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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/6/2015

File Folder USSR (2/11/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

235

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170265	MEMO	W. CLARK TO G. ROBINSON RE US RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE BUILDUP <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-1-4</i>	1	2/11/1982	B1
170803	MEMO	ROBINSON TO CLARK RE US RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE BILDUP <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-2-3</i>	3	2/4/1982	B1
170804	STATEMT	COPY OF STATEMENT IN DOC #170817 (RE US RESPONSE TO THE BUILDUP BY THE SOVIET UNION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-3-2</i>	4	ND	B1
170805	MEMO	H. RUSSELL AND S. KRAMER TO W. CLARK RE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR BINARY ISSUE	2	1/31/1982	B1
170813	REPORT	PRE BINARY WEAPONS DECISION <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-5-0</i>	4	ND	B1
170814	REPORT	RE CHEMICAL WARFARE <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-5-0</i>	4	ND	B1
170816	Q AND A	RE CHEMICAL WARFARE <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-6-9</i>	11	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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170817	STATEMNT	RE US RESPONSE TO THE BUILDUP BY THE SOVIET UNION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (STATEMENT + PRESS RELEASE) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-3-2</i>	8	ND	B1
170818	MEMO	W. STOSSEL TO REAGAN RE BILLY GRAHAM AND MOSCOW PEACE CONFERENCE (INCL. PRESS RELEASE) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-7-8</i>	3	2/11/1982	B1
170819	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE BILLY GRAHAM AND MOSCOW PEACE CONFERENCE <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-8-7</i>	1	2/10/1982	B1
170820	CABLE	MOSCOW 1603 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-17-9-6</i>	6	2/9/1982	B1


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC/S:

 Please incorporate McFarlane's
note in file #581.

Thanks,

Kathy, 2/11

(U)
5812THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1982

FOR: MIKE WHEELER

FROM: BUD McFARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Strategy
for Binary Issue

Lest there be any misunderstanding with respect to what is required on the subject issue, here is the guidance.

We need (today) a memorandum laying out specific events such as the Presidential Determination, the submission of the budget to the Congress, etc., as well as how these events are integrated with public statements.

In addition, the memo should contain a proposal for who (The White House, State and/or Defense) should make statements, when, and what they should say -- the latter both in the context of any announcements and draft Q's and A's.

Judge Clark has had inquiries from ICA (Deputy Director Robinson) as to whether there will be a meeting to coordinate this matter. The answer is no. Our staff officer should, however, coordinate his package with ICA as well as State and Defense.

Any questions?

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NLR 748-22-17-4

BY 60 NARA DATE 11/6/85

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

170265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 11, 1982

Bi

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GILBERT A. ROBINSON
The Acting Director, International
Communication Agency

SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical
Warfare Buildup

Thank you for your memorandum of February 4 in which you offered additional recommendations for achieving the most effective public presentation. As you know, we have in place a public affairs strategy for the U.S. chemical program. Concerning the Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs and use, the Interagency Group on Chemical and Biological Warfare Arms Control is developing a comprehensive public information strategy. Members of your staff have been invited to participate and present your recommendations for interagency consideration.

Again, thank you for your views as we work toward a well-defined public posture for responding to the Soviet chemical program.

Bi

William P. Clark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review February 8, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

581

MW
4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED VERSION
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/6/85 #08

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CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

February 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: HORACE RUSSELL *HR*
SVEN KRAEMER *SK*
CARY LORD *CL*

SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical
Warfare Buildup

Gil Robinson recommends at Tab II a strategy for responding to the Soviet chemical warfare buildup. Because a CBW IG effort, including ICA participation is already underway, we recommend that ICA's suggestions be folded into the interagency effort.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I thanking Gil Robinson for his comments.

Approve V

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Gilbert Robinson
Tab II Incoming memo

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82 FEB 4 P 1: 49

February 4, 1982

170803

5

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-17-2-3

FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson
Acting Director

gar

BY 603 NARA DATE 11/6/79

SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical
Warfare Buildup

The revised factsheet and "Q and As" represent in our estimation a solid advance over preliminary versions, and have the makings of a useful public affairs treatment. Your staff has been highly professional in dealing with us in this difficult matter.

However, final review of USG plans is needed to achieve the most effective public presentation. Our position is still somewhat defensive. We should seek to focus world attention on the continuing desire of the United States to achieve a verifiable treaty on chemical warfare, while being prepared for production of replacement munitions if necessary. We offer the following recommendations:

A brief introductory statement such as prepared by USICA (copy attached) should be drawn on by the State Department press spokesman to announce the broad U.S. policy response to the Soviet chemical warfare buildup. State would refer additional questions to DoD and ACDA.

Following the State announcement, DoD and ACDA briefings should be held which reiterate the Department's policy announcement and add evidence for our view of the Soviet buildup and of our careful and considered approach. The DoD spokesman would respond to press queries about binary weapons along lines in the factsheet and Q and A's, keeping the stress on:

- The buildup of Soviet chemical forces.
- The use by the USSR of chemical agents in Asia.
- The U.S. search for peace.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by Gilbert A. Robinson

GDS 2/4/88

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

-- The deterrent intent and nature of any foreseeable U.S. chemical munitions.

-- The binaries as replacements for older systems.

-- The plans to phase down outmoded munitions and arrive at a smaller effective deterrent.

-- The U.S. view that we do not need to match the Soviets and therefore perceive no "chemical arms race."

ACDA should explain some of the past difficulties in negotiations and some possible new approaches. ACDA would include mention that the U.S. is considering steps to resume negotiations.

Together the press statements and additional background briefings should be perceived by the press as a USG effort to prod the Soviets to negotiate a verifiable treaty. It would be seen that the U.S. is leaving time for negotiation while preparing to produce replacements for existing outmoded munitions if necessary.

We also recommend that the principal officials involved in the decision and its public presentation meet as soon as possible to discuss these suggestions, review the factsheet and Q and A's, and map out additional briefings and steps recommended in our proposed scenario (copy attached).

With careful and total coordination aimed at the fundamental impression we wish to create, it should be possible to deflect at least some of the opposition. FBIS and other reports of media coverage abroad as well as reports from our Embassies (recent cables from Bonn and London are attached) show that the Soviets are poised to mount a significant propaganda campaign against the U.S. decision, and that they will have receptive audiences in Europe. Independent of whatever mischief the USSR might attempt, recent coverage in the American press attests to ready condemnation here and abroad unless we construct a policy that takes the high ground and directs attention to U.S. peace efforts in this instance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 3 -

cc: The Honorable
Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

The Honorable
Walter J. Stoessel
Deputy Secretary-Designate
Department of State

The Honorable
David R. Gergen
Assistant to the President
for Communications

The Honorable
Richard R. Burt
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Horace Russell
Staff Member
National Security Council

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
The White House

The Honorable
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Honorable
Fred Ikle
Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense

The Honorable
Henry Catto
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR 748-22173-2

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BY 603 NARA DATE 11/6/85

170804

Statement on the U.S. Response to the Buildup by
the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons

Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Munitions

As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably necessary to undertake preparation in the coming year for production two years hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLACE — NOT SUPPLEMENT — older types that are less safe to store and handle. These are not new and they are not biological. They are a retaliatory deterrent. The United States has already renounced first use of such munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment could only occur after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such consultations have not occurred.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

Background: The Growth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities

For the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special decontamination vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical weapons. Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war. The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect any country.

U.S. Restraint

The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in 1969 renounced the first use of chemical and biological weapons and toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare.

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-3-

President Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. The United States closed research and production facilities, reducing its research and development to a strict study of how to defend against attack by an adversary.

Soviet Use of Mycotoxins

The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins -- commonly known as "Yellow Rain" -- against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The testimony of those who have suffered, the chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces, amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See attached Department of State report.)

U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons

Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a comprehensive, verifiable

agreement to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. The talks were suspended in 1980 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate verification of both parties' compliance.

The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable and provides for adequate verification.

We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations.

Attachment

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170805	MEMO H. RUSSELL AND S. KRAMER TO W. CLARK RE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR BINARY ISSUE	2	1/31/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Public Affairs Strategy

NLRR 748-22-17-500

for

170813

BY 108 NARA DATE 4/6/15 the Binary Weapons DecisionIssue

To ensure that the Public Affairs dimension of the Binary Decision is well coordinated and properly managed by the Administration.

Background

The Administration's FY 81 Defense Supplemental request included \$20M to purchase and install the equipment required to complete the binary production facility authorized and appropriated by the previous Congress. The Defense Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) denied this request based upon a letter from Senator Hatfield (Chairman, SAC). Subsequently, the Administration was able to override Chairman Hatfield's objection by appealing to strong supporters for the binary modernization program (Senators Jackson, Warner, Tower, and Cannon).

The FY 82 budget request contained \$455M for the chemical program (primarily defensive equipment), but no funds for procurement of weapons.

The FY 83 budget request, scheduled for submission on February 8, 1982, includes \$32M for procurement of some production items that will be used to produce binary chemical munitions--the 155mm Binary Artillery Projectile and the BIGEYE Aerial Chemical Bomb. The FY 83 program also contains an additional \$641million for chemical defense improvements, operations and maintenance, construction and equipment.

Section 1519 of Title 50, United States Code, requires Presidential certification to the Congress that production of lethal binary chemical munitions is essential to the national interest before the \$32M can be used for this purpose. A Defense paper to the Congress is also required. Section 1519 also directs that the certification and paper be submitted as far in advance of production as is practicable.

NSDD 18 on CBW Arms Control, signed by the President on January 4, 1982, states the policy that the Administration will "ensure that modernization of short- and long-range chemical weapons proceeds so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent retaliatory capability, and so the United States can gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control."

The production decision is independent of any future deployment decision. Deployment would require close consultation with Allies. There is also no connection between the CW modernization program and the current discussions on the US INF deployment in Europe.

Soviet CW forces are fully integrated into the Soviet military structure, and we believe the Soviets have large stocks of chemical weapons and modern, effective delivery systems. New Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, and other support vehicles are equipped to operate in nuclear, biological, and chemical environments. Use of chemical agents to provide realism in training has been confirmed. Against this growing Soviet capability, the US has a deteriorating stockpile and insufficient protective equipment to support our policy of deterrence or retaliation in kind.

US Position

The FY 83 request for production funding is consistent with US policy and is a further step toward improving our CW capability. It does not represent a decision to increase our reliance on chemical weapons, but only a continuation of decisions taken last year and before to deter the use of chemical weapons and to gain potential arms control negotiation leverage.

The US remains committed to the eventual goal of achieving a complete and verifiable agreement to ban chemical weapons and will be participating in the discussions of the 40-nation UN Committee on Disarmament to begin in February. Because past efforts have foundered on verification, the US will give highest priority to pressing verification issues and expressing grave concerns about compliance with existing agreements.

Considering the substantial Soviet CW capabilities and the absence of a verifiable ban on producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, the US must assure deterrence of chemical warfare by denying a significant unilateral military advantage to any possible initiator.

Milestones

Our Allies were informed last week by State that the US Defense Budget for the upcoming fiscal year contains funds for items that will be used to produce binary chemical munitions. They also were advised that actual weapons production is two years away and that we would consult before any decisions on foreign deployment.

Secretary Weinberger is expected to ask for Presidential certification on or about February 2. The proposed certification is already prepared and is formally coordinated at the staff levels of State, Defense, ACDA and NSC staff.

Borsting will brief Congressional staffers on the Defense Budget on Friday, February 5, at 2:30 p.m.

Stockman will brief the press on the total Budget this Saturday, February 6, at 10:00 a.m.

Carlucci will brief the press on the Defense Budget two hours after Stockman, on Saturday, February 6 at noon.

The Budget and Presidential certification will be officially submitted to the Congress on Monday, February 8, at noon.

The Defense Paper will be submitted to the Congress on Monday, February 15 or 22.

Plan for Public Statements

We may receive questions on the binary program as early as Tuesday, February 2. Consequently, the interagency-coordinated Qs and As should be used by all Administration spokesmen to respond. Draft Qs and As are provided at Attachment 2 and will be fully coordinated by c.o.b., Monday, February 1.

Key Congressional supporters should be briefed by Defense and provided the fact sheet no later than Friday, February 5. The fact sheet summarizing the Defense paper will be fully coordinated by c.o.b., Wednesday, February 3.

Borsting and Stockman should make no statement nor answer any questions pertaining to the Binary Issue, but should refer questions to Carlucci in preparation for his Saturday noon briefing to the press. They should, however, if asked, acknowledge that funds for binary production items are included in the budget request.

Carlucci should provide the above fact sheet to the press, but have the sheet embargoed until noon on February 8. Because he will be briefing the total Defense Budget, there should be little time available for specific questions on Binary. He should, however, be prepared with the interagency fact sheet and interagency Qs and As.

On February 8, the Defense and State spokesmen at the daily briefings should not make a statement, but should be prepared for questions with the interagency fact sheet and the interagency Qs and As.

The State Department on or about February 8 should instruct Ambassadors to answer questions on the basis of the interagency fact sheet and interagency Qs and As.

Other than the Presidential certification to the Congress, no other White House statement should be released.

The Defense and State spokesmen at the daily briefings on the date (February 15 or 22) the Defense paper is submitted to the Congress should be prepared for questions with the interagency fact sheet and updated interagency Qs and As.

THE US PROGRAM TO DETER CHEMICAL WARFARE

170814

Background

The Administration's program in the area of Chemical Warfare (CW) is designed to improve US CW defense and deterrent capabilities. Consistent with existing treaties and international law, US policy objectives are to deter the use of chemical weapons while seeking the ultimate goal of a complete and verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The US will not use chemical weapons unless they are first used against us or our allies. The US does not possess, and will not use, biological or toxin weapons under any circumstances.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-2207-50

BY CDP NARA DATE 11/6/85Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs

Soviet military doctrine includes the use of chemical weapons and acknowledges their value, particularly when used in massive quantities and in surprise attacks.

Of more significance, the Soviet Union and its allies are well prepared to wage chemical warfare and to fight in a chemically contaminated environment. The USSR possesses a wide variety of lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and the means to deliver them. They have a busy and expanding chemical proving ground and a large, well trained chemical organization, with over 60,000 troops, whose status within the Soviet military hierarchy was enhanced during the 1970s. They have invested heavily in individual and collective protection and decontamination equipment, and they train with actual chemical agents.

In addition to extensive Soviet chemical warfare programs, the major biological warfare accident in Sverdlovsk and evidence in Southeast and Southwest Asia indicate that the Soviet Union's arsenal also includes toxic substances specifically prohibited by the international Biological Warfare convention.

US Programs and Arms Control Efforts in the 1970s

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States in 1969 stopped the production of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and the filling of new munitions with chemical agents. At the same time, the US renounced the use of biological and toxin weapons, destroyed all stocks and converted its biological warfare facilities to peaceful purposes. During the 1970s, the US did not maintain a credible retaliatory CW stockpile, did little to improve defense against chemicals and neglected relevant defense doctrine and training.

While unilaterally restraining our capabilities, the US made major efforts to eliminate the chemical warfare threat by attempting to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. However, these efforts stalemated due to the Soviet intransigence on the issue of the on-site inspections required to verify such a ban. Negotiations were further complicated by our weakness in this area compared to the Soviets, who possessed a decisive military advantage and had little arms control incentive in the face of the large asymmetry in chemical warfare capabilities. The Soviets did, however, have an interest in negotiations as long as it impeded improvement of US deterrent capabilities.

US Objectives and Requirements

It is the objective of the US chemical warfare programs to improve defensive and deterrent capabilities against CW attack, to increase the safety of the systems involved, and to provide incentive and gain leverage in arms control negotiations.

Recent US Government reviews and program requests include the following:

- In 1980, both the Defense Science Board and a Senior Interagency Review Group found serious deficiencies in the US CW posture and recommended an improvement program consisting of both protective and deterrent retaliatory elements.
- In 1980 the Carter Administration requested \$259 million for such improvement efforts in the FY 1981 budget.
- In 1981 the new Administration's FY 1981 Defense Supplemental request included \$20 million to purchase and install the equipment required to complete the binary production facility authorized and appropriated by the previous Congress.
- The FY 1982 Budget request included \$455 million for chemical warfare programs, primarily defensive equipment, but no funds for the production of weapons.
- The Administration's FY 1983 budget request, scheduled for submission on February 8, 1982, includes \$32 million for procurement of production items used to produce binary chemical munitions: the 155mm Binary Artillery Projectile, and the BIGEYE Aerial chemical bomb. The FY 1983 program also includes a request for \$641 million for chemical defense improvements, operation and maintenance, construction and equipment.

- In accordance with statutory requirements (Section 1519, Title 50, US Code), Presidential certification and a separate report will be provided to the Congress stating that production of lethal binary chemical munitions is essential to the national interest.

Impact of New Programs

Implementation of the requested program will

- Develop and acquire sufficient equipment and materiel to improve the ability of US forces to survive chemical attacks;
- Restore a strong technology base and Research & Development program for protection against CW and BW.
- Assure sufficiency and safety of weapons required for deterrence and sustained operations. The current stockpile (which will ultimately be destroyed) is stored in bulk containers which could only be used if filled into new munitions; much of the remainder is in ammunition for weapons that have been phased out of service because they were obsolete, and virtually none is available for use against the rear echelons of attacking forces.
- Improve doctrine and training programs to support operations in a chemically contaminated environment.
- Provide a credible retaliatory capability with which to deter chemical attacks by forcing the potential initiator of such attacks to consider the possibility of retaliatory CW strikes against his own forces.
- Through the above, provide incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate toward a complete and verifiable ban on production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons.

The defensive element of the program will improve the quality and quantity of all aspects of chemical defense: training, individual and collective protection, detection and warning, decontamination and medical. The objective for the retaliatory element of the program is to maintain the safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that provides the ability to deny a significant military advantage to any initiator of chemical warfare. We need not, and will not, plan to match the Soviets in agent/munition quantities and types. The considerable safety, surety, and logistical advantages that binary weapons offer during the entire life cycle from manufacturing through storage and transportation, to eventual disposal, make binaries the logical choice over unitary munitions for stockpile modernization.

Alliance Issues

Our NATO Allies have been informed of our intent to improve US defensive and deterrent retaliatory capability. This US decision to modernize our chemical capabilities involves production only. No decisions or recommendations have been made regarding deployment of chemical weapons to any overseas area. Should it ever be determined that overseas deployment is desirable, there will be full consultation with the nations involved.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of US policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Our program supports this goal by improving our military posture sufficiently so that the Soviets will perceive they have nothing to gain from chemical or biological warfare.

It is worth noting that since the end of World War I, all use of toxic chemical weapons has been against unprotected military forces and civilians who could not protect themselves and who had no ability to retaliate. Even in the intense European conflict of World War II following D-Day, Hitler did not use his chemical arsenal, for he believed the Allies stood ready to retaliate.

The thrust of all our efforts in this area is to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons, and to give incentive to the Soviet Union to join us in our objective of seeking a complete and verifiable ban on the production, stockpiling and use of such weapons.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (PROGRAM OBJECTIVE)

170816

Q: What is the objective of the US chemical warfare program?

A: The immediate objective of the chemical warfare program is to deter enemy first-use of chemical weapons against US and allied forces and to terminate such use (on terms favorable to the US) at the lowest possible level should deterrence fail. Our ultimate goal is a complete, verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and our improvement program is consistent with this goal and is viewed as the only way to convince the Soviets that they have nothing to gain from chemical use.

DECLASSIFIED**NLRR 748-22-1769****BY GDB NARA DATE 11/6/15**

CHEMICAL WARFARE (MORALITY)

Q: Why do you want to produce these immoral weapons?

A: We do not want to produce chemical weapons; we have no other choice to deter their use and to provide arms control incentives. Our attempts to reduce the threat of chemical warfare by other means have been unsuccessful.

The US has not produced lethal or incapacitating chemical agents or filled new munitions since 1969, but this restraint was not matched by the Soviets, who have greatly increased their chemical capabilities since that time. We totally renounced the use of biological and toxin weapons, destroyed all stocks, and converted what facilities we had to peaceful purposes.

We engaged in bilateral discussions with the Soviets from 1977-1980 in an attempt to achieve a complete, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. These talks were unsuccessful due to fundamental disagreement on the tough issue of verification and Soviet intransigence on on-site inspections.

We are now in a position wherein the Soviets could gain a decisive military advantage from chemical use, and wherein our own weakness serves as an incentive for them to use it in any future war and as a disincentive for meaningful arms control efforts.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (THREAT)

Q: By producing these improved weapons, aren't you making chemical warfare more likely?

A: It is worth noting that since the end of World War I, all use of toxic chemical weapons has been against unprotected military forces and civilians who could not protect themselves and who had no ability to retaliate. Even in the intense European conflict of World War II following D-Day, Hitler did not use his chemical arsenal. He believed the Allies stood ready to retaliate. The thrust of all our efforts in this area is to similarly dissuade any future enemy from using any chemical weapons.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (DEFENSE ONLY)

Q: Why can't you just improve chemical defenses?

A: Reliance on chemical defenses alone would not deter chemical use; in fact, it would still provide the Soviets a major incentive to use chemicals. Furthermore, imagine, if you will, two armies fighting a war, with the soldiers on one side free to fight in their normal uniforms and equipment, with the soldiers on the other side required to wear vision and air restricting masks, heavy rubber gloves, bulky suits, and oversize boots. It is obvious that the side fighting in their normal uniforms enjoys a tremendous advantage, and this is exactly the situation we and our allies face today.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (SAFETY)

Q: Why are binary munitions considered to be so safe?

A: The binary munitions, as being developed by the US, contain two relatively nontoxic substances which must be mixed to form the standard nerve agents. This provides considerable safety, surety, and logistical advantages during the entire life cycle, from manufacturing through storage and transportation, to eventual disposal.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (CIVILIAN CASUALTIES)

Q: Isn't it true that chemical weapons will kill more civilians than soldiers?

A: If used indiscriminately, chemical weapons have the potential to kill large numbers of unprotected civilians. For this reason, US chemical doctrine emphasizes great care in their use. However, we have no evidence to indicate either that the Soviets share our concerns or would be constrained by the possibility of massive civilian casualties resulting from chemical use. In fact, judging from evidence of use by Soviet, or Soviet trained and sponsored, forces in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Southeast Asia, civilians have often been specific chemical targets.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (ARMS RACE)

Q: Is this the start of a major chemical arms race?

A: No; it should not be. Our chemical munitions stockpile requirements are based on the Theater Commanders' assessments of their needs. In making their determination, they considered the number of targets suitable for attack with chemical weapons, agent and weapon effectiveness, the expected duration of conflict, and the delivery systems at their disposal. We have no need, or intention, to attempt to match the Soviets on a round-for-round basis or to match them in types of chemical weapons.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (CURRENT STOCKPILE ADEQUACY)

Q: You have a huge arsenal of chemical weapons. Why do you want even more?

A: Our program will result in a stockpile containing fewer chemical agents and weapons than we now have. However, the new stockpile will have a high deterrent and military utility as opposed to the current stockpile--the preponderance of which is unusable. Two-thirds of the present stockpile (the entire stockpile will ultimately be destroyed) is stored in bulk containers and could only be used if filled into new munitions. Much of the remainder is in ammunition for weapons that have been phased out of service because they were obsolete.

(301)

CHEMICAL WARFARE (NUCLEAR DETERRENCE)

Q: Why can't we rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet chemical use?

A: In the days when we enjoyed nuclear superiority, such a strategy might have been possible; however, we no longer have nuclear superiority, and, in some systems, we do not even have nuclear parity. This leaves us in a position where we might be leaving control of nuclear escalation in the hands of the Soviets. Furthermore, barriers to nuclear weapons use and the nuclear threshold should be kept as high as possible; not artificially lowered to counter threats which can be handled in other ways.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (NATO VIEWS)

Q: What are the views of our NATO allies on improved chemical warfare capabilities?

A: NATO recognizes and is concerned about the chemical threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the NATO Long Term Defense Plan requires major improvements in chemical defenses. Implementation of the plan varies among the nations--primarily due to differences in available funding. Regarding chemical weapons, the NATO policy is to rely primarily on conventional and nuclear systems to deter chemical use, but to maintain the capability to retaliate with chemical weapons to enemy first-use.

CHEMICAL WARFARE (ALLIED NOTIFICATION)

Q: Have our allies been notified and what are their views on the decision?

A: Yes, the allies have been informed that we are taking steps to maintain and improve our retaliatory capability. However, this is viewed as a US decision to meet our worldwide needs. Of course, we will consult with the nations involved prior to making any future decision on forward deployment, should it be determined that such deployment is needed.



January 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM:

Gilbert A. Robinson *gar*
Deputy Director

The attached package of materials has not gone to anyone, but it will be distributed to all recipients of the memorandum either prior to the meeting or at the meeting, depending on the way you would like to proceed.

Also, do you think these are the proper persons to attend the meeting?

Please let me know.

Attachment

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATTACHMENTS

11/6/85 6:00

January 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

Gilbert A. Robinson
Deputy Director *gar*

Attached are a statement and suggested scenario for handling the binary announcement. It is compiled from the original work of the Department of Defense and the State Department.

We believe it is essential that this announcement be well coordinated and that the government speak with one voice on this issue which could have adverse public reaction, both at home and abroad, if handled piecemeal.

Attachment (Limited Official Use)

Distribution

The Honorable
William P. Clark

The Honorable
David R. Gergen

The Honorable
William Casey

The Honorable
Eugene V. Rostow

The Honorable
Fred Ikle

The Honorable
Dean Fischer

The Honorable
Richard R. Burt

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NLRR 748-22-17-3-2

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170817

Y KDB NARA DATE 4/6/85

Statement on the U.S. Response to the Buildup by
the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons

Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Munitions

As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably necessary to undertake preparation in the coming year for production two years hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLACE -- NOT SUPPLEMENT -- older types that are less safe to store and handle. These are not new and they are not biological. They are a retaliatory deterrent. The United States has already renounced first use of such munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment could only occur after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such consultations have not occurred.

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-2-

Background: The Growth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities

For the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special decontamination vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical weapons. Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war. The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect any country.

U.S. Restraint

The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in 1969 renounced the first use of chemical and biological weapons and toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare.

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-3-

President Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. The United States closed research and production facilities, reducing its research and development to a strict study of how to defend against attack by an adversary.

Soviet Use of Mycotoxins

The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins -- commonly known as "Yellow Rain" -- against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The testimony of those who have suffered, the chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces, amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See attached Department of State report.)

U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons

Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a comprehensive, verifiable

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agreement to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. The talks were suspended in 1980 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate verification of both parties' compliance.

The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable and provides for adequate verification.

We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations.

Attachment

Scenario

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Public Announcement of U.S. Response to the Soviet Buildup
of Chemical Weapons

Assuming that the FY 1983 budget request, including items for chemical munitions, will be sent to the Congress in early February and thus be a matter of public record, the following scenario for public affairs treatment is proposed. The scenario calls for a coordinated series of U.S. public affairs initiatives in Washington and overseas that seek to direct public attention overseas to the actions of the Soviet Union.

- 1) Any additional evidence or reports on the Soviet use of mycotoxins should be made available to the press prior to the submission of the budget to the Congress. However, the USG should not attempt artificially to generate attention to mycotoxins because it would be reported as a transparent effort to distract world attention from our impending decision on chemical weapons. Reports or statements from Congressional leaders, other private American sources, particularly scientists and leaders and experts from other countries, would be useful.
- 2) Shortly before release of the budget, a number of senior U.S. officials should have deep background briefings on an exclusive basis with a few leading columnists or editors, explaining the forthcoming decision with emphasis on our intent to use binaries as a deterrent and an incentive to the Soviets to attain a verifiable agreement.

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- 3) The State Department Spokesman at the noon briefing on the day of release of the budget should make a brief, forceful statement on U.S. plans regarding chemical weapons (draft attached). He should of course be prepared for questions with a briefing paper drawing on the cables already prepared by State and DoD and talking points consolidated by USICA (drafts attached).
- 4) At the same time White House, NSC, DoD and State Department senior officials and briefers should brief the press corps including meetings at the Foreign Press Center and followup exclusives for leading foreign press. U.S. officials should have in hand the briefing papers that focus on Soviet buildups and actions, U.S. interest in negotiations and the deterrence intent of our weapons.
- 5) The Department should instruct Ambassadors in key countries to seek statements from foreign leaders that fix the onus for the buildup of chemical weapons on the USSR and support a US call for renewed negotiations. Similar statements from other public figures should also be sought.
- 6) A Presidential statement should be prepared either for delivery by the President personally before the press corps or as part of a press conference, in which the President:

-- Regrets the need for US preparations;

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- 3 -

- Places the responsibility for our decision on Soviet actions;
- Calls strongly for resumed negotiations;
- Emphasizes that we have consciously built in time for negotiation before being forced to proceed to production;
- Asks the Soviets to account to the world for their stocks and military preparation;
- Seeks support from the international community for a treaty that is verifiable;
- Stresses the deterrent and retaliatory nature of US weapons.

7) Coincident with the actions directly related to the U.S. decision, the USICA Wireless File or USINFO and Voice of America should carry stories on previous U.S. actions and agreements attempting to ban and eliminate biological and chemical weapons, and more general accounts of major U.S. arms reduction and peace initiatives, as well as analyses of Soviet chemical warfare strategy.

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- 4 -

8) It will be valuable for the Voice of America and the File to cross-play to the field texts or summaries of any supportive media reaction and public statements from abroad and from the U.S.

9) At every opportunity senior U.S. officials should voice their commitment to search for ways to make progress in arms reduction and guarantee world peace and security.

Drafted by: PGM/G:MDSchneider:hg 1/20/82

Clearances: PGM/G:JThurber
PGM:GDMalone
C:JShirley
DD: Mr. Robinson

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APPROVED BY PM: RBURT
OSD/AE: HGEINSEL
OSD/ISP: MR. McDONALD
OSD/RE: MR. DASHIELL
OSD/PA: LT. COL. DELORME
ICA: GROBINSON (INFO)
ACDA: R. MIKULAK (INFO)
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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: DOD PRESS GUIDANCE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
MODERNIZATION

REF: STATE 011311

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED BY DOD REGARDING
NYT ARTICLE ON CHEMICAL WEAPON MODERNIZATION THAT APPEARED
ON JANUARY 15, 1982. (NYT ARTICLE BEING SENT SEPTCL).

- THE US OFFICIALLY RENOUNCED THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS IN 1969 AND SINCE THEN HAS DESTROYED ALL STOCKS
OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO PLANS TO
INITIATE PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE ARE
ALSO NO PLANS TO BEGIN PRODUCTION OF A NEW TYPE OF CHEMICAL
NERVE AGENT. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO CONGRESS
AND THE PUBLIC, WE ARE DEVELOPING BINARY MUNITIONS ONLY
FOR RETALIATION TO ANY ENEMY USE OF CW.
FYI: THE BINARY MUNITIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE WILL CONTAIN
NERVE AGENT SIMILAR TO EXISTING NERVE AGENTS, AND THUS
NE TYPES OF NERVE AGENTS WILL NOT BE PROD'CED. END FYI.

2. THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM WAS PROVIDED TO DOD PUBLIC
AFFAIRS TO ASSIST IN RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES ON THE NYT
ARTICLE, AND TO CORRECT INACCURACIES IN THAT ARTICLE.
- THE TOTAL BUDGET FIGURES QUOTED IN THE NYT ARTICLE
FOR THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM ARE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT,
HOWEVER, THE ONLY MONIES EXPENDED FOR RETALIATORY
WEAPONS (OTHER THAN THE \$20M FOR EQUIPMENT AND \$ 3M
FOR PLANT RENOVATION) HAS BEEN FOR RDT&E.
BASICALLY 94-97 PERCENT OF ALL F'NDS EXPENDED FROM
1978 TO 1982 HAVE BEEN FOR DEFENSIVE ITEMS; MASKS,
COLLECTIVE PROTECTION DETECTORS, ALARMS, TRAINING,

AND DEMILITARIZATION OF EXISTING STOCKS.
THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM HAS BEEN: (\$M)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
TOTAL	111	123	157	259	455

	7	6	6	7	29
RDT&E RETALIATORY	7	6	6	7	29
RETALIATORY PERCENT	6	5	4	3	6

- THE ARTICLE IS BASICALLY CORRECT IN THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION WILL BE RECOMMENDING AND EMPHASIZING
MODERNIZATION OF BOTH ITS DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE
CAPABILITIES.

- THE PROGRAM WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE
FUNDING FOR:

- - RDT&E OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT AND
DRUGS FOR ANTIDOTES OR PRETREATMENTS.

- - RDT&E OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR
RETALIATION TO ENEMY USE OF CW.

- - PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT
AND SUPPLIES.

B PRIOR YEAR PROGRAM COSTS (\$M)

	81	82
RDT&E, DEFENSIVE	81	173
RDT&E, RETALIATORY	7	29
PROCUREMENT, DEFENSIVE	72	174
PROCUREMENT, RETALIATORY	20	0
O&M	79	79
TOTAL	259	455

NOTE: THE ,982 REQUEST HAD NO F'NDS FOR PROCREMENT
OF RETALIATORY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS.
THIS PROGRAM IS NEEDED TO REDRESS THE EFFECTS OF YEARS
OF NEGLECT WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE EXPANDING THEIR CAPA-
BILITIES. THE SOVIETS ARE THE BEST-EQUIPPED NATION IN
THE WORLD TO WAGE CHEMICAL WAR.

- WE RECOGNIZE THAT DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING
ALONE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE
USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE. CW WILL BE AN ATTRACTIVE OP-
TION TO THE SOVIETS AS LONG AS THEY CAN USE IT WITHOUT
FEAR OF RETALIATION.

- IN ADDITION WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT WITHOUT A CREDI-
BLE US OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY, THE SOVIETS CAN ACHIEVE A
MAJOR QUOTE FORCE MULTIPLIER UNQUOTE EFFECT OVER PRO-
TECTED US AND ALLIED PERSONNEL BY FORCING ALLIED FORCES
TO OPERATE ENCUMBERED BY PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WHILE THE
SOVIETS CAN OPERATE UNENCUMBERED. (THIS IS PARTICULARLY
SIGNIFICANT FOR DEEP TARGETS SUCH AS AIRBASES, DEPOTS,
PORTS, AND STAGING AREAS.)

- BOTH THE US AND SU ARE PARTIES TO THE GENEVA PRO-
TOCOL. WE HAD BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 1977 AND
1980 TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT WITH
THE SOVIET UNION TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, MAJOR
DIFFERENCES EXIST IN THE AREA OF VERIFICATION. GIVEN
SOVIET RESISTANCE TO EFFICACIOUS VERIFICATION MEASURES,
THE US HAS BEEN FACED WITH NO PRUDENT ALTERNATIVE BUT
TO DEVELOP LONG RANGE PLANS TO REDUCE THE ASYMMETRY OF
CAPABILITY THAT NOW EXISTS.

- THE NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE PROVIDES ESSENTIALLY
CORRECT FIGURES. HOWEVER, THESE FIGURES ARE VERY MIS-
LEADING SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE EXPENDITURES AND THE

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PLANNED PROGRAM IS LARGELY DEVOTED TO DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS. FOR EXAMPLE 95 PER CENT OF FUNDS FOR FY 79 (\$123M) ARE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF FORCES. IN FY 80, RETALIATORY PROGRAMS WERE 4 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET, WHICH INCREASES TO ABOUT

10 PERCENT IN 83 AND TO 19 PERCENT RETALIATORY PLANNED FOR FY 84.

THIS PROGRAM REPRESENTS A WELL PLANNED EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE DOD TO MEET WHAT WE PERCEIVE AS A SERIOUS NATIONAL SECURITY DEFICIENCY. ONE ERROR IN THE ARTICLE WHICH SHOULD BE CORRECTED IS THE STATEMENT THAT THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (DSB) RECOMMENDED STORAGE IN BRITAIN. THE DSB SUPPORTED MODERNIZATION OF THE CW STOCKPILE; HOWEVER, IT DID NOT REPEAT NOT RECOMMEND STORAGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE UK.

2/2

THE PLAN FOR APPROVAL OF ANY PRODUCTION NOTED IN THE ARTICLE IS WELL KNOWN AND CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BY PUBLIC LAW. MODERNIZATION OF THE US C STOCKPILE HAS BEEN STRONGLY RECOMMENDED BY ALL WHO HAVE STUDIED THE MATTER. MODERNIZATION OF OUR CW STOCKPILE DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN OUR STRATEGY -- BUT IS NEEDED TO REPLACE OBSOLETE WEAPONS. WHICH HAVE BEEN A PART OF OUR DETERRENCE. A PRODUCTION DECISION IS INDEPENDENT OF ANY DEPLOYMENT ISSUE.

3. FOLLOWING IS PRESS GUIDANCE PROVIDED DOD PRESS SPOKESMAN IN RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE BY WALTER PINCUS ON JANUARY 16, 1982.

- QUESTION - WILL GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES BE EQUIPPED WITH A CHEMICAL WARHEAD?

ANSWER - THE U.S. HAS CURRENT PLANS FOR PRODUCING ONLY THE 155MM BINARY ARTILLERY PROJECTILE AND THE BIGEYE AERIAL CHEMICAL BOMB. WE ARE EVALUATING A WIDE VARIETY OF POTENTIAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS MODERNIZATION OPTIONS TO INCLUDE MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS AND CRUISE MISSILES. THESE HAVE NOT PROGRESSED BEYOND FEASIBILITY STUDIES.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROPOSED CHEMICAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE GLCM DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE. THE GLCM'S UNDER DISCUSSION HAVE NO CHEMICAL CAPABILITY NOR IS ONE PLANNED.

4. POSTS MAY DRAW UPON ABOVE AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED REFTEL IN RESPONDING TO PRESS INQUIRIES.

5. POSTS SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT A CORRECTED COPY OF REFTEL WAS TRANSMITTED ON JANUARY 17, 1982. ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION DROPPED FIRST TWO LETTERS FROM WORD QUOTE UNWILLINGNESS UNQUOTE IN THIRD ANSWER OF PARA 4. CORRECT TEXT SHOULD READ QUOTE -- AND SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE A VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- UNQUOTE. POSTS SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT PARA 4 OF REFTEL (Q'S AND A'S) IS UNCLASSIFIED. HAIG

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DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/6/85 CCB

RECEIVED 30 JAN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM RUSSELL

DOCDATE 29 JAN 82

KRAEMER

29 JAN 82

RUSSELL

31 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: CBW

MEDIA

Q+A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR BINARY ISSUE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 03 FEB 82 STATUS C FILES PA

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UNCLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
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FROM RUSSELL

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31 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: CBW

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Q+A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR BINARY ISSUE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

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National Security Council
The White House

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>9/</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch

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COMMENTS

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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1982

Dan Murphy,

I understand the Vice President
has agreed to call Billy Graham
about his attendance at Moscow
"Peace Conference."

Attached is a paper with talking
points from Walter Stoessel and
a staff background paper.



John M. Poindexter

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NLRR 748-22-17-7-8

170818

BY 167B NARA DATE 11/6/85

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Secretary
SUBJECT: Presidential Intervention to Prevent
Dr. Billy Graham from Attending Moscow
"Peace Conference"

Dr. Graham has recently accepted a verbal invitation to participate in a Soviet-sponsored "world peace conference" in Moscow. We believe that only a telephone call from you may deter Dr. Graham from attending.

The "peace conference," to be hosted by the Soviet-dominated Russian Orthodox Church, is scheduled for May 1982. It will be designed to serve as a Soviet propaganda tool that portrays the U.S. as belligerent and the Soviets as "champions of peace."

Most Western religious leaders plan to attend only at a low level, if at all. Unfortunately, despite our warnings of the risks involved, Graham's advisors have gone ahead with arrangements for his personal attendance at Moscow. The Graham organization seeks Soviet agreement for an evangelistic tour of the U.S.S.R., and they hope to achieve this by agreeing to Graham's presence at the "peace conference." The Soviets have tentatively agreed to let Dr. Graham preach in two churches while he is in Moscow.

We have conveyed our serious concerns about this Soviet-sponsored exercise to top Graham advisors, and Dr. Graham has personally discussed his plans with the Vice President. But Dr. Graham still plans to attend the Moscow affair. We believe that only a phone call from you may finally dissuade Dr. Graham from going to Moscow. Attached are suggested talking points.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment:
As Stated.

GDS 2/8/88

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR BILLY GRAHAM

-- I AM CALLING YOU TO REGISTER MY DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT REPORTS THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE PART IN A SOVIET-SPONSORED "PEACE CONFERENCE" WHICH WILL BE HELD THIS MAY IN MOSCOW.

-- I AM CONVINCED THAT THAT THE PROPOSED "PEACE CONFERENCE" IS A SHAM, AND IS PURELY A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THE SINCERE DESIRE FOR PEACE HELD BY SO MANY AROUND THE WORLD.

-- YOUR PARTICIPATION WOULD BE A MAJOR COUP FOR THE SOVIETS:

- ① IT WOULD GIVE THE CONFERENCE A RELIGIOUS CREDIBILITY THAT IT OTHERWISE TOTALLY LACKS;
- ② IT WOULD GUARANTEE WIDE MEDIA ATTENTION;
- ③ AND IT COULD ENCOURAGE A HIGHER, MORE PRESTIGIOUS ATTENDANCE BY OTHER CLERGY AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS.

-- THE SOVIET UNION HAS, THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, STOOD FOR MILITANT ATHEISM AND THE REPRESSION OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS. NOW THE SOVIETS ARE CONSPIRING IN THE BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF THE CHRISTIAN PEOPLE OF POLAND.

-- THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE NO COMPUSSION ABOUT EXPLOITING YOUR GOOD NAME, OR DISTORTING ANY STATEMENTS YOU MIGHT MAKE AT THE CONFERENCE, OR AT THE MOSCOW CHURCHES WHERE I UNDERSTAND YOU WILL BE PERMITTED TO PREACH.

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-- I HOPE THAT, AFTER FURTHER CONSIDERATION, YOU WILL
DECIDE NOT TO PERMIT YOUR GOOD NAME TO BE USED BY THE SOVIETS
FOR THEIR PURPOSES, AND THAT YOU WILL ULTIMATELY DECIDE NOT TO
ATTEND THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT YOU WOULD
BE DOING YOUR COUNTRY, AND THE OPPRESSED CHRISTIANS OF THE
SOVIET UNION, A GREAT SERVICE BY NOT COOPERATING WITH SOVIET
AUTHORITIES IN THIS MATTER.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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February 10, 1982

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NLRR 748-22-1787

INFORMATION

BY KDB DATE 11/6/15

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Billy Graham and the Moscow "World Peace Conference"

Embassy Moscow's report (Tab A) on the May 1982 Moscow "World Conference" of religious workers notes that the organizer, Metropolitan Filaret, is using Billy Graham's attendance to gain support for the conference. The conference is designed to advance Soviet foreign policy objectives by promoting Western peace movements, condemning new weapons such as the "neutron bomb," and criticizing U.S. positions on arms control and defense.

On the same day Filaret received Billy Graham's acceptance, he used it to try to convince another reluctant invitee to attend. It can be assumed that he will use this ploy on other Western religious leaders. When Billy's representatives met with Bud Nance on February (see Tab B), they said Billy would alert other Western church leaders to be careful of being entrapped by some Soviet propaganda campaign. Since the conference will be rigged from the beginning -- the final communique is already in draft -- any religious leaders attending will perforce be entrapped by a Soviet propaganda campaign. Billy has been had already.

cc: Richard Pipes
Carnes Lord

Attachments

Tab A Moscow's report
B Memo of 2/4/82

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Review 2/10/88

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 2/09/02 (MCCALL, SHERROD B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PROP, SCUL, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET "WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE" SHIFTS
INTO HIGH GEAR

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 1500 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS,
(B) ROME 0024 (NOTAL), (C) STATE 17037 (NOTAL),
(D) 81 MOSCOW 16883, (E) ROME 3206 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: PREPARATIONS FOR THE MOSCOW "WORLD

PEACE CONFERENCE" IN MAY ARE MOVING INTO HIGH GEAR, INDICATING THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN MOSCOW'S "PEACE OFFENSIVE" DESIGNED TO DISTORT AND FRUSTRATE U.S. DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES. ON THE SAME DAY THAT METROPOLITAN FILARET RECEIVED BILLY GRAHAM'S ACCEPTANCE, HE USED THE FACT OF GRAHAM'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TO TRY TO CONVINCE ANOTHER RELUCTANT INVITEE TO ATTEND. FILARET THEN DEPARTED FOR THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE TO SEEK HIGH-LEVEL ROMAN CATHOLIC ATTENDANCE. WE HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT SOME STATE LEADERS, SUCH AS INDIRA GANDHI, WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND. THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE FOR THE CONFERENCE IS REPORTEDLY ALREADY IN DRAFT; IT (1) ENCOURAGES WESTERN PEACE MOVEMENTS, (2) CONDEMNS NEW WEAPONS SUCH AS THE NEUTRON BOMB, (3) URGES PROGRESS IN INF AND THE BEGINNING OF START, AND (4) CALLS FOR FOREIGN AID INSTEAD OF ARMS. THIS ALL TRACKS CLOSELY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND SPEECHES OF THE PREPARATORY SESSION HELD IN MOSCOW IN LATE JANUARY WHICH WERE DIRECTED SOLELY AT CRITICIZING THE UNITED STATES BY NAME OR IMPLICATION. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE ADOPTED AT THE PREPARATORY SESSION WILL GUARANTEE THE EXCLUSION OF MOST WESTERN PRESS AND WILL PREVENT ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. THE ORGANIZERS ARE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER THE CONFERENCE SHOULD MAKE SOME KIND OF AWARD TO BREZHNEV FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE. ACTION SUGGESTED: THAT RECIPIENT POSTS MAKE THE OBVIOUS PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES OF THIS CONFERENCE CLEAR TO POTENTIAL ATTENDEES IN THEIR COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

3. PREPARATIONS FOR THE "WORLD CONFERENCE: RELIGIOUS WORKERS FOR SAVING THE SACRED GIFT OF LIFE FROM NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE" TO BE HELD IN MOSCOW IN MAY ARE MOVING AHEAD BRISKLY. A PRE-

PARATORY SESSION WAS HELD IN MOSCOW JANUARY 26-28 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF METROPOLITAN FILARET, FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPUTY AND HEIR APPARENT TO PATRIARCH PIMEN. THIS SESSION DETERMINED THE AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE AND ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE (DISCUSSED BELOW). FILARET IS NOW BUSILY SEEKING AS WIDE ATTENDANCE AS POSSIBLE AT THE CONFERENCE BY WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURES. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT OVER FOUR HUNDRED INVITATIONS HAVE GONE OUT FOR THE CONFERENCE: HOWEVER, THE BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 01603

ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE
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SEVENTY ATTENDEES AT THE PREPARATORY SESSION WERE
HEAVILY DOMINATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SOVIET
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND RELIGIOUS FIGURES
FROM COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH OR FRIENDLY TO THE
SOVIET UNION. OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN MAY WILL FIND
THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE CONFERENCE (AND
INDEED, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE) PRESENTED TO THEM AS
A FAIT ACCOMPLI, AS IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM A
RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH HIERARCHY WHICH IS SQUARELY
UNDER THE THUMB OF THE SOVIET REGIME AND ADEPT AT
USING TYPICAL REGIME TACTICS. EVEN THE SCHEDULING
OF THE CONFERENCE IS LOADED TO SERVE SOVIET PURPOSES:
THE SESSIONS WILL TAKE PLACE MAY 10-14. HOWEVER,
THE PARTICIPANTS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN A
SERIES OF RELIGIOUS SERVICES AND OTHER FESTIVITIES

ON SUNDAY, MAY 9, WHICH JUST HAPPENS TO BE SOVIET
VICTORY DAY.

4. THE MOST IMPORTANT WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURE
TO ACCEPT FILARET'S INVITATION SO FAR IS BILLY
GRAHAM (REPORTED REF A). LITERALLY WITHIN
MINUTES OF LEARNING OF GRAHAM'S ACCEPTANCE FROM
A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GRAHAM ORGANIZATION,
FILARET ATTEMPTED TO USE THE FACT OF GRAHAM'S
ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TO PERSUADE ARCHI-
MANDRITE NIPHON SIKALI TO CONVINCE HIS OWN
PATRIARCH, IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH, TO COME TO THE
CONFERENCE. IGNATIUS HAS BEEN UNDER INCREASING
SOVIET/RUSSIAN PATRIARCHATE PRESSURE TO ATTEND;
THE REFERENCE TO BILLY GRAHAM IS NOT THE FIRST
NOR THE LAST PLOY WHICH FILARET WILL USE TO GET
HIM TO COME. HOWEVER, NIPHON (PROTECT) HAS
TOLD ACTING DCM THAT HE REMAINS OPPOSED TO
PARTICIPATION BY HIS PATRIARCH AND DURING HIS
CURRENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE
AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF FILARET'S INVITATION. WE
ANTICIPATE THAT FILARET WILL USE GRAHAM'S NAME
AND STATURE IN ALL HIS FUTURE DISCUSSIONS AND
CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER WESTERN RELIGIOUS GROUPS
TO ENTICE THEM TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AS WELL.

5. FILARET HAS DEPARTED FOR A TRIP TO THE
NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE WHERE WE BELIEVE HE WILL
BE SEEKING HIGH-LEVEL ATTENDANCE BY ROMAN
CATHOLIC FIGURES. THE INTENTION OF THE VATICAN
TO SEND ONLY A GROUP OF LOW-LEVEL OBSERVERS TO
THE CONFERENCE IS CLEARLY UNSATISFACTORY TO
FILARET. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HE WILL BE
APPROACHING CARDINAL BRAND OF THE NETHERLANDS
AS A LIKELY ATTENDEE. WE BELIEVE THAT FILARET
HAS SELECTED THE TWO MOST INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCHES TO CULTIVATE DURING HIS
CURRENT TRIP AS THE MOST PROMISING AVENUES TO
PUT PRESSURE ON THE HOLY SEE TO UPGRADE ITS
DELEGATION. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THE
ORTHODOX PATRIARCHS OF POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
WILL NOT BE INVITED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ATTENDANCE OF
(AND PROMINENCE FOR) DELEGATIONS FROM THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCHES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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6. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT A NUMBER OF STATE LEADERS MAY BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. SPECIFIC NAMES MENTIONED ARE INDIRA GANDHI AND JULIUS NYERERE. THE SOVIETS/PATRIARCHATE ARE EVIDENTLY ALSO LOOKING FOR FIGURES OF BOTH RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR STATURE WHO MAY BE INVITED OR ASKED TO BE "HONORARY PATRONS" OF THE CONFERENCE. ATTENDANCE BY FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURES OF IMPORTANCE WOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES FOR THE SOVIETS. FIRST, IT WOULD LEND PRESTIGE TO THE EVENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND AMONG NEUTRALS. SECOND, IT WOULD THEN BE EASIER FOR THE HOST COUNTRY CHIEF OF STATE TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE PROCEEDINGS IN SOME WAY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT

THE ORGANIZERS OF THE CONFERENCE HAVE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SOME KIND OF AWARD TO BREZHNEV FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE. THIS COULD BE EITHER IN THE FORM OF A RESOLUTION BY THE CONFERENCE PRAISING SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES OR DECORATIONS GIVEN TO BREZHNEV BY VARIOUS CHURCH GROUPS. THE IDEA OF LEONID BREZHNEV BEING DECORATED WITH A RELIGIOUS ORDER MAY STRIKE SOME OBSERVERS AS PECULIAR (AND IN POOR TASTE), BUT IT WOULD NOT BE OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE HOOPLA WHICH RECENTLY SURROUNDED THE SOVIET LEADER'S 75TH BIRTHDAY. MORE IMPORTANT, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE ENTIRELY IN KEEPING WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH IS TO COVER SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES AND PROPAGANDA WITH THE GLOSS OF A BROADLY ECUMENICAL GATHERING OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES.

7. ACCORDING TO REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE IS ALREADY IN DRAFT AND HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CERTAIN SELECTED PARTICIPANTS OF THE STEERING GROUP. THE MAIN THEMES WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IT WILL CONTAIN TRACK CLOSELY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND COMMUNIQUE OF THE JANUARY PREPARATORY SESSION AND OF EARLIER SESSIONS HELD OCTOBER 1-2 AND DECEMBER 7-8, AS WELL AS WITH THE SPEECHES OF PIMEN AND FILARET TO THESE SESSIONS. THE MAIN POINTS WE EXPECT TO SEE IN THE CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE (WITH SAMPLE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY SESSIONS) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

-- (1) WEST EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED AS A MATTER OF RELIGIOUS DUTY. "PROFOUND SATISFACTION WAS ALSO EXPRESSED AT THE GROWING MASS MOVEMENT AGAINST THE CONTINUED ESCALATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION... AS IS KNOWN, BROAD RELIGIOUS CIRCLES HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THIS MOVEMENT, WHICH DESERVES APPROVAL AND EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT." "THE PARTICIPANTS NOTED WITH PROFOUND SATISFACTION THE GROWING STRENGTH OF MASS MOVEMENTS PROTESTING AGAINST THE ARMS RACE; LARGE CIRCLES OF RELIGIOUS PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN THE INITIATION AND PARTICIPATION

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ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE
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OF THESE MOVEMENTS." "NOWADAYS THE DEATH
CLOUDS ARE THICKENING AGAIN. THEY ARE THE
EFFECT OF THE OVER-ACCUMULATION OF SOPHISTI-
CATED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE WORLD,
OF THE CRIMINAL PROPAGANDA OF THE PERMISSI-
BILITY TO USE THE NUCLEAR MEANS OF WARFARE,
THE PERFIDIOUS FORGING OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS
WHICH ARE STIMULATED BY THE IMMORAL ALLEGATION
ABOUT THE 'SOVIET MILITARY THREAT'." "WE FULLY
SHARE MR. LEONID ILYICH BREZHNEV'S CALL THAT
THERE COULD BE NEITHER STRANGERS NOR INDIFFERENT
PERSONS IN THE CAUSE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
HUMAN RIGHT TO LIFE." "WE NOTE AT THE SAME
TIME WITH DEEP ANXIETY THE FACT THAT OTHER
LEADERS, INSTEAD OF PROMOTING PEACE AND

DETENTE, GUIDE THE WORLD CLOSER TO THE BRINK
BY ADOPTING A POLICY OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY
OVER OTHER NATIONS AND BY ADVOCATING DANGEROUS
NOTIONS LIKE THE WINNABILITY OF A 'LIMITED'
NUCLEAR WAR, OR THE INEVITABILITY OF A THIRD
WORLD WAR." "IN RESPONSE TO THE PEACEFUL
INITIATIVES OF OUR FATHERLAND FOR OVERCOMING
NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE THERE ARE PUT FORWARD PLANS
FOR A STILL MORE ACCELERATED ARMS RACE, AND
SHOULD THESE PLANS BE REALIZED, OUR PLANET
WOULD TURN INTO A STOREHOUSE OF MORTAL WEAPONS...
IN MANY COUNTRIES OF EUROPE NOW WE CAN WITNESS
IMPRESSIVE MASS MANIFESTATIONS FOR THE PRESERVA-
TION OF PEACE, FOR THE RESTORATION OF TRUST
AND FOR THE RETURN TO THE WAY OF DETENTE
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT IS NOT A MINOR
ROLE THAT WE, PEOPLE OF RELIGION, PLAY IN THIS
GENERAL MOVEMENT FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE WORLD
AND FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE SACRED GIFT OF
LIFE."

-- (2) CONDEMNATION OF "NEW WEAPONS" (E.G. NEUTRON
BOMB) AND DANGEROUS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE. "THE
DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MANUFACTURE OF
THE NEUTRON BOMB BRINGS US NEARER TO THE
THRESHOLD OF A NUCLEAR WAR." "WE DECISIVELY
RENDUNCE ANY STRATEGY BASED ON NUCLEAR WAR.
A 'LIMITED' NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT REMAIN LIMITED."
"POWERFUL POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCLES STAND
IN THE OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE AND...SEEK TO ACCELERATE THE GROWTH
OF ARMAMENTS AND IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO MAIN-
TAIN THE SO-CALLED 'BALANCE OF FEAR'... AND
IN CREATING THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY OPEN TO THE IDEA OF THE
PROBABILITY OR EVEN INEVITABILITY OF A NEW
WORLD WAR." "THE PROFOUND CONCERN OF THE
PARTICIPANTS EXTENDED NOT ONLY TO THE PERIL
OF WAR IN EUROPE, BUT TO THE WHOLE WORLD,
THREATENED BY AN ARMS RACE THE LIKE OF WHICH
WAS NEVER SEEN BEFORE, BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW TYPES OF WEAPONRY (LASER, OUTER SPACE,
ANTI-BALLISTIC), BY THE RISE OF SENSELESS

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ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE
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MILITARY DOCTRINES LIKE 'LIMITED NUCLEAR
WAR', WITH THEIR POTENTIAL TO CAUSE THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE WHOLE OF CIVILIZATION, BY
THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF QUALITA-
TIVELY NEW WEAPONS BY CERTAIN NATIONS AND THE
MILITARY ALLIANCES LED BY THEM. THIS DANGER
GROWS DAILY AS A RESULT OF THE POLICY OF THESE
NATIONS AND THEIR ALLIANCES -- A POLICY
DESIGNED TO STRAIN FURTHER THE TENSION BETWEEN
NATIONS AND TO IGNORE OR ESCAPE THE NEED TO
SEARCH FOR DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY WAYS TO
UNIVERSAL PEACE AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE
HUMAN RACE."

-- (3) THE NEED FOR PROGRESS AT THE GENEVA TALKS

AND FOR NEW STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, TAILORED TO
THE SOVIET POSITIONS ON BOTH. "THE SALT
PROCESS MUST BE RE-OPENED. AS CHRISTIANS,
WE PRAY THAT NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RESTRICTION
OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE MAY BE A
SUCCESS... WE COME OUT IN SUPPORT FOR
PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR-
FREE ZONES." THE BREZHNEV "PROPOSALS" IN
BONN ARE CITED AS THE LINE TO FOLLOW IN THE
GENEVA TALKS.

-- (4) MONEY SHOULD BE SPENT ON AID TO DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES RATHER THAN ON ARMS. "GIGANTIC
UNPRODUCTIVE EXPENDITURES ON ARMAMENTS ARE ONE
OF THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE FURTHER SPEEDING DOWN
OF THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS A
TENDENCY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EARLY EIGHTIES."
"UNIVERSAL PEACE, IN ORDER TO BE STABLE, HAD
TO BE BASED ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER."

8. THE PREPARATORY SESSIONS HAVE ARRANGED THE MAY
CONFERENCE TO BE ALMOST FOOLPROOF FOR THE ACHIEVE-
MENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND PROPAGANDA AIMS.
THE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED AGENDA CAREFULLY FILLS ALL
THE TIME OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND CHANNELS DIS-
CUSSIONS INTO THREE CATEGORIES: "CATASTROPHIC CON-
SEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR WAR," "NEW
DOCTRINES OF NUCLEAR WAR," AND "URGENT TASKS OF
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT." EACH PLENARY SESSION WILL
BE CHAIRED BY A MEMBER OF THE STEERING GROUP WITH
A PREPARED LIST OF SUB-TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION.
TOTAL ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE IS LIMITED TO
350 PERSONS IN FIVE CATEGORIES (HONORARY PATRONS,
DELEGATES, OBSERVERS, EXPERTS AND GUESTS) BUT WITH
A LOOPHOLE FOR AN INCREASE OF TEN PERCENT IN

INVITATIONS. THESE CATEGORIES ARE EVIDENTLY
DESIGNED TO CONTROL THE NUMBER OF VOTING FULL
DELEGATES IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT FILARET AND HIS
STEERING GROUP CAN MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE CON-
FERENCE AND OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE "RULES OF
PROCEDURE" STATE THAT DECISIONS WILL BE MADE ON
THE "BASIS OF WIDE AGREEMENT" EXCEPT IN CASES OF
"NECESSITY" WHEN VOTES MAY BE TAKEN. THIS
OBVIOUSLY ALLOWS GREAT DISCRETION TO THE CHAIR.
BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

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IN VOTING ON THE COMMUNIQUE, PARTICIPANTS CAN
ONLY PROPOSE CHANGES, "IF THEY FIND IT NECESSARY,"
IN WRITING THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN TO THE DRAFTING
COMMISSION. IN OTHER WORDS, NO ALTERATIONS FROM
THE FLOOR. FINALLY, "AT THE PLENARY SESSION WHICH
IS TO ADOPT THE FINAL DOCUMENTS, PROPOSALS FOR THEIR
BASIC CHANGING SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED."

9. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL, ACCORDING
TO THE "RULES," BE OPEN ONLY TO JOURNALISTS
"OFFICIALLY REGISTERED AT IT." THE OCTOBER PRE-
PARATORY SESSION DECIDED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF
JOURNALISTS TO TWENTY. EVEN THESE WILL HAVE TO
WORK THROUGH AN OFFICIAL PRESS CENTER.

10. COMMENT: AS REPORTED EARLIER, THE "PEACE
CONFERENCE" IS A TOOL OF SOVIET PEACE PROPAGANDA
PURE AND SIMPLE. THE PREPARATIONS WE HAVE
OBSERVED INDICATE THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE MORE
BLATANTLY CONTROLLED AND TAILORED TO SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY AIMS THAN EVEN WE HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. THE
ADVANCE PREPARATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE, THE LIMITED
AGENDA, RULES RESTRICTING CHANGES TO THE FINAL
DOCUMENTS AND LIMITED PRESS ACCESS ALL CONFIRM
THAT WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURES WILL BE COMING TO
GIVE A SHEEN OF RESPECTABILITY TO SOVIET PEACE
INITIATIVES. END COMMENT.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: WE SUGGEST THAT ADDRESSEES
DRAW ON THIS CABLE, PARTICULARLY PARAS 7 - 9,
FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND RELIGIOUS
FIGURES.
ZIMMERMANN
BT

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MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

February 4, 1982

JL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Bud*
SUBJECT: Visit by Dr. John Akers and Dr. Walter Smith,
Assistants to Dr. Billy Graham

On February 3, 1982, Dr. John Akers and Dr. Walter Smith visited me at the request of Billy Graham. They wanted to inform me of their plans for Billy's visit to the Soviet Union.

The Patriarch of Russia has asked Billy to speak at the "Conference of World Religious Leaders on Preserving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Annihilation." Billy has accepted this invitation. He plans the following schedule:

May 9 - A.M. Preach at the Moscow Cathedral

P.M. Preach at the Moscow Baptist Church

May 10 No schedule

May 11- 1000 Speak at the Conference of World Religious Leaders on Preserving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Annihilation. (Present will be leaders of the World Council of Churches, the Baptist World Conference, the National Conference of Churches and other similar religious leaders from the U.S. In addition, there will be Moslems, Buddhists, Hindi and other religious leaders from throughout the world. Billy has contacted Cardinal Casaroli, who indicated the Vatican would send a senior representative.

May 12 Meet with Russian officials, including the Director of the Council of Religious Affairs for Russia, Georgiy Arbatov, and other Russian officials.

Dr. Akers and Dr. Smith say they know they are playing a "dice game" and that the Soviets will try to use them for propaganda purposes. However, Billy is going to leave before any possible communique can come out of this meeting. In addition, he will alert other Western church leaders to be careful that they are not entrapped by some Soviet propaganda campaign. Akers and Smith know that the Patriarch is state-approved and will probably be an instrument for the state. In general, I believe they are going in there with their eyes open and their guard up for possible Soviet actions.

Last December Billy Graham and Dr. Akers met with Ambassador Dobrynin. At that meeting they told Dobrynin when they go to Russia they may well have to take a strong stand on what is happening to the Pentacostalists. Dobrynin said he understood this may happen.

I asked Akers and Smith why Billy goes into Russia and Eastern European countries. They said they knew they were being exploited in some fashion because the Communist countries always try to show the world that things were better off than they really are and that their countries are not anti-religious. However, Billy feels the good he gets from the great religious gatherings that he holds far outweighs the uses the Soviets and Eastern Europeans make of the visit. He may be correct.

I believe the real reason for the visit from Akers and Smith is to ensure that you know of Billy's planned trip. I told them we would be glad to help Billy in any way that we can.

TO CLARK

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
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RECEIVED 11 FEB 82 07

DOCDATE 10 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

GRAHAM, BILLY

SUBJECT: BILLY GRAHAM & MOSCOW WORLD PEACE CONF

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