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Council: Head of State File: Recirds
Folder: U.S.S.R: General Secretary Gorbachev
(851090-8591097)
Box: 40

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: HEAD OF STATE FILE	Withdrawer
		CAS 9/1/2011
File Folder	USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV 851090-8591135	FOIA
		M11-407
Box Number	40	MATLOCK
		1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117965	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO RR RE GORBACHEV LETTER TO PM THATCHER 10/12 <i>R 3/26/2013 M407/1</i>	1	10/23/1985	B1
117966	CABLE	LONDON 23410 (211737Z)	4	10/21/1985	B1
117967	MEMO	BILL WRIGHT ET AL TO RR RE GORBACHEV LETTER TO PM THATCHER 10-12	1	10/22/1985	B1
117968	PROFS NOTE	FROM JOHN POINDEXTER RE LETTER FROM GORBACHEV TO THATCHER	1	10/22/1985	B1
117969	PROFS NOTE	SAME TEXT AS 117968	1	10/22/1985	B1
117970	CABLE	LONDON 23410 (211732Z)	7	10/21/1985	B1
117971	LETTER	REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/16/2000 NLSF99-051 #353</i>	4	10/22/1985	B1
117972	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV	1	10/21/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: HEAD OF STATE FILE

File Folder USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV 851090-8591135

Box Number 40

Withdrawer
CAS 9/1/2011
FOIA
M11-407
MATLOCK
1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117973	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO GORBACHEV (MATLOCK VERSION) <i>R 3/26/2013 M407/1</i>	4	ND	B1
117974	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO GORBACHEV (DOS VERSION) <i>R 3/26/2013 M407/1</i>	4	ND	B1
117975	CABLE	NO CABLE NUMBER RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV (ANNOTATED)	4	10/18/1985	B1
117976	LETTER	RR TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/16/2000 NLSF99-051 #358</i>	4	10/31/1985	B1
117977	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO RR RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV	1	10/31/1985	B1
117978	DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO GORBACHEV (ANNOTATED) <i>R 10/4/2000 NLRRM00-004 #11</i>	3	10/30/1985	B1
117979	ROUTING SLIP	RE LETTER	1	ND	P5
117980	MEMO	NICHOLAS PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV <i>R 7/25/2000 NLRRF99-051 #361</i>	1	10/31/1985	B1
117981	DRAFT KETTER	REAGAN TO GORBACHEV	1	ND	B1

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Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: HEAD OF STATE FILE

File Folder

USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV 851090-8591135

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CAS9/1/2011

FOIA

M11-407

MATLOCK

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117982	LETTER	GORBACHEV TO REAGAN (TRANSLATION) <i>R 10/16/2000 NLSF99-051 #363</i>	1	10/12/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8591090-8591135 **Date:** 5/17/99
Box 40 (Page 1 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8591090			
1. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Reagan, re: Gorbachev Letter to Prime Minister Thatcher - October 12, 1 p.	10/23/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Cable	#211737Z Oct 85, 4 p.	10/21/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Memo	Bill Wright/Bob Linhard to Reagan, re: Gorbachev Letter to Prime Minister thatcher - October 12, 1p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Email	PROF note John Poindexter to WH Sit. Rm., 1p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Email	Copy of Item #4 (with no routing information), 1 p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Cable	#211732Z Oct 85, 7 p.	10/21/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8591097			
7. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p.	10/22/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
8. Memo	Jack Matlock to McFarlane, re: President's Letter to Gorbachev, 1 p.	10/21/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
9. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, (Amb. Matlock version), 4 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
10. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, (DOS version), 4 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
11. Cable	No cable #, Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p.	10/18/85	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Archivist: dlb
Head of State File
File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8591090-8591135 Date: 5/18/99
Box 40 (Page 2 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8591135			
12. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p. <i>A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #358</i>	10/31/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
13. Memo	McFarlane to Reagan, re: Letter to Gorbachev, 1 p.	10/31/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
14. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev (with notations), 3 p. <i>A MR 2000-004 #11 10/14/00</i>	10/30/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
15. Routing Slip	re: Letter, 1 p.	n.d.	P5
16. Memo	Nicholas Platt to McFarlane, re: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, 1 p. <i>R 799-051 #361 7/25/00</i>	10/31/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
17. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
18. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 1p. <i>A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #363</i>	10/12/85	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

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 - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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RECEIVED 22 OCT 85 14

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 22 OCT 85

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

12 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

USSR

THATCHER, MARGARET

HS

ARMS CONTROL

INF

SUBJECT: CY GORBACHEV LTR TO PM THATCHER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 22 OCT 85 STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LINHARD

MATLOCK

MARTIN

PEARSON

COMMENTS SEE JMP PROFS NOTE TO YOU ON THIS SUBJECT. RESPONSE

DEADLINE BACK TO JMP IS COB TODAY -- 22 OCT

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B 1B

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Mcfarlane X 10/22 For SignaturePres IP 10/23 for information via PDBC 10/28 Pres notedBW, RL

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House



System #

346

II

Package #

91090

85 OCT 22 P 7: 19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>M</i>	<i>A</i>
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	34	<i>BT</i>	<i>Via PDB N</i>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

PDB Wed.

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen

SYSTEM II
91090

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

October 23, 1985

RR
117965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rem*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter to Prime Minister Thatcher -
October 12

We have obtained a copy of the text of General Secretary Gorbachev's October 12 letter to Prime Minister Thatcher (Tab A). We understand that the British Foreign Office is now drafting a reply to Gorbachev for the Prime Minister's consideration upon her return from the U.S. Working-level contacts indicate that the reply is likely to be strongly negative.

His letter extolls the virtues of the Soviet "concrete" Geneva proposals; ban space strike arms, 50% cut in the nuclear armaments capable of reaching each other's territory and an equal aggregate on "nuclear charges" of 6000. While not advocating the cessation of negotiations on medium-range nuclear armaments with the U.S., he goes on to indicate a willingness for "direct conversation" with the U.K. and France to "...look at the nuclear balance of forces in Europe, in its constituent components...." He ends with a request for her views.

The British agree with our assessment that none of the recent Soviet INF proposals reflect any substantial accommodation of Western concerns. Even Karpov's "informal" proposal of October 14 (to allow 100-120 GLCMs), while seeming to concede the legitimacy of some U.S. INF deployments, in fact does no such thing since it was billed as an "interim" solution leading to the ultimate goal of zero U.S. deployments. Given the rigid linkage between SS-20s and U.K./French systems underlying all the Soviet INF proposals, we consider them largely tactical maneuvers aimed at wedge-driving rather than at laying the basis for real negotiation.

In your October 23 bilateral with Margaret Thatcher you may wish to reinforce this above assessment.

Attachments

Tab A Text of Gorbachev-Thatcher Letter of October 12

Prepared by:
Bill Wright

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M11-407#117965

BY *RW* DATE 3/26/13

TAB A

85910907

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2-3 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

TAB II

8591090

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National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

II

91090

83 22 P 2: 44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	1	J.	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt Bill Martin	2	✓	A
NSC Secretariat	4	BT	STAFF
Situation Room			
Linhard via Bohn	3	RS	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

This is the cable I addressed
in my PROTS note.

J

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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12

SYSTEM II PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8591097

RECEIVED 21 OCT 85 21

TO MCFARLANE FROM MATLOCK DOCDATE 21 OCT 85
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S 12 SEP 85

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/25/99

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJECT: PRES RESPONSE TO 12 SEPT GORBACHEV LTR

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG DUE: STATUS P FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / R)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>PRES</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>10/22 Signature via DB</i>		<i>VP</i>
	<i>10/22</i>	<i>Mcfarlane approved TAB III ltr</i>		
	<i>10/22</i>	<i>PRES sgd ltr</i>		
<i>STATE</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>10/22 for Dispatch</i>		<i>JW, SE WTH</i>
<i>DISPATCHed CDX & P sheet</i>				
W/ATTCH FILE (C)				

13

05 37 12 PG: 16

C

11/25/44

Extremely
URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOG #: 91097

URGENT

Extremely URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 91097 14

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Date 22 OCT 1985

Subject: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

Amb. McFarlane	Mr. Dobriansky	Col. Linhard	Mr. Robinson	Mr. Teicher
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Mr. Kimmitt		Mr. Mahley	Col. Rye	Cmdr. Thompson
Mr. Pearson	Col. Douglass	Mr. Martin	Mr. Sable	Mr. Wigg
Mr. Burghardt	Mr. Fortier	Mr. Matlock	Mr. Sestanovich	Mr. Wood
Mr. Cannistraro	Mr. Grimes	Mr. Menges	Mr. Sigur	Mr. Wright
Ltc. Childress	Mr. Kraemer	Mr. McMinn	Ms. Small	NSC Secretariat
Col. Cobb	Mr. Laux	Ltc. North	Mr. Sommer	Sit. Room
Mr. Covey	Mr. C. Lehman	Mr. Raymond	Cmdr. Stark	NSC Admin.
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Mr. De Graffenreid	Mr. Levine	Mr. Ringdahl	Ms. Tahir-Kheli	

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Date

Time

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THE VICE PRESIDENT
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Pentagon

ORIGINAL

10/22

324

Johnson

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 91097

Date 22 OCT 1985

Subject: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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Mr. Kimmitt		Mr. Mahley	Col. Rye	Cmdr. Thompson
Mr. Pearson	Col. Douglass	Mr. Martin	Mr. Sable	Mr. Wigg
Mr. Burghardt	Mr. Fortier	Mr. Matlock	Mr. Sestanovich	Mr. Wood
Mr. Cannistraro	Mr. Grimes	Mr. Menges	Mr. Sigur	Mr. Wright
Ltc. Childress	Mr. Kraemer	Mr. McMinn	Ms. Small	NSC Secretariat
Col. Cobb	Mr. Laux	Ltc. North	Mr. Sommer	Sit. Room
Mr. Covey	Mr. C. Lehman	Mr. Raymond	Cmdr. Stark	NSC Admin.
Mr. Cox	Mr. R. Lehman	Ms. Reger	Mr. Steiner	
Mr. De Graffenreid	Mr. Levine	Mr. Ringdahl	Ms. Tahir-Kheli	

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, ACDA

ORIGINAL

10/22

Colette D. Johnson

15

C

12/25/44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WILLIAM MARTIN btm 456-2224 _____
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV

LOG #: 91097

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
STATE	NICK PLATT	Executive Secretary	

URGENT

REMARKS VERY URGENT. FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING TO EMBASSY MOSCOW.
ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW. PLEASE POUCH ORIGINAL LTR TO EMBASSY
MOSCOW FOR DELIVERY IN MOSCOW AT OOB TOMORROW, OCT 23.

URGENT

REFERRAL

DATE: 22 OCT 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: NICK PLATT

DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 22 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

URGENT

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL LTR

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 23 OCT 85

COMMENTS: ADVANCE SENT BY LDX. ORIGINAL LTR SHOULD BE SENT URGENT BY

POUCH FOR DELIVER IN MOSCOW, OOB TOMORROW, 27 OCT.


WILLIAM F. MARTINFOR ~~ROBERT XXXXXXXXX~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

F SII O B C B

URGENT

17

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to the meeting and to the prospect of more constructive relations. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will address the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary is a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as its unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

We both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All nations, particularly

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NLS F99-051 # 353

BY smf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we have found our regional experts' discussions useful and propose to hold them on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in detail when we meet at Geneva. Even before then, however, I will put before the UN General Assembly an initiative to deal with an important groups of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America. I want you to be aware in advance of the proposal I will make.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts that did most to erode our relationship in the past. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. Of course, each of these conflicts has its own character and requirements, and we approach them with this fact in mind; other conflicts will need separate treatment altogether.

The peace program that I will put before the General Assembly seeks progress at three levels: internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic reconstruction.

Because these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, the starting point must be negotiations between the warring parties in each conflict; in the case of Afghanistan, this would obviously mean your own government. These talks may take different forms, but we believe that, together with improvement of internal political conditions, they are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, a second level of the process would be useful: separate U.S.-Soviet discussions, aimed at supporting the negotiating process between the warring parties. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations; needless to say, it is not for us to impose solutions. In some cases, however, it would be appropriate to consider guarantees for agreements reached. In every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and restraint on the flow of outside arms.

If the first two stages are successful, a third would then become possible: the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United State is prepared to contribute generously at this stage.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We want to strengthen these existing

mechanisms, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce them.

I feel that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation that neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts, and will offer early support for my proposal. If so, you will find us willing to do our part, and to make the most of opportunities thereby opened for progress on other critical issues.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II
91097

21

October 22, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

To sign the attached letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Facts

We have prepared a letter to Gorbachev outlining the regional initiative you will be making in your General Assembly address.

Discussion

The attached letter responds to Gorbachev's letter of September 12 which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered when you met with him September 27. In addition, it gives Gorbachev advance notice of the regional initiative you will be proposing in your speech to the UN General Assembly on Thursday.

Recommendation

OK

No

RR

That you sign the attached letter to Gorbachev.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RR
cc Vice President

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

343

System #

II

Package #

91097

85 OCT 21 P 8: 58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
William Martin	<u>5</u>	<u>W.M.</u>	<u>Review</u>
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson	<u>2</u>		
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>Lo seen</u>	<u>A</u>
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>W.M.</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room		<u>W.M.</u>	<u>LOX</u>

I = Information

A = Action

cc VP Regan Dickson
 ()
 on
 Send to State for dispatch.
 Delivery instructions should
 be to deliver at OOB
 on Wed 23 Oct.
 PM

8591077 28

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

34

7

23

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AMB MATLOCK'S VERSION

117993

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I would like to thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when we met in the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to my meeting with you and to the prospect of making our relations more constructive. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will be addressing the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary provides us all with a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as the organization's unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

At the same time we must both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M11-407 #117913

BY RW NARA DATE 3/26/13

nations, particularly those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts. In this regard, I was pleased to note in your recent letter that you thought it useful for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to seek, "wherever possible practical solutions." I believe that with the proper will on both sides, it will be possible to find such solutions.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we believe that our regional experts' discussions have been useful and have proposed that we hold such exchanges on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in considerable detail when we meet at Geneva.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts which eroded our relationship in past years. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. I have in mind a peace process that seeks progress at three levels encompassing internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and

economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. We must recognize, of course, that every regional dispute will have its own particular character and requirements. In some instances the international dimension of the problem would need to be addressed at the outset, in others the local reconciliation process would take priority.

Recognizing that these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, one step must be negotiations between the real adversaries in the conflict; as the process of negotiation moved forward, an end to violence with national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops could be envisioned.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, separate U.S.-Soviet discussions could begin. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations but would aim to support the negotiating process between the warring parties. The focus would be on ending or preventing the resumption of outside military presence.

In some cases they might offer guarantees for agreements reached, but in every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and limitation of the flow of outside arms.

If the first two stages are successful, it would make possible the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United States is prepared to contribute generously to this effort.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We agree with that assessment, want to strengthen these existing fora, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce those mechanisms.

I fear that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation which neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts. If so, you will find us willing to do our part to reduce our respective military involvement in these regions.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

II

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DEPT OF STATE VERSION

2
Pres Green

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u> <u>X</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>advance</u>
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>advance</u>
William Martin	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

ASAP
(Date/Time)

But,
Have discussed w/ Metlock. Recommend
Presidential green to be signed at 1030 then move to
convert letter to a demarche / I'll for Martin
Metlock says should go not tomorrow, Dr.
Bob

117974

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I would like to thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when we met in the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to my meeting with you and to the prospect of making our relations more constructive. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will be addressing the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary provides us all with a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as the organization's unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

At the same time we must both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MIL-407 #117974
BY RW NARA DATE 3/26/13

nations, particularly those directly involved must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts. In this regard, I was pleased to note in your recent letter that you thought it useful for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to seek, "wherever possible practical solutions." I believe that with the proper will on both sides, it will be possible to find such solutions.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we believe that our regional experts' discussions have been useful and have proposed that we hold such exchanges on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in considerable detail when we meet at Geneva.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. As you are aware, in our view the Soviet Union's resort to direct use of force, as in Afghanistan, its use of proxies in other areas, and its willingness to take advantage of unsettled local situations to impose governments against the will of the people all contributed to the deterioration of relations between our countries in the last decade. The regimes which the Soviet Union has supported are repressive and unpopular, and have not established themselves despite outside military intervention, often including advisers, foreign troops and massive military supplies. In fact the policies of these Soviet-style regimes have given rise to indigenous opposition seeking to liberalize or overthrow them.

I have made clear on many occasions our sympathies are with freedom-loving peoples everywhere who fight for genuine self-determination. At the same time, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts which eroded our relationship in past years. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. I have in mind a peace process that seeks progress at three levels encompassing internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. We must recognize, of course, that every regional dispute will have its own particular character and requirements. In some instances the international dimension of the problem would need to be addressed at the outset, in others the local reconciliation process would take priority.

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If the first two states are successful, it would make possible the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United States is prepared to contribute generously to this effort.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We agree with that assessment, want to strengthen these existing fora, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce those mechanisms.

I fear that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation which neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts. If so, you will find us willing to do our part to reduce our respective military involvement in these regions.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MD
5/25/94

JB

MESSAGE NO. 002175 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE No. Pages 5
FROM: BRUNSON MCKINLEY S/S 22540 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
CABLE TO MOSCOW - PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
UNDER COVER OF PLATT/MCFARLANE

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	MR. ROBERT PEARSON		
NSC	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	395-3044	
	SECRET		
	MARTIN, INFO		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

FOR CLEARANCE PLEASE BY: COB TODAY, OCTOBER 21st.

Clearance

Copy to Matlock:

S/S Officer: Bo K. / TF for

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

85

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