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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/3/2015

File Folder USSR (12/18/81-12/23/81)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

224

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170246	MEMO	J.NANCE TO REAGAN RE BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO BREZHNEV	1	12/18/1981	B1
170430	MEMO	R. PIPES TO J. NANCE RE BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO BREZHNEV R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-2-5	1	12/17/1981	B1
170431	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO J. NANCE RE BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-3-4	1	12/14/1981	B1
170432	MINUTES	RE 11/30/81 MEETING OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION COMMITTEE FOR US-SOVIET AFFAIRS PAR 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-4-3	5	ND	B1
170433	CABLE	MOSCOW 17250 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-5-2	12	12/20/1981	B1
170434	CABLE	W. BROCK TO J. NANCE RE TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOVIET UNION R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-6-1	3	12/22/1981	B1
170435	CABLE	J. NANCE TO REAGAN RE HAIG'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPEECH AND LETTERS R 4/8/2013 CRST NLR-748-22-6-7-0	1	11/22/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170436	LETTER	RR TO GEN. JARUZELSKI (DRAFT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-8-9	3	12/22/1981	B1
170438	CABLE	MOSCOW 17369 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-6-9-8	2	12/23/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED

81 DEC 17 P 4: 08

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

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Comments:

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 17, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to Brezhnev

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748-22-6-2-5

W LDD

TE 11/3/85

Attached at Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum to the President stating the reasons why no Presidential birthday message should be sent to Brezhnev. State, after some initial hesitation, concurs. At Tab II is State's memorandum, which need not be forwarded to the President. *AC*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab II State's memorandum, dated December 14, 1981.

cc: Bill Stearman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Review~~ December 17, 1987.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8135268

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81 DEC 15 A2:04

December 14, 1981

BY LOS NARA DATE 1/3/85 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Birthday Message to Brezhnev

Brezhnev's 75th birthday falls on December 19, and will be feted with great fanfare in the Soviet bloc. Embassy Moscow has suggested that the President send Brezhnev a short, dignified message for the occasion. Such a letter would be a useful public reaffirmation of our interest in serious negotiations and peaceful cooperation with the Soviets.

We propose the following draft:

Dear Mr. President:

Please allow me to join others in wishing you health on this, your seventy-fifth birthday. Our two countries have profound differences on many international issues. The Polish situation is especially worrisome at this moment.

We nonetheless seem to share a common desire for peace. I am hopeful that, with restraint and respect for each other's interests, and through serious negotiations and concrete forward steps on the issues that divide us, we can together find ways to achieve this goal.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

L. Paul Bremer, III.
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 12/14/87

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
14/3/15 108

RECEIVED 15 DEC 81 09

TO NANCE

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 14 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: BIRTHDAY MSG TO BREZHNEV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE

DUE: 16 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

CLEVELAND

COMMENTS

REF# 8135268

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Rane	4 12/17	Sub Pres for decision	12/18	cc ✓
Pres	P 12/19	for decision		
	C 12/21	Pres appt recom 12/19		RP ✓
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 18, 1981

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WITH CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT

81 DEC 18 10:38

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE
THE WHITE HOUSE

ENTERED
SITE

Subject: Minutes of the November 30 ICCUSA Meeting

Attached are the minutes of the November 30 meeting of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA).

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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WITH CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT

11/3/15 EOB

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CLASSIFIED IN PART

748-22-6-4-3

DOS REVIEWED 25-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

CDB

TE 11/3/15

REFER TO CIA

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Minutes from the November 30 Meeting of the
Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs
(ICCUA)

CIA REVIEWED 14-May-2013: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1. Overview on US-Soviet Relations

Deputy Assistant Secretary Scanlan discussed the November 30 opening in Geneva of the talks on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). He pointed out that many European governments must contend with a rising tide of anti-nuclear -- and sometimes anti-American -- sentiment which has been abetted by constant Soviet propaganda and that allied leaders have been anxious to see greater prominence attached to arms control in the East-West dialogue. In that connection, the President's November 18 speech had been instrumental in convincing Europeans of our sincerity in pursuing arms control and more constructive East-West relations. The zero option proposal reflects many months of intensive alliance consultations through the Special Consultative Group, (SCG), which is chaired by Assistant Secretary Eagleburger.

The timing and wide coverage of the President's arms control initiative also served to some extent to steal the thunder from Brezhnev's Bonn visit. Brezhnev attempted to regain the high road by offering a repackaging of their moratorium proposal as well as a variant of a European nuclear-free zone. Scanlan commented that European audiences are more skeptical of Soviet championship of nuclear-free zones after the recent submarine incident in Sweden.

Chancellor Schmidt solidly defended the FRG commitment to NATO modernization during the Brezhnev visit. The U.S. was obviously not happy with the recent agreement on the gas pipeline deal which was an established fact some weeks ago. We hope to minimize the damage by continuing to work with our European friends to develop alternate energy supplies as well as high reserve capacity.

Returning to arms control, Scanlan stressed that these negotiations will not be allowed to overshadow U.S. insistence on Soviet restraint in other areas -- where we will keep up the pressure.

This insistence on balanced progress is reflected in the U.S. stance at the CSCE conference on the proposed Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The delegations reconvened in Madrid on October 27. Although December 18 has been scheduled

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- 2 -

as the date for conclusion, there has been no substantive movement from the Soviets on the old problem of area coverage for a CDE nor the requisite progress on human rights. The U.S. is working with allies and neutrals on proposals for the CSCE endgame.

Maritime Boundary

Turning to the economic front, Scanlan reported that U.S. and Soviet teams of legal and cartographic experts met the previous week in Washington to discuss the delimitation of the US-Soviet maritime boundary which was established by the 1867 convention by which Alaska was ceded to the US. The original boundary was established along a few fixed points without specifying how to map the remaining segments. Scanlan pointed out that the lack of agreement on the precise boundary line could lead to technical violations of the line by Soviet fishing vessels. The talks concluded with an agreement that experts on both sides would review the data before setting a date for new talks.

Maritime Agreement

A US team met in London November 16-19 to renegotiate the maritime agreement which the Soviets had already been informed was no longer acceptable. The U.S. deleted six ports for security reasons to which the Soviets previously had access and proposed a more favorable balance in cross-trade operations and a grain shipment rate high enough to ensure significant US flag participation. Although the current agreement will lapse December 31, the initial round ended with no agreement on any of the key issues. It appeared as if the Soviet team was not authorized to engage in any substantive negotiations at the session. When the talks resume in Moscow on December 7, the US is prepared to stick by its ambitious but just proposals even should a stalemate result in the lapse of the agreement. The U.S. should have greater leverage in this case since the absence of an agreement would cause the Soviets more inconvenience than it would the US.

Reciprocity

Scanlan described the recent effort undertaken to brief Western European governments on our reciprocity practices. The trip was designed to sensitize European governments to the benefits of reciprocity and we will follow up bilaterally with various governments to exchange data. This effort was supplemented by the November 25 meeting of the NATO permanent representatives to discuss respective governments' reciprocity practices vis-a-vis the Soviets. A compendium of this material will be provided to foreign ministers at the NATO Ministerial in December.

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- 3 -

Reciprocal Access

Scanlan alluded to the responsibility of all agencies to report their contacts with Soviet officials so that the State Department could attempt to monitor reciprocal official access. Because of the repeated inability of a U.S. Embassy officer in Moscow to secure a call in one division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a recent call by a Soviet Embassy officer in Washington was rejected by a State officer. Soviet Embassy officials were told very clearly that this turndown was made on reciprocity grounds. Scanlan hoped that this action would result in an improvement of the situation in Moscow.

Foreign Missions Act

Scanlan noted that the Foreign Missions Act has passed the House and that the Senate version has cleared the Foreign Relations Committee and should come up for a full Senate vote early next year (expected to be favorable).

Exchanges

Scanlan reviewed the renewal process of the bilateral exchange agreements: the extension of the Health and Environment Agreements has been approved by the NSC. The World Oceans Agreement is now awaiting NSC action (which he was confident would be favorable). The Artificial Heart Agreement has been circulated to ICCUSA members for comment and initial consideration of the Science and Technology Agreement has begun.

ICA Soviet Exchange Programs

ICA Director for European Affairs Baldyga reported that his agency had no approved budget and that it was not possible to forecast cuts in funding for Soviet programs. He detailed the current ICA Soviet exchanges (summarized in attachment) which have operated at reduced levels since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He noted that the Soviets have broken the ground rules of the Amparts program by publicly quoting the remarks of the US participants.

Turning to the Findley Amendment, Baldyga said that IREX representatives had had a series of useful meetings with DOD and DIA. In a recent memo, COMEX evaluated IREX in a more positive light. Hurwitz (State) reported that he had met with a Findley staffer to discuss the problems presented by the Amendment; she took his points and has promised to schedule a meeting for Congressman Findley with State and ICA representatives.

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- 4 -

Baldyga felt that ICA is faced with the prospect that the Soviets would increasingly seek to end-run the agency as official exchanges wind down, i.e., by dealing directly with private organizations. Stearman (NSC) asked how the USG could deal with this problem. Baldyga suggested that we could tighten up in COMEX although U.S. sponsors might be less willing to cooperate. Tighter control might also be exercised through Export Administration or revised or reinterpreted U.S. visa laws.

Radio Liberty Broadcasting to the USSR

Roberts described the mission of Radio Liberty (RL) and the oversight role played by the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) of which he is Executive Director. [REDACTED]

25x3

[REDACTED] the radios are now funded by Congressional appropriations. RL seeks to broadcast from the listeners' point of view in order to compensate for the censorship practiced by the USSR. The Radio has been heavily jammed since its inception in 1950 although there are an estimated 3 million daily listeners in the Soviet Union. RL is anxious to increase broadcasting to Soviet Central Asia and various government agencies are assisting in the difficult effort to obtain new broadcasting facilities abroad.

Referring to criticisms of RL which have been aired in Jack Anderson's column, Roberts stated that a small amount of broadcast material was indeed judged to be in violation of RL policy. To a large extent, this situation has been corrected. Broadcasts are carefully monitored. Roberts identified other current RL problems as the lack of qualified personnel who speak the more esoteric (i.e., Kirghiz) of the 15 Soviet broadcast languages and attacks on RL/RFE personnel and facilities. Security has been improved since the February 1980 bombing of RL/RFE headquarters in Munich.

Voice of America Broadcasting to the USSR

Voice of America Deputy Director Catherman described VOA's mission to represent the American people in toto in its broadcasting. VOA's policy on broadcasting to the Soviet Union is under review. Consideration is being given to tailoring its broadcasting to fit more closely Soviet audiences. VOA is also considering giving an expanded voice to Soviet emigré opinion.

The Soviet government resumed jamming VOA broadcasts in August 1980 which today constitutes the VOA Soviet Service's biggest problem. Director Conklin is intent on finding a more

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- 5 -

effective way to counter jamming than simply increasing the power. Catherman was also concerned over the future of VOA's broadcast facilities in Greece. If Prime Minister Papandreu decides to use the stations in Kavala as bargaining chips, VOA has only poor backup facilities although powerful transmitting may be possible from Sri Lanka. State and ICA have been asked to help locate new areas from which VOA can broadcast into the Soviet Union. Allen (Director of VOA's USSR Division) noted that VOA also suffered from a lack of personnel competent in the various Soviet nationality languages and urged representatives to steer possible candidates to VOA as well as RL.

Other Business

Heiss (Commerce) stated that her agency would publicly announce that day the approval of the International Harvester license to sell an agricultural combine package to the USSR. Scanlan added that the technology involved had been determined to be non-sensitive but the issue had nonetheless taken several months to resolve. Rixse (DOD) indicated that his agency had not been happy with the decision.

Shafran (HUD) said that her agency's proposed budget would reduce international affairs staff from 12 to 5 and would eliminate the director's slot for the Soviet program. DOE (Metzler) and HHS (Henry) noted that their agencies' proposed budgets made no provision for Soviet exchanges.

Attachment:

Summary of USICA US-USSR Exchanges

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SUMMARY OF U.S-U.S.S.R. EXCHANGES

Funded by USICA during FY 1981

Academic ExchangesFulbright Lecturers

The Fulbright Lecturers Program, administered under contract by the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), is conducted on an informal basis in the absence of an Agreement with the Soviet government. The exchange is conducted with the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Specialized Education (MinVUZ).

ICA contributes 100 percent of the costs of this program; in FY '81 this amounted to \$298,994.

In FY '81, 39 U.S. lecturers were nominated, 17 were placed by the Soviets and 14 finally accepted grants. Twenty five Soviet lecturers were nominated, 14 were placed through CIES at U.S. universities.

Cooperation with Private Institutions (CPI's)International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)

IREX conducts exchange programs with the USSR and Eastern Europe. ICA contributed \$1,735,000 toward the total IREX budget of \$4,250,000 during FY '81 to assist with administrative and program costs principally in the Soviet Union.

The IREX program in the USSR includes the following exchanges:

Exchange	U.S.	Soviet
Graduate Student/Young Faculty	29	29
Senior Research Scholars	14	9
ACLS/USSR Academy of Sciences	14	22
Summer Language Teachers	35	35

American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR)

ACTR provides an opportunity for qualified American students of Russian to undertake advanced language study at the Pushkin Institute in Moscow. Thirty U.S. students participate in a semester program and 4 students in a 10 month program.

ICA contributed \$5000 toward the ACTR FY'81 budget of \$126,000.

American Field Service (AFS)

AFS administers an exchange of secondary school language teachers in cooperation with the Soviet Ministry of Education. Six teachers on each side are exchanged for a 10 week period.

ICA contributed \$27,780 of the FY '81 AFS budget of \$68,000.

Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE)

Conducted by a consortium of 26 U.S. colleges and universities, CIEE enables American undergraduates to study at Leningrad State University for a summer term, a semester or an academic year. In FY '81, 155 students were in the summer program, 35 are scheduled for each semester and 10 will study for the entire academic year.

ICA contributed \$25,000 of the FY '81 CIEE budget of \$1,237,595.

Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA)

A consortium consisting of the universities of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan State, Minnesota, Ohio State and Wisconsin, MUCIA and Moscow State University have an agreement to exchange research professors, lecturers and related activities. During FY '81 each side plans to exchange 4 lecturers and 4 researchers for at least one semester.

ICA contributed \$10,000 of the FY '81 MUCIA budget of \$39,300.

State University of New York (SUNY)

SUNY's agreement with Moscow State University provides for an exchange of undergraduate and graduate students, faculty members and librarians. In FY '81, approximately 10 undergraduate students, 12-15 graduate students and 4-6 faculty on each side will participate.

ICA contributed \$50,000 for support of graduate student and faculty exchanges only toward the estimated FY '81 SUNY budget of \$455,895.

-3-

Private Exchanges (Facilitative Support Only)

Ohio State University/Pushkin Institute: Ohio State sends 24 students and one professor to each of two programs of language study at Pushkin Institute.

Middlebury College/Pushkin Institute: Middlebury sends 15 students and one professor to each of two semester programs at the Pushkin Institute.

Lowell University/Tbilisi State University: A university to university agreement for the annual exchange of one or two professors or graduate students.

University of Missouri/Moscow State University: A recently concluded university to university agreement which has yet to function.

Wayne State University/Yerevan State University: A university to university agreement approved by the Armenian Ministry of Higher Education but not yet implemented.

In addition to the above, many American colleges and universities organize travel-study programs for students of Russian language, literature and Soviet studies. Some are mainly tourism, while others involve lectures and language courses at such institutions as Leningrad State University.

Non-Academic Exchanges Funded by ICAInternational Visitor Program (IV)

During FY '81, three Soviets participated in ICA-sponsored Multi-regional IV Projects and one Soviet visited the U.S. on an individual grant. This compares with more than 50 individual and multi-regional grants annually prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

American Participants (AMPARTS)

Nine American specialists in economics, defense and security affairs and arms control were sent to the USSR during FY '81. Among recent AMPARTs to the USSR were John Hardt, Richard Kaufman, Vladimir Treml in economics; William Griffith and Jack Kangas in defense/security/arms control. The number of AMPARTs is a significant reduction from pre-Afghanistan levels of 25-30 annually.

prepared by: WPKiehl EU

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RECEIVED 21 DEC 81 09

TO NANCE

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 18 DEC 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/3/15 6015

KEYWORDS: USSR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MARITIME VOA

RL EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 30 NOV ICCUSA MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

SHOEMAKER

LORD

GUHIN

COMMENTS

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 7250
SIT174 DATE 12/22/81

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TOR: 354/1227Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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NLRR 748-22-6-5-2

BY KDB NARA DATE 11/3/85

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #7250/01 3540948 (TAO)
O 200909Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0132

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 8707
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 7112
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3221
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 1880
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 5854
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 7528
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AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1398
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1224
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6664
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USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 5584
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 17250
EXDIS
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
USNATO HOLD FOR EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 12065: RDS 12/19/01 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR
SUBJECT: ONE WEEK INTO THE POLISH CRISIS: THE SOVIET
- PERSPECTIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1. ~~SECRET~~, ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY:

2. ONE WEEK INTO POLISH MARTIAL LAW, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS KNOW THEY ARE IN DEEP TROUBLE. REGARDLESS OF THE OBVIOUS SOVIET COLLUSION IN THE SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE POLISH GENERALS, THE DETERIORATION IN POLAND TO MILITARY RULE IS ALREADY A COSTLY DISASTER FOR SOVIET POLICY AND INTERESTS. THERE ARE CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE HOPING FOR A MIRACLE FROM THE JUNTA IN WARSAW, BUT ARE NOT CONFIDENT OF IT. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FULLY COMMITTED THEIR PRESTIGE OR AUTHORITY TO THE SUCCESS OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND, TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WARSAW OR TO JARUZELSKI PERSONALLY. THEY ARE KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE ON JARUZELSKI. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT SO FAR COMMITTED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 7250

DTG: 200909Z DEC 81 PSN: 001079

ITSELF TO ANY FURTHER COURSE OF ACTION IN POLAND; NONE OF THE SOVIET OPTIONS HAS BEEN CLOSED.

3. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS KEENLY UNDERSTAND THE COSTLINESS OF ALL THEIR OPTIONS IN POLAND. THEY ARE NOW ENGAGED IN DAMAGE LIMITATION EFFORTS. IN OUR VIEW, THE PRIMARY SOVIET NEEDS ARE FOR ORDER ON THEIR WESTERN BORDER AND SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THEIR ARMIES IN GERMANY. IF THE JUNTA IN WARSAW CAN PULL THE DOMESTIC SITUATION TOGETHER AND ACHIEVE SOME REASONABLE FORM OF STABILITY, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL BE WILLING TO ACCEPT AN ENORMOUS PRICE: THE REPLACEMENT, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, OF A COMMUNIST PARTY GOVERNMENT IN POLAND WITH A NATIONALIST MILITARY ONE. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY FEAR THAT THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ONLY BE MORE NATIONALIST THAN ITS PREDECESSORS, BUT PERHAPS ALSO NO MORE COMPETENT IN GETTING POLISH WORKERS TO WORK; ALMOST CERTAINLY THE NEW REGIME WILL BE MORE COSTLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. NEVERTHELESS, TO ASSIST THE JUNTA, CURRENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ORGANIZING SIZEABLE EMERGENCY SHIPMENTS OF FOOD AND OTHER AID FROM HERE AND OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES.

4. IN THE PAST WEEK THE SOVIETS HAVE REACTED WITH CAUTION IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON POLAND.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE BELIEVE THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON THE WORD "REACT." THE SOVIETS ARE NOT SEEKING CONFRONTATION OR DISPUTE WITH THE WEST. SOME WESTERN PRESS ACCOUNTS COMING FROM MOSCOW IN RECENT DAYS HAVE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESTRAINED SIGNALS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SENDING TO THE WEST. WE THINK THE SOVIETS ARE PLAYING IT VERY COOL, AND WANT THE UNITED STATES TO DO THE SAME.
END SUMMARY.

5. WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS HAD SUBSTANTIAL KNOWLEDGE OF JARUZELSKI'S MOVE IN ADVANCE. WITHOUT QUESTION, THEY FELT STRONGLY THAT DRASTIC MEASURES WERE REQUIRED TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN POLAND. THEREFORE, WHATEVER THE DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE POLISH GENERALS, WE BELIEVE THEY SEIZED POWER TO PREVENT FURTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN UNACCEPTABLE TO THE KREMLIN.
-- IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE METICULOUS PREPARATIONS FOR THE COUP COULD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT179 DATE 12/22/81

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TOR: 354/1202Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0133

INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 8708
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 7113
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AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 5855
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 17250
EXDLS

KNOWLEDGE, AND AGREEMENT, OF THE SOVIET FORCES COMMANDER
AND KGB REPRESENTATIVES IN POLAND.

-- FOR MONTHS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TELLING THE POLES
PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT CONTINUED AND INCREASING
DISORDER ON THE SOVIET WESTERN BORDER WAS INTOLERABLE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE PRETTY CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THEY
WOULD NOT SUBSIDIZE A POLISH ECONOMY IN WHICH SOLIDARITY
CALLED THE SHOTS.

-- REMEMBERING EVENTS IN HUNGARY IN 1956 AND IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968, THE SOVIETS MUST HAVE FEARED
THAT THE DIRECTION OF POLISH REFORM WOULD ULTIMATELY
THREATEN POLAND'S POSITION IN THE WARSAW PACT AND
HENCE THE SOVIET LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THEIR FORWARD
ARMIES IN EAST GERMANY.

-- THE CREATION OF A POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENT AMONG
THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY WOULD
RELEGATE THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY (AND THEREBY ALL
OF MOSCOW'S LOYAL HENCHMEN IN POLAND) TO A SUBSIDIARY
ROLE WITHIN THE WEAKEST OF THE THREE PARTS OF THE
TRIUMVERATE. SOLIDARITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ARE
HATEFUL TO THE KREMLIN AS BOTH THE SEAT OF SOVIET

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POWER AND THE REPOSITORY OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM.
--THIS IS SIMPLY A TERRIBLE TIME IN SOVIET HISTORY
FOR THEIR CONTROL IN POLAND TO BREAK DOWN: THE SOVIET
ECONOMY IS A MESS; AGRICULTURE IS A DISASTER; THE
AMERICANS ARE RISING TO THEIR CHALLENGE WORLDWIDE;
THE CHINESE ARE IN CAHOOTS WITH THE AMERICANS;
AFGHANISTAN IS MUCH MESSIER THAN THEY EXPECTED; AND
THE WHOLE WORLD REGARDS SOVIET IDEOLOGY AS BANKRUPT.
TO CROWN IT ALL, THE POWER STRUCTURE IS FACING AN
INTERREGNUM FROM WHICH NO ONE CAN PREDICT THE OUTCOME.

6. DESPITE SOVIET CRIES FOR ACTION AGAINST SOLIDARITY,
THE IMPOSITION OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN POLAND IS
NOT LIKELY TO MAKE THE SOVIETS REALLY HAPPY:

-- SO FAR, THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY IS THE ODD MAN
OUT OF THE STRUGGLE. THE JUNTA IN WARSAW AT LEAST
TREATS SOLIDARITY AND THE CHURCH SERIOUSLY; THE
PARTY IS NOTABLE FOR ITS ABSENCE FROM THE LEADERSHIP
AND FROM THE NEWS.P

-- EVEN IF SOLIDARITY CAN BE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED
(A BIG IF INDEED), POLAND WOULD THEN BE IN THE HANDS
OF THE MILITARY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH; RUSSIANS ARE
WEANED ON HISTORICAL HATRED AND FEAR OF THESE TWO
POLISH INSTITUTIONS.

-- DURING A PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE, POLAND WILL REMAIN
USELESS AND UNRELIABLE AS AN EFFECTIVE MEMBER OF THE
WARSAW PACT; THE REAR OF THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES,
GERMANY, WILL STILL BE INSECURE.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- THE POLISH ECONOMY WILL CERTAINLY REMAIN A MAJOR
LIABILITY TO THE ENTIRE SOVIET BLOC. EVEN IF THE
MILITARY CAN PREVENT STRIKES THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO
GET ANYONE TO WORK VERY HARD. IF CURRENT SIGNS OF
LARGE EMERGENCY FOOD SHIPMENTS FROM THE BLOC ARE
RELIABLE, THE COSTS OF SUBSIDIZING THE JUNTA ARE

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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6410
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USMISSION USBERLIN PRIORITY 5586
BT

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 06 MOSCOW 17250

EXDIS
GOING TO BE STEEP, AND UNPOPULAR HERE.
-- THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME IS A HUGE GAMBLE IN WHICH
MANY OF THE CHIPS BELONG TO MOSCOW. IF THE JUNTA FAILS,
THE SOVIETS FACE THE NIGHTMARE THEY HAVE AVOIDED
EVER SINCE THE POLISH CRISIS STARTED: THE PROSPECT OF
THEIR OWN INTERVENTION AND LONG-TERM OCCUPATION OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POLAND.
-- WORST OF ALL, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST CONTINUE
TO WATCH ITS SUPPOSED CLIENT STATE DETERMINE ITS OWN
DESTINY. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE MILITARY
REGIME WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE REACTIONS OF MILLIONS
OF POLES, NOT BY THE DECISIONS OF THE KREMLIN.

7. BAD AS THE MESS IN POLAND MUST LOOK TO THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP, IN THE PAST WEEK IT DOES HAVE SOME REDEEMING
FEATURES:

-- SOMETHING HAS BEEN DONE AT LAST; THE SLOW DRIFT INTO
CHAOS HAS AT LEAST BEEN DEFLECTED IF NOT STOPPED.
-- THE MILITARY RULERS OF POLAND ARE NOT MEN LIKELY TO
FORGET THE POLICY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS OF SOVIET
RUSSIA; THEY MAY NOT BE LOYAL MOSCOW STOOGES, BUT THEY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ARE COMMITTED TO ESTABLISHING ORDER. ORDER IS
FUNDAMENTALLY WHAT MOSCOW WANTS.

-- THE JUNTA HAS CLEARLY DECLARED ITS ADHERENCE TO
ITS WARSAW PACT OBLIGATIONS. IT MAY BE MILITARILY
IMPOTENT BUT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT THREATENING
A REPETITION OF 1956 IN HUNGARY OR 1968 IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

-- SO FAR, THE POLISH POLICE AND MILITARY SEEM TO BE
FOLLOWING ORDERS. THIS MUST BE A HUGE RELIEF TO
MOSCOW, EVEN IF THE KREMLIN IS STILL HOLDING ITS
BREATH.

-- IF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT CAN LAST, THERE IS SOME
DISTANT PROSPECT THAT POLAND WILL PULL ITSELF TOGETHER
AND BECOME AT LEAST ECONOMICALLY FUNCTIONAL. THE
HUNGARIANS DID IT AFTER 1956; THE EAST GERMANS DID IT
AFTER THE WALL WENT UP; THE CZECHS DID IT AFTER 1968.

8. DESPITE THEIR OBVIOUS FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE COUP,
WE BELIEVE THERE ARE CLEAR INDICATIONS THE SOVIETS
ARE FAR FROM CONFIDENT OF THE OUTCOME OF MARTIAL LAW
IN POLAND AND ARE UNWILLING TO EXPLICITLY COMMIT
THEMSELVES TO ITS SUCCESS. ONE EFFECT IS TO KEEP
PRESSURE ON JARUZELSKI. NOTHING THE SOVIETS HAVE
PUBLICLY SAID SO FAR WOULD FORECLOSE ANY FURTHER ACTION
THEY MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE. DESPITE SOME ESCALATION
OF THE RHETORIC IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, THE SOVIET PUBLIC
REACTION TO EVENTS IN POLAND HAS SO FAR BEEN VERY
CAUTIOUS:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN ONLY LIMITED PUBLIC APPROVAL
TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW; THEY HAVE STOPPED
SHORT OF OUTRIGHT ENDORSEMENT OF JARUZELSKI'S HANDLING
OF IT. SOVIET PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY HAVE NOT BEEN
VESTED IN ANY ULTIMATELY CONSTRAINING WAY ON THE
OUTCOME OF THIS GAMBLE BY THE POLISH MILITARY.

-- IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE KREMLIN LEADERS
AND THE POLISH GENERALS TO CONCEAL THE EXTENT OF
SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUP. THE GENERALS DON'T
WANT TO BE SEEN AS SOVIET PUPPETS; THE SOVIETS DON'T
WANT TO FOCUS WORLD CRITICISM ON THEMSELVES.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO BLAST SOLIDARITY,
BUT THEY HAVE KEPT THEIR HANDS OFF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
AND HAVE BITTEN THEIR LIPS ABOUT THE ARREST OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 MOSCOW 17250

EXDIS
PROMINENT PARTY FIGURES. THE SOVIETS ARE CONSPICUOUSLY
NOT CALLING FOR ACTION OR AN ASSERTION OF AUTHORITY
BY THE POLISH PARTY; THEY ARE IGNORING THE POLISH
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ALMOST AS MUCH AS IS THE JUNTA
IN WARSAW.
-- SOVIET MEDIA ARE NOT NOW COMMUNICATING TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POPULACE HERE THAT A SHOWDOWN IN POLAND REQUIRING
SOVIET ACTION IS IMMINENT, POLISH REPORTING IS BEING
TREATED WITH KID GLOVES. IN RECENT DAYS, THIS REPORTING
HAS MIXED GRIM ACCOUNTS OF CLASHES AND DEATHS WITH
INCREASING, BUT STILL IMPLICIT, EXPRESSIONS OF SATIS-
FACTION. NO IMPLICATION OF A BREAKDOWN IN CONTROL
BY POLISH SECURITY FORCES IS BEING GIVEN TO THE SOVIET
PUBLIC, BUT NEITHER ARE THEY BEING ASSURED OF A GOOD
OUTCOME.

-- IN THE FIRST DAYS AFTER THE COUP, THE SOVIETS WERE
NEARLY SILENT ABOUT WESTERN INFLUENCE IN POLAND.
MORE RECENTLY, THEY HAVE REACTED TO WESTERN, ESPECIALLY
AMERICAN, STATEMENTS DRAWING THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSION
OF SOVIET COMPLICITY IN THE COUP BY ACCUSING THE WEST
OF ENCOURAGING, AIDING AND EVEN DIRECTING THE ACTIONS

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OF SOLIDARITY. HOWEVER, THESE HAVE BEEN SOVIET REACTIONS, NOT INITIATIVES, AND THEY HAVE BEEN CARRIED AT LOW MEDIA LEVELS WITHOUT OFFICIAL IMPRIMATEUR.

-- SOVIET COMMENTARY IS DEVELOPING TWO THEMES IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE: AMERICAN "INVOLVEMENT" IN SOLIDARITY'S ALLEGED PLANS TO SEIZE POWER AND THE AMERICAN "ECONOMIC BLOCKADE" OF POLAND AS A RESPONSE TO MARTIAL LAW. THESE THEMES ARE LIKELY TO BECOME MORE PROMINENT AS THE SOVIETS TRY TO PROVE THAT THE WEST SOUGHT TO SABOTAGE POLAND POLITICALLY BEFORE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER AND IS NOW SEEKING TO SABOTAGE POLAND ECONOMICALLY.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT USED THE GATHERING OF EAST BLOC PARTY CHIEFS IN MOSCOW FOR BREZHNEV'S BIRTHDAY TO BEAT THE DRUMS ON POLAND; INDEED, THE SILENCE ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN STRIKING. THE TONE OF JARUZELSKI'S BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO BREZHNEV SUGGESTS A POSSIBILITY THAT JARUZELSKI WOULD LIKE A MORE WHOLEHEARTED COMMITMENT AND CONFIDENCE FROM MOSCOW.

9. WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS TRYING TO TELL US IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT POLAND DURING THE PAST WEEK?

-- THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS STILL WHISTLING IN THE DARK ABOUT THE TREMORS ON ITS WESTERN BORDER.

-- THE SOVIETS WANT SOME KIND OF ORDER IN POLAND BUT THEY HAVE NO BETTER IDEAS NOW ABOUT HOW TO ACHIEVE IT THAN DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- WHILE THEY APPARENTLY ARE WILLING TO PLACE FOOD SUPPLIES AND CREDITS ON THE LINE TO BACK THE GAMBLE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONFIDENT ABOUT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WARSAW TO GIVE IT OVERT SOVIET SANCTION AND SUPPORT.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO ACT COOL WHILE THE MILITARY IN POLAND TRIES TO BEAT DOWN THE FLAMES; THEY WANT EVERYONE ELSE TO PLAY IT COOL AS WELL. CAUTIOUS STATEMENTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ARE GREETED WITH EITHER SILENCE OR MILD APPROVAL. MORE PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS (IN THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT) ARE PARRIED PUBLICLY, BUT AT A LOW LEVEL AND WITHOUT OFFICIAL IMPRIMATEUR.

-- IN SHORT, THE SOVIETS ARE HOPING FOR A MIRACLE FROM THE MEN ON HORSEBACK IN WARSAW, BUT THEY WON'T REALLY BELIEVE IT TILL THEY SEE IT.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 MOSCOW 17250
EXDIS

10. WHAT DO THE SOVIETS FEEL THEY MUST HAVE IN POLAND?
-- SOME SEMBLANCE OF ORDER.
-- NO THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE WARSAW PACT'S
LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
-- SOME EXPECTATION THAT THE POLISH ECONOMY WILL NOT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE A BASKET CASE INDEFINITELY.
-- SOME PROSPECT THAT CONDITIONS WILL BE CREATED FOR
THE ULTIMATE RESTORATION OF REAL PARTY RULE.
-- ABOVE ALL, SOME PROGRESS TOWARD AN END TO UNCERTAINTY.
THE ENDLESS DRAMA OF THE POLISH CRISIS IS SIMPLY TOO
STRAINING FOR A SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN ITS TWILIGHT YEARS.
THEY WANT PREDICTABILITY ON THEIR WESTERN BORDER.

11. WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS WILLING TO PAY?
-- MILITARY RATHER THAN COMMUNIST PARTY RULE IN THEIR
LARGEST CLIENT STATE (AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING).
-- A POLISH REGIME WHICH IS MORE NATIONALIST THAN
SOCIALIST AND MORE PRO-POLISH THAN PRO-SOVIET.
-- THE CONTINUATION, UNDER MILITARY GUIDANCE, OF SOME
OF THE POST-1980 REFORMS.

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-- PUBLIC SILENCE ON DEVELOPING TRENDS IN POLAND WHICH ARE HISTORICALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY HATEFUL TO THE KREMLIN.

-- IF THE GENERALS IN WARSAW CAN SUCCEED, THE BOSSES IN MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY GO ALONG WITH THE EXPEDIENTS THE JUNTA CHOOSES TO EMPLOY WITHIN POLAND. THE SOVIET MOTIVATION:

12. FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE MESS IN POLAND IS THE WORST KIND OF CRISIS, IN THE WORST POSSIBLE PLACE AT THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME. DURING THE PAST FOUR CENTURIES THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL MIND HAS BEEN FIXATED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF "THE TIME OF TROUBLES," WHEN ORDER IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE COLLAPSED WITH A CONSIDERABLE ASSIST FROM CATHOLIC POLAND. SINCE THAT TIME, THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER WITHIN THE EMPIRE HAS TAKEN PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OTHER GOALS. THE PRESENT SOVIET EMPIRE, DESPITE ITS MASSIVE INERTIAL STRENGTH, IS SUFFERING MAJOR STRAINS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE COMPELLING SOVIET REQUIREMENT AND BASIC GOAL WITHIN ITS POLISH "PROVINCE" IS THE RESTORATION OF ORDER. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD BE WILLING TO ESTABLISH THIS ORDER WITH THE BAYONETS OF THE RED ARMY, IF THEY THOUGHT SUCH A MOVE WOULD WORK. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST TWO YEARS INDICATES THAT THEY HAVE BEEN CONVINCED THAT MILITARY ACTION IN POLAND WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR SOVIET POLICY AND THAT ONLY POLES CAN EFFECTIVELY GOVERN POLES. TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SURRENDER CONTROL OF POLISH AFFAIRS INTO THE HANDS OF THE POLISH MILITARY IS ITSELF A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IT MEANS, IN ESSENCE, THAT MOSCOW MUST SACRIFICE ITS OWN CONTROL WITHIN A LARGE PART OF ITS EMPIRE TO ACHIEVE ORDER THERE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A SACRIFICE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS RELUCTANTLY WILLING TO MAKE. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IF FACED WITH CLEAR FAILURE BY THE POLISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT, THE SOVIETS WILL PREFER THEIR OWN CONTROL WITHOUT ORDER TO NEITHER CONTROL NOR ORDER.

FOR THE UNITED STATES:

13. FROM THE WEST (WHICH IN SOVIET EYES MEANS ABOVE ALL THE UNITED STATES) THE SOVIETS WANT ACCEPTANCE OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 7117
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 1885
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 5859
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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 7337
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6413
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1403
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 MOSCOW 17250

~~EXDIS~~
THEIR BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR ORDER IN POLAND. THEY
ALSO EXPECT UNDERSTANDING OF HOW MUCH THEY ARE
SWALLOWING THERE. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THE WEST
WILL NOT GO TO WAR OVER POLAND; WE HAVE TOLD THEM
SO. THEY ALSO KNOW THEY HAVE PRECIOUS LITTLE LEVERAGE
OVER OTHER WESTERN ACTIONS IN THE POLISH CRISIS. BUT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THEY DON'T REALLY MUCH CARE IF WESTERN BANKS LOSE THEIR
MONEY AND THEY CAN ENDURE WHAT THE WESTERN PRESS,
WESTERN PUBLICS AND EVEN WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES
SAY ABOUT POLAND. THE SOVIETS LOOK AT THE WORLD IN
VERY TRADITIONAL "GREAT POWER" TERMS. THEY SIMPLY
DON'T BELIEVE THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CANNOT AND
WILL NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR PASSION FOR ORDER WITHIN
THEIR EMPIRE. TO THE EXTENT THE WEST DOES NOT
ACKNOWLEDGE THIS SOVIET "RIGHT," THE KREMLIN WILL
NURSE A GRUDGE, LOOK FOR OTHER OUTLETS FOR ITS
BITTERNESS, AND SIMPLY ENDURE WHAT COMES. SO FAR,
HOWEVER, THE KREMLIN HAS BEEN MUCH MORE CONCERNED
WITH THE ONGOING GAMBLE OF THE POLISH MILITARY. THE
SOVIETS ARE NOT SEEKING A CONFRONTATION WITH THE
UNITED STATES OVER POLAND AND HOPE TO MINIMIZE THE
COSTS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 200909Z DEC 81 PSN: 001068

14. WARSAW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HARTMAN

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THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
WASHINGTON
20506

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NLRR 748-22-6-6-1

BY KDB NARA DATE 11/3/15

December 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO: JAMES W. NANCE, ACTING ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM E. BROCK *W.E.B.*

SUBJECT: Trade Sanctions Against the Soviet Union

In the event of a decision to impose economic sanctions upon the Soviet Union in response to Soviet involvement in the unfolding events in Poland, several alternatives exist in the trade area. 1/ They are:

- I. Imposition of an embargo on exports of high technology to the Soviet Union.
- II. Imposition of a total embargo on exports to the Soviet Union.
- III. Imposition of a total embargo on trade with the Soviet Union.

United States exports to the Soviet Union are comprised primarily of agricultural products, and to a lesser degree, high technology. Prior to the grain embargo imposed in January 1980, U.S. exports reached a record high of \$3.6 billion in 1979. Of this total, \$2.8 billion was made up of agricultural exports (primarily corn, wheat, and soybeans). Exports of sophisticated technology accounted for something less than \$700 million. During the first six months of 1981, U.S. exports were again dominated by agricultural products which comprised roughly 80 percent of the total of \$1.1 billion.

United States imports from the Soviet Union amounted to \$872 million in 1979 and \$430 million in 1980. Imports from the U.S.S.R. totalled \$218 million during the first six months of 1981. Imports historically have been comprised of petroleum products, metals, and minerals.

Any action taken by the United States must be sustainable and must have a long-term impact on the Soviet Union, as well as provide flexibility for U.S. policy in the future. Furthermore, for any action taken to be effective, it is imperative that it be taken in unison with the Western Allies.

1/ One option that is correctly not being considered is an embargo solely on agricultural products. Such an action would have serious domestic costs and would have little impact on the U.S.S.R., which can readily find other suppliers.

(TOP SECRET, SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL)
CLASSIFIED BY *W.E.B.*
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
12-22-86

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- 2 -

Option I Embargo on High Technology Exports to the Soviet Union

PROS

- o Definitive long-term impact on the development of the Soviet economy, particularly in the energy sector, requiring an identifiable shift of resources away from military expenditures.

CONS

- o Little direct impact on Soviet behavior in Poland in the short term due to current relatively low level of trade as a result of sanctions in place since Afghanistan, and implementation by Allies of relatively stringent export control policies.
- o Would require total cooperation of Allies which may be difficult to secure in light of greater importance of trade with the East to the Allies, and generally poor economic prospects in Europe. Without Allied cooperation, unilateral restrictions imposed by the United States will have little effect on Soviets and result in lost commercial opportunities for U.S. firms as they no longer have monopoly on high technology products.
- o Some domestic political opposition from U.S. companies denied commercial opportunities by the restrictions.

Option II Total Embargo on U.S. Exports to the U.S.S.R.

PROS

- o Moderate impact upon the Soviet economy, particularly in the food and energy sectors, forcing the Soviets to seek alternative sources of food and to shift resources away from military production to economic development.
- o Domestically, no one group will be singled out to bear the brunt of the restrictions.

CONS

- o Unlikely to radically influence course of Soviet involvement in Poland in the short term.
- o Absolutely requires the total cooperation of U.S. Allies, friends, and other countries. If cooperation is not forthcoming, effectiveness of sanctions will be undermined as in case of post-Afghanistan sanctions. In any event, cooperation will be difficult to sustain over the long term.

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- 3 -

31

- o Potential loss of large-scale agricultural sales in a time of surpluses and very depressed income levels for American farmers and strong Soviet demand for food imports.
- o Domestic political opposition in the farm community would be great, leading to pressures to open up additional international markets through additional support programs, e.g., export subsidies.

Option III

Total Embargo on Trade with the Soviet Union

PROS

- o Same as those described under Option II.
- o Avoids criticism that some sectors of U.S. economy are being spared from impact of embargo.
- o Denial of hard currency sales to the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviets are experiencing a hard currency squeeze.

CONS

- o Same as those described under Option II.
- o Inconvenience of dislocation of source of supply to the United States of certain important natural resources used in various production processes.

In conclusion, of the three options, an embargo on U.S. exports of high technology to the U.S.S.R. would be the most likely to succeed in having an adverse impact on the Soviet Union over the long term, because it would offer a better chance for an effective, concerted effort involving other countries. It also would be more acceptable domestically because if agricultural exports were restricted there would be great pressure for expensive alternative actions to protect farm income (e.g., domestic supports, export subsidies). It will require the total cooperation of the Western Allies, and should be taken in concert with a broad range of economic and diplomatic actions across the entire spectrum of Allied Country-Soviet relations.

cc: Edwin Meese, III

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RECEIVED

81 DEC 22 P 5:39

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

*Staff for action**get to know**Bailey ASAP to**incorporate in**NSC paper on**Poland.*

SHOW CC

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Comments:

Bailey's cfc called 12/22 AM.
 will address first thing Wednesday
 (12/23) am. dmnsels

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
F CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 22 DEC 81 18

TO NANCE

FROM BROCK, W

DOCDATE 22 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: INTL TRADE

USSR

POLAND

CM

NSC

SUBJECT: TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION / TOPIC
FOR NSC MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE

DUE: 23 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAILEY

PIPES

STEARMAN

WEISS

NAU

LENZ

COLSON

this is OBE

COMMENTS BAILEY'S OFC CONTACTED THIS PM / THEY WILL ADDRESS FIRST

THING IN THE AM

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(D *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*C 12/29**OBE per Bailey**NB*

DISPATCH

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ID 8107273

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

11/3/15 KDB

RECEIVED 13 SEP 84 15

TO PRESIDENT

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 22 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

POLAND

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SPEECHES

JARUZELSKI, WOJCIECH

SUBJECT: HAIG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPEECH & LTRS TO BREZHNEV & JARUZELSKI

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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MEMORANDUM

7273

35

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

170435

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 22, 1981

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-67-0

BY 1603 NARA DATE 4/3/85

OK
PR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Bud*

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Recommendations for
Wednesday Speech and Letters to
Brezhnev and Jaruzelski

Al Haig has just sent you the attached note which he asked that I send directly to you. The NSC staff and your speech writers are reviewing the attachments. We will have firm recommendations and another version of the speech for you this afternoon.

Papers for the afternoon NSC meeting will follow shortly.

Tab A: Secretary Haig Memorandum of December 22, 1981

CC: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review on December 22, 1987

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SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


811 1 22 1111 333

December 22, 1981

Mr. President:

At enclosure 1 is some draft language to be folded into the current draft of your Presidential Christmas message for Wednesday evening.

At enclosures 2 and 3 are draft messages to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski respectively. I recommend you delay on the dispatch of these two messages until after this afternoon's NSC meeting, during which we will have an opportunity to discuss their impact, the likely responses and the issues they will face us with.



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Encls

The President
The White House

3

1

Insert to Presidential Christmas Message
(should follow page three)

In this season we celebrate peace, yet the world knows little peace. Refugees still flee from war and oppression in Kampuchea. Proud men fight on for their independence in Afghanistan. And now in Poland, a brave people filled with faith in God and a love of freedom resists the brutal grip of dictatorship. The Poles have tasted liberty, and their thirst for it will never be quenched.

In this season celebrating peace, we call upon the Government of Poland to allow its prisoners to spend Christmas with their families. We call upon it to release them now, if truly it seeks to bind up that nation's wounds. We ask the Polish government that the International Red Cross be permitted to visit all prisoners, to monitor the conditions of their detention, and to bring them the medical attention, food, or clothing they may need. These are simple humanitarian gestures for which conscience cries out.

As Americans, we thank God that though so much of the world knows strife, we live in a land of liberty and peace. Let us remember how fortunate we are, and let us recall the debt we owe to all those who came before us. Their sacrifices earned our freedom. As we sadly study the troubled world around us, let us strengthen our determination to preserve the liberty they bequeathed to us.

2

DECLASSIFIED

12/22/81

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NLRR 748-22-6-8-9

BY GDB NARA DATE 11/3/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

170436

Dear General Jaruzelski:

I am deeply concerned over recent developments in Poland. Your government's imposition of martial law has led to the arrest and confinement of thousands of Polish workers and intellectuals -- the very people your government and party claim they are pledged to serve. In addition, we have reports of widespread beatings -- and even killings -- by Polish internal security organs. It is impossible to reconcile these gross violations of the most elemental human rights with Poland's obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of the United Nations, and the assurances you have given us concerning your intention to continue the process of renewal.

I recognize that you have been under considerable external pressure to roll back the reforms that have taken place in Poland during the past 16 months. It is not the purpose of this letter to question the nature of Poland's political system or its military alliances. But the United States Government cannot sit by and ignore the widespread violations of human rights occurring in Poland. To do so would make us a party to the repression of the rights of the Polish people.

His Excellency
General Wojciech Jaruzelski
President of the Council of Ministers,
Warsaw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-1 12/21/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 2 -

In response to your government's actions, the government of the United States has decided to suspend consideration of your request for \$740 million in agricultural assistance. In this regard, I should note that I had just approved \$100 million in emergency agricultural assistance when your government declared martial law. I have also decided to withhold the remainder of the undelivered amount of the \$71 million worth of dried milk and butter which we agreed to sell Poland last April. There are further steps which I am considering taking which would have a severe impact on our relations, particularly in the economic sphere. I hope I will not be forced to take them. However, if the repression continues, I will order a full review of every aspect of our policy toward Poland.

The United States Government stands ready to reconsider the actions it has taken once we are convinced that your government has taken concrete steps to end repression, freed those who have been subjected to arbitrary detention, and begun a search for reconciliation and a negotiated accommodation with the true representatives of all of the social, spiritual and political elements of Polish society which have made Poland the great country it is. For the sake of the Polish people, stability in Europe and the future of U.S.-Polish relations, I strongly urge you to take steps to move Poland toward a policy of genuine compromise and negotiation.

Sincerely,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

stable Poland. But a process of reconciliation and moderate reform in Poland represents no threat to the Soviet Union. The United States cannot acquiesce in externally and internally imposed suppression of the Polish people's legitimate desire for such a process of renewal.

Your actions in the days ahead will determine our own decisions. As leaders of two great and powerful nations, we bear a mutual obligation to demonstrate wisdom, moderation and restraint. Let me assure you that I am prepared to join in the process of helping to heal Poland's wounds and to meet its real needs if you are prepared to reciprocate. I call upon you to make clear that you understand the need for reconciliation in Poland, and to do so in the next few days.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170438

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 7369
SIT554 DATE 12/30/81

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-22-6-9-8
BY 603 NARA DATE 11/3/15

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NO DIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 12/23/01 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PL, UR
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON POLAND
REF: STATE 338335

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE READ THE POSITION WE PLAN TO TAKE ON POLAND IN THE NAC AND I THINK IT IS RIGHT ON THE MARK AS FAR AS THE DIRECTION IS CONCERNED AND THE COURSES OF ACTION. BUT I DISAGREE MOST HEARTILY WITH THE CONCLUSION IN PARA 3 INDENT 4 THAT "EITHER WAY, THE WEST WOULD SUFFER A PROFOUND MORAL AND POLITICAL DEFEAT." I BELIEVE THAT JUST THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE. THIS IS A MORAL DEFEAT OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH GENERALS. IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE IN THE WEST ARE FREE OF PROBLEMS OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOUGH DECISIONS, BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN POLAND, AND THE SOVIET AND POLISH AUTHORITIES' REACTION, IS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE MORAL BANKRUPTCY OF THESE COMMUNIST REGIMES. WHAT THE POLISH SITUATION SHOWS IS THAT NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION NOR THE POLISH GOVERNMENT CAN ACCEPT THAT MEASURE OF DIVERSITY WHICH WOULD PERMIT A SOLUTION TO THE GRAVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROBLEMS THAT POLAND FACES. THIS ASSUREDLY IS NOT A WESTERN FAILURE AND WE WOULD BE GRAVELY MISTAKEN TO DECLARE IT SUCH.

3. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW ASSUMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POLISH ECONOMY. OUR PUBLIC DECLARATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES. WE SHOULD USE THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING HOME ONCE AGAIN TO WESTERN OPINION AND IN OUR BROADCASTS TO THE EAST THAT THIS ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A SOCIETY WHICH PERMITS CHOICE AND, THEREFORE, CAN ADJUST, AND A SOCIETY BASED ON AUTHORITARIAN PRINCIPLES. THE SOVIETS AND THE POLISH AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO MADE EASIER OUR TASK OF MAINTAINING WESTERN UNITY AND DEALING WITH THE PHONY SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 7369

DTG: 231453Z DEC 81 PSN: 005410

WHAT WE MUST NOW DO IS TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD THE WEST ON COURSE. THE GREATEST STRENGTH WE HAVE NOW IS THE HIGH MORAL GROUND THAT HAS VIRTUALLY BEEN HANDED TO US. THIS IN THE END WILL GIVE US THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF PRESSURE AND LEVERAGE ON THE REGIMES IN THE EAST. OUR OBJECTIVE OUGHT TO BE TO KEEP THE EAST EVOLVING IN DIRECTIONS THAT ARE OPPOSED TO MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINE. THIS HAS BEEN HAPPENING TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IN EACH OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND IN A PRACTICAL SENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH IN NO WAY IS THIS REFLECTED IN THEIR DOCTRINAL STATEMENTS. LET'S KEEP THE PRESSURE ON TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION AND STOP DECLARING DEFEAT.
HARTMAN

~~SECRET~~