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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/16/2015

File Folder USSR (5/14/82-5/19/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

253

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170464	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SUMMITS WITH SOVIET LEADERS	2	5/14/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-36-1-3			
170466	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE US-SOVIET SUMMIT	2	4/21/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-36-2-2			
170467	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE SOVIET SUMMITS	1	ND	B1
	<i>R</i>	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-36-3-1			
170468	MEMO	R. ROBINSON TO CLARK RE WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE	2	5/17/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-36-4-0			
170470	CABLE	121916Z MAY 82	1	5/12/1982	B1
170471	CABLE	STATE 131498	6	5/18/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-36-6-8			
170474	CABLE	MOSCOW 6011	7	5/18/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-36-7-7			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/16/2015

File Folder USSR (5/14/82-5/19/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

253

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170476	MEMO	W. CLARK TO A. HAIG RE REMOVAL OF SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNET	1	5/19/1982	B1
170478	MEMO	E. MCGAFFIGAN AND G. WEISS TO W. CLARK RE REMOVAL OF SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNET	2	ND	B1
170479	MEMO	DRAFT OF DOC #170476, W/EDITS (CLARK TO HAIG RE REMOVAL OF SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNET)	1	ND	B1
170480	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	5/19/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WHSR 1
5/14
Please put ~~None~~
Briscoe's folder in
the morning (Sat).
Copy for these, Broken
Denver, VP.
Return file to Brian.
W

169

2

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 2840

RECEIVED

92 MAY 10 P 8:41

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>7</u>		
Sit Room			
	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver
Other

COMMENTS

Judge,
You had asked that Dick Pipes' earlier paper be combined with Bill Stearns'.

~~0930 today~~
Where is State memo?

148

National Security Council
The White House

3

REC- ED

Package # 2840

APR 27 10:26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1		
Bud McFarlane	2	m	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4		A
John Poindexter	5		
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>PIPES</u>	6		A

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS



Dick,
Please combine your memo
with Bill Stearns'.
John

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~DECLASSIFIED~~

May 14, 1982

INFORMATIONBY LCDBATE 11/14/85

m

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Summits with Soviet Leaders

Soviet leaders are keen on summits with U.S. Presidents and for good reason. They feel confident they will come out ahead in such encounters because

- their government has greater continuity than ours and therefore greater store of expertise in international affairs;
- well-publicized summits arouse expectations in free societies which enable Moscow, by manipulating Western opinion, to exert pressure on their opposite numbers for unreciprocated concessions. ~~(C)~~

They further favor summits because they afford them the opportunity to size up the President as a person and as a statesman. ~~(C)~~

Experience indicates that U.S.-Soviet summits, from Roosevelt's Yalta to Nixon's Moscow, have generally turned out to the disadvantage of the United States. Still, inasmuch as every U.S. President since 1933 has personally met with his Soviet counterpart, it will be difficult for you to reject a summit altogether. A full-fledged summit, however, should take place only if the following conditions are met:

- Moscow demonstrates by deeds rather than words that it is prepared to negotiate seriously.
- The groundwork is well prepared beforehand so that you discuss concrete agenda items and do not become embroiled in longwinded ideological disputes of the kind that Khrushchev lured Kennedy into in Vienna in 1961 and which invariably end in the hardening of respective positions. ~~(C)~~

A good model to follow in this matter is President Eisenhower who had given it much thought. In 1953, after Stalin's death President Eisenhower came under great pressure from our Allies (especially

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 10, 1988.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Britain) and the State Department to hold a summit with G. Malenkov, Stalin's immediate successor. In his memoirs, Eisenhower tells why he resisted these pressures. He reviews the disappointing experiences of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with summit meetings and says: "I was ... not willing to meet with Communist leaders unless there was some likelihood that the confrontation would produce results acceptable to the peoples of the West".

~~(C)~~

"... I developed a stock answer to any question about a possible Summit. I would not go to a Summit merely because of friendly words and plausible promises by the men in the Kremlin; actual deeds giving some indication of a Communist readiness to negotiate constructively will have to be produced before I would agree to such a meeting."

He was rewarded for his firm stand with a Soviet troop withdrawal from Austria. ~~(C)~~

This is a good principle to keep in mind as the Russians increase their pressure for a summit. It would be best to have no summit this year: but if one is to be held the Russians should be required to demonstrate their good will by such actions as acceptance of our "zero option", withdrawal from Afghanistan or lifting of the martial law in Poland. ~~(C)~~

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

mw 6

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

May 10, 1982

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended

With House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008

BY NARA 1087, DATE 11/6/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SIGNED
[Red Stamp]

SUBJECT: Summits with Soviet Leaders

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President which combines Bill Stearman's memorandum to you of April 21 with mine of April 26. *(C)*

Bill Stearman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

Review May 10, 1988.

CONFIDENTIAL

2840

MW
7

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 26, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Soviet Summits

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *KOB*, DATE *9/16/08*

Attached at Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum from you to the President giving him a bit of history on circumstances surrounding previous summit meetings with the Soviets. *(C)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *✓*

Disapprove

*Combine w. other memos re
Summit*

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review April 26, 1988.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2729

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED


April 21, 1982

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-22-36-2-2

BY KM NARA DATE 11/6/85

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: William L. Stearman 

SUBJECT: Observations on a US-Soviet Summit

Brezhnev wants a real summit in Europe (instead of a handshake in New York) in order to promote the current Soviet peace campaign and slow down US and NATO defense improvements. For this and additional reasons described below, I do not believe that a summit this year would serve U.S. interests; however, if the President wants to avoid taking a negative position on a summit, he might follow President Eisenhower's example and put a price tag on it. (C)

Beginning in 1953, Churchill pushed for a summit with the new post-Stalin Soviet leaders. Eisenhower indicated that he would agree to a summit if the Soviets would: sign a German Peace Treaty or an Austrian State Treaty or contribute to real arms control progress. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty, which was signed in May 1955, and a summit was held in Geneva that July. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" detente atmosphere was slowly eroding NATO's strength and cohesion when this detente was ended by the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. (It should be noted that the foreign ministers conference, which followed up on the Geneva summit, produced no real results, but this fact was overshadowed by the prevailing post-summit euphoria.) (C)

The record of US-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. In terms of U.S. interests, these summits have ranged from being unnecessary to disastrous -- with the sole exception of Camp David 1959 which postponed Soviet action on Berlin until U-2 coverage revealed there was no "missile gap," which fact strengthened our negotiating position. In addition to providing the Soviets an ideal propaganda platform and promoting their "super power" image, summits present other intrinsic problems. (U)

At best, summits permit only a superficial exchange of views on complex and potentially dangerous issues. There is little actual time for discussion, and this is halved by the interpreters.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 4/21/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

US-Soviet summits engage two men with vastly different backgrounds, mentalities and objectives. (I am only being half facetious when I say that any American President should have had extensive dealings with Mafiosi in order really to be prepared for encounters with Soviet leaders.) Thus, summits can hardly result in any real meeting of minds and can easily lead to serious and even dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations. For example, I have long been convinced that the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit (in which I was involved) was responsible for both the Berlin Wall and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. (c)

Since U.S. recognition of the USSR in 1933, all previous U.S. Presidents have met with Soviet leaders (bilaterally beginning with Camp David). It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect President Reagan to avoid summitry altogether. He is bound to come under increasing pressure to have a summit. He can, however, follow Eisenhower's example and demand of the Soviets some price of admission, some earnest of their good intentions, such as: acceptance of our "zero option" proposal, withdrawal from Afghanistan or ending martial law in Poland. (c)

Richard Pipes concurs in views expressed above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10

MEMORANDUM

2840

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR 748-22-363-1

INFORMATION

BY COB NARA DATE 11/6/85

170467

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Soviet Summits

After Stalin's death in 1953, President Eisenhower came under great pressure from our Allies (especially Britain) and the State Department to hold a summit with G. Malenkov, Stalin's immediate successor. In his memoirs, Eisenhower tells why he resisted these pressures. He reviews the disappointing experiences of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with summit meetings and says: "I was ... not willing to meet with Communist leaders unless there was some likelihood that the confrontation would produce results acceptable to the peoples of the West".

"At home and abroad the subject continued a live one. The constant debate -- pro and con -- assured the persistent interest of the press; so I developed a stock answer to any question about a possible Summit. I would not go to a Summit merely because of friendly words and plausible promises by the men in the Kremlin; actual deeds giving some indication of a Communist readiness to negotiate constructively will have to be produced before I would agree to such a meeting."

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review April 26, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 0202840

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
4/16/85 CDB

RECEIVED 20 APR 82 16

11

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 26 APR 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

SUBJECT: BRIEF HISTORY ON SOVIET SUMMITS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 27 APR 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

8202729

NSC/FID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Pipes	S 5/7	for info	5/10	
Clark	x 5/10	Hand to Pres for info	5/11	
Pres	IP 5/14	Low info		VP, EN, JB, MD
	C 5/17	Pres noted		2P, 4T -

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(PA)

(C) 84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12

MEMORANDUM

3443

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

May 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Update on West Siberian Pipeline (U)

WPG HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74822-364-0

170468
BY *608* NARA DATE *11/14/5*

Although covered in the "Soviet Bloc Economic and Financial Update #22," a report out of John Brown Engineering Company, UK, is of particular importance in the upcoming debate on the December 30, 1981 sanctions. A summary of the cable (Tab I) appears below:

1. John Brown Engineering reportedly has confirmed that the Administration's restrictions on GE exports of rotor kits has delayed construction of the West Siberian pipeline by at least two years. *(C)*

2. Assuming the sanctions are maintained, the shift to rotors supplied by Alsthom-Atlantique will cost substantially more than anticipated. The cost increase is a result of a considerably higher licensing fee charged by GE for the pipeline contract, and the French firm using the sales price to cover the costs of retooling and increasing production capacity. *(C)*

3. John Brown Company currently has only six Frame V turbines in inventory and will reportedly restrict sales to the Soviets to only those six unless the Soviets agree to permit the increased costs of the French rotor kits to be added to the original contract price. (The Soviets have thus far refused.) Barring some accommodation on this matter, John Brown would reportedly be forced to cancel its turbine supply contract for the pipeline. (In this connection, we have confirmed that, contrary to UK government assertions, John Brown is in excellent financial condition as are its subsidiaries and have adequate competing orders for turbines to maintain capacity.) *(C)*

4. Although the Soviets are already negotiating with other European suppliers of turbines, John Brown does not consider these discussions serious. They claim the Soviets rely on the Frame V turbines because of existing Soviet capability to manufacture most of the spare parts, proven

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on
May 17, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

performance in permafrost conditions, and a delay in pipeline construction of at least three years if a change is made to another type of turbine. (c)

Also attached (Tab II) is a Wall Street Journal article of May 13, 1982 discussing the likelihood of an additional \$131 million in "down payment" financing from a German banking consortium for the pipeline. The Chairman of AEG, Heinz Duerr, also stated that he expects the Administration to lift the December 30, 1981 sanctions" within the next month." (c)

Attachments

Tab I Cable re Soviet Pipeline
Tab II Wall Street Journal Article, May 13, 82

cc: Norman Bailey

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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KDB 11/16/2015

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USSR (5/14/82-5/19/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

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Box Number

22

253

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170470 CABLE		1	5/12/1982	B1
	121916Z MAY 82			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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German Banks May Increase Pipeline Credits

New Financing Would Cover
100% of Bonn's Stake
In Soviet Gas Line Project

By JOHN M. GEDDES

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

BONN.—The Soviet gas pipeline project to Western Europe, slowed in the aftermath of the imposition of martial law in Poland, seems to be gaining momentum again.

A West German government official said he expects German banks to accede soon to a Soviet request that they finance 100% of the German share of the pipeline project, instead of the 90% originally planned. That would mean the equivalent of a further \$131 million in credits for the Soviets in addition to the \$1.12 billion already granted.

The Bonn government, however, has informed the banks that it will provide export credit insurance for only 85% of the German share of the project, and not the 100% that the banks are being asked to consider.

The 3,600-mile pipeline, with an estimated cost of between \$10 billion and \$15 billion, is being designed to carry 1.41 trillion cubic feet of natural gas annually from western Siberia to Germany, France, Italy and other European countries.

A Soviet delegation is expected in the next weeks to visit Germany to discuss the credit issue and perhaps visit industrial concerns, banking sources said. They said the Soviets may attempt to assuage German companies, which have complained that their share of the pipeline orders of about \$657 million hasn't matched the German credits granted.

One German industrialist expects his problems with the pipeline project to be resolved soon. Heinz Duerr, managing board chairman of AEG-Telefunken AG, said he expects the U.S. government to lift its ban within the next month on the export of U.S. turbine parts to be used for the pipeline.

The ban blocked the export of rotor blades and other turbine parts by General Electric Co. to its European licensees building compressors for the pipeline, including Telefunken. A West German official said the Bonn government recently requested, through private channels, that the Reagan administration lift the ban.

If German banks accede to the Soviet request for additional credits, as the Bonn government official predicted, it would be a reversal of the banks' earlier stance. In January, German banks rejected that request, citing changes in the original terms of the agreement, improper timing (due to Poland) and worries about Soviet demands for favorable borrowing rates.

That stance, however, was undercut weeks later by French banks, which agreed to provide 100% financing.

The Soviets have been pressing West German banks for 100% financing in an apparent attempt to gain needed hard currency and to prove their creditworthiness. A Deutsche Bank AG spokesman said after a trip to Moscow by some of its top officials last month that it wouldn't rule out the acceptance by German banks of complete financing.

Other German bankers are less confident about acceptance of the Soviet request, noting that although German interest rates have dropped it will still be problematic building a consortium for the \$131 million credit. They emphasize that concrete negotiations on the issue have neither been held nor are scheduled.

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package #

3443

22 MAY 17 P 4:40

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	2	<i>[initials]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	1	<i>[initials]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[initials]</i>	
Judge Clark	4	<i>[initials]</i>	I
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	

Other _____

COMMENTS

This is a little old, but good background on some of the duplicity involved on Soviet sanctions.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 JUN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM ROBINSON

DOCDATE 17 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

GAS

OIL

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

6/25

Clark noted

20 ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C)

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

18

170471

PAGE 01 OF 06 SECSTATE WASHDC 4198
SIT758 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 180027Z MAY 82 PSN: 033308
TOR: 138/1123Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #4198 1380108
O 180027Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-36-68

BY EDB NARA DATE 11/16/5

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 134198 TOSEC 070171
NOIS

FROM PM DIRECTOR JONATHAN T. HOWE AND EUR-J. SCANLON, ACTG.
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/17 01 (HOWE, JONATHAN T.)
TAGS: PARM, START, INF, US, UR
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV ARMS CONTROL SPEECH EXPECTED

REF: STATE 119393

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. BREZHNEV MAY UTILIZE THE SPEECH HE IS EXPECTED TO DELIVER TUESDAY, MAY 18, AT THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS TO RESPOND TO THE PRESIDENT'S EUREKA SPEECH. IF SO, HE IS LIKELY TO CRITICIZE THE US PROPOSALS, LAY OUT MOSCOW'S INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND PROPOSE A TIME AND PLACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, HIS SPEECH MAY PROVIDE A VEHICLE FOR NEW INITIATIVES ON INF. WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE THE PRECISE TONE AND CONTENT OF BREZHNEV'S REMARKS BUT BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENCIES. THE FOLLOWING IS PREPARED FOR YOUR CONTINGENCY USE, SHOULD YOU NEED IT, TUESDAY AT THE NAC. WE WILL REVISE IT ACCORDING TO ANY GUIDANCE YOU MAY HAVE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHATEVER BREZHNEV ACTUALLY SAYS AND THEN TRANSMIT GUIDANCE TO NATO POSTS FOR THEIR USE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. START
US PROPOSALS

BREZHNEV MAY ECHO RADIO MOSCOW'S COMMENT THAT "REAGAN'S STATEMENT CAN BE APPRAISED AS A POSSIBLE SIGN OF A SANER APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM," BUT HE COULD ALSO ECHO THE MORE NUMEROUS SOVIET MEDIA COMMENTS THAT HAVE CAST ASPERSIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERLYING MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS.

BREZHNEV IS CERTAIN TO DEPICT THE U.S. PROPOSALS AS HEAVILY ONE-SIDED AND TO DWELL IN PARTICULAR ON THE OMISSION OF LIMITATIONS ON BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06 SECSTATE WASHDC 4198

DTG: 180027Z MAY 82 PSN: 033308

HE MAY ALSO CONTEST OUR CLAIM OF EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS, WHILE INSISTING THAT THERE IS AN OVERALL BALANCE IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THAT THIS BALANCE MUST BE PRESERVED. HE IS LIKELY TO CONTEND THAT DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES ARE INEQUITABLE AS LONG AS U.S. FBS AND ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAT CAN STRIKE THE USSR ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN EITHER START OR INF.

SOVIET PROPOSALS

BREZHNEV WILL PROBABLY AGREE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PROBABLY IN JUNE. LESS LIKELY WOULD BE A DELAY UNTIL FALL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE USSR WILL NOT BE RUSHED IN VIEW OF THE LENGTHY DELAY ALREADY CAUSED BY THE US.

BREZHNEV MAY CALL FOR RATIFICATION OF SALT II OR SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST ITEM ON THE START AGENDA BE A FORMALIZATION OF THE STATUS OF SALT II AS AN INTERIM AGREEMENT.

EVEN IF HE SIMPLY DEPLORES THE DEMISE OF SALT II, BREZHNEV IS LIKELY TO CALL FOR THE INCORPORATION OF "THE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS" OF PAST ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN A START AGREEMENT. HE MAY PROPOSE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT COVERING ALL SYSTEMS LIMITED IN SALT II AND THE PROTOCOL, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING SYSTEMS LIKE CRUISE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MISSILES AND SLBMS IN WHICH THE U.S. ENJOYS A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD. BY WAY OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT HE COULD SUGGEST A STRATEGIC ARMS MORATORIUM OR FREEZE SIMILAR TO THE ONE HE HAS PROPOSED FOR INF. IN ADDITION, HE COULD RECYCLE A NUMBER OF OTHER SOVIET INITIATIVES, INCLUDING PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON THE PATROL AREAS OF SSBN'S AND ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF TRIDENT AND TYPHOON AND A BAN ON NEW OR MODERNIZED MISSILES FOR THESE SUBMARINES.

BREZHNEV MAY PROPOSE THAT INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS BE MERGED AND COVER ALL SYSTEMS OVER 1000 KILOMETERS IN RANGE, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THIS UNLIKELY.

US RESPONSE

THE FOLLOWING GENERAL PRESS GUIDANCE MIGHT BE DRAWN UPON AFTER THE BREZHNEV SPEECH IF BREZHNEV CRITICIZES BUT DOES NOT REJECT THE U.S. FRAMEWORK:

- BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV HAVE NOW SPOKEN ON THE CONTROL OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

- WE WILL STUDY PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S PROPOSALS CAREFULLY. THE U.S. PROPOSALS PROVIDE A SOUND AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS.

- SOME SOVIET THEMES ARE FAMILIAR, ONE-SIDED IDEAS, BUT WE INTEND TO CONSIDER THE WHOLE SPEECH.

- IT IS TIME TO BEGIN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND WE HAVE BEGUN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO DO SO.

IF BREZHNEV FLATLY REJECTS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL, IN ADDITION WE WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPRESS REGRET AT THEIR RIGIDITY AND TO SAY THAT WE HOPE THIS DOES NOT

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PREFIGURE THEIR NEGOTIATING APPROACH. IF HE REJECTS BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JUNE, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPRESS REGRET AT THE SOVIET DESIRE TO DELAY AND REAFFIRM OUR INTEREST IN BEGINNING BY THE END OF JUNE.

CONTINGENCY POINTS:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE FOLLOWING POINTS MIGHT BE DRAWN UPON TO RESPOND TO PARTICULAR SOVIET PROPOSALS OR COMMENTS:

- ON BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE-LIMITATIONS' -OUR INITIAL AND PRIMARY CONCERN IS TO PLACE LIMITS ON THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS -- I.E., ICBM'S. WE ARE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER.

- ON SALT II RATIFICATION OR FORMALIZATION. THIS AGREEMENT IS DEFECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE RATIFIED FOR COGENT REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN STATED MANY TIMES.

--ON A STRATEGIC MORATORIUM OR FREEZE. A FREEZE WOULD PERPETUATE EXISTING IMBALANCES AND ASYMMETRIES THAT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR A THREATENING STRATEGIC INSTABILITY. WE MUST GO BEYOND A FREEZE TO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, WHILE TAKING WHATEVER STEPS ARE POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE INTERIM.

- ON A MERGER OF START AND INF. WE RECOGNIZE THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS BUT CONSIDER IT PREMATURE TO THINK OF COMBINING THEM.

4 INF

THE FORTHCOMING BREZHNEV SPEECH COULD ALSO BE THE VEHICLE FOR AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE UNILATERAL INF MISSILE REDUCTIONS MENTIONED IN BREZHNEV'S MARCH 16 SPEECH. THESE WOULD MOST LIKELY BE FURTHER RETIREMENTS OF THE SS-4 AND SS-5, THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE TOKEN REDUCTIONS OF SS-20S IN THE EUROPEAN USSR. A PAPER (REF. STATE 119393) HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO SCG REPS OUTLINING POSSIBLE SOVIET INF INITIATIVES AND SUGGESTING GENERAL THEMES TO BE USED IN RESPONSE.

5. IN THE EVENT BREZHNEV ANNOUNCES A UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF SS-4S AND SS-5S, THE FOLLOWING EXPANDED POINTS MIGHT BE DRAWN UPON:

-- THE REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED BY BREZHNEV MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE ENORMOUS, SUSTAINED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GROWTH IN SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT YEARS.

-- THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY REPRESENT A GENUINE REDUCTION IN SOVIET LRINF CAPABILITIES WHICH CURRENTLY THREATEN NATO EUROPE. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY DO NOT.

-- THE SYSTEMS IN QUESTION ARE OLDER SS-4 AND SS-5 MISSILES WHICH, AS BREZHNEV HIMSELF HAS STATED, HAVE OUTLIVED THEIR USEFUL SERVICE LIFE.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN RETIRING THESE SYSTEMS IN

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PARALLEL WITH THEIR SS-20 BUILD-UP AND HAVE ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS ON THE GROUNDS OLDER SYSTEMS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN FROM THE INVENTORY.

-- THE NET RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAS BEEN A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN SOVIET LRINF CAPABILITIES SINCE DECEMBER 1979.

-- TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO, THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED SOME 870 LRINF WARHEADS ON 140 SS-20 LAUNCHERS (WITH THREE WARHEADS EACH) AND 450 SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS.

-- TODAY, THEY DEPLOY 1200 WARHEADS ON 300 SS-20 LAUNCHERS AND 300 SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS.

-- THUS, A REDUCTION OF (FILL-IN) SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS STILL LEAVES THE SOVIETS WITH A TOTAL OF (FILL-IN) WARHEADS. AN INCREASE OF (FILL-IN) PER CENT RELATIVE TO THE LEVEL TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO.

-- MOREOVER, BY VIRTUE OF ITS SUPERIOR RANGE, ACCURACY AND MOBILITY, THE SS-20 REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE SS-4 AND SS-5.

-- IN SUM, THE SO-CALLED REDUCTIONS AMOUNT TO A PLANNED RETIREMENT OF OBSOLESCEENT SYSTEMS SUBSEQUENT TO A REAL QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES. BY ANY MILITARY MEASURE, NOTHING HAS BEEN REDUCED.

-- THE "REDUCTIONS" STILL LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITH

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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A MONOPOLY IN LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, THE SYSTEMS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES.

-- IT IS CLEAR THE SOVIETS ARE NOT YET READY TO CONSIDER THE KIND OF MEANINGFUL LIMITATION ON THEIR SYSTEMS THAT WOULD LESSEN THE THREAT TO EUROPE AND PROVIDE A BASIS FOR REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.

-- IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT CONSTRUCTION HAS CONTINUED AT SS-20 SITES IN THE EUROPEAN USSR WHICH WERE ALREADY UNDERWAY AT THE TIME BREZHNEV ANNOUNCED THE SO-CALLED UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON MARCH 16.

-- THE US INF PROPOSAL, BY CONTRAST, CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CATEGORY OF LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, A MOVE THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES AND BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS THE GOAL OF LOWERING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

6. IN THE LESS LIKELY EVENT BREZHNEV ANNOUNCES A REDUCTION IN SS-20S, THE FOLLOWING EXPANDED POINTS MIGHT BE DRAWN UPON:

-- THE REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED BY BREZHNEV MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE ENORMOUS, SUSTAINED GROWTH IN SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT YEARS.

-- THE NET RESULT OF THIS BUILD-UP HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE-INCREASE IN SOVIET LRINF CAPABILITIES SINCE DECEMBER 1979.

-- TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO, THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED SOME

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870 LRINF WARHEADS ON 140 SS-20 LAUNCHERS WITH THREE WARHEADS EACH, AND 450 SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS.

-- TODAY, THEY DEPLOY 1200 WARHEADS ON 300 SS-20 LAUNCHERS AND 300 SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS.

-- THUS, A REDUCTION OF (FILL-IN) SS-20 LAUNCHERS STILL LEAVES THE SOVIETS WITH A TOTAL OF (FILL-IN) WARHEADS, AN INCREASE OF (FILL-IN) PER CENT RELATIVE TO THE LEVEL TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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-- THE REDUCTIONS STILL LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITH A MONOPOLY IN LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, THE SYSTEMS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES.

-- IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT CONSTRUCTION HAS CONTINUED AT SS-20 SITES IN THE EUROPEAN USSR WHICH WERE ALREADY UNDERWAY AT THE TIME BREZHNEV ANNOUNCED THE SO-CALLED UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON MARCH 16.

-- THE US INF PROPOSAL, BY CONTRAST, CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CATEGORY OF LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, A MOVE THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES AND BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS THE GOAL OF LOWERING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

7. IF SS-20 REDUCTIONS TAKE THE FORM OF SIMPLY WITHDRAWALS BEHIND THE URALS, THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY BE USED IN ADDITION TO THOSE IN PARA 6:

-- GIVEN THE LONG RANGE AND TRANSPORTABILITY OF THE SS-20, IT POSES A THREAT TO NATO EUROPE WHEREVER LOCATED. THE SS-20'S LONG RANGE ALLOWS IT TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF EVERY EUROPEAN MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE FROM BASES EAST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS. MOREOVER, SS-20 SYSTEMS WITHDRAWN FROM THE EUROPEAN USSR COULD EASILY BE RETURNED.

-- WITHDRAWAL OF SS-20S TO EASTERN PORTIONS OF THE USSR IS AN ARTIFICIAL MEASURE, WHICH DOES NOT GENUINELY ENHANCE THE ALLIANCE'S SECURITY, AND DECREASES THE SECURITY OF NATIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD (E. G., THE FAR EAST).

8. A THIRD CONTINGENCY: BREZHNEV MIGHT EXTEND THE "MORATORIUM" ANNOUNCED MARCH 16 TO ALL SS-20S "TARGETED ON EUROPE" OR "INTENDED FOR USE IN EUROPE." TALKING POINTS FOR THIS EVENTUALITY:

-- THE SOVIETS DO NOT CLAIM THEY ARE CEASING TO DEPLOY THE SS-20; THEY ARE MERELY PROMISING NO FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS OF THOSE SS-20S WHICH THEY DEFINE AS BEING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TARGETED ON EUROPE. THEY WOULD THUS BE FREE TO CONTINUE UNLIMITED DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20S NOT SO DEFINED. -- DUE TO ITS RANGE AND TRANSPORTABILITY, ANY SS-20 MISSILE PRESENTS A THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE, REGARDLESS OF WHERE IT IS CURRENTLY LOCATED. THIS SOVIET GESTURE THUS IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE SS-20 THREAT TO THE NATO ALLIANCE.

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9. DEPENDING ON THE TIMING AND CONTENTS OF ANY BREZHNEV STATEMENT, THERE MAY BE A NEED TO COORDINATE OFFICIAL PUBLIC REACTIONS AND STATEMENTS MADE IN WASHINGTON WITH WHATEVER MIGHT EMERGE FROM LUXEMBOURG. WE HAVE MADE AVAILABLE THE SUGGESTED RESPONSES CONTAINED ABOVE TO OTHER AGENCIES HERE, AND WOULD WELCOME FURTHER SUGGESTIONS FROM THE SECRETARY'S PARTY.

NOTE: TASS, QUOTING A 16 MAY SOVIET-KAMPUCHEAN COMMUNIQUE, NOTED TODAY THAT "THE EARLIEST RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, AND ATTAINMENT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS OF RELEVANT ACCORDS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE SIDES WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP IN PROMOTING CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES." THIS TENDS TO CONFIRM OUR BELIEF THAT HOWEVER BREZHNEV CHOOSES TO RESPOND TO THE EUREKA SPEECH, HE WILL NOT REJECT U. S. PROPOSALS OUT OF HAND. STOESEL

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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV SPEECH ON START AND INF

1. SUMMARY: SPEAKING TO THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS TODAY, BREZHNEV: 1) CALLED THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO BEGIN START TALKS A "STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION," BUT HE SAID "IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TALKS SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY IN THE RIGHT KEY," 2) CRITICIZED THE U. S. START PROPOSAL AS UNILATERAL IN NATURE AND AS ALLOWING THE U. S. TO EXCLUDE FROM THE TALKS THE ARMS IT IS MOSTLY INTENSIVELY DEVELOPING, 3) ENDORSED A FREEZE ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 4) SAID THE USSR IS IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR, 5) PLEDGED THAT THE USSR WOULD DEPLOY NO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES BEYOND THE URALS BUT CAPABLE OF HITTING WESTERN EUROPE, 6) SAID THE SOVIET UNILATERAL FREEZE ENCOMPASSED ALSO AN END TO LAUNCH SITE CONSTRUCTION, AND 7) IMPLIED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES DEPLOYED IN THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE CHINA. END SUMMARY.

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2. BREZHNEV'S MAIN POINTS ON ARMS CONTROL WERE:
SSOD

-- THE SOVIET UNION WILL DO ITS UTMOST FOR THE
- SUCCESS OF THE SESSION.

INF

-- IT IS NOW NOT ENOUGH TO SPEAK ABOUT PEACE,
- SPECIFIC AND PRACTICAL MATTERS ARE NEEDED.
- THE KEY TASK TODAY IN THIS RESPECT IS TO
- LOWER THE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE,
- WHICH HAS REACHED DANGEROUS CEILINGS, TO END
- THE FURTHER STOCKPILING OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS
- PEPE.

- ANOTHER ROUND OF THE TALKS ON THE LIMITATION
- OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE WILL BE OPENED
- BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES IN
- GENEVA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. LET US WATCH
- HOW THE AMERICANS WILL CONDUCT THEMSELVES --
- WILL THEY MARK TIME ONCE AGAIN, PREPARING FOR
- THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES, OR WILL THEY SHOW A
- DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT.

-- WE HAVE COME OUT IN FAVOR OF THE FULL
- LIQUIDATION OF ALL MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR
- SYSTEMS IN EUROPE; THE WEST OBJECTED THAT
- THIS WOULD GO MUCH TOO FAR;

-- WE PROPOSED THAT SUCH SYSTEMS BE REDUCED BY
- MORE THAN TWO THIRDS; WE ARE TOLD THAT THIS
- IS TOO LITTLE.

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LUXEMBOURG FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

-- WELL, LET US SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE
- FIGURES -- WE ARE ALSO PREPARED FOR BIGGER
- REDUCTIONS, OF COURSE, ON A MUTUAL BASIS.
.
-- TO FACILITATE MATTERS THE SOVIET UNION
- UNILATERALLY DISCONTINUED RECENTLY A FURTHER
- DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE
- EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR AND DECIDED TO
- REDUCE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THEM. I CAN REPORT
- THAT WE ARE ALREADY EFFECTING THE REDUCTION
- OF A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SUCH MISSILES.
.
-- THESE CONCRETE PEACEFUL ACTIONS OF OUR
- COUNTRY ARE REGARDED APPROVINGLY IN THE WORLD.
- SOME PEOPLE IN THE WEST, HOWEVER, TRY TO
- QUESTION THEIR IMPORTANCE, TOO.
.
-- IT IS BEING ASSERTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE
- DECISION ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT
- PREVENT US FROM CONTINUING TO DEPLOY OUR MISSILES
- SO AS TO SECURE THAT THEY, LET IT BE FROM BEYOND
- THE URALS, COULD REACH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

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- I CAN SAY IN ALL DEFINITENESS: NO MEDIUM-RANGE
- MISSILES WILL BE ADDITIONALLY DEPLOYED IN PLACES
- FROM WHICH BOTH THE FRG AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF
- WESTERN EUROPE COULD BE WITHIN THEIR REACH.

-- THIS DECISION ALSO ENVISAGES A UNILATERAL
- FREEZE ON THE TERMINATION OF PREPARATION FOR
- THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES, INCLUDING AN END
- TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF LAUNCHING POSITIONS
- FOR SUCH MISSILES.

-- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA PRESSES THE USSR TO
- FREEZE, AND ELIMINATE ALTOGETHER, SUCH MISSILES
- DEPLOYED IN THE EASTERN PART OF OUR COUNTRY. THIS
- IS TRULY AN ABSURD CLAIM! IT IS POSSIBLE TO
- HANDLE QUESTIONS OF MISSILES -- THEIR LIMITATION
- AND REDUCTION. BUT ONLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS
- WITH THOSE WHOSE HANDS ARE THE NUCLEAR
- WEAPONS WHICH ARE OFFERED BY OUR MISSILES. AND
- AGAIN, OF COURSE, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

-- WE DO NOT OBJECT TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, BUT,
- UNDERSTANDABLY, THIS IS A SEPARATE QUESTION.

START

-- THE DESTINIES OF WAR AND PEACE IN MANY RESPECTS
- DEPEND ON WHETHER OR NOT A SOVIET-U. S. ACCORD

- IS REACHED ON LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC
- ARMS. AN HONEST AND FAIR ACCORD, WITH NO
- DETRIMENT TO ANYONE'S INTERESTS.

-- AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, IT HAS INVARIABLY
- COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF THE BEGINNING OF TALKS
- WITH THE OBJECT OF WORKING OUT SUCH AN UNDER-
- STANDING WITHOUT DELAY AND WITHOUT ANY STRINGS
- ATTACHED. THIS IS OUR POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN,
- BOTH IN PUBLIC AND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS,
- MADE KNOWN TO THE AMERICAN SIDE.

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS NOW DECLARED THAT THE
- UNITED STATES IS READY FOR THE RESUMPTION
- OF THE TALKS. IN OUR OPINION, THIS IS A
- STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT IS, HOWEVER,

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LUXEMBOURG FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

- IMPORTANT THAT THE TALKS SHOULD BEGIN
- IMMEDIATELY IN THE RIGHT KEY.
- .
- THE PRESIDENT SAID THE UNITED STATES
- WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.
- WELL, WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN FAVOUR OF SUB-
- STANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THERE
- IS NO NEED TO PERSUADE US IN THIS RESPECT.
- .
- BUT IF ONE LOOKS AT THE ESSENCE OF THE IDEAS
- VOICED BY THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT ON SUCH
- REDUCTIONS, ONE NOTES UNFORTUNATELY THAT THE
- AMERICAN POSITION IS ABSOLUTELY UNILATERAL
- IN NATURE, ABOVE ALL, BECAUSE THE UNITED
- STATES WOULD LIKE IN GENERAL TO EXCLUDE FROM
- THE TALKS THE STRATEGIC ARMS IT IS NOW MOST
- INTENSIVELY DEVELOPING.
- .
- IT IS NOT WITHOUT REASON THAT COMPE-
- TENT PEOPLE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY
- STATED THAT THIS WAS AN UNREALISTIC POSITION,
- CUT OFF FROM LIFE AND PERHAPS SIMPLY AN

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- INSINCERE POSITION. IT IS DIRECTLY
- PREJUDICING THE SECURITY OF THE USSR AND AT
- THE SAME TIME LEAVES WASHINGTON A FREE HAND
- IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMERICAN PROGRAM OF
- STOCKPILING STRATEGIC ARMS.
-- THE U.S. POSITION IS NOT TO ATTAIN AN AGREEMENT,
- BUT TO ENSURE MILITARY SUPERIORITY.
.
-- WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THE TALKS TO PROCEED
- SUCCESSFULLY AND TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT?
- FIRST, THE TALKS SHOULD ACTUALLY PURSUE THE
- AIM OF LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC
- ARMAMENTS RATHER THAN BE A COVER FOR THE
- CONTINUED ARMS RACE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
- EXISTING PARITY.
.
-- SECOND. IT IS NECESSARY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD
- CONDUCT THEM WITH REGARD FOR EACH OTHER'S
- LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS AND STRICTLY IN
- ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND
- EQUAL SECURITY.
.
-- LASTLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE EVERYTHING
- POSITIVE THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED EARLIER. THE
- TALKS DO NOT START FROM SCRATCH BUT A GOOD
- DEAL OF FAR FROM USELESS WORK HAS BEEN DONE.
- THIS SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED.
.
-- WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ONLY WITH THIS APPROACH
- THERE CAN BE ANY HOPE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT
- ON CONCRETE MEASURES TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE
- THE STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS OF BOTH SIDES.
.
-- IT IS LIKEWISE VERY IMPORTANT TO EFFECTIVELY BLOCK
- ALL THE CHANNELS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE
- STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN ANY FORM. THIS MEANS
- THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC
- WEAPONS SHOULD BE EITHER BANNED OR RESTRICTED
- TO THE UTMOST BY AGREED UPON CHARACTERISTICS.
.
NUCLEAR FREEZE

.
-- WE ALSO HAVE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL. WE WOULD
- BE PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT THAT THE STRATEGIC
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
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- ARMAMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. ARE FROZEN
- ALREADY NOW, AS SOON AS THE TALKS BEGIN, FROZEN
- QUANTITATIVELY, AND THAT THEIR MODERNIZATION IS
- LIMITED TO THE UTMOST.

- IT IS ALSO NECESSARY THAT NEITHER THE USA NOR THE
 - SOVIET UNION TAKE SUCH ACTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD
 - TO AN UPSETTING OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, SUCH
 - A FREEZE, AN IMPORTANT THING BY ITSELF, WOULD
 - FACILITATE BOTH HEADWAY AND A RADICAL LIMITATION
 - AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. HARTMAN
- BT

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170476 MEMO

1 5/19/1982 B1

W. CLARK TO A. HAIG RE REMOVAL OF
SUPERCONDUCTING MAGNET

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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John Poindexter			
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