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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170251	CABLE	MOSCOW 0196 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-4-7</i>	3	1/7/1982	B1
170748	CABLE	MOSCOW 0388 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-5-6</i>	6	1/12/1982	B1
170749	MEMO	L. BRADY TO J. NANCE RE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-6-5</i>	1	1/12/1982	B1
170750	MEMO	B. DENYSYK TO L. BRADY RE USSR OIL AND GAS POLICY <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-7-4</i>	1	1/11/1982	B1
170751	CABLE	MOSCOW 0400 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-8-3</i>	5	1/13/1982	B1
170752	CABLE	MOSCOW 0445 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-9-2</i>	3	1/14/1982	B1
170753	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE POLAND <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-1-0</i>	2	ND	B1
170754	CABLE	STATE 10237 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-2-9</i>	3	1/14/1982	B1
170755	CABLE	SAME AS DOC #170752 (MOSCOW 0445) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-3-8</i>	3	1/14/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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170757	CABLE	STATE 10406 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11-10-0</i>	1	1/15/1982	B1
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170759	CABLE	MOSCOW 0534 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-11--12-8</i>	2	1/15/1982	B1

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170251

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0196
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00196

EXDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV AND EUR/RPM
EUR/RPM PLEASE PASS TO AMB. KAMPELMAN
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/7/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS ON PENTECOSTALS'
- EMIGRATION/HUNGER STRIKE
REF: MOSCOW 0193

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: DCM ZIMMERMANN TODAY CALLED ON MFA USA DIVISION ACTING CHIEF MYSHKOV TO BOTH PROPOSE A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE PENTECOSTALS' EMIGRATION AND TO REQUEST SOVIET EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION TO MEDICALLY EVACUATE AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA VASHCHENKO TO A WESTERN COUNTRY IN THE EVENT THEIR CONDITION SHOULD BECOME SERIOUS. MYSHKOV GAVE NO HOPE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO A MEDICAL EVACUATION, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT REJECT IT ON THE SPOT. HE SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN THE PROPOSED LONG-TERM SOLUTION: THE EMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTALS' FAMILY MEMBERS FROM CHERNOGORSK TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE DEPARTURE OF THE SEVEN IN THE EMBASSY TO APPLY FOR EXIT PERMISSION IN THEIR LEGAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE.
END SUMMARY.

3. THIS AFTERNOON (JANUARY 7) DCM MADE DEMARCHE ON PENTECOSTAL ISSUE TO MYSHKOV, ACTING CHIEF OF MFA USA DIVISION. FOLLOWING INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH THAT THIS WAS AS MUCH A SOVIET AS A U.S. PROBLEM AND TO ASSURE MYSHKOV THAT WE TOOK SERIOUSLY THE SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT THE SEVEN COULD EMIGRATE ONLY FROM CHERNOGORSK, DCM SAID THAT THERE WERE NOW TWO ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM: A BASIC ASPECT AND AN EMERGENCY ASPECT. TAKING THE BASIC ASPECT FIRST, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A NEW DEVELOPMENT WHICH OFFERED A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE SEVEN: AFTER MANY MONTHS OF INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS, THE SEVEN PENTECOSTALS HAD AGREED TO THE EMBASSY'S OUTLINING TO THE SOVIETS A NEW SUGGESTION. THE DCM HANDED MYSHKOV THE TEXT OF THE SUGGESTION AS A NON-PAPER. THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT: THE PENTECOSTALS WITHIN OUR EMBASSY HAVE ASSURED US THAT IF THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS IN CHERNOGORSK ARE FIRST ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY SOVIET LAW, AND IF THE SEVEN ARE GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL NOT FACE PROSECUTION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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AND THAT THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EMIGRATION WILL BE FAVORABLY PROCESSED, THEY WILL LEAVE THE EMBASSY. END TEXT.
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4. THE DCM SAID THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION FOR ALL CONCERNED. WITH THE FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE U.S., THE SOVIETS COULD OFFER EMIGRATION TO THE SEVEN ON THE BASIS OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION. THE DCM NOTED A 1978 PRECEDENT FOR THIS: AN ARMENIAN WOMAN (ELIZA OVSEPYAN) WHO HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY AFTER THREE MONTHS ON RECEIVING ASSURANCES FROM THE SOVIETS THAT HER APPLICATION FOR EMIGRATION WOULD BE LOOKED UPON FAVORABLY; SEVERAL WEEKS LATER SHE DID RECEIVE PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE.
-

5. THE DCM THEN TURNED TO THE EMERGENCY ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. HE DESCRIBED THE HUNGER STRIKE BY AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA VASHCHENKO AND SAID THAT THE EMBASSY IS NOW PERSUADED THAT THE TWO ARE PREPARED TO DIE. EMBASSY OFFICERS, THE FAMILY'S FRIENDS ABROAD, AND OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE EMBASSY HAD FAILED TO DISSUADE AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA. THE DCM REMINDED MYSHKOV OF THE TREMENDOUS PUBLICITY IN THE WEST THAT WOULD RESULT IF THE TWO DIED, AND THE INEVITABLE RESPONSIBILITY THAT WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE DCM SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE ONLY ONE SOLUTION THAT THE TWO WOULD ACCEPT: THEIR MEDICAL EVACUATION TO A CITY OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, HELSINKI. HE ASKED MYSHKOV TO GIVE URGENT ATTENTION TO THIS EMERGENCY SOLUTION AS WELL AS TO THE LONGER TERM PROBLEM OF THE EMIGRATION OF ALL THE FAMILY MEMBERS.
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6. IN PROVIDING A PROVISIONAL RESPONSE, MYSHKOV SAID IT WAS NOT HELPFUL TO REFER TO THIS AS A
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PAGE 01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00196

EXDIS
SOVIET PROBLEM OR TO DESCRIBE THE BAD PUBLICITY THAT WOULD REDOUND ON THE SOVIETS. HE SAID THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS CERTAINLY NOT A HELPFUL WAY TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM; HE CALLED IT A FORM OF BLACKMAIL. HE REITERATED THE STANDARD SOVIET REPLY- WHICH THE DCM HAD ALREADY ANTICIPATED IN HIS PRELIMINARY COMMENTS - THAT THE PROBLEM COULD BE RESOLVED ONLY IF THE SEVEN RETURNED TO CHERNOGORSK. HE SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE SITUATION OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS IN CHERNOGORSK, AND ASKED IF THEY HAD APPLIED FOR EMIGRATION VISAS. THE DCM RESPONDED THAT THE FAMILY MEMBERS HAD INDEED SOUGHT EMIGRATION PERMISSION, AND HE CATALOGUED IN DETAIL THE OBSTACLES AND FRUSTRATIONS THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED IN TRYING TO GET IT. HE ADDED THAT MARIA CHMYKHALOV'S HUSBAND AND SON HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO TRAVEL TO MOSCOW YESTERDAY, BUT HAD SIMPLY BEEN TOLD AT THE ALL-UNION OVIR THAT THEY HAD TO RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK TO APPLY FOR THE VISAS. MYSHKOV APPEARED TO BE UNAWARE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. THE DCM EMPHASIZED THAT FAILURE BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW THE FAMILY MEMBERS IN CHERNOGORSK TO EMIGRATE HAD GREATLY STRENGTHENED THE SEVEN'S RELUCTANCE TO RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK THEMSELVES.

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7. IN RESPONSE TO MYSHKOV'S COMMENTS ABOUT BLACKMAIL, THE DCM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS INDEED INTENDED AS A FORM OF PRESSURE ON THE U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS. WE HAD NOT SUPPORTED IT, INDEED WE HAD TRIED TO PREVENT IT AND WE ARE STILL TRYING TO STOP IT. BUT MYSHKOV HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS AN OBJECTIVE REALITY THAT HAD TO BE DEALT WITH ON AN URGENT BASIS. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT COMPROMISE ANY OF ITS LAWS, REGULATIONS, OR PRACTICES IF IT AUTHORIZED A MEDICAL EVACUATION; THIS WOULD BE A SIMPLE HUMANITARIAN ACT. MYSHKOV GAVE NO INDICATION OF INTEREST IN THE MEDICAL EVACUATION SOLUTION, BUT HE DID NOT REJECT IT ON THE SPOT. HE DID SEEM TO SHOW SOME INTEREST IN THE LONGER-TERM SOLUTION, AND HE AGREED TO TAKE THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES UNDER CONSIDERATION.
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EX-148-22-115-6
BY 6008 NARA DATE 1/4/85

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00388

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/12/88 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, UR, PL
SUBJECT: CZYREK VISIT TO MOSCOW: TOUGH COMMUNIQUE CALLS
FOR RETURN TO EUROPEAN DETENTE

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: AT THE END OF POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK'S JANUARY 10 TO 12 TRIP TO MOSCOW, THE TWO SIDES ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH IS IN EFFECT A TOUGH RETORT TO WESTERN CENSURE AND A CALL FOR A RETURN TO EUROPEAN DETENTE. DENOUNCING THE U.S., REJECTING THE NATO DECLARATION AT BRUSSELS, REGRETTING THE EC-10 POSITION AND AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF POLAND UNDER THE SOVIET SECURITY UMBRELLA, THE COMMUNIQUE CALLS UPON THE WEST EUROPEANS TO RETURN TO A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP AND EXPRESSES HOPE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE MADRID MEETING (WITH A DECISION TO HOLD A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE). DESPITE THE DENUNCIATIONS OF U.S. "INTERFERENCE" IN POLAND, THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO SPEAKS POSITIVELY OF THE INF TALKS AND A RESUMPTION OF THE SALT TALKS. NOTHING SPECIFIC IS SAID ON SOVIET AID TO POLAND BEYOND CZYREK'S EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE FOR SOVIET SUPPORT INCLUDING SUPPLIES OF GOODS AND RAW MATERIALS, AND NOTHING AT ALL IS SAID ABOUT MOSCOW'S ROLE BEHIND THE MILITARY JUNTA. IN ADDITION TO HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO, CZYREK ALSO MET WITH CPSU NUMBER TWO AND IDEOLOGUE MIKHAIL SUZLOV. THERE IS NO HINT IN THE COMMUNIQUE ABOUT THE LECTURE HE INEVITABLY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RECEIVED THERE ON RESTORING THE PARTY TO PROMINENCE
IN POLAND. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED THE EVENING OF JANUARY 12 GIVES LITTLE HINT OF THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS OR OF CZYREK'S OTHER CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW. IT IS DIRECTED AT THE FOREIGN AUDIENCE AS A DEFIANT ANSWER TO THE WEST. IT DOES NOT TALK OF CZYREK BRIEFING THE SOVIETS ON THE POLISH SITUATION, AS DID THE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING LAST SUMMER'S CRIMEA MEETING BETWEEN KANIA AND BREZHNEV. HOWEVER, IN AN INTERVIEW ON THE SOVIET TELEVISION PROGRAM VREMYA, CZYREK MADE CLEAR THAT BRIEFING THE SOVIETS WAS A MAJOR PART OF HIS TASK. HE TOLD THE TELEVISION AUDIENCE THAT HE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH HIS SOVIET HOSTS ON: (1) JOINT ACTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, (2) OPINIONS ON THE PROBLEMS IN POLAND, AND (3) COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND THE USSR. HE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, MENTIONED SUSLOV SPECIFICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS IN POLAND. CZYREK ALSO ASSERTED THAT HIS STATEMENTS HAD MET WITH "FULL UNDERSTANDING" FROM THE SOVIETS AND HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO THE TV AUDIENCE FOR THE AID AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS WAS APPARENTLY MUCH BETTER THAN THOSE LAST SUMMER

OR THE STRAINED CZYREK-GROMYKO SESSION AT THE UN IN SEPTEMBER; THE COMMUNIQUE CALLED THESE LATEST TALKS "CORDIAL AND WITH FULL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING."

4. ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS, THE COMMUNIQUE EMPHASIZES:
-- CLOSE AND COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM (I.E. SOVIET LEADERSHIP
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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 7436
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AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6764
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 5644

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00388

-- ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE AND POLITICAL
ALLIANCE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES;
-- POLISH GRATITUDE FOR SOVIET SUPPORT AND
ASSISTANCE AND SUPPLIES OF GOODS AND RAW MATERIALS;
AND
-- SOVIET ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT FOR POLISH EFFORTS
TO OVERCOME THEIR DIFFICULTIES.

5. ON WESTERN "INTERFERENCE", THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
IN GRADED TERMS:

-- "STRONGLY DENOUNCE" THE LATEST STEPS OF THE US
AGAINST POLAND AND THE USSR;
-- REPEAT THE ASSERTION THAT THIS IS AN EFFORT TO
HAMPER NORMALIZATION IN POLAND, SUBVERT ITS
"SOCIALIST FOUNDATIONS", AND TURN IT INTO
"A SEAT OF TENSION IN EUROPE";
-- CALL U. S. ACTIVITIES A "DIRECT VIOLATION OF
THE UN CHARTER AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, SAYING THEY ARE "PARTICULARLY
DANGEROUS" BECAUSE THEY UNDERMINE THE FOUNDATIONS
OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION;
-- "STRONGLY REJECT" THE BRUSSELS NATO STATEMENT
AS "AN ATTEMPT AT GROSSLY INTERFERING IN THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN STATE"; AND
-- PREDICTABLY SAY U. S. EFFORTS TO IMPOSE ITS
WILL ARE "FUTILE".
-

6. THE COMMUNIQUE ARGUES THE IMPORTANCE OF "NORMAL
AND UNRUFFLED RELATIONS" BETWEEN ALL COUNTRIES
ON THE CONTINENT AND ADVOCATES "THE FURTHER
AUGMENTING OF EVERYTHING POSITIVE THAT HAS BEEN
ACHIEVED IN EUROPE BY JOINT EFFORTS DURING THE PAST

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DECADES." IN RELATIVELY MILD TERMS, IT CRITICIZES THE EC-10 STATEMENT FOR NOT "POINTING IN THIS DIRECTION" AND SUGGESTS THAT U.S. STEPS WERE AIMED TO COMPLICATE THE ATMOSPHERE JUST WHEN PEOPLE BEGAN "HOPING FOR THE RESUMPTION OF A DIALOGUE". CLEARLY REACTING TO WESTERN PLANS TO DISCUSS POLAND IN THE MADRID CONTEXT, THE COMMUNIQUE CALLS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE MADRID MEETING, INCLUDING A DECISION TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. IT PLEDGES THE TWO COUNTRIES "WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT" FOR THE MEETING "TO BE CROWNED WITH POSITIVE DECISIONS ADVANCING THE EUROPEAN PROCESS BEGUN IN HELSINKI."

7. ON U.S.-SOVIET ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS SAY:
-- ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE "WOULD HAVE A SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN PEACE" AND ADD THAT ACHIEVEMENT IN THE TALKS IS POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF "STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY;
-- EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0388
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00388
IMPORTANCE",

8. TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF BUSINESS-AS-USUAL,
THE COMMUNIQUE IS PADDED WITH STANDARD PRAISE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES AND TAKES STANDARD
POSITIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, ANGOLA, AND
NAMIBIA. IT ALSO NOTES THAT GROMYKO ACCEPTED
AN INVITATION FOR A VISIT TO POLAND.
HARTMAN

MOSCOW 0388

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0388

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260 10
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
Washington, D.C. 20230

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JAN 12 1982

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036

MEMORANDUM FOR: James W. Nance
Deputy to the Assistant
to the President for National Security

FROM: Lawrence J. Brady *JB*
Assistant Secretary
for Trade Administration

SUBJECT: Economic Sanctions (Export Controls)
Applying to the USSR

As the attached memorandum to me indicates, there is disagreement on the scope of the President's decision to expand the oil and gas controls on exports to the Soviet Union. This was clear at the Commerce meeting last week referred to in the attached memorandum. This memorandum sets out the two issues on extraterritorial application of the controls -- the application of controls to U.S. foreign subsidiaries and application of controls to foreign firms producing products from licensed U.S. technology.

In order to carry out the President's decision fully, we request written clarification from the NSC.

Attachment: Denysyk/Brady Memorandum, January 11, 1982

Deriv. Classified By Bo Denysyk/DAS/EA
Source(s) Commerce Dept., DAS/EA
Declassify On 1/8/88

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JAN 11 1982



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
Washington, D.C. 20230

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: LAWRENCE J. BRADY
Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration

FROM : Bo Denysyk
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Export Administration

SUBJECT : U.S.S.R. Oil and Gas Export Policy

NLRR 748-22-11-7-4

JY 16 DB NARA DATE 11/4/85

170750

1. Subsequent to the January 7, 1982, meeting with Olmer, Hormats, Unger, et al., I called Norman Bailey, Director of Planning for the National Security Council, in an attempt to clarify the intent of the Presidential statement on expansion of oil and gas controls. During the meeting it was clear that State interpreted the expansion of oil and gas controls to prevent only U.S.-origin goods from going to the U.S.S.R. My recollection of Presidential intent was to prevent U.S. companies from selling to the U.S.S.R. The other issue that needed clarification was whether products of U.S. technology produced by foreign firms were to be embargoed also.
2. During my initial discussion with Bailey, I asked him to coordinate with Jim Nance and/or William Clark. At approximately 5:00 P.M., Bailey called back and said that:
 - a. It was the President's intent to prevent U.S. firms from selling oil and gas equipment to the U.S.S.R. regardless of location of manufacturing.
 - b. The issue of embargoing products of U.S. technology manufactured by foreign firms under license to U.S. firms had to be raised with the President for clarification.I assume Bailey coordinated with Nance and Clark, but I don't know that for a fact.
3. I suggest that we proceed to amend the regulations to include all U.S. persons (including wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries abroad and U.S. controlled foreign companies). This amendment would prevent foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from selling oil and gas equipment to the U.S.S.R. without a validated license. I will coordinate with State to accomplish this.
4. When issuing this new regulation, we can credibly argue that the President's intent was to cover U.S. subsidiaries all along, but we needed a legal clarification before implementation.

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RECEIVED 21 JAN 82 11

TO NANCE

FROM BRADY, L

DOCDATE 12 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

OIL

GAS

USSR

ECONOMICS

COCOM

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS APPLYING TO USSR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE

DUE: 26 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENZ

WEISS

FEITH

Bailey

NAU

PIPES

STEARMAN

~~BAILEY~~*Long*

COMMENTS

OBE MB

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(L /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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*C 1/21 OBE per Bailey**WBS*

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PA(C) *WBS*

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0400
SIT033 DATE 01/18/82

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHMO #0400/01 0130927
P 130920Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0696

INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0911
USMISSION GENEVA 5497
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8806
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3691
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NLRR 748-22-11-8-3

BY KDD NARA DATE 11/4/05

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00400

EXDIS

USINF

USSTART

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/12/88 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M

TAGS: MPOL, PARM

SUBJECT: POLAND AND ARMS CONTROL

1.. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOR SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE THE
EVENTS IN POLAND PRESENT A NEW DILEMMA -- AND AT
SOME POINT MOSCOW MIGHT TURN TO ARMS CONTROL TO TRY TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESOLVE IT. IT IS NOW CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT
EUROPEANS ARE INDIGNANT ABOUT EVENTS IN POLAND. THE
SOVIET UNION HAS RETURNED TO THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION
OF TWO YEARS AGO. IF THE CRISIS IN POLAND WORSENS
AND THE SOVIETS EXERT A HEAVY HAND, ISOLATION COULD
INCREASE. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, THE USSR MIGHT SEEK
TO BREAK THE ISOLATION BY TAKING STEPS AIMED AT
RETAINING THE MOMENTUM OF RECENT SOVIET DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE. INITIATIVES IN SUCH FORA AS CSCE/CDE OR
MBFR COULD OFFER PARTICULAR ADVANTAGES TO MOSCOW.
PROGRESS ON EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL MIGHT: HAVE BROAD
APPEAL IN EUROPE, EASE EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF A SOVIET
THREAT, ADVANCE THE AIMS OF SOVIET "PEACE STRATEGY,"
AND COME AT LITTLE COST AND POSSIBLE GAIN TO SOVIET
SECURITY INTERESTS. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0400

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3. IT IS NOW CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT EUROPEANS ARE INDIGNANT ABOUT EVENTS IN POLAND. AT FIRST THE SOVIETS THOUGHT U.S. POLICIES OF SANCTIONS WOULD CAUSE A SHARP RIFT IN NATO. THESE SOVIET PERCEPTIONS ARE CHANGING. THE BROAD RESENTMENT OF EUROPEAN PUBLICS, AND U.S. SUCCESS IN LEADING THE ALLIANCE, SURPRISED THE SOVIETS. THE EC STATEMENT, THE REAGAN-SCHMIDT COMMUNIQUE, AND NOW THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECLARATION HAVE SHOWN THAT WESTERN EUROPE IS NOT THAT WEAK ON POLAND. SOVIET REACTIONS HAVE LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THEY TAKE SERIOUSLY THE THREAT THAT EUROPEAN REACTION MIGHT TAKE MORE CONCRETE FORM.

4. SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE NOW FACES A NEW DILEMMA. IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS MOSCOW HAS COME TO VIEW THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AS ADVERSE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS SCORED NO MAJOR GAINS IN THE THIRD WORLD. RELATIONS WITH CHINA ARE FROZEN. CRITICAL TO SOVIET PRESTIGE, THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS DETERIORATED SHARPLY. TWO YEARS AGO THE WEST SHARPLY EMBARRASSED THE SOVIET UNION BY IMPOSING SANCTIONS. IN THIS STRAINED INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, RECENT SOVIET DIPLOMACY HAS ENJOYED ONE BRIGHT SPOT -- A EUROPE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN DETENTE EVEN IF ONLY WITHIN ITS CONFINES, AND UNEASY ABOUT MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIETS REACTED TO ALL THIS THE ONLY WAY THEY COULD. SINCE THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA TRIUMPH IN THE "NEUTRON BOMB" EPISODE FOUR YEARS AGO, THE USSR HAS DEVOTED MORE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND MORE OF ITS DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES TO EUROPE, STRESSING THE NEED TO PRESERVE DETENTE, IMPLEMENT THE SOVIET "PEACE STRATEGY," AND REJECT NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS. BREZHNEV'S LATE NOVEMBER VISIT TO BONN SYMBOLIZED NOT ONLY THE PARTICULAR ROLE OF THE FRG IN THIS ENDEAVOR, BUT ALSO THE HIGH POINT OF CONTEMPORARY SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE. BREZHNEV RODE TO BONN ON A CLOUD OF CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM BUOYED BY THE MASSIVE ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE VISIT.

5. THIS ALL CHANGED, STARTING IN LATE NOVEMBER. SOVIET HOPES FOR THE BONN VISIT WERE NOT MET. THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND CATAPULTED IN THE USSR BACKWARD INTO THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION OF TWO YEARS AGO. IF THE CRISIS IN POLAND WORSENS AND THE SOVIETS EXERT A HEAVY HAND, THIS ISOLATION COULD ESCALATE. WERE THIS TO HAPPEN, THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY SERIOUS FOR THE USSR. BESET AT HOME BY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND WEAKENED BY WIDESPREAD PUBLIC CYNICISM, THE SOVIET STATE CAN ILL AFFORD TOTAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR DOMESTIC

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0400
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PRIORITY
STU2293
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P 130920Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0697

INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0912
USMISSION GENEVA 5498
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8807
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3692
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00400

EXDIS
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PESSIMISM AND FOREIGN PRESTIGE WOULD BE TOO GREAT. THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE ABILITY EVEN OF THE USSR TO HUNKER DOWN.

6. IN THIS SITUATION, THE USSR MIGHT SEEK TO BREAK THE ISOLATION BY TAKING STEPS AIMED AT RETAINING THE MOMENTUM OF SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH SOVIET INITIATIVES COULD COME IN SEVERAL FIELDS (E.G., LOOSENING CONDITIONS OF VISITS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF GERMANY), ARMS CONTROL MIGHT OFFER PARTICULAR ADVANTAGES TO THE SOVIETS. PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE MIGHT:

- HAVE BROAD APPEAL IN EUROPE;
- EASE EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF A SOVIET THREAT;
- FURTHER THE AIMS OF SOVIET "PEACE STRATEGY;" AND
- COME AT LITTLE COST AND POSSIBLE GAIN TO SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS.

IN ADDITION, ANY SOVIET INITIATIVE THAT PROMOTED DETENTE IN EUROPE WOULD ENABLE SOVIET LEADERS TO CLAIM AT HOME THAT THEIR POLICY ON POLAND HAD NOT INCREASED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

7. THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY HINTING THAT WESTERN PATIENCE ON POLAND WILL YIELD GAINS IN ARMS CONTROL. A TOP CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIAL, LEONID ZAMYATIN, HAS SET FORTH THREE PRIORITIES FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE YEAR AHEAD: CSCE/CDE, MBFR, AND THE GENEVA TALKS ON "MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE." BREZHNEV'S NBC INTERVIEW, PUBLISHED LESS THAN A WEEK AFTER MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED, FAILED TO MENTION POLAND BUT STRESSED PEACE AND DISARMAMENT THEMES. USA INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR BOGDANOV HAS ASSERTED TO US THAT THE NBC INTERVIEW WAS INTENDED TO SHOW SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL IF THE WEST LAID OFF ON POLAND. NOTWITHSTANDING BOGDANOV'S CLAIM, WE BELIEVE THE BREZHNEV AND ZAMYATIN STATEMENTS ARE NOTHING MORE THAN PROPAGANDA PLOYS. IT

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PAGE 02 OF 02

MOSCOW 0400

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IS CONCEIVABLE THAT EVENTS IN POLAND MIGHT PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO BOLSTER THEIR DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE BY MAKING CONCESSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TOOK SUCH A DECISION HASTILY IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF DECEMBER 13.

8. IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO DECIDE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL, THEY MIGHT EXPLORE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES:

A) CSCE/CDE

THE SOVIETS MIGHT EASE, OR EVEN DROP, THEIR INSISTENCE ON LANGUAGE PLACING SOME CONSTRAINTS ON THE U.S. RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE, AND THUS IN EFFECT BUY THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CBMS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS WOULD GRIT THEIR TEETH, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THEY MIGHT ACCEPT THE WEST'S MAIN HUMAN RIGHTS BALANCING ELEMENTS, E.G., HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING, IF THIS WERE NECESSARY TO CLINCH A CDE MANDATE. AGREEMENT IN CSCE ON A CDE MANDATE WOULD HAVE A NEW AND SPECIAL ADVANTAGE FOR MOSCOW. SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS COULD USE IT TO "PROVE" THAT ACTIONS IN POLAND, AS WELL AS AFGHANISTAN, DID NOT VIOLATE THE FINAL ACT OR DEFLECT THE DETENTE PROCESS.

B) MBFR

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0698

INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0913

USMISSION GENEVA 5499

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8808

AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3693

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AMEMBASSY LONDON 4014

AMEMBASSY PARIS 1088

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00400

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ONE SHOULD ALWAYS BE CAUTIOUS IN ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR EASTERN MOVEMENT IN THE LONG-STALEMATED MBFR TALKS. DESPITE RECENT REITERATION OF SOVIET CLAIMS OF SERIOUS INTEREST IN BRINGING THE VIENNA TALKS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, THE PROBLEMS OF DATA AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES HAVE REMAINED THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCKS. NEVERTHELESS, IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO DECIDE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, MBFR MIGHT BE A GOOD PLACE TO DO IT. THE TALKS ARE MATURE, THE ISSUES AND POSITIONS ARE CLEAR, AND THE EUROPEAN REACTION TO A PHASE 1 AGREEMENT WOULD BE OVERWHELMINGLY POSITIVE. AS THE WESTERN SIDE HAS NOTED PUBLICLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE NEXT ROUND TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO OUR PROPOSAL OF JULY 23. IF THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE PROGRESS IN MBFR, THEY COULD FIND A WAY TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY SO THAT IT DID NOT SEEM THEY WERE NOW ACCEPTING OTHER WESTERN PROPOSALS THEY HAD EARLIER REJECTED.

C) INF AND START

MOSCOW COULD CHANGE THE WAY IT TALLIES THE INF BALANCE, AND THEREBY GIVE IMPETUS TO THE INF TALKS. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE AT LEAST THINKING ABOUT "BALANCES" OTHER THAN THE ONE THEY DEFEND PUBLICLY. MAKING EARLY CONCESSIONS IN THE INF TALKS AND PUBLICIZING THEM, HOWEVER, MIGHT NOT BRING MOSCOW SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL BENEFITS. THE TALKS HAVE JUST BEGUN AND WILL TAKE TIME TO REACH MATURITY. THE SAME APPLIES FOR START. HARTMAN
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0445
SIT011 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031332
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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0445/01 0140910
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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HLRR 748-02-11-9-2

BY CDU NARA DATE 11/4/85

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0728

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00445
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/14/02 (HARTMAN, A.) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION ON THE PENTECOSTAL PROBLEM

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AS YOU KNOW, TWO OF THE SEVEN PENTECOSTALS IN OUR EMBASSY ARE INTO THEIR THIRD WEEK OF A HUNGER STRIKE. THEY ARE TAKING FRUIT JUICE AND OTHER LIQUIDS, AND THE EMBASSY DOCTOR BELIEVES THAT, IF THEY CONTINUE TO DO SO, WE MAY HAVE SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE WE ARE AT A DANGEROUS POINT. NEVERTHELESS, BEFORE I LEAVE FOR GENEVA JANUARY 22, I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO HAVE YOUR CONCURRENCE ON A PLAN OF ACTION IN THE EVENT WE REACH A CRISIS.

3. WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE FOREIGN OFFICE ABOUT THE HUNGER STRIKE AND HAVE ASKED THEM TO ASSIST US IN A MEDICAL EVACUATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY IF THE STRIKERS' CONDITION DETERIORATES. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE, BUT REALISTICALLY THE CHANCES OF A FAVORABLE RESPONSE ARE NEXT TO ZERO. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A NEW AND MUCH MORE HOPEFUL TRACK. AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF DEBATE AMONG THEMSELVES,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SEVEN PENTECOSTALS ASSURED US LAST WEEK THAT, IF THEIR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS IN SIBERIA ARE FIRST ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE, IF THE SEVEN ARE NOT PROSECUTED, AND IF THEY ARE ASSURED THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EMIGRATION WILL BE FAVORABLY PROCESSED, THEY WILL LEAVE THE EMBASSY. WE HAVE ALSO PRESENTED THIS PROPOSAL TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WHICH HAS SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN IT.

4. IF A HEALTH CRISIS ARISES BEFORE THIS LATTER APPROACH HAS HAD TIME TO BE TESTED, WE WILL BE FACED WITH WHAT TO DO WITH THE SINKING HUNGER-STRIKERS. IT IS MY STRONG VIEW -- CONCURRED IN BY A NUMBER OF VISITING CONGRESSMEN WHOM I SOUNDED OUT LAST WEEK -- THAT OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO SAVE THEIR LIVES. I WOULD THEREFORE PROPOSE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0445

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031332

TO RETURN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND REITERATE OUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN A MEDEVAC OUT OF THE COUNTRY. IF THAT IS TURNED DOWN (AS IS ALMOST CERTAIN), I WOULD THEN TELL THE SOVIETS (1) THAT WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO HOSPITALIZE THEM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND (2) THAT WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ALLOW THEM TO RETURN TO THE EMBASSY -- IF THEY SO DESIRE -- WHEN THEY ARE WELL. (WE CANNOT MAKE THIS SECOND POINT A CONDITION OF OUR HOSPITALIZING THEM, SINCE, IN VIEW OF THE EMBASSY'S LACK OF MEDICAL FACILITIES TO DEAL WITH AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO PRESERVE THEIR LIVES.) THE COURSE OUTLINED ABOVE SEEMS TO ME THE ONLY AVAILABLE COURSE CONSISTENT WITH PROTECTING THE LIVES AND HEALTH OF THE HUNGER-STRIKERS.

5. I HAVE ALSO GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO WHAT WE MIGHT DO TO ENCOURAGE OR PROVOKE SOVIET ACTION TO ALLOW THE SEVEN TO EMIGRATE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY CHANCE THE SOVIETS WILL LET THEM EMIGRATE FROM THE EMBASSY; THEY WILL INSIST THAT THE FAMILIES RETURN TO THEIR HOME IN SIBERIA AND APPLY THERE. THE PROPOSAL I OUTLINED IN PARA 3 ABOVE RECOGNIZES THIS SOVIET REQUIREMENT, WHILE PRESENTING AN APPROACH WHICH THE SEVEN FAMILY MEMBERS HAVE ACCEPTED. IT IS THEREFORE OUR BEST HOPE, AND I THINK WE HAVE A CHANCE -- THE GERMANS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOT SOMEBODY OUT THAT WAY (AFTER A YEAR IN THE FRG EMBASSY) AND WE OURSELVES GOT AN AMERICAN WOMAN OUT OF THE EMBASSY THAT WAY AFTER A THREE-MONTH STAY IN 1978. I BELIEVE A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV, PRESSING THIS PROPOSAL, COULD DO SOME GOOD, SO LONG AS IT WAS WORDED IN A WAY THAT EMPHASIZED WE WERE BEING SERIOUS AND NOT POLEMICAL OR PROPAGANDISTIC. SUCH A MESSAGE SHOULD EMPHASIZE (1) THE HUMANITARIAN ENDS THAT WOULD BE SERVED ON BOTH SIDES, (2) THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND TAKES ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS THE SOVIETS HAD EXPRESSED PREVIOUSLY, AND (3) THE EFFECT POSITIVE ACTION COULD HAVE IN ARRESTING A FURTHER EXACERBATION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER SHOULD BE SENT QUICKLY, AND -- TO FURTHER EMPHASIZE OUR SERIOUSNESS -- YOU SHOULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA IF WE HAVE HAD NO RESPONSE BY THEN.

6. TO GIVE OUR PROPOSAL THE GREATEST POSSIBLE

MOSCOW 0445

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031332

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0445
SIT010 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031333
TOR: 014/1447Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0445/02 0140912
O 140902Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0729

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00445
NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
RUNNING ROOM, WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PUBLICIZE
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. UNLIKE THE SAKHAROV
HUNGER STRIKE -- WHERE PUBLICITY EXERTED
SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS -- THE
SOVIETS SEE THE PENTECOSTALS AS ESSENTIALLY A
U.S., NOT A SOVIET PROBLEM (IN FACT, THE HUNGER
STRIKE IS DIRECTED AGAINST US, NOT THE SOVIETS).
PUBLICITY GENERATED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS MORE
LIKELY TO STIFFEN THEM AGAINST RELEASING THE
FAMILIES THAN TO MAKE THEM MORE FLEXIBLE. THE
GERMANS ACHIEVED THEIR RELEASE THROUGH A POLICY
OF TOTAL SILENCE. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY
NOT AVAILABLE TO US BECAUSE OF THE PENTECOSTALS'
OWN PENCHANT FOR PUBLICITY. BUT WE SHOULD HOLD
OFF OURSELVES AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER YOUR MEETING
WITH GROMYKO.

7. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AT
THE WAY THE MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY HAVE EXPENDED
THEIR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THESE SEVEN PEOPLE.
BOTH OUR CONSULAR OFFICERS WHO DEAL WITH THE
CASE ON AN HOUR-BY-HOUR BASIS AND THE LARGE NUMBER
OF EMBASSY VOLUNTEERS WHO HAVE WORKED TO IMPROVE
THE CONDITIONS AND THE SPIRITS OF THE FAMILIES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVE ACTED IN THE BEST AMERICAN TRADITION.
HARTMAN

MOSCOW 0445

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031333

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

January 14, 1982

11/4/85 EDB

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES R

SUBJECT: Poland: One Month Under Martial Law

The memorandum attached at Tab I for your signature to the President is a self-explanatory update on the situation in Poland.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Norman Bailey
Bill Stearman
Allen Lenz
Paula Dobriansky

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

170753

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-22-11-1-0

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY COB NARA DATE 4/4/85

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Poland: One Month Under Martial Law

As the initial shock of December 13 dissipates, the intentions of Poland's military government are becoming increasingly clear. (S)

The purpose of Jaruzelski's coup was not merely to stamp out the nation-wide opposition that has arisen in 1980-81, but also to ensure, through a complete revamping of the entire system, that Communist authority will never be challenged again. This military dictatorship is the classic embodiment of the counterrevolution. As the counter-reforms are put in place, the junta intends gradually to relax its grip on the country and turn power over to a new, restructured Communist Party. The process is likely to take years rather than months, and its outcome is far from certain. (S)

Judging both by the actions and statements of the Polish junta, its objective is to transform Poland politically on the Czech model and economically on the Hungarian one. This means the restoration of totalitarianism with a certain amount of carefully controlled decentralization and self-management in the economic sphere. (S)

- The Polish Government is moving quickly and ruthlessly to destroy all vestiges of political reforms introduced in 1980-81. The democratic processes introduced into the party in July 1981 have been abrogated and strict centralism is being restored. Trade union activity has been outlawed. Statutes ensuring university autonomy have been abolished. In short, all independent associations and democratic procedures are being done away with.
- The Polish Communist party, which in the first days of the new regime disappeared from view, is energetically reconstituting itself. The party is, for all practical purposes, a skeletal organization and must begin from scratch. Widespread purges are conducted to eliminate both ordinary bureaucratic profiteers and ideological "revisionists". The party that will emerge from this purge will be leaner and more pliant. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review January 14, 1988.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

24

~~SECRET~~

2

These political moves point toward the ultimate objective of a totalitarian state of the kind now in place in Czechoslovakia. However, the Polish economy is in such ruin that it cannot be reconstituted by Stalinist methods. For this reason, the junta has committed itself to the adoption of the Hungarian "New Economic Mechanism". State enterprises will be required to show profitability instead of meeting preordained production quotas; marginal sectors of the economy will be transferred into private hands; and limited trade union activity, under strict party supervision, will be allowed. (S)

For this economic plan to work, Jaruzelski requires help from foreign lenders as well as from the mass of Polish workers and peasants, neither of which he is likely to obtain. (S)

- According to a statement by a Polish Deputy Prime Minister on January 9, Poland will require in the coming year a rescheduling of \$10 billion in foreign obligations (principal and interest) as well as an "absolute minimum" of \$6.0 billion in additional hard currency credits with which to buy essential raw materials and components for its industries. Lacking that new capital, he warned, Poland will be forced to "shut down factories".
- The industrial working class is overwhelmingly hostile to the new regime: not a single senior Solidarity leader has defected to it. All indications are that workers are engaging in passive resistance. Farmers are refusing to deliver food and slaughter livestock. (S)

The Government thus faces a very bleak economic prospect: the looming economic catastrophe may well undermine its entire ambitious political plan. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union, with its own economic and financial problems, can rescue its Polish client. The junta hangs in the air, uncertain what to do and how to get out of its economic predicament, for repression has its limits. A firm Western stand may well in time compel a change of course in Poland. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

35

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OTHER	_____		_____

COMMENTS

COMMENTS

W.K. [Signature] K.R. 1/30/82

~~SECRET~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
11/4/15 CDS

ID 8200216

26

RECEIVED 14 JAN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 14 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: POLAND

USSR

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON POLISH SITUATION / ONE MONTH UNDER MARTIAL LAW

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

BAILEY

STEARMAN

LENZ

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

RP	S 1/20	noted by WPC	1/21	
NSC/S	C 2/5/82	AFAR per RP after discussion w/ WPC		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

7A

(C)

mds

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170754

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 0237
SIT997 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 141911Z JAN 82 PSN: 031847
TOR: 014/2152Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUEHC #0237 0141920
Z 141911Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH 0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 010237 TOSEC 010148
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/14/02 (STOESSEL, WALTER J., JR.)
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: COMMENT ON AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PENTECOSTAL PROBLEM
(S/S 8200849 AND 8200850)
REF: MOSCOW 445

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, PER SECTO
1009, WE HAVE PREPARED A PACKET WITH RECOMMENDED
ACTIONS ON THE PENTECOSTAL HUNGER STRIKE AT EMBASSY
MOSCOW, INCLUDING A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
BREZHNEV WHICH WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE MADE PUBLIC.

3. AFTER REFLECTING ON AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S
RECOMMENDATIONS (REFTEL), WE BELIEVE THAT HIS PROPOSED
COURSE OF ACTION COULD BE A PROMISING ONE AND IS WELL
WORTH A SERIOUS TRY BEFORE WE PROCEED WITH THE ALL-OUT
PUBLIC AND PRESS ACTION PLAN WE HAVE PREPARED. WHILE
WE OF COURSE HAVE NO GUARANTEE THAT HARTMAN'S PLAN WILL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE ACTED ON FAVORABLY BY THE SOVIETS, WE BELIEVE IT
OFFERS THE SOVIETS A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT OF THIS TRAGIC
PROBLEM IF THEY HAVE ANY INTEREST AT ALL AT THIS POINT
IN SOLVING IT. IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT TAKE PROMPT STEPS

TO ACT ON THIS PROPOSAL, WE RECOMMEND PROCEEDING WITH
THE FULL PUBLIC AND PRESS ACTION PLAN.

4. ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE THE
FOLLOWING TEXT OF A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV
AND AUTHORIZE US TO FORWARD A MEMORANDUM TO THE
PRESIDENT WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT IT BE CONVEYED
TO BREZHNEV AND THAT THE MESSAGE RECEIVE NO PUBLICITY
AT THIS TIME.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 0237

DTG: 141911Z JAN 82 PSN: 031847

5. PROPOSED TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV:
QUOTE. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I WISH TO DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION ON AN URGENT BASIS TO THE PLIGHT OF SEVEN SOVIET PENTECOSTALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN LIVING IN OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW SINCE SEEKING REFUGE THERE IN JUNE, 1978. THESE PEOPLE SEEK PERMISSION FROM SOVIET AUTHORITIES FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES TO EMIGRATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY APPROACHED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF PETR AND AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO AND THEIR DAUGHTERS, LIDIYA, LYUBA, AND LILIYA; AND MARIA CHMYKHALOV AND HER SON, TIMOFEY; AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THESE TWO FAMILIES, SEEKING A PROMPT AND HUMANITARIAN SOLUTION TO THEIR PLIGHT. YET THREE AND A HALF YEARS LATER, THEY STILL AWAIT PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE. THE FAMILIES' SITUATION HAS NOW TAKEN ON A NEW AND POTENTIALLY TRAGIC ASPECT. AFTER THREE AND A HALF YEARS OF WAITING, IN FRUSTRATION AND NOW IN DESPAIR, TWO OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS, MRS. AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO AND HER DAUGHTER, LIDIYA, HAVE EMBARKED UPON A HUNGER STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR GOALS. DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF AND OF THE FAMILIES' OTHER FRIENDS AND SINCERE WELL-WISHERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE TO DISSUADE THEM FROM THIS LIFE-ENDANGERING COURSE, THE TWO WOMEN HAVE MADE CLEAR THEY ARE

SECSTATE WASHDC 0237
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 141911Z JAN 82 PSN: 031847

DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THEIR FAST. OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INFORMING THE MINISTRY THAT THE TWO FAMILIES HAVE AGREED TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY AND RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN CHERNOGORSK FOR THE PROCESSING OF THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EMIGRATION, ACCORDING TO SOVIET LAWS AND PROCEDURES, IF THEIR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS RESIDING IN CHERNOGORSK ARE FIRST PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE, AND IF THE SEVEN FAMILY MEMBERS ARE GUARANTEED THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PROSECUTED BY THE AUTHORITIES ONCE THEY DEPART THE U.S. EMBASSY AND ASSURED THAT THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT PERMISSION FOR REUNIFICATION WITH THEIR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS ABROAD WILL BE GRANTED. OUT OF DEEP CONCERN FOR THEIR LIVES AND HEALTH AND FOR THE PLIGHT OF THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, I ASK YOU TO INTERVENE PERSONALLY IN THIS MATTER TO ALLOW THESE PEOPLE TO EMIGRATE AND THEREBY BRING ABOUT A HUMANITARIAN SOLUTION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. END QUOTE.

6. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORIZE HARTMAN TO PROCEED WITH HIS PROPOSAL TO PURSUE THE MEDEVAC/HOSPITALIZATION QUESTION WITH THE SOVIET MFA, AS OUTLINED IN PARA 4, REFTEL.

7. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT PENTECOSTALIST SUPPORTERS IN THE U.S. HAVE PERSUADED FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER TO TELEPHONE THE PENTECOSTALISTS IN EMBASSY MOSCOW IN AN EFFORT TO DISSUADE THE TWO WOMEN FROM CONTINUING THEIR HUNGER STRIKE. CARTER IS MUCH ADMIRER BY THE PENTACOSTALISTS AND HIS DIRECT APPEAL COULD WORK. THE CALL IS SCHEDULED FOR MORNING (EST) OF 15TH. WE UNDERSTAND (BUT CANNOT GUARANTEE) THAT CARTER INTENDS NO PUBLICITY BUT WE DOUBT THAT PENTACOSTALISTS WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS EVENT, IF IT TAKES PLACE, SHOULD DETER US FROM OUR OWN COURSE OF ACTION AND THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED AS RECOMMENDED ABOVE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1

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DTG: 141911Z JAN 82 PSN: 031847

8. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) THAT WE FORWARD THE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APPROVE - DISAPPROVE

(B) THAT HARTMAN BE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH HIS
MEDIVAC OPTION.

APPROVE - DISAPPROVE

STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 0237

DTG: 141911Z JAN 82 PSN: 031847

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

36

170755

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0445
SIT004 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031332
TOR: 014/1446Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0445/01 0140910
O 140902Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-22-11-3-8
BY UDD NARA DATE 11/4/11

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0728

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00445
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/14/02 (HARTMAN, A.) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION ON THE PENTECOSTAL PROBLEM

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AS YOU KNOW, TWO OF THE SEVEN PENTECOSTALS IN OUR EMBASSY ARE INTO THEIR THIRD WEEK OF A HUNGER STRIKE. THEY ARE TAKING FRUIT JUICE AND OTHER LIQUIDS, AND THE EMBASSY DOCTOR BELIEVES THAT, IF THEY CONTINUE TO DO SO, WE MAY HAVE SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE WE ARE AT A DANGEROUS POINT. NEVERTHELESS, BEFORE I LEAVE FOR GENEVA JANUARY 22, I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO HAVE YOUR CONCURRENCE ON A PLAN OF ACTION IN THE EVENT WE REACH A CRISIS.

3. WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE FOREIGN OFFICE ABOUT THE HUNGER STRIKE AND HAVE ASKED THEM TO ASSIST US IN A MEDICAL EVACUATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY IF THE STRIKERS' CONDITION DETERIORATES. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE, BUT REALISTICALLY THE CHANCES OF A FAVORABLE RESPONSE ARE NEXT TO ZERO. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A NEW AND MUCH MORE HOPEFUL TRACK. AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF DEBATE AMONG THEMSELVES,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SEVEN PENTECOSTALS ASSURED US LAST WEEK THAT, IF THEIR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS IN SIBERIA ARE FIRST ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE, IF THE SEVEN ARE NOT PROSECUTED, AND IF THEY ARE ASSURED THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EMIGRATION WILL BE FAVORABLY PROCESSED, THEY WILL LEAVE THE EMBASSY. WE HAVE ALSO PRESENTED THIS PROPOSAL TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WHICH HAS SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN IT.

4. IF A HEALTH CRISIS ARISES BEFORE THIS LATTER APPROACH HAS HAD TIME TO BE TESTED, WE WILL BE FACED WITH WHAT TO DO WITH THE SINKING HUNGER-STRIKERS. IT IS MY STRONG VIEW -- CONCURRED IN BY A NUMBER OF VISITING CONGRESSMEN WHOM I SOUNDED OUT LAST WEEK -- THAT OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO SAVE THEIR LIVES. I WOULD THEREFORE PROPOSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0445

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031332

TO RETURN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND REITERATE OUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN A MEDEVAC OUT OF THE COUNTRY. IF THAT IS TURNED DOWN (AS IS ALMOST CERTAIN), I WOULD THEN TELL THE SOVIETS (1) THAT WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO HOSPITALIZE THEM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND (2) THAT WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ALLOW THEM TO RETURN TO THE EMBASSY -- IF THEY SO DESIRE -- WHEN THEY ARE WELL. (WE CANNOT MAKE THIS SECOND POINT A CONDITION OF OUR HOSPITALIZING THEM, SINCE, IN VIEW OF THE EMBASSY'S LACK OF MEDICAL FACILITIES TO DEAL WITH AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO PRESERVE THEIR LIVES.) THE COURSE OUTLINED ABOVE SEEMS TO ME THE ONLY AVAILABLE COURSE CONSISTENT WITH PROTECTING THE LIVES AND HEALTH OF THE HUNGER-STRIKERS.

5. I HAVE ALSO GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO WHAT WE MIGHT DO TO ENCOURAGE OR PROVOKE SOVIET ACTION TO ALLOW THE SEVEN TO EMIGRATE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY CHANCE THE SOVIETS WILL LET THEM EMIGRATE FROM THE EMBASSY; THEY WILL INSIST THAT THE FAMILIES RETURN TO THEIR HOME IN SIBERIA AND APPLY THERE. THE PROPOSAL I OUTLINED IN PARA 3 ABOVE RECOGNIZES THIS SOVIET REQUIREMENT, WHILE PRESENTING AN APPROACH WHICH THE SEVEN FAMILY MEMBERS HAVE ACCEPTED. IT IS THEREFORE OUR BEST HOPE, AND I THINK WE HAVE A CHANCE -- THE GERMANS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOT SOMEBODY OUT THAT WAY (AFTER A YEAR IN THE FRG EMBASSY) AND WE OURSELVES GOT AN AMERICAN WOMAN OUT OF THE EMBASSY THAT WAY AFTER A THREE-MONTH STAY IN 1978. I BELIEVE A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV, PRESSING THIS PROPOSAL, COULD DO SOME GOOD, SO LONG AS IT WAS WORDED IN A WAY THAT EMPHASIZED WE WERE BEING SERIOUS AND NOT POLEMICAL OR PROPAGANDISTIC. SUCH A MESSAGE SHOULD EMPHASIZE (1) THE HUMANITARIAN ENDS THAT WOULD BE SERVED ON BOTH SIDES, (2) THE DEGREE TO WHICH OUR PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND TAKES ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS THE SOVIETS HAD EXPRESSED PREVIOUSLY, AND (3) THE EFFECT POSITIVE ACTION COULD HAVE IN ARRESTING A FURTHER EXACERBATION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER SHOULD BE SENT QUICKLY, AND -- TO FURTHER EMPHASIZE OUR SERIOUSNESS -- YOU SHOULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA IF WE HAVE HAD NO RESPONSE BY THEN.

6. TO GIVE OUR PROPOSAL THE GREATEST POSSIBLE

MOSCOW 0445

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031332

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0445
SIT003 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031333
TOR: 014/1447Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0445/02 0140912
O 140902Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0729

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00445
NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
RUNNING ROOM, WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PUBLICIZE
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. UNLIKE THE SAKHAROV
HUNGER STRIKE -- WHERE PUBLICITY EXERTED
SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS -- THE
SOVIETS SEE THE PENTECOSTALS AS ESSENTIALLY A
U.S., NOT A SOVIET PROBLEM (IN FACT, THE HUNGER
STRIKE IS DIRECTED AGAINST US, NOT THE SOVIETS).
PUBLICITY GENERATED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS MORE
LIKELY TO STIFFEN THEM AGAINST RELEASING THE
FAMILIES THAN TO MAKE THEM MORE FLEXIBLE. THE
GERMANS ACHIEVED THEIR RELEASE THROUGH A POLICY
OF TOTAL SILENCE. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY
NOT AVAILABLE TO US BECAUSE OF THE PENTECOSTALS'
OWN PENCHANT FOR PUBLICITY. BUT WE SHOULD HOLD
OFF OURSELVES AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER YOUR MEETING
WITH GROMYKO.

7. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY PRIDE AT
THE WAY THE MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY HAVE EXPENDED
THEIR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THESE SEVEN PEOPLE.
BOTH OUR CONSULAR OFFICERS WHO DEAL WITH THE
CASE ON AN HOUR-BY-HOUR BASIS AND THE LARGE NUMBER
OF EMBASSY VOLUNTEERS WHO HAVE WORKED TO IMPROVE
THE CONDITIONS AND THE SPIRITS OF THE FAMILIES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVE ACTED IN THE BEST AMERICAN TRADITION.
HARTMAN

MOSCOW 0445

DTG: 140902Z JAN 82 PSN: 031333

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

33

170756

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0460 DTG: 141405Z JAN 82 PSN: 031355
SIT007 DATE 01/18/82 TOR: 014/1502Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0460 0141405
O 141405Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0738

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 00460
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/14/02 (HARTMAN, A.) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION ON THE PENTECOSTAL PROBLEM
REF: MOSCOW 0445

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WOULD S/S CORRECT THE FOLLOWING TYPO IN PARA 5,
LINE 13, OF REFTEL: THE WORD "AMERICAN" SHOULD BE
"ARMENIAN."
HARTMAN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-11-9-2

BY CDO NARA DATE 11/4/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

34

170757

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0406
SIT 749 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 150131Z JAN 82 PSN: 032163
TOR: 015/0324Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0406 0150137
O 150131Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0144

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 010406
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS 1/14/02 (STOESSEL, WALTER J.)

TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US

SUBJECT: PENTECOSTAL HUNGER STRIKE

REF: MOSCOW 445

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE SECRETARY HAS APPROVED THE PLAN OF ACTION
OUTLINED IN PARA FOUR OF REFTEL.

3. THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO APPROVED YOUR PLAN FOR A
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV, WHICH IS PRESENTLY
UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE NSC. WE WILL INFORM YOU AS
SOON AS NSC CONCURRENCE IS OBTAINED. STOESSEL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-11-10-0

BY LC08 NARA DATE 10/4/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

35

170758

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0429
SIT993 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 151310Z JAN 82 PSN: 032629
TOR: 015/1404Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0429 0151314
O 151310Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0146

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 010429
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 1/14/02 (STOESSEL, WALTER J.)

TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV IN SUPPORT OF
PENTECOSTALISTS

REF: MOSCOW 445

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. ON THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATION, THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED THE APPROACH INVOLVING A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AS OUTLINED IN AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S TELEGRAM (REFTEL). THE LETTER WILL NOT BE PUBLICIZED. THE AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE TEXT TO GROMYKO OR KORNIYENKO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN FOLLOWS: BEGIN
TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I WISH TO DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION ON AN URGENT BASIS
TO THE PLIGHT OF SEVEN SOVIET PENTECOSTALISTS WHO HAVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEEN LIVING IN OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW SINCE SEEKING
REFUGE THERE IN JUNE, 1978. THESE PEOPLE SEEK

PERMISSION FROM SOVIET AUTHORITIES FOR THEMSELVES AND
THEIR FAMILIES TO EMIGRATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION
ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. WE
HAVE REPEATEDLY APPROACHED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON
BEHALF OF PETR AND AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO AND THEIR
DAUGHTERS, LIDIYA, LYUBA, AND LILIYA; AND MARIA
CHMYKHALOV AND HER SON, TIMOFEY; AND THE OTHER MEMBERS
OF THESE TWO FAMILIES, SEEKING A PROMPT AND
HUMANITARIAN SOLUTION TO THEIR PLIGHT. YET THREE AND A
HALF YEARS LATER, THEY STILL AWAIT PERMISSION TO
EMIGRATE.

THE FAMILIES' SITUATION HAS NOW TAKEN ON A NEW AND

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-11-11-9

BY 603 NARA DATE 11/4/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0429

DTG: 151310Z JAN 82 PSN: 032629

POTENTIALLY TRAGIC ASPECT. AFTER THREE AND A HALF YEARS OF WAITING, IN FRUSTRATION AND NOW IN DESPAIR, TWO OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS, MRS. AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO AND HER DAUGHTER, LIDIYA, HAVE EMBARKED UPON A HUNGER STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR GOALS. DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF AND OF THE FAMILIES' OTHER FRIENDS AND SINCERE WELL-WISHERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE TO DISSUADE THEM FROM THIS LIFE-ENDANGERING COURSE, THE TWO WOMEN HAVE MADE CLEAR THEY ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THEIR FAST. OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INFORMING THE MINISTRY THAT THE TWO FAMILIES HAVE AGREED TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY AND RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN CHERNOGORSK FOR THE PROCESSING OF THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EMIGRATION, ACCORDING TO SOVIET LAWS AND PROCEDURES, IF THEIR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS RESIDING IN CHERNOGORSK ARE FIRST PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE, AND IF THE SEVEN FAMILY MEMBERS ARE GUARANTEED THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PROSECUTED BY THE AUTHORITIES ONCE THEY DEPART THE U.S. EMBASSY AND ARE ASSURED THAT THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT PERMISSION FOR REUNIFICATION WITH THEIR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS ABROAD WILL BE GRANTED. OUT OF DEEP CONCERN FOR THEIR LIVES AND HEALTH AND FOR THE PLIGHT OF THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, I ASK YOU TO INTERVENE PERSONALLY IN THIS MATTER TO ALLOW THESE PEOPLE TO EMIGRATE AND THEREBY BRING ABOUT A HUMANITARIAN SOLUTION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT. STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 0429
END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DTG: 151310Z JAN 82 PSN: 032629

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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170759

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0534
SIT987 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 151637Z JAN 82 PSN: 032974
TOR: 015/1744Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0534 0151640
O 151637Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0787

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 00534
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/15/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV IN SUPPORT OF PENTECOSTALISTS
REF: STATE 10429

1. ~~(C-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT OF REFTEL, DCM DELIVERED
PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO MFA USA DIVISION CHIEF
KOMPLEKTOV WITH REQUEST THAT IT BE IMMEDIATELY
PASSED ON TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV. DCM EMPHASIZED
THAT THE LETTER WAS COUCHED IN HUMANITARIAN TERMS,
THAT IT CONTAINED NO POLEMICS OF ANY SORT, AND
THAT IT DESCRIBED A PROPOSAL WHICH OFFERED A WAY
OUT OF THE PROBLEM. KOMPLEKTOV SAID HE WOULD DO
SO AND WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE LETTER ITSELF, BUT
HE DID HAVE SOME REMARKS TO MAKE ON THE PENTECOSTAL
ISSUE. KOMPLEKTOV THEN, IN A TONE WHICH WAS
INSENSITIVE EVEN FOR HIM, SAID THAT THE PENTECOSTALS
WERE ENTIRELY A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. EMBASSY
AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY IN
ANY WAY. HE CALLED THE PROPOSAL OFFERED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S LETTER -- WHICH THE DCM HAD DISCUSSED
WITH HIS DEPUTY THE WEEK BEFORE -- "NOT A PROPOSAL,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT A CONDITION." THE DCM DISAGREED, SAYING THAT
IT HAD TAKEN THE FAMILIES SEVERAL MONTHS TO AGREE
ON SUCH A PLAN AND THAT IT OFFERED A GOOD POSSIBILITY
FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM. RETURNING TO THE ATTACK,
KOMPLEKTOV SAID THAT THE PRIOR EMIGRATION OF THE
FAMILY MEMBERS WAS CERTAINLY A PRE-CONDITION. HE
SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS CLEAR AND CONSISTENT:
THE FAMILIES SHOULD GO BACK TO CHERNOGORSK
AND APPLY FOR EMIGRATION PERMISSION THERE.
IN CLOSING HE ASKED SARCASTICALLY WHAT
WERE OUR PLANS FOR RELEASING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.
DCM ASSURED HIM THAT THE LETTER WOULD NOT BE RELEASED
BECAUSE WE WANTED TO PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBILITY
FOR RESOLVING THIS CASE. DISBELIEVING, KOMPLEKTOV
SAID "WE WILL SEE WHETHER THE U.S. SIDE LEAKS THE
LETTER." IN CLOSING, HE REITERATED THAT HE WAS NOT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-11-12-8

BY DOB PARA TE 11/4/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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COMMENTING ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ITSELF AND
THAT IT WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV.
HARTMAN##

MOSCOW 0534

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