

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR USSR (05/20/1982-05/22/1982)

Box: RAC Box 22

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/16/2015

File Folder USSR (5/20/82-5/22/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

254

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170506 MEMO	S. KRAEMER TO W. CLARK RE BRIEFING	1	5/20/1982	B1 B3
170507 REPORT	RE SOVIET PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE STRATEGY (INCL. COVER NOTE) PAR 10/28/2009 CREST 748-22-37-2-1	20		B1 B3
170508 CABLE	STATE 140896	6	5/22/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

18C

1

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED Package # 35/4

82 MAY 20 P 9: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>R</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>JH</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>JC</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>JP</u>	
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>KRAEMER</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

Good idea
M

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/16/2015

File Folder

USSR (5/20/82-5/22/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

22

254

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170506 MEMO	S. KRAEMER TO W. CLARK RE BRIEFING	1	5/20/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

3

A



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4
170507

MR. KRAMER,

As per your request, Attached
Are xerox copies of The viewgraphs
used in the briefing we presented to
you on The 29th of April: revised.

25x1

DIA REVIEWED 30-May-2008: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

BY CRB

BY CU

DATE 4/8/13

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR CRES/NUR-748-22-37-27

BY GA NARA DATE 4/8/13



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET MENTAL BAGGAGE

- NATURE OF HISTORY IS CLASS STRUGGLE
 - IT EXISTS OBJECTIVELY
- SOVIET POWER IS INSTRUMENT OF CLASS STRUGGLE
- CLASS STRUGGLE WILL BE DECIDED BY THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES"
 - MILITARY, POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
- "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY PERMITS SOVIETS TO ALTER "CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN THEIR FAVOR
- ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE MOVEMENT ARE ELEMENTS OF SOVIET "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY
 - ENABLES SOVIETS TO MAKE WESTERN MILITARY GROWTH MORE DIFFICULT
 - PERMITS SOVIETS TO SEEK SAME ENDS THAT MORE ARMS WOULD ACHIEVE



DAI8784E

WORKING PAPERS

3

SOVIET "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY FACILITATED BY

- **COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO PLANNING AND ACTION**
- **MAINTAINING AND INCREASING MILITARY
CAPABILITIES**
- **VARIETY OF INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE TO
SOVIET LEADERSHIP**



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

6

SECRET

4

INTEGRATION OF SOVIET POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY

DEFENSE
COUNCIL

POLITBURO

GENERAL STAFF

- CONTROLS MILITARY FORCES
- PREPARES WAR PLANS
- FORMULATES DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY
- OVERSEES R&D PROGRAMS

INTERNATIONAL DEPT. OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

- OVERSEES FOREIGN POLICY MANDATES (PARTY'S "GENERAL STAFF")
- ADVISES ON EXPORT OF REVOLUTION
- COORDINATES OVERT AND COVERT ACTIVITIES ABROAD

SECRET



WORKING PAPERS

7

USSR DEFENSE COUNCIL

- SMALL, UNIFIED GROUP WITH TOTAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
- STABLE, INFREQUENT CHANGES IN COMPOSITION
- CONTROL OF BUDGET/FORCES IN A SINGLE-PARTY SYSTEM
- MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONMAKING

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

~~TOP SECRET GAMMA~~

6



DEFENSE COUNCIL OF THE USSR (FUNCTIONS)

SENIOR SOVIET DECISION-MAKING BODY


- **DETERMINES STRATEGIC POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES**
- **ESTABLISHES POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES**
- **APPROVES WAR PLANS**
- **DIRECTS DEFENSE R & D AND PROCUREMENT**
- **PEACETIME/WARTIME NATIONAL COMMAND ELEMENT**

~~TOP SECRET GAMMA~~

WORKING PAPERS

6

STRUCTURE OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL DECISION-MAKING



TOP SECRET GAMMA

DIA20110

WORKING PAPERS

ARMS CONTROL IN SOVIET "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY

- **FURTHERS SOVIET POLITICAL/MILITARY OBJECTIVES**
- **AID TO SOVIET MILITARY POLICIES**
- **CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS**



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET CONCEPTS OF WAR

- NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE NOT CHANGED THE NATURE OF WAR: WAR CONTINUES TO BE FOUGHT FOR POLITICAL ENDS
- WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE, BUT REMAINS POSSIBLE
- IF WAR COMES, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM WILL WIN, THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM WILL COLLAPSE
- VICTORY IS NOT AUTOMATIC
- THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO PREPARE FOR VICTORY
- VICTORY REQUIRES WARFIGHTING, WARWINNING CAPABILITIES ACROSS THE BOARD: TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

WORKING PAPERS



TOP SECRET UMBRA

SOVIET WARFIGHTING, WARWINNING

- BREAK THE ENEMY'S WILL TO RESIST
- DESTROY THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO FIGHT AND THAT WHICH SUSTAINS THAT CAPABILITY
- TARGETS ARE:
 - NUCLEAR FORCES AND STORAGE SITES
 - ARMED FORCES FORMATIONS
 - COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE
 - OTHER MILITARY TARGETS
 - CRITICAL WAR-SUSTAINING INDUSTRIES

(CONFIRMED BY SOVIET WRITINGS AND EXERCISES)

TOP SECRET UMBRA ORCON GAMMA CONTROLLED

DIA20100

WORKING PAPERS

10

13

SOVIET WARFIGHTING, WARWINNING

- **REQUIRES THE PROTECTION OF:**
 - **SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES**
 - **MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSETS TO SUSTAIN THE WAR**
 - **SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND CADRES**
- **REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGIC ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE**



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET CONCEPTS OF WAR

- NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DECISIVE
- INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR IS DECISIVE
- STRESS ON THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE
- PREEMPTION AND SURPRISE
- CONDITIONS FOR VICTORY
 - PRESERVATION OF SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM
 - DECOUPLING OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES FROM EUROPE
 - NEUTRALIZATION OF ENEMY STRATEGIC WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
 - OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY (EUROPE)

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET FORCE REQUIREMENTS

- FIRST STRIKE COUNTERFORCE, HARD TARGET KILL CAPABILITIES
- STRATEGIC ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSE, AND CIVIL DEFENSE
- OFFENSIVE THEATER SUPERIORITY



DIAB701F

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

- **ELIMINATE WESTERN EFFORTS THAT THREATEN TO
UNDERMINE SOVIET WARFIGHTING, WARWINNING
STRATEGY**
- **PROTECT CAPABILITY TO MEET SOVIET DOCTRINAL
REQUIREMENTS**
- **PURSUE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES THAT ENHANCE
CREDIBILITY OF SOVIET STRATEGY**



DIA8784

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

**ELIMINATE WESTERN EFFORTS THAT
THREATEN TO UNDERMINE SOVIET
WARFIGHTING, WARWINNING
STRATEGY**

**SPECIFIC TREATY PROVISIONS OR PROPOSALS
THAT ELIMINATE, REDUCE, CONSTRAIN
WESTERN PROGRAMS**

- **SALT I — ABM TREATY (TO PROTECT CREDIBILITY
OF SOVIET FIRST STRIKE)**
- **SALT II — MOBILE ICBM BAN (AVOID TARGET
ACQUISITION PROBLEMS)**



DIA 978

WORKING PAPERS

SECRET

SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL PROTECT CAPABILITY TO MEET DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

● PROTECT SOVIET PROGRAMS

- SALT I — PROTECT FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY BY NO CLEAR DEFINITION OF HEAVY ICBM
- SALT II — PROTECT RECONSTITUTION CAPABILITY WITH ONLY RAPID RELOAD BAN
- ASAT — PROTECT CAPABILITY TO ATTACK U.S. C³I

● INSURE BREAKOUT OR CIRCUMVENTION OPTION

- SALT I — CONTINUED ABM R&D
- SALT II — CIRCUMVENT ONE NEW TYPE ICBM LIMITATION

SECRET

DIA8784

WORKING PAPERS

SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

PURSUE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES THAT
ENHANCE CREDIBILITY OF SOVIET
STRATEGY

- INCLUDE U.S. FBS IN SALT I, SALT II, INF
- COUNT FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES
- NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES



DIA878

WORKING PAPERS

EUROPEAN "PEACE MOVEMENT" IN SOVIET "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY

●OBJECTIVES

REJECTION OF INF (CURRENT GOAL)
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF EUROPE
U.S. OUT OF EUROPE

●INSTRUMENTS

INDIGENOUS GROUPS
LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRONTS

●TACTICS

FORMATION OF UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS
DEMONSTRATIONS
SIGNATURES CAMPAIGNS
MARCHES
AND OTHER MEANS TO INFLUENCE
GOVERNMENTS



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" STRATEGY

CONCLUSIONS

**ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES IS BEING
FACILITATED BY**

- **DECISIONMAKING UNIFIED IN SMALL BODY WITH TOTAL
AUTHORITY**
- **MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF MILITARY POWER**
- **COORDINATED USE OF AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING
THE "PEACE MOVEMENT" AND ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS**

~~SECRET~~



DIA8784E

WORKING PAPERS

NS/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8203514

23

RECEIVED
11/16/85 61711

RECEIVED 20 MAY 82 20

TO CLARK

FROM KRAEMER

DOCDATE 20 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

AC

SUBJECT: DIA BRIEFING RE SOVIET PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE STRATEGY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 21 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

E 5/24 Clark approved

81c ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(C)A

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

24

170508

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0896
SIT996 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038849
TOR: 142/0048Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS PIPE

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST // // // // SENT TO PIPES FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0896/01 1420044
O 220039Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

NLRR 748-22-37-30
BY EDS NARA DATE 11/16/15

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4287

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7571
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 140896
NOBIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/21/02 (STOESSEL. WALTER J., JR.)
TAGS: UR US PARM
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV'S MAY 20 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~15~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SOVIET CHRGE BESSMERTNYKH CALLED AT HIS REQUEST AT 1430L MAY 21 ON DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL, AFTER SECRETARY WAS UNABLE FOR SCHEDULING REASONS TO RECEIVE HIM AS REQUESTED, TO DELIVER LETTER DATED MAY 20 FROM BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 7. EUR/SOV DIRECTOR SIMONS WAS NOTETAKER. TEXT OF UNOFFICIAL SOVIET EMBASSY TRANSLATION, REVIEWED BY DEPARTMENT AGAINST RUSSIAN TEXT, CONCLUDES THIS MESSAGE.

3. IN PASSING THE LETTER TO STOESSEL, BESSMERTNYKH COMMENTED THAT IT TRIED TO ANSWER ALL THE POINTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, DESCRIBED THE "PRINCIPLED" SOVIET APPROACH TO START AND MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. AFTER A FIRST READING OF THE LETTER, STOESSEL REPLIED THAT WE WOULD STUDY IT CAREFULLY, AND THAT IT WOULD BE CONVEYED AT ONCE TO THE PRESIDENT. HE NOTED THE PARAGRAPH CONCERNING CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS, AN ELEMENT WHICH HAD THUS NOT CHANGED. ALSO NOTING THE PASSAGE AGREEING THAT ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS, INCLUDING TIME AND VENUE, BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEAR FUTURE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, STOESSEL SAID HE ASSUMED BESSMERTNYKH WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH EUR AS-DESIGNATE RICHARD BURT.

5. BESSMERTNYKH RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS AGREED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ARE OF COURSE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES CONCERNING SUBSTANCE. WITH REGARD TO MODALITIES, HE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0896

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038849

EXPECTED INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE HAD THE "FEELING" THEY MIGHT ARRIVE MONDAY OR TUESDAY (MAY 25/6), AND THUS PROBABLY MONDAY OR TUESDAY HE "HOPED" TO BE IN TOUCH WITH STOESSEL, IF IT WERE AGREEABLE, TO LOOK AGAIN AT FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. STOESSEL AGREED.

6. STOESSEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT AS BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THERE ARE DIFFERING VIEWS ON SUBSTANCE. THE POSITION THE U.S. HAD PUT FORWARD IS A REASONABLE ONE, AND WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT AT ALL ONE-SIDED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE READY TO LISTEN TO ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS, AND LOOK FORWARD TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH, AND TO AGREEMENT. WE HAD STUDIED BREZHNEV'S MAY 18 KOMSOMOL SPEECH CAREFULLY.

7. BESSMERTNYKH ASKED WHETHER STOESSEL WOULD CARE TO COMMENT ON THE SPEECH, NOTING THE WHITE HOUSE HAD SAID IT WOULD BE STUDIED. STOESSEL SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE ABOUT THAT, BUT NOTED WE HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED OURSELVES CONCERNING THE FREEZE CONCEPT.

8. BESSMERTNYKH COMMENTED THAT BREZHNEV HAD PROPOSED A FREEZE. OUR APPROACHES ARE DIFFERENT, AND HE HOPED WE COULD WORK OUT THESE DIFFERENCES. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ALSO SAW SIMILAR ELEMENTS IN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COUNTRIES, LIKE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS ACHIEVED IN PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS, AND AGREEMENT TO RADICAL REDUCTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT START AT ZERO. THERE IS COMMON GROUND.

9. BESSMERTNYKH CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD BE IN IMMEDIATE TOUCH ONCE HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS. IF WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON TIME AND PLACE, IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO THINK ABOUT THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT. STOESSEL SAID HE THOUGHT THIS APPROPRIATE, AND WE WOULD LOOK INTO IT.

10. TEXT OF BREZHNEV LETTER FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT.

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

WITH REGARD TO YOUR MESSAGE TO ME OF MAY 7, 1982 I WOULD LIKE ABOVE ALL TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION - THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN US BEING A CLEAR TESTIMONY THEREOF - HAS BEEN STEADILY AND PERSISTENTLY CALLING ON THE UNITED STATES TO AGREE ON JOINT MEASURES AIMED AT EFFECTIVELY BRIDLING THE ARMS RACE, FIRST OF ALL, IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT ONLY BY MOVING ALONG THIS PATH IS IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING A NUCLEAR WAR, WHICH WOULD BECOME AN IRREPARABLE TRAGEDY FOR ALL MANKIND.

LIFE ITSELF PUTS QUESTIONS OF LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IN THE CENTER OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. WE HAVE ALWAYS FAVORED INCREASINGLY RADICAL STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION. AND IT IS NOT OUR FAULT THAT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION PROCESS WAS INTERRUPTED

SECSTATE WASHDC 0896

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038849

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0896
SIT995 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038851
TOR: 142/0050Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS PIPE
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0896/02 1420044
O 220039Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4288

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7572
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 140896
NODIS
FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

REFERENCES MADE TO THIS OR THAT EVENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE CANNOT JUSTIFY THE LACK OF READINESS ON THE PART OF THE U. S. TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE WHICH YOU YOURSELF JUSTLY CALL ONE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD AT LARGE. AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THEIR LEADERS IN THIS RESPECT IS CERTAINLY NOT A THING THAT HAS EMERGED TODAY. THAT RESPONSIBILITY EXISTED IN EQUAL MEASURE ONE YEAR AGO, A YEAR AND A HALF AGO. ON OUR PART WE ALWAYS PROCEEDED FROM THIS PREMISE.

IF THE U. S. SIDE HAS NOW COME TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THAT IN ITSELF IS A POSITIVE FACT.

OUR POSITION OF PRINCIPLE IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING SUCH NEGOTIATIONS IS SURELY WELL KNOWN TO YOU. I CAN REAFFIRM THAT IT HAS NOT CHANGED. WE AGREE THAT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THE TIME AND VENUE FOR HOLDING THEM, BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEAR FUTURE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

SPEAKING OF THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS, ONE CAN BE CERTAIN

THAT A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO RECOUP FOR THE TIME LOST AND THE OPPORTUNITIES MISSED. BUT THAT MUST BE DONE. HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT CAN BE, FIRST, THE PRESERVATION OF WHATEVER POSITIVE HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH THE JOINT EFFORTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND, SECOND, A GENUINELY SERIOUS WILLINGNESS TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT COMMENSURATE WITH THE SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRULY HISTORIC TASK THAT STANDS BEFORE US.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0896

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038851

IN OTHER WORDS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BE SET ON THE RIGHT COURSE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THAT THEY BE CONDUCTED CONSTRUCTIVELY WITHOUT ONE SIDE ATTEMPTING TO GAIN ADVANTAGE IN THEM AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER.

I DEEM IT NECESSARY TO SAY IT WITH ALL CLARITY, SINCE THE POSITION WITH WHICH THE U.S., JUDGING BY YOUR SPEECH OF MAY 9, IS APPROACHING THE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BUT CAUSE APPREHENSION AND EVEN DOUBTS AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE U.S. SIDE.

AFTER ALL, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT TO ISOLATE JUST ANY ONE COMPONENT OUT OF THE TOTALITY OF THE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND TO MAKE IT A SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO CONNECTION TO THE OTHERS, AS YOU SUGGEST, WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO A DISTORTED PICTURE OF THE BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN THE SIDES. THUS, THE "SUBSTANTIAL" REDUCTIONS THE U.S. SIDE IS TALKING ABOUT ON THE BASIS OF THE PICTURE IT HAS ITSELF PRESENTED WOULD NATURALLY BE SUBSTANTIAL ONLY FOR THE SOVIET SIDE.

ONLY ONE THING WOULD BE THE RESULT OF SUCH A ONE-SIDED APPROACH - AN UPSETTING OF THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES AND A BREACH OF THAT VERY STABILITY WHICH THE U.S. SIDE IS ALLEGEDLY SO ANXIOUS TO ENSURE.

SECSTATE WASHDC 0896
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038851

THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING, MR. PRESIDENT: THIS IS NOT A REALISTIC POSITION, NOT THE PATH TOWARD AGREEMENT. BESIDES, AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE NOT THE ONLY ONES WHO HOLD SUCH A VIEW.

WE BELIEVE IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE AGAINST THE FACT THAT, WHEN IT COMES TO MATTERS TOUCHING UPON NATIONAL SECURITY, NEITHER SIDE CAN ALLOW A TILT TO BE MADE IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. WE ARE REALISTS AND DONOT EXPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACCEPT THAT. TO AN

EQUAL DEGREE, IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED OF THE SOVIET UNION EITHER. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO STATE THIS DIRECTLY, WITH NOTHING OMITTED.

IN YOUR LETTER YOU MENTION THAT A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. BUT THIS DOES NOT MAKE ANY MORE CONVINCING THE ARGUMENTS FOR SUCH AN APPROACH WHICH IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE USSR, TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

TAKING THIS OPPORTUNITY, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT I FOUND IT NECESSARY ALSO TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY IN MY SPEECH ON MAY 18, 1982 AT THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS, OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH A ONE-SIDED APPROACH AND OUR OPINION REGARDING THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A GENUINELY FAIR AND EQUITABLE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

28

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0896
SIT994 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038852
TOR: 142/0051Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS PIPE
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0896/03 1420044
O 220039Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4289

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7573
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 140896
NOTIS
REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS SHOULD BE BASED.

IN DOING SO, I ALSO STATED THE READINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES TO THE EFFECT THAT RIGHT NOW, AS SOON AS THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN, THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF BOTH COUNTRIES BE FROZEN QUANTITATIVELY AND THAT THEIR MODERNIZATION BE LIMITED TO THE UTMOST. SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FACILITATE ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES THEREIN. I WOULD ASK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, CAREFULLY TO CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, AND WHICH WOULD MEET THE OBJECTIVE OF MUTUAL LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, JUST AS THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE PREVIOUSLY REACHED AGREEMENTS THAT YOU CITED. SOVIET PEOPLE - AND YOU CAN TAKE MY WORD FOR THAT - WILL RESOLUTELY SUPPORT SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND-THE LAST POINT. IN OUR CORRESPONDENCE I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT TO WHOM AN APPEAL FOR RESTRAINT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED. SINCE YOU RAISE THAT SUBJECT AGAIN, I SHALL ONLY SAY, WITHOUT REPEATING MYSELF, THAT IT IS PRECISELY OF THE U. S. THAT WE, AND INDEED OTHER COUNTRIES, EXPECT RESTRAINT AND A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BOTH TO ISSUES OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TO FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, ABOVEALL TO THOSE RELATED TO LIMITING THE ARMS RACE AND STRENGTHENING COMMON SECURITY.

WE, OF COURSE, ARE GIVING AND WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE A PROPER EVALUATION TO UNACCEPTABLE MANIFESTATIONS IN U. S. POLICY AS WELL AS TO THE INCESSANT ATTACKS MADE REGARDING THE SOVIET UNION. BUT WE, ON OUR PART, HAVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

29

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 0896

DTG: 220039Z MAY 82 PSN: 038852

BEEN SEEKING NEITHER SHARP POLEMICS NOR CONFRONTATION. YOU MAY BE ASSURED, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT A READINESS TO DEAL ON AN EQUAL BASIS, TO RESPECT THE INTERESTS OF EACH OTHER, AND TO DEVELOP MUTUAL TRUST, WILL MEET A MOST POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION.

WE WILL, AS BEFORE, CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN SO THAT PEOPLE CAN LOOK INTO THE FUTURE WITH CONFIDENCE AND CALM, WITHOUT FEARING FOR THE THREAT OF WAR WHICH IS NOT NEEDED EQUALLY - I REPEAT, EQUALLY - EITHER BY THE SOVIET OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

SINCERELY, L. BREZHNEV MAY 20, 1982. END TEXT. HAIG

~~SECRET~~