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Withdrawer

KDB 11/4/2015

File Folder USSR (1/21/82-1/23/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

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231

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170253	CABLE	MOSCOW 0746 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-13-1-8	12	1/21/1982	B1
170760	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK	3	1/21/1982	B1
170761	POINT PAPER	TO STEARMAN (INCL. ATTACHMENTS)	7	1/20/1982	B1
170762	CABLE	STATE 17487 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-13-5-4	3	1/22/1982	B1
170763	CABLE	MOSCOW 0802 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-13-4-5	2	1/22/1982	B1
170764	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET EMBARGO (INCL. ATTACHMENTS) R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-22-13-10-3	7	1/22/1982	B1
170765	CABLE	MOSCOW 0869 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-13-7-2	2	1/23/1982	B1
170766	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE PROPOSED MEETING R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-13-8-1	1	1/23/1982	B1
170767	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO CLARK RE PROPOSED MEETING	1	1/19/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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File Folder USSR (1/21/82-1/23/82)

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Box Number 22

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170768	MEMO	SEC. HAIG TO REAGAN RE MEETING WITH GROMYKO	1	1/19/1982	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-13-10-6			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170253

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746
SIT616 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040579
TOR: 021/2055Z

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DE RUEHMO #0746/01 0211240
O 211233Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0936

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00746
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/21/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON WITH KORNIYENKO,
JANUARY 20

REFS: (A) STATE 5511, (B) STATE 6652

1. ~~45~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S LUNCH WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE JANUARY 20 WAS A SPIRITED, OFTEN SHARP, GIVE-AND-TAKE RANGING OVER THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THE U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE AMBASSADOR WARNED THE SOVIETS THAT HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT MOSCOW COULD NOT EXPECT TO BUILD ITS ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP WITH WASHINGTON ON THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN OTHER AREAS WOULD ALWAYS BE CONSIDERED BY AMERICANS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RELATIONSHIP. IF THE SOVIETS REALLY WANTED PROGRESS ON THE "CENTRAL ISSUES," THEN THEY HAD TO STOP MEDDLING AROUND THE WORLD. IN THAT CONTEXT THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE POINTS IN REFTELS ON POLAND AND CUBA.

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PREDICTABLY KORNIYENKO DID NOT ACCEPT THIS CONTRADICTION IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AND QUESTIONED U. S. SERIOUSNESS ON SUCH "CENTRAL" ISSUES AS NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. IN PARTICULAR, HE SAID HE HOPED SECRETARY HAIG WOULD BE PREPARED FOR A SERIOUS CONVERSATION ON SALT/START IN GENEVA. HE SHOWED LITTLE INCLINATION TO DISCUSS POLAND, BUT DID NOT TROT OUT THE STANDARD SOVIET LINE THAT IT IS THE U. S. WHICH IS INTERFERING. HE ALSO TRIED TO PASS OFF WITH MINIMAL COMMENT THE AMBASSADOR'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET PLANES TO CUBA AND THE SIZE OF THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA. IN ALL, KORNIYENKO WAS PREPARED TO DEBATE IN REASONABLY (FOR HIM) NON-IDEOLOGICAL TERMS. WHILE RELAXED THROUGHOUT, HE DID BETRAY SOME ANXIETY THAT AT GENEVA WE MIGHT NOT BE

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DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040579

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DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040579

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TOR: 021/2057Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0746/02 0211241
O 211233Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0937

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00746
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THAT IT WAS UP TO THE POLES TO DECIDE THEIR INTERNAL
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONCERN FOR THE WEST AS WELL AS THE EAST THAT
POLAND ACHIEVE A LEGITIMACY IN ITS INTERNAL ORDER
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR STABILITY THERE --
BROUGHT ONLY MUTTERED EXCLAMATIONS FROM THE
SOVIETS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS. THE AMBASSADOR
STRONGLY PROTESTED SOVIET JAMMING OF VOA BROADCASTS
TO POLAND; THE SOVIETS TRIED TO BRUSH ASIDE
THEIR JAMMING, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO DENY IT.

6. AFGHANISTAN

WHEN AFGHANISTAN CAME UP NATURALLY IN THE
CONVERSATION, KORNIYENKO ASSERTED THAT "YOU KNOW
WE KNOW WHAT YOU WERE UP TO WITH DAUD AND WHAT
YOU WERE DOING IN THE NORTH OF THAT COUNTRY." HE

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WENT ON TO SAY THAT TARAKI HAD NOT INFORMED THE SOVIETS IN ADVANCE OF HIS MOVE AGAINST THE DAOUD REGIME. "TARAKI TOLD US LATER THAT HE HAD NOT INFORMED US OF HIS INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE BECAUSE HE KNOW WE WOULD BE OPPOSED. AND WE WOULD HAVE BEEN." ALTHOUGH AFGHANISTAN WAS MENTIONED A NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION, NONE OF THE SOVIETS MADE ANY REFERENCE TO DOBRYNIN'S DEMARCHE TO THE SECRETARY FOR TALKS ON THE MATTER. KORNIYENKO COMPLAINED IN STRONG TERMS, THAT THE U.S. WAS PREVENTING PAKISTAN FROM NEGOTIATING ON THIS MATTER.

7. INF AND START

KORNIYENKO SAID HE STRONGLY HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON SALT/START IN GENEVA. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT. KORNIYENKO COMPLAINED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT TREATING THE "CENTRAL ISSUE" OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL IN THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP SERIOUSLY. HE ALSO DISPARAGED U.S. SERIOUSNESS IN INF, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY (1) ON THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, ("IF THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE NATO FORCES ARE AN INTEGRAL WHOLE, THEN IT IS ONLY LOGICAL TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INCLUDE ALL SYSTEMS THAT CAN REACH THE SOVIET UNION") AND (2) ON THE ILLOGIC OF OUR ASKING FOR THE DISMANTLING OF THE SS-4'S AND 5'S WHEN THEY HAD NOT BOTHERED US BEFORE THE SS-20'S BECAME AN ISSUE. KORNIYENKO ALSO CLAIMED (SIC) THAT SCHMIDT HAS ADMITTED THAT THERE IS NOW A MEDIUM-RANGE BALANCE.

8. MIDDLE EAST

THE SOVIETS SHOWED GREAT PREOCCUPATION WITH AND SENSITIVITY OVER THE MIDDLE EAST, RAISING THE SUBJECT TO ASSERT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT LIVED UP TO THE OCTOBER 1977 AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS FOR A COLLECTIVE APPROACH, BUT HAD PERSUADED SADAT TO GO TO JERUSALEM AND THEN INSTIGATED THE CAMP DAVID APPROACH, WHICH ONLY AGGRAVATED INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. KOMPLEKTOV HEATEDLY CHARGED THAT THE U.S. HAD DELIBERATELY MANEUVERED IN BAD FAITH "SO THAT NOW YOU EVEN HAVE YOUR OWN SOLDIERS THERE IN THE AREA."

9. NONPROLIFERATION

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0746/03 0211242
O 211233Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0938

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00746
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THE AMBASSADOR RAISED NONPROLIFERATION AS INSTRUCTED IN 1981 STATE 321977, GIVING KORNIYENKO A NONPAPER ON THE SUBJECT. KORNIYENKO AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTEREST AND VIEWS COINCIDED.

10. BILATERAL ISSUES

WHEN THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE PENTECOSTALISTS AND URGED CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH DCM ZIMMERMANN HAD MADE TO MYSHKOV -- THAT THE CHERNOGORSK RELATIVES BE ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE, AFTER WHICH THE PENTECOSTALISTS IN THE EMBASSY WOULD RETURN HOME AND PURSUE THEIR OWN EMIGRATION IN ACCORD WITH SOVIET LAW AND PRACTICE -- KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS OF A CONDITIONAL NATURE WHICH "DOES NOT ACCORD WITH OUR LAW AND PRACTICE." KORNIYENKO LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS ON THE EMBASSY'S PLANS FOR CONTROLLING ACCESS IN ORDER TO PREVENT FUTURE INCIDENTS, AND AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN "DANGEROUS" ACCESS INCIDENTS AT THE EMBASSY. HOWEVER, HE STILL BLAMED THE EMBASSY FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE PENTECOSTALIST PROBLEM AND HE ASSERTED THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD ONLY HAVE MORE SUCH PROBLEMS IF THE PROPOSAL WHICH THE EMBASSY HAD MADE FOR THE EMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTALISTS WERE FOLLOWED. IN AN IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO THEIR HUNGER STRIKE, KOMPLEKTOV INTERJECTED THAT THE EMBASSY ALSO HELD RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE "WELL BEING" OF THE PENTECOSTALISTS.

11. THE ISSUE OF IMPORTATION OF THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCE FOR INSPECTION OF THE NEW CHANCERY CONSTRUCTION WAS RAISED BY DCM ZIMMERMANN WITH KOMPLEKTOV AND REPORTED SEPTEL. AN EXCHANGE ON ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA WAS ALSO

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REPORTED SEPTEL.

12. SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS IF
APPROPRIATE.
HARTMAN

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746
SIT732 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040579
TOR: 021/2055Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0746/01 0211240
O 211233Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0936

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00746
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/21/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON WITH KORNIYENKO,
JANUARY 20

REFS: (A) STATE 5511, (B) STATE 6652.

1. - ENTIRE TEXT)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746
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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00746
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONCERN FOR THE WEST AS WELL AS THE EAST THAT
POLAND ACHIEVE A LEGITIMACY IN ITS INTERNAL ORDER
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR STABILITY THERE --
BROUGHT ONLY MUTTERED EXCLAMATIONS FROM THE
SOVIETS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS. THE AMBASSADOR
STRONGLY PROTESTED SOVIET JAMMING OF VOA BROADCASTS
TO POLAND; THE SOVIETS TRIED TO BRUSH ASIDE
THEIR JAMMING, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO DENY IT.

6. AFGHANISTAN

WHEN AFGHANISTAN CAME UP NATURALLY IN THE
CONVERSATION, KORNIYENKO ASSERTED THAT "YOU KNOW
WE KNOW WHAT YOU WERE UP TO WITH DAOUD AND WHAT
YOU WERE DOING IN THE NORTH OF THAT COUNTRY." HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746

DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040581

WENT ON TO SAY THAT TARAKI HAD NOT INFORMED THE SOVIETS IN ADVANCE OF HIS MOVE AGAINST THE DAQUD REGIME. "TARAKI TOLD US LATER THAT HE HAD NOT INFORMED US OF HIS INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE BECAUSE HE KNOW WE WOULD BE OPPOSED. AND WE WOULD HAVE BEEN." ALTHOUGH AFGHANISTAN WAS MENTIONED A NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION, NONE OF THE SOVIETS MADE ANY REFERENCE TO DOBRYNIN'S DEMARCHE TO THE SECRETARY FOR TALKS ON THE MATTER. KORNIYENKO COMPLAINED IN STRONG TERMS, THAT THE U. S. WAS PREVENTING PAKISTAN FROM NEGOTIATING ON THIS MATTER.

7. INF AND START

KORNIYENKO SAID HE STRONGLY HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE A SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON SALT/START IN GENEVA. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT. KORNIYENKO COMPLAINED THAT THE U. S. WAS NOT TREATING THE "CENTRAL ISSUE" OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL IN THE U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP SERIOUSLY. HE ALSO DISPARAGED U. S. SERIOUSNESS IN INF, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY (1) ON THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, ("IF THE U. S. CONSIDERS THE NATO FORCES ARE AN INTEGRAL WHOLE, THEN IT IS ONLY LOGICAL TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INCLUDE ALL SYSTEMS THAT CAN REACH THE SOVIET UNION") AND (2) ON THE ILLOGIC OF OUR ASKING FOR THE DISMANTLING OF THE SS-4'S AND 5'S WHEN THEY HAD NOT BOTHERED US BEFORE THE SS-20'S BECAME AN ISSUE. KORNIYENKO ALSO CLAIMED (SIC) THAT SCHMIDT HAS ADMITTED THAT THERE IS NOW A MEDIUM-RANGE BALANCE.

8. MIDDLE EAST

THE SOVIETS SHOWED GREAT PREOCCUPATION WITH AND SENSITIVITY OVER THE MIDDLE EAST, RAISING THE SUBJECT TO ASSERT THAT THE U. S. HAD NOT LIVED UP TO THE OCTOBER 1977 AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS FOR A COLLECTIVE APPROACH, BUT HAD PERSUADED SADAT TO GO TO JERUSALEM AND THEN INSTIGATED THE CAMP DAVID APPROACH, WHICH ONLY AGGRAVATED INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. KOMPLEKTOV HEATEDLY CHARGED THAT THE U. S. HAD DELIBERATELY MANEUVERED IN BAD FAITH "SO THAT NOW YOU EVEN HAVE YOUR OWN SOLDIERS THERE IN THE AREA."

9. NONPROLIFERATION

MOSCOW 0746

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746
SIT730 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040584
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SIT: WPC NAN MCF COL JP VP SIT EOB
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0746/03 021124Z
O 211233Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0938

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00746
NODIS

THE AMBASSADOR RAISED NONPROLIFERATION AS
INSTRUCTED IN 1981 STATE 321977, GIVING KORNIYENKO
A NONPAPER ON THE SUBJECT. KORNIYENKO AGREED WITH
THE AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE
ON WHICH SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTEREST AND VIEWS
COINCIDED.

10. BILATERAL ISSUES

WHEN THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE PENTECOSTALISTS
AND URGED CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH
DCM ZIMMERMANN HAD MADE TO MYSHKOV -- THAT THE
CHERNOGORSK RELATIVES BE ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE,
AFTER WHICH THE PENTECOSTALISTS IN THE EMBASSY
WOULD RETURN HOME AND PURSUE THEIR OWN EMIGRA-
TION IN ACCORD WITH SOVIET LAW AND PRACTICE --
KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS OF A
CONDITIONAL NATURE WHICH "DOES NOT ACCORD WITH
OUR LAW AND PRACTICE." KORNIYENKO LISTENED
ATTENTIVELY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS ON THE
EMBASSY'S PLANS FOR CONTROLLING ACCESS IN ORDER
TO PREVENT FUTURE INCIDENTS, AND AGREED THAT THERE
HAD BEEN "DANGEROUS" ACCESS INCIDENTS AT THE
EMBASSY. HOWEVER, HE STILL BLAMED THE EMBASSY FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE PENTECOSTALIST PROBLEM AND HE ASSERTED THAT
THE EMBASSY WOULD ONLY HAVE MORE SUCH PROBLEMS IF
THE PROPOSAL WHICH THE EMBASSY HAD MADE FOR THE
EMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTALISTS WERE FOLLOWED.
IN AN IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO THEIR HUNGER STRIKE,
KOMPLEKTOV INTERJECTED THAT THE EMBASSY ALSO HELD
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE "WELL BEING" OF THE
PENTECOSTALISTS.

11. THE ISSUE OF IMPORTATION OF THE RADIOACTIVE
SOURCE FOR INSPECTION OF THE NEW CHANCERY CON-
STRUCTION WAS RAISED BY DCM ZIMMERMANN WITH
KOMPLEKTOV AND REPORTED SEPTEL. AN EXCHANGE ON
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECRETARY'S
MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA WAS ALSO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0746

DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040584

REPORTED SEPTEL.

12. SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS IF
APPROPRIATE.
HARTMAN

MOSCOW 0746

DTG: 211233Z JAN 82 PSN: 040584

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/4/15 CDR

RECEIVED 25 JAN 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 21 JAN 82 13

KEYWORDS: USSR

PAKISTAN

SUBJECT: SOVIET THREAT TO PAKISTAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 05 FEB 82 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KEMP

PIPES

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LB DM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

- 2/01	Clark noted w/Comment		
Stearmen S 2/01	further action		
C 4/1	OAR / original not returned		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council

Clark/McFarlane

Comment Sheet

SUSPENSE

400
2/1 w/ Stearnman A
For
Further
Action
cc: GK, MW

Number

Date

1 FEB 82

WPC comments

"GOOD ANALYSIS, WHAT
FOLLOW UP?"

Action

Coordinate

Info

STEARMAN

KEMP

WHEELER

DUE DATE

5 FEB 82

-NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # _____

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<i>McFarlane</i> 2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BUD NANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JOHN POINDEXTER 3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JACQUE HILL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JUDGE CLARK (4)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JANET COLSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Bud me
your analysis
what follow-up?
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170760	MEMO W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK	3	1/21/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170761	POINT PAPER TO STEARMAN (INCL. ATTACHMENTS)	7	1/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

26

170762

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 7847
SIT734 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 222349Z JAN 82 PSN: 042358
TOR: 023/0001Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7847 0222359
O P 222349Z JAN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0385

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 3710
WHITE HOUSE 7063
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 017847
NODIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 01/22/88 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)

TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER
REGARDING PENTECOSTALISTS
REF: STATE 10429

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: ON 22 JANUARY, SOVIET DCM BESSMERTNYKH
DELIVERED PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER (REFTEL) IN SUPPORT OF THE
PENTECOSTALISTS. THE LETTER REPEATED THE LONG-STANDING
SOVIET POSITION CONCERNING THE PROBLEM - THAT THE US
SIDE SHOULD MAKE THE FAMILIES LEAVE THE EMBASSY AND
THAT THEIR EMIGRATION REQUEST WOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY
AFTER THEY RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK. END SUMMARY.

2. AT 1130 EST ON JANUARY 22, SOVIET DCM BESSMERTNYKH
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DELIVERED TO ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS SCANLAN THE RESPONSE FROM BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER OF JANUARY 15. THE TEXT OF THE
RESPONSE IS PROVIDED BELOW.

3. IN DELIVERING THE LETTER, BESSMERTNYKH BRIEFLY
SUMMARIZED THE CONTENTS, POINTING OUT THAT THE FAMILIES
WOULD NOT BE PROSECUTED SHOULD THEY LEAVE THE EMBASSY,
AND THAT THEIR REQUEST TO EMIGRATE WOULD ONLY BE
CONSIDERED AFTER THEY HAD RETURNED TO CHERNOGORSK. HE
NOTED THAT AT THE END OF THE LETTER, PRESIDENT BREZHNEV
REFERRED TO THE POLOVCHAK CASE. IN RESPONSE TO
SCANLAN'S QUERY ABOUT A POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN THIS
CASE AND THAT OF THE PENTECOSTALISTS, BESSMERTNYKH
STATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS MAKING A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 222349Z JAN 82 PSN: 042358

"PHILOSOPHICAL" RATHER THAN A PRACTICAL LINKAGE.

4. SCANLAN UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT THE LETTER PROMPTLY, AND HE REITERATED US CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF THE PENTECOSTALISTS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE ONGOING HUNGER STRIKE. HE EMPHASIZED OUR INTEREST IN AVERTING A POSSIBLE TRAGEDY.

5. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: WITH REGARD TO YOUR COMMUNICATION OF JANUARY 15, 1982, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING.

THE PEOPLE FOR WHOM YOU ARE PETITIONING HAVE REALLY FOUND THEMSELVES IN A SITUATION NOT TO BE ENVIED. AFTER ALL, THIS SITUATION WAS CREATED AND HAS LONG BEEN MAINTAINED IN AN ARTIFICIAL MANNER. A WAY OUT OF IT COULD HAVE BEEN FOUND A LONG TIME AGO. AT THE PRESENT TIME, TOO, IT IS POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION.

THE ONLY THING NEEDED IS THAT THE US SIDE, RATHER THAN DETAIN THOSE PEOPLE WITHIN THE WALLS OF ITS EMBASSY, TAKE MEASURES FOR THEM TO LEAVE IT. NOTHING STANDS IN THE WAY OF SUCH A STEP - NOBODY INTENDED OR INTENDS TO PROSECUTE THAT GROUP OF PENTECOSTALISTS.

AS TO THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE USSR, THIS QUESTION CAN MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE CONSIDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED UNDER OUR LAWS AND EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL SOVIET CITIZENS, AFTER THOSE PERSONS RETURN TO THE PLACE OF THEIR RESIDENCE.

HOWEVER, THE GROUP OF THE SECT MEMBERS THAT HAPPENED TO BE IN THE US EMBASSY IS BEING PUSHED FOR SOME REASON OR ANOTHER IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION - TOWARD VIOLATION OF THE SOVIET LAWS, SETTING FORTH PRIOR CONDITIONS AND ALL SORTS OF DEMANDS THAT CAN LEAD ONLY TO AN IMPASSE. THUS THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EXISTING SITUATION RESTS WITH THE US SIDE, INCLUDING THE

RESPONSIBILITY OF A HUMANITARIAN NATURE. WE ARE NOT THE ONES TO BE CALLED UPON TO EXERCISE HUMANENESS. FOR THAT MATTER, THE REFERENCES TO HUMANENESS ARE NOT CONVINCING, WHILE, IN FACT, ATTEMPTS ARE BEING MADE TO MANIPULATE THE DESTINIES OF INDIVIDUALS AND NOT ONLY THOSE OF THE SECT MEMBERS WHO ARE KEPT IN THE US EMBASSY.

WHAT KIND OF HUMANENESS CAN ONE INVOKE, WHEN CHILDREN ARE FORCEFULLY SEPARATED FROM THEIR PARENTS, AS IS THE CASE OF THE SOVIET CITIZENS POLOVCHAKS? INDEED, WHEN EVEN AN AMERICAN COURT RULES TO RETURN VLADIMIR POLOVCHAK - A MINOR - TO HIS PARENTS AND THE US EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES ARE RAISING OBSTACLES THERETO, IT IS NOT SIMPLY INHUMANE, BUT IMMORAL.

I WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT ON THE PART OF THE US SIDE NECESSARY MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO DISCONTINUE THE ABNORMAL SITUATION EXISTING AROUND THE GROUP OF SOVIET CITIZENS WHO FIND THEMSELVES IN THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

SINCERELY, L. BREZHNEV, JANUARY 21, 1982. END TEXT. HAIG

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 222349Z JAN 82 PSN: 042358

SECSTATE WASHDC 7847

DTG: 222349Z JAN 82 PSN: 042358

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170763 29

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0802
SIT714 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 220758Z JAN 82 PSN: 041250
TOR: 022/0808Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN COL JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0802 0220758
O 220758Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0972

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4067
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 1306
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5531
BT

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NLRR 748-22-13-5-4
BY LDB NARA DATE 11/4/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 00802
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/22/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM, UR, UK, US
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG BY
- LABOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN
REF: LONDON 1504

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHILE COGNIZANT OF THE SECRETARY'S CROWDED SCHEDULE, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT SECRETARY HAIG GIVE A FEW MOMENTS TO LABOR PARTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN ROBERTSON ON THE PLIGHT OF THE SIBERIAN SEVEN.

3. SUCH MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THE MULTILATERAL POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE THE EMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTALS HAS ASSUMED. THOUGH PRESENTLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL US-USSR RELATIONS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IT IS NOT SIMPLY A "U. S. PROBLEM" AS THE SOVIETS ARE WONT TO ASSERT. OUR RECEPTIVITY TO SUCH MEETINGS ALSO UNDERLINES THAT THE U. S. GOVERNMENT WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

4. THE OPPORTUNITY CAN ALSO BE USED TO POINT OUT TO ROBERTSON AND SWEDISH PARLIAMENTARIAN NILSSON THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS READY AT ANY TIME TO FACILITATE THE IMMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTAL FAMILIES. AT ISSUE IS THE REFUSAL OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO GRANT THE NECESSARY EXIT PERMISSION FOR EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE WE THUS WELCOME THE INTEREST AND SUPPORT SHOWN BY ROBERTSON/NILSSON, IT IS ONLY THE SOVIET SIDE WHICH IS IN A POSITION TO END THE IMPASSE. TO DRIVE THIS POINT HOME, ROBERTSON AND NILSSON SHOULD

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0802

DTG: 220758Z JAN 82 PSN: 041250

BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE
SOVIETS ON THE ISSUE. HARTMAN

MOSCOW 0802

DTG: 220758Z JAN 82 PSN: 041250

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MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

380

31

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

170764

SECRET ATTACHMENT
INFORMATION

January 22, 1982

pr

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *mr*

SUBJECT: Soviet Embargo

Attached is an analysis conducted by the CIA outlining the effects of an embargo on the Soviet Union of specific items by the United States. As will be seen, a unilateral embargo is not particularly effective whereas a US/Allied embargo could do substantial damage to the Soviet economy.

Attachment

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NLRP NLR-748-22-13-103
BY CN A
11/13/12

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

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Table 1: The Effect of Further Trade Restrictions
on Selected Technologies and End-Products

<u>Technology or End-Product</u>	<u>Effect*</u>		<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>US</u>	<u>US/Allies</u>	
Grain	Small	Substantial	Even if replaced by foreign suppliers, the US action probably would raise Soviet costs and strain Soviet hard currency reserves. Given poor Soviet and world harvests, unilateral USG action could exacerbate Soviet food shortages. Allied action could cut Soviet grain imports by 70%.
Agricultural Machinery	Moderate	Substantial	US action would inhibit long-term Soviet drive for self-sufficiency. Allied action would further inhibit this drive.
Microelectronics	Moderate	Substantial	Legal acquisitions, coupled with illegal ones, have given the Soviets an entire industry. US actions would slow Soviet advances. Allied action would substantially retard Soviet advances.

* In increasing order of magnitude, from Small through Moderate to Substantial

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Chemicals	Moderate	Moderate	US and/or Allied action would affect Soviet agricultural productivity.
° fertilizer			
° pesticides			
Oil and gas equipment/ technology	Small	Substantial	Allied action would reduce expected Soviet oil and gas recovery by 2 or 3 million barrels per day by late 1980s.
° submersibles			
° off-shore rigs			
° drill bits and pipe			
° pipeline equipment, including compressors			
° recovery chemicals			
Construction equipment/materials	Small	Substantial	Non-US equipment is widely available.
° large-diameter pipe			Allied action would cause severe dis-
° rolled steel			ruptions in machine building and gas
° bulldozers/excavators/ dumpsters			transmission.
Materials	Small	Substantial	Allied action would inhibit advanced Soviet work.
° ceramics			
° composites/powders			
° special steel alloys			
Computers	Small	Substantial	US action would be reduced by foreign availability.
° software			
° large-frame			
° minis			
° peripherals			

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Machinery*	Small	Substantial	Non-US suppliers are numerous. Allied action would seriously hamper Soviet efforts to boost quality/quantity in production.
° NC/CNC/robotics			
° CAD/CAM			
° mills/foundries/fabrication			
° precision machinery			
Shipbuilding	Small	Substantial	Allied action would curtail Soviet naval construction and repair capabilities.
° floating drydocks			
° heavy-lift cranes			

* NC: numerically controlled
CNC: computer numerically controlled
CAD: computer-aided design
CAM: computer-aided manufacture

3
~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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Table 2: Related USG Sanctions

<u>Technology/action</u>	<u>Impact</u>	<u>Foreign availability</u>	<u>Commentary</u>
1. Total cut-off of export credits, including retroactive action on outstanding credit	Forces Soviets to pay scarce hard currency and/or compete for market rates	Europeans and Japanese already offer "below prime" rates <u>but</u> increased Soviet demand may increase cost of borrowing	Now suspended by US only
2. Terminate maritime agreement	Shipping and cross-trading with and by Soviets would increase their costs and reduce hard currency earnings	Allies have stronger flag- shipping requirements and the Soviet fleet would not encroach on their markets	Now suspended by US only
3. Terminate fishing agreement	Deprives Soviets access to fertile grounds and would cut Soviet protein consumption	World fisheries are already strained; may cause friction with allied competitors	Now suspended by US only
4. Reduce Soviet commercial presence	Reduces Soviet presence and would limit intelligence service (IS) uses	Soviets would probably shift commercial activities to allies	An easy, low-cost action--if we trade less, they don't need commercial offices
5. Eliminate all S&T* agreements (including Article 4 exchanges of technical data with US firms) not up for renewal in short-run, including "unofficial" exchanges (e.g., direct university-Academy exchanges, Fulbright Scholars, etc.)	Cuts off direct Soviet access to US academies and business	Allies have such agreements and Soviets are strengthening them	These generally are of one-way benefit to Soviets and are very difficult to monitor--no loss to USG

*See Appendix

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6. Reduce or eliminate US participation in trade shows attended by Soviets, and restrict sales presentations, and industry tours	Cuts Soviets off from personnel relations with US firms and state-of-the-art technology and reduces IS involvement	Allies could and probably would pick up slack	Reduces the risk of theft, inadvertent losses of know-how and design processes, and IS recruitment/assessment threat
7. Reduce or eliminate US presence in international organizations (e.g., IIASA, UNDP) with large Soviet presence	Cuts Soviets off from close contacts with US experts and reduces IS involvement	Allies may pick up tab, but not likely	A rather simple way of restricting US "subsidies" to Soviets, but may cause problems in multilateral contexts (e.g., UN)
8. Eliminate Soviet access to USG open source documents (NTIS, Library of Congress)	Would restrict Soviet access to USG-sponsored research	Some agreements with Allies (e.g., British library) must be altered	
9. Regulated activities of Soviet-owned, US-chartered companies	Would weaken Soviet commercial presence, and use of same for IS related activities	NA	Would probably require legal action, but well worthwhile in any event
10. Restrict imports of Soviet-origin goods	Damages Soviet prestige and may crimp somewhat Soviet hard-currency earnings	NA	Mostly symbolic, as we don't import a great deal

~~2~~
~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

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Appendix: US-USSR BILATERAL TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date for Renewal</u>	<u>Notification</u>
Science & Technology	July 8, 1982	-
Agriculture	June 19, 1983	By Dec. 1982
Artificial Heart Research & Development	June 28, 1987	-
Atomic Energy	June 21, 1983	-
Energy	June 28, 1982	30 day advance
Environmental Pro- tection	May 23, 1987	-
Housing and Con- struction	June 28, 1984	By Dec. 1983
Medical Science and Public Health	May 23, 1987	-
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes	May 24, 1982	-
Transportation	June 19, 1983	-
Studies of the World Ocean	Dec. 15, 1986	-

(UNCLASSIFIED)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/4/5 LDB

RECEIVED 23 JAN 82 15

TO PRESIDENT

FROM CLARK

DOCDATE 22 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

EMBARGO

SUBJECT: CIA ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF EMBARGO ON USSR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IP FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(X /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 1/25 noted by Pres

KP, NB, HO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C) MB

2

170765

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0869
SIT691 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 231222Z JAN 82 PSN: 043174
TOR: 023/1456Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN MCF COL JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0869 0231224
O 231222Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1026

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 00869
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/23/01 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, UR, US
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THE
PENTECOSTALS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE PENTECOSTALS MIGHT PROVE USEFUL - AT THE PROPER TIME - IN PERSUADING AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA TO END THEIR HUNGER STRIKE. WE SEE SUCH A LETTER AS OUR LAST CARD TO PLAY BEFORE A DECISION TO MOVE THE HUNGER STRIKERS TO A SOVIET HOSPITAL. AS SUCH IT WOULD BEST BE WITHHELD UNTIL THE EMBASSY DOCTOR DETERMINES THAT THEIR CONDITION IS BECOMING LIFE-THREATENING. LIDIA AND AUGUSTINA HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WILL NOW CEASE TAKING ANY LIQUIDS AFTER TODAY. IF, AS SO FAR IN THE HUNGER STRIKE, AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA BACK OFF OF THIS EXTREME POSITION BEFORE THEIR HEALTH IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED, WE WOULD ADVISE AGAINST A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER; WE THINK IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE WITH THEM ONLY AS A LAST-DITCH EFFORT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HOWEVER, SHOULD THE VASHCHENKOS THIS TIME CARRY OUT THEIR INTENTION TO THE POINT WHERE DANGER TO THEIR LIVES SEEMED IMMINENT, WE WOULD WANT, AT LEAST 24 HOURS BEFORE THEIR SITUATION REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION, TO PRESENT A PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST THAT THEY RECONSIDER THEIR ACTION.

3. WE THINK A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF IT MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- THE PRESIDENT IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO SEEKING THE EMIGRATION OF THE VASHCHENKOS AND CHMYKHALOVS ALONG WITH THEIR FAMILIES IN CHERNOGORSK;
-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0869

DTG: 231222Z JAN 82 PSN: 043174

CONTACT WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS AT A HIGH
LEVEL TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OF THIS
PROBLEM;

-- WHILE THESE EFFORTS HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN
SUCCESSFUL, THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO
CONTINUE THEM AND IS HOPEFUL THAT A SOLUTION
WILL BE FOUND;

-- THE PRESIDENT IS ABOVE ALL CONCERNED FOR THE
HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PENTECOSTALS;

-- THEREFORE, THE PRESIDENT URGES THE VASHCHENKOS
TO TOTALLY ABANDON THEIR HUNGER STRIKE.

4. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CONCURS IN THIS APPROACH.
ZIMMERMANN

MOSCOW 0869

DTG: 231222Z JAN 82 PSN: 043174

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen

254

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

170766

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-22-138-1

January 23, 1982

BY KDB NARA DATE 11/4/15

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Haig-Gromyko January 26 Meeting (U)

At Tab A is a memorandum from Al Haig to you proposing that he proceed with meeting Gromyko in Geneva on January 26 -- for one day instead of two as originally planned. (S)

Al intends to take the Soviets to task on a number of outstanding issues in the meetings, and I believe this session with Gromyko can be useful in conveying to the Kremlin our current concerns about Poland, Cuba and other problems. (S)

Attachment

Tab A Haig Memo, Jan 19, 82

~~SECRET~~

Review on
January 19, 1988

~~SECRET~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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KDB 11/4/2015

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USSR (1/21/82-1/23/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170767	MEMO W. STEARMAN TO CLARK RE PROPOSED MEETING	1	1/19/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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82 : 19 P 2.35
PR 170768

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~


DECLASSIFIED

January 19, 1982

NLRR 748-22-13-10-8

BY KDB NARA DATE 1/4/15

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in Geneva January 26

We have remained flexible up to now on whether or not to proceed with the meeting with Gromyko originally scheduled for the two days of January 26-27. There have been powerful pros and cons on both sides of the question. After considering them, and taking into account the encouragement to go ahead I have been getting from the Pope and the Europeans, I believe on balance that I should go ahead with the meeting, and use it to register our outrage at continuing repression in Poland and the fact that we will not be conducting business as usual while it goes on.

As a preliminary signal, I am reducing the duration of the meeting to one day instead of two, and this will be clear when the two sides make their announcement Thursday. At the meeting itself, I will focus on Poland, Cuba and other egregious Soviet breaches of decent behavior and international comity. (I will also follow up on your letter to Brezhnev about the Pentecostalist families in our Moscow Embassy.) My point will be that the Soviet Union has been tearing down the whole structure of political relationships built up since the War, thereby raising serious questions as to the durability of that structure.

RDS-1 1/19/02

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

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Package # 0254

02

27

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u>g</u>
BUD NANCE	<u>✓</u>	<u>Bud</u>
JOHN POINDEXTER	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
JACQUE HILL	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
JUDGE CLARK	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>1</u>	<u>g</u>

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COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 JAN 82 15

TO . PRESIDENT

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 19 JAN 82

URGENT

KEYWORDS: USSR

POLAND

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

CUBA

FOREIGN TRAVEL

CM

SUBJECT: SECSTATE PROPOSED MTG W/ SOVIET FOMIN GROMYKO IN GENEVA ON 26 JAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 19 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

FONTAINE

LENZ

COLSON

COMMENTS *** URGENT THREE HOUR TURNAROUND

REF# 8201173

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP</i>	<i>1/23 for info</i>		
	<i>✓</i>	<i>1/25 Noted by Pres</i>		<i>RP, SI</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C) *1/22*