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File Folder USSR (2/18/82-2/25/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

237

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170267	CABLE	STATE 43863 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-1-2	2	2/18/1982	B1
170839	CABLE	MOSCOW 2040 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-2-1	2	2/19/1982	B1
170840	CABLE	MOSCOW 2048 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-3-0	3	2/20/1982	B1
170841	MEMO	M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE ARBATOV VISIT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-4-9	1	2/22/1982	B1
170842	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO WHEELER RE ARBATOV VISIT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-5-8	1	2/22/1982	B1
170843	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE ARBATOV VISIT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-5-8	1	2/17/1982	B1
170844	MEMO	STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE ARBATOV VISIT	2	2/16/1982	B1
170845	MEMO	N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE REPORT ON CONVERSATION PAR 1/26/2012 CREST NLR-748-22-19-7-6	2	2/23/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170846	CABLE	PARIS 5928 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-8-5	2	2/19/1982	B1
170847	CABLE	RE SOVIET/GAS PIPELINE	4	2/20/1982	B1
170848	CABLE	STATE 50084 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-10-2	3	2/25/1982	B1
170849	CABLE	MOSCOW 2269 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-19-11-1	4	2/25/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170267

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3863
SIT434 DATE 02/24/82

DTG: 182352Z FEB 82 PSN: 021641
TOR: 050/0447Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #3863 0500247
O 182352Z FEB 82 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1234

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
USNMR S; APE BE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 043863
EXDIS/USINF/SHAPE FOR GEN. ROGERS AND INTAFF ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/18/02 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PARM, INF, UR, US

SUBJECT: SCANLAN-BESSMERTNYKH MEETING FEBRUARY 18 -
- RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEMARCHE ON INF
MILADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
REF: A) STATE 42618
- B) STATE 39285 -
- C) INF-114 (GENEVA 1964)

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON FEBRUARY 18, EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
SCANLAN PRESENTED SOVIET DCM BESSMERTNYKH WITH U. S.
DEMARCHE (REF A) RESPONDING TO SOVIET DEMARCHE ON INF OF
FEBRUARY 12 (REF B). SCANLAN ALSO REAFFIRMED POINTS MADE
TO KVITSINSKIY BY AMBASSADOR NITZE (REF C) THAT, WHILE
THE U. S. WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE TENDENTIOUS TASS
COMMENTARY OF FEBRUARY 9, WE NONETHELESS FELT IT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ADVISABLE TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THE U. S. SIDE FELT THAT THE TALKS HAD
BEGUN IN A SERIOUS MANNER; THERE HAD BEEN NO PROCEDURAL
DELAYS, RATHER THE SIDES HAD IMMEDIATELY IMMERSSED
THEMSELVES IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE. IT WAS
ESSENTIAL THAT CONFIDENTIALITY REGARDING THE DETAILS OF
THE TALKS BE MAINTAINED.

3. BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE WOULD TIFORM MOSCOW OF THE U. S.
DEMARCHE, BUT HE WANTED TO CONF'RM THE SOVIET POSITION
EXPRESSED IN THE FEBRUARY 12 NON-PAPER. IT WAS THE U. S.
THAT HAD GONE PUBLIC FIRST, WITH ITS "ZERO OPTION."
AMBASSADOR NITZE HAD ARRIVED IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER WITH
THIS PROPOSAL, AND DID NOT MOVE ONE INCH BEYOND THE U. S.
PUBLIC POSITION DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF THE TALKS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74822-191-2

BY LCB NARA DATE 11/6/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3863

DTG: 182352Z FEB 82 PSN: 021641

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FEBRUARY 4 STATEMENT ON THE DRAFT TREATY HAD PROMPTED MOSCOW TO RESPOND, SINCE IT GAVE THE WRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE U. S. WAS DOING SOMETHING IN THE TALKS, WHILE THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING NOTHING.

4. SCANLAN SAID THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION. THE U. S. FELT IT WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SIDES TO KEEP THEIR PUBLICS INFORMED ABOUT THEIR GENERAL GOALS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE USSR HAD PUBLICIZED ITS MORATORIUM PROPOSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, AT AN EARLY DATE. THE DETAILS OF THE TALKS, HOWEVER -- THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF THE TWO SIDES -- SHOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. THIS WAS OUR CENTRAL CONCERN, AS EXPRESSED IN THE U. S. DEMARCHE.

5. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WAS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. LOOKING AT THE RECORD OF U. S. -SOVIET ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS, SALT I AND II IN PARTICULAR, ONE WOULD NEVER FIND A CASE WHERE THE SOVIET SIDE WAS THE FIRST TO REVEAL SECRETS. BUT MOSCOW OFTEN HAD GROUNDS TO COMPLAIN ABOUT LEAKS, OR "OFFICIAL" LEAKS, BY THE U. S. SIDE. THE SOVIET SIDE HOPED THAT CONFIDENTIALITY COULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE FUTURE.

6. OTHER ASPECTS OF MEETING WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL.

SECSTATE WASHDC 3863
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 182352Z FEB 82 PSN: 021641

HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

3

170839

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 2040
SIT429 DATE 02/24/82

DTG: 191740Z FEB 82 PSN: 022604
TOR: 050/1947Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #2040 0501740
O 191740Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1935
USMISSION USNATO 1165

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1688
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1678
AMEMBASSY BONN 2263
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2164
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1445
AMEMBASSY LONDON 4246
AMEMBASSY LISBON 0998
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0327
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1040
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1376
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1305
AMEMBASSY ROME 6693
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0323
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1119
BT

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NLRR 748-22-19-2-1
BY LCDB NARA DATE 11/6/85

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 02040
EXDIS/USINF/SHAPE FOR GEN. ROGERS AND INTAFF ONLY
SECSTATE: PLEASE PASS TO USNMR SHAPE BE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/19/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, INF, UR, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEMARCHE ON INF: AMBASSADOR'S
MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO, FEBRUARY 19
REFS: (A) STATE 42618, (B) STATE 43863

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. FOLLOWING UP DAS SCANLAN'S DEMARCHE TO SOVIET
DCM BESSMERTNYKH, AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CALLED ON FIRST
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO FEBRUARY 19 TO PRESENT
US VIEWS ON SOVIET PUBLICATION OF DETAILS OF THE
INF NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER DRAWING ON THE GUIDANCE
IN REF (A), THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET
ACTION CASTS REAL DOUBT ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF
THEIR APPROACH AT GENEVA, AND REITERATED OUR
OWN CONVICTION THAT THE TALKS MUST BE CARRIED OUT
ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS IF, AS THE U.S. SIDE HOPES,
THEY ARE TO LEAD TO SERIOUS PROGRESS.

3. KORNIYENKO, WHO WAS CLEARLY PREPARED FOR THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 2040

DTG: 191740Z FEB 82 PSN: 022604

DEMARCHÉ, BEGAN BY CLAIMING THE U. S. HAS A LONG HISTORY OF LEAKS, CITING SPECIFICALLY SALT AND THE SCC. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF THE CURRENT INF TALKS: BEFORE THE SOVIETS HAD SAID ANYTHING, NEWS CAME OUT OF THE NITZE VISIT TO BRUSSELS AIMED AT PUTTING A POSITIVE GLOSS ON THE U. S. POSITION. KORNIYENKO DENIED THAT THE BREZHNEV MEETING WITH THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL GROUP CONTRAVENED THE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENTIALITY. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT ON A SOVIET INITIATIVE THAT AMBASSADOR NITZE HAD SAID THAT HIGH OFFICIALS CAN DESCRIBE THEIR NATIONAL POSITIONS AS LONG AS THEY DID NOT REVEAL CONCRETE APPROACHES AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, KORNIYENKO SAID, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE U. S. TABLING OF A DRAFT TREATY DID ADDRESS NEGOTIATING SUBSTANCE. AND THE NEXT DAY, ALL THE U. S. PAPERS HAD THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY. ONLY AFTER THAT DID THE SOVIET UNION FEEL IT NECESSARY TO OUTLINE ITS OWN POSITION.

4. KORNIYENKO CLOSED BY REAFFIRMING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ADHERE TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS ON CONDITIONS THAT THE U. S. SIDE DOES THE SAME AND DOES NOT IMPEL THE SOVIETS TO SPEAK OUT EITHER BY GIVING A DISTORTED PICTURE OR BY ORGANIZING LEAKS. KORNIYENKO SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD NOT BE FOUND WANTING REGARDING THE SERIOUS APPROACH TO THE TALKS.

5. THE AMBASSADOR CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY AS BEING ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TALKS.
HARTMAN

MOSCOW 2040

DTG: 191740Z FEB 82 PSN: 022604

~~SECRET~~

5

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170840

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 2048
SIT410 DATE 02/24/82

DTG: 201150Z FEB 82 PSN: 024691
TOR: 051/1540Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #2048/01 0511153
O 201150Z FEB 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1942

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 02048
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/20/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A) OR-M
TAGS: US, UR, AF, SF
SUBJECT: KORNIYENKO'S VIEWS POST-GENEVA
REF: MOSCOW 2040

1. ☒ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSION WITH KORNIYENKO ON INF (REFTEL) FEBRUARY 19, I ASKED HIM FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE IN LIGHT OF THE GENEVA TALKS BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. KORNIYENKO SAID HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO HEAR MY ASSESSMENT.

3. I RESPONDED THAT THE TALKS HAD COVERED ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES, ALTHOUGH NO NEW GROUND HAD BEEN BROKEN. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT IN SOME AREAS WE SHOULD BEGIN TO GET DOWN TO A MORE SPECIFIC APPROACH WHICH COULD ALLOW US TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS, EVEN IF IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE THEM. SECRETARY HAIG BELIEVED IN THE IMPORTANCE OF PURSUING ISSUES LIKE SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THIS WAY; HE HAD ALSO FELT, AS GROMYKO KNEW, THAT FURTHER EXPLORATION OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BE USEFUL. I EMPHASIZED THAT I HAD NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT EXPRESSED MY VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY NEEDED TO FIND A WAY TO SATISFY THE BROAD MASS OF THE AFGHANISTAN POPULATION. THE BABRAK KARMAL REGIME WAS CLEARLY NOT ABLE TO DO THIS; IT WOULD THEREFORE BE MORE VIABLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO EXPLORE THE PEOPLE'S FEELINGS AND PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THEM, AS WELL AS TO EXPLORE WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO MAINTAIN A GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED, INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN WHOSE REGIME IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE POPULATION.

4. KORNIYENKO SAID THAT THE GENEVA TALKS HAD NOT LED TO SOLUTIONS NOR -- IN CONTRAST TO THE SEPTEMBER MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO MINISTERS -- TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 2048

DTG: 201150Z FEB 82 PSN: 024691

SPECIFIC STEPS FOR RESOLVING PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT MAYBE SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS AN EXCEPTION TO THIS STATEMENT. ON THIS SUBJECT, HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD PRESENTED CONCRETE VIEWS AND SUBSEQUENTLY A JOINT CUBAN-ANGOLAN STATEMENT WAS RELEASED.

(COMMENT: WE HAD FOUND THE FEBRUARY 5TH STATEMENT INTERESTING FOR THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT LINKED THE ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA SOLUTIONS AND FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY PROMINENCE THE SOVIET PRESS GAVE TO IT; HOWEVER, MFA OFFICIALS BELOW KORNIYENKO'S LEVEL HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO PERSUADE US THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING PARTICULARLY NEW IN THE STATEMENT.) KORNIYENKO SAID THAT SECRETARY HAIG HAD REMARKED ON THE COMMON GROUND FOR FUTURE EFFORTS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT HAD NOT RESPONDED DIRECTLY TO GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE AWAITED A RESPONSE FROM THE U. S. SIDE.

5. ON AFGHANISTAN, KORNIYENKO SAID THAT HE WAS MYSTIFIED BY THE U. S. POSITION. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD WRITTEN PRESIDENT BREZHNEV THAT I WOULD BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS; BUT SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. (I COMMENTED THAT I WOULD BE BACK IN WASHINGTON THE WEEK OF MARCH 8 AND WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY THEN FOR A DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN.)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. KORNIYENKO SAID HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN ISSUES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS WANT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND ARE PREPARED FOR SERIOUS COOPERATION WITH ALL OTHER PARTIES WHO WANT ONE, INCLUDING THE U. S. BY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, HE CONTINUED, THE SOVIETS OF COURSE HAVE IN MIND THE SITUATION "AROUND" AFGHANISTAN, NOT THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. ON THAT, HE SAID, THE DISCUSSION OF WHETHER THE CURRENT REGIME IS SUITABLE IS NOT A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ANY OTHER THIRD COUNTRY. (I NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT KORNIYENKO HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF MY REMARKS ON THE BABRAK KARMAL REGIME.)

7. KORNIYENKO SAID: LET US THROUGH A JOINT EFFORT HELP TO CHANGE THE SITUATION SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ARMED INCURSIONS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES AND SO THAT NO WEAPONS WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO AFGHANISTAN. THEN, HE SAID, YOU WILL SEE WHETHER THE PRESENT REGIME HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT TRYING TO EVADE THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET TROOPS; THIS CAN BE SETTLED IN THE

MOSCOW 2048

DTG: 201150Z FEB 82 PSN: 024691

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2048
SIT409 DATE 02/24/82

DTG: 201150Z FEB 82 PSN: 024694
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #2048/02 0511154
O 201150Z FEB 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1943

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 02048
NODIS
GENERAL CONTEXT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. AS
GROMYKO SAID TO SECRETARY HAIG -- AND HE WAS "NOT
JOKING," KORNIYENKO ADDED -- THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. IS NOT AS INTERESTED
IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AS IN CONTINUING
THE PRESENT POLICY LINE.

8. AT THIS POINT I JUMPED IN TO REJECT THIS LAST
STATEMENT AS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE. THE CONVERSATION
THEN TURNED TO OTHER TOPICS.

9. COMMENT: KORNIYENKO SEEMED TO WANT TO LEAVE
THE MESSAGE IN THIS DISCUSSION THAT THE SOVIETS
ARE INTERESTED IN FURTHER AND MORE SPECIFIC
DISCUSSIONS WITH US ON BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND
SOUTHERN AFRICA. I WILL HOPE TO EXPLORE BOTH
ISSUES WITH THE SECRETARY WHEN I RETURN IN TWO
WEEKS' TIME. HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8

NLRR 74822-19-4-9

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

972 (add-on)

170841

BY COB NARA DATE 11/6/15

CONFIDENTIAL

February 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Arbatov Visit (U)

This memorandum provides a written record of State-NSC telephone conversations on the visit to the U.S. of Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the (Soviet) Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. (C)

The NSC Staff was asked for its recommendations on the Arbatov visit. Judge Clark asked William Stearman to inform State that he opposed granting Arbatov a visa for his planned trip to the U.S. Stearman informed Deputy Secretary Stoessel's office of this recommendation on February 16. Later that evening, Secretary Haig called Judge Clark, and a decision was reached to grant Arbatov a five day visit just to attend the "Palme Commission" meeting at Mt. Cisco, New York, February 19-21, 1982. (Arbatov was issued the visa and has subsequently come and gone.) (C)

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Review on~~
~~February 22, 1988~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

972 (add-on)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

170842

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

February 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Arbatov Visit (U)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-19-5-8

BY KDB R.C. TEL 4/6/85

At Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to Jerry Bremer on the Arbatov case (as you requested). I was unable to provide Judge Clark's comments to Haig on this since I was not privy to that conversation. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Jerry Bremer.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Bremer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on
February 22, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL STEARMAN

FROM: MIKE WHEELER *mw*
SUBJECT: File #972, attached

Bill,

I appreciate your position on this matter; however, we do need to follow up in writing. The system of "handling things by phone" is problematic in that there may be subsequent questions which would not arise if there had been a piece of paper.

Please prepare a follow-up memo for my signature.

Thanks.

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

972

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

170843

CONFIDENTIAL

February 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER / *mw*

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *W*

NLRR 748-22-19-5-8

SUBJECT: Arbatov Visit

BY KDR

TE 14/6/5

I do not believe that a follow-up memorandum to Bremer is necessary here. Judge Clark discussed this with Secretary Haig yesterday evening and finally agreed to option 2 (5 day visa which was State's position); although the Judge initially favored option (1) (denial).

I initially passed on Judge Clark's recommendation to deny the visa to Walter Stoessel's office. Stoessel notified Secretary Haig who, in turn, called Judge Clark and got his agreement to option 2.

CONFIDENTIAL
Review on
February 17, 1988

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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File Folder

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FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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170844	MEMO STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE ARBATOV VISIT	2	2/16/1982	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

TO CLARK

UNCLASSIFIED UFO
OF CLASSIFIED ENC
FROM STEARMANJUNE(S)
11/6/82 KJD

RECEIVED 16 FEB 82 20

DOCDATE 16 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

VISA

ARBATOV, GEORGIY

SUBJECT: QUESTION OF GIVING ARBATOV A VISA TO US

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 FEB 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

PIPES

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

B 2/16 Clark approved recon II 1 RP

2/16 Stearman handled by phone

Stearman S 2/17 Prepare memo Wheeler to Bremer 2/17

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MEMORANDUM

1115

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 23, 1982

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 748-22-19-7-6

INFORMATIONBY ~~623~~ PARA DATE 4/6/15

170845

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY

SUBJECT: Report on Conversation with Alsthom-
Atlantique Executive

One of the most commonly used arguments against any attempt to affect the Siberian gas pipeline through our unilateral controls is that they will be completely ineffective because they will be systematically circumvented by our allies.

The implication in this argument is that whereas our allies are very concerned over Soviet policies and reactions, they are not at all concerned about our policies and reactions (with whom they do immensely greater business than with the Soviets and who protect them militarily). This is simply not so. What is true is that our allies, from long experience, simply don't believe we are serious about any of this, and therefore can ignore our wishes and circumvent our actions.

Two reports recently indicate how questionable these assumptions are. There is no more vital European company in all of this than Alsthom-Atlantique of France. It is the only one of the G.E. licensees that can manufacture (with substantial costs and delays) the rotors and shafts that G.E. now makes in the U.S. and ships to its licensees. An officer of the U.S. Embassy in Paris recently spoke to an executive of Alsthom-Atlantique (Tab A). It is worth reading in its entirety but note especially the following:

"He granted that under AA's licensing accord with G.E., AA could be forbidden to export the rotor kits and that their lawyers might take the case to international arbitration where after three years or more there might be a resolution as well as the destruction of the friendly and cooperative climate that had existed between AA and G.E. after almost 20 years of working together. He said that he

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didn't think personally that it was the legal agreement that was so important; he said that if the President of G.E. were to telephone the President of AA and ask him not to have AA make the rotors, that AA would be very unlikely to make them, such was the nature of their long association and the value placed upon it for the future."

"Emboff also asked whether the government of France had put any pressure on AA to produce additional rotors as had been suggested in the press. He said no."

"Emboff then asked whether in his view the GOF, as the major stockholder in AA through its nationalization of CGE could or would direct AA to take on the order for the additional rotors if the U.S. Government were to invoke its export controls as provided for in the license accord with G.E. He said that he greatly doubted it, that France was an open society with a vigorous press just as in the United States and that the outcry would be very great and that in addition the chief executives of AA would not accept such direct interference."

25X1

Attachments

Tab A State Cable

cc: Richard Pipes
William Stearman
Tom Reed

Don Gregg
Henry Nau
Gus Weiss

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 05928

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12065: GDS 2/19/88 (BLACK, CLAY) OR-E
TAGS: ENRG, FR, UR, ETRD, ESTC
SUBJ: ALSTHOM ATLANTIC INVOLVEMENT IN SIBERIAN GAS
PIPELINE PROJECT

1. ENBOFF DISCUSSED SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE AND EFFECTS OF U.S. EMBARGO WITH EXECUTIVE OF FRENCH FIRM ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE (AA). AA HAS AN ORDER DIRECTLY FROM SOVIET IMPORT ENTITY MACHINEIMPORTEX FOR 40 SPARE ROTOR KITS WHICH WILL BE MANUFACTURED USING GENERAL ELECTRIC TECHNOLOGY FOR DELIVERY AT THE RATE OF TWO PER MONTH BETWEEN OCTOBER 1983 AND JUNE 1985. AA HAS BEEN ASKED BY MACHINEIMPORTEX (A MR. ROSKOFF-PHONE) IF AA COULD MOVE FORWARD THE DELIVERY DATES OF THE ROTORS AND WHETHER AND ON WHAT SCHEDULE AA COULD PRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL 100 OR 140 ROTOR KITS. AFTER STUDYING THE MATTER AND FROM A PURELY INDUSTRIAL POINT OF VIEW, AA HAS REPLIED THAT IT COULD NOT ADVANCE THE DELIVERY DATE FOR THE INITIAL DELIVERIES OF THE 40 ROTOR KITS ALREADY ORDERED. AA ALSO INFORMED THE SOVIETS IT COULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL 100 OR 140 ROTOR KITS FOR DELIVERY TOWARDS THE END OF 1984 AND CONTINUING THROUGH APRIL 1987 IF IT WERE TO MAKE CERTAIN ADDITIONAL INVESTMENTS. THE AA EXECUTIVE STRESSED THAT AA HAS NOT YET BEEN REQUESTED BY THE SOVIETS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH AN ADDITIONAL CONTRACT NOR HAS IT TREETEARED A BID IN ANTICIPATION OF SUCH A REQUEST.

2. ENBOFF RAISED THE QUESTION OF AA'S READING OF ITS LICENSE AGREEMENT WITH GE AND WHETHER IT CONSIDERED THE LICENSE AS A POSSIBLE IMPEDIMENT TO ITS EXPORTATION OF ROTOR KITS TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE EXECUTIVE SAID THAT AA SAW NO EXISTING IMPEDIMENT TO THE EXPORTATION. THE TECHNOLOGY HAD ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED AND NOTHING THAT THEY HAD SEEN IN THE U.S. FEDERAL REGISTER EXPORT REGULATIONS CONCERNING EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION APPEARED TO TOUCH THEIR ROTOR KIT EXPORTS. ENBOFF MENTIONED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE AA LICENSE ACCORD WITH GE WAS THAT AA WAS PREVENTED FROM EXPORTING ANY PRODUCT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSMITTED UNDER THE AGREEMENT IF U.S. EXPORT

ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS FORBID IT. THE EXECUTIVE SAID THAT THERE WERE VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACCORD AMONG THEIR LAWYERS, BUT THAT AS OF THIS MOMENT THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION FROM GE THAT THEY COULD NOT GO AHEAD WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE ORDER FOR 40 ROTOR KITS. HE GRANTED THAT UNDER AA'S LICENSING ACCORD WITH GE, AA COULD BE FORBIDDEN TO EXPORT THE ROTOR KITS AND THAT THEIR LAWYERS MIGHT TAKE THE CASE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WHERE AFTER THREE YEARS OR MORE THERE MIGHT BE A RESOLUTION AS WELL AS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE CLIMATE THAT HAD EXISTED BETWEEN AA AND GE AFTER ALMOST 20 YEARS OF WORKING TOGETHER. HE SAID THAT HE DIDN'T THINK PERSONALLY THAT IT WAS THE LEGAL AGREEMENT THAT WAS SO IMPORTANT; HE SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT OF GE WERE TO TELEPHONE THE PRESIDENT OF AA AND ASK HIM NOT TO HAVE AA MAKE THE ROTORS, THAT AA WOULD BE VERY UNLIKELY TO MAKE THEM, SUCH WAS THE NATURE OF THEIR LONG ASSOCIATION AND THE VALUE PLACED UPON IT FOR THE FUTURE.

3. PRIOR TO THIS CONVERSATION ON U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS, THE EXECUTIVE HAD DISCUSSED THE SOVIET ALTERNATIVES AND HIS IMPRESSION OF THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET RESOLVE TO PUSH FORWARD WITH THE PROJECT DESPITE THE AMERICAN EMBARGO. HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAS DEALT WITH THE SOVIETS ON A VARIETY OF PROJECTS OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY HAD A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITH ROSKOFF OF MACHINEIMPORTEX, WHOM HE HAD KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME, AND THAT HE WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO PUSH THROUGH THIS PROJECT AND THAT THEY WERE CAREFULLY EXAMINING THE ALTERNATIVES. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE ALREADY BUILDING AN AIRCRAFT-TURBINE DERIVATIVE COMPRESSOR WHICH THEY WERE USING ON THE GAS PIPELINE TO IRAN AND THAT THAT WAS AN ALTERNATIVE THAT THEY COULD FALL BACK ON FOR THE SIBERIAN-EUROPEAN LINE, BUT THAT THE PROBLEM WAS PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND CONSEQUENT DELAYS. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS LIKED THE GE TURBINES; THEY HAVE 220 ON THE ORENBURG GAS

PIPELINE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THEY ALREADY HAVE THREE FRAME 5 GE TURBINES OF THE TYPE WHICH HAVE BEEN ORDERED FOR THE SIBERIAN GAS LINE. IT IS NOT IN HIS VIEW SO MUCH A QUESTION OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AS OF PRODUCTION CAPACITY. HE NOTED THAT IF AA WERE TO MANUFACTURE THE ROTOR KITS NEEDED FOR THE PIPELINE WITH EXPANDED CAPACITY THROUGH NEW INVESTMENT, THE NEW PIPELINE WOULD STILL BE BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 05928

DELAYED BY 2 AND 1/2 YEARS BUT THE 80 PERCENT MARKET SHARE OF GE TECHNOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE MAINTAINED. HE ALSO FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS COULD SQUEEZE ENOUGH ADDITIONAL GAS THROUGH THE ORENBURG LINE TO MEET THEIR BASIC OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACTS WITH EUROPE. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT A POLITICAL DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES, FORMALLY OR THROUGH INFORMAL PRESSURE ON GE, COULD PREVENT THE EXPORT OF AA ROTOR KITS TO THE SOVIETS.

4. EMBOFF ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE HAD PUT ANY PRESSURE ON AA TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL ROTORS AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN THE PRESS. HE SAID NO. EMBOFF THEN ASKED WHETHER IN HIS VIEW THE GOF, AS THE MAJOR STOCKHOLDER IN AA THROUGH ITS NATIONALIZATION OF CGE, COULD OR WOULD DIRECT AA TO TAKE ON THE ORDER FOR THE ADDITIONAL ROTORS IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE TO INVOKE ITS EXPORT CONTROLS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LICENSE ACCORD WITH GE. HE SAID THAT HE GREATLY DOUBTED IT, THAT FRANCE WAS AN OPEN SOCIETY WITH A VIGOROUS PRESS JUST AS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THE OUTCRY WOULD BE VERY GREAT AND THAT IN ADDITION THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF AA WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH DIRECT INTERFERENCE.

5. HE SUGGESTED, WITHOUT ARGUING, THAT ALLOWING AA TO PRODUCE GE-TYPE ROTORS WITH A CONSEQUENT DELAY TO THE GASLINE OF 2 AND 1/2 YEARS WAS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN FORCING THE SOVIETS TO GEAR UP THEIR OWN PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT-DERIVATIVE GAS TURBINES. GALBRAITH
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TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY 11/6/85

DOCDATE 23 FEB 82

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FRANCE GAS
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SUBJECT: RPT ON CONVERSATION W/ ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE EXECUTIVE RE INVOLVEMENT IN
SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/23/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)

TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: FOLLOW-UP ON HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AFTER ASSESSING DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND GROMYKO, DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT FOLLOW-UP IS REQUIRED TO:

--DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE DO NOT SEE CONTINUING MILITARY ESCALATION AS THE ONLY OPTION;

--REJECT GROMYKO'S IMPLICIT THREATS AGAINST PAKISTAN'S SECURITY WHILE REITERATING OUR WARNINGS AGAINST SOVIET ESCALATION EITHER IN AFGHANISTAN OR AGAINST PAKISTAN; AND

--CLARIFY OUR POSITION OF POSSIBILITY OF U.S.-SOVIET "EXPERT TALKS" ON AFGHANISTAN.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. AMBASSADOR IS INSTRUCTED TO SEEK EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH GROMYKO OR KORNIYENKO TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN SECRETARY HAIG AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AT GENEVA.

-- WE ARE PREPARED FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET SIDE ON AFGHANISTAN WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION THE SECRETARY WAS INTERESTED BUT ALSO DISAPPOINTED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN IN GENEVA.

-- UNFORTUNATELY THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE REASON TO

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BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOW PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO DISCUSS A RESOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I WOULD LIKE TO REFER TO THREE SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY MINISTER GROMYKO IN THIS REGARD:

THE MINISTER INDICATED THAT RETURN OF SOVIET TROOPS TO THEIR HOMELAND WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY AFTER CESSATION OF ALLEGED OUTSIDE AGGRESSION AND AFTER BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. AS YOU ARE AWARE THIS FORMULATION IS NOT A REALISTIC ONE IF THE SOVIET UNION IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN A POLITICAL SOLUTION. ALSO IT APPEARS TO BE A STEP BACKWARD FROM THE MINISTER'S SUGGESTION AT NEW YORK AND TO ME ON NOVEMBER 18 THAT DISCUSSION OF RETURN OF SOVIET TROOPS AND OF GUARANTEES AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE COULD BE COMBINED. WE SEE THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL ON A CLEAR TIMETABLE LINKED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROCEDURE FOR ENSURING AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD ENSURE AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE U.S. WOULD NOT EXACERBATE THE SITUATION DURING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL NOR WOULD WE SEEK TO EXPLOIT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL TO ESTABLISH A WESTERN PRESENCE.

WE ALSO NOTED THE MINISTER'S EMPHASIS ON INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STATUS AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET SIDE IS AWARE THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAS TAKEN THE FIRM POSITION THAT BILATERAL AFGHAN/PAKISTANI NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE WHILE SOVIET FORCES REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. THAT IS A POSITION WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES FULLY AGREES. THERE IS A CLEAR INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS BEHIND RESTORATION OF A

NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN AT PEACE WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS AND SECURE WITHIN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. IT IS OUR POSITION THAT QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNED STATUS AND MODALITIES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES ARE AMONG THE ELEMENTS THAT COULD BE DISCUSSED SIMULTANEOUSLY, IF THERE IS A SINCERE DESIRE FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION--HOWEVER, WE MUST BE ASSURED THAT ANY PROCESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD ASSOCIATE OURSELVES INVOLVED IRREVOCABLE SOVIET COMMITMENTS TO WITHDRAW ON A CLEAR TIME TABLE AND TO RESPECT AN AGREED PROCEDURE FOR-- EFFECTING AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION.

WE FURTHER NOTED THE MINISTER'S INSISTENCE THAT THE CURRENT INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS IRREVERSIBLE. IN OUR VIEW THE COMPOSITION OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE LEGITIMATELY BE DETERMINED BY ANY OUTSIDE POWER. THUS, AS THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR TO THE MINISTER IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE U.S.S.R. TO INSIST THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN CANNOT BE CHANGED IF THAT IS THE WILL OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. --FOR OUR PART THE U.S. WOULD NOT OPPOSE ANY GOVERNMENT FREELY CHOSEN BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. QUITE OBVIOUSLY THE CONDITIONS FOR FREE CHOICE DO NOT EXIST UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS OF WAR AND THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 90,000 FOREIGN COMBAT TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY.

--THE ESSENTIAL BASIS OF OUR APPROACH IS THAT THESE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION--RETURN OF SOVIET-TROOPS

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TO THE USSR, A PROCEDURE FOR AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION, AND ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ENSURING AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE--ARE FUNCTIONALLY INTERRELATED AND MUST BE DISCUSSED TOGETHER AND IMPLEMENTED IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER, IF AFGHANISTAN IS TO CEASE TO BE AN OBSTACLE TO CONSTRUCTIVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

--ON THIS BASIS, WE ARE NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO AUGMENTATION OF OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON BY PARTICIPATION OF "SPECIALISTS" FROM EACH SIDE. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS IF IT WERE JUSTIFIED AND MADE NECESSARY BY PROGRESS IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM.

--IT SHOULD GO WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS PROSPECT WOULD DISAPPEAR IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE TO SEEK TO LINK PAKISTAN'S POSITION ON THE AFGHAN ISSUE AND OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING PAKISTAN'S SECURITY, SUCH AS THE

AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER QUESTION, THE STATUS OF THE PAKISTANI PROVINCE OF BALUCHISTAN, AND RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA. UNFORTUNATELY, SOME OF MINISTER -- GROMYKO'S COMMENTS IN GENEVA LEND THEMSELVES TO THIS INTERPRETATION. WE REJECT AND OBJECT STRENUOUSLY TO IMPLICIT THREATS AGAINST PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY ALONG THESE LINES.

--AS THE SOVIET SIDE IS AWARE THE U. S. HAS A LONG STANDING FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN AND A COMMITMENT TO THAT COUNTRY'S SECURITY. THEREFORE WE WOULD VIEW WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS ANY-SOVIET - MILITARY ESCALATION EITHER WITHIN AFGHANISTAN ITSELF OR DIRECTED AT INTIMIDATION OF PAKISTAN. SUCH AN ESCALATION WOULD INEVITABLY INCREASE REGIONAL TENSIONS, FURTHER UNDERMINE PROSPECTS FOR US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON - AFGHANISTAN AND INDEED US-SOVIET RELATIONS GENERALLY, AND ELICIT AN APPROPRIATE U. S. RESPONSE. HAIG

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EXDIS.

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 2/23/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PROP, SCUL, UR, US

SUBJECT: AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN SOVIET "WORLD
PEACE CONFERENCE"

REF: (A) MOSCOW 1603, (B) MOSCOW 1968, (C) STATE 45440,
(D) STATE 45462,

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBABLE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL PROMINENT AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FIGURES IN THE "WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE" TO BE SPONSORED BY THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX PATRIARCH HERE IN MOSCOW IN MAY. IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THIS EVENT IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE WORLDWIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES AND TO ENCOURAGE OPPOSITION TO U.S. GOALS AMONG WESTERN POPULATIONS. IT IS BAD ENOUGH THAT MANY PROMINENT WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURES ARE LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE; THE ATTENDANCE OF AMERICAN CHURCHMEN OF STATURE IS EVEN WORSE SINCE IT PLAYS DIRECTLY INTO SOVIET HANDS IN PORTRAYING AMERICA AS A DIVIDED AND HENCE, UNRELIABLE ALLY. THE DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS AT DIS-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COURAGING SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOW RESULTS.
END SUMMARY.

3. WE HAVE REPORTED IN SOME DETAIL ON THE SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" AND ON WHAT IS LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM IT (REFS A & B). WE HAVE SHARED THIS INFORMATION WITH OUR NATO ALLIES HERE IN MOSCOW AND HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT USNATO DISCUSS THE CONFERENCE WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE WEST EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. WE HAVE SENT BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THE CONFERENCE TO MORE THAN TWO DOZEN OF OUR EMBASSIES FOR USE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE HOST COUNTRY CHURCHMEN FROM ATTENDING. REALISTICALLY, WE CANNOT EXPECT AMERICAN ARGUMENTS

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TO INFLUENCE MORE THAN A HANDFUL OF FOREIGN RELIGIOUS FIGURES IN MAKING THEIR DECISIONS TO ATTEND OR NOT. (WE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE CONSISTENTLY TOUGH LINE TAKEN BY THE VATICAN ON THE "PEACE CONFERENCE.") AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR EFFORTS, I BELIEVE THAT THE U.S.G. SHOULD SEEK, IN PERSONAL APPROACHES AT HIGH-LEVEL, TO DISCOURAGE OUR OWN CHURCHMEN FROM GIVING THIS SOVIET PROPAGANDA EXERCISE THE BENEFIT OF THEIR WELL-PUBLICIZED PRESENCE.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW ALL OF THE AMERICAN CHURCHMEN WHO HAVE BEEN INVITED BY THE RUSSIAN PATRIARCHATE TO THE CONFERENCE; WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THE NUMBER IS BETWEEN THIRTY AND FORTY. I SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON FOUR PRINCIPAL GROUPS, EACH OF WHICH COULD HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE ON OTHER RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONS ONCE THEY ARE THEMSELVES PERSUADED NOT TO ATTEND. THESE ARE (1) THE BILLY GRAHAM ORGANIZATION, WHICH IS SHOWING SOME SECOND THOUGHTS (REF C); (2) THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, WHICH HAS WITHIN ITS UMBRELLA MOST OF THE OTHER POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS; (3) THE AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH, WHOSE BISHOP DAVID PREUS IS LEANING TOWARD PARTICIPATION (REF D); AND (4) THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U.S.A., WHICH HAS BEEN REPRESENTED AT THE PREPARATORY MEETINGS FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE CONFERENCE BY DR. BRUCE RIGDON. I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THESE GROUPS MAY BE SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVES IN RAISING THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" WITH THEM. NONETHELESS, THESE PEOPLE NEED TO BE TOLD CANDIDLY SOME OF THE FACTS OF LIFE ABOUT THE "PEACE CONFERENCE," IF ONLY SO THERE CAN BE NO FINGER-POINTING LATER ON.

5. THE BASIC POINTS FROM OUR EARLIER REPORTING WHICH I THINK SHOULD BE MADE TO AMERICAN INVITEES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" IS NOT A RELIGIOUS EVENT; IT IS BEING CONDUCTED BY THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES.
- THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" IS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF MANY IN THE CURRENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO COVER THEIR OWN ARMAMENTS PROGRAMS AND AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICIES WITH A HAZE OF "PEACE INITIATIVES."
- LY THE
- THE TARGET OF THESE EFFORTS IS UNMISTAKABLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE COHESION OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE (IN PARTICULAR THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION).

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EXDIS

-- THE PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE CONFERENCE GUARANTEE TOTAL SOVIET CONTROL: THE CATEGORIES OF DELEGATES, THE NUMBERS WITHIN EACH CATEGORY, THE COMPOSITION OF THE DISCUSSION COMMITTEES AND THE AGENDA PLACE THE SOVIET CHAIRMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES IN FULL PROCEDURAL COMMAND.

-- THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN AND CLEARED. IT WILL (1) ENCOURAGE WEST EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS AS A MATTER OF RELIGIOUS DUTY (I.E., SUPPORT OPPOSITION TO THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION); (2) CONDEMN NEW WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DOCTRINE (SUCH AS THE NEUTRON BOMB AND CRUISE MISSILES); (3) CALL FOR PROGRESS AT THE GENEVA TALKS AND THE REOPENING OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS; AND (4) CALL FOR MONEY TO BE SPENT ON DEVELOPMENT AID RATHER THAN WEAPONS. BASED ON THE DOCUMENTS COMING OUT OF THE THREE PREPARATORY SESSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE TOPICS WILL BE SLANTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND IN LINE WITH SOVIET INITIATIVES.

-- THE ORGANIZERS OF THE CONFERENCE ARE DISCUSSING THE PRESENTATION OF AN AWARD TO BREZHNEV FOR HIS "CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE."

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- FINALLY, PARTICIPATION BY AMERICAN CHURCHMEN IN THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" WILL NOT PROVIDE A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING TIES WITH BELIEVERS IN THE SOVIET UNION. DESPITE THE GLADHANDING WHICH FOREIGN DELEGATES WILL RECEIVE FROM THE OFFICIALLY-REGISTERED AND APPROVED SOVIET CHURCHMEN WHO WILL HOST THE CONFERENCE, THE HARD-PRESSED AVERAGE BELIEVER IN THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE AFFORDED ANY RELIEF FROM OFFICIAL REPRESSION NOR BE ENCOURAGED BY SEEING WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURES ON SOVIET TELEVISION BEING USED IN A PROPAGANDA FESTIVAL; MANY IN FACT WILL BE DISMAYED.

6. TRYING TO CONVINCE IMPORTANT CHURCHMEN

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NOT TO COME TO MOSCOW IN MAY WILL REQUIRE A MAJOR
EFFORT, OFTEN AT TOP LEVELS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,
WITH NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, IF WE ARE
SERIOUS ABOUT COMBATTING SOVIET DISINFORMATION
EFFORTS, THIS PEACE-PROPAGANDA EXTRAVAGANZA
IN THE SOVIET CAPITAL IS A FIRST-CLASS TARGET.
HARTMAN

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