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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 11/5/2015

**File Folder** USSR (2/2/82-2/10/82)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 22

SKINNER

234

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170263	MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING (W/ ADDED NOTE)	1	2/2/1982	B1
170795	MEMO	L. BRADY TO BUD NANCE RE SOVIET TRADE MINISTER'S SPEECH <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-2-4</b>	3	1/12/1982	B1
170796	MEMO	G. ROBINSON TO W. CLARK RE U.S RESPONSES TO SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE BUILDUP <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-3-3</b>	3	2/4/1982	B1
170797	STATEMENT	RE US RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUILDUP <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-8-8</b>	4	ND	B1
170798	SCENARIO	RE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF US RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS BUILDUP <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-9-7</b>	4	ND	B1
170799	CABLE	LONDON 1876 <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-4-2</b>	1	1/27/1982	B1
170800	CABLE	BONN 1671 <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-5-1</b>	2	1/25/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170801	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO BREZHNEV <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-6-0</b>	1	2/5/1982	B1
170802	CABLE	MOSCOW 1713 <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-16-7-9</b>	7	2/10/1982	B1

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National Security Council  
The White House

2

Package # 603

82 FEB 9 P 4: 55

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>ll</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>ll</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>

Sit Room

I-Information A-Action B-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	

Other

COMMENTS

Mike:  
Give Pipes feedback.  
John

2/11

WC:

I called Bremer's office (Clay McManaway) and indicated you would like for them to give Pipes an answer re his request for the Haig-Gromyko memcon:

This is the situation: The Secretary has the memcon with him on this trip for his approval. The Bremer office was in hopes that the Sec. would have a chance to read and approve and cable back his approval so that the memcon could be distributed. This has not happened.

JA

RECEIVED 09 FEB 82 14

DOCDATE 02 FEB 82

TO

CLARK

FROM PIPES

KEYWORDS: USSR

HAIG, A

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CY OF MEMCON OF HAIG GROMYKO MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 FEB 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 2/11 Clark approved mem fl mw

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA+ (C) MR

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 3, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY/HENRY R. NAU <sup>MB</sup> <sup>LRN</sup>SUBJECT: Memo from Brady of Commerce re  
Patolichev's Speech

Larry Brady of Commerce sent a memo to Bud Nance on January 12 recommending a possible linkage in handling the sanctions and steel issues with our European allies.

At the time, Baldrige and Olmer were in Africa. The memo did not have their concurrence. We held action until Baldrige and Olmer returned. On further discussion with Olmer, he asked that the memo not be acted upon.

RECOMMENDATION: That no action be taken on this memo.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment

Tab I Previous package including Brady memo  
and memo to Nance from Bailey and Nau



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # 0157

82 JAN 15 P 4: 04

*OK  
Washington  
377-2867*

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
BUD NANCE	<u>✓</u>	<u>HAS SEEN</u>
JOHN POINDEXTER	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
JACQUE HILL	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
JUDGE CLARK	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
JANET COLSON	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	<u>      </u>	SHOW CC	<u>      </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u>      </u>	SHOW CC	<u>      </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u>      </u>	SHOW CC	<u>      </u>
CY TO DEEVER	<u>      </u>	SHOW CC	<u>      </u>
OTHER	<u>      </u>		

COMMENTS

HAS SEEN  
To Bud McFALLANE — For  
your info and possible  
later action. Bud

MEMORANDUM

#0157

*af*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 15, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB* / HENRY R. NAU *HN*  
SUBJECT: Memo from Larry Brady re Patolichev's Speech

Larry Brady has sent you some forthright thoughts (Tab I) and suggestions on U.S. responses to Soviet Trade Minister Patolichev's speech in which the Soviets threaten economic sanctions against Europe if Europe adopts U.S.-type sanctions against the Soviet Union.

We are informed that this memo has not been cleared within Commerce, let alone with other agencies. Baldrige and Olmer are presently in Africa. We recommend that this action be held until they return and provide their comments.

Attachment

Tab I      Memo from Brady

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

#157 add on

Mike,

I agree with Henry's note; i.e.,  
this memo does not need to be  
forwarded -- ". . .Olmer asked  
that the memo not be acted upon."

We can simply forward to Secretariat  
with notation: No further action  
required.

Approve ✓

Other       

Kathy, 2/4

isc/s:

No further Action

---

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mike Wheeler,

I do not think  
this even needs to  
go across the street.  
It's just a way of  
closing out the matter  
formally.

Henry

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	_____	_____
BUD NANCE	_____	_____
JOHN POINDEXTER	_____	_____
JACQUE HILL	_____	_____
JUDGE CLARK	_____	_____
JANET COLSON	_____	_____

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
OTHER	_____		_____

COMMENTS

CRU 7818

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
International Trade Administration  
Washington, D.C. 20230

January 12, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

0157

TO: Bud Nance

NLRR 748-22-16-2-482

FROM: Larry Brady

BY KDB DATE 11/6/8

170795

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on a Response to Soviet Trade Minister  
Patolichev's Speech

Since seeing the Patolichev article dated January 9, I have been giving some thought as to how we might provide some incentive for the Europeans to be more forthcoming in supporting our sanctions against the Soviets. It is clear that the USSR is eager to use economic pressure to achieve diplomatic goals, and that they view trade as an important weapon. I thought the following ramblings might be useful to you. Secretary Baldrige and Under Secretary Olmer are currently out of the country but I intend to share these thoughts with them, when they return.

1. On Saturday, January 9, Pravda threw down the economic warfare gauntlet against Europe. Soviet Trade Minister Nikoli Patolichev told the Europeans they had two choices: either to cooperate with the USSR by refusing to support the U.S. trade sanctions, or to face trade retaliation from the Soviet Union. This threat offers convincing evidence that the USSR will use economic warfare to assert its hegemony over Western Europe and other U.S. allies.
2. The Administration should take maximum advantage of this opportunity to obtain support for its sanctions. The USSR has not only given the West the motivation to apply unified sanctions, it has now provided Western leaders with the best bargaining position possible.
3. If the U.S. and the other members of COCOM fail to respond swiftly and effectively to this challenge, the Soviets achieve a truly significant strategic advantage. They succeed in:

~~SECRET~~

Classified By L. J. Brady  
Declassify On January 12, 2002



~~SECRET~~

12

-2-

- a. undermining the U.S. sanctions;
  - b. dividing the Western Alliance;
  - c. achieving enough influence in European and American business circles to neutralize any future efforts by the Administration to use trade for leverage;
  - d. implementing their own strategy of economic warfare while depriving us of the use of this instrument; and
  - e. turning the Polish crisis into our crisis and attaining a major propaganda victory.
4. The Soviets have carefully chosen the timing of their threat. Economic conditions in Europe are bad and growing worse. Understandably, European leaders may feel they cannot afford to give up trading with the East, especially at this time.

Nevertheless, it is my conviction that if the West were to act swiftly in responding to the Soviets in concerted fashion with unified sanctions, the Soviets would have no alternative other than to negotiate. They may have acted too fast this time--they have backed themselves up against the wall. (The Soviet economy is under considerable strain because of Poland and other serious problems, and they can ill afford to cut off trade with the West.)

Action Recommendation:

Show the Europeans that the United States will support them if they join in the sanctions, by helping them resolve the single most important trade issue of the moment, which is steel. U.S. steel companies are calling for satisfaction against imports of highly subsidized, indeed, socialized steel from Europe. The United States should show its sensitivity to European economic problems by trying to forge a new agreement on the steel import problem.

The United States could call an immediate high-level meeting involving representatives of key EEC and U.S. parties concerned both with the steel and the sanctions issues. The United States calls this meeting on the self-evident premise that the West must now take the Soviets by surprise and respond immediately in a unified way to their use of economic blackmail.

Taking mandatory concerted sanctions as a premise for a compromise on the steel problem, the purpose of the meeting would be to work out the best possible arrangement for U.S. steel imports. This arrangement would serve as the initial example of U.S. willingness to support and work together economically with the Europeans during this time of trial.

Classified By L. J. Brady  
Declassify On January 12, 2002

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

13

-3-

Under provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the countervailing duty dispute could be settled voluntarily for the parties who would negotiate an Orderly Marketing Arrangement.

A properly structured OMA on the CVD cases could then conceivably lead U.S. industry to withdraw its anti-dumping complaints. Agreement would be very difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to achieve. It will not be easy to arrive at OMA steel import levels acceptable to all the parties. We would be wise to develop some incentives for the U.S. steel industry to cooperate with this arrangement.

It must be absolutely clear that if anyone at the meeting challenges the premise of unified sanctions in return for economic partnership, the United States will leave the meeting and we are left exactly where we began: wondering how to respond to the Patolichev speech of January 9.

Speed is of the essence in this undertaking. Soviet tactics will be to incite infighting and bickering within the Reagan Administration, among the Europeans, and between the U.S. and Europe. Only if the United States takes the leadership initiative can this potential crisis for NATO be turned decisively to the West's advantage.

Action Request:

The International Trade Administration (ITA) has primary responsibility for implementing the USSR trade sanctions. It also has responsibility for administering the steel import policy. I am requesting an initial reaction from NSC as soon as possible in the absence of both Secretary Baldrige and Under Secretary Olmer, in order that coordination may begin immediately.

ITA could contact the principle steel participants and State could contact principal political participants.

Classified By L. J. Brady  
Declassify On January 12, 2002

~~SECRET~~



14  
WASHINGTON POST

January 10, 1982

# Moscow Hints at Trade Reprisals if Europe Sets Curl

By Dusko Doder

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 9—The Soviet Union hinted broadly today that it would take retaliatory trade action against Western European nations that decide to follow President Reagan's program of economic sanctions over Poland.

Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev, in a long article in the official Communist Party newspaper Pravda outlining economic benefits Western Europe had enjoyed as a result of East-West detente, charged that the United States was trying to "worsen" international relations to unleash "an unstoppable arms race."

Another Pravda article today said the Reagan administration was becoming "increasingly hysterical" about the course of events in Poland since the military takeover. It said the Americans were threatening to call off U.S.-Soviet arms limitation talks to exert pressure on Moscow.

The twin approach suggested that Moscow was trying to play upon the transatlantic divisions on these two issues to try to preclude the emergence of a common Western response.

Without mentioning Poland, Patolichev said that the Reagan administration was resorting to the "unacceptable" use of "trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the ob-

See SOVIET, A23, Col. 1

# SOVIET From A

jective of exerting political pressures on them."

Patolichev warned that "those countries that succumb to pressure exerted from the other side of the ocean may pay for this with the loss of their positions in our foreign trade. Experience shows that it is far easier to disrupt trade relations than to restore them."

He said that Western Europe had received "real benefits" from business cooperation with the Soviet Bloc during the years of detente in the 1970s. He added that "outdated trade and economic ties reflect 'vital interests' of Western Europe, 'especially in the conditions of economic decline.'"

They identified Western economic difficulties as involving "a long structural crisis in a series of the most important industrial branches, significant underutilization of production capacities and a continually growing unemployment."

Patolichev's article clearly stated that the Europeans have a far greater stake in East-West trade than the Americans, and that Reagan's concept of sanctions could turn out to be self-defeating for Western European countries.

The daily labor union newspaper Trud, meanwhile, said in a column today that the United States was "impose its own interests on Western Europe."

The economic interests of the United States and Western Europe are "far from

being identical," Trud continued. "Reagan is ready to sacrifice the interests of American firms, which will involve no small losses to them, but their losses seem to be a trifle compared with the losses of West European firms if their countries follow American footsteps."

Patolichev, who has been foreign-trade minister for more than 20 years and was involved in all major Soviet trade negotiations with the West, said the policies of the Reagan administration have produced "uncertainties in American firms and Soviet trade organizations about the possibility of normal trade between the two countries."

U.S.-Soviet trade has declined while Soviet trade with other countries has flourished, Patolichev noted. But he gave no figures.

The decline occurred following former president Jimmy Carter's partial embargo on U.S. exports to the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. Total U.S. exports that year stood at \$3.6 billion and were scheduled, before the invasion, to go up to \$4.8 billion in 1980.

Apart from U.S. grain exports, Soviet-American trade has sharply declined despite President Reagan's decision last spring to lift the partial Carter grain embargo. The total trade for the first eight months of 1981 was slightly above \$1.4 billion, with U.S. agricul-

tural exports accounting for about \$800 million of the total.

To be effective, Reagan's sanctions would have to be accompanied by similar allied punitive measures. The Soviets seem to have been satisfied with the lukewarm West European reaction to Reagan's proddings, and Patolichev's three-column article was seen by Western diplomats here as reflecting continued Soviet pressure on the Europeans to resist Washington.

The main focus of his article was on West Germany, France, and Finland. He said that since the onset of detente, Moscow's trade with the West has risen from \$6.7 billion in 1971 to \$45 billion in 1980.

In 1980, Soviet trade with West Germany accounted for \$8.2 billion, Finland for \$5.6 billion and France for \$5.4 billion.

Patolichev also emphasized economic benefits involved in the gas pipeline that a West German-led European consortium plans to build to carry Soviet natural gas from western Siberia to Germany and other West European countries.

He also singled out individual West German firms ranging from those contracted to deliver 700,000 tons of pipes to others that will build a new aluminum plant and a large factory producing synthetic fibers.

Referring to the recent visit to Bonn by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, Patolichev said several large projects "are being considered now, including some that are looking into the next century."

Patolichev also analyzed Soviet trade relations with Italy, Austria and Japan and mentioned only in passing Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden.

He said the Soviet Union continued to promote trade with Western countries "even in the present complex world situation." This, he said, reflected Moscow's determination to contribute "to the improvement of general relations with them and to continue detente."

He said Western Europe today accounts for 80 percent of Soviet trade with industrialized countries.

During the last decade, he continued, "Europe lived in the conditions of peace and detente, getting real benefits from the extension of business cooperation with socialist countries. The large and steadily growing markets of the socialist community constitute an objective reality. This is why the trend for expanding business cooperation between Western Europe, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the other, is inevitable."

UNCLASSIFIED UNDER  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE  
11/6/87 KDO

RECEIVED 13 JAN 82 10

TO NANCE

FROM BRADY, L

DOCDATE 12 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: INTL TRADE

USSR

PATOLICHEV, NIKOLI

EAST WEST ECONOMICS

POLAND

SPEECHES

MEDIA

SUBJECT: SOME THOUGHTS ON RESPONSE TO SOVIET TRADE MINISTER PATOLICHEV SPEECH  
RE US SANCTIONS AGAINST USSR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 14 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NAU

BAILEY

PIPES

WEISS

STEARMAN

LENZ

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8107318

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Nance	1X	1/15	for information		
	1X	1/26	Noted by McFarlane	HW, WB	NB
Man	3	1/26	For further action	1/30	
Man					
Wheeler	2/4	No further action			

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) dom

**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



82 FEB 4 P 1: 49

February 4, 1982

170796

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR 748-22-16-3.3

FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson  
Acting Director

*gar* BY LCRR NARA DATE 4/6/85

SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical  
Warfare Buildup

The revised factsheet and "Q and As" represent in our estimation a solid advance over preliminary versions, and have the makings of a useful public affairs treatment. Your staff has been highly professional in dealing with us in this difficult matter.

However, final review of USG plans is needed to achieve the most effective public presentation. Our position is still somewhat defensive. We should seek to focus world attention on the continuing desire of the United States to achieve a verifiable treaty on chemical warfare, while being prepared for production of replacement munitions if necessary. We offer the following recommendations:

A brief introductory statement such as prepared by USICA (copy attached) should be drawn on by the State Department press spokesman to announce the broad U.S. policy response to the Soviet chemical warfare buildup. State would refer additional questions to DoD and ACDA.

Following the State announcement, DoD and ACDA briefings should be held which reiterate the Department's policy announcement and add evidence for our view of the Soviet buildup and of our careful and considered approach. The DoD spokesman would respond to press queries about binary weapons along lines in the factsheet and Q and A's, keeping the stress on:

- The buildup of Soviet chemical forces.
- The use by the USSR of chemical agents in Asia.
- The U.S. search for peace.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by ~~Gilbert A. Robinson~~

~~GDS 2/4/88~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

-- The deterrent intent and nature of any foreseeable U.S. chemical munitions.

-- The binaries as replacements for older systems.

-- The plans to phase down outmoded munitions and arrive at a smaller effective deterrent.

-- The U.S. view that we do not need to match the Soviets and therefore perceive no "chemical arms race."

ACDA should explain some of the past difficulties in negotiations and some possible new approaches. ACDA would include mention that the U.S. is considering steps to resume negotiations.

Together the press statements and additional background briefings should be perceived by the press as a USG effort to prod the Soviets to negotiate a verifiable treaty. It would be seen that the U.S. is leaving time for negotiation while preparing to produce replacements for existing outmoded munitions if necessary.

We also recommend that the principal officials involved in the decision and its public presentation meet as soon as possible to discuss these suggestions, review the factsheet and Q and A's, and map out additional briefings and steps recommended in our proposed scenario (copy attached).

With careful and total coordination aimed at the fundamental impression we wish to create, it should be possible to deflect at least some of the opposition. FBIS and other reports of media coverage abroad as well as reports from our Embassies (recent cables from Bonn and London are attached) show that the Soviets are poised to mount a significant propaganda campaign against the U.S. decision, and that they will have receptive audiences in Europe. Independent of whatever mischief the USSR might attempt, recent coverage in the American press attests to ready condemnation here and abroad unless we construct a policy that takes the high ground and directs attention to U.S. peace efforts in this instance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

cc: The Honorable  
Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable  
William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

The Honorable  
Walter J. Stoessel  
Deputy Secretary-Designate  
Department of State

The Honorable  
David R. Gergen  
Assistant to the President  
for Communications

The Honorable  
Richard R. Burt  
Director of Politico-Military Affairs  
Department of State

Mr. Horace Russell  
Staff Member  
National Security Council

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane ✓  
The White House

The Honorable  
Frank C. Carlucci  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Honorable  
Fred Ikle  
Under Secretary for Policy  
Department of Defense

The Honorable  
Henry Catto  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

20

170797

NLRR 748-22-168-8  
BY KDR NARA DATE 11/6/05

Statement on the U.S. Response to the Buildup by  
the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons

Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Munitions

As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably necessary to undertake preparation in the coming year for production two years hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLACE — NOT SUPPLEMENT — older types that are less safe to store and handle. These are not new and they are not biological. They are a retaliatory deterrent. The United States has already renounced first use of such munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment could only occur after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such consultations have not occurred.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

21

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

Background: The Growth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities

For the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special decontamination vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical weapons. Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war. The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect any country.

U.S. Restraint

The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in 1969 renounced the first use of chemical and biological weapons and toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare.

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-3-

President Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. The United States closed research and production facilities, reducing its research and development to a strict study of how to defend against attack by an adversary.

#### Soviet Use of Mycotoxins

The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins -- commonly known as "Yellow Rain" -- against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The testimony of those who have suffered, the chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces, amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See attached Department of State report.)

#### U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons

Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a comprehensive, verifiable

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-4-

agreement to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. The talks were suspended in 1980 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate verification of both parties' compliance.

The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable and provides for adequate verification.

We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations.

Attachment

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~



REMOVED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*11/8/15 CDB*

NOTE :

The attached documents were inadvertently  
omitted from the memo from Gilbert A. Robinson  
to Judge William P. Clark dated February 4, 1982,  
subject: The U.S. Response to the Soviet  
Chemical Warfare Buildup.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

International Communication Agency United States of America

DECLASSIFIED

Scenario

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NLRR 748-22-16-9-7

BY GDB NARA DATE 11/6/02/70798

Public Announcement of U.S. Response to the Soviet Buildup  
of Chemical Weapons

Assuming that the FY 1983 budget request, including items for chemical munitions, will be sent to the Congress in early February and thus be a matter of public record, the following scenario for public affairs treatment is proposed. The scenario calls for a coordinated series of U.S. public affairs initiatives in Washington and overseas that seek to direct public attention overseas to the actions of the Soviet Union.

- 1) Any additional evidence or reports on the Soviet use of mycotoxins should be made available to the press prior to the submission of the budget to the Congress. However, the USG should not attempt artificially to generate attention to mycotoxins because it would be reported as a transparent effort to distract world attention from our impending decision on chemical weapons. Reports or statements from Congressional leaders, other private American sources, particularly scientists and leaders and experts from other countries, would be useful.
- 2) Shortly before release of the budget, a number of senior U.S. officials should have deep background briefings on an exclusive basis with a few leading columnists or editors, explaining the forthcoming decision with emphasis on our intent to use binaries as a deterrent and an incentive to the Soviets to attain a verifiable agreement.

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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

- 2 -

3) The State Department Spokesman at the noon briefing on the day of release of the budget should make a brief, forceful statement on U.S. <sup>4c</sup> plans regarding chemical weapons (draft attached). He should of course be prepared for questions with a briefing paper drawing on the cables already prepared by State and DoD and talking points consolidated by USICA (drafts attached).

4) At the same time White House, NSC, DoD and State Department senior officials and briefers should brief the press corps including meetings at the Foreign Press Center and followup exclusives for leading foreign press. U.S. officials should have in hand the briefing papers that focus on Soviet buildups and actions, U.S. interest in negotiations and the deterrence intent of our weapons.

5) The Department should instruct Ambassadors in key countries to seek statements from foreign leaders that fix the onus for the buildup of chemical weapons on the USSR and support a US call for renewed negotiations. Similar statements from other public figures should also be sought.

6) A Presidential statement should be prepared either for delivery by the President personally before the press corps or as part of a press conference, in which the President:

-- Regrets the need for US preparations;

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28  
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- 3 -

- Places the responsibility for our decision on Soviet actions;
- Calls strongly for resumed negotiations;
- Emphasizes that we have consciously built in time for negotiation before being forced to proceed to production;
- Asks the Soviets to account to the world for their stocks and military preparation;
- Seeks support from the international community for a treaty that is verifiable;
- Stresses the deterrent and retaliatory nature of US weapons.

7) Coincident with the actions directly related to the U.S. decision, the USICA Wireless File or USINFO and Voice of America should carry stories on previous U.S. actions and agreements attempting to ban and eliminate biological and chemical weapons, and more general accounts of major U.S. arms reduction and peace initiatives, as well as analyses of Soviet chemical warfare strategy.

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- 4 -

8) It will be valuable for the Voice of America and the File to cross-play to the field texts or summaries of any supportive media reaction and public statements from abroad and from the U.S.

9) At every opportunity senior U.S. officials should voice their commitment to search for ways to make progress in arms reduction and guarantee world peace and security.

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INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

30

PAGE 01 LONDON 01070 271346Z  
ACTION EUR-12

031565 ICC112  
271350Z

LONDON 01070 271346Z

031565 ICC112

INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 EU-03 PGHR-01 PGHP-04 VOA-05 /016 A3 3

MADE IN RECENT MONTHS AGAINST THE "PEACE" MOVEMENT  
BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DOWNPOLLING SPEECH, THE  
BEGINNING OF THE TALKS, AND THE POLISH CRISIS.

170799

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 H-01 10-15  
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-03 DOE-10 TRSE-00 PM-09  
PA-01 INRE-00 SAL-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 ICAE-00 SP-02  
DOEE-00 HCE-03 SPRS-02 /097 W

-----106034 271351Z /46

O 271344Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6019  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
NATO COLLECTIVE  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
CIRCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CIRCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
USNMR SHAPE BE

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 01070

GENEVA ALSO FOR INF

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 01/27/12 (STREATOR, EDWARD J.)  
TAGS: MPOL, UK, NATO  
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE CW ISSUE IN EUROPE

REF: BONN 1671 (NOTAL)

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE CONCUR IN EMBASSY BONN'S INSIGHTFUL ANALYSIS OF  
THE DANGERS POSED TO OUR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY  
GOALS BY THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUE.

3. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY DRUMBEAT OF CRITICAL MEDIA  
ATTENTION TO THE CW ISSUE HERE SINCE THE ANORETTA  
HOEBER INTERVIEW WITH --UTTR'S, WHICH RAISED THE

POSSIBILITY OF CW DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN. WE EXPECT  
MEDIA INTEREST TO MULTIPLY FOLLOWING JANUARY 25  
EDITION OF BBC'S WEEKLY NEWS DOCUMENTARY "PANORAMA,"  
WHICH FOCUSED ON CW ISSUES. PROGRAM REHEARSED HOEBER  
CONTROVERSY, LAID HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE POSSIBILITY  
OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN ANY CW EXCHANGE, CAST  
DOUBT ON U.S. ASSUMPTIONS OF A SOVIET CW BUILDUP,  
SPOKE DARKLY OF NEW CW WEAPONS TO FOLLOW BINARIES,  
AND FEATURED 2-MINUTE SEGMENT (APPARENTLY FROM OLD  
MILITARY TRAINING FILM WITH U.S. VOICEOVER) OF  
RABBIT DYING FROM CW EXPOSURE. THERE WAS ALSO A  
STATEMENT THAT PANORAMA HAD "INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED"  
THAT HIGH-LEVEL DOD OFFICIALS DID, IN FACT, WANT TO  
DEPLOY NEW BINARY WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

4. BECAUSE OF RECENT PUBLICITY, THE MOD HAS ALREADY  
RECEIVED A LARGE NUMBER OF QUERIES ON CW AND IS  
EXPECTING A DELUGE FOLLOWING LAST EVENING'S "PANORAMA"  
PROGRAM. IN RESPONDING, THE MOD WILL DRAW FROM  
WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE (STATE 11311 AND 13243).

5. OUR CONTACTS AT THE FCO AND THE MOD HAVE BEEN  
EXPRESSING INCREASING CONCERN THAT A CW CONTROVERSY  
IS THE WRONG ISSUE AT THE WRONG TIME. THIS IS NOT  
JUST THE SENTIMENT OF FCO DOVES. A SENIOR MOD  
OFFICIAL, FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE SAYING THAT HE  
PERSONALLY CONSIDERS CW DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE "A GOOD  
IDEA", CAUTIONED THAT ANY SUCH U.S. DEPLOYMENT  
PLANS COULD REVERSE THE TENDENCY PROGRESS WE HAVE

6. THE POINT IS WELL TAKEN. THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR  
DISARMAMENT THRIVES ON DISTRUST OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE PERCEPTION THAT THERE ARE FEW CONTROLS ON  
THE DEPLOYMENT OF EVER MORE FRIGHTENING U.S. WEAPONS  
TO USE ON A EUROPEAN BATTLEFIELD. A CW CONTROVERSY  
COULD WELL FUEL THIS SENTIMENT AND REVIVE A  
FLAGGING CND--INCREASING OPPOSITION TO OUR DEFENSE  
POLICIES ACROSS THE BOARD AND  
PARTICULARLY TO INF DEPLOYMENTS.

7. WE CANNOT HOPE ENTIRELY TO DEFUSE THE CW ISSUE  
HERE. BUT WE CAN HELP CONTAIN IT. SOME ACTIVITY  
IN THE CD CONTEXT WOULD BE HELPFUL, AS WOULD MORE  
EVIDENCE OF THE EXTENT OF SOVIET PROGRAMS. FOR  
THE REST, THE MORE SAID ABOUT DETERRENCE AND THE  
LESS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT THE BETTER. REGARDING  
DETERRENCE, DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOTE PREVALENT  
PERCEPTION HERE THAT HITLER WAS DETERRED FROM USING  
CW AGENTS ONLY BY HIS BELIEF THAT ALLIES  
HAD CAPACITY TO RETALIATE. LOUIS

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NLRR 748-27-16-4-2

BY ICDR AA DATE 14/6/12

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INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM  
170800 31

PAGE 01 BOHN 01671 01 OF 02 251755Z 029164 ICC216  
ACTION EUR-12 -25/1809Z

BOHN 01671 01 OF 02 251755Z 029164 ICC216

INFO TCO-01 DCO-02 EU-03 PGMR-01 PGMP-04 VOA-05 /016 A2 2

IN PIRMASENS IN THE SOUTHWEST OF THE COUNTRY THE  
STATE (LAND) CHAIRMAN OF THE COMBINED LABOR UNIONS  
FILED SUIT AGAINST THE FEDERAL POLICY OF STORING  
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY AT FISCHBACH.

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 ED-08 H-01  
10-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-03 DOE-10 TRSE-00  
PM-09 PA-01 INRE-00 SAL-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 ICAC-00  
SP-02 MCE-00 NRC-02 SPRS-02 /107 W

THIS WEEK AN EMBASSY SPD CONTACT REMINDED US OF THAT  
INCIDENT, AND POINTED OUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADE  
UNIONS TAKING THAT ACTION. HE, TOO, NOTED THAT THE  
RESISTANCE TO NEW OR ADDITIONAL CW STORAGE IN THE  
FRG WOULD BE ALMOST CERTAIN TO GROW.

0 251727Z JAN 82

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3463

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE

CINCUSAFE RAHSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE

USNHR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BOHN 01671

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/25/82 (WOESSNER, W.H.) OR-M

TAGS: KPOL, GE

SUBJECT: MANAGING THE CW ISSUE IN EUROPE

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ALTHOUGH WE WELL UNDERSTAND THE DEFENSE  
RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISION TO PRODUCE BINARY  
MUNITIONS, WE ARE FEARFUL THAT WE MAY WELL BE HEADING  
INTO A RED-HOT POLITICAL CONTROVERSY, SIMILAR TO THE  
ONE THAT SURROUNDED ERW, SHOULD THAT DECISION BE  
FOLLOWED BY ONE TO FORWARD DEPLOY THE MUNITION IN THE  
FEDERAL REPUBLIC. WITH THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN PARA  
4 BELOW, CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE NOT YET BECOME A PUBLIC  
OR MEDIA ISSUE HERE, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS  
ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE "PEACE MOVEMENT", WHICH  
IS BADLY IN NEED OF NEW SLOGANS, AND OTHER GROUPS

CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY BUILD-UP IN EUROPE SEIZE  
THE ISSUE. INDEED, STORIES SUCH AS THE RECENT PIRCUS  
ARTICLE LINKING CW AND GLCM NOT ONLY SERVE TO DRAW  
PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM BUT MAY WELL BE USED  
BY ANTI-INF ADVOCATES TO PRESSURE BOTH THE CHANCELLOR  
AND THE SPD/FDP COALITION TO REASSESS THEIR PRESENTLY  
FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION. EVEN WITH  
THE BEST OF MANAGEMENT, WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT AVOID  
SERIOUS POLITICAL STRAINS.

3. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH EUR/CE DIRECTOR  
KORNBLUM, A SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL WHO IS CLOSE  
TO THE CHANCELLOR (HOEYCK) SAID THAT UNLESS THE MATTER  
WERE CAREFULLY HANDLED, THE CW ISSUE COULD BE EVEN  
WORSE THAN THE ERW CONTROVERSY. OFFICIALS OF THE  
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED  
SIMILAR CONCERNS. HOEYCK VENTURED THE PERSONAL  
VIEW THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A NEW AND SERIOUS  
ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE REGARDING THE ELIMINATION  
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ORDER TO CONTAIN THE ISSUE.  
(EMBASSY COMMENT: WHILE HOEYCK'S SUGGESTION FOR A  
TWO-TRACK APPROACH ALA INF WAS PERSONAL, WE WOULD  
NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF SOMETHING ALONG THESE  
LINES BECOMES THE FRG POSITION. END COMMENT).

4. A FURTHER SIGN OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE FRG  
CONCERNING CW TURNED UP IN THE NEWS LATE LAST YEAR.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN  
DISCUSSING BINARY MUNITIONS THE WORD "MODERNIZATION"  
BE AVOIDED IN ORDER TO AVOID THE INF PARALLEL BEING  
DRAWN AND THAT A WORD SUCH AS "REPLACEMENT"  
"RENEWAL" OR "EXCHANGE" BE SUBSTITUTED IN ORDER TO  
MAKE CLEAR THAT CW STOCKS ALREADY EXIST IN EUROPE.  
WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT RATHER THAN REFERRING TO  
PAST "NEGLECT" OF US CW CAPABILITY, WE SAY THAT  
THE US HAD EXERCISED "RESTRAINT" IN DECIDING SOME  
YEARS AGO NOT TO PROCEED WITH BINARY PRODUCTION  
IN THE HOPE THAT THE CW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR  
IN GENEVA WOULD BE FRUITFUL AND MAKE IT UNNECESSARY.  
IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO LAY THE BLAME FOR LACK OF  
PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE SOVIETS' DOOR.  
FORHOFF OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IN  
DISCUSSING THE GREATER SAFETY OF BINARY WEAPONS  
WE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID IMPLYING THAT THE WEAPONS  
NOW STORED IN THE FRG ARE UNSAFE. THEY ALSO  
SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT THAT BINARIES CAN, ONCE  
THEY ARE NO LONGER NEEDED, BE DESTROYED WITH MANY  
FEWER ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS WAS WORTH STRESSING.  
WE ALSO SUGGEST PLACING EMPHASIS ON THE DETERRENT  
VALUE OF BINARY WEAPONS AND AVOIDING, INsofar AS  
POSSIBLE, COMMENTING ON POSSIBLE RETALIATORY USE.  
FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE  
FACT THAT THE LARGEST PORTION OF OUR EXPENDITURES

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NLRR 748-2275-5-1

BY 60013

DATE 4/6/85

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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

32

INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

PAGE 01  
ACTION EUR-12

BONN 01671 02 OF 02 251755Z

029165 ICC215  
25/1009Z

INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 EU-03 PGMR-01 PGMP-04 VOA-05 /016 A1 1

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EB-08 H-01  
IO-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-03 DOE-10 TRSE-00  
PM-09 PA-01 INRE-00 SAL-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 ICAE-00  
SP-02 MCE-00 NRC-02 SPRS-02 /107 W

-----024414 251809Z /41

O 251727Z JAN 82

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3464

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE

CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 01671

~~ON CW WILL BE FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, NOT WEAPONS,~~  
~~WILL BE HELPFUL; INDEED, ONE OF OUR FMOD CONTACTS~~  
HAS TOLD US HE HAD ALREADY USED THIS ARGUMENT WITH  
SOME SUCCESS.

6. WASHINGTON SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT A PROBLEM  
MAY ARISE OVER THE LINKAGE, OR NON-LINKAGE, OF  
CW WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT  
ONE POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR A CW CAPABILITY IS THAT IT  
GIVES US A NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO SOVIET USE OF  
CW, WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A DIFFERENT ARGUMENT  
FROM ONE OF OUR FMOD CONTACTS. HIS ARGUMENT, WHICH  
SEEMS TO BE POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY, IS THAT  
WE OUGHT TO AVOID ANY HINT THAT WE MIGHT RESPOND  
TO SOVIET CW USE WITH ONLY NON-NUCLEAR MEANS.  
THIS WOULD, HE ARGUED, BE DECOUPLING. OUR  
CONVERSATION WAS TOO BRIEF TO DEVELOP FULLY THIS

IDEA BUT WE WILL PURSUE IT WITH HIM AND WITH OTHER  
FRG OFFICIALS.

7. EVEN IF WE SUCCEED IN PUTTING THE BEST FACE ON  
THE BINARY ISSUE, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN  
EASILY AVOID AGAIN PUTTING THE FRG GOVERNMENT, AND THE  
CHANCELLOR PERSONALLY, UNDER SERIOUS, PERHAPS UNACCEPTABLE,  
POLITICAL PRESSURE. UNFORTUNATELY, AS IN ERW, PUBLIC  
PASSIONS AND "ANTI-WAR" PROPAGANDISTS ARE NOT LIKELY  
TO BE SWAYED BY LOGIC ON THE CW ISSUE. IN THE FINAL  
ANALYSIS, OF COURSE, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE CHANCELLOR'S  
ABILITY TO TAKE ON AN EMOTIONAL BINARY PROBLEM ALONG  
WITH THE HEAVY POLITICAL BURDENS HE IS BEARING ON  
INF. WE FEAR THAT HOENYCK'S CONCERN (PARA 3 ABOVE)  
THAT "THE CW ISSUE COULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN THE ERW  
CONTROVERSY" MAY BE ONLY TOO ACCURATE, IN WHICH CASE OUR  
PROBLEMS HAVE NOT YET BEGUN. END COMMENT.

BURNS

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

848

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 5, 1982

170801

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INFORMATION

NLRR 748-22-12-6-0

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

BY KDB N DATE 11/4/85

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Brezhnev on the  
Pentecostals (U)

Monday Afternoon (February 8), State is going to brief the Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on Immigration and some Committee members on the Pentecostals. State (SOV) would like our permission to refer to the President's January 15, 1982 letter to Brezhnev and to Brezhnev's reply. The briefing will be confidential, and State will not show the Sub-Committee the texts, but will only give them the gist of the contents. I see no problem. Any objections from your side of the street? (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 2/5/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Feb 8, 1982

Mr. Stearman brought back your note on this package and said that this was going to McFarlane not the Judge and did not need Approve/Disapprove block, etc.

Any guidance?

Carol C.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Feb 5, 1982

This package should be Action  
not infor and give the  
Judge Clark some approve/  
disapprove blocks.

Carol C.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

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Package # 617

82 - 3 P 5. 15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
I-Information	<u>A-Action</u>		

**DISTRIBUTION**

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other			

**COMMENTS**

\* 848

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Feb 8, 1982

MEMO FOR: WILMA HALL *JMP*  
FROM: CAROL CLEVELAND

Per our discussion, attached is the Stearman package. I really do think it is OEB. We had returned it to him on Friday and he brought it back to us this morning.

We will be glad to do anything you decide.

*The memo is OBE.  
Handled verbally at  
morning staff meeting.  
Judge OK'd the reference  
to President's letter under  
conditions stated. W*

~~UNCLASSIFIED//CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~  
11/6/15 KDB

RECEIVED 09 FEB 82 15

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 05 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: REQUEST FM STATE TO REFER TO PRES 15 JAN LTR TO BREZHNEV DURING  
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON PENTECOSTALS

ACTION: OBE PER POINDEXTER / WPC OKD DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NONE

STEARMAN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( D / D )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

9

170802

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1713  
SIT127 DATE 02/16/82

DTG: 101724Z FEB 82 PSN: 010560  
TOR: 041/2247Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHMO #1713/01 0411747  
O 101724Z FEB 82  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR 748-2216-79**

**BY CDB NARA DATE 11/6/15**

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1672

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 6008  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 01713  
EXDIS  
CORRECTED COPY (SECTION 1 OF 4 VICE 1 OF 5)  
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV  
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 2/10/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M  
TAGS: SREF, UR, US  
SUBJECT: THE EMBASSY PENTECOSTALS - A POSSIBLE  
BREAKTHROUGH

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. LIDIA VASHCHENKO'S DECISION TO RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK TO APPLY FOR EXIT PERMISSION AND THE UPCOMING RUSSIAN ORTHODOX PATRIARCH'S WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE PRESENT THE UNITED STATES WITH ITS BEST LEVERAGE IN THREE YEARS TO INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO RESOLVE THE EMBASSY PENTECOSTALS' EMIGRATION PROBLEM. PROSPECTS ARE THAT AUGUSTINA WILL ABANDON HER HUNGER STRIKE WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. THE CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC ATTENTION AROUSED IN THE WEST BY THE HUNGER STRIKE CAN THEN BE MORE FRUITFULLY DIRECTED AT SOVIET OBSTRUCTION OF THE PENTECOSTALS' EMIGRATION. INCREASED INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE VASHECHENKOS AND CHMYKHALOVS MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IZE THEIR PROBLEM. THE EMBASSY PROPOSES IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN A WAY TO MAXIMIZE THESE ADVANTAGES. END SUMMARY.

3. LIDIA'S RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK: BOTH LIDIA AND MEMBERS OF THE VASHCHENKO FAMILY STILL WITHIN THE EMBASSY APPEAR TO BE AGREED THAT LIDIA, AFTER HER RELEASE FROM BOTKIN HOSPITAL ON FEBRUARY 11, SHOULD RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK TO APPLY FOR EMIGRATION. TWO MEMBERS OF THE VASHCHENKO FAMILY IN CHERNOGORSK -- VERA AND SASHA -- ARRIVED IN MOSCOW THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 10 TO VISIT LIDIA IN THE HOSPITAL AND POSSIBLY ACCOMPANY HER BACK TO CHERNOGORSK. (COMMENT: THE CHERNOGORSK VASHCHENKOS WERE ABLE TO ARRANGE THEIR TRIP TO MOSCOW IN RECORD TIME, SEEMINGLY INDICATING CONSIDERABLE SOVIET INTEREST IN PROMOTING THE VISIT. END COMMENT.) LIDIA WILL CARRY WITH HER NEW VYZOVS FROM MR. LYNN BUZZARD,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 101724Z FEB 82 PSN: 010560

A SUPPORTER FROM THE U. S., TO ALLOW HER, ALONG WITH OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS IN CHERNOGORSK, TO MAKE APPLICATION IN THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE INSISTED ALL ALONG. PENTECOSTAL SUPPORTERS IN THE WEST HAVE ALREADY PROMISED TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THIS APPLICATION AS A TEST OF SOVIET GOOD FAITH.

4. STATUS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUNGER STRIKE: AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO IS STILL OFFICIALLY CONTINUING HER HUNGER STRIKE. SINCE LIDIA'S HOSPITALIZATION, HOWEVER, AUGUSTINA HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY REASSESSING HER ACTION. HER WEIGHT HAS REMAINED ABSOLUTELY STABLE FOR OVER ONE AND ONE-HALF WEEKS, INDICATING CONSIDERABLE CALORIC INTAKE, AND SHE HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE STRIKE THAT WAS ABSENT BEFORE. AUGUSTINA BELIEVES THAT MAINTAINING THE STRIKE WILL SOMEHOW HELP PROTECT LIDIA UNTIL SHE IS SAFELY IN CHERNOGORSK. ALL OF THE VASHCHENKOS ARE ALSO SOMEWHAT FEARFUL THAT ENDING THE FAST WILL CAUSE THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE WEST TO LOSE INTEREST IN THEM. DESPITE THIS, PROSPECTS ARE THAT AUGUSTINA WILL GRADUALLY TAPER OFF THE STRIKE, ENDING IT TOTALLY WITHIN PERHAPS A FEW WEEKS.

5. THE HUNGER STRIKE, WHILE IT FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS STATED PURPOSE OF FORCING THE SOVIETS TO PERMIT THE PENTECOSTALS' EMIGRATION, DID ASSIST THE VASHCHENKOS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND CHMYKHALOVS IN ONE RESPECT--IT BROUGHT CONSIDERABLE NEW PUBLIC INTEREST IN THEIR PLIGHT AND HAS IN SOME RESPECTS IRREVERSIBLY CHANGED THE SITUATION FOR THE SOVIETS. BEFORE THE FAST, THE NUMBER OF PERSONS AWARE AND INTERESTED IN THE PENTECOSTALS, WHILE SLOWLY GROWING, TOTALED ONLY SEVERAL THOUSAND. THE HUNGER STRIKE HAS MADE THE PLIGHT OF THE VASHCHENKOS AND CHMYKHALOVS VIRTUALLY OVERNIGHT INTO ONE OF THE MOST CELEBRATED HUMAN RIGHTS CASES IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY SHOWN AWARENESS OF THIS BY THEIR CAREFUL TREATMENT OF LIDIA DURING HER HOSPITALIZATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR PROVIDED LIDIA WITH WHAT APPEARS TO BE VERY PROFESSIONAL HOSPITAL CARE, AND HAVE ALLOWED THE EMBASSY, PRESS AND PRIVATE VISITORS MORE GENEROUS ACCESS THAN A NORMAL PATIENT WOULD BE ACCORDED. WHILE THE MFA HAS TOLD US IT HOPES LIDIA WILL RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK, THAT MOVE WILL FOCUS ATTENTION DIRECTLY ON THE SOVIET OBSTRUCTION OF THE PENTECOSTALS' EMIGRATION AS NEVER BEFORE, PRESENTING THEM WITH A NEW DILEMMA.

6. THE HUNGER STRIKE BROUGHT SOME DISADVANTAGES TO THE VASHCHENKOS AND CHMYKHALOVS AS WELL. AUGUSTINA AND LIDIA WERE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY OUTSIDE OF SOVIET CONTROL DURING THEIR FAST, AND THE EMBASSY, NOT THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 01713  
EXDIS  
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION 02 OF 04 VICE 02 OF 05)  
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV  
SOVIETS, FACED THE PRESSURE OF AN ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE--  
THE POINT AT WHICH THE HUNGER STRIKERS WOULD DO SERIOUS  
DAMAGE TO THEIR HEALTH. THE SOVIETS WERE ABLE IN  
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE U.S. TO TAKE A PRINCIPLED  
POSITION--THAT THE PENTECOSTALS SHOULD APPLY FOR  
EMIGRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET LAW AND THAT  
THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS THE U.S.'S PROBLEM. THE STRIKE  
MAY THUS HAVE UNDERCUT THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS MADE TO  
ADDRESS THE OVERALL GOAL OF EMIGRATION. THE STRIKE ALSO  
MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SEEN BY THE SOVIETS AS AN ACT OF  
DESPERATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MONITOR  
THE PENTECOSTALS' PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH SUPPORTERS  
IN THE WEST AND HAVE BEEN IN A POSITION TO OBSERVE THE  
STRIKING CHANGE IN LIDIA'S MOOD SINCE SHE LEFT THE  
EMBASSY. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS HAD THEIR OWN  
PREFERRED SOLUTION TO THE PENTECOSTAL PROBLEM (THE  
DEPARTURE OF ALL SEVEN PENTECOSTALS FROM THE EMBASSY  
WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS OR ASSURANCES), AND HAVE PURSUED  
THAT COURSE FOR THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS WITH  
CONSISTENCY. THE SOVIETS ARE SURELY AWARE THAT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PENTECOSTALS ARE SUFFERING FROM "CABIN FEVER" AND  
LONG TO BE REUNITED WITH THEIR CHERNOGORSK FAMILIES.  
LIDIA'S DEPARTURE FROM THE EMBASSY AND RETURN TO  
CHERNOGORSK WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS OR ASSURANCES  
PLAYS PERFECTLY TO SOVIET DESIGNS, EVEN WHILE IT  
CONFRONTS THEM WITH NEW PROBLEMS.

7. PRESSURING THE SOVIETS: IN VIEW OF THE MIXED  
RESULTS OF THE HUNGER STRIKE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE  
QUICKLY, WHILE CIRCUMSTANCES FAVOR THE PENTECOSTALS, TO  
FIND A RESOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEM. WE PROPOSE TO  
ACCOMPLISH THIS IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

- A. LINKING THE PENTECOSTALS TO THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX  
- PATRIARCH'S WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE: THE SOVIETS  
- PUT CONSIDERABLE STORE BY PROMOTING THEIR IMAGE  
- AS CHAMPIONS OF PEACE AND STRENGTHEN PEACE

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- MOVEMENTS IN THE WEST. TO THAT END THE SOVIETS  
- ARE MAKING GREAT EFFORTS TO GAIN THE PARTICIPATION  
- IN THEIR CONFERENCE OF A NUMBER OF PROMINENT  
- WESTERN CHURCHMEN. REVEREND BILLY GRAHAM HAS  
- ALREADY AGREED TO TAKE PART IN THE CONFERENCE, BUT  
- IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR BY ONE OF HIS ASSISTANTS  
- THAT HE WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO RAISE THE PENTECOSTAL  
- ISSUE WHILE IN MOSCOW IF IT IS NOT RESOLVED BY THEM.  
- WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH THE DEPARTMENT  
- AND THE EMBASSY TO WORK THROUGH CHRISTIAN GROUPS  
- IN THE WEST, PARTICULARLY LYNN BUZZARD'S  
- CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY IN THE U.S., CHRISTIAN  
- SOLIDARITY INTERNATIONAL IN SWITZERLAND AND THE  
- BUZZ ORGANIZATION IN ENGLAND, TO CONVINCE WESTERN  
- CHURCHMEN TO TIE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CON-  
- FERENCE TO RESOLUTION OF THE PENTECOSTALS'  
- PROBLEM. FAILING THIS, THE CHRISTIAN GROUPS  
- WOULD SEEK A COMMITMENT FROM PARTICIPANTS TO RAISE  
- THE PENTECOSTAL ISSUE, THREATENING THE TONE OF THE  
- SOVIET PROPAGANDA EXTRAVAGANZA. IN MEETINGS WITH  
- REVEREND GRAHAM'S REPRESENTATIVE DR. HARASTZI  
- AND LATER WITH LYNN BUZZARD, METROPOLITAN FILARET,  
- COORDINATOR OF THE PATRIARCH'S CONFERENCE, SHOWED  
- CONCERN OVER THE EFFECT THE PENTECOSTALS COULD HAVE  
- ON THE CONFERENCE. THE PATRIARCH'S PEACE CON-  
- FERENCE CONVENES MAY 10, PRESENTING THE SOVIETS  
- WITH A CLEAR DEADLINE TO AUTHORIZE THE EMIGRATION  
- OF MEMBERS OF THE CHMYKHALOV AND VASHCHENKO FAMILIES

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- IN CHERNOGORSK IN ORDER TO GET THE EMBASSY PENTE-  
- COSTALS TO RETURN HOME AND MAKE APPLICATION. THE  
- FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE IS DESIGNED TO ATTRACT  
- PRECISELY THE FIGURES RESPONSIVE TO AN AROUSED  
- CHRISTIAN PUBLIC OPINION PROVIDES SOME HOPE THAT  
- THIS LEVERAGE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.  
B. SHIFTING PUBLIC FOCUS TO THE SOVIETS: LIDIA'S  
- RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK TO APPLY FOR EXIT PERMISSION  
- WILL PLACE THE SOVIETS AND THE DECISIONS THEY  
- MAKE AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION. PENTECOSTAL  
- SUPPORTERS DR. KENT HILL AND LYNN BUZZARD WILL  
- COORDINATE WITH SUPPORT GROUPS IN EUROPE AND THE  
- UNITED STATES TO PUBLICIZE THE FACT THAT LIDIA IS  
- FINALLY DOING WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE INSISTED THAT  
- THE PENTECOSTALS DO ALL ALONG. PENTECOSTAL  
- SUPPORTERS WILL TRY TO MAKE CLEAR THROUGH THE  
- PRESS THAT IT IS NOW TIME FOR THE SOVIETS TO  
- EITHER LIVE UP TO THEIR WORD OR BE SEEN AS  
- ACTING IN BAD FAITH.  
C. QUIET DIPLOMACY: SINCE LIDIA'S HOSPITALIZATION,  
- THE SOVIETS HAVE ON THEIR OWN ACTED CORRECTLY,  
- AT LEAST SO FAR. THEY HAVE GIVEN LIDIA  
- GOOD MEDICAL TREATMENT, HAVE NOT TRIED TO PRESSURE

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 01713  
EXDIS  
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION 3 OF 4 VICE 3 OF 5)  
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV

- HER ON WHERE SHE SHOULD GO AFTER THE HOSPITAL
- (THOUGH THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN ANY ASSURANCE THAT SHE
- WOULD BE ALLOWED BACK IN THE EMBASSY), AND HAVE
- GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT LIDIA WILL BE SUBJECT
- TO ANY SORT OF PERSECUTION. ABOUT THE TIME OF
- LIDIA'S RELEASE FROM THE HOSPITAL, THE CHARGE
- PLANS TO CONTACT THE MFA IN ORDER TO: (1) THANK
- THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL TREAT-
- MENT OF LIDIA; (2) INFORM THEM OF LIDIA'S DECISION
- TO RETURN TO CHERNOGORSK; AND (3) NOTE THAT LIDIA'S
- RETURN TO APPLY FOR EMIGRATION IN HER PLACE OF
- RESIDENCE WITHOUT ASSURANCES OR PRECONDITIONS
- COMPLIES WITH THE LONGSTANDING SOVIET POSITION,
- PUTTING THE SOVIETS ON NOTICE THAT IT IS TIME
- FOR THEM TO DELIVER.
- D. INTERNATIONALIZING THE PROBLEM: IN THE PAST THE
- GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRIA AND CANADA HAVE MADE DEMARCHES
- ON BEHALF OF THE PENTECOSTALS. DURING THE HUNGER
- STRIKE, INCREASED PUBLIC INTEREST IN WESTERN
- EUROPE LED SOME PARLIAMENTARIANS IN SWEDEN,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- HOLLAND, BRITAIN, NORWAY AND IRELAND TO CALL
- UPON THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE EFFORTS ON
- BEHALF OF THE PENTECOSTALS. WHEN CONTINGENCIES
- FOR THE MEDICAL EVACUATION OF LIDIA WERE BEING
- MADE, THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND
- AND THE FRG WERE ALL MOST COOPERATIVE. PUBLIC
- OPINION AND INTEREST IN THE PENTECOSTALS IS STRONG
- AT PRESENT IN WESTERN EUROPE AND WE SUSPECT THAT
- MANY WESTERN CSCE SIGNATORIES WOULD BE AGREEABLE
- TO MAKING QUIET BILATERAL DEMARCHES ON THE
- PENTECOSTALS' BEHALF. WE SUGGEST THAT THE DEPART-
- MENT INSTRUCT OUR EMBASSIES IN THESE, AND PERHAPS
- OTHER, CAPITALS TO ENCOURAGE HOST GOVERNMENTS
- TO MAKE SUCH DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIETS TO EMPHASIZE
- THE CONCERN OF THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
- NATION FOR THE PENTECOSTALS. WE WOULD SUGGEST

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- THAT THE APPROACHES BE MADE QUIETLY TO IMPRESS
- THE SOVIETS THAT THE WEST IS SERIOUS, AND NOT
- SEEKING SIMPLY TO EMBARRASS THE SOVIETS. THE
- SOVIETS SHOULD BE LEFT EVERY AVENUE TO RESOLVE
- THE PENTECOSTALS' EMIGRATION WITHOUT LOSS OF
- PRESTIGE. WE WILL TRANSMIT SEPTEL BACKGROUND
- MATERIAL WHICH CAN BE USED IN SUCH CABLES
- SOLICITING SUCH DEMARCHES.
- E. MAXIMIZING PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE PENTECOSTALS:
- THE SOVIETS HAVE CLEARLY SHOWN SENSITIVITY TO WESTERN
- PUBLIC OPINION DURING LIDIA'S HOSPITALIZATION.
- WHILE WE WANT AUGUSTINA TO END HER HUNGER STRIKE,
- WE THINK IT TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO ENCOURAGE THE
- GROWTH OF INTEREST IN THE PENTECOSTALS THAT THE
- STRIKE HAS ENGENDERED. DURING THE STRIKE A NUMBER
- OF CHRISTIAN GROUPS NEWLY INTERESTED IN THE
- PENTECOSTALS HAVE ASKED TO SPEAK WITH MEMBERS
- OF THE VASHCHENKO AND CHMYKHALOV FAMILIES BY PHONE.
- WHILE WE FACILITATED UNRESTRICTED PHONE ACCESS TO
- THE PENTECOSTALS FOR WELL-KNOWN SUPPORTERS WHO
- WISHED TO PERSUADE THE VASHCHENKOS TO END THE
- STRIKE, OUR FACILITIES WERE TOO LIMITED TO PUT
- THROUGH CALLS FROM NEW PARTIES. THE EMBASSY
- PROPOSES, AS SOON AS AUGUSTINA ABANDONS HER FAST,
- TO ALLOW WESTERN SUPPORTERS VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED
- PHONE CALLS TO THE PENTECOSTALS. IT IS OUR HOPE
- THAT SUCH CALLS WILL NOT ONLY ENCOURAGE SUPPORT
- IN THE WEST, BUT BOLSTER THE PENTECOSTALS' MORALE.

## MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- UNDER THE PRE-STRIKE POLICY, THE PENTECOSTALS
- RECEIVED ONE PHONE CALL PER MONTH FROM A PARTY
- DESIGNATED BY THE ORGANIZATION SAVE, WHICH THE
- PENTECOSTALS HAD CHOSEN TO ARRANGE THE CALLS.
- AS CALLS WILL NOW BE UNLIMITED, THE EMBASSY WILL PLAN TO
- HANDLE REQUESTS DIRECTLY, RATHER THAN THROUGH AN
- INTERMEDIARY. EMBASSY RULES REGARDING PHONE CALLS
- WOULD THEN BE AS FOLLOWS:
- --CALLS WILL BE ACCEPTED FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF
- ORGANIZATIONS (NOT FROM UNAFFILIATED INDIVIDUALS
- AS THAT WOULD EXCEED OUR ABILITY TO HANDLE THEM)
- DURING WORKING HOURS MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY
- EXCEPTING HOLIDAYS.
- --NO RECORDING OF THE CALLS IS TO TAKE PLACE.
- --NO PRESS INTERVIEWS MAY BE CONDUCTED BY PHONE.
- CALLERS WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO NOTIFY THE EMBASSY IN

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 01713  
EXDIS  
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV  
ADVANCE VIA THE DEPARTMENT (EUR/SOV) OR TELEX OF  
THE DATE AND TIME THEY WOULD LIKE TO PHONE. UN-  
ANNOUNCED CALLS WILL BE PUT THROUGH IF RESOURCES  
ALLOW.  
WE REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE IN THIS  
APPROACH. ZIMMERMANN

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