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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170406	REPORT	DRAFT PAPER ON PROPOSALS BY SENATORS NUNN AND JACKSON	12	ND	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-22-32-1-7		
170407	REPORT	DOD STUDY (COVER SHEET + PAGES NUMBERED 43-56)	14	ND	B1
170408	REPORT	NSC STAFF EVALUATION RE JACKSON-NUNN PROPOSALS (NUMBERED AS PP. 20-22)	3	ND	B1

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TAB B

TAB B - Interagency Draft Paper Assessing the Proposals of
Senators Nunn and Jackson (Working Group Level Paper)

Draft Paper on Proposals by Senators Nunn and Jackson
for Crisis Control Center and Information Sharing

170406

INTRODUCTION

The Senate adopted an amendment to the FY-83 DoD Authorization Act, entitled "Study of Improved Control of Use of Nuclear Weapons." The amendment, introduced by Senator Nunn, requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a "full and complete study" of selected initiatives, including among others:

- (1) Establishment of a multinational military crisis control center for monitoring and containing the use or potential use of nuclear weapons by third parties or terrorist groups.
- (2) Development of a forum through which the United States and the Soviet Union could exchange information pertaining to nuclear weapons that could potentially be used by third parties or terrorist groups.

In addition, Senator Jackson has proposed the establishment of a Joint US-USSR Consultation Center. He has described the center as an institution for consultation and dialog between the US and USSR and for instantaneous information exchange during nuclear crises "that neither side wanted nor had planned". Jackson has written to the President on this matter and has publicly linked his proposal with the Nunn Amendment proposals and with his own Jackson-Warner Senate Resolution.

This paper describes the features of each proposal, discusses relevant considerations, lists the pros and cons for the proposals, and recommends possible areas for future study. This paper will recommend a response only for the specific Nunn and Jackson proposals outlined above.

I. MULTINATIONAL MILITARY CRISIS CONTROL CENTER

The amendment language describes the objective of the center as being "to monitor and contain the use or potential use of nuclear weapons by third parties or terrorist groups." In Senate remarks, Nunn said the center could "deal constructively with the prospect of a nuclear war triggered by a third country or terrorist group." Discussions with Nunn's staff indicate that Nunn wishes to contain both the acquisition and the use of nuclear weapons by third countries and terrorists. One possible vehicle for achieving these goals, according to Nunn's staff, could be a standing multinational crisis control center, discussed herein. Other possibilities of interest to Nunn -- a bilateral center, or a multilateral/bilateral information sharing forum -- are discussed later in the paper.

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Nunn is motivated by a concern that a disguised attack on the US or the USSR by a third party could lead to a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. He cites a SAC study which shows that both the US and USSR need to improve their warning and attack characterization for dealing with nuclear weapons use by a third country or terrorist group.

Senator Nunn's description of a multinational military crisis control center is sketchy, but suggests that he envisions a standing body with highly professional military and civilian staffing and an extensive communications capability for advising governments on measures to address nuclear activity by a third country or terrorist group. The broad purpose for such measures would be to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used in a non-strategic context. We foresee that other specific functions could include the following:

- To provide a forum for consultation and exchange of information on third country and terrorist nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
- To be able to call immediately into play the mediating efforts of one or more nations to affect the behavior of states or groups which are believed close to a decision to use nuclear weapons, and to warn and seek to influence the response of the intended target states or groups.
- To assist diplomatic and other non-military bilateral or multilateral efforts for the purpose of stabilizing a conflict in which a nuclear detonation had occurred, particularly in order to prevent nuclear escalation.
- To advise on and coordinate the provision of multilateral disaster relief assistance in the event of a nuclear detonation.

3R
These functions are obviously a blend of military, political, and humanitarian functions. At present, no single international organization is tasked specifically to perform these functions. Regular bilateral channels such as embassies perform some of these functions on a case-by-case basis. While some existing multinational fora -- the U.N. Military Staff Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group -- could be revised to permit their performance of the functions above, for practical and political reasons, it is unlikely that any of these bodies could perform the mix of diplomatic, humanitarian, and military functions cited above.

U.N. Military Staff Committee

The Charter of the United Nations provides the Security Council with a Military Staff Committee to consist of the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of the five permanent members of the Council. The Committee was supposed to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to military requirements for maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of armed forces placed at the Security Council's disposal, and the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament.

The Charter contemplated agreements between the Security Council and various governments under which military forces would be made available to the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee, under the Security Council, was supposed to be responsible for the strategic direction of such forces. It also was supposed to assist the Council in determining their strength and degree of readiness, as well as plans for their use in a combined international enforcement action.

The actual status of the Military Staff Committee is quite different from that envisioned above. Because of Soviet intransigence in the Security Council, responsibility for the organization and employment of United Nations military forces in the Israeli-Egyptian, the Congo, and the Cyprus crises was assigned to the Secretary-General. This move, made for obvious political reasons, has relieved the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee from any direct connection with existing United Nations forces.

Accordingly, the potential for managing and resolving crises through the U.N. Military Staff Committee has not been realized. Because of political considerations, it is doubtful that the Committee could serve the crisis control function at this time.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 to promote the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. One of its major functions is to establish and administer a system of safeguards designed to assure that within nonnuclear member states nuclear and other materials, equipment, facilities, services and information are not diverted to military purposes. On-site inspections of member countries' nuclear facilities by IAEA inspectors are an integral part of the safeguard system.

In its nonproliferation work, the IAEA, however, addresses the potential development and/or acquisition of nuclear weapons -- one aspect of Nunn's concerns. But, it does not address the potential use of nuclear weapons, and its jurisdiction is limited to member states.

Expansion of the role of the IAEA to include efforts to limit the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-IAEA member states or terrorist groups, or the potential use of such weapons, would represent a major departure from the present responsibilities of the IAEA and a fundamental change in the character of the organization. The principal national security objective for the US which the IAEA serves is the safeguarding of many of the world's civil nuclear programs. It would not be feasible to encourage the IAEA to take on the responsibilities of a military crisis control center at the present time because of the political difficulties involved. There may be potential for an expanded role in limiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by third parties, but the political difficulties in chartering such an expanded role would be major.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

In 1975 a series of meetings were held in London by the major exporters of nuclear technology and materials to find ways to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation caused by rapid expansion of nuclear technology worldwide and aggravated by aggressive national competition for shares of the world's nuclear market. This Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) adopted a series of guidelines designed to help prevent the diversion of their exports to weapons development. Among the guidelines are requirements for recipients of any nuclear technology to accept IAEA safeguards, to give assurances that nuclear facility imports will not be used to make nuclear explosives for any purpose, and to refrain from transferring any materials or equipment to third countries without obtaining identical assurances. The NSG also drew up a "trigger list" of nuclear exports, including components of sensitive technology.

These export restrictions and the deliberations of the NSG had some influence in limiting French and West German exports. Both governments publicly announced a decision not to enter into any new commitments to supply reprocessing facilities. The NSG published its guidelines in early 1978 and has not met formally since 1977, partly because many of the NSG are sensitive to criticism by developing countries that the NSG is an "exclusive" club which denies technology to developing countries.

Bilateral consultations between NSG members continue to be a major feature of international cooperation on nuclear export control, and these consultations could encompass questions of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear third countries or terrorists. The NSG is, however, limited to its focus on nuclear export control and offers no prospect for accomplishing the functions of a military crisis control center.

None of the foregoing organizations are presently configured or mandated to carry out the functions of Nunn's crisis control center, and there is no reasonable prospect of modifying them to do so. Accordingly, the Nunn proposal must be seen as requiring a fundamentally new institution. Because of its basic crisis management purpose, it would require a degree of cooperation between the US and the USSR that is unprecedented in the post-World War II era. In order to be effective such a center would need to have both a military and a nonmilitary role. If the center were to operate the way Nunn envisions, it would also require a high degree of reliance upon decisions made at the crisis control center. The active cooperation of all the major nuclear weapon/nuclear supplier states would be needed; yet such reliance is highly improbable, particularly in a nuclear emergency. Decisions made during any such crises would undoubtedly be made in national capitals.

The multinational nature of the organization would, of course, compound the problems. In order for any decisions to be made, some political mechanism (such as a weighted voting system) would need to be in place. The broader the membership, the more likely that its decision-making system would become bogged down.

Although the argument above indicates that such a center could not be created to fulfill Senator Nunn's goals, there are a number of other pros and cons to consider.

PROS

- Would enhance US security if the center fulfilled the purposes of keeping abreast of third country and terrorist nuclear developments and furthering nations' understanding of the dangers of nuclear weapons so as to discourage proliferation.
- Demonstrate US willingness to take a lead in and commit resources to the area of nuclear crisis stability, reinforcing inter alia our commitment to nonproliferation and arms control.
- May be useful in crisis situations for exchanging detailed information and analysis, or in case other channels fail to operate as planned.
- May be useful in non-crisis periods for exchanging information or views on contingency plans for crisis situations, or other items involving strategic stability.
- As a negotiating success, could build support for arms control talks.

CONS

- * - The Soviet Union might interpret this center as a means to obtain US intelligence data on the military programs of US allies.
- As in any multinational body, effective functioning would be difficult. Coordination would be particularly difficult where member nations' nonproliferation policies diverge.
- * - Some level of deception and misinformation among members are likely.
- In a crisis requiring rapid US-Soviet interaction, this forum would probably be bypassed in favor of consultation through the US and Soviet embassies or direct contact via the Hotline. Thus the necessity of this forum is questionable.
- * - Information sharing may compromise intelligence sources, methods and capabilities.
- * - Would offer other countries an opportunity to demand multilateral involvement in regional crises (such as in the Middle East) where we do not wish their involvement.
- Would be subject to criticism by nonmembers.

Recommendations on Crisis Control Center

On the basis of the arguments above, the Working Group recommends that Senator Nunn's proposal for a multinational military crisis control center be rejected. A center which could contribute substantially to the goal of containing and controlling a third party nuclear crisis could not be created in today's international climate because most nations would not be willing to accord it the necessary authority to perform crisis management functions.

Some elements of Senator Nunn's crisis center proposal are worthy of further development, however. We will explore two options which could reduce the chances of a nuclear event precipitating a US-USSR crisis.

- Develop procedures for the exchange of information in specific emergency situations. A US-USSR bilateral treaty could be negotiated, with a protocol allowing third countries to become participants (precedents include the US-Panama Canal Treaty and a number of bi/trilateral arms control agreements arrived at soon after World War II). Alternatively, a multinational accord could be negotiated.

- Establish separate, national crisis control centers connected by a multinational communications hotline, parallel to but not connected with the DCL Hotline, for use during crises resulting from nuclear weapons use by third parties. (Currently, RAND is undertaking a study for OSD that analyzes this option, among other things.)

The Soviet Union has recently proposed that the US and USSR cooperate in creating a standing committee in the IAEA to monitor events and trends in nonproliferation. The US rejected the idea of a standing committee but has agreed in principle to a US-USSR nonproliferation bilateral. This represents an effort to pursue goals similar to those that partly motivated Nunn's crisis control center proposal. Although preliminary discussions are extremely sensitive, the background on these consultations is provided below.

With the President's authorization, the Secretary of State suggested to Gromyko during their discussions at UNGA that the US and the Soviet Union agree to conduct bilateral consultations on nonproliferation issues in the near future. The USSR agreed to do so.

We are now discussing timing, venue and a possible agenda for such a meeting with the Soviets and expect agreement to meet in Washington or Moscow during December or January. The meeting would be exploratory, designed to canvass the possibilities for constructive action in an area in which our interests are parallel. As the talks progress, we may be able to direct them more toward the concerns which we share with Senator Nunn.

The discussions would be managed in such a way as to reinforce, rather than compete with, multilateral nonproliferation discussions in the IAEA. While it is possible that any bilateral meeting could become public, we will not seek to publicize these consultations ourselves so as to avoid unrealistic expectations about the results we may achieve or any suggestion that we wish to create a US-Soviet condominium on this issue.

Conclusion

The Working Group recommends that the Administration respond to Senator Nunn's military crisis control center proposal in the following way:

- that his proposal for a multinational military crisis control center is not feasible as proposed and that some of its functions are being or could be handled by existing organizations.
- that such a center could not be created today because nations would be unwilling to give the center the crisis management authority it would need.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- that we recognize that his concern is with solving the problems of reducing the risk of nuclear war arising from third party use of nuclear weapons, not with his specific proposal.
- that the examination of his proposal helped generate some new thinking for preventing/reducing the risks of third party nuclear weapons.
- that those new ideas include at least two options, the multinational accord on nuclear emergencies and the multinational crisis control center hotline, which will be explored further in the coming months.
- that we share his recognition that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by third countries or terrorist groups is an equally important aspect of the problem.
- that the US and USSR are already planning to engage in sensitive discussions to explore reinforcing multilateral nonproliferation efforts.

II. US-USSR INFORMATION SHARING FORUM

Senator Nunn originally envisioned and still discusses the military crisis control center as possibly taking the form of "joint U.S.-Soviet information sharing combined with a multinational center for crisis management." In his amendment, though, Nunn separated the information sharing forum from the crisis control center.

The stated objective of the information sharing forum is to exchange information in advance on the acquisition of nuclear weapons that could be used by third countries or terrorists. This objective is not premised on a requirement to be able to take military action to prevent such use.

Currently, the types of information described above are exchanged on a case-by-case basis through existing channels, including embassies and multinational organizations. Some pros and cons of the more limited US-USSR information sharing forum follow.

PROs

- Demonstrate US willingness to take a lead in and commit resources to the area of nuclear crisis stability, reinforcing inter alia our commitment to nonproliferation and arms control.
- May be useful in crisis situations for exchanging detailed information and analysis, or in case other bilateral channels fail to operate as planned.
- May be useful in non-crisis periods for exchanging information or views on contingency plans for crisis situations, or other items involving strategic stability.

- May encourage greater Soviet responsiveness in other bilateral negotiations.
- Could reduce world public criticism that the US and USSR are not talking to one another.

CONS

- * - Information sharing could compromise some intelligence sources, methods and capabilities.
- * - The Soviet Union might interpret this center as a means to obtain US intelligence data on the military programs of US allies.
- * - Some degree of deception and misinformation are likely.
- * - Could be perceived as an example of the "superpower condominium," particularly by potential developers of nuclear weapons.
- Would exclude other countries whose participation could be valuable.

Recommendations on Information Sharing Forum

There are probably potential benefits from expanded information exchange with the USSR. These benefits might even be enhanced by developing a mechanism which goes beyond Senator Nunn's proposal for a joint US-USSR forum to include all interested countries. Advance exchange of appropriate information and, particularly, development of exchange procedures could reduce the chances of third party nuclear weapons crises arising. In addition, the upcoming US-USSR nonproliferation consultations could potentially contribute to risk-reducing information exchange procedures.

On the other hand, it might be more appropriate at this time to pursue the expansion of information sharing within existing fora and channels.

Conclusion

The Working Group recommends that the Administration respond to Senator Nunn's proposal for a US-USSR information sharing forum in the following way:

- that the objective behind his proposal is one which we share.
- that such a separate forum is not a viable option at this time, however.

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- that opportunities do exist for expanding US-USSR and/or multinational information exchanges along lines that address Nunn's concerns. These opportunities include the IAEA, the bilateral nonproliferation consultations, and the options included in Section I.
- that we prefer at this time to pursue these and not to seek formally to establish a separate forum

III. JOINT US-USSR CONSULTATION CENTER

Senator Jackson has described his center as a "permanent institution for superpower consultation, dialog, and instant information exchange when incidents arose that could trigger a nuclear exchange that neither side wanted nor had planned." The center would also develop and put in place measures to help prevent nuclear crises as well as resolve them.

There are several key differences between Jackson's proposal and that of Senator Nunn. Under Jackson's proposal, consultations would take place in any nuclear crisis arising from misunderstanding or misinterpretations as well as those resulting from nuclear weapons use by a third party. Jackson's center would be bilateral, as compared to Nunn's multinational center (Nunn's proposal does provide for a bilateral information exchange forum).

Jackson's center would be headed by senior diplomatic personnel with broad US-Soviet experience. These diplomats would require a secure, direct communications link to their respective highest leaders (e.g., President, SecState, SecDef). In addition, the staff would include military and technical personnel, who would interact daily with the staff of the other side. The center would need to be a low-profile, relatively propaganda-free operation in a mutually-acceptable, presumably neutral location.

Problems associated with a crisis resolution facility were described in the discussion of Nunn's crisis control center. As with Nunn's center, the advent of a true crisis would probably result in the circumvention of any crisis control center located in a third country. Jackson's argument that his face-to-face consultation would be better and faster than the US-USSR Hotline is groundless, because the procedures that the center's staff would have to follow would only add extra time and steps to any crisis resolution process. Instead of just a series of President-to-President messages on the Hotline, Jackson's mechanism would also add a series of messages back and forth between the respective capitals and the consultation center. Such a mechanism would only slow up crisis resolution and would therefore be bypassed.

Jackson also sees potential benefits from the ongoing dialog in his proposed center, and it is possible that exchanging information such as Jackson envisions would help prevent crises. In addition, the center could carry out a possible CBM-development role, which could be useful. The specific proposals which Jackson outlines are already dealt with in existing negotiations, however, and in the President's own CBM initiatives which will be proposed in his upcoming speech. These proposals include:

- expanded prelaunch notifications for ballistic missile launches
- advance notification of major military exercises which could be perceived as potentially threatening
- expanded exchange of information on nuclear forces, including deployed forces and those in storage.

Some pros and cons of the Jackson proposal for a consultation center include:

PROs

- Might provide some US-USSR ability to jointly undertake preventive or stabilizing actions in crisis situations and possibly to offer a ready apparatus for the distribution of material assistance to victims of a limited scale nuclear attack or accident.
- Demonstrate US willingness to take a lead in and commit resources to the area of nuclear crisis stability, reinforcing inter alia our commitment to nonproliferation and arms control.
- May be useful in crisis situations for exchanging detailed information and analysis or in case other channels fail.
- May be useful in non-crisis periods for exchanging information or views on contingency plans for crisis situations, or other items involving strategic stability.
- As a negotiating success, could build support for arms control talks.
- Could reduce world public criticism that the US and USSR are not talking to one another.

CONS

- The Soviets might use the center to pursue the sharing of intelligence data on the military programs of US allies.
- Deception and misinformation are likely. (But implications and degree of risk need further study.)

- In a crisis requiring rapid US-Soviet interaction, this forum would probably be bypassed in favor of consultation through the US and Soviet embassies or direct contact via the Hotline. Thus, its necessity is questionable.
- Information sharing could compromise intelligence sources, methods and capabilities.
- X - Would offer Soviets an opportunity to demand bilateral involvement in regional crises (such as in the Middle East) where we do not wish their involvement.
- X - Could be seen as another "superpower condominium" example.

Recommendations on Joint Consultation Center

The Working Group recommends that Senator Jackson's proposal for a consultation center be rejected as not being feasible. The goal of minimizing misinformation concerning nuclear crises would not be enhanced. Existing mechanisms such as embassy consultations and the Hotline would still be preferred in such crises.

It is worth noting, though, that there is room for improvement of present systems. Several ongoing and potential initiatives were noted in the recommendations in Section I and offer potential for meeting some of Senator Jackson's objectives as well.

Conclusion

The Working Group recommends that the Administration respond to Senator Jackson's proposal by saying:

- that his proposed center is not feasible at this time
- that the examination of his proposal helped generate some new thinking for preventing/ reducing the risks of third party nuclear weapons
- that we share his concerns and that his ideas contributed to our thinking about new options and improvements to existing systems
- that among those options are the President's CBM initiatives, the US-USSR nonproliferation bilaterals, a possible accord on handling nuclear emergencies, and possible national crisis control center connected by a multinational hotline for nuclear emergencies

TAB C - Description of Senator Nunn's Proposal as Provided
by his Office

TAB C



Sam Nunn

10
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
(202) 224-3521

For Release Monday at 3:00 p.m.
April 26, 1982

For Further Information
Contact Arnold Punaro or Ed Nagy

NUNN PROPOSES US-USSR CRISIS CONTROL CENTER AND HOT LINE ENHANCEMENT AMENDMENT

WASHINGTON -- In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn introduced an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Authorization Bill which requires a study by the Secretary of Defense and report by the President on initiatives to contain and control the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, Nunn's amendment requires the study and report to address two proposals he made in November 1981. The first recommendation is for a joint military crisis control center, and the second is for an enhanced hot line between the U.S. and the USSR.

Attached is a copy of Nunn's floor statement, the amendment, an article on this subject written by Nunn in November 1981, and a letter to the Strategic Air Command in March 1981, requesting a study of U.S. - USSR ability to deal with a third country or terrorist nuclear trigger.

#

NUCLEAR DEBATE -- THE MISSING LINK

Mr. President, in all of the current focus on nuclear freezes, "no first use" and arms control policies in general, there is an extremely important element missing -- the need to deal constructively with the prospect of a nuclear war triggered by a third country or terrorist group. No change in NATO's nuclear doctrine and none of the freeze proposals would decrease or prevent the chances of such a catastrophe. An accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation should be of mutual concern to the two superpowers.

I have been concerned about the potential of an accidental nuclear exchange between the two superpowers for some time. On March 10, 1981, I wrote the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General Richard Ellis, and asked SAC, as the premier defense command in nuclear matters, to analyze the potential for this type of exchange and to recommend some initiatives for dealing with the problem. General Ellis is now retired and serving as the U.S. representative on the Standing Consultative Committee and is one of the most thorough and knowledgeable military men in the arms control area as well as an expert in nuclear policies and weapons.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to General Ellis be included in the record at this point.

In the letter, I outlined my belief that our strategic arms control efforts have for some time concentrated almost exclusively on the number of launchers and warheads and the "bolt from the blue" premeditated strategic strike. While I certainly agree with the

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importance of this focus and these negotiations, I feel that we should also begin to think seriously about what could be more likely catalysts which could lead to nuclear war. There are many factors that need assessment as to how the US/USSR would interact at the strategic level in times of crises and conflict. For example, a disguised third country attack on one of the superpowers could precipitate a U.S./Soviet nuclear exchange.

I asked General Ellis to examine four key areas in his study as follows:

1. Is our communications, command and control capable of discerning the source of attack under this type scenario?
2. What capabilities do the Soviets have in this respect (warning and threat assessment)?
3. What other scenarios should be considered in terms of US/USSR strategic interaction in periods of crises and conflict?
4. Are there arms control innovations and initiatives that can be proposed in this general area as well as the overall C-3/connectivity area?

General Ellis established a study group that spent many months working on these issues, and in July of that same year I went to SAC in Omaha to discuss the results of their study.

Mr. President, I believe that their conclusions are even more relevant today. The SAC analysis showed that the US and the Soviets must dramatically improve their warning and attack characterization to deal with the use of a nuclear device by a third party in either peacetime or a crisis situation.

The SAC analysis dealt with the potential third party threat by examining the various unconventional delivery systems that could be utilized to explode such a device on US or Soviet soil.

SAC also identified many unconventional methods of delivery other than the normally discussed platforms such as fighter planes, missiles or bombers that a third world nation might utilize.

Mr. President, by the end of the decade over 20 nations will have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons, and the possibility of possession of these weapons by terrorists cannot be dismissed.

After talking to many other experts in the field, I wrote an article for the Washington Post which appeared on November 12, 1981. I ask unanimous consent that this article be included in the Record at this point.

A major part of this article dealt with the whole issue of the Third World trigger and accidental nuclear war. After pointing out the real and growing dangers in this area, and the fact that this is certainly an area of US/USSR mutual interest in preventing such a crisis, I made two major recommendations.

The first recommendation was that the US and USSR establish a joint military crisis control center for the monitoring and containment of nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups. The second major recommendation was to address other mutual arms control steps such as strengthening and enhancing the US/Soviet hotline.

Mr. President, I am convinced that both the US and USSR have a common and mutual interest in preventing such a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that both nations have a mutual interest in working together to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack. I am convinced that arms

control efforts can be made relevant to the growing danger of this type of a nuclear catalyst.

Everyone now seems to be in search of an easy solution in the arms control area, but there are no nuclear quick fixes. What we can begin to do jointly with the Soviet Union is to build a capability and mutual trust to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation. This step could add a strong element of deterrence to any party contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of provoking a confrontation between the superpowers.

For this reason, Mr. President, I am introducing an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Authorization Bill directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct a full and complete study of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons including:

- 1) establishment of a multi-national military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

- 2) development of a forum for joint U.S./USSR sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

- 3) development of U.S./USSR confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

- A) an improved U.S./USSR communications hotline for crisis control;

- B) enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

C) measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

D) measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

This study and report would be provided to the Congress by August 1, 1982, and I would further require that the President review the results of the DOD analysis and submit to the Congress within a month his views on the merits of the proposals and their relevance to U.S. arms control policies and proposals.

Mr. President, I believe this amendment will provide a sound analytical framework for the key agencies in our government and the public to deal with the issue of accidental nuclear war. There has been very little work done in this area other than the pioneer study by SAC under General Ellis' direction.

This amendment will also serve to focus attention on this important element of the nuclear issue which is missing in the current debate and discussion and which is a more likely contingency, in my view, than a premeditated nuclear attack or "bolt out of the blue."

I will have a more detailed statement when this amendment is discussed on the floor. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the amendment be included in the Record at this point. I urge my colleagues to study this prior to the floor discussion on the Defense Authorization Bill.

IMPORTANT—Insert short statement of purpose here:

An amendment to evaluate arms control
initiatives to include military crisis
control center and hotline enhancements

CALENDAR No. _____

PRINTED AMENDMENT No. _____

UN-PRINTED AMENDMENT No. _____

(The above for use of the Office of Secretary
of Senate.)

S. _____
H.R. _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Referred to the Committee on _____ and ordered to be printed.

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT

Intended to be proposed by Mr. Nunn

to S. 2248, a bill to authorize appropriation for (Insert title of bill below)
FY 1983 for the Department of Defense
H.R. _____, an Act

viz: On page _____, line _____, insert the following:

At the end of the bill add the following section:

Sec. _____(a) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a full and complete study and evaluation of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in crises. Such study and evaluation shall include but not be limited to the following initiatives:

- 1) establishment of a multi-national military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;
- 2) development of a forum for joint U.S./USSR sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and
- 3) development of U.S./USSR confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

A) an improved U.S./USSR communications hotline for crisis control;

B) enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

C) measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

D) measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

a) this report shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the House and Senate by August 1, 1982 and should be available in both a classified, if necessary, and unclassified format.

b) the President shall report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations one month later on September 1, 1982 on the merits of such initiatives developed in section (a) to the arms control process and on the status of any such initiative as they may relate to any arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union.



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 97th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 127

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1981

No. 168

Senate

CONTINUITY

SENATOR NUNN ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1981]

ARMS CONTROL: WHAT WE SHOULD DO

(By SAM NUNN)

America's arms control goals have been vague and poorly understood by the public. Our tactics have been short-term, and our strategy ambiguous. Our patience at the negotiating table has been short-lived. Our timing has too often been driven by election considerations and our expectations have swung between euphoria and despair.

Three arms control treaties with the Soviet Union have been signed (by presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter) but have not been ratified by the Senate. This may demonstrate that our "separation of powers" is alive and well, but it also raises serious questions as to whether any American president can conclude an arms control treaty any more.

THE SETTING

The United States is now abiding (without formal agreement) by a SALT treaty that President Reagan himself declared "fatally flawed." While awaiting leverage from newly announced but as yet unapproved strategic programs, we are not renegotiating this unratified treaty. Testimony indicates it will be at least the late 1980s before any new strategic programs close the "window of vulnerability" and bring us back to "parity." Several key parts of the recently announced strategic program, which are not yet well-defined, will have major arms control implications.

We are about to begin negotiations with the Soviets on tactical nuclear weapons, an area in which the United States has little leverage and NATO is at a pronounced military disadvantage. These negotiations provide the Soviet Union a considerable opportunity to prevent the long overdue NATO tactical nuclear force modernization. They also create an increasingly unrealistic separation between strategic and theater nuclear weapons and allow the Soviets skillfully to manipulate growing European skepticism of American leadership.

Under these circumstances, should we be puzzled when we look over our shoulder and our allies aren't following our lead? They don't know where we're going. Do we? Whether we like it or not, our arms control efforts and NATO's future are now linked. A clear, consistent arms control approach that enjoys the support of Congress and the American people is a national security imperative.

If the American position on arms control is to have more credibility with our allies, our adversaries and the American people, we must bring some continuity to our process for formulating and executing arms control policy and integrating it with military policies. We must develop a clear set of long-term goals, objectives and priorities that can be understood by the public, our allies and, ideally, even our adversaries.

Procedures within our government must be developed to ensure that strategic weapons programs and arms control measures mesh together better. We can no longer separate the two functions, giving civilians the job of controlling arms and the military the job of procuring weapons. U.S. military planners must have a greater input in shaping our arms control objectives so that arms control measures can also be treated as viable instruments for attaining required security objectives.

For more than a decade, the Soviets have had essentially the same people negotiating SALT. During that same period, the United States has had six chief negotiators and the major support staff has been changed many times. Why shouldn't the Soviets be confident they can wait out the Americans? Why shouldn't our allies and our adversaries believe that our patience and our horizons are limited in the arms control arena?

One way to improve arms control continuity would be to upgrade substantially the current General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. The present committee is collocated with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and, rightly or wrongly, is viewed as an adjunct of that agency. We should consider creating a bipartisan presidential commission to be the board of directors for our arms control efforts.

The commission would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for overlapping terms long enough to give it independence and continuity. It could not and should not supersede the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch to negotiate, and the Senate to ratify, treaties. It could, however, be asked to bring some coherence to our arms control philosophy and implementation. Reporting directly to the president, the board should have a broad charter to consider arms control under the rubric of overall national security and foreign policy.

It could provide a publicly respected review board to:

- Help formulate long- and short-term arms control objectives, goals and priorities consistent with our national security and our defense policies;

- Monitor negotiations; and

Keep the American public informed of the goals, objectives and priorities of our arms control efforts in a way that can be separated from partisan political considerations.

STABILITY

The U.S. arms control process has had a narrow scope that undermines its potential positive impact in military terms and in international opinion. Over the last decade, most of our arms control effort has been directed at limiting the size of nuclear arsenals rather than avoiding or limiting the potential use of nuclear weapons in crises—so-called "crisis-stability." We hope to reduce the number of weapons in the long run, but reductions in numbers do not automatically or necessarily increase crisis stability. We hope to save money with a sound arms control agreement, but an even larger strategic budget would be well worth the money if the result were the reduced likelihood of nuclear war. With thousands of nuclear warheads available to each side, control of their use in crises is more important than reduction of numbers, cost or technological development.

We must begin to think about arms control initiatives that will address crisis stability.

How would the Russians react if a low-flying aircraft with U.S. markings delivered a nuclear device on one of their cities? Do they have the capability to determine the true origin of the aircraft? Would stunned and angry Russians react calmly and cautiously or would they draw immediate conclusions and launch a nuclear attack against America? How would we react if a nuclear device exploded in a ship of unknown origin in San Francisco harbor and obliterated the city? Will we sit idly by while the possibilities grow in the years ahead that a fanatical leader may attempt to rid the world of the superpowers by pulling a Third World trigger?

Are these unreal science fiction fantasies or is there a growing possibility of a third-party or terrorist use of nuclear weapons? At my request last spring, Gen. Richard Ellis, then commander of the Strategic Air Command, undertook the evaluation of the possibility of a third party triggering a superpower nuclear exchange under a variety of scenarios. Unfortunately, this evaluation showed that there are real and developing dangers in this area.

Do the U.S.S.R. and the United States have a mutual interest in preventing a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons? Should both nations have a mutual interest in working together to be able immediately to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack? Can arms control efforts be made relevant to the growing dangers of this type of nuclear catalyst?

The point is not to frighten, but to stimulate the best minds in both the United States and the Soviet Union to think soberly about the future potential for destruction facing the world. There are an increasing number of scenarios that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated or intended. By 1990, our government believes that more than 20 nations may have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons. Terrorist possession of nuclear warheads in the future cannot be dismissed. Several nations are now also developing rockets for "commercial purposes." The simple fact is that we really don't have an international framework or mechanism for quickly and decisively controlling or containing these possibilities. In a world growing more dangerous with proliferation of nuclear weapons

and delivery systems, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other nuclear powers, have growing reason to work together to prevent nuclear war.

U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION

While there is still time, serious thought should be given by ourselves and the Russians to our possible mutual interest in establishing a military crisis control center for the monitoring and containment of nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups. This could take the form of joint U.S.-Soviet information-sharing combined with a multinational center for crisis management. A precedent for this type of effort can be found in the four-power Berlin center for movement of aircraft in the Berlin corridors.

The crisis management group could be a permanent standing team of highly qualified civilian and military personnel, in full operation 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, with access to the top political and military leadership. Its purpose would be to provide a mechanism that gives each side more confidence in the facts during a nuclear crisis. It would afford the leaders of both nations a better chance to determine, independently and jointly, the origin and parties responsible for any explosion of nuclear weapons. It has the potential for encouraging cooperation and building confidence between the superpowers, even when political relations are at a low ebb. These steps could contribute to crisis stability. They could also add a significant degree of deterrence to third-country or terrorist attempts to light the nuclear bonfire.

This will not be a simple task completed quickly, but the discussions and negotiations should begin. These negotiations could be broadened to address other mutual arms control steps, such as confidence-building measures to enhance verification, strengthening the U.S.-Soviet hot line, as well as reducing the vulnerabilities of command, control and communications of both nations. We could also begin discussions on a possible nuclear weapons deployment agreement that would lengthen the warning time both nations would have of a nuclear attack.

The nuclear powers must begin to improve our capacity to control a nuclear crisis—regardless of origin. Our nation must adopt clear goals that establish a foundation for arms control that has long-term continuity and less vulnerability to domestic partisan politics. We must find an arms control policy we can live with.

JOHN TOWER, TEX., CHAIRMAN

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CARL LEVIN, MICH.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 10, 1981

RHETT B. DAWSON, STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL

General Richard H. Ellis
CINCSAC
Offutt AFB, Nebraska 68113

Dear General Ellis:

The March 6th Subcommittee hearing on Strategic Communication, Command and Control as well as connectivity was important and informative. I have the impression we are at least making a beginning in this crucial area. You and your staff are to be commended for your leadership.

I have believed for some time that our strategic arms control efforts are concentrated almost exclusively on the number of launchers and warheads and the "bolt from the blue" premeditated strategic strike. While I certainly agree with the importance of this focus and these negotiations, I feel that we should also begin to think seriously about other perhaps more likely catalysts which could lead to nuclear war. There are many other factors that need assessment as to how the US/USSR would interact at the strategic level in times of crises and conflict. For example, a disguised third country attack on one of the super-powers could precipitate a U.S./Soviet nuclear exchange.

Pursuant to our conversation during the hearing break, I look forward to a visit to SAC sometime this spring. While there, I would like, among other topics, to discuss this with you and your staff with several questions in mind:

1. Is our C-3 capable of discerning the source of attack under this type scenario?
2. What capabilities do the Soviets have in this respect (warning and threat assessment)?
3. What other scenarios should be considered in terms of US/USSR strategic interaction in periods of crises and conflict?
4. Are there arms control innovations and initiatives that can be proposed in this general area as well as the overall C-3/connectivity area?

I look forward to seeing you again in the near future.

Sincerely,



Sam Nunn

TAB D - Description of Senator Jackson's Proposal as Provided in
His Letter to the President and by Material Supplied by
His Office

TAB D

ROOM 137
RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
(202) 224-3441

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

SYSTEM II
90267

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April 28, 1982

CLOSE HOLD
SENSITIVE

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciated your thoughtful phone call following my appearance on Face the Nation last Sunday. This is my promised personal letter to you to follow up on my suggestion for a Joint U.S.-USSR Communications/Information Center. As you may know, this is an aspect of arms control on which Senator Nunn has worked for some time and in which he is also greatly interested.

What I have in mind is that our government now put a high priority on establishing, with the Soviets, a permanent Joint Communications/Information Center which -- particularly in times of heightened international tension or crisis -- could minimize the risk of U.S.-Soviet hostilities or conflict being precipitated by inadvertence, miscalculation or simple misunderstanding. As more and more countries acquire nuclear weapons or devices -- and proliferating terrorist groups are on the loose -- the danger increases of incidents that, unless quickly controlled or contained, might trigger a nuclear conflict, particularly incidents subject to initial misinterpretation or misunderstanding.

The prime purpose of such a center would be to provide a continuing U.S.-USSR dialogue and cross-checking of information at a very senior staff level with immediate access to the top leadership in both countries, able, as necessary, to get the chiefs-of-state themselves into direct communication at a moments notice. Such continuing reciprocal communication would have the added advantage of making the prime communicators more or less known quantities to each other -- a phenomenon that, of itself, would facilitate or ease meaningful dialogue in any period of stress or crisis.

In any such communications exchange, we would obviously need at all times to protect and safeguard essential aspects of American defense and of intelligence-gathering capabilities.

There are actually two long-standing precedents for the sort of thing I have in mind: Panmunjom and the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). Neither is an exact model, but both offer a rich

April 28, 1982

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history that can be drawn upon.

In practical terms, I believe we would want (1) to use and build on the current hot-line (teletype) for head-of-state direct, personal interchange, (2) establish a joint U.S.-USSR facility, manned by small highly professional staffs, and (3) provide an immediately adjacent American facility (with presumably a matching Soviet facility) which would house the terminals of secure communications links to Washington, plus rooms where senior Americans and their staffs could talk in private.

From the start, it should be understood and agreed with the Soviets that this center was not to be a vehicle or forum for polemics or propaganda, and that it would function in private.

As I see it, the burgeoning popular focus on nuclear weapons, and the widespread fears of nuclear holocaust are due in very great measure to the concern that a nuclear war might break out just because Moscow and Washington were out of touch with each other so that accidents and other incidents could "get out of hand". I am convinced that a joint institution along the lines I am suggesting -- that would represent and assure continuing superpower dialogue -- would go far to lessen these anxieties and fears.


Moreover, given that START negotiations are bound to take considerable time, this initiative offers the possibility that our government could conclude an early arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that could help build world confidence in the possibilities for stability and peace.

I would hope the kind of initiative I have outlined here only in preliminary fashion would intrigue you, and that there would be an opportunity for a small bipartisan group of us from the Congress to talk with you personally about it in the very near future. At this time I know that Senator Nunn and Senator Warner who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces would be glad to join in that meeting.

I'm sure you would share my view that it is important to insulate this kind of effort from the political adversary arena, particularly during the coming election campaigns.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,


Henry M. Jackson U.S.S.

SENATOR JACKSON

see p 3.

/ News

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U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington

(202) 224-9378

For Release: 10:00 A.M.
Wednesday, May 12, 1982

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION

Testimony by Senator Henry M. Jackson

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Wednesday, May 12, 1982 - 10:00 A.M.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

It is for Senator Warner and me a great honor to appear before you today. I thank you for this opportunity to speak in support of Senate Joint Resolution 177 -- a bipartisan resolution whose aim is to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. As my colleagues know, the Senate sponsors of this resolution number well over a majority of this chamber.

For almost four decades, our country has been trying to gain Soviet agreement to arms control and reduction measures that would reduce the risks of nuclear war.

Speaking for President Truman at a time when this country alone possessed nuclear arms, Bernard Baruch offered the world a plan to turn all our weapons over to an international authority. But this historic proposal foundered on the rock of Soviet objections.

All six of Mr. Truman's followers in the Presidency -- three of them from one party and three from the other -- advanced arms control proposals to reduce the danger of nuclear war. And now President Reagan takes up the challenge.

The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that despite our forty years of trying

to make the world's weapons-stockpiles smaller, they have steadily grown larger and larger.

Mr. Chairman, nuclear force levels at their present size and balance invite both war by deliberate design and war by accident or misunderstanding. To the hundreds of millions who would be killed or maimed in a nuclear holocaust, it would matter not an iota whether they had been victims of malevolence or mistake.

Our nations first priority in arms negotiations, therefore, cannot be trying to keep things as they are; it must be trying to make things better.

I do not see how there can be any disagreement about the goal of our arms negotiations with the Soviets. It must be to reduce weapons, to bring existing nuclear forces down to lower and lower levels of equality, until they eventually reach zero on both sides.

Such differences of view as may exist must go to the question of means and not to ends. The real issue is not where we want to go, it is how best to get there.

For many of us a freeze of nuclear forces at their present levels of threat and terror perpetuates the very problem we are trying to solve. Indeed, we would severely lessen the chances for real arms reductions if ever we adopted policies ratifying or acquiescing in or legitimizing the nuclear armaments status quo.

It is time for a change -- a big change. Our first order of business must be to reduce the threshold of violence and step by step to win Soviet agreement to substantial nuclear arms reductions.

Permit me now briefly to summarize what our resolution says and why.

First: The resolution calls upon the United States to propose to

the Soviet Union a verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces.

The reductions must be substantial. I have in mind cuts that would shrink present day overall nuclear force levels by one-half or even greater fractions.

The reductions must be equitable. They must result in far lower and equal levels of forces that would give neither side a military advantage over the other.

And the cuts must be verifiable. Neither side must be required to make the safety of its people hostage to the simple assurance of the other that agreements were being observed.

Second: The resolution calls upon our government to propose practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists. This is an area of arms control in which Senator Nunn and Senator Hart among others have been particularly interested.

With some 15,000 nuclear weapons now in the stockpiles of the superpowers, with more and more other nations possessing weapons, and with terrorism on the rampage, the danger mounts of incidents that through inadvertence or misinterpretation might trigger a nuclear disaster.

As my colleagues know, I am urging the establishment of a permanent Joint U.S.-USSR Communications and Information Center that would provide uninterrupted and reciprocal superpower contact and dialogue. Such a Center would be staffed by senior Soviet and American professionals. It would build on the present hot-line and have communications links that gave it sure and instant access to the White House and the Kremlin.

Such a Center would provide what could be a literally life-saving arrangement for instant information exchange and consultation when incidents occurred that could be misinterpreted as harbingers of an imminent nuclear assault by one power against the other.

Arms reductions negotiations are bound to be lengthy and complicated. However, it could well be possible to reach early agreement on a Communications Center, whose establishment would be so clearly in the interests of both sides.

Third: The resolution asks our government to challenge the Soviets to join with us in a great effort to divert the energies and resources of our nations away from the amassing of nuclear armaments and to focus them on attacking mankind's common and ancient enemies -- poverty, hunger and disease.

Of course, our country must do what is necessary to help keep the peace. But every dollar spent on armaments means one less dollar available for succoring the needy and healing the afflicted.

The arms burden weighs even more heavily on the Soviets. Compared with us, they devote to military spending a far larger fraction of a far smaller gross national product.

Nuclear force level reductions of the dimensions contemplated in our resolution could over time release for other purposes billions and billions of dollars and rubles. We can all visualize the humane and constructive uses to which both sides could put money that would be saved by reduced spending on nuclear arms.

Fourth: The resolution says we should continue to press month after month, year after year, for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. It thereby recognizes that there can be only one sure way of reducing to zero the possibility of nuclear

calamity. And that is by reducing to zero the number of nuclear weapons in the world's armament inventories. All of us know how far away this ultimate objective now is. But who of us for this reason would dare stop working toward it.

Mr. Chairman, when I look ahead I see no magic breakthrough that will suddenly propel us toward the goals that have so far eluded us. Instead, I see an unremitting need for bold proposals, hard thinking, hard bargaining -- and the patience of Job.

JACKSON-WARNER NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION RESOLUTION
(S.J.Res. 177)

Senator Jackson (D.Wash.) and Senator Warner (R.Va.) on March 30, 1982, introduced a bipartisan nuclear arms reduction resolution on behalf of a majority of members of the Senate.

The resolution calls on the United States to propose to the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. A copy of the resolution is attached.

The 61 cosponsors of the resolution are as follows:

Mr. Jackson, Mr. Warner, Mr. Baker, Mr. R. Byrd, Mr. Lugar,
Mr. Nunn, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Bentsen, Mr. Abdnor, Mr. Andrews,
Mr. Boren, Mr. Boschwitz, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Burdick, Mr. H. Byrd,
Mr. Cannon, Mr. Chiles, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Cranston, Mr. D'Amato,
Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Dole, Mr. Exon, Mr. Ford, Mr. Garn,
Mr. Goldwater, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Hatch, Ms. Hawkins, Mr. Hayakawa,
Mr. Heflin, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Jepsen,
Mr. Johnston, Mr. Kasten, Mr. Long, Mr. Mattingly, Mr. Melcher,
Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Pryor,
Mr. Quayle, Mr. Rudman, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Specter, Mr. Stennis,
Mr. Stevens, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Tower, Mr. McClure, Mr. Roth,
Mr. Simpson, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Schmitt, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Zorinsky.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION

To express the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions of their nuclear weapons in a manner which would contribute to peace and stability.

Whereas, a nuclear war would kill or injure millions and millions of people and threaten the survival of the human race;

Whereas, there can be no assurance that a nuclear war, once initiated, would remain limited in scope;

Whereas, there exists the ever-present risk that nuclear weapons might be employed through accident or miscalculation;

Whereas, the American people who are a people of peace, maintain nuclear armaments only in the defense of freedom and yearn for world conditions in which they could do far more to lift the burdens of human privation and despair;

Whereas, the current nuclear force imbalance is destabilizing and could increase the likelihood of nuclear war;

Whereas, sizeable and verifiable mutual reductions of Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and far-lower level would enhance stability and the maintenance of peace; and

Whereas, President Reagan, on November 18, 1981, stated that the United States "will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable";

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled; That

(1) The United States should propose to the Soviet Union a long-term, mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces;

(2) The United States should propose to the Soviet Union practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists;

(3) The United States should challenge the Soviet Union to join in this historic effort to channel the genius of our two peoples away from the amassing of nuclear armaments and to focus the energy and resources of both nations on attacking the ancient enemies of mankind -- poverty, hunger and disease; and

(4) The United States should continue to press month after month, year after year, to achieve balanced, stabilizing arms reductions, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals.

TAB E - Portions of the Department of Defense Study on Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) Which Focus on the Proposals of
Senators Nunn and Jackson

~~SECRET~~

6470

2



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

17 SEP 1982

8.1 1 08 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Measures to Reduce the Risk of Unintended Nuclear
War

As you requested in your memorandum of 21 June, attached is the draft DoD study on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or from other causes unintended by national authority (sometimes referred to as "Confidence Building Measures").

This draft study examines the suggestions made by the President in his speeches in Berlin and at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the suggestions made by Senator Nunn in his Amendment to the FY-83 Defense Authorization Bill, and additional ideas. For each initiative, it provides relevant background information, analyzes the potential benefits and risks associated with the initiative, and makes appropriate recommendations.

Given the complexity and diversity of the initiatives covered by this report and the time constraints under which we have been operating, this draft study is necessarily preliminary. At this point, it would be useful to have the views of other agencies, as this would expedite the process of reaching government-wide agreement on possible near-term initiatives. In designing the follow-on work program on the initiatives which require further study, DoD will, of course, take account of the suggestions from other agencies.

Attachment
a/s

UNCLASSIFIED upon removal
of enclosure

11/15/85 (CDB)

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170407	REPORT	14	ND	B1
	DOD STUDY (COVER SHEET + PAGES NUMBERED 43-56)			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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Nov 9
6:00 pm

Bob,

Outstanding! You have my concurrence;
please initial for me, or let me initial
original.

Please consider the ~~following~~ small
fixes indicated on pp. 21-22 of NSC analysis
paper as indicated in red. There is a run-
on sentence which mixes two thoughts. But
the larger issue is whether or not you really
want to identify in the paper itself the
fact that it is an MSC Staff Evaluation ,
as distinguished from a Staff Evaluation.
It carries more weight with NSC label, but this
could be assured in transmission to agencies.

On other hand this label could also be used
negatively in, ^{ringing alarm bells across street about} some bureaucrat's unapproved ^{or could help}
leak to Jackson/Nunn. I just raise this matter, ^{inspire}
without having a particular view.

PK
Sven

PS IG paper needs transmittal memo & date.

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170408	REPORT NSC STAFF EVALUATION RE JACKSON-NUNN PROPOSALS (NUMBERED AS PP. 20-22)	3	ND	B1

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