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> **CAS** 9/1/2011

File Folder

USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV 851090-

FOIA

8591135

M11-407

Box Number

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MATLOCK

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
117965 MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO RR RE GORBACHEV LETTER TO PM THATCHER 10/12	1	10/23/1985	B1
	R 3/26/2013 M407/1			
117966 CABLE	LONDON 23410 (211737Z)	4	10/21/1985	B1
117967 MEMO	BILL WRIGHT ET AL TO RR RE GORBACHEV LETTER TO PM THATCHER 10- 12	1	10/22/1985	B1
117968 PROFS NOTE	FROM JOHN POINDEXTER RE LETTER FROM GORBACHEV TO THATCHER		10/22/1985	B1
117969 PROFS NOTE	SAME TEXT AS 117968		10/22/1985	B1
117970 CABLE	LONDON 23410 (211732Z)		10/21/1985	B1
117971 LETTER	REAGAN TO GORBACHEV R 10/16/2000 NLSF99-051 #353		10/22/1985	B1
117972 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV	1	10/21/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV 851090-

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8591135

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117974 DRAFT LETTER	REAGA	N TO GORBACI	HEV (DOS VERSION)	4	ND	B1
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117975 CABLE			E PRESIDENTIAL EV (ANNOTATED)	4	10/18/1985	B1
117976 LETTER		GORBACHEV 10/16/2000	NLSF99-051 #358		10/31/1985	B1
117977 MEMO	MCFAR GORBA	LANE TO RR RI CHEV	E LETTER TO	1	10/31/1985	B1
117978 DRAFT LETTER	REAGA	N TO GORBACH 10/4/2000	HEV (ANNOTATED) NLRRM00-004 #1		10/30/1985	B1
117979 ROUTING SLIP	RE LET	TER		1	ND	P5
117980 MEMO	LETTE! GORBA	R TO GENERAL CHEV			10/31/1985	B1
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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages
117982 LETTER	GORBACHEV TO REAGAN (TRANSLATION)	1 10/12/1985 B1
	R 10/16/2000 NLSF99-051 #363	7

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8591090-8591135 Date: 5/17/99

Box 40 (Page 1 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8591090			
1. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Reagan, re: Gorbachev Letter to Prime Minister Thatcher - October 12, 1 p.	10/23/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Cable	#211737Z Oct 85, 4 p.	10/21/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Memo	Bill Wright/Bob Linhard to Reagan, re: Gorbachev Letter to Prime Minister thatcher - October 12, 1p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Email	PROF note John Poindexter to WH Sit. Rm., 1p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Email	Copy of Item #4 (with no routing information), 1 p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Cable	#211732Z Oct 85, 7 p.	10/21/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8591097			
7. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p. R. 10/14/00 NCS F99-051 + 3	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
8. Memo	Jack Matlock to McFarlane, re: Presiddent's Letter to Gorbachev, 1 p.	10/21/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
9. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, (Amb. Matlock version), 4 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
10. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, (DOS version), 4 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
11.Cable	No cable #, Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p.	10/18/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
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P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA).
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRA).

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Archivist: dlb

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File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8591090-8591135 Date: 5/18/99

Box 40 (Page 2 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8591135			
12. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-05/	10/31/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
13. Memo	McFarlane to Reagan, re: Letter to Gorbachev, 1 p.	10/31/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
44. Draft Letter	Reagan-to Gorbachev (with notations), 3-p	10/30/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
15. Routing Slip	R MR 2000 - 004 #11 /0/ re: Letter, 1 p.	<i>v/a</i> v n.d.	P5
1 6. Memo	Nicholas Platt to McFarlane, re: Letter to General	10/31/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
17. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 1 p. Reagan to Gorbachev, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
18. Letter	Gorbachve to Reagan, (translation), 1p. R 10/16/00 NLS/F99-051 # 36	10/12/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
	A 10/14/00 NLSF99-051 # 36		

RESTRICTION CODES

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National Security Council The White House



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PDB Wed.

SYSTEM II 91090

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1985

117965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Gorbachev Letter to Prime Minister Thatcher -

October 12

We have obtained a copy of the text of General Secretary Gorbachev's October 12 letter to Prime Minister Thatcher ($\underline{\text{Tab A}}$). We understand that the British Foreign Office is now drafting a reply to Gorbachev for the Prime Minister's consideration upon her return from the U.S. Working-level contacts indicate that the reply is likely to be strongly negative.

His letter extolls the virtues of the Soviet "concrete" Geneva proposals; ban space strike arms, 50% cut in the nuclear armaments capable of reaching each other's territory and an equal aggregate on "nuclear charges" of 6000. While not advocating the cessation of negotiations on medium-range nuclear armaments with the U.S., he goes on to indicate a willingness for "direct conversation" with the U.K. and France to "...look at the nuclear balance of forces in Europe, in its constituent components...." He ends with a request for her views.

The British agree with our assessment that none of the recent Soviet INF proposals reflect any substantial accommodation of Western concerns. Even Karpov's "informal" proposal of October 14 (to allow 100-120 GLCMs), while seeming to concede the legitimacy of some U.S. INF deployments, in fact does no such thing since it was billed as an "interim" solution leading to the ultimate goal of zero U.S. deployments. Given the rigid linkage between SS-20s and U.K./French systems underlying all the Soviet INF proposals, we consider them largely tactical maneuvers aimed at wedge-driving rather than at laying the basis for real negotiation.

In your October 23 bilateral with Margaret Thatcher you may wish to reinforce this above assessment.

Attachments

Tab A

Text of Gorbachev-Thatcher Letter of October 12

Prepared by: Bill Wright

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
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National Security Council The White House

System #





P 2: 44

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SUBJECT: PRES RESPONSE TO 12 SEPT GORBACHEV LTR

ID 8591097

RECEIVED 21 OCT 85 21

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 21 OCT 85

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KEYWORDS: USSR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Extremely URGENT

. Mr. Ringdahl

Time

Ms. Tahir-Kheli

Received/Signed For By:

Mr. De Graffenreid

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THE SECRETARYOF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon DIRECTOR, ACDA

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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Mr. Levine

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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DATE: 22 OCT 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: NICK PLATT

DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S URGENT

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 22 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL LTR

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 23 OCT 85

COMMENTS: ADVANCE SENT BY LDX. ORIGINAL LTR SHOULD BE SENT URGENT BY

POUCH FOR DELIVER IN MOSCOW, OOB TOMORROW, 27 OCT.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FOR NSC USE ONLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

October 22, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevard-nadze at the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to the meeting and to the prospect of more constructive relations. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will address the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary is a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as its unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

We both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All nations, particularly

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F99-051 # 353

BY Amf, MARA, DATE 10/16/00

those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we have found our regional experts' discussions useful and propose to hold them on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in detail when we meet at Geneva. Even before then, however, I will put before the UN General Assembly an initiative to deal with an important groups of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America. I want you to be aware in advance of the proposal I will make.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship.

Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts that did most to erode our relationship in the past. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. Of course, each of these conflicts has its own character and requirements, and we approach them with this fact in mind; other conflicts will need separate treatment altogether.

The peace program that I will put before the General Assembly seeks progress at three levels: internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic reconstruction.

Because these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, the starting point must be negotiations between the warring parties in each conflict; in the case of Afghanistan, this would obviously mean your own government. These talks may take different forms, but we believe that, together with improvement of internal political conditions, they are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, a second level of the process would be useful: separate U.S.-Soviet discussions, aimed at supporting the negotiating process between the warring parties. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations; needless to say, it is not for us to impose solutions. In some cases, however, it would be appropriate to consider guarantees for agreements reached. In every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and restraint on the flow of outside arms.

If the first two stages are successful, a third would then become possible: the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United State is prepared to contribute generously at this stage.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We want to strengthen these existing mechanisms, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce them.

I feel that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation that neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts, and will offer early support for my proposal. If so, you will find us willing to do our part, and to make the most of opportunities thereby opened for progress on other critical issues.

Sincerely,

(I) onced

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow



WASHINGTON

October 22, 1985

SECRET

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

To sign the attached letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Facts

We have prepared a letter to Gorbachev outlining the regional initiative you will be making in your General Assembly address.

Discussion

The attached letter responds to Gorbachev's letter of September 12 which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered when you met with him September 27. In addition, it gives Gorbachev advance notice of the regional initiative you will be proposing in your speech to the UN General Assembly on Thursday.

Recommendation

OK 1/2 (C

No

That you sign the attached letter to Gorbachev.


Attachment

Tab A

Letter to Gorbachev

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cc Vice President



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THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I would like to thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by foreign Minister Shevardnadze when we met in the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to my meeting with you and to the prospect of making our relations more constructive. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will be addressing the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary provides us all with a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as the organization's unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact/that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hothed of military tension."

At the same time we must both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All



nations, particularly those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts. In this regard, I was pleased to note in your recent letter that you thought it useful for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to seek, "wherever possible practical solutions." I believe that with the proper will on both sides, it will be possible to find such solutions.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we believe that our regional experts' discussions have been useful and have proposed that we hold such exchanges on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in considerable detail when we meet at Geneva.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact of our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts which eroded our relationship in past years. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. I have in mind a peace process that seeks progress at three levels encompassing internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and

economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. We must recognize, of course, that every regional dispute will have its own particular character and requirements. In some instances the international dimension of the problem would need to be addressed at the outset, in others the local reconciliation process would take priority.

Recognizing that these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, one step must be negotiations between the real adversaries in the conflict; as the process of negotiation moved forward, an end to violence with national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops could be envisioned

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, separate U.S.-Soviet discussions could begin. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations but would aim to support the negotiating process between the warring parties. The focus would be on ending or preventing the resumption of outside military presence.

In some cases they might offer guarantees for agreements reached, but in every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and limitation of the flow of outside arms.

If the first two stages are successful, it would make possible the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United States is prepared to contribute generously to this effort.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We agree with that assessment, want to strengthen these existing fora, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce those mechanism.

I fear that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions -a situation which neither of us should welcome. 'I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts. If so, you will find us willing to do our part to reduce our respective military involvement in these regions.

incerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Comm nist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow



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Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our of erall relationship. As you are aware, in our view the Soviet Union's resort to direct use of force, as in Afghanistan, its use of proxies in other areas, and its willingness to take advantage of unsettled local situations to impose governments against the will of the people all contributed to the deterioration of relations between our countries in the last decade. regimes which the Soviet Union has supported are repressive and unpopular, and have not established themselves despite outside military intervention, often including advisers, foreign troops and massive military supplies. In fact the policies of these Soviet-style regimes have given rise to indigenous opposition seeking to liberalize or overthrow them

I have made clear on many occasions our sympathies are with freedom-loving peoples everywhere who fight for genuine self-determination. At the same time, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts which eroded our relationship in past years. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. I have in mind a peace process that seeks progress at three levels encompassing internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. We must recognize, of course, that every regional dispute will have its own particular character and requirements. In some instances the international dimension of the problem would need to be addressed at the outset, in others the local reconciliation process would take priority.

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General Secretary of the Central Committee
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The Kremlin
Moscow

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