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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/5/2015

File Folder USSR (1/25/82-1/26/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

232

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170261	MEMO	GENE TO W. CLARK AND R. MCFARLANE RE HAIG GROMYKO TALKS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-1-7	2	1/25/1982	B1
170769	LETTER	GENE TO BUD RE ENCLOSED MEMO	1	1/25/1982	B1
170770	CABLE	MOSCOW 0932 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-3-5	4	1/25/1982	B1
170771	CABLE	MOSCOW 0940 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-4-4	3	1/25/1982	B1
170772	CABLE	MOSCOW 1000 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-5-3	1	1/26/1982	B1
170773	CABLE	STATE 20363 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-6-2	2	1/26/1982	B1
170774	CABLE	MOSCOW 1013 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-7-1	2	1/26/1982	B1
170775	CABLE	MOSCOW 1015 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-8-0	2	1/26/1982	B1
170776	MEMO	N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET EXPORT SANCATIONS	1	1/26/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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232

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170777	ISSUE PAPER	RE ECONOMIC SANCATIONS <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-10-7</i>	4	ND	B1
170778	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-11-6</i>	1	1/26/1982	B1
170779	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-14-12-5</i>	1	1/22/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

NLRR 748-22-142-6

BY KAB N DATE 11/3/15 January 25, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. CLARK
AND THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Haig-Gromyko Talks Tomorrow

As nearly as I can tell, after talking with you and Walt Stoessel on Saturday, how Al will handle START in his talk with Gromyko tomorrow is still unresolved. I think it is wrong to leave so fundamental an issue to anyone's battlefield discretion. Paul, to whom I talked this morning about how INF and START should be handled, agrees with me. Paul has seen a letter from Al to Genscher on the subject. It was not sent to me for clearance and I cannot get a copy from S/S.

I feel strongly that there is no sense in the tactic of our not raising START with Gromyko. The idea has now been explained in the TIMES. If Gromyko keeps quiet, he will convict us of aborting START (and INF, if we fail to table the treaty) and restore the credibility of the Soviet propaganda effort to prove that we are trying to derail arms control and start a nuclear war in Europe. After a few months, they will make some cosmetic changes in Poland, and we shall have to crawl back to the negotiations, in effect certifying that conditions in Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) have improved, and that the Soviet Union is now in a state of grace. //

What on earth do we gain from such a scenario?

In my judgment, it would be much better for us to stick with the initial plan for handling START: i.e.,

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2.

to propose that the two sides agree to begin START in the spring. The exact date would be worked out through diplomatic channels.

Paul and I are also concerned about tabling the draft treaty in the preparation of which so much blood has been spilled. I gather that a good deal of thought is being given in State to holding up tabling the treaty. Now that we have finally gotten a draft treaty to Paul, I think he should be given the flexibility to table it when he wants. In his judgment that is next Tuesday. A telephone call about Paul's meeting with Al today reports that Al agrees with Paul on this point.

Gene~~SECRET~~

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170769	LETTER GENE TO BUD RE ENCLOSED MEMO	1	1/25/1982	B1

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National Security Council
The White House

4

ED

Package # _____

82 MAY 29 P 4: 48

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
I-Information A-Action			

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COMMENTS

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/5/15 EJB

RECEIVED 29 JAN 82 19

TO CLARK

FROM ROSTOW, E

DOCDATE 25 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

HAIG, A

INF

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: COMMENTS RE INF & START TALKS BTW HAIG & GROMYKO

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES -

STEARMAN -

SHOEMAKER -

KRAEMER -

LINHARD -

RETSCHER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M / M)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0932.
SIT685 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 251653Z JAN 82 PSN: 045436
TOR: 025/1954Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO *0932/01 0251654
O 251653Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1072
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 2805
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 5066

INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5557
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8617
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0447
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1307
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00932
EXDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV: GENEVA FOR AMB HARTMAN
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/25/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM, SREF, UR, US, FI, GW
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIR MEDICAL
EVACUATION OF PENTECOSTAL HUNGER STRIKERS
REF: (A) MOSCOW 772 (NOTAL), (B) MOSCOW 853 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT DECISION OF
TWO MEMBERS OF THE PENTECOSTAL GROUP IN RESIDENCE
IN THE EMBASSY TO INTENSIFY THEIR FOUR-WEEK-OLD
HUNGER STRIKE BY FORESWEARING ALL LIQUIDS, APPROACHES
HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO THE FINNISH AND FRG EMBASSIES
CONCERNING CONTINGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION VIA THEIR
RESPECTIVE NATIONAL AIRLINES. BOTH MISSIONS RESPONDED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN A POSITIVE VEIN, THOUGH COGNIZANT OF THE NECESSARY
AND HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC SOVIET ACCESSION TO SUCH A
PLAN. A PHONE REPORT FROM CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY
INTERNATIONAL RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF RECEPTIVITY OF
THE GOVERNMENTS OF SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA TO RECEIVING
THE POTENTIAL MEDICAL EVACUEES. THE RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES
WILL BE CONTACTED JANUARY 26 IN THIS REGARD. EMBASSY
HELSINKI AND AMCONSUL FRANKFURT ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE
PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AS TO HOSPITAL RECEPTION AND
CARE LOCALLY. END SUMMARY.

3. THE DECISION OF AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA VASHCHENKO
TO ABSTAIN FROM ALL LIQUIDS -- EVEN WATER -- COULD
BRING ABOUT A MEDICAL CRISIS BY MID-WEEK, ACCORDING
TO THE EMBASSY PHYSICIAN. WE HAVE ALREADY WARNED
THE SOVIETS OF THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR A MEDICAL

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DTG: 251653Z JAN 82 PSN: 045436

EVACUATION; WE NOW PLAN TO GO BACK TO THEM TO SAY THAT THE EMERGENCY HAS NOW ARISEN AND TO ASK THEM TO GRANT EXIT PERMISSION TO THE TWO HUNGER-STRIKERS. WHILE THE ODDS OF SUCH EXIT PERMISSION BEING GRANTED ARE SLIM, OUR CONCERN FOR THE LIVES AND HEALTH OF THE TWO PENTECOSTALISTS DICTATES THAT WE MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO GET ALL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES IN PLACE IN CASE THE SOVIETS ACCEDE. ACCORDINGLY, ORAL REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING MEDICAL EVACUATION ON COMMERCIAL CARRIERS WERE MADE OF THE FINNISH AND FRG EMBASSIES JANUARY 25. (SPECIAL MEDIVAC FLIGHTS, WHETHER OF USG OR PRIVATE ORIGIN, INVOLVE COMPLICATED CLEARANCES OF FLIGHT PLANS AND CREWS THAT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO LEAD TIMES.)

4. ADCM AND CHIEF OF CONSULAR SECTION CALLED ON FINNISH MINISTER/COUNSELLOR ERKKI TIILIKAINEN JANUARY 25 SEEKING FINNISH COOPERATION IN THE CASE OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A MEDICAL EVACUATION OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS. AFTER RECEIVING A MODEST EXPOSITION OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION, TIILIKAINEN AGREED TO FACILITATE THE TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS OF SUCH A MEDIVAC THROUGH FINNAIR, WHICH HAS FOUR FLIGHTS WEEKLY TO HELSINKI: TUESDAY, WEDNESDAY, FRIDAY, AND SUNDAY. TIILIKAINEN'S ONLY CAVEAT HINGED ON THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINNISH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTICIPATION IN THE AFFAIR, BUT HE ALLOWED THAT A SOVIET GRANT OF EXIT PERMISSION FOR SUCH AN EVACUATION WOULD ITSELF IMPLY POLITICAL APPROVAL. ADCM MCCALL ASSURED TIILIKAINEN THAT THE MEDIVAC FLIGHT WOULD BE ATTEMPTED ONLY WITH SOVIET CONSENT. TIILIKAINEN PROMISED TO COMMUNICATE THE RESULTS OF HIS COORDINATION EFFORTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. MUCH THE SAME SCENE PLAYED ITSELF OUT AT THE EMBASSY OF THE FRG IN A MEETING WITH MINISTER HERMANN HUBER. MR. HUBER WAS MOST FORTHCOMING IN OFFERING HIS ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING WITH LUFTHANSA FOR UP TO EIGHT SEATS (TWO STRETCHERS, PLUS TWO ESCORTS) ON A STAND-BY BASIS. LUFTHANSA HAS DAILY FLIGHTS TO FRANKFURT. THUS, SHOULD ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SUCCESSFULLY BE COMPLETED, A CONTINGENCY MEDICAL EVACUATION FLIGHT WILL BE AVAILABLE EVERY DAY OF THE WEEK, WITH DOUBLE POSSIBILITIES ON THE DAYS OF FINNAIR SERVICE.

6. MARIANNE RIDGE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY INTERNATIONAL (AN ORGANIZATION ONG ACTIVE

MOSCOW 0932

DTG: 251653Z JAN 82 PSN: 045436

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1/25 0932
SIT684 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 251653Z JAN 82 PSN: 045439
TOR: 025/1955Z

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SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHMO #0932/02 0251656

O 251653Z JAN 82

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1073

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 2806

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 5067

INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5558

AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8618

AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0448

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1308

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00932

EXDIS

IN SUPPORT OF BOTH PENTECOSTAL FAMILIES IN REFUGE
IN MOSCOW), PHONED TO INQUIRE AS TO THE CONDITION
OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS AND TO REPORT WHAT SHE TERMED
"BEHIND THE SCENES EFFORTS" TO COORDINATE AN AUSTRIAN/
SWISS DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS IN SUPPORT OF THE RECENT
EFFORT OF NINE SWEDISH PARLIAMENTARIANS TO SECURE
THE EMIGRATION OF THE PENTECOSTALS THROUGH AN APPEAL
TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV. ACCORDING TO RIDGE, "THE
AUSTRIANS" (SHE DID NOT SPECIFY WHO) HAD AGREED
BASICALLY TO THE PLAN IF THE SWISS THEMSELVES DECIDE
TO BECOME INVOLVED. CSI AND OTHER SUPPORTERS OF THE
PENTECOSTALS WILL SEEK TO CONVINCE THE SWISS FOREIGN
MINISTER, NOW IN GENEVA, TO BACK THE APPROACH. SINCE
IN ANY EVENT BOTH AIR AUSTRIA AND SWISSAIR CONDUCT
FREQUENT FLIGHTS FROM MOSCOW, EMBASSY PLANS TO
PRESENT THEM TOMORROW WITH REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE
SIMILAR TO THOSE BROACHED TO THE FINNS AND GERMANS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. ACTION REQUESTED: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI AND AMCONSUL
FRANKFURT ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE PRELIMINARY AND
TENTATIVE INQUIRIES AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF QUALIFIED
MEDICAL ATTENTION FOR INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO BE
SUFFERING SEVERE DEHYDRATION AND UNDERNOURISHMENT.
DEPARTMENT REQUESTED TO AFFIRM AVAILABILITY OF
EMERGENCY FUNDS TO COVER COSTS OF HOSPITALIZATION,
IF NECESSARY, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS PRIVATE SUPPORT
FOR THE CARE OF THE PENTECOSTALS COULD BE ARRANGED.
ZIMMERMANN

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DTG: 251653Z JAN 82 PSN: 045439

MOSCOW 1/25 0932

DTG: 251653Z JAN 82 PSN: 045439

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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(70771)

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0940
SIT687 DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 251747Z JAN 82 PSN: 045444
TOR: 025/1959Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB
EOB: PIPE
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST / REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #0940/01 0251749
O 251747Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-1444

BY 16DB NARA DATE 11/5/15

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1079

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00940
NOBIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY AND
AMBASSADOR HARTMAN IN GENEVA
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/25/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, UR, US
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT OF
PENTECOSTAL HUNGER STRIKERS
REFS: (A) 81 MOSCOW 1935, (B) 81 STATE 28253

1. ~~XC~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: EMBASSY PHYSICIAN, IN CONSULTATION
WITH STATE DEPARTMENT MEDICAL DIVISION, HAS DETER-
MINED THAT THE PENTECOSTAL HUNGER STRIKERS ARE LIKELY
TO REQUIRE MEDICAL TREATMENT UNAVAILABLE AT THE
EMBASSY AFTER WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27. EMBASSY IS THUS
PUTTING INTO MOTION MACHINERY FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION
OF THE TWO VASCHENKOS FROM THE USSR ON WEDNESDAY,
JANUARY 27, OR (IF THAT IS UNATTAINABLE) FOR REMOVAL
OF THE PAIR TO A SOVIET HOSPITAL THE SAME DAY.
DEPARTMENT IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT PRESIDENTIAL
LETTER TO EMBASSY BY OOB JANUARY 26.

3. TWO JANUARY 25 EXAMINATIONS REVEALED AN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ALARMING RECENT WEIGHT LOSS. THE EMBASSY
PHYSICIAN DETERMINED THAT AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO
HAS LOST THREE AND ONE-HALF POUNDS AND LIDIA
VASHCHENKO ONE AND ONE-HALF POUNDS SINCE THEIR
JANUARY 24 EXAMINATION. IN THE MONTH OF THEIR
FAST LIDIA HAS LOST FIVE POUNDS, (SHE NOW WEIGHS
ONLY 93); AUGUSTINA HAS LOST 13 POUNDS (SHE NOW
WEIGHS 166). BOTH AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA SHOW
RESOLVE TO CONTINUE THEIR NO-LIQUIDS HUNGER
STRIKE. THE EMBASSY DOCTOR HAS CONCLUDED,
AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH DEPARTMENT MEDICAL BUREAU,
THAT THE VASHCHENKOS MIGHT GO SEVEN DAYS WITHOUT
WATER UNTIL DEATH, BUT THAT IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE
IS A SERIOUS DANGER AFTER FOUR DAYS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 251747Z JAN 82 PSN: 045444

4. THE EMBASSY THUS PLANS EITHER TO MEDICALLY EVACUATE THE HUNGER STRIKERS TO A THIRD COUNTRY OR SEEK MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE PAIR IN A SOVIET HOSPITAL ON JANUARY 27. WE WILL INITIATE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ON JANUARY 26:

- CHARGE WILL SEEK EMERGENCY APPOINTMENT WITH MFA USA DIVISION CHIEF KOMPLEKTOV TO REPEAT OUR REQUEST FOR SOVIET AUTHORIZATION FOR THE MEDICAL EVACUATION OF THE TWO VASHCHENKOS ON JANUARY 27 VIA EITHER THE FINNAIR OR LUFTHANSA REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHT, OR SPECIAL U.S. MILITARY MEDEVAC PLANE (BOTH AIRLINES AND THE USAF HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND ARE PREPARED TO ASSIST);
- EMBASSY DOCTOR WILL NOTIFY THE HUNGER STRIKERS THAT THE TIME FOR THEIR HOSPITALIZATION IS GROWING NEAR IF THEY DO NOT END THEIR FAST;
- CHARGE WILL READ PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS ASSURING THEM OF U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THEIR FAMILY'S EMIGRATION AND REQUESTING THEM TO END THE HUNGER STRIKE.

5. SHOULD THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO ALLOW A MEDICAL EVACUATION OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS OR FAIL TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESPOND TO OUR DEMARCHE BY 12:00 MOSCOW TIME JANUARY 27, CHARGE WILL AGAIN CONTACT MFA TO STATE THAT IN VIEW OF THE EMERGENCY SITUATION, THE EMBASSY WILL BE CALLING A SOVIET AMBULANCE TO TAKE THE HUNGER STRIKERS TO A SOVIET HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT. THE CHARGE WILL EMPHASIZE THAT WE FULLY EXPECT THE EMBASSY DOCTOR AND A CONSULAR OFFICER TO BE ALLOWED TO ACCOMPANY THE VASHCHENKOS, AND THAT THE VASHCHENKOS WILL BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE EMBASSY AFTER THEIR RECOVERY SHOULD THEY SO DESIRE. WE ANTICIPATE THAT AN AMBULANCE WILL BE SENT. IF SO, WE WILL ALLOW IT ONTO THE COMPOUND, BUT EMBASSY OFFICERS WELL KNOWN TO THE PENTECOSTALS - NOT SOVIET PERSONNEL - WILL PUT THE TWO HUNGER STRIKERS INTO THE VEHICLE. SHOULD THE SOVIETS FAIL TO RESPOND TO OUR CALL FOR AN AMBULANCE, WE WILL PLACE THE HUNGER STRIKERS IN AN EMBASSY VEHICLE AND, ACCOMPANIED BY THE EMBASSY DOCTOR AND A CONSULAR OFFICER, TAKE THEM TO A SOVIET HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT.

MOSCOW 0940

DTG: 251747Z JAN 82 PSN: 045444

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0940
SIT686- DATE 01/25/82

DTG: 251747Z JAN 82 PSN: 045447
TOR: 025/2000Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHMO #0940/02 0251750

O 251747Z JAN 82

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1080

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00940
NODIS

6. THE HUNGER STRIKERS WILL BE GIVEN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO GO OFF OF THEIR FAST -- AND WILL BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO DO SO -- BEFORE THE EMBASSY PROCEEDS WITH COMMITMENT TO A SOVIET HOSPITAL. THE DOCTOR IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE VASHCHENKOS WITH ADVICE ON REALIMENTATION AND WITH SPECIAL BEVERAGES.

7. ACTION EUR/SOV: PLEASE TRANSMIT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO EMBASSY BY OOB MOSCOW TIME TUESDAY, JANUARY 26. WE WILL NEED IT BY THEN IF IT IS TO PLAY A MAXIMUM ROLE IN OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE TWO TO END THEIR STRIKE.
ZIMMERMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

27 JAN 1982

Office of the Director



USICA

14

Not
January 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CW*
Director

SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert Number 3"

Enclosed is the third issue of "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research under the auspices of Project Truth's Executive Committee.

In December, the Soviets continued to emphasize that they steadfastly maintain a humane, peaceful, and defense-oriented foreign policy, while the U.S. policy is bellicose, aggressive and inconsiderate of other nations. Specifically, Soviet propaganda:

- o harshly accused the U.S. of interfering in internal Polish affairs;
- o depicted the U.S. as conniving and insincere in nuclear arms limitation negotiations, more interested in attaining a one-sided advantage than in working out fair and mutually acceptable solutions;
- o portrayed the U.S. as a threat to stability and progress in the Third World; and
- o continued to charge that the U.S. is waging a campaign of slander and lies against the Soviet Union and socialism.

PROJECT TRUTH

Soviet Propaganda Alert

No. 3

January 11, 1982

Re: Project Truth

Summary

Soviet external propaganda in December continued to emphasize that the Soviet Union steadfastly maintains a humane, peaceful and defense-oriented foreign policy, while U.S. policy is bellicose, aggressive and inconsiderate of other nations.

In connection with specific international events and developments, Soviet propaganda efforts:

- o depicted the U.S. approach to negotiations on nuclear arms reduction in Europe as conniving and insincere (in contrast to the sincere and longstanding Soviet commitment to arms negotiations).

- o dwelled on issues of U.S. and NATO military policy in Europe, playing up alleged differences between the U.S. and some of its European allies on that subject. At the same time, the Soviets stressed their ties with Western Europe and their stake in common "European" concerns, implying unsubtly that the U.S. is an outside power stirring up trouble and seeking to further its own ends against the interests of all Europeans.

- o denounced Solidarity "extremists" and other elements in Poland for counterrevolutionary, antisocialist activities against the interests of the Polish people. Soviet media conveyed approval of the imposition of martial law. Since the crackdown, they have emphasized that conditions are generally calm and "returning to normal." Soviet propaganda harshly accused the U.S. of interfering in internal Polish affairs, charging, among other things, that the CIA was behind Solidarity.

- o attempted to weaken the impact of U.S. official statements and news media items critical of the Soviet Union by ridiculing them as "cynical fabrications" or "shopworn anti-Soviet cliches" designed to distract attention from the real evils perpetrated by the U.S. Media attacks were targeted on American officials and journalists associated with the alleged anti-Soviet propaganda campaign.

- o portrayed the U.S. as a threat to stability and progress in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, Indian Ocean region and Latin America.

End Summary

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency**

Washington, D.C.

A. Arms Reduction Talks in Europe

Soviet media commentaries repeatedly chided the U.S. for behavior and statements by American leaders which allegedly revealed a cynical and unserious attitude toward arms limitation negotiations. Soviet propagandists claimed that the U.S. embarked on negotiations only under pressure (mainly from public opinion in Western Europe and the U.S. itself). While expressing their hope that the U.S. would negotiate in a "businesslike" and sincere fashion, Soviet commentators noted somberly that the U.S. had thus far not manifested its intentions to do so.

The U.S. was consistently portrayed as a reluctant and untrustworthy participant in arms negotiations, more interested in attaining a one-sided advantage than in working out fair and mutually acceptable solutions. Nonetheless, much of the Soviet reportage dealing directly with the newly begun Geneva arms talks was rather restrained in tone and played down the usual harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric. Soviet commentators rarely failed to inject a note of optimism alongside the usual cautions that reaching agreements at Geneva would not be easy. Soviet media appeared to be attempting to prepare the ground for negotiations without discouraging the development of popular opposition to U.S. arms policy in Europe.

Despite its relatively cautious treatment of the Geneva talks, Soviet propaganda throughout December did not ease efforts to depict the U.S. administration overall, and certain officials in particular (e.g., Secretaries Haig and Weinberger), as "war-mongering" and "saber-rattling." Frequent media items on such topics as the U.S. military budget, NATO talks, and measures to enhance U.S. and NATO military preparedness were intended to contribute to the image of U.S. militarism.

Constant references were made to Leonid Brezhnev's recent Bonn visit--termed his "peace mission"--and to the Soviet position on arms in Europe which Brezhnev set forth, once again, during that visit. Continuing the line of previous months, Soviet propaganda characterized Soviet arms reduction proposals as ideal, but proclaimed Moscow's willingness to seek compromise and consider other "serious" approaches. Brezhnev's Bonn statements were described as indicating the most fruitful direction for negotiations to take.

President Reagan's "zero option" proposal, on the other hand, was criticized as a blatantly unreasonable suggestion disingenuously put forth for sheer propaganda value--a "phony proposal" designed to deflect criticism from the Reagan Administration. Soviet propaganda charged that the West's selective method of counting weapons in Europe presented a false picture

(over)

of Soviet strength. In reality, the Soviets contended, there currently exists a rough parity in Europe. In the Soviet view, the U.S. proposal sought to reestablish Western military superiority in Europe and ignored legitimate Soviet defense concerns.

Alleged U.S. willingness to sacrifice Europe in a "limited nuclear war" was, as in previous months, another major point of Soviet propaganda. A December 9 article in Literaturnaia gazeta, for example, described Europe as America's "nuclear football field"--"no matter which goalpost the 'goals' are kicked through, the Americans remain on the other side of the ocean ready to sacrifice the Europeans." Numerous media features seeking to portray the U.S. as the real threat to European security drew on the Soviet propaganda pamphlet Threat to Europe released in November.

B. Poland

Soviet coverage of the Polish situation before the declaration of martial law consisted largely of fierce attacks on Solidarity--accused of "providing cover for counterrevolution"--and on other elements of Polish society characterized as anti-socialist. After the crackdown, Soviet media, in addition to continuing their denunciations of Solidarity and the "anti-socialist threat" to Poland, endorsed the measures taken and began to stress that conditions in Poland were beginning to "return to normal."

The Soviet media have reported selectively on developments in Poland, exercising particular care in the choice of material for domestic Soviet audiences. Relatively little concrete information on what is going on in Poland has been offered by Soviet media. Instead, they have sought to pound away on several ideas which they would like to have the world believe. These include:

- o The vast majority of Poles did not support the Solidarity "extremists" and are relieved that Party and military leaders have reasserted control to return the country to normal. Soviet reportage is laced with quotes attributed to Polish citizens which criticize Solidarity and express support for the measures taken by the Military Council. Although "isolated" hot spots have been noted in Soviet reportage on Poland, a heavy emphasis has been placed on depicting the situation as generally peaceful with constant improvements in popular morale and progress in the efforts to resolve Polish economic problems.

- o While the Polish armed forces are playing a significant role in saving Poland from counterrevolution and helping it "return to normal," it is the leadership of the Polish Party which is of key importance. (Some Soviet defensiveness on this issue was indicated in commentaries which took pains to underplay

the Polish Army's role and even managed to credit "the Party leadership" with the crackdown.)

o The Polish situation is an internal Polish matter and should be resolved by the Poles. Western speculations that Moscow is orchestrating events there and may intervene militarily are "slanderous lies" and merely part of the general U.S.-inspired anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that sees the Kremlin behind everything from international terrorism to peace marches in Europe. However, while repeating that there should not be outside interference in internal Polish affairs, Soviet media have asserted the USSR's special position in regard to Poland, noting that a threat to Poland "directly affects the security interests" of all the Warsaw Treaty nations.

o It is actually the U.S. and NATO that are interfering in domestic Polish affairs by holding meetings and issuing statements designed to support and incite counterrevolutionary activity, and to pressure the Polish government into taking actions--such as making concessions to Solidarity--deemed desirable by the West. According to the Soviets, Western "crude interference in the affairs of sovereign Poland" is taking other forms as well: economic blackmail; escalated "subversive propaganda" broadcasts into Poland by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe; and provocative media sensationalization and distortion of events in Poland.

Such allegations of Western (especially American) interference and provocation in Poland have been a daily staple of Soviet media since mid-December. President Reagan's announcements of sanctions to be taken against Poland and the USSR triggered intensified attacks on the President personally and on American policy vis-a-vis Poland. The sanctions were denounced and the the President accused of resorting to "lies" and "blackmail."

During the last week of December, Soviet propagandists sought to elaborate on their charges of "U.S. interference." They claimed to have "documentary proof" that the U.S.--and in particular the CIA--was deeply involved in trying to wrest Poland from the "socialist community" by supporting and inciting "coup-plotters." Soviet media also contended that the U.S. has been displeased with the course of "normalization" in Poland since the imposition of martial law, and is continuing efforts to destabilize the Polish situation and use it to exacerbate international tensions and provide a pretext for continued Western military buildup and antisocialist activity.

Other Soviet media themes which have become significant since U.S. sanctions against Poland and the USSR were announced are:

o The U.S. is attempting to force its NATO allies to join in the American "campaign of pressure" against Poland and the USSR,

(over)

but this is meeting with little success. U.S. "official circles" disregard European interest in and need for cooperation and detente in Europe.

- o Washington continues to "magnify" and "distort" events in Poland in a deliberate attempt to build tensions. This attempt, however, is doomed to failure.

- o The U.S. decision on economic sanctions is "extremely in-human"--withholding of food as a means of exerting political pressure is particularly reprehensible. However, these sanctions will have no real effect. (Western sources are extensively cited by Soviet commentators making this point.)

- o U.S. policy toward Poland since the imposition of martial law fits perfectly into the overall pattern of U.S. foreign policy--seeking to hinder detente, and discriminating against socialist countries on various pretexts while supporting truly repressive regimes simply because they are antisocialist.

To summarize, the overall effort of Soviet propaganda on Poland in the closing days of 1981 was to emphasize charges of continuing U.S. pressure against Poland and the socialist bloc while at the same time downplaying the actual international significance of Polish events. By taking this approach, Soviet propagandists hoped to: show a real need for martial law to repel outside threats to Poland; muster public opinion against the U.S.; divert attention from Soviet involvement in Poland; and demonstrate that declared Soviet foreign policy goals (detente, arms control, etc.) should and would not be jeopardized by developments in Poland.

C. Attacks on U.S. "Propaganda" Against the USSR

A longstanding common complaint in Soviet media has been that the U.S. is waging a campaign of slander and lies against the Soviet Union and socialism. In December there was an unrelenting flow of prominently featured media items on this theme, zeroing in on the Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power, the State Department's Soviet Active Measures report, USICA and VOA in general, "Project Truth," Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and network television news programming. Articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, Literaturnaia gazeta and other publications attacked "American anti-Soviet propaganda" for allegedly seeking to invent a mythical Soviet threat and to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria in order to divert American--and worldwide--anxieties over U.S. policy, in particular increased defense spending and deployment of new weapons.

Soviet media sought to discredit U.S. information efforts by, among other things, personal attacks on the integrity of the individuals and institutions involved. Protesting that "aggressive and provocative radio propaganda" from the West had

escalated, the Soviets reiterated familiar charges that RFE-RL is staffed with "traitors and renegades" who formerly served the Nazis, and that the CIA is overseeing U.S. international broadcasting operations. A long article in the Izvestiia weekly supplement Nedelia (December 10) described ICA Director Charles Wick in disdainful tones as a millionaire who made his money in "real estate, show business and brothels," and a "cold warrior" who wants to return to the Truman era.

D. U.S. Policy and the Third World

While not introducing any new themes, Soviet propaganda keyed its repetition of the standard ones to current international situations. Major emphasis was on the Middle East and Latin America. Specific themes included the following:

- o Libya. The Soviets charged the U.S. with trying "to implement a plot against an independent and sovereign Arab state" and, in addition, with "reanimating the propaganda falsehood of the 'support' by the Soviet Union...for international terrorism, which had failed [to convince people] on all counts." The Soviets contended that the U.S. had no support worldwide for its accusations against Libya.
- o Middle East. Soviet propaganda called it "ridiculous" to think that the U.S. did not know in advance about and approve Israeli plans to annex the Golan Heights. By its consistent support of Israeli aggression in the Middle East, claimed Soviet media, the U.S. shared responsibility for the latest Israeli actions.
- o Latin America. The Soviets gave heavy coverage to the Moscow visit of Nicaragua's foreign minister, making use of the occasion to condemn the U.S. for a "flagrant campaign of threats" against Nicaragua aimed at forcing that country to cooperate with alleged U.S. imperialist policy in Latin America. Soviet media also criticized U.S. plans to increase "provocative" broadcasts to Cuba.
- o Indian Ocean. Propaganda attacks focused on the presence of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (referred to as evidence of escalating imperialist military power), and alleged U.S. failure to join efforts to secure peace in the region.
- o Afghanistan. Complementing glowing accounts of beneficent Soviet activity in Afghanistan were condemnations of the Western media for "creating lies" about the Afghanistan situation. The U.S., China and Pakistan were accused of continuing to incite and support "bandit activity," thus blocking complete normalization of conditions in Afghanistan. Stories portrayed Soviet soldiers serving in Afghanistan as conscientious young citizens fulfilling their "internationalist duty" under trying conditions. Babrak Karmal's praise for Soviet assistance was also reported at length.

(over)

E. Human Rights

On the occasion of UN Human Rights Day (December 10), Soviet media self-righteously described the socialist states as the true defenders of the most important of all human rights--the right to live in a peaceful world--inasmuch as "socialism and peace are indivisible." Replaying familiar themes, Soviet commentaries contrasted the rights enjoyed by citizens of socialist countries--right to a job, to free universal education, free health care, etc.--with the lack of rights in Western capitalist societies, as evidenced, they noted, by high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, and expensive medical care.

Some of the Soviet propaganda on human rights may have been designed especially as a counterweight to Western media coverage of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner's hunger strike in defense of Liza Alexeeva's right to emigrate to join her husband (Bonner's son, Sakharov's stepson). But the Soviet media regularly feature such material and rarely let suitable opportunities such as Human Rights Day pass without comment. Soviet media treatment of the Sakharov hunger strike itself consisted, predictably, of extremely cryptic reporting of events themselves along with generalized articles criticizing Sakharov, Alexeeva and others involved. The hunger strike was characterized in some Soviet sources as a "provocation" intended to promote Western opposition to detente.

F. Brezhnev's Birthday

The Soviet news media were packed with material dedicated to Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of his 75th birthday, celebrated on December 19. Birthday-related items included congratulations and praise from numerous Soviet Party and government organizations; congratulatory messages from foreign communist parties and foreign government leaders; excerpts from Brezhnev's books; biographical features; speeches by Politburo members; reports on exhibits, plays, and other events devoted to Leonid Ilich; poems and songs; and much, much more--all highly laudatory.

Western observers noted several characteristics of the birthday adulation. Brezhnev was praised for his lifelong dedication to the cause of peace. At the same time, relatively great attention was focused on his military experience and ties to the military, perhaps underscoring the prestige and significance of that institution. Controversial international issues were totally avoided in the many official speeches; there was no mention of Poland. There were, however, references to serious Soviet economic problems and the need to solve them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170772

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 1000
SIT602 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 261524Z JAN 82 PSN: 046801
TOR: 026/1833Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN MCF JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #1000 0261526
O 261524Z JAN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-22-14-5-3
BY KOR NARA DATE 11/5/15

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1111

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 01000
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/26/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, UR, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PENTECOSTALS
REF: (A) MOSCOW 869 (B) MOSCOW 940 (C) MOSCOW 957

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHILE LIDIA AND AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO HAVE BEGUN TO TAKE LIQUIDS, EASING THE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THEIR HEALTH, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN (REF A) ON HAND URGING THE VASHCHENKOS TO END THE HUNGER STRIKE. THE EMBASSY DOCTOR HAS ADVISED THAT LIDIA AND AUGUSTINA MAY HAVE USED UP MUCH OF THEIR BODILY STORES IN THE PAST THREE DAYS (REF C). UNLESS THE VASHCHENKOS BEGIN TO TAKE SOLID FOOD, THEIR HEALTH MAY AGAIN BE ENDANGERED IN APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS.
ZIMMERMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23

170773

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0363
SIT799 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 261851Z JAN 82 PSN: 046950
TOR: 026/2050Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0363 0261904
O 261851Z JAN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0490

INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 9956
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 020363
NODIS
GENEVA FOR AMB HARTMAN AND DAS SCANLAN
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/25/02 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)

TAGS: SREF, SHUM, UR, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THE PENTECOSTALISTS

REF: MOSCOW 869

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. PROVIDED BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER THE
PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORIZED TO BE DELIVERED TO THE HUNGER
STRIKING PENTECOSTALISTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLAN
OUTLINED IN REFTL.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR AUGUSTINA AND LTDIYA:
I WANT YOU TO KNOW OF MY DEEP PERSONAL CONCERN FOR YOUR
HEALTH AND YOUR LIVES, WHICH NOW ARE PLACED IN EXTREME

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JEOPARDY BY THE HUNGER STRIKE YOU HAVE UNDERTAKEN. MY
DISTRESS IS SHARED BY YOUR MANY OTHER FRIENDS AND
WELL-WISHERS HERE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, WHO JOIN ME IN URGING YOU TO
ABANDON THIS COURSE BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
VASHCHENKO AND CHMYKKHALOV FAMILIES ARE NOT ALONE AS YOU
PURSUE YOUR BRAVE AND DETERMINED EFFORT FOR
EMIGRATION. THOSE WHO WORK ON YOUR BEHALF, AND I HAVE
LONG COUNTED MYSELF AMONG THEM, ARE MANY, AND THEIR
EFFORTS ARE UNFLAGGING.

SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT, I HAVE DIRECTED MY
ADMINISTRATION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ASSIST YOU
IN REACHING YOUR GOAL. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-22-14-6-2
BY COOB NARA DATE 11/5/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0363

DTG: 261851Z JAN 82 PSN: 046950

SOVIET OFFICIALS AT HIGH LEVELS TO SEEK RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO SEEKING YOUR EMIGRATION, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY AND THE CHMYKHOLOV FAMILY. I AM DETERMINED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS, AND AM HOPEFUL THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND.

I ASK YOU NOT TO LOSE FAITH BUT TO TAKE HEART FROM THE SINCERE COMMITMENT OF YOUR MANY SUPPORTERS. I URGE YOU TO ABANDON YOUR HUNGER STRIKE, AND TO CONTINUE YOUR COURAGEOUS COURSE, A STRUGGLE THAT IS AN INSPIRATION TO ALL WHO VALUE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.
STOESSEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

25

107.74

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1013
SIT601 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 261748Z JAN 82 PSN: 046830
TOR: 026/1901Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: PUBS SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #1013 0261748
O 261748Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-14-7-1

BY 1608 NARA DATE 11/5/15

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1119

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 01013
NODIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SOV
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO
GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND EUR/SOV DIRECTOR SIMONS
ALSO PASS TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
E.O. 12065: XDIS-3 1/26/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, SHUM, PEPR, UR, US, GE
SUBJECT: REPORTED EAST GERMAN INTEREST IN EXCHANGE
- FOR PENTECOSTALS

1. SECRET, ENTIRE TEXT.

2. RAY BARNETT, PRESIDENT OF THE GROUP FRIENDS IN THE WEST WHO IS IN MOSCOW ACCOMPANYING FELLOW CANADIAN DR. DOUGLAS ROBERTS, HAS REPORTED AN APPROACH FROM EAST GERMAN LAWYER WOLFGANG VOGEL CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF "AN EXCHANGE" (PRESUMABLY OF EAST BLOC AGENTS IN CUSTODY IN THE WEST) FOR THE PENTECOSTALS IN RESIDENCE IN EMBASSY MOSCOW.

3. BARNETT SAID HE BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH VOGEL (WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN OTHER SUCH EXCHANGES OR PROPOSED EXCHANGES) IN THE MATTER OF GREGORIY VINTS. BARNETT STATED THAT THOUGH HE RAISED THE PENTECOSTAL'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CASE AT THAT TIME WITH VOGEL AS WELL, THE LATTER SHRUGGED OFF ANY ATTEMPT ON THEIR BEHALF, SAYING "IT IS NOT THE TIME."

4. ONE WEEK AGO, VOGEL REPORTEDLY CONTACTED BARNETT WITH A REVERSAL OF HIS PREVIOUS POSITION: "NOW IS THE TIME." HE GATHERED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA CONCERNING THE SEVEN PENTECOSTALS, THEN ASKED BARNETT WHAT THE WEST HAD TO OFFER IN EXCHANGE. BARNETT WAS NOT ABLE TO BRING ANY NAMES TO MIND AND ASKED WHO VOGEL MIGHT SUGGEST. VOGEL DECLINED TO SPECIFY ANY INDIVIDUAL(S) AND INSTEAD SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO THE WEST TO MAKE AN OFFER. ACCORDING TO BARNETT, VOGEL IS STILL WAITING FOR AND EXPECTING A RESPONSE. VOGEL REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE "TOP AUTHORITIES" OF THE GDR ARE INVOLVED IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 1013

DTG: 261748Z JAN 82 PSN: 046830

THIS INITIATIVE.

5. BARNETT REQUESTED THAT THE EMBASSY PASS ALONG
WORD OF THIS PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION, AND
STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NO GUARANTEES COULD
BE GIVEN THAT ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN UPON IT.
ZIMMERMANN

MOSCOW 1013

DTG: 261748Z JAN 82 PSN: 046830

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170775 27

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1015
SIT801 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 261758Z JAN 82 PSN: 046810
TOR: 026/1841Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN MCF JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #1015 0261759
O 261758Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1122
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5566

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 5815
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 01015
USMISSION GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN
AND EUR/SOV DIRECTOR SIMONS
E.O. 12065: GDS 1/26/88 (LEININGER, WAYNE) OR-V
TAGS: SREF, UR, US
SUBJECT: PENTECOSTAL HUNGER STRIKE - JANUARY 26, 1981
REF: (A) MOSCOW 957 (B) SECTO 2017

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-14-8-8

BY LOBB NARA DATE 11/5/10

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHILE LIDIA AND AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO CONTINUE TO TAKE LIQUIDS AND THEIR CONDITION REMAINS STABLE (REF A) MEMBERS OF THE VASHCHENKO FAMILY ARE ALREADY HAVING DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR DECISION TO ABANDON THE NO-LIQUIDS FAST. LYUBA VASHCHENKO LATE JANUARY 26 TOLD CONSOFF AND VISITING CANADIAN DOCTOR ROBERTS THAT LIDIA AND AUGUSTINA'S DECISION TO RESUME LIQUIDS INTAKE HAD BEEN A BIG MISTAKE BECAUSE "THE GOVERNMENTS STILL DO NOT TAKE THE MATTER SERIOUSLY."

3. DANNY SMITH OF THE COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SIBERIAN SEVEN SPOKE WITH CONSOFF JANUARY 26 FROM GENEVA, WHERE HE HAS TRAVELED WITH LABOR MP GEORGE ROBERTSON AND MICHAEL BORDEAUX OF KESTON COLLEGE IN AN EFFORT TO SEE THAT THE PENTECOSTALS' PROBLEM IS RAISED AT THE HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING (REF B). SMITH SAID THAT LETTERS ON BEHALF OF THE PENTECOSTALS HAD BEEN DELIVERED INDIRECTLY TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AS WELL AS SECRETARY HAIG. SMITH TERMED HIS MEETING WITH EUR/SOV DIRECTOR SIMONS AS "USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE." SMITH MET SEPARATELY WITH OFFICIALS OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (WCC), WHO REPORTEDLY WROTE THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH ON DECEMBER 19 UPON LEARNING THAT THE VASHCHENKOS WERE CONTEMPLATING A HUNGER STRIKE TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE FOR THE PENTECOSTALS. THE WCC OFFERED TO MEDIATE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND FROMISED TO PHONE TO THE ORTHODOX PATRIARCATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 1015

DTG: 261758Z JAN 82 PSN: 046810

IN MOSCOW IN SUPPORT OF THE PENTECOSTALS.

4. KENT HILL/LYNN BUZZARD SPOKE WITH THE EMBASSY TWO TIMES JANUARY 26. THE HILL/BUZZARD PLANNED TRIP TO MOSCOW HAS BEEN DELAYED UNTIL AT LEAST FEBRUARY 2 DUE TO PROBLEMS OBTAINING A SOVIET VISA. THE PAIR HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH OLIN ROBISON, PRESIDENT OF MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE, REGARDING WORTHWHILE RELIGIOUS CONTACTS IN MOSCOW. HILL AND BUZZARD PLAN TO STOP OFF IN ZURICH ON THE WAY INTO MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN PENTECOSTAL SUPPORTERS AND THROUGH MADRID ON THE WAY OUT FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH CSCE DELEGATES.

5. MICHAEL ROWE OF KESTON COLLEGE AND THE COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE SIBERIAN SEVEN INFORMED CONSOFFS JANUARY 25 THAT EFFORTS TO SEND A BRITISH PHYSICIAN TO MOSCOW ON OR ABOUT JANUARY 29 WOULD CONTINUE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF DR. ROBERTS OF CANADA. ROWE SPOKE ALSO WITH LYUBA VASHCHENKO AND ON THE BASIS OF THAT CONVERSATION ISSUED A SENSATIONAL AND ERRONEOUS REPORT TO UPI AND AP THAT LIDIA VASHCHENKO WAS IN CRITICAL CONDITION AND WOULD BE MOVED TO A SOVIET HOSPITAL TUESDAY, JANUARY 26. WHEN ROWE AGAIN SPOKE WITH CONSOFF JANUARY 26, THE LATTER POINTED OUT THAT SUCH REPORTS DO NO GOOD TO THE CREDIBILITY OF KESTON COLLEGE NOR TO THE CAUSE OF THE PENTECOSTALS. ROWE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAS PROMISED TO CHECK SUCH INFORMATION WITH THE EMBASSY IN THE FUTURE.
ZIMMERMANN

MOSCOW 1015

DTG: 261758Z JAN 82 PSN: 046810

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

440

29

OBE

✓

Jan 27

MOW:

Queried Bailey's secretary as to why this package was handcarried. She was only able to tell me that Bailey handcarried this when he went over for a meeting yesterday in Judge Clark's office.

Problems: The recommendation is that Judge Clark ask the President for a decision. There should be a memo to the President included in this package.

Agree _____

Other _____

klm

let's discuss

MW

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1/26/82

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170776	MEMO N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET EXPORT SANCATIONS	1	1/26/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
ISSUES RELATING TO EXTENSION OF OIL AND GAS CONTROLS

170777

Introduction

The President announced sanctions on December 29, 1981 against the USSR that broadened oil and gas controls to include refining and transmission equipments. The controls prevent the export or reexport of U.S. origin commodities and technology to the USSR. Commerce Department specialists maintain that the broadened controls require additional extension to block or delay the construction of the West Siberian Pipeline. The proposed extensions are:

- I. Barring of all "U.S. Persons" (controlled foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations) from exporting oil and gas equipments to the USSR regardless of U.S. content, and
- II. Barring the export to the USSR of foreign products based on U.S. technology without U.S. components.

By further extending the controls, the U.S. will have a significantly higher probability of delaying or blocking the pipeline; our allies are expected to object strongly, however. New controls would also blunt criticism by the press and the AFL-CIO. On the other hand, these extensions could cause long-term US business losses as foreign customers turn in the future to non-US suppliers of technology and components. Decisions need to be taken regarding the extension of the new controls.

Two other issues have surfaced since December 30th. Several foreign governments (U.K., FRG, and Italy) and companies have informally requested that signed contracts should not be affected by the sanctions and that components already shipped from the U.S. should not require reexport authorizations. Turbine rotors supplied by G.E. to firms in Western Europe are affected by both these issues. Several hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of jobs are involved. Decisions should be taken on how to handle requests by governments to make exceptions to our sanctions.

Present Coverage

The expanded controls cover:

- o Exports or reexports of U.S. origin goods (regardless of physical location)
- o Products of technology exported after December 30, 1981
- o Reexport of foreign produced commodities containing U.S. origin components

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-1440-7

BY KDD NARA DATE 10/5/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Issues for Decision

- I. Should the U.S. prevent U.S. foreign subsidiaries from selling controlled commodities?

Legal Authority: Legal authorities exist under the EAA to assert control over U.S. subsidiaries.

Discussion: Although authority exists to control subsidiaries, it has been used only once (Levi's uniforms for the Moscow Olympics). If this action is taken, the major contracts affected include Dresser Industries' French subsidiary (\$30 million contract for the sale of 21 compressors) and Howmet Turbine Components Corporation's U.K. and French subsidiaries (\$4 million contract under negotiation). This option provides the President significant leverage to delay or even block the pipeline. Allied reaction is expected to be strong but this step is necessary if we are to stop compressor sales. It may be possible to get voluntary allied cooperation to prevent sales of relevant equipment. Voluntary compliance should be discussed before action is taken.

Decision: Include all U.S. foreign subsidiaries under the sanctions (consult with allies to solicit voluntary agreement before actually implementing.)

Yes _____ No _____

- II. Should the U.S. assert control over foreign made products of U.S. technology which was transferred before December 30, 1981?

Legal Authority: No precedent exists under the export regulations for such an application (Carter Administration controls on oil and gas production and exploration equipment were applied prospectively). It can be done, however; but on tenuous legal grounds.

Discussion: Several companies in Europe use General Electric's technology to produce gas turbines, and have signed contracts with the USSR to supply the pipeline's 41 compressor stations. No deliveries have been made. At the time of the technology transfers, no license nor written assurances were required. The G.E. Manufacturing Associates include AEG-KANIS Turbinefabrick (West Germany), John Brown Engineering (U.K.), and Nuovo Pignone (Italy). Alsthom-Atlantique (France) also has a license arrangement with G.E. to produce turbines. Lastly, Rolls Royce (U.K.) manufactures a turbine for which a coupling shaft is a product of U.S. technology, as is the compressor itself.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If these products could be prevented from going to the Soviet Union and option I is implemented, the President would be provided significant leverage to delay or block the pipeline. The allies argue that we should only include products of U.S. technology which is transferred after December 30, 1981, and that to cover earlier technology is retroactive application of U.S. law.

Decision: Include in our sanctions foreign-made products of U.S. technology which was transferred before December 30, 1981? (Consult with Allies to solicit voluntary agreement before actually implementing.)

Yes _____ No _____

III. Grant reexport authorization for controlled components already in Europe?

Legal Authority: The EAA and present regulations clearly require a reexport authorization from Commerce

Discussion: Over the past two years, G.E. and other companies have exported to Western Europe components that didn't require the government's prior approval but that now require a validated license because of the sanctions the President imposed on December 30th. For example, John Brown has 6 rotors, AEG Kanis has 2 rotors, and Nuovo Pignone 14. Each rotor costs \$1.5 million. Ambassador Louis has suggested granting these authorizations to ease tensions between the U.S. and our allies, since without the U.S. rotors the companies would lose over \$500 million in business (some of which would be covered by insurance) and result in substantial layoffs. The situation is especially acute in the U.K.

By granting this exception, the ultimate fate of the pipeline will not be affected. The pipeline requires 125 turbines and this would allow only those currently in Europe (22) to be sent to the U.S.S.R. Rotors for the rest of the turbines would require export licenses to leave U.S. shores. Granting an exception, however, could be used as a bargaining chip to induce allies to take independent steps to stop the pipeline. This action would be viewed as a dilution of the sanctions that were imposed on December 30th.

Decision: Grant exception by issuing reexport authorization while negotiating with allies for them to take independent steps to delay the pipeline.

Yes _____ No _____

IV. Grant export Licenses to G.E. to export 103 rotors to fulfill present contracts?

Legal Authority: EAA and present regulations clearly require validated licenses to export turbine rotors.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Discussion: Contracts or Letters of Intent (Nuovo Pignone) exist to sell 125 gas turbines for the pipeline. G.E. will supply the rotors while final assembly will be in the U.K., FRG, and Italy. With U.S. sanctions, the rotors can't be supplied thereby preventing the foreign companies from delivering over \$500 million of turbines. Substantial lay-offs would result, especially in the U.K. The respective governments are expected to request exceptions to the sanctions. While alternatives to G.E. gas turbines exist, they are either less reliable, more costly or impractical. Granting the exceptions would be viewed as substantially diluting the sanctions imposed on December 30th and invite criticism in the press. Agreeing to this option would ensure that the pipeline is built.

We could, however, use an exception for present contracts to entice our allies to take independent actions (withdrawal of loan guarantees) to delay or block the pipeline. The negotiations, if started, should be low-key. Also, if exceptions are granted, we should grant licenses for all signed contracts in the U.S. and abroad for oil and gas equipment. U.S. industry would strongly object if we allowed exceptions only for one U.S. firm.

Decision: Grant exception by issuing export licenses for rotors after successfully negotiating with allies to take independent steps to block pipeline (withdrawal of loan guarantees)? /Note: Granting this exception means that we should examine -- with presumption of approval -- all signed contracts.7

Yes_____ No_____

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OF CLOSURE ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 26 JAN 82 14

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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM OLMER, L

DOCDATE 25 JAN 82

BAILEY

26 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

OIL

GAS

USSR

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

LEGAL ISSUES

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF PENDING ISSUES ON EXPORT CONTROLS RE EFFORTS TO
DELAY SIBERIAN PIPELINE W/ REGARD TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 27 FEB 82 STATUS X FILES

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FOR INFO

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MW
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 26, 1982

170778

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT:

Implementation of Sanctions Against the USSR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 748-22-14-11-6

BY LCDB NARA DATE 11/5/00

At Tab I is a memorandum to you from Jerry Bremer describing the activities of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) in implementing sanctions against the USSR.

We and OSTP are preparing implementation guidelines for ICCUSA discussion. There are still a number of points to be clarified in defining the extent of these sanctions. Dick Pipes and Norm Bailey concur.

RP

NB

Attachments

Tab I Bremer's memo

*Bill S.
Thanks very
much
Bill*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 1/26/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8201336

411 40

January 22, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82 JAN 22 PII: 13

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

W. P. CLARK
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Implementation of Sanctions Against the USSR

170779

Pursuant to the sanctions against the USSR announced by President Reagan on December 29, the Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) met on January 7 to discuss implementation of those sanctions. Agencies were instructed to adhere closely to the sanctions which had been carefully worked out to put a calculated degree of pressure on the Soviet Union and to keep further possible punitive measures in reserve. Our memorandum of January 18 transmitted a copy of written instructions to ICCUSA members along these lines.

The ICCUSA Subcommittee on Exchanges met on January 20 to proceed with the review of all existing US-USSR bilateral cooperative agreements. A report on this review will shortly be transmitted to the NSC's Monitoring Group on Soviet and Polish Sanctions.

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS (1/20/88)

NLRR 748-22-14-12-5
BY UDS NARA DATE 1/5/85

✓
National Security Council
The White House

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Package # _____

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JK</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>HAS SEEN</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>JK</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

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11/5/15 KJB

RECEIVED 23 JAN 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 22 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

POLAND

SUBJECT: IMPEMENATATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE USSR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 25 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

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(M /)

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Clark *IX 1/26* *For information*
c 1/29 *Noted by McFarlane* *ST, RP, KJB*

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