

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR (03/25/1982) (2 of 2)

Box: RAC Box 22

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/9/2015

File Folder USSR (3/25/82) (2)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

242

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170304	MEMO	D. GREGG TO W. CLARK RE POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES	1	3/25/1982	B1
	R	1/13/2012	CREST NLR-748-22-25-1-5		
170305	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	3/26/1982	B1
	R	1/13/2012	CREST NLR-748-22-25-1-5		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

TAB D

2

MONDALE INTERVIEW

A. Content of Forgery--A bogus interview with then Vice President Mondale quoting him as saying that he did not consider either Prime Minister Begin of Israel or President Sadat of Egypt as suitable to the task of conducting the Camp David negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement. The Vice President also was quoted as saying that "everyone knows" Begin has a terminal illness and that President Sadat cannot govern Egypt.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The bogus interview was intended to compromise the Middle East peace process and embarrass the U.S. Administration in the eyes of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders. There was no media replay of the "speech."

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--In July 1978 xerox copies of a forged U.S. Embassy Paris press release were mailed anonymously to newspaper and news service correspondents in Paris.

D. Format of Forgery--The forgery purported to be an interview with Vice President Mondale by one Karl Douglas, who turned out to be a fictitious person. From a technical standpoint, the forgery left much to be desired, containing misspellings, typographical errors and grammatical constructions unlikely to be used by the Vice President or any other educated American.

OFFICE OF THE PRESS ATTACHÉ • AMERICAN EMBASSY • 2, AVENUE GABRIEL, PARIS • ANJ. 74-62

for the press

Vice President Mondale talks to Karl Douglas

July 11, 1978

Excerpts.

Douglas. Mr. Vice President, first of all I want to thank you on behalf of my newspaper's readers for agreeing to see me...

Mondale. Not at all. Everyone here knows my door is open to all comers. I have time until 4 o'clock.

Q. Then I'll come right to the point. Mr. Vice President, what is your opinion about the trend in American-Soviet relations and the present status of the SALT talks? When may we expect a SALT agreement?

A. I guess you couldn't have found a more difficult question to lead off with, but I will sum up my opinion briefly on this composite question which has such vital importance for the whole world. American-Soviet relationships have deteriorated, in fact declined, during recent months. Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa, the strengthening of the aggressive potential of the Warsaw Pact forces and the stalling of the SALT discussions have created serious tensions in relations between the two countries.

Q. A few months ago it seemed - and President Carter affirmed this several times in public - only certain unimportant points needed to be cleared up before signing the SALT II agreement.

A. Yes, more than once it looked as if all serious hurdles had been cleared and it was a matter of days or weeks and SALT II would be signed, yet nothing happened. At the last minute the Soviet Union either made another political move or came up with a new proposal which prevented the signing of the SALT II agreement we all are so anxious to see concluded.

- Q. What political moves do you have in mind?
- A. Measures of both domestic and foreign policy. Take the activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Ghana, or the political trials going on in the Soviet Union, not to speak of the Soviets presenting proposal after proposal while they steadily expand their arsenal of nuclear and conventional weaponry. For example there is the SS-20 ballistics missile which substantially increased the Soviet threat to military and civilian targets. I mention this merely to illustrate one of the many things which conflict with our goals. We are committed to the further reduction of nuclear weapons, to the stricter limitation of updating and new delivery systems, but we cannot do it alone. If the SALT II talks are to be successful, the Soviet Union must display the same commitment.
- Q. From what you say, you believe the events in Africa are also having a broad negative impact on the SALT II talks....?
- A. Yes that is very true. In our opinion the reduction of tensions must not be confined to one or two continents. Not only Europe, but Africa also wants to benefit from reduced tensions, and this is understandable. Present Soviet policy in Africa has nothing in common with this noble goal. When can we expect a SALT II agreement? It is very difficult to give an unequivocal answer at this moment because so much could happen in the interim. In all events one thing is sure, we will not conclude an agreement at any price, we will wait patiently until the Soviet Union comes up with a proposal acceptable to us. Fully aware of the present status of the discussions, I would close the question by saying I have no hopes for a quick solution. I am confident though we will be able to wrap up a SALT II agreement if not in the near future then in the distant future.
- Q. I believe that and so do our readers. For long years now the Middle East has contained the danger of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. What do you think of this score now, especially after visiting Israel and Egypt?
- A. I think it is going too far to take such a gloomy and pessimistic view of the question since basically the Middle East problem must be solved by the countries directly involved, first of all by Israel and Egypt, and not by us and the Soviet Union. A big step forward was made toward settling the Middle East problem when Sadat recognized he holds one of the keys to it and began discussions with Israel.

Unfortunately, Sadat stopped short on the way to achieving this goal. We are continuing our efforts to get the talks moving again between Israel and Egypt, but to tell the truth - as was emphasized by the talks with Begin and Sadat - I do not consider either Begin or Sadat suitable for the task, especially because as everyone knows Sadat has a terminal illness, and all Sadat's energy is pinned down by his domestic worries, and he probably won't be able to stand up long in the face of his internal opposition. So there is good reason to expect shifts in personalities in the two countries involved. Should changes of this nature occur, we would welcome at the head of both countries experienced and unbiased politicians able to pursue a realistic policy and willing to mutually and peacefully settle their differences. This would clear the way for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole.

Q. By realistic politicians whom do you have in mind?

A. You've got me there because at the moment it would be hard to mention a concrete name. How now should I put it... in Egypt maybe it could mean a man like Fahmy.

Q. You mentioned that basically it was not up to the United States to solve the Middle East problem. By that do you imply that the United States should play the role of a passive onlooker?

A. Not at all, I didn't say that. As is clearly apparent, we also have military, political and economic interests in the area so any idea we have for a settlement will take the interests of the oil producing countries and Israel into consideration.

Q. Therefore, two opposite poles, or to be more precise oil and Israel or the Israeli lobby, play a large part in the United States plan for settlement?

A. That's exactly it.

Q. And to what extent is the process of settlement helped or hindered by American shipping arms to both sides?

A. As to hindering, it does not hinder by any means; in fact I may say it helps, because our reason for sending weapons to both sides is to create a balance in the region which will assure a firm peace.

Q. Asia has traditionally had an important role in U.S. foreign policy in the past. Is that still true today?

A. Yes, of course. Asia continues to play an important part in our foreign policy. I am thinking first of all of Japan and China, but I would not want to give the impression I am belittling the importance of the other countries of Asia in our policy in Asia. We are committed to guaranteeing that this troubled region will become a symbol of the policy of peaceful coexistence. That is why we are making serious efforts to settle our relationships with Vietnam either this year or early next year. We must, of course, rely basically on Japan and China in achieving our policy in Asia. One major task in this region is to prevent the

6

TAB E

7

HEARD LETTER

A. Content of Forgery--A forged letter from an Air Force official acknowledging that the U.S. would render transport assistance in sending military advisers, light weapons, and equipment from the People's Republic of China to Zaire, and that additional weapons could be dispatched to Zaire from West Germany and Britain.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The letter was intended to embarrass the U.S. and its NATO allies and to support the Soviet propaganda allegation that Western "imperialism" is cooperating with China to suppress national liberation movements in Africa.

Unlike prior examples of Soviet forgeries, this one was not publically released. Rather, it was sent to several Belgian government officials, perhaps with the hope the fabrication would be replayed in the media after the Belgian government made it public. However, this did not happen because the Belgian government immediately was suspicious of the document's origins and never released the letter. The Belgian government did make an inquiry into the matter.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The letter was sent anonymously in late 1978 or early 1979 to selected members of the Belgian Cabinet. It was not released publically by the sender.

D. Format of Forgery--A totally fabricated letter on U.S. Air Force letterhead allegedly sent by Colonel Allen P. Heard, Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, U.S. Department of the Air Force, to a Belgian defense attache in Washington, Colonel Armand Troquet.

135

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



14 July 1978

Colonel Armand Troquet
Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Embassy of Belgium
3330 Carfield Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Colonel Troquet:

I have been authorized to inform you that the U.S. Air Force will render certain assistance with the transport of a limited number of military advisers, light weapons and equipment, from China to Zaire. This action will be implemented in accordance with an ad hoc agreement reached in Peking this year, and after final detailed negotiations between the governments of Zaire and China.

Further contingents of light weapons and equipment, under the same agreement, will be dispatched to Zaire from the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. Headquarters Command, USAF has assumed responsibility for safeguarding this mission, which is being carried out in congruity with our mutual interests in this region of Africa.

Sincerely,

ALLAN P. HENRP, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Foreign Liaison Division
Office of the Vice Chief of Staff



TAB F

9

10

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM *

A. Content of Forgery--A forged State telegram purporting to outline U.S. policy toward the Greek-Turkish dispute as favoring Ankara over Athens.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The telegram was intended to strain U.S.-Greek relations and to undermine NATO. There was no media replay or government inquiry connected with the forgery.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--A copy of what was alleged to be a September 1976 State telegram entitled "Greek-Turkish Dispute in the Aegean" was tabled in the Greek Parliament in March, 1978.

D. Format of Forgery--The document was described by the State Department as a "gross alteration" of the original telegram.

* A copy of this forgery is not available.

17

TAB G

PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH FORGERY

A. Content of Forgery--In the phony speech, President Carter allegedly made demeaning references to the Greek government and reproached Athens for not living up to its responsibilities in NATO.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The bogus speech was intended to strain U.S.-Greek relations. The speech was published by two Athens newspapers, "To Vima" and "Rizospastis" (the official organ of the Moscow wing of the Greek Communist Party).

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The text of the speech was mailed anonymously to several Greek publications in Athens in late December, 1977.

D. Format of Forgery--A low quality reproduction of a bogus U.S. Information Service press release in the "American Perspective Series" of a non-existent speech attributed to President Jimmy Carter. The items contained numerous errors of style and language usage indicating that English was not the native language of the author.

19

TAB H

american PERSPECTIVE

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE ATHENS

September 29, 1977

PRESIDENT CARTER ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK



PRESIDENT CARTER ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

After the signing of the base agreement between the United States and Greece, President Carter commented on several additional problems concerning this area:

The U.S. administration has undertaken a number of steps in order to justly and successfully resolve issues between allies on the southern flank of NATO, and to strengthen the alliance against the danger threatening the Free World in the face of the steadily increasing attempts of Warsaw Pact countries to attain military superiority over the West.

Both parties concerned - Greece and Turkey - must realize that it is their duty to wholeheartedly support these efforts of the United States since resolving this issue is their own concern as well.

The agreement on U.S. bases in Greece signed early in August must be viewed as the first step Greece had to take in an effort to improve its relations to the West. A further step, and the earlier taken the better, must be Greece's full return to NATO and making ensuing provisions. I disagree with statements of some prominent Greek politicians indicating that the accord with the U.S. does not mean Greece's rapprochement with NATO. Quite the contrary. For Greece, in much the same way as for the U.S., the interests of the NATO alliance must be the first and foremost consideration.

I would like to point out that NATO members have the obligation to fulfill their political and military commitments connected with NATO operations, not only in case of a direct communist aggression but also at the time of peace. This also pertains to Greece, which plays a specific role in the defense plans of the alliance, and such commitments are mandatory even for the Greek government.

During the recent NATO Council meeting in May, the necessity for increased efficiency and modernization of the NATO alliance were considered. The overwhelming majority of NATO members comprehended this necessity and agreed to increase their financial appropriations for this program. In this connection it is essential to emphasize that, in certain instances and if the situation demands the potential weakening of the alliance, the U.S. and other NATO countries are entitled to require from all members to fulfill their commitments even if they may not seem to be consonant with the program of the government concerned, and this applies to all countries without exception, including Greece.

We are aware that in recent years the policy of the United States and NATO has become the target of unwarranted criticism by several Greek political leaders, and certain walks of the population including the younger generation. I want to re-emphasize that this criticism is unwarranted and stems from purely individual and nationalist viewpoints. The Greek government as well as the Greek people should realize that the policy of the United States,

based upon the moral principles of the Free World, will never harm the interests of its faithful allies. This policy must, however, be uncompromisingly principal and ensure the protection of the interests of the Free World even at the cost of sacrifices and risks involved. If Greece desires to continue to enjoy the advantages and protection of the United States, it must be prepared to make these sacrifices.

I would like to point out that last July 3 years had elapsed since the beginning of a period of Greece's abnormal relations to its western allies and to our country. We and our allies have exhibited much patience in an effort to allow these problems to resolve themselves. For reasons of ensuring mutual security, to continue to wait however, is no longer feasible. It is necessary to be decisive, and I personally believe that at the very earliest the Greek government will take such measures which are our mutual interest.

During my meeting with the Greek Premier in London, I received with deep satisfaction Mr. Caramanlis' assurance that he would do his utmost to resolve the disputes between Greece and Turkey in accordance with the interests of the alliance and the U.S. This would enhance prospects for increased efficiency in the defense of NATO's southern flank, and a firm wall of defense of the Free World would be erected in this area.

FOUO

LUNS LETTER

A. Content of Forgery--A bogus letter from NATO Secretary General Luns alleging that the Belgian Ministry of Defense was preparing for the U.S. a list of journalists opposed to the neutron weapon. The implication was that journalists whose names appeared on the list could expect to receive official harrassment of some sort.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The letter was part of the Soviet anti-neutron bomb campaign. It also was an effort to damage the U.S./NATO relationship and discredit the NATO Secretary General. NATO authorities immediately disclaimed the letter and publically labeled it a forgery.

In June, 1978, Atlantic News published an article presenting the NATO position. However, the next month the Belgian "De Nieuwe" published a copy of the forged letter with an accompanying article but did not mention that the letter had been officially identified as a forgery. In August, the Dutch newspaper "De Volkskrant" replayed the "De Nieuwe" article.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--In early June, 1978, photocopies of the letter were sent with an anonymous cover letter to several Belgian newspapers.

D. Format of Forgery--The letter--a total fabrication--was written on NATO letterhead from Secretary General Luns to U.S. Ambassador to NATO W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. This forgery bears a distinct resemblance in many aspects to the forged State Airgram A-8950 which was circulated two years earlier. In particular, the format of the anonymous cover letter bears a striking similarity to the one used with the forged Airgram.

Anonymous Cover Letter
1978 Forgery

Messieurs,

Moi, je suis un lecteur régulier de votre journal et l'estime que je vous porte me décide de vous écrire non sans avoir longtemps hésité. Je suis indigné des mesures prises par le Ministère de la Défense nationale contre les journalistes pour leur conscience éveillée et leur souci de la sauvegarde de la paix dans le monde.

La liberté de l'expression de la pensée est une des bases fondamentales de notre société démocratique. La violation de ce droit serait un grand pas vers le totalitarisme. En tant qu'étranger dans votre pays hospitalier j'éprouve de la honte à cause de l'activité d'autres étrangers tels que M. Luns et l'ambassadeur américain à l'OTAN M. Bennett qui me semble-t-il par leurs activités dont il est question dans cette lettre, passent la limite des pouvoirs que nos pays-membres leur ont accordés.

J'espère que vous vous rangerez à mon avis que sur de pareilles questions il est impossible de se taire.

Votre ami

P. S. Je vous prie de vouloir bien me pardonner les fautes commises car le français n'est pas ma langue maternelle.



ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

BRUSSELS, 15 February 1979

Dear Mr. Bennett,

I regret that owing to my official duties it will be hardly possible for us to see each other as we had agreed upon earlier. Today, as you know, I am saying my farewells to my countryman Ambassador Martens and on Friday, the same to Georg Leher in Bonn. Therefore, I am sending you this short note.

Going back to our previous talks I am willing to tell you that with the help of my friends from the Belgian Defence Ministry the listing of the journalists showing negative attitude to the nuclear bomb and to certain aspects of the policy of the Alliance and of your country as well is under way. To avoid any complications, we agreed upon having all this carefully done. There are also some details to be reconsidered since, I am afraid, one of our Belgian friends is, I would say, overzealous in doing his job.

My friends promised to influence the local Foreign Ministry to take appropriate measures concerning the N-bomb too. In this respect it is worth-while considering what sort of material are we to offer to the Royal journalists and to those from the special category to interpret the Alliance's policy in our mutual interest.

In my opinion such a course of things will give better results than the ones we were hoping to get earlier.

Looking forward to seeing you,

(Dr. J. A. M. Luns)

63 772 309

26

TAB I

GREEN LETTER

A. Content of Forgery--A letter denying rumors that 80 infant deaths in Naples, Italy were attributable to chemical and bacteriological weapons stored at a nearby U.S. military base and that destruction of oyster beds at Naples was caused by alleged spillage of chemical and bacteriological substances.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--This forged letter was intended to "confirm" that the U.S. stores chemical and bacteriological weapons at a base near Naples (it does not), and to create pressure for removal of the base.

The forgery was designed to exploit local concern over the infant mortalities, which also was being stirred up in handbills on the same subject that were being distributed anonymously.

Two Italian newspapers--Corriere Della Sera and Il Messaggero--carried the forgery in May 1979.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The forged letter was mailed to several newspapers in Naples in April, 1979. There was no cover letter.

D. Format of Forgery--A totally fabricated letter on official U.S. Embassy Rome letterhead with a reproduction of the signature of the U.S. Defense Attache in Rome, William C. Green.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defense Attache Office
Rome, Italy

29 March 1979

Chief Editor of PRESENZA SOCIALDEMOCRATICA
Via Maddaloni 6,
80134 Naples

Dear Sir:

I wish to notify you officially that the rumors suggesting the death of the children in Naples could be due to chemicals or bacteriological substances stored at NATO, or rather American bases near Naples, are completely unwarranted. I think those rumors hinting that the containers which disappeared in December, 1977 held substances dangerous to human beings are especially harmful. Just as absurd is the idea that the oyster beds at Naples will have to be periodically destroyed if the substances spill into the sea.

There is no truth to the gossip that the Italian and foreign specialists investigating the matter are acting under duress and the influence of US military agencies.

U.S. officials believe the present Naples administration, which is incapable of handling the sanitation problem of the city, is solely and exclusively responsible for the regrettable epidemic among the children.

I hope your newspaper will inform the Italian public about the matter in line with the above. I am also taking this opportunity to convey my profound condolences to the parents of the dead children.

Sincerely,

W.C. Green
WILLIAM C. GREEN
Captain, U.S. Navy
U.S. Defense and Naval Attache

WCG/jdm

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

A. Content of Forgery--U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann F. Eilts purportedly attacked President Sadat for his lack of leadership, foresight, and political acuity. A final paragraph alleged that the CIA Chief of Station in Cairo concurred with Eilts' assessment of Sadat.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The bogus memorandum was intended to compromise Ambassador Eilts' working relationship with Sadat and to embarrass the U.S. Government. While there was an inquiry by the Egyptian government, the matter received no coverage in the press.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--Photocopies of this forgery were mailed to ten Egyptian newspapers and magazines in June 1977. There was no cover letter.

D. Format of Forgery--The item was on a genuine "Operations Memorandum" form bearing the forged signature of Ambassador Eilts. The form itself was filled in, with errors, by the forger and was classified "TOP SECRET."

155

FORM DS-642
1-1-77

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

Date: March 28, 1977

FROM: EMBASSY IN CAIRO

SUBJECT: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

REF: W.O.-C-7985-H-77

With reference to my previous reports and the new guidelines discussed in Washington, I have paid close attention to political developments here with special emphasis on how the Sadat Government is tackling the problems posed by the January disturbances.

As time passes, it becomes clear that two major factors helped trigger the January riots: for the first time over a long period, President Sadat came up against the opposition of his advisers, and the Cabinet displayed a large degree of impotency.

President Sadat's attempts to blame the communists and Nasser followers for the January events failed miserably and was poorly conceived even as a propaganda ploy. The Government reshuffle was not carried out and nepotism is as bad as ever. Serious differences persist in the Government. The ministers of information and of welfare openly criticized the President's domestic policy and, in particular, his wife's activity and meddling in political matters.

Since January, there have been no signs of improvement in the posture of President Sadat and his Government. The country's economy is still in crisis. Aid received so far is insufficient for an intensive economic upturn since a good part goes down the drain of corruption. Unfortunately, the same can be said about the aid given by us which, some Egyptian friends say, is being dissipated by the Government. Business leaders in the Government do not have the conception to enable them to find a way out of the country's deplorable economic situation. According to Deputy

32

156

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Prime Minister Kaisuni, aid for this year was obtained only after intensive and protracted negotiations, and even then as the result of personal contacts. Additional loans from the gulf countries of Arab states will be harder to get in the future and Arab capital funds can be ruled out for the time being.

The Government also was unsuccessful in decreasing the chronic budget deficit. Kaisuni believes the only realistic way to do it is to drastically raise prices of industrial and agricultural products and consumer goods. He claims to have the agreement of President Sadat and Prime Minister Salem on this, although they are afraid of political repercussions similar to those in January.

Some Egyptian politicians view the statement on the Geneva Conference issue as a major reason for the difficulties, arguing it has undercut Egypt's stance which, in turn, discourages investment in Egypt.

Despite salary raises, bonuses and Mr. Gamassi's February tour, army morale has not improved. Not a single branch of service possesses adequate reserves or spare parts, and this is creating a hiatus in military matters. The country's economic situation and the political measures introduced prevent Gamassi from acting on the army's demands; consequently, his position in the army is being eroded, and weaponry modernization is also suffering. President Sadat's latest decision to station the army outside Cairo is not the most fortunate step. The army resents it as a sign of lack of confidence.

Discontent is burgeoning among all segments of the population. The fact that former Nasser politicians are resuming their activity, the incompetence of the Sadat leadership and the incredible economic and political corruption all indicate an explosive potential which may get out of our control.

63 772 332

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

The President's leadership style leaves much to be desired and this could be an obstacle to our plan for a settlement in the Middle East. Close associates of the President are shocked to see that recently he has displayed reluctance to read the reports, analyses and proposals prepared on the country's affairs or to devote proper attention to the country's problems.

I discussed the problem at length several times with Mr. Fees who was of the same opinion. The defects in President Sadat's style of leadership were described very well in a character study prepared by a friend of Mr. Fees. After reading the characterization, I am even more convinced that Mr. Sadat may not be the most suitable person to put across our plan for Egypt and the Middle East.

M. G. Galtz

FORGOTTEN

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8201735

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
4/9/83

RECEI

20 MAR 82 09

FROM ROBINSON, G

DOC DATE 10 MAR 82

TO CLARK

KEYWORDS: USSR

ICA

SUBJECT: SOVIET & SOVIET PROXY FORGERIES OF US GOVT DOCUMENTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 24 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

LORD

MYER

COMMENTS

REF #

LOG

NSC IF ID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Clark x 3/24 for signature
3/25 Clark sgd memo RPLO

DISPATCH

done dom 3/25

WATCH

FILE

PA (cdsm)

~~SECRET~~

1881

MW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 25, 1982

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD GREGG *dg*

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Moves--A Preliminary Alert

WPC HAS SEEN

I am in regular contact with Fred Hutchinson, CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Warning. We talked this morning about the possible meaning of Brezhnev's remark about putting the United States "in an analogous position" if we did not react positively to the latest Soviet proposal regarding strategic weapons deployment. Hutchinson indicated that there have been, since November and December, veiled indications from the Soviets that they might be motivated to deploy the SS-20 closer to the United States if we proceeded with our plans for Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. CIA is now giving priority attention to the implications of a series of Soviet moves in Cuba, such as the deployment of nuclear capable FLOGGER D aircraft, the possible deployment of FENCER aircraft to Cuba, the future construction of ground support facilities for the SS-20, etc.

Hutchinson believes that it is possible the Soviets may undertake such a series of steps to create bargaining chips in their efforts to deter our planned deployments in Europe. The possibility and impact of these steps is now being actively examined at CIA.

The purpose of this memorandum is twofold:

- To alert you to what is going on and
- To encourage those of you with a direct interest to communicate with CIA on this matter so that their examination of this issue can be as comprehensive as it needs to be.

cc: R. Pipes
N. Bailey
H. Russell
J. Rentschler
M. Guhin

CRIT
MLRR *NLR-76-22-25-1-5*

BY *CN* NARA DATE *11/13/12*

~~SECRET~~

Review on March 25, 2002

~~SECRET~~

37

91

37

National Security Council The White House

Package # _____

NOV 20 1956

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

RECEIVED 26 MAR 82 09

38

TO CLARK

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 25 MAR 82

170305

KEYWORDS: USSR

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CUBA

DECLASSIFIED
CRO+
NLRR 748-2225-1-5
BY GL NARA DATE 1/13/12

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES A PRELIMINARY ALERT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(V /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 4/2 noted by Clark DG

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)