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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Withdrawer

MJD 2/28/2005

File Folder FAR EAST - GENERAL (03/04/1983-06/12/1983)

FOIA

2005-053

Box Number 8

WILLENS

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
4584	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE TRIP TO FAR EAST	3	6/6/1983	B1
R	8/29/2006	2005-053			
4585	PAPER	RE PROPOSED TRIP	1	ND	B1
R	8/29/2006	2005-053			
4586	PAPER	RE PROPOSED TRIP	4	ND	B1
R	8/29/2006	2005-053			
4587	MEMO	CHARLES TYSON TO CLARK RE RESPONSE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ	1	6/14/1983	B1
R	8/29/2006	2005-053			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

RECEIVED 04 MAR 83 12

DOC DATE 04 MAR 83

UNCLASSIFIED UP
CLASSIFIED ENCLREMOVAL OF
RE(S)

2/24/05

URGENT

KEYWORDS: ASEAN

ASIA

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: SEC SHULTZ SPEECH ON EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS ON 5 MAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 04 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

LAUX

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COMMENTS

REF# 8306309

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Clark	X 3/4	for decision	3/4	
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1458

WJ
2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 4, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz' Speech on East Asian Affairs
on March 5

WPC: AS SL

I have worked on this speech with Paul Wolfowitz over the past several days. Dick Childress and I went over this draft again this morning and suggested a few minor changes to Paul which he will incorporate. I think the speech is a good and accurate reflection of the President's policies for East Asia and the Pacific and follows up in more detailed fashion on the guidelines he put forth in his recent American Legion speech.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you concur with the draft speech for Secretary Shultz.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Sec. Shultz Speech

White House
By *mzn*

1997
2124105

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

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1458

WJ
2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 4, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *JS*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz' Speech on East Asian Affairs
on March 5

WPC: JS

I have worked on this speech with Paul Wolfowitz over the past several days. Dick Childress and I went over this draft again this morning and suggested a few minor changes to Paul which he will incorporate. I think the speech is a good and accurate reflection of the President's policies for East Asia and the Pacific and follows up in more detailed fashion on the guidelines he put forth in his recent American Legion speech.


RECOMMENDATION:

That you concur with the draft speech for Secretary Shultz.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Sec. Shultz Speech



28, 1997
2/24/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

565

Package # 1458

'83 MAR -4 P5:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>X</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>		<u>n</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Forward to West Coast

4 MAR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Retain for files.

Had sent copy of
this to Judge Clark
earlier today.

Brenne



S/S 8306309

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1458

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March 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Secretary Shultz' Speech on East Asian Affairs

Attached is the latest draft of the speech on East Asian affairs which the Secretary of State intends to deliver Saturday, March 5, in San Francisco.

Little Fiske for

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Speech

cc: DOD - Col. Stanford

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines July 21, 1985
BY 1430 NAI/RA Date 3/3/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DRAFT: 3/3/83

DRAFT FOR SECRETARY'S EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC SPEECH

**(The speech would begin with a brief tribute to Phil Habib
to be written.)**

Phil Habib's magnificent work in the Middle East is by now well known. We salute him for his tireless and productive efforts. But remember: his outstanding career has involved him in every part of the world. In East Asia and the Pacific, he served with distinction as Ambassador and Assistant Secretary. The Ambassador's residence in Seoul is known admiringly as "the house that Habib built." Phil will agree and note ruefully that he never lived in it. I have just returned from a trip to Phil's old stomping ground convinced more than ever that if you want to understand the future, you must -- like Phil -- understand the Pacific region.

My recent trip to Northeast Asia, and two days of meetings with our Chiefs of Missions from all of East Asia and the Pacific, underlined for me the importance of this vibrant area for the United States and for the world. The dynamism that I saw convinces me that, as important as the region is today, it will only be more important tomorrow. There is probably no other part of the world about which the same statement can be

made with equal confidence. Simply put, much of our future lies in the Pacific region.

Nothing more graphically highlights the direct interests of the United States in this region than two simple facts:

-- We trade more today with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific than with any other region on earth, including Western Europe.

-- We have fought three wars in the Pacific in the last forty years. We do not want to fight another.

My trip left me with many strong impressions. Some features of the region, such as its economic and political progress, offer great hope. Others, such as the poverty and injustice that remain and the menacing military postures of Vietnam, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, present familiar challenges. But all observers would agree that the region is less troubled than it was in the early 1970s.

The great majority of nations in the region have used the last decade very well. They have developed a new self-confidence, and they have a lot to be self-confident about. It is a confidence born of successes and of an emerging maturity that has brought responsible leadership to the fore.

As a result, our relations with the region have, on the whole, never been better. If there is a symbol of the new maturity in the region, and of the benefits that maturity can bring to us all, it is China's emerging role as a constructive force. This is only one of many important factors in the region's success, but it is one of the most striking when Asia today is compared with Asia of recent years.

The new success and maturity in Asia today provides not only a pattern for the future, but valuable lessons for our policy. Tonight, I would like to discuss four of these lessons.

- o First, there is a need for a global, not merely a regional view;
- o Second, despite great diversity, a growing community of interests is apparent in the Pacific region;
- o Third, economic and political freedom are essential elements of the region's future; and
- o Fourth, the United States has both vital interests and a unique and critical role to play in the area.

The Need for a Global View

First and foremost, the trip reinforced what we all know: the fate of regions and nations around the world are intertwined. No one area of the world can pull up the drawbridge and ignore problems elsewhere.

Thirty years ago, in his famous farewell address to Congress, General MacArthur said: "The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia. And the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other."

The reality of this interlock has never been clearer.

-- What the nations of Europe decide about nuclear missiles has a dramatic impact upon Asia.

-- Decisions on trade and free markets in Asian lands influence the actions of legislators in Washington, and governments world wide.

-- The continued growth of Asian economies is an essential element of US and European recovery, while improvement in those economies will send waves coursing across the Pacific.

-- The sea lanes and resources of the region are not only of strategic importance to the countries in the region, they are crucial to the defense of the Indian Ocean, East Africa and the Middle East.

As East Asian and Pacific nations prosper, we hope to see them adopt an increasingly global view. Our interest in the area's progress is not to exclude other regions, but to improve all regions.

We already see encouraging steps in this direction.

-- East Asian and Pacific nations, and most importantly Japan, have acknowledged their responsibilities for strengthening GATT and maintaining an open international trading system;

-- Even smaller Asian countries, such as Korea, see that they must consider modification of their own protectionist policies to help ensure their own continued access to larger markets;

-- Australia, New Zealand and Fiji have contributed peacekeeping forces for the Sinai;

-- ASEAN governments are playing an effective and constructive role in the non-aligned movement, the Islamic Conference, and other international forums.

-- Japan has provided economic assistance to states in the Middle East and Caribbean; and

-- China, while not yet a wealthy nation, has proven itself among the most sophisticated, with a decidedly global approach and a clear view of the importance of resisting Soviet aggression.

As the Pacific region gains strength and confidence, it will be increasingly aware of, and increasingly influential in, the global agenda.

A Growing Community of Interest

The second lesson about the Pacific region: our policy must reflect the growing community of interests in preserving peace and promoting economic progress. There are no broad regional institutions like NATO and the EEC to provide a framework for regional cooperation. The great differences and

historical animosities that separate different countries probably preclude such institutions for the immediate future. But, despite enormous diversity, the nations of the region are increasingly cooperating with one another, driven by two factors:

- the immense stake that they have in continued economic growth and an open world economy; and
- A clear-eyed perception of the military threat posed by the forces of the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese and North Korean allies.

Economically, the area boasts the world's highest and longest sustained economic growth rates. First Japan in the 1960's, and then later Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea achieved growth rates higher than 10 percent a year. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia also grew 6 to 8 percent per year, posting record highs for developing countries. These economic achievements have given the nations of East Asia and the Pacific a new weight in the world. For example, the region now accounts for a sixth of total world trade. These achievements are not accidental. They are the fruit of a commitment to hard work, a willingness to sacrifice immediate benefits for future growth, and generally sound policies of economic management. But Pacific region nations recognize that continued success is dependent on a healthy world economy.

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Nations of the region are similarly aware of the keen threat to the region's security posed by the Soviet Union and their clients. A decade and a half ago, Soviet vessels seldom ventured south into the Pacific. Now, the Soviets have their largest fleet in that ocean, backed by modern, long-range bombers. Soviet land forces in the region have also grown during that time, from 20 to more than 50 divisions. Most ominous of all, scores of SS-20s, a relatively new generation of Soviet nuclear missiles, are deployed facing Asia.

With massive Soviet assistance, 180,000 Vietnamese forces occupy Kampuchea, use chemical weapons on innocent civilians and threaten the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. The North Koreans, who spend twenty percent of their GNP on their armed forces, threaten their southern neighbors with one of the largest armies in the world. When you visit the DMZ in Korea, as I did recently, the tension is palpable. You know what it means to confront real danger, as American soldiers and their South Korean allies do every day.

Common economic and security concerns are breaking down communication barriers, reducing historical animosities, and spurring the nations of the region to take responsible steps in their own interests. Let me give just a few examples.

o The Japanese Government has acknowledged its responsibility for maintaining an open world economy and is opening its own markets for freer trade. In addition, it has affirmed Japan's commitment to undertake broader responsibilities for its own defense, appropriate to its abilities and its constitutional requirements.

o Prime Minister Nakasone's recent visit to Seoul, and Japan's sizeable foreign assistance to Korea, have put the important Japanese-Korean relationship on a new and stronger footing.

o The ASEAN states have put behind them many of their differences. They are working effectively together to resist Vietnamese aggression and to mobilize international support for a peaceful outcome in Kampuchea.

o Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and China have all played major roles in handling the massive exodus of Indochinese refugees.

o The new Pacific Island states are building both regional and national institutions simultaneously, with the help of their neighbors in Australia and New Zealand.

o The Republic of Korea has initiated a productive dialogue with states in the region.

o And China, once a source of instability, has begun to seek closer cooperation with a number of its neighbors and to play a constructive regional role.

Clearly, there is more that can be done, and more that we would like to see done. We will continue to urge Japan to assume a greater share of the burden of its own defense and to open its own market to the free competition that Japanese products enjoy in the United States. But both we and Japan must also look beyond these bilateral concerns to our shared responsibilities. As President Reagan recently said, ". . . no two nations are more mutually dependent than the United States and Japan . . . Our partnership is so essential, we have a strong obligation to our own peoples, to each other, to insure its continued vitality."

As Japan's weight has grown, so to must its responsibilities. Decisions on trade issues, bank credit to developing countries in Asia and Latin America, and official economic assistance must reflect Japan's global interests. If we are patient, as well as persistent, we can do more than just maintain the remarkable historical record of Japanese-American cooperation. We can build on it and make it an increasingly important part of our future.

Clearly, serious problems remain. China's new, more constructive role is essential to progress in the region. We need only to recall earlier, hostile periods to see how grave the danger of a reversal in China's role might be. Yet we must pursue this progress with China in a way that sustains our unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

Frustrations and problems in our relationship are inevitable. They will arise not only out of differences concerning Taiwan but out of the differences between the systems. But we believe that these problems can be managed because the community of interests that promises further progress is real. It has brought tangible results. It is a potent force in the future of the region. As President Reagan has said "Our relationship with the People's Republic of China is important not only for stability and peace in Asia but around the globe . . . Despite our differences, it is clear that both sides value this relationship and are committed to improve it."

The key to doing so lies in managing our differences over Taiwan by observing the commitments made in our three joint communiques and allowing the passage of time to assist the parties themselves to resolve their differences peacefully. It lies in working to reduce impediments to expanding trade in technology, as well as other economic relations, consistent

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with our long-term security needs. It lies in seeking to resolve any misunderstanding or dispute through consultations and negotiations rather than by unilateral action.

In so doing we work to build a long-term, enduring and constructive relationship on a basis of mutual confidence. As I made clear in Beijing, Chinese leaders will find the United States ready to join with them on that basis in pursuing our common interests in peace and modernization.

The Importance of Economic and Political Freedom

The third lesson is the importance of economic and political freedom for the region's progress and security. It should come as no surprise that we rely most on the great democracies of the region, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. We believe that democratic nations are more likely to follow the just and sensible policies that will best serve the future of the region, and the globe.

The Pacific region's economic growth has shown the efficiency of a free-market system. The progress of the ASEAN states, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan contrasts starkly with the dismal performance of their command economy neighbors.

Political progress is more difficult to gauge than economic change. And it seems to usually move at a slower and less even pace than we would all desire. But a long-range perspective of free market nations in East Asia and the Pacific clearly reveals, I believe, a trend towards the growth of democratic institutions.

Japan is the most obvious example, but younger nations are moving in a similar direction. Indonesia last year added to an increasingly long record of regularly held elections. And Malaysia regularly times accomplishes by democratic processes that most difficult task: a peaceful change of leadership. The new Pacific nations have laid strong foundations for popular participation in government. The Republic of Korea, despite continuing intense pressure from the north that creates severe internal pressures as well, has taken recently additional welcome steps toward liberalization and toward what we hope will be an eventual constitutional transition of power in 1987.

Progress toward democratization, and human rights in general, is an integral element of lasting progress. Abuses of human rights undermine the legitimacy, progress, and even stability of governments, thereby vitiating other gains.

In the end, economic and political freedom, both important in their own right, are closely intertwined with security

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concerns. For economic and political progress provides the resources for defense, and, at once, reduces the risks of internal chaos and opportunities for external aggression. As President Reagan has said, "Economic freedom is the world's mightiest engine for abundance and social justice."

The Unique U.S. Role

The fourth and final lesson is that our role in the region is unique. We are the one nation of the region whose policies today truly reflect a world-wide view. As a great power, we have great responsibilities. We have borne them well and we must continue to do so.

It is necessary and proper that we encourage those countries that share the benefits of a peaceful and prosperous world order to assume greater responsibilities for maintaining it. We will not ask how we can perform that task by ourselves or how we can get others to do it for us, but how we can combine our strength with those who share our commitment to peace and economic progress. Fortunately, in the Pacific region there are many who share those interests, and their strength is growing.

Our goal in asking others to increase their efforts, is added strength, not less effort. While specific tasks may

change, our overall responsibilities are undiminished in importance and cannot be shifted to others. This is particularly true of our security relationships with our friends and Allies in the area:

-- Our treaty commitments to Korea, to Thailand, to the Philippines, and to our other allies are essential to give them the self-confidence necessary to face potential threats.

-- Our alliances with Japan, with ANZUS, and with others provide a security framework and coordinating element in a region where broader alliance arrangements are not feasible.

-- And because our influence is so broadly felt throughout the region, the way we handle each of our bilateral relationships affects the interests of many others. As we seek, for example, to build a stronger relationship with China and to manage the differences between us, we must remember that the interests of many other friends in the region may be affected as well.

-- In Asia, as in the rest of the world, there remain threats that only the United States can meet. If we do not play our role, the shadow cast by Soviet military power will threaten the region's hopes for progress.

Vietnam War ended in overcoming the inevitable doubts that arose in the region about the will and capability of the United States to fulfill our essential commitments. President Reagan's strong efforts to continue that progress have increased the credibility of our role in Asia, and, in the process, increased the self-confidence of our friends in the area as well.

Conclusion

If it is true that much of the future is in Asia, then the record of East Asia and the Pacific in recent years is good news indeed. It says that the future seems to be working. Not that the region is free of problems. Far from it. But most of the nations of the region -- despite enormous differences of every kind -- share a realistic and confident approach toward solving problems. And a dynamic community of economic, political and security interests has begun to take shape:

-- Most nations of the area have faced -- and many still face -- immense problems of poverty and dislocation. But these problems are being faced with imagination, with self-reliance and with remarkable success;

-- The countries of the region face great threats from the Soviet Union and two of its most heavily-armed allies. But

they are meeting these threats with realism and with a determination not to be intimidated;

-- Great national and cultural differences, deepened by historical antagonisms, place obstacles in the way of cooperation among nations of the region. But increasingly those nations are recognizing the overriding importance of working together in the interest of peace and economic progress.

We Americans recognize -- and welcome -- this progress. Our Asian partners are developing rewarding relationships not only with us, but with each other. They also are joining with us in cooperative efforts that extend beyond the Asian continent and increasingly bring their positive influence into the world at large. These steps are the basis for a global role that will fit the region's growing strength and responsibilities. We Americans are determined to join them in building our community of interests. The results will have much to say about our future.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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RECEIVED 07 JUN 83 16

TO

CLARK

FROM TYSON

DOCDATE 06 JUN 83

24

MARTIN

06 JUN 83

ROBINSON

06 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

FAR EAST

CHINA P R

JAPAN

KOREA SOUTH

INDONESIA

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES TRIP TO FAR EAST

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

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(C)

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1983

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: Your Proposed Trip to the Far East

Issue

Should you visit the Far East this October?

Facts

It is recommended that you visit the Far East this October to strengthen economic and security ties with our key allies in this crucial region.

Stops are contemplated in Bali, Indonesia (to address the heads of state of the ASEAN countries), Tokyo, Seoul and possibly Beijing. On your return home, it is proposed that you stop in Hawaii for a tripartite meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau and President de la Madrid.

You would use the visit to carry forward the themes and unity embodied in the Williamsburg Declaration, reaffirm democratic principles, applaud the economic progress achieved by Pacific Basin countries, and urge greater coordination in the region to spread the benefits of economic growth to less fortunate neighbors.

Although this visit would stress economic themes, these countries remain the cornerstone of US defense in Far East. Like Williamsburg, strong economic and security ties can be effectively emphasized. This demonstration of enhanced unity will be vital to outflanking Soviet strategic interests in the area.

Discussion

A preliminary itinerary could be as follows:

Prepared by:
Charles P. Tyson
William F. Martin
Roger W. Robinson

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~NLS FO5-053 #4584BY WJ, NARA, DATE 8/29/06

Bali, Indonesia -- Your objective in meeting with the ASEAN heads of state would be to promote greater economic ties among Pacific Basin countries. Indonesia is a suitable place to meet as the Presidency of ASEAN will be occupied by Indonesia during the time of the proposed visit. This meeting with smaller Far Eastern countries (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore) would help dispel fears that the US only deals with the major Far Eastern allies. This occasion could also facilitate the launching of a Pacific Basin Cooperation Council, which could serve as a Pacific equivalent to the OECD. Tactically, it would be better if the ASEAN heads extended you an invitation, rather than our appearing as demandeur. The groundwork could be laid so that such an invitation could be extended at the ASEAN meeting at the end of June where Secretary Shultz will be participating.

Japan -- This would be the logical next stop as it is the centerpiece of our Asian policies. The US and Japanese economies represent one-third of the world's total GNP. You could make further tangible progress in settling our bilateral trade problems and be viewed as linking the two greatest engines of economic growth in the free world. Other topics which could be covered would include defense issues and our joint cooperative efforts in the fields of energy, space, technology and medicine.

Korea -- The present Korean government strongly supports you and would be greatly disappointed if you did not include a short stop in Seoul. Korea is a critical link in our Far Eastern defense, including the presence of significant US military assets. It is also appropriate that this emerging economic power be integrated as a key player in our strategy for the Pacific Basin.

China -- There could be considerable potential in a China visit; however, it has been the Administration's policy not to have you visit China before Premier Zhao visits the United States.

Pursuant to your receiving an invitation from the ASEAN leaders, Ambassador Hummel will be instructed to convey your plans to travel to the Far East in mid-October and that you would like to include China. This will not be possible, however, unless Premier Zhao visits the United States by mid-September. In the event that he agrees to a visit in September, you could either visit China in October or make a special visit in spring 1984. If Zhao indicates he will visit the US after September, you could reach an understanding that you would return the visit in spring 1984. Without an understanding in place with the Chinese prior to your trip, the media may criticize a Far East itinerary without China.

Your approach should be to advance a constructive dialogue, but not offer specific concessions as has been the case in the past. This would be consistent with the approach taken by Secretary Shultz. Finally, we would need a positive response within the

next two weeks if we are to include China on the October schedule.

Honolulu -- The purpose of this stop would be for a tripartite meeting between you, Prime Minister Trudeau and President de la Madrid. Two objectives would be achieved by such a meeting. First, it would reinforce the importance of relations with our two neighbors which represent our first and second largest trading partners. Secondly, it would illustrate the importance of the Western rim of North and South America to the Pacific Basin as a whole. This meeting would be greeted as a big bonus to the trip as it would represent a logical follow-on to your successful trip to South America last year and further demonstrate our concern over the plight of developing countries. The proposed meeting in Honolulu could be announced during your visit to Mexico in August to maximize press buildup and again demonstrate that we treat Mexico as a full partner in North America.

You could then return for a three day visit to the ranch. The proposed itinerary is attached (Tab A). Also attached (Tab B) is a substantive background piece on the objectives and issues for each proposed stop.

Recommendation:

OK

NO

✓

That you approve the trip as outlined in Tab A.

With special care that I do not visit China prior to their visiting us -

Attachments

Tab A

Itinerary

Tab B

Background Paper

29

A

Proposed Official Visit of the President to the Far East

Overall Objective: Promote greater economic ties between US and the Pacific Basin countries as well as among these countries, carrying forward the themes and unity embodied in the Williamsburg Declaration to this center of world economic activity and growth.

Duration: 14 days (without China); 17 days (with China); both include 3 day rest at ranch.

<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>Objectives</u>
Bali, Indonesia	1 (rest) 1 (meeting)	Meeting with ASEAN leaders; strengthen economic ties with smaller Far Eastern economies and discussion of proposed Pacific Basin Cooperation Council.
Tokyo	2½	Strengthen good relations with Prime Minister Nakasone; address resolution of trade and security issues.
Seoul	1½	Necessary inclusion in Far East visit; integrate as key player in Asian policies.
Beijing	3	Build on recent liberalization of technology trade; enhance US business opportunities in China's modernization program; signal to USSR of improved US-China relations. (Contingent on visit of Premier Zhao to Washington.)
Honolulu	1 (meeting) 1 (rest)	Complete "full circle" of Pacific rim countries with tripartite talks with Trudeau and de la Madrid; solidify North American partnership; stress benefits of including Western rim of North and South America in Pacific Basin economic cooperation.
Total Travel	3	
The Ranch	3	Rest before returning to Washington.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F05-053#4585



PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO THE FAR EASTBACKGROUND

The Williamsburg Summit clearly demonstrated the President as leader of the free world.

We should capitalize on this success to further position the President in a global leadership role dedicated to world peace and economic prosperity. The Far East trip is the Pacific-equivalent of Williamsburg (which focused primarily on US-European relations) carrying forward the themes and unity of the Williamsburg Declaration and forging strengthened ties with this crucial and dynamic part of the world. It is now time to "reach out" to the East and cross an historic threshold in US relations with the Pacific countries.

The trip would represent a watershed in US understanding and response to the shift in the world's center of economic activity in the direction of the Pacific Basin. These countries have achieved an economic vitality that in many cases already lives up to the high standards established by the Williamsburg Declaration of open markets, invigorated trade, stable financial relations, and durable economic growth. The President could use these stops to reaffirm his democratic principles, applaud the economic progress achieved by these countries, and urge greater coordination in the region to spread the benefits to less fortunate neighbors.

Although this trip would stress economic themes, these countries remain the cornerstone of US defense in the Far East. Like Williamsburg, strong economic and security ties can be emphasized. Such a show of enhanced unity will be vital to outflanking Soviet strategic interest in the area.

A successful trip for the President would reinforce his image as a global statesman dedicated to world recovery, peace, and stability.

RESULTS AND HEADLINES

-- Initiate historic shift in U.S. policy concern toward countries of the Pacific rim to complement and carry forward strengthened economic and security ties with Europe embodied in the Williamsburg Declaration.

-- Further position the President as a global statesman identifying and structuring the shared economic interests of the world's most growth-oriented region.

-- Endow smaller Asian countries with new stature in contributing to world economic recovery while pulling up less fortunate neighbors.

-- Reinforce bilateral relationship with Japan which is the key to our long-term economic and security interests in the region.

-- Build on positive momentum of liberalized technology trade to advance overall bilateral relations with China while promoting US business participation in China's modernization program. (Contingent on Premier Zhao's visiting Washington by mid-September.)

-- Further integrate Korea into our policies for Asia and tangibly signal our commitment to advancing its emerging role as an economic power in the region.

-- Establish a genuine North American partnership with our neighbors, Mexico and Canada, while underscoring our deep concern for the plight of developing countries and the benefits of enhanced cooperation to those countries on the Western rim of the Pacific.

MEETING WITH ASEAN HEADS OF STATE (Bali, Indonesia)

Objective: Carry forward the themes of the Williamsburg Declaration and promote greater economic ties between Pacific Basin countries; defuse concern over China and excessive influence of Japan; stress common values and shared responsibilities; demonstrate US sensitivity to the objectives and concerns of this vital region.

Issues: The ASEAN countries are already living up to the Williamsburg Declaration in an exemplary way. They are following democratic, free market principles and succeeding. You can use these opportunities to stress the message that staying this course will help strengthen the world recovery. To enhance the beneficial economic integration and coordination of the region, the ASEAN countries could propose, and we could endorse, the formation of a Pacific Basin Cooperation Council dedicated to free trade and open markets in the Pacific. This organization would serve as a new Pacific equivalent to the OECD. It is important that this appear as an ASEAN initiative, but we could assist in bringing other nations of the region on board.

JAPAN STATE VISIT

Objective: Establish new milestone in relations with this key economic and security ally in the Far East. Enhance relations with and support for Prime Minister Nakasone -- a leader willing to advance the objectives of US foreign policy and economic values. Exhibit, through a personal visit, our long standing high regard for this invaluable Pacific friend. The President can also demonstrate tangible results in our continuing efforts to resist protectionism and resolve bilateral trade problems which will be prenegotiated for the trip.

Issue: The President recently stated, "The US-Japanese relationship remains the centerpiece of our Asian policy." A trip to Japan would underscore this fact. Because of the depth and breadth of the US-Japan Alliance in almost every conceivable area, how the US manages or mismanages relations with Japan will seriously affect the future course of our country and, indeed, the world.

If we are able to move forward with Japan as a full partner we will create a firm foundation for peace and stability in this region which will frustrate Soviet ambitions. Likewise, if our two countries -- which together represent one-third of the world's GNP -- can succeed in forging enduring solutions to our bilateral trade problems, we will have linked the two greatest engines of economic growth in the free world. This relationship is also the vital cornerstone of our short and long term policies in the Pacific Basin. The President and Prime Minister Nakasone can also use this opportunity to reaffirm US-Japan cooperation in the fields of energy, space, technology, and medicine and commit to the prospect of an ever expanding list of joint cooperative projects.

There are two sensitive events taking place in this time frame. The Tanaka trial decision is expected to be announced during the autumn, but this issue has no direct bearing on US-Japan relations. We also anticipate that elections might be held in the spring of 1984 but, in any case, this should not interfere with a fall visit.

KOREAN STATE VISIT

Objective: Further integrate Korea as a meaningful player in our Pacific policies in the economic, political and defense areas and reinforce the common interests which exist between the US, Japan and Korea. Demonstrate that Korea is viewed as a mainstay in greater Pacific Basin economic cooperation.

Issues: The present Korean government strongly supports the President's policies and would be greatly disappointed if he were to visit the Far East and not include a visit to Seoul. Korea represents an emerging economic power with abundant opportunities for cooperation with the US, many of which are untapped. Korea could play a role in any Pacific Basin economic cooperation initiative. They have also expressed a strong interest in importing oil, gas and coal from the United States, which in turn would generate jobs and a significantly expanded market for US business.

CHINA (Contingent on Premier Zhao's Visit to Washington)

Objective: To return the visit of Premier Zhao to Washington and to further advance US-China relations. The President can build on the positive momentum generated by his liberalization of technology trade to enhance our strategic relationship with the PRC as well as promote opportunities for U.S. firms in major

Chinese modernization projects. The President can also reaffirm his belief that a strong and friendly US-PRC relationship is a major contributor to stability and peace in Asia.

Issues: Emphasize economic relations and US desire to assist the PRC in its modernization program, particularly the development of Chinese energy resources. These offshore projects could mean billions of dollars of business for US firms. In strategic terms, such a visit will remind the Soviet Union that the President intends to develop our relations with the PRC despite our bilateral differences. This leg of the trip would only be appropriate if Premier Zhao should visit the US by mid-September.

HONOLULU MEETING WITH DE LA MADRID AND TRUDEAU

Objective: This meeting responds to the recent proposal of Prime Minister Trudeau during his recent bilateral with the President for a tripartite meeting of the US, Mexico and Canada. It is also consistent with the President's earlier positive reference to developing a genuine North American partnership. Together, as Pacific rim nations, it also reinforces the themes of his trip. The Honolulu location makes this connection even more apparent.

Issue: Canada and Mexico are our first and second largest trading partners, respectively. An invigorated economic environment and new sense of shared interests among the Pacific Basin countries will assist both Canada's and Mexico's trade opportunities with the region which is particularly critical to alleviating Mexico's suffocating debt burden. Such a meeting with our two vital neighbors can also make clear that the Pacific Basin includes the western rim of North and South America. This approach has the effect of highlighting our deep concern for Latin and Central America and is an important follow-on to the President's Latin American visit. Finally, this meeting would capture the imagination of the American people and media due to the more obvious benefits to all parties of greater cohesion.

Prepared by:
Charles P. Tyson
Roger W. Robinson
William F. Martin

Gaston Sigur and David Laux concur.

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2/24/05

KEYWORDS: PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL FAR EAST
CHINA P R JAPAN
KOREA SOUTH INDONESIA

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES TRIP TO FAR EAST

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
PRESIDENT

COMMENTS

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June 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of StateSUBJECT: Your Memorandum on Setting up the
President's Trip to Asia (S)

We have reviewed the useful suggestions in your memo and concur with the recommendations. I would only urge that we try to have the initial phase of the invitation process completed by the end of this week. (S)


William P. Clark

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White House Guide, August 28, 1997
By MJD N Date 2/24/07

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Judge Clark

John Poindexter

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
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June 14, 1983



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *cat*

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary Shultz
re: Far East Trip

The two memos from Secretary Shultz to you on the President's proposed trip to the Far East are encouraging. The comments track very well with our original memo proposing the trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached note (Tab I) to Secretary Shultz providing NSC concurrence on his thoughtful suggestions.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

C-1
get Davis' concurrence
MR

Attachments

Tab I Concurrence memo from you to Secretary Shultz
Tab II Incoming memos from Secretary Shultz to you
Tab III Original memo proposing the trip

OK MKD

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BY KDJ

8/29/06