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Collection Name Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Withdrawer MJD 12/23/2011

File Folder CHINA, PRC (JANUARY 1984) (3 OF 3)

FOIA F00-173/5 TUCKER

Box Number 007R

48

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
126629	MEMO	DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE CHINA	1	1/18/1984	B1
126631	NSC/S PROFILE	RE 8400554	1	1/18/1984	B1
126630	MEMO	BUD MCFARLANE TO GOERGE SHULTZ RE CHINA	1	1/30/1984	B1
126632	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE CHINA	2	1/28/1984	B1
126633	MEMO	DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE CHINA	3	1/23/1984	B1
126634	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO THE PRESIDENT RE CHINA	2	1/18/1984	B1
126635	CABLE	STATE 010499	4	1/20/1984	B1
126636	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETINGS	2	1/25/1984	B1
126637	LETTER	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO RICHARD SOLOMON RE CHINA	2	2/18/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
126638	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE LETTER FROM SOLOMON	1	2/16/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126629	MEMO DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE CHINA	1	1/18/1984	B1

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2

National Security Council
The White House

84 N20 P6:13

System # OTS

Package #

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		I
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	✓	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	4		R

I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		Staff
Situation Room			

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COMMENTS

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Staff to Laura for action
Cmt Sigur
Robinson
Info Fortier
Martin

RCM → P
Due
1/25/84

4

948 CF

RECEIVED
84 JAN 24 P3:35

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System # I

Package # 0554

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	WFM	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4	✓ - cy pkd	
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126631	NSC/S PROFILE RE 8400554	1	1/18/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126630	MEMO BUD MCFARLANE TO GOERGE SHULTZ RE CHINA	1	1/30/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126632	MEMO ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE CHINA	2	1/28/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126633	MEMO DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE CHINA	3	1/23/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126634	MEMO KENNETH DAM TO THE PRESIDENT RE CHINA	2	1/18/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126635	CABLE STATE 010499	4	1/20/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
126636	MEMO GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETINGS	2	1/25/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/S PROFILE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ID 8400854

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) NARA 12/23/11

RECEIVED 30 JAN 84 11

TO MCFARLANE FROM SOLOMON, RICHARD DOCDATE 24 JAN 84 20

KEYWORDS CHINA P R KOREA

TAIWAN

SUBJECT LTR TO MCFARLANE FM SOLOMON RE US - CHINA RELATIONS

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 03 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

SIGUR FORTIER LAUX

COMMENTS STAFFING PER MCFARLANE

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane X	2/2	FOR SIG		
Cleveland S	2/15	For further action		
Sigur X	2/15	Redo		
McFarlane X	2/16	For Sig	2/17	

FEB 1 8 1984 Mcfarlane sgd ltr

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

WHITE HOUSE MAIL ROOM (0854)

Receipt for **REGISTERED MAIL**

Date 2-22-84 No. 02/004961

Time of Receipt 3pm Init. JL

Class 1st Postage PP

Value ol Fee Pd. PP

Special Delivery Fee

Return Receipt Fee

Return Receipt Requested
Showing Address Where Delivered

Restricted Delivery

SENDER NSC

ADDRESSEE R. Salomon
1700 Main St
Santa Monica Ca

(Postmark)

wnl

992

RECEIVED

National Security Council
The White House

84 FEB 16 P12:33

System # I

Package # 0854

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	WM	A
Bob Kimmitt	6	D	
NSC Secretariat	7		D —
Situation Room			Stamp Tab TF Confidential

I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

The response to Solomon is very explicit. I would stamp it Confidential (still can go regular mail).

RECEIVED
84 FEB 14 A10:12

National Security Council
The White House

9/88

System # I

Package # 854

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	I		
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Cleveland	2		A

I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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2-15-84

Bill -

This package was typed on 2/2 but did not get out of Fortier's office until today. Shall I have it redated.

Get redated ✓

Leave as is _____

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
126637	LETTER ROBERT MCFARLANE TO RICHARD SOLOMON RE CHINA	2	2/18/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
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THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA -- AUSPICIOUS PROSPECTS

An address delivered by

Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz

Before the Asia Society

January 31, 1984

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

It is a pleasure to be here in the Asia Society once again.

Several weeks ago, as I was considering the title for this speech, the air was filled with good omens. The two Korean children whom Mrs. Reagan had brought to America for heart surgery were returning home healthy. Relations between all elements of our societies had been warmed and buoyed by the strong message of support and human freedom that President Reagan had brought to Korea. And Korea had just announced that in 1983 its economy had grown 9% in real terms.

It was about this same time that I was looking at the very beautiful catalogue that was prepared for the recent exhibition of Korean folk art here at the Asia Society, entitled, "Auspicious Spirits." I was struck by a particularly forceful painting of a dragon and by the accompanying text by Robert Moes, Curator for Oriental Art at the Brooklyn musuem:

> As everyone knows [Mr. Moes wrote], the Western dragon is the embodiment of evil, the serpent in the Garden of Eden, the symbol of Satan slain by St. Michael. The Far Eastern Dragon is quite different, awesome but entirely benevolent. A Dragon is the most auspicious of dreams; if a man dreams of one, he will enjoy great success; if a women does, she will bear a son.

I have titled this speech, "The US and Korea -- Auspicious Prospects," partly as a tribute to the Asia Society's many contributions, and to those that the new Korea Society undoubtedly will make, and partly as a reflection of optimism about the growing and vital relations between Korea and the United States. But that Western dragon is a helpful reminder that those prospects must be fashioned from materials that are harsh and forbidding and by harnessing forces that are far from benevolent.

A hundred years ago, about the time that Korean folk artist was painting his blue dragon, President Chester A. Arthur received the first Korean mission to reach our shores. He greeted them with these words:

> "This republic, while conscious of its power, of its wealth and of its resources, seeks, as our history shows, no dominion or control over other nationalities and no acquisition of their territory, but does seek to give and receive the benefits of friendly relations and of a reciprocal and honest commerce."

As the United States and Korea entered a new era, President Arthur and his lesser known successors were true to these words. Within a dozen years, Americans had helped Korea build its first electric plant, its first water works, its first trolley system, and its first railway. Two dozen years after that, inspired by President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, and spurred by groups in exile, including the famous "Liberty Congress" in Philadelphia, Koreans raised their voices for their own right of self-determination. In 1919 a Korean "Declaration of Independence" was read at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, the very spot at which our own Declaration of Independence was first proclaimed.

Friendly relations, economic progress, and political freedom remain the blessings Americans most want to share with the world. Unfortunately, the world will not always let things pass so peacefully.

A hundred years and a day after that first Korean delegation arrived on our shores, a Russian jet fighter tracked and downed KAL flight 7. Barely six weeks later, North Korean officers assassinated 17 South Koreans, including four cabinet members, in Rangoon. This act of premeditated murder took the lives of some of Korea's most distinguished and talented leaders--men who, incidentally, were friends of the United States and, I am sure, of many persons in this room. Only a few weeks after that a North Korean vessel was caught trying to infiltrate into South Korean waters.

Koreans must sometimes wonder why they, over the years and centuries, have so frequently borne contention, conflict and tragedy. To Koreans, the modern era must seem about as uncertain and dangerous as any period in the long history of the peninsula.

There are today more soldiers and more weapons on the peninsula than there were in June 1950. North Korea devotes over 20% of its GNP to its military. It maintains a standing army of 800,000 men, including the largest commando forces in the world. The North fields twice as many maneuver battalions, armored vehicles and tanks as the South. Along a front only 120-miles wide the North fields three-fourths as many artillery pieces as the US army has worldwide. If the North should some day turn from assassination to invasion, it could mount an attack with little warning and sustain intensive combat for several weeks -- even without any support from its major allies.

The security threat facing South Korea is quite real. Today it is easy to take for granted South Korea's restrained reaction to the Rangoon bombing. But it is not an exaggeration to say that at the time the peace of the entire region depended on the statesmanship of the South Korean leadership. It is against this background that we have received the latest North Korean proposals on talks, which I will discuss later on.

Today I would like to talk not just about the perils South Korea faces and its security needs, but also about the promises it offers for the historic dreams of both our countries: economic well-being, political freedom, and friendship among nations. I speak of each of these aspects not to cover all topics, but to adequately cover one topic: the future of Korea and our relations with it.

For security, economic growth, political development and sound international relations are four related problems. They are intertwined. Without a secure environment, political and economic progress are endangered. Without political and economic progress, security is undermined. Without peaceful progress and strength, sound relations between countries, and the reduction of tension throughout the peninsula, will never be achieved, or once achieved, be long sustained.

President Reagan's trip to Korea last fall symbolized U.S. commitment to all four of these goals. It was a trip that he and the First Lady took despite threats to their personal safety from the North, threats that, given recent history, had to be taken seriously. Of the messages the President brought, none was more visible -- whether in his appearance before the National Assembly or at the DMZ -- than his commitment to the security of South Korea.

Preventing war on the Korean peninsula is a matter of the greatest importance, not only for our allies in the Republic of Korea, but for regional and global security as well. In light of North Korea's past actions and its present capabilities, simple prudence requires that we and the Republic of Korea maintain a strong and credible military deterrent. President Reagan made clear to his Korean hosts that the United States will continue to do its part. Our ground forces will remain in Korea, because we believe that they, along with the air and naval forces we could bring to bear, add both strength and credibility to deterrence. In addition, we will continue to assist Korea's force modernization program by providing credits for the purchase of essential military equipment. Through those efforts and the substantial commitment of South Korea's own resources, we expect slow but steady progress toward a more secure balance on the peninsula.

In the coming years, the widening economic gap between the two Koreas will make the South ever more capable of reducing the military superiority the North enjoys today. We hope a strengthened South and our own continued commitment will convince the rulers in the North that a policy of military confrontation cannot succeed, and that peaceful dialogue is the only sensible course. That is our hope for the future. But for today our faith rests in a strong deterrent and a proffered hand of peace, a combination that has prevented war for thirty years.

Korea has used those thirty years of peace to build its economy at a phenomenal, almost unprecedented rate. Without significant natural resources and highly vulnerable to world economic conditions, the Korean economy nonetheless grew at an average annual real rate of over eight percent between 1961 and 1982. From a base in 1961 of $2.3 billion, Korea's GNP today has grown to $70 billion, approximately the 25th largest in the world. In those twenty years Korea's per capita income grew from roughly $80 to $1800. Korea began as an aid recipient--on a massive scale--and has become one of the world's important industrial and trading powers. Korea today ranks among the world's leading manufacturers of such products as shoes, textiles, ships and steel. Korean shipbuilders, to take just one example, are already the second largest in the world.

As Korea's industrial capacity has grown, so has our bilateral trade--from some $300 million twenty years ago to more than $12 billion in 1983. That is an increase of 4000%. Now our ninth largest trading partner, South Korea ranks sixth as a market for US exports, and in the top three or four as a purchaser of US agricultural products. All of the aid we provided Korea in its early, struggling years amounts to less than half of one years' trade today.

The phenomenal success of our ally, in some part due to our own efforts, should be a source of pride and comfort to Americans. But it is sometimes a source of discomfort, as well. Satchel Paige, that great American folk philosopher who moonlighted as a baseball pitcher once said: "Don't look back. Someone might be gaining on you." Well, when American businessmen look back, they see that East Asian economies have been gaining. The labels, "Made in Japan," "Made in Taiwan," and "Made in Korea," have become increasingly common, some Americans would say, disturbingly so.

When President Arthur welcomed that first Korean mission 100 years ago, he said that America seeks, "to give and receive the benefits... of a reciprocal and honest commerce." Our wish has not changed. Nor has our demand that the access to markets and the terms of trade must remain reciprocal and honest. At times, for Korea this does not always seem to be the case.

Korea, we are told, trades unfairly, restricting imports and providing massive subsidies for export industries. Korea, it is also said, is concentrating massive resources in selected industries and targeting potentially vulnerable foreign competitors for extinction. Korea, it is finally charged, is a low-wage country and thus has an unfair advantage in international markets. In short, the argument proceeds, Korea is not playing by the rules of the game.

We lose no opportunities to emphasize to the Korean government, as the President did during his recent visit, our belief that Korea, as a major beneficiary of the international free trade system, has a responsibility to defend that system. In our view, Korea's task should be to pare away barriers blocking access to its domestic market, despite political and bureaucratic difficulties, and to establish predictable and equitable conditions for foreign investors.

But each charge of unfair practices must be evaluated on its merits, not used as an excuse for protectionist instincts of our own. Certainly much of Korea's success is due not to unfair practices, but to hard work and wise investment.

But just as certainly there are aspects of Korea's policies which are not acceptable, such as Korea's own local content legislation and restrictions imposed on foreign businesses.

The economic leadership of Korea recognizes the need to open its market further, and to reduce direct government intervention in the economy. There has been progress. Trade has been liberalized, and tariffs are being reduced. But there needs to be more. Korean economic planners know that without further liberalization the transition toward full development will be retarded.

Today, as in the past, we are for a reciprocal and honest commerce. We seek no more; we are entitled to no less.

We of course have a parallel obligation, to maintain the openness of our own economy. We must never forget that the American economy is heavily dependent on exports. One out of every seven jobs in manufacturing and one of every three in agriculture is due to exports. We have mechanisms to counter unfair trade practices and we will not hesitate to use them--but we should not let them be perverted into mechanisms for restricting fair trade as well. If they are, I believe the prospects for reducing trade barriers in Korea--and in every other country to which we sell--will decline dramatically.

The growing prosperity of which I have spoken, so essential to Korea's security, is the direct result of the economic freedom Koreans enjoy. Economic freedom transforms the energy and creativity of a people into economic success. It does so in a manner that enhances, rather than restricts, the opportunity and fulfillment of peoples' lives.

Both security and economic freedom, in turn, are necessary to political freedom. Personal liberty, as well as national liberation, was the goal of those early Korean patriots, who inspired by Woodrow Wilson, bravely declared Korean Independence in 1919. Their declaration proclaimed:

"[This] is the day of the restoration of all things, on the full tide of which we set forth without delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for the glory of our people."

Their spirit remains alive in Korea today. The importance of political freedom, not only for its contributions to security and economic progress, but also as a goal in its own right, is a third major theme of our policy toward Korea.

In his speech to the Korean National Assembly, the President underscored our belief that democratic political systems are a source of fundamental national strength, and stressed our support for progress toward more complete democracy in Korea. The President noted the security context within which Korea's political evolution must go forward. But he also emphasized that a political system that inspires broad popular support and participation is not a luxury enjoyed at the cost of national security, but an essential element of that security. I remember the applause that greeted the President when he said that:

"The development of democratic political institutions is the surest means to build the national consensus that is the foundation of true security."

Steps already taken by the government, and others contemplated for the future, suggest to me a recognition that further liberalization has become an essential feature of Korea's political landscape. The Christmas Amnesty in which record numbers of students and political prisoners were released is a positive development. President Chun's pledge to step down from the Presidency when his term ends in 1988 and hand over power to a successor is an important step toward what would be the first peaceful and constitutional transfer of power in Korea's modern history. President Reagan made clear in both his public and private statements during his visit that such a commitment to democratic progress is essential to progress on all fronts and would have our full support.

We will continue to make our support for such efforts known through both public statements and private representations. But while we must not spare our efforts, we must not exaggerate the degree of our influence. Our proper role is to encourage the Koreans' own efforts for democracy while helping to provide the shield and support that make democratic development possible.

Discussions of democratic and economic rights in Korea all too often end here -- with a pledge to urge and support efforts to promote democracy in the South. Today, because this group is dedicated to the well-being of all Asians, not just those living under friendly governments, I want to add a plea for progress toward individual freedom in North Korea, as well.

We do not know as much as we would like about life in North Korea. This itself is a measure of the strict controls the North Korean government has imposed. But we know enough to say that North Korea is among the world's most repressive countries.

If you lived in North Korea, you could not choose your profession. You could not leave your village without permission, permission granted for only limited purposes. Your children would be drilled daily in rote homage to Kim Il-sung and his family. Listening to foreign radio broadcasts or religious observance would be punished severely by measures including torture and imprisonment. It has been estimated that 100,000 such "ideological offenders" are held in camps. Right to trial, ready access to information from outside the country, free speech and assembly are, of course, non-existent. Access to better jobs, schools, hospitals, and stores depend on security ratings based in part on the political behavior and class background of your relatives, not merely since 1950, but since the Japanese occupation of 1910.

This is a partial listing of the deprivations and degradations Koreans living north of the 38th parallel must endure. I hope that our attention to the need for political progress in the South does not prevent us from speaking out for the welfare of those unfortunate enough to live in the North.

Koreans in both the North and the South suffer an additional burden, the burden of division. For them, the harsh confrontation between the North and South is a continuing personal tragedy. It divides families, distorts political life, absorbs valuable resources, and instills a pervasive fear and suspicion. The reduction of tensions within the peninsula is a fourth major theme of our policy toward Korea.

We believe that the problems of a divided Korea must be addressed by the two Korean states, and that a dialogue between them is therefore required. The obstacle to dialogue for these thirty years and more since an armistice was signed in Korea, has been North Korea's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and to deal with its government. It has spurned numerous offers over the years for direct, unconditional talks between North and South. Instead, too often North Korea has made known through deeds as well as words its antagonism toward the Republic of Korea and its willingness to employ any means, including military force, to achieve reunification on its own terms. The Rangoon attack was only the latest and most horrible in a series of attempts mounted by Pyongyang on the lives of South Korean leaders.

Its record has bred deep skepticism in the South toward the North's proposed "solutions." These proposals customarily call for the withdrawal of US forces and a change of government in the South as preconditions to dialogue. We share the skepticism of our Korean allies.

Recently we have had from the North yet another proposal. This time, the North seems to be expressing a willingness to talk not just with the United States, but with the government of the Republic of Korea. Despite a skepticism borne of repeated experience we will consider their proposal carefully, for the chance of peace, however slim, is too precious to cast away.

As we do so, we will continue to be guided by the principle that the South must be a full and equal partner in any talks. We do not intend to move in ways that could undermine our alliance and the effectiveness of our deterrence. As always, we favor direct North-South discussions. If others are to be involved, both we and the South Korean Government have made known our preference for a four-party format, in which China would join ourselves and the two Koreas at a conference table. We believe that China could make a constructive contribution to this process.

At the same time, we will continue our efforts through the Military Armistice Commission to develop concrete measures for reducing the risk of miscalculation and war along the Demilitarized Zone. We have in the past proposed mutual notification of military exercises for example, and mutual observation of such exercises--confidence building measures, some of which have been adopted in Europe by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There is no need to delay a discussion of such measures: the MAC forum is in place, and proposals are already on the table.

We will also continue to support the numerous proposals put forward by South Korea to reduce the pain that the division of the Korean peninsula causes to its people, North and South. Proposals for family visitation--which could ease the burden of the more than ten million Koreans who are members of divided families--exchanges of mail, and other simple human measures could go far to reduce the stark isolation of the two Koreas from each other, and prepare the way for discussion of the inevitably more complicated and difficult question of political reunification.

The problems of security, peace and development that the Republic of Korea must confront, and which are a part of the life and outlook of its people, sometimes seem daunting. I would nevertheless contend--and Korean history seems to demonstrate--that the resilience, determination and strength of its people will enable them to cope with those challenges successfully. And not merely to cope, but to overcome.

As a friend and ally of the Republic of Korea, the United States can take a measure of pride in its achievements, and satisfaction in the benefits those achievements have brought to us. Korea's military strength serves our interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia just as it serves Korea's own need for security. Her commitment to defense is buttressed by a remarkable willingness to bear the substantial costs of defense. Her economic development has transformed Korea from an aid recipient to one of our largest trading partners. Korea has become an increasingly active participant in international diplomacy, and more often than not its positions on issues far removed from Korea are similar to our own--because its interests, in an open international economic system and a stable and non-violent political order, also coincide fundamentally with ours.

The South Korea of today is strikingly different from the one of thirty, ten or even five years ago, and the transformation has been as positive as it has been dramatic. And as South Korea has changed, so has the US-Korean relationship. These facts are, I believe, still inadequately known to the American people. Perhaps it will take the Seoul Olympics of 1988 to bring home to Americans at large the nature of Korea today, and of our ties with that country.

In the meantime, it will fall to us--in government and in groups such as this one--to pay heed to what is happening in Korea, to understand what developments there mean now and can mean in the future for our interests, and to spread the word.

I began this talk with reference to the recent exhibit here of Korean folk art, and in particular to a dragon painted a century ago. I would like to end it with another and even earlier work from that same exhibit, a hand carved Phoenix. In the West, the Phoenix has for centuries stood for a miraculous resurrection from the ashes. As such, it is an appropriate symbol of the remarkable post war economic growth first of Japan, and now of Korea.

In the East the Phoenix carries another meaning. It is a symbol of a people's desire for peace, prosperity, and good government. The hopes, skill and industry of that 18th century artist bespeak auspicious prospects for Korea, not just in the remainder of this decade, but in the decades to come.

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To Sigur
For action
for reply
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Dick, What
do you think?
Bud

1-28-84

RICHARD H. SOLOMON
Head
Political Science Department

24 January 1984

The Honorable Robert C. MacFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

Many thanks for your hospitality at breakfast two weeks ago. For reasons elaborated below, I am motivated to send you some ideas on China policy in the wake of the Zhao Ziyang visit.

The public impact of the Zhao visit was quite positive for both sides; and I think our people did an effective job in managing the Premier's tour. It came across as low key and dignified, with the right combination of frankness and warmth.

For a variety of reasons both personal, domestic political, and anti-Soviet, the Chinese leadership will see to it that the President has a good trip to the PRC in April. It is clear that Beijing is anxious to move the relationship forward, in part to have maximum influence on U.S. policy--as is evident in their sustained warnings, both private and public, on the Taiwan issue. And even though they *publicly* downplay the strategic dimensions of the U.S.-PRC relationship, strategic coordination remains exceptionally important to them as they go into the fourth round of talks with Moscow this spring. PRC leaders know that Moscow will discount their denials of a strategic relationship with the U.S. as the Soviets tend to assume that there is "more going on than meets the eye," especially in view of the continuing preparations for Defense Minister Zhang Ziping's visit to Washington later this year.

There are three aspects of our dealings with the Chinese that I believe were not given sufficient emphasis during the Zhao visit, all the more so in view of their desire to strengthen ties with us. As the President has established a strong record with Beijing for both firmness on key issues and a willingness to be flexible in moving ahead with the U.S.-PRC relationship, I hope that as preparations proceed for the April visit some thought can be given to initiatives on the issues of Taiwan, Korea, and U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation.

Regarding Taiwan, we need to counter Zhao's pressures for action on the Taiwan Relations Act and for visible reductions in arms sales to the

island with a strong private statement on why such actions would work against PRC interests by imposing great strains on U.S. domestic support for the PRC (especially in an election year) and undercutting the very authorities on Taiwan they hope to negotiate with. We need to educate Beijing on the increasing need to manage the Taiwan issue with sensitivity and restraint. (More on this below.)

On Korea, we should undercut Pyongyang's peace propaganda offensive with a well-constructed proposal (coordinated with the ROKs) for military stabilization and confidence-building measures on the Peninsula to neutralize North Korea's provocative military posture. We should stress the need for progress in *bilateral* North-South talks (as was attempted in 1972) as a precondition for three- or four-party talks. This approach will minimize North Korean opportunities to put pressure on our relations with Seoul, and limit the complications of how to involve in such talks the other major powers with interests on the Peninsula (China, the Soviets, and Japan).

On U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation, we should use the recent increase in Soviet military deployments in the Far East (the Tu-16 bombers in Vietnam, and the SS-20s in the Transbaykal Military District) to heighten Chinese interest in working with us on regional air defense problems and in coordinating arms control proposals. While they can be expected to remain cautious about working with us on these issues, the PRC military has a strong latent interest in cooperating with the U.S., and we should work to develop common perspectives with this element of the leadership which, as best we can tell, has been distrustful of the U.S. relationship.

We should also make clear to the Chinese that high-profile criticism of our foreign and defense policies--as in the case of Grenada, where the Soviets were trying to do to us through the Cubans what Moscow is trying to do to the PRC in Indochina via the Vietnamese--undercuts domestic support in the U.S. for expanding the U.S.-PRC relationship.

Regarding Taiwan, it is evident that Zhao's stress during his visit on the possibility of a new "crisis" in U.S.-PRC relations over arms sales to the island was driven primarily by Chinese domestic politics. He may also have some concern that in an election year the President may not be sufficiently restrained on the arms sales issue to meet his domestic political needs. We know that the domestic political play in China of the Taiwan issue is strongly influenced by actions and statements in Washington because the PRC Embassy here reports in minute detail every Congressional and press speculation on Taiwan. These reports are given highly visible internal distribution in Party and government channels.

What we have to do is make a strong private statement to the senior leadership emphasizing the counterproduction effect of their efforts to have the Taiwan Relations Act modified, while detailing how the President's policies in fact stabilize the situation on Taiwan at a time when management of this issue becomes evermore delicate and complex because of the