JUL 86 PSN: 062

NO DIS

NO DIS

NO DIS

NO DIS

AND ASKING WHAT FRIENDLY GESTURES MIGHT BE
MADE BY THE U.S. TO DEMONSTRATE THIS SINCERITY.
RAFSANJANI DODGED A DIRECT REPLY, DECLARING WITHOUT
FURTHER ELABORATION THAT "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT KNOWS WHAT
IT SHOULD DO. THE U.S. MUST DEMONSTRATE ITS GOOD WILL BY
CONCRETE ACTIONS OVER A CERTAIN PERIOD. CURRENTLY THE
IRANIAN PEOPLE HARBOR DEEP MISTRUST OF THE U.S. HENCE,
IF THE U.S. (NEW) ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN IS DEMONSTRATED
THROUGH CERTAIN ACTIONS, THEN THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WOULD
UNDERSTAND. THEN IRAN AND THE U.S. COULD START TALKING.
THE ONLY WAY THAT AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS COULD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OCCUR IS BY U.S. ACTIONS WHICH DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL."

[REDACTED]

NEVERTHELESS, THEY COME OUT OF THEIR MEETINGS IN TEHRAN WITH NO ADVICE, NO PRESCRIPTIONS FOR NEXT MOVES, AND NO REAL SENSE THAT MUCH HAS CHANGED. END COMMENT.

6. IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT. WE WILL NOT REPEAT WHAT WE UNDERSTAND IS TO BE SHARED WITH DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, BUT OUR SENSE IS THAT THE BOTTOM LINE IS SIMPLY: NO MOVEMENT, AND NO DISPOSITION TO MOVE, IN TEHRAN. RAFSANJANI AND THE OTHERS REPEATED THEIR LONG-STANDING DEMAND THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN BE REMOVED, AND THEY OFFERED THE JAPANESE NO ENCOURAGEMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT.

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U.S.-Iran Dialogue

40488

I. BASIC PILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

- President Reagan came into office at a time when Iran had had a certain impact on the American political process -- perhaps not what you intended.
- The President represents and embodies America's recovery from a period of weakness. He has rebuilt American military and economic strength.
- Most important, he has restored American will and self-confidence. The U.S. is not afraid to use its power in defense of its interests. They are not intimidated by Soviet pressures, whether on arms control or Angola or Central America or Afghanistan.
- At the same time, they are prepared to resolve political problems on the basis of reciprocity.
- They see many international trends -- economic, technological, and political -- working in their favor.

II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. U.S. Assessment of Iranian Policy.

- The U.S. views the Iranian revolution as a fact. The U.S. is not trying to turn the clock back.
- The present U.S. attitude toward Iran is not a product of prejudice or emotion, but a clear-eyed assessment of Iran's present policies.
- The U.S. sees Iran's activity in many parts of the world, including even Central America.
- The U.S. knows how Iran views the Soviet Union. But Iranian subversion of Western interests and friends objectively serves Soviet interests on a global scale.
- U.S. assessment is that a decisive Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would only unleash greater regional instability, a further erosion of the Western position, and enhanced opportunities for Soviet trouble-making. The U.S. believes the Soviets are fully prepared to intervene militarily to prevent an Iraqi defeat.

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- The U.S. will therefore do what it can to prevent such a development. The U.S. regards the war as dangerous in many respects and would like to see an end to it.
- B. Possible Intersections of U.S.-Iranian Interests.
 - Despite fundamental conflicts, the U.S. perceives several possible intersections of U.S. and Iranian interests. They propose to explore these areas.
 - First, the U.S. has had a traditional interest in seeing Iran preserve its territorial integrity and independence. This has not changed. The U.S. opposes Soviet designs on Iran.
 - Second, the U.S. has no interest in an Iraqi victory over Iran. The U.S. had no relationship with Iraq when the war began and, in fact, had worked with Iran against Iraq in earlier periods. The U.S. seeks an end to this conflict and wants to use an improved relationship with Iran to further that end.
 - Third, the U.S. and Iran have parallel views on Afghanistan. Soviet policy there is naked aggression, a threat to all in the region. Mutual friends -- China and Pakistan -- are threatened. The U.S. has ties with different elements of the Mujahideen -- but the objective is the same: the Soviets must get out and let the Afghan people choose their own course.
- C. U.S. Objective Today.
 - The U.S. has no illusions about what is possible in a bilateral relationship. Perhaps a direct meeting will reveal only a limited, momentary, tactical coincidence of interests. Perhaps more. The U.S. is prepared either way.
 - In essence, the U.S. is prepared to have whatever kind of relationship with Iran that Iran is prepared to have with the U.S.

III. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

- Moscow has designs on parts of Iran. The U.S. believes that Moscow will intervene to prevent an Iranian victory over Iraq. The Soviets' Arab equities are too important.
- Afghanistan illustrates the price the Soviets are ready to pay to expand areas under their direct control.

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- There are significant Soviet capabilities along the border and inside Afghanistan which threaten Tehran.
- U.S. is aware of Soviet activity in Baluchistan, air strikes and military threat to Pakistan.
- Soviets have been preparing for invasion of Iran if necessary.
- Iranian support to Sandinista regime in Nicaragua aids and abets Soviet designs -- makes U.S.-Iranian relationship more difficult.
- U.S. is willing to help Iran cope with Soviet threat.

IV. AFGHANISTAN

- There is real value in Iran and U.S. cooperating against Moscow in Afghanistan.
- U.S. can provide humanitarian assistance for refugees as well as military aid for Mujahideen.
- The U.S. is willing to work quietly with Iran to devise a strategy to exploit Iranian contact with certain elements of the Afghan Mujahideen.

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