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(August 1982) (2 of 4)

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Withdrawer

12/16/2011

File Folder

CHINA, PRC (AUGUST, 1982) (2 OF 4)

FOIA | F00-173/5

MJD

Box Number

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BOX Number 00/K			1 OCKER 28		
ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
125968	МЕМО	GASONG SIGUR TO WILLIAM CLARK RE PLANNING	1	8/16/1982	B1
125969	МЕМО	L. PAUL BREMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE PLANNING	4	8/14/1982	B1
125970	CABLE	BEIJING 10901	4	8/14/1982	B1
125971	CABLE	BEIJING 10902	2	8/14/1982	 B1
125972	CABLE	STATE 228810	2	8/15/1982	B1
125973	CABLE	STATE 228829	2	8/15/1982	B1
125974	CABLE	BEIJING 10903	1	8/15/1982	 B1
125975	CABLE	BEIJING 10904	2	8/15/1982	 B1
125976	CABLE	ВЕІЛІNG 10902	2	8/15/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 14 AUG 82

RECEIVED 16 AUG 82 08

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

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# National Seculity Council 308 The White House

Package #_ 5828

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### **Ronald Reagan Library**

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Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File MJD 12/16/2011

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CHINA, PRC (AUGUST, 1982) (2 OF 4) F00-173/5

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GASONG SIGUR TO WILLIAM CLARK RE PLANNING

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L. PAUL BREMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE PLANNING

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**BEIJING 10901** 

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**BEIJING 10902** 

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**BEIJING 10903** 

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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**BEIJING 10904** 

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RECEIVED 17 AUG 82 10 DOCDATE 16 AUG 82 23 CLARK FROM BREMER KEYWORDS: CHINA P R TAIWAN MEDIA SUSPENSE SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIALS RE US - CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 17 AUG 82 STATUS S FILES FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO SIGUR SIMS COMMENTS REF# 8224601 LOG NSCIFID (C/) ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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12/18/11

August 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Press Materials: U.S.-China Joint Communique

Attached are the press statement, press themes, and questions and answers that Assistant Secretary Holdridge will use on Tuesday, August 17 during his background briefing of the press on the U.S.-China Joint Communique. Also attached is a copy of the press guidance prepared for the State Department press spokesman for use at tomorrow's noon briefing.

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

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PRESS GUIDANCE

August 17, 1982

12/14/11

### STATEMENT: US-PRC COMMUNIQUE

The White House announced this morning an agreement on a new US-PRC communique. The text of that communique is available to you.

In brief, we believe the communique reaffirms fundamental principles which have governed our relations with the People's Republic of China and the people of Taiwan since normalization. It establishes a basic framework for dealing with the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan. It reflects the great importance we place on a strong US/PRC relationship and the continuation of unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. We expect that the communique will enable us to develop further a wide range of friendly ties between the US and China and to maintain our unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

For answers to specific questions, I refer you to the background briefing held for you earlier this morning.



### STATEMENT FOR PRESS BACKGROUNDER BY EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

Ladies and Gentleman:

I welcome this opportunity to brief you on the outcome of our discussions with the Chinese, extending over almost ten months, on the difficult and complicated Taiwan arms sales issue. The United States and China, after these many months of intensive discussions, have reached agreement on a new Joint Communique setting a framework for dealing with that issue. The text of this document is available, as is the text of the Presidential statement.

The question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was not resolved at the time of normalization and the Chinese made clear that they would raise it again. As a result of high-level meetings last October — President Reagan and Premier Zhou in Cancun, Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Huang in Washington — the two sides agreed to hold discussions in an effort to resolve this issue. Tensions at that time were high. In exchanges between Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Huang Hua, both sides stated that they were prepared for a retrogression in relations. Discussions were subsequently held by the two sides on the basis of firmly—held principles. The Communique as finally agreed upon represents a significant step forward in resolving US-China differences over this issue and enunciates policies

upon which we and the leaders of China hope to move our relationship forward to a new level.

Turning now to the document itself, let me point out a few key features; then I'll take your questions.

--First, the document must be read as a whole, since the policies it sets forth are interrelated.

--Second, the Communique contains a strong Chinese statement that its fundamental policy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan question by peaceful means (Para 4). In this context, I would point out that the reference to their "fundamental" policy carries the connotation in Chinese of "unchanging and long-term."

to Taiwan (Para 6) are based on China's statements as to its fundamental peaceful policy for seeking a resolution to the Taiwan question and on the "new situation" created by those statements (Para 5). This situation is new because, for the first time, China has described its peaceful policy toward Taiwan in the terms I have outlined. Thus, our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan. This is indicated

by the words at the beginning of Para 5 that "Having in mind the foregoing statements by both sides, the United States Government states..." We have no reason to think that the Chinese will change this fundamental policy, but if they should we would, of course, reexamine our position.

ending arms sales to Taiwan and the statements of future US arms sales policy embodied in the Communique do not provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination. The U.S. statements are fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and we will continue to make appropriate arms sales to Taiwan based on our assessments of their defense needs.

past several months, there has been considerable speculations about the substance of our discussions with the Chinese. As you know, we have not felt free to comment on such speculation while our talks were underway. Therefore, it might be useful at this point to clarify our stand on a number of issues which have surfaced in such speculations.

As to our position on the resolution of the Taiwan problem, we have consistently held that it is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. It follows that we see no mediation role for the U.S. nor will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

I would also call your attention to the fact that there has been no change in our long-standing position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique (Para 1) in its opening paragraph simply cites that portion of the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. in which the U.S. "acknowledged the Chinese position on this issue" (i.e. that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China).

It has been reported in the press that the Chinese at one point suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act be revised. We have no plans to seek any such revisions.

Finally, in Para 9 the two sides agree to "maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest." Obviously, we do not consider it appropriate for the specifics of our future arms sales to Taiwan to be a matter for consultation.

However, as indicated, we would be prepared to address a wide range of other matters.

--We hope and expect that this Communique, and the step forward which it represents in the resolution of United States-Chinese differences on this issue, will enhance the confidence of the people of Taiwan, whose well-being and prosperity continue to be of the utmost importance to us. From the President on down, we have acted in a way which seeks to enhance the future security and prosperity of the people of Taiwan, and I call your attention to the emphasis on this matter in the President's statement.

--Removal of the arms question as a serious issue in US-China relations will help to ensure that both countries can continue to cooperate on mutually-shared international objectives, e.g. deterring Soviet aggression in East Asia and removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. It will ease fears by American friends and allies that the general peace and stability in the Asia/Pacific region could be undermined. By defusing the difficult issue of arms sales we will open the way for an expansion of U.S.-China relations in a broad range of economic, cultural, scientific and technological areas as well as in people-to-people contact.

Theme: REACTION ON TAIWAN

General Point: Taiwan has been kept generally informed of our discussions with China and has had time to prepare for the announcement. People on Taiwan have shown great resiliency in the past. Our continued strong support for unofficial relations with Taiwan should cushion any adverse reaction to the joint communique.

### Specifics:


--We have kept Taiwan generally informed, through appropriate, non-governmental channels, over the past several months. The Communique will not come as a surprise. There was no sudden, last minute notification. A fundamental goal of the Administration has been to conduct our unofficial relationship in a manner consistent with the mutual concern befitting old friends.

--Taiwan has had time to prepare for the announcement. The people on Taiwan have shown great resiliency in the past and we have a high degree of confidence in their ability to do so again.

--We are committed to maintaining the strong, unofficial relationship between the people on Taiwan and the people of the U.S. Trade, investment, cultural and other ties will be maintained and we fully expect they will continue to increase in the coming years.

--Selected, defensive weapons sales will continue, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. There will be no sudden change in our supply of arms. In fact, we consistently refused to set a termination date.

--The President's statement makes clear his deep concern for the continued well-being of the people on Taiwan and his personal commitment to maintaining the unofficial relationship with them.



Theme: EFFECT ON TAIWAN'S SECURITY

General Point: The question of Taiwan's security involves political as well as military factors. Stable US-China relations will enhance the long-term well-being of the people on Taiwan by allowing both the US and PRC to pursue evolutionary policies. We will be able to avoid a confrontation that could lead the PRC to take drastic, sudden action that would seriously destabilize Taiwan.

### Specifics:

--The best assurance for Taiwan's well-being is provided through maintenance of good US-China relations, with China continuing its fundamental policy of peaceful resolution of differences.

--Good US-China relations, and a China engaged in constructive relationships with American friends and allies, is an important means of assuring that China does not feel compelled to resort to force to settle the Taiwan issue. Conversely, a serious deterioration in US-China relations, particularly if focussed on the Taiwan question, could greatly undercut this goal.

--The gradual reductions in arms sales envisaged in the Joint Communique reflect our assessment of Taiwan's future defense needs. That assessment is directly influenced by our expectation that China's approach toward Taiwan will continue to be peaceful. The communique makes clear that this is China's "fundamental policy." The Chinese version in particular connotes steadiness of purpose and constancy over time. Should China depart from that approach, our assessment of Taiwan's defense needs naturally would have to be reviewed.

--Arms sales will continue, based on Taiwan's defense needs. We will continue to assess those needs and respond as appropriate.

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Theme: EFFECT ON US-CHINA RELATIONS

General Point: Strong US-China relations are important to our national security interests. The arms sales issue has been the single most difficult problem in US-China relations in the last year and had the potential of leading to a serious setback in relations. Agreement on how to handle this problem, in a manner that does not compromise either side's principles, removes a major sticking point and opens opportunities for further advances in the relationship.

### Specifics:

--A strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive Administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia.

--Handling the Taiwan issue in a manner that does not compromise either side's principles avoids a potentially serious setback in relations that could have had a negative impact on a wide range of US interests.

-- Economic, cultural, scientific, technological, and people-to-people contacts have grown rapidly since establishment of diplomatic relations. Now that we have defused the difficult issue of arms sales, we are confident that US-China relations will continue to advance in a broad range of areas.

Theme: EFFECT ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION

General Point: Unsettled US-China relations lead directly to fears by American friends and allies that the general peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region could be threatened. A mutally satisfactory means of accommodating both US and Chinese principles concerning arms sales to Taiwan removes the specter of a serious deterioration in bilateral relations. It allows for an expansion of the relationship as well as continued progress toward achieving mutually-shared international objectives.

### Specifics:

--Our allies have been greatly concerned that US-China differences over Taiwan could undermine the general peace and stability that have characterized the region in recent years. They will be greatly relieved that both sides have found a way of dealing with a complex historical issue.

--Countries in Asia will welcome China's statement that its fundamental policy toward Taiwan is a peaceful one.

--Removal of the arms question as a serious issue in US-China relations will help to ensure that both countries can continue to cooperate on mutually-shared international objectives, e.g. deterring Soviet aggression in East Asia and removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

Theme: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINESE AND US STATEMENTS IN COMMUNIQUE

General Point: China has consistently maintained that the settlement of differences between China and Taiwan is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide, with no interference by any outside government. The US has maintained that its sole, abiding concern is that any settlement be a peaceful one. A fundamental U.S. negotiating objective was to obtain a relationship between China's policy of peaceful resolution of differences and our policy on future arms sales to Taiwan.

### Specifics:

--Throughout the history of US-China rapprochment, China has maintained that it would not give an outside government a guarantee of non-use of force against Taiwan. It has argued that to do so would be to allow interference in China's internal affairs. In practice, however, China has made clear that it would prefer a peaceful resolution of its differences with Taiwan.

-China has stated in the joint communique that its Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, issued on January 1, 1979, and its Nine Point Proposal of September 30, 1981 constitute a fundamental policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of differences.

--Our statement of future policy regarding arms sales to Taiwan is premised on a continuation of China's fundamental policy of striving for a peaceful solution to its differences with Taiwan.

Theme: DEFINITION OF "QUANTITY" AND "QUALITY"


General Point: "Quantity" and "quality" are general terms whose specific interpretation will depend on a variety of factors. (We will want to be less specific in defining these terms in public than we were in discussions with the Congress.)

### Specifics:

-- A number of factors, including a variety of financial and quantitative considerations, will influence how we apply these terms.

--We are certain we can provide sufficient defense capability for Taiwan within the definition of these terms and in accordance with US law

--We have not negotiated with China specific definitions of the terms or how they will be applied.



Theme: THINGS WE HAVE NOT DONE IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE

General: Taiwan has said it would help to maintain confidence among the people on Taiwan if the US made public oral points made to Taiwan.

Specifics: There are six points not contained in the Joints Communique:

- -- a date certain for termination of arms sales;
- --agreement on prior consultations with the PRC on arms to Taiwan;
  - --a mediation role for the US
  - --agreement to change our law;
  - --any change in the US position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan;
  - -- any US pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

PRESS GUIDANCE August 17, 1982

### US POLICY TOWARD CHINA -- TAIWAN

Q: Does this Communique represent any change in our policies towards China or Taiwan?

A: No. The Communique reaffirms fundamental principles which have governed our relations with the People's Republic of China and the people of Taiwan since normalization. The Communique seeks to reduce differences with China and to strengthen the basis for a further development of our friendly ties. It also reflects the great importance we place on strong US-PRC relationship and the continuation of unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

Q: Are we attempting to pressure Taiwan into negotiations with the PRC for purposes of reunification?

A: The US does not take a position on the issue of reunification. The US statement made at the time of normalization stated clearly our expectation that the Taken issue would be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. There has been no change in our position.



Q: What are the long-term US interests with China?

A: We seek to build a strong relationship with China based on common strategic interests and a broad network of cultural and economic ties. We face a common challenge from the Soviet Union and its proxies. We hope to pursue policies which will strengthen our mutual ability to resist this challenge. The also share with China an interest in peace and stability in East Asia. And the benefits have been substantial.

Q: Could you elaborate on the reference in the Communique to a new situation which has emerged on the Taiwan question?

A: The reference is to China's enunciation in this Communique of its fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question.


### US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

Q: Are we linking arms sales to Taiwan to China's approach on the Taiwan issue?

A: The Communique does not address the specifics of the status of PRC-Taiwan relations, but it makes clear that US policies concerning its future arms sales to Taiwan are related to China's fundamental peaceful policy for resolving the Taiwan question.

Q: Does this mean that if China's peaceful policy changes, we would change our arms sales policies?

A: I would not want to get into hypothetical discussions of what would happen if either side acted inconsistently with the Communique, but the Chinese clearly understand the relationship of our policies to theirs as set forth in the Communique.



Q: Does the language of the Communique imply that the US will terminate arms sales to Taiwan after a period of time? How long a period?

A: The Communique specifies no set period within which arms sales are to be gradually reduced and does not provide for their termination. The Communique provides us with a framework for resolving US-PRC differences over the issue of arms sales, but does not specify the precise manner of resolution.

- Q: If there is no set time period for ending these sales, aren't we just postponing the day when Beijing will again demand that we end such sales?
- A. On the basis of the policies of both governments enunciated in the Communique, we expect the issue to decline in importance. We expect the PRC to remain concerned about the question in general terms, but we have made clear to the Chinese that we do not consider it appropriate to consult with them on the specifics of our arms sales to Taiwan.

Q: If the US limits its arms sales to Taiwan both qualitatively and quantitatively, won't Taiwan's position necessarily deteriorate as the PRC upgrades its offensive capability?

A: Our position is premised on expectations concerning the PRC's fundamental peaceful policy towards Taiwan, which relate directly to Taiwan's defense needs. We will continue to monitor the situation and our sales to Taiwan will continue to be governed by the US assessment of Taiwan's defense needs, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

Q: What are the guidelines for determining qualitative and quantitative limits on arms sales to Taiwan?

A: We will consider a variety of factors, including financial and numerical, and our assessment of Taiwan's capability and the threat it faces to guide us in formulating our policy.

(If pressed) I prefer not to get into more specific definitions of these terms as the questions are complex and involve a wide range of interrelated considerations. All decisions will continue to be made on a case by case basis.

Q. Does the US acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over Taixon?
If so, don't the arms sales violate that sovereignty?

A: There has been no change in the US position on the question of sovereignty over Taiwan. The US has consistently stated that it "acknowledges" the Chinese position that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The question of US arms sales to Taiwan is rooted in history and this Communique is an attempt to help resolve our differences with the PRC on this score.

Q: Does the Communique restrict US authorization of third country sales to Taiwan of arms that incorporate US technology

A: We will consider the question of US authorization of such sales as it arises, on a case by case basis.

- Q: What specific measures and conditions are contemplated in para 1 of the Communique as conducive to a settlement of the arms sales issue?
- A: The Communique addresses this question. Specific measures and conditions would relate to implementing the policies of both governments enunciated elsewhere in the Communique.

Q: When will the Administration notify Congress on the intended extension of the F5-E co-production line on Taiwan?

A: We indicated our intention last January to approve the extension of the F5-E co-production line. The notification to Congress will be sent forward at an appropriate time. I would prefer not to comment further on that at this time. My purpose this morning is to discuss this Communique, not specific arms sales that will be made in accordance with its provisions.

### U.S.-CHINA MILITARY POLICY

- Q. Does this communique suggest that China will some day be a full military ally of the U.S.?
- A. The United States and China pursue parallel policies in many areas. Neither side seeks a formal defense relationship. This Communique is not related to that aspect of our relationship.

- Q. Does the U.S. now intend to liberalize export control licensing requirements for dual-use sales to China?
- A. Our export control policy is intended to reflect our overall policy, which is to treat. China as a friendly non-allied nation. We will continue our offer to consider specific Chinese requests on a case by case basis in accord with our laws and policies.

### CONSULTATIONS ON COMMUNIQUE

Q: When was Taipei informed of this Communique?

A: We gave prior notification and have consulted with the Taiwan authorities through appropriate channels.

Q: What was Taiwan's reaction?

A: I believe we should let Taipei speak for itself.



Q: Were there any consultations with Congress prior to concluding the Communique?

There have been full and frequent consultations with Congress during our discussions with the Chinese.

Q: How did the Congress react?

A: It would not be appropriate for me to characterize response of individual Members of Congress.

Q: Did the U.S. consult with or inform our allies and other interested governments in advance of this Communique? What about Japan and the Soviet Union?

A: We have kept interested governments informed of our discussions with the Chinese and did inform key allies and other interested governments prior to the announcement this morning. We have been in close touch with the government of Japan on this, but I don't want to go into details. We have not discussed this with the Soviet Union.