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**Folder Title:**

USSR (04/06/1982-04/12/1982)

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 11/13/2015

**File Folder** USSR (4/6/82-4/12/82)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 22

SKINNER

245

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170361	CABLE	MOSCOW 2790 <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-28-1-2</b>	1	4/6/1982	B1
170362	MEMO	RE USSR: THE SUCCESSION PROCESS <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-28-2-1</b>	1	4/6/1982	B1
170363	CABLE	MOSCOW 4252 <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-28-3-0</b>	3	4/8/1982	B1
170364	MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK: SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN UPDATE <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-28-4-9</b>	1	4/9/1982	B1
170365	MEMO	BOB LINHARD TO R. MCFARLANE RE DATA ON SS-17/18/19 (INCL. NSC PROFILE SHEET AND ATTACHMENT) <b>PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-22-28-5-8</b>	3	4/13/1982	B1
170366	MEMO	RE SOVIET FORCES (INCL. ATTACHED TABLES)	5	2/22/1982	B1 B3
170367	MEMO	N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE MEETING WITH ED MEESE AND SEC. BLOCK (INCL. ATTACHED REPORT)	6	4/6/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 11/13/2015

**File Folder** USSR (4/6/82-4/12/82)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 22

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245

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170368	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE AND DICK BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE 12/5/82 MEETING <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-28-7-6</b>	2	12/4/1982	B1
170369	TALKING POINTS	RE MEETING <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-28-8-5</b>	2	ND	B1
170370	REPORT	RE INF NEGOTIATIONS <b>PAR 1/26/2012 CREST NLR-748-22-28-9-4</b>	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170361

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1457  
SIT689 DATE 04/15/82

DTG: 061905Z APR 82 PSN: 027745  
TOR: 096/2040Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP WHLR VP EOB MR  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #1457 0961938  
O 061905Z APR 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2790

~~SECRET~~ STATE 091457

NOBIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 04/01/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)  
TAGS: ABLD, PDIP, US, UR  
SUBJECT: KIEV CONSULATE ISSUE

1. ~~(S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY MEMBERS OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO SUPPORT AT PRESENT FOR PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH A DEFINITE POSITIVE SIGNAL ON THE QUESTION OF OPENING A CONSULATE IN KIEV. WE HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT, DESPITE STRONG ENTHUSIASM FOR A KIEV CONSULATE ON THE PART OF THE UKRAINIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AT LARGE (AND THEREFORE CONGRESS) WOULD BE TOUGH TO CONVINCE, IN THE WAKE OF THE POLISH CRISIS, THAT SUCH A POSITIVE SIGNAL WOULD BE IN ORDER.

3. THEREFORE, AT PRESENT WE CANNOT GIVE KORNIYENKO ANY DEFINITE INDICATION THAT WE INTEND EVENTUALLY TO RETURN TO KIEV. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, LIKE TO KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN WITH REGARD TO STRELETSKAYA, IF POSSIBLE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. AMBASSADOR IS THEREFORE REQUESTED TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH KORNIYENKO ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

--WHEN THE SECRETARY MOST RECENTLY MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN GENEVA, WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO PROPOSE FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES QUESTION, BUT THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES HAD NARROWED THE SCOPE FOR THIS KIND OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.

--THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE SITUATION. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE CANNOT AT THIS TIME GIVE YOU ANY ASSURANCES OR POSITIVE INDICATIONS CONCERNING THE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES QUESTION.

--ON THE PURELY TECHNICAL QUESTION OF THE STRELETSKAYA

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 748-22-28-1-2

BY KOB

DATE 11/15/15

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1457

DTG: 061905Z APR 82 PSN: 027745

OFFICE BUILDING, WHICH YOU RAISED WITH ME LAST FEBRUARY, WE DO NOT INTEND TO USE THIS BUILDING IN THE NEAR TERM. BUT WE WOULD OF COURSE LIKE THE SOVIET SIDE TO KEEP IT OPEN FOR US.

--WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS THE SOVIET SIDE MAY HAVE ON HOW OUR OPTION ON THE STRELETSKAYA BUILDING CAN BE PRESERVED.

--I WISH TO EMPHASIZE HOWEVER, THAT WE CAN MAKE NO COMMITMENTS, NOR CAN WE GIVE ANY ASSURANCES AT THIS TIME THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE DECIDES TO KEEP STRELETSKAYA OPEN FOR US, IT WILL EVENTUALLY BE USED BY THE U. S. SIDE.  
HAIG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

6 April 1982

NLRR 748-22-28-2-1

MEMORANDUM

BY 66B R DATE 11/13/85

SUBJECT: USSR: The Succession Process

The procedures that the Soviet leadership would follow in replacing Brezhnev as party leader are not specified in party rules, which simply state that the General Secretary is chosen by the Central Committee. Historical precedent provides a more realistic, although hardly conclusive, description of the selection process and the signs that the outside world would observe when it is under way.

Politburo Decision: Brezhnev's 12 surviving colleagues on the Politburo would control the process of selecting his replacement. They would meet as soon as possible after Brezhnev's death, or perhaps before, if it were clear that he was sinking fast. An urgent meeting of the Politburo, therefore, would be one sign that the succession process was under way.

We could not be confident that we would detect such a gathering, although the four Politburo members not normally in Moscow might be noticed coming to the capital. If any Politburo members were abroad at the time of Brezhnev's death--and Gromyko often is--our chances of noticing a suddenly called meeting would improve.

The Politburo's deliberations probably would be preceded by informal consultations, particularly among the senior members. If a powerful consensus in favor of one candidate developed, the Politburo meeting itself would be pro forma.

The Politburo would decide on funeral arrangements and announce the creation of a funeral commission. This commission would not necessarily reflect the new order or rank in the Kremlin. (Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov--the most important Soviet leaders during the first days after Stalin's death--were not on the commission for Stalin's funeral.)

Central Committee Plenum: Preparations for this meeting also would begin quickly. Members of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission would be ordered to Moscow and would probably meet the day after the Politburo had decided on its course of action--or no later than two or three days after Brezhnev's death.

~~SECRET~~

The actions of the Committee would be limited to ratifying the Politburo's decisions except in the unlikely event that the senior leaders were so divided that they could not present a single slate for committee approval. (This did happen in 1957 when a Politburo majority sought to remove Khrushchev from office.) Once the Central Committee had approved the Politburo's decisions, the new leadership appointments would be announced in Pravda.

Announcement of Death: Brezhnev's death could be announced on Soviet TV and radio. If death came slowly, the Soviet populace would probably be informed of his condition. If he died suddenly, the Politburo could delay announcement for perhaps a day until it had a chance to decide on funeral and leadership arrangements. In any case, a commission of doctors would be created to make a report on the cause of death, and its findings would be reported in Pravda.

The Funeral: The new leadership would be given pride of place during the funeral. It is likely that the new party chief would deliver the eulogy and that the leading members of the Politburo would receive protocol honors during Brezhnev's lying in state and funeral procession.

Other Arrangements: During the course of the leadership transition process various security measures probably would be taken.

- Soviet armed forces, particularly those in the Moscow Military District, might be brought to a heightened state of readiness.
- The number of police in the streets of Moscow would be increased, primarily to control the crowds that gather for public viewing of the body and the funeral itself.
- KGB security personnel who protect the leadership would be more active.

~~SECRET~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 4252  
SIT499 DATE 04/15/82

DTG: 081519Z APR 82 PSN: 030934  
TOR: 098/2028Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: SIT PUBS VP EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NOTE

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHMO #4252/01 0981522  
O 081519Z APR 82  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3544

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04252  
NODIS  
CORRECTED COPY (PARA 7)  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/8/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A.) OR-M  
TAGS: MPOL, PEPR  
SUBJ: KORNIYENKO ON LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA AND  
- AFGHANISTAN

1. ~~(2-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY: IN MY APRIL 7 MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO, I GAVE HEAVY EMPHASIS TO LATIN AMERICA AS A MAJOR CONCERN, PARTICULARLY SOVIET RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND SOVIET SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. KORNIYENKO TOOK THE USUAL POSITION THAT THE CUBANS NEEDED ARMS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AN INVASION, A THREAT THEY PERCEIVED AS REAL EVEN IF IT MAY BE MISTAKEN. KORNIYENKO CRITICIZED THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS ON SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN NICARAGUA, BUT WHEN I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD DENY THE SOVIET PRESENCE, HE WAFFLED. KORNIYENKO PREDICTABLY CLAIMED THAT U.S. INTEREST IN DISCUSSIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS WANING, BUT I REJECTED THIS AND ASSURED HIM WE WOULD GET BACK SOON ON THIS MATTER. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD SAY NOTHING ON AFGHANISTAN FOR THE TIME BEING. ON CENTRAL AMERICA, I THINK KORNIYENKO'S REMARKS (OR LACK OF THEM ON THE EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS, DESPITE MY PROMPTING) REFLECT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A CONCERN THAT THE RELEASE OF U.S. DATA ON SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, AND ESPECIALLY THE ELECTIONS, HAVE HINDERED SOVIET PURPOSES IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY.  
LATIN AMERICA  
-----

3. I GAVE HEAVY EMPHASIS TO LATIN AMERICA AS A MAJOR CONCERN, PARTICULARLY SOVIET RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND SOVIET SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT INTO THE REGION. I NOTED THAT WE HAD TALKED WITH VARIOUS PARTIES IN THE REGION, BUT WE ARE NOT AT ALL OPTIMISTIC THAT ANYTHING WILL COME OF IT BECAUSE OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT THE USSR IS SENDING IN. ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN EL SALVADOR. THEY WERE QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO VOTED AND PROVIDED A MAJOR SAMPLING OF REAL SALVADORAN OPINION.

DECLASSIFIED

748-22-28-3-0  
BY LCB NARA DATE 11/3/15

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

5

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 4252

DTG: 081519Z APR 82 PSN: 030934

4. KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT YOU KEEP COMING BACK TO OUR PROVISION OF WEAPONS TO CUBA. HOW DO YOU EXPECT ANYTHING DIFFERENT? AFTER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION CAME IN, THERE WAS A LOT OF TALK ABOUT A POSSIBLE U. S. ATTACK. THE CUBANS WERE VERY WORRIED. U. S. PAPERS KEPT TALKING ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE-AND-MORE HOSTILE LINE IN WASHINGTON ON CUBA. THE CUBANS WERE REALLY CONCERNED. THEY CREATED A MILITIA OF ALMOST ONE-HALF MILLION MEN, AND THEY NEEDED WEAPONS SO IT COULD DEFEND AGAINST AN INVASION. WHY SHOULDN'T THEY BE CONCERNED? THEY MAY BE MISTAKEN, BUT THE CONCERN IS REAL. KORNIYENKO SAID THAT HE WAS NOT TALKING HERE ABOUT THE MIGS, WHICH ARE A DIFFERENT ISSUE AND ARE FOR THE REGULAR ARMY. "THE PLANES HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE 1962 UNDERSTANDING," KORNIYENKO ADDED.

5. KORNIYENKO CONTINUED: YOU SAY THESE WEAPONS GO TO NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR AND OTHER PLACES. YOU CANNOT PROVE IT AND IT IS NOT TRUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TALKS ABOUT SEVENTY SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN NICARAGUA AND A LARGE NUMBER OF CUBAN SOLDIERS. YOU MAY THINK THAT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY CUBANS ARE THERE, BUT WE DO KNOW. AND WE CERTAINLY KNOW ABOUT OUR OWN PEOPLE. THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THESE CHARGES.

6. I ASKED KORNIYENKO IF HE WAS SAYING THAT NO SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS ARE IN NICARAGUA. INTERESTINGLY,

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DTG: 081519Z APR 82 PSN: 030934

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE ANSWERED, "I AM NOT SUPPOSED TO SAY." HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO COMPLAIN: HOW ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND THE SECRETARY'S USE OF THIS UNTRUTH? IS IT INTENTIONAL OR IS HE BEING FED WRONG INFORMATION BY THE SECRET SERVICES? I INFORMED KORNIYENKO THAT WE WERE CONFIDENT OF OUR ESTIMATES. SECRETARY HAIG'S REMARKS TO DOBRYNIN, FAR FROM REFLECTING MISINFORMATION OF U. S. "SECRET SERVICES," WERE FACTUAL STATEMENTS WHICH THE USSR HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DISPROVE.

AFRICA  
-----

7. I SAID WE WOULD FOLLOW UP ON OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AFTER ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP AROUND AFRICA. I SAID WASHINGTON BELIEVED SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES. WE MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS TIMING AND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ANGOLAN AND NAMIBIAN QUESTIONS. PEOPLE ARE GENERALLY MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN THEY WERE FOUR MONTHS AGO. I SAW

MOSCOW 4252

DTG: 081519Z APR 82 PSN: 030934

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

6

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4252  
SIT500 DATE 04/15/82

DTG: 081519Z APR 82 PSN: 030937  
TOR: 098/2030Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NOTE

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHMO #4252/02 0981524  
O 081519Z APR 82  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3545

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 04252  
NODIS  
NO REASON WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT FAVOR SUCH  
DEVELOPMENTS.

8. KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET IMPRESSION IS  
THAT, COMPARED WITH LAST SEPTEMBER, U.S. INTEREST IN  
DISCUSSIONS SEEMS MORE AND MORE TO BE VANISHING.  
I STRONGLY DEMURRED.  
AFGHANISTAN  
-----

9. I SAID I HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN WASHINGTON AND THE  
REASON I HAVE NOTHING TODAY IS THAT WE WANT TO SEE FIRST  
WHAT WILL HAPPEN WITH THE VISIT OF THE UN SPECIAL  
REPRESENTATIVE. I TOLD KORNIYENKO THAT I EXPECTED TO  
HAVE SOME WORD FOR HIM ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.  
KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD WAIT UNTIL  
THE U.S. HAD SOMETHING TO SAY. HARTMAN

SECRET

HW  
7

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 9, 1982

170364

INFORMATION

CLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR 748-22-28-4-9

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES

BY LCDR NARA DATE 4/13/85

SUBJECT:

Soviet and East European Update

WPC HAS SEEN

Polish Economy: Bad and getting worse. Insufficient availability of raw materials and supplies has caused some 40 percent of Polish industrial capacity to be shut down. Light industry has been especially hard hit. For the first time in years there is a surplus of electric power. There is talk of layoffs and an estimated 300,000 Polish workers are said by official Polish newspapers to be threatened with unemployment. High Polish bureaucrats admit both privately and publicly that without the lifting of Western sanctions and fresh credits the Polish economy cannot be improved and faces "catastrophe". There is fear in Warsaw of mass violence caused not by political motives but by anger over the dramatic drop in living standards. (S)

Soviet Union:

Because of personnel shortages, the Soviet Union has altered its student draft deferments, sharply cutting down the number of students eligible for them. (C)

A senior Soviet official told an American executive that because of hard currency shortages, in the immediate future the USSR will have to confine its imports largely to food: even important energy-related projects will have to be delayed. (S)

There are rumors that Soviet authorities have ceased to accept applications from Jews wishing to emigrate. There is a likelihood that Jewish emigration will be completely suspended. (S)

On the succession crisis there is nothing new to report: Brezhnev is suffering from a heart-related complication which has incapacitated him but does not seem to pose an immediate danger to his life. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Derivative multiple sources; review April 2008.

8

**National Security Council  
The White House**

120

8

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch  
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Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8202481

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
14/17/15 608

RECEIVED 09 APR 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 09 APR 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

POLAND

ECONOMICS

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SITUATION IN USSR & POLAND

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO ✓

② 4/23 Clark noted

RP

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W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (c)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 9, 1982

~~INFORMATION~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By 6005 NARA, Date 10/13/83

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *pl*

NOTED

SUBJECT: President's "Invitation" to Brezhnev

The enclosed report (Tab I) from Copenhagen seems to be Moscow's oblique response to the President's oblique invitation to Brezhnev to meet with him in June. It transpires that Moscow would like to transform such an encounter into a full-blown summit. (C)

Attachment:

Tab I Copenhagen's cable No. 4910, dated April 7.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review April 9, 1983.

UNCLASSIFIED

*Requested* 11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01  
EOB262

COPENHAGEN 2497  
AN007164

DTG: 071445Z APR 82 PSN: 030039  
TOR: 098/0630Z CSN: HCE213

DISTRIBUTION: RENT-01 /001 A3

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SIT: PUBS SIT EOB  
EOB:

PRIORITY  
UTS2657  
DE RUDKPNQ #2497 0971500  
R 071445Z APR 82  
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4910

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1470

UNCLAS COPENHAGEN 2497

E. O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: PEPR US UR  
SUBJ: DANISH COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER REPORTS BREZHNEV PRE-  
PARED TO MEET REAGAN

1. LAND OG FOLK, DANISH COMMUNIST PARTY (PRO-MOSCOW) DAILY  
NEWSPAPER, PUBLISHED REPORT APRIL 7 FROM MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT  
PALLE ANDERSEN THAT PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IS PREPARED TO MEET  
PRESIDENT REAGAN. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION OF  
FULL ARTICLE:

2. BEGIN TEXT. BREZHNEV IS PREPARED TO MEET REAGAN.  
MOSCOW (LF). US PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S "SLIGHTLY  
DISGUISED" INVITATION TO THE CPSU'S SECRETARY GENERAL  
AND USSR'S PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV OF THE DAY BEFORE YES-  
TERDAY HAS BEEN RECEIVED WITH THE GREATEST SATISFACTION IN  
MOSCOW. BREZHNEV IS PRESENTLY CONFINED TO HIS BED IN HIS  
OWN HOME. HIS SCHEDULE FOR THE MONTH OF  
MARCH WAS UNSUALLY DIFFICULT AND INCLUDED INTER ALIA THE  
TRADE UNION CONGRESS AND THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET REPUBLIC  
OF UZBEKISTAN.

ACCORDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO "LAND OG  
FOLK", BREZHNEV IS POSITIVELY DISPOSED TOWARDS THE MEETING  
AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH REAGAN IN NEW YORK IN CONTINUATION  
OF THE UN'S SPECIAL SESSION ON A "BROAD RANGE" OF  
DISARMAMENT ISSUES.

THE SESSION IS SCHEDULED FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, BUT  
THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOW AWAITING A MORE CONCRETE MESSAGE  
FROM REAGAN THROUGH THE USUAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

IT HAS BEEN UNDERLINED TO "LAND OG FOLK" THAT ONE  
WOULD LIKE THE MEETING TO BE PREPARED WELL IN ADVANCE,  
AMONG OTHER THINGS THROUGH PRELIMINARY TALKS AT FOREIGN  
MINISTER LEVEL. ON PREVIOUS OCCAIONS, FOR INSTANCE  
AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN  
COTOBER LAST YEAR, BREZHNEV HAVE MORE THAN HINTED THAT HE,  
AND THEREBY THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD LIKE A PERSONAL  
MEETING WITH REAGAN -- BUT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING OF  
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT THE USUAL THEATRICAL  
PERFORMANCES OF THIS FALLEN COWBOY. END TEXT.

LOEB  
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 2393

7

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

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Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS



NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8202393

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
11/13/15 CDB

RECEIVED 09 APR 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 09 APR 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: PRES INVITATION TO BREZHNEV

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

STEARMAN

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W/ATTCH FILE

*[Signature]*

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TOP SECRET

ID 8290219

RECEIVED 13 APR 82 17

TO MCFARLANE FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 10 APR 82 14

170365

CREST  
UPLD DUE-748-22-28-5-8

CN MAR DATE 1/13/12

KEYWORDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS USSR  
INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT DATA ON SS-17/18/19 MISSILES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

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MEMORANDUM ~~ED~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ P 5: 40  
6 APR 13  
INFORMATION

April 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C McFARLANE

FROM: BOB LINHARD ~~Re~~

SUBJECT: DATA ON SS-17/18/19

Last week I provided you with data on the SS-17/18/19 ICBMs. At the time I noted that it was based on the approved -- but dated -- NIE.

I have had the agency update the data sheet to reflect the changes in the new NIE. The new NIE has now been approved, but it is not yet distributed.

At TAB A you will find a markup of the sheet provided last week to show you the extent of the change. Two forces are used in the new NIE -- appropriately titled Force 1 and Force 2. The differences between the two forces are explained in the highlighted sections on the first page of TAB B. On the markup sheet (TAB A), the black pencil entries track to the new Force 1, the red pencil entries to the new Force 2.

At TAB B you will find complete extracts from the force tabs for the new NIE.

Please tell me how I can help!

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLR Crest  
BY CL NARA DATE 1/13/12

CC to:  
Thomas Reed  
Ken de Graffenreid

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WITH ATTACHMENTS REMOVED.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Review on April 10, 1998

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**Page Denied**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

22

4/10  
Hornman,  
How do we get  
2nd item through

NSC?

Joh

National Security Council  
The White House

115  
23

Package # 2184

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

The second item ought  
to come through NSC  
Judge, [initials]  
You might want to talk  
with Ed Meese on economic  
issues that have a major foreign  
policy impact. John

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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*FOIA*

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SKINNER

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170367	MEMO  N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE MEETING WITH ED MEESE AND SEC. BLOCK (INCL. ATTACHED REPORT)	6	4/6/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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FILE

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14/3/15

ID 8202184

RECEIVED 06 APR 82 18

3

CLARK

FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 06 APR 82

KEYWORDS: GRAINS

USSR

MEESE, E

NSC

FOOD

BLOCK, J

SUBJECT: OUTCOME OF MTG ON 6 APR W/ MEESE & BLOCK ON SOVIET GRAIN AGREEMENT

~~4/13~~  
~~4/19~~  
4/23

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

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PIPES

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OBE

COMMENTS

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	4/10	Clark approved	
Bailey	5 4/10	further action	
NB	4/30	OBE	

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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OF CL ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 22 APR 85 14

TO CLARK

FROM MCFARLANE 14/13/85 KOB

DOC DATE 12 APR 82

BOVERIE

12 APR 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: MTG ON SUNDAY 5 DEC RE OVERTURE TO SOVIETS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

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LOG

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(C).

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

System II  
91082

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

December 4, 1982

170368

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*  
DICK BOVERIE  
SUBJECT: Meeting on Sunday, December 5, 1982.  
Overture to Soviets?

NLR 748-22-28-7-6  
BY 6003 NARA DATE 11/13/15

In the wake of Andropov's succession and based on discussions among the President, Secretary Shultz, and you, it seems appropriate to ask whether it is reasonable to test Soviet interest in seeking to make progress in some area of the relationship. If so, the next question is whether it should be on a regional issue, such as Poland or Afghanistan, on arms control or some other issue such as human rights. For a number of reasons we believe the best opportunity for real progress without damaging U.S. interests lies in arms control.

If the answer is arms control, we have to select which of the principal arms control negotiations we should focus our attention on: START, INF, or MBFR. Given that MBFR is a rather muddled situation and that there are no near-term prospects for settling on an agreed data base on Soviet forces in that area, MBFR is probably not the answer. START is a possibility, since the Soviets have not completely stonewalled us in that area (e.g., they have proposed a limit of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which is a lower limit than SALT II) and the negotiations seem serious. However, positions are far apart, and the Soviets have not accepted the basic objective of the US (substantial reductions in ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight). Achievement of a START agreement in the near term is not likely.

INF is a more promising area for a U.S. initiative than MBFR or START. The INF negotiations have been underway for over a year, and both sides' positions are well understood. The Soviets have recently modified their approach to include some reductions of SS-20s, and their interest in keeping the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel open may indicate the possibility of further movement. In the coming year our Allies will face formidable domestic opposition to the initial deployments of GLCMs and PERSHING IIs; an arms control initiative that did not address INF could undermine our efforts to create an environment in which deployment can proceed. In addition, the changes in the Soviet position will force us to take a hard look at our INF approach in any event.

If the President elects to attempt to make movement on INF, then we have to address two particular factors: process and substance.

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Declassify on: OADR

With respect to process, we could use channels such as meetings between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin in the East Wing of the White House, and/or the private Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel.

With respect to substance, we would need to develop a new proposal which protects Western security interests and is negotiable. Alternative approaches will need to be considered. One possibility would be a proposal based on the approach recommended by Ambassador Nitze last summer (and reiterated by Dr. Rostow in October with modifications reflecting Washington's review):

- Low, equal ceilings on US and Soviet INF missiles targetable on Europe (e.g., 75 launchers or 300 warheads on each side);
- Separate equal ceilings on such missiles outside of Europe;
- Equal ceilings on long-range theater aircraft that would not affect US current or planned forces.

Such an approach would demonstrate US flexibility and serious interest in an agreement, and could be a counter to recent Soviet moves, but our experience this past summer indicates that an agreement along these lines is not likely.

An asymmetric approach requiring substantial reductions of SS-20s but permitting the Soviets a larger number of INF missiles in Europe than the US (implicitly recognizing the existence of British and French forces) could lead to an agreement.

The objectives of the meeting should be to answer the following questions:

- Should we or should we not test Soviet interest in our broad relations by making an overture to the Soviets to reach early agreement on INF?
- If so, what further tasking is necessary, i.e., who needs to do what and by when?

Proposed talking points for your use at the meeting are at Tab A. A general discussion of the possibility for movement in the INF negotiations is at Tab B. A more detailed outline of the notional INF proposals mentioned above is at Tab C.

#### Attachments

Tab A	Talking points
Tab B	Discussion paper
Tab C	INF proposals



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NLRR 748-22-28-8-5

Talking Points

BY 1008 NARA DATE 4/8/13

170369

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-- The President has indicated that it may be appropriate to ask whether it is reasonable to test the interest of the new Soviet leadership in our broad relations.

---

-- Should this test be on a regional issue, such as Poland or Afghanistan, or should it be on arms control? It seems to me that one of the principal arms control negotiations -- START, INF, and MBFR -- is a logical place to begin.

-- There are no near-term prospects for settling on an agreed data base for Soviet forces in MBFR. Also, START has been underway only a few months and our positions are far apart. However, INF has been underway for over a year and both sides' positions are well understood; moreover, Soviet interest in keeping open the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel may indicate possibility of movement.

-- Therefore, I believe that INF is a more promising area for a US initiative than MBFR or START. Additionally, movement in the INF negotiations could improve our chances for successful deployment of our INF systems to Europe.

-- So my basic question is: Should we or should we not test Soviet interest in our broad relations by making an overture to the Soviets to reach early agreement on INF?

- George (Shultz), what do you think?
- (Go around the table, asking other principals how they feel about it.)

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\* \* \* \* \*

-- (After the principals provide their views) -- I think it would be useful if our special high-level working group (Jon Howe, Jim Timbie, Fred Ikle/Richard Perle, Gen Burns - possibly also Ambassador Nitze) would get together and develop, on a close-hold basis, a couple of options for our consideration.

-- I believe that at least one of the options developed should consider implicitly recognizing British and French forces. I know that this could be controversial, but we owe it to ourselves to at least look at the possibility.

-- Also, prospects for verification should be taken into account.

-- It would be useful to have the options for our review within approximately two weeks - not later than December 20th.

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Possibility of Movement in INF Negotiations

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MLRR748-22-28-9-4

BY 1000 NARA DATE 1/26/02

Possible Soviet Interest

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

The Soviets have recently modified their position to require reductions in the number of SS-20s targeted on Europe (from the current level of about 250 to about 150). We can expect that the Soviets will develop this into a public proposition that in return for cancellation of US GLCM and PERSHING II deployment plans, the Soviets would reduce their SS-20s targeted on Europe to 150 and eliminate all the SS-4s and 5s. They would claim that the resulting SS-20 force would have fewer warheads (450) than were deployed on SS-4s and SS-5s in the 1960s and early 1970s, before SS-20 deployment began, and that the 150 SS-20s simply offset a similar number of British and French missiles. This proposal will have considerable appeal in Europe, and if the US does not respond and is perceived as inflexible in its position, our ability to go forward with deployments could be called into question. 170370

While the Soviet approach is clearly designed to appeal to European publics, their interest in keeping open the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel may indicate a willingness to engage in serious negotiations with the US.

Ambassador Nitze has recently returned from Geneva. He has been in close touch with the British and Germans, and believes there is an increasing chance that our NATO allies will reject INF deployments. He is also persuaded that the US needs to develop a response to the new Soviet strategy, and will recommend that the US resume private negotiations in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel.

OSD review completed

State Dept. review completed

Agency Views

State and ACDA can be counted upon to support any reasonable initiative we may wish to take with the Soviets.

DOD would be problematical, with separate elements within DOD generating differing views:

- Dr. Ikle: In a private discussion I had with Dr. Ikle several weeks ago, he seemed to indicate that some movement on arms control would be necessary in the coming months. He was worried about precipitous movement in START, but did say that early progress in INF could be the way to go.
- Richard Perle: Mr. Perle continues to strongly support 0/0 and would undoubtedly be reluctant to move away from that position. The only time I have heard him indicate a

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possibility of a variant was when, in late October, he extemporaneously hypothesized an approach based on O/O with compensation for British and French systems (presumably premised upon a feeling that the British may not deploy TRIDENT II in any event); however, he almost immediately withdrew that hypothetical suggestion.

-- JCS: The JCS might well go along with a break from O/O, provided we would deploy both PERSHING II and GLCM (but there could be flexibility on the quantities).

The Director of Central Intelligence would likely support movement in the INF negotiations. A key question, however, is whether any new proposal would be verifiable (verification is a sticky proposition at best in almost any conceivable INF agreement and could be the ultimate stumbling block for any meaningful movement).

**Page Denied**

Form of Agreement

One approach would be to seek a prompt understanding with the Soviets on the broad outlines of an agreement comparable to the accord worked out by Presidents Ford and Brezhnev in Vladivostok in 1974. The Delegation in Geneva would then produce a Treaty based on this framework.

A second approach would be to make the agreement itself a brief exchange of letters. Such a less formal approach could be considered if we concluded that an agreement was in our interests, but it did not meet our standards for a formal treaty because the levels were unequal or the verification arrangements were subject to question.