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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National Security  
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**Folder:** U.S.S.R: General Secretary Gorbachev  
(8690146-8690267)  
**Box:** 40

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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Head of State File

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8690146-8690267 Date: 5/24/99

Box 40

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8690146			
<del>1. Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Gorbachev, 8 p.</del>	<del>2/22/86</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #49</i>		
<del>2. Letter</del>	<del>Copy of item #1, 8 p.</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #420</i>		
<del>3. Cable</del>	<del>#230328Z Feb 86, 11 p.</del>	<del>2/23/86</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #421</i>		
NSC System II #8690267			
<del>4. Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Gorbachev, 4 p.</del>	<del>4/11/86</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #422</i>		
<del>5. Letter</del>	<del>Copy of Item #4, 4 p.</del>	<del>4/11/86</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #423</i>		
6. Memo	John Poindexter to Reagan, re: Letter to Gorbachev, 1 p.	4/11/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
<del>7. Letter</del>	<del>Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 5 p.</del>	<del>4/2/86</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #425</i>		
<del>8. Letter</del>	<del>Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 3 p.</del>	<del>4/2/86</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
	<i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #426</i>		

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 FEB 86 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM POINDEXTER *n70 6/11/86*

DOCDATE 22 FEB 86

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

USSR

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV RE JAN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8690079 8690091 NSCIFID ( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>State</i>	<i>- 2/25</i>	<i>Pres sgl</i>		
	<i>c 2/25</i>	<i>for dispatch</i>		

DISPATCH *Ed O'Quinn* W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90146

Date 25 FEB 1986

Subject: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

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### EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	#	CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT					
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	ORIGINAL				
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422			<u>2/25/86</u>	<u>1637</u>	<u>Jalson</u>
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon					
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State					
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State					
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THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,					
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By dlb White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
NARA, Date 5/24/97

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

REFERRAL

DATE: 25 FEB 86

MEMORANDUM FOR: NICK PLATT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 22 FEB 86

KEYWORDS ARMS CONTROL USSR GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJ:

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REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:



Rodney B. McDaniel  
FOR ~~ROBERT M. KIMMITT~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

----- FOR NSC USE ONLY -----

FOR INFO

F SII O B C

SYSTEM II  
90146  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 24, 1986

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is a hard copy of the cable which was sent to General Secretary Gorbachev this weekend. Because this letter will be sent expressly to Secretary Gorbachev, your personal signature is appropriate.

  
David Chew

The President has seen *2/25*  
**SIGNED**

SYSTEM II

90146


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

The President has seen 2/25  
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David Chew

National Security Council  
The White House

DM

86 FEB 25 P 3: 40

System # II  
Package # 90146  
DOCLOG BT A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>Review</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>BT</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Act 2/22. B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The elimination of nuclear weapons has been an American goal for decades, from our proposals at the dawn of the nuclear age to my vision of a nuclear-free world made possible through the reliance of our countries on defense rather than on the threat of nuclear retaliation. In a 1983 speech to the Japanese Diet and on many subsequent occasions, I have advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have done so because I believe this is an objective which reflects the deep yearning of people everywhere, and which provides a vision to guide our efforts in the years ahead. It was for similar reasons that I have sought to develop concepts and frameworks to guide the efforts of our governments in other aspects of our relations -- whether solving the regional tensions that have damaged our relations over the years, or expanding the people-to-people contacts that can enrich both our societies.

It is in this spirit that I have studied with great care your letter of January 14, your January 15 statement to the Soviet people, and your subsequent statements on the prospects for progress in arms control. I believe they represent a significant and positive step forward.

I am encouraged that you have suggested steps leading toward a world free from nuclear weapons, even though my view regarding the steps necessary differs from yours in certain respects. However, having agreed on the objective and on the need for taking concrete steps to reach that goal, it should be easier to resolve differences in our viewpoints as to what those steps should be. Our initial moves are of course the essential ones to start this process and therefore I believe we should focus our negotiating efforts on them.

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NLS F99-051 # 419

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

Of course, if we are to move toward a world in which the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons will be possible, there must be far greater trust and confidence between our two countries than exists at present. We cannot simply wave away the suspicion and misunderstandings which have developed over the past four decades between our two countries. The process of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons can by itself nurture greater confidence and trust. But there will be many in my country, and I believe in yours, who will question the wisdom of eliminating nuclear weapons -- which both sides see as the ultimate guarantor of their security -- if they see the other's conduct as threatening. This leads me to three general observations.

First, it will be vitally necessary as we move down this path to ensure the most stringent verification, with measures far more comprehensive and exacting than in any previous agreement. I welcome your recognition of this in your expressed willingness to make use of on-site inspection and to adopt other measures that may be necessary. For our part, we will be proposing verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits which are contemplated. Our negotiators will, of course, work out the details of the measures, but I believe we both will have to pay close attention to this aspect and see to it that our respective governments develop and implement the necessary arrangements. At the same time, it will be essential to resolve outstanding compliance concerns and ensure that all obligations our governments have undertaken are faithfully observed.

My second point is that any sustained effort to resolve our basic security concerns must go hand-in-hand with concrete steps to move ahead in other areas of our relationship -- non-nuclear military issues, regional problems, human rights, and bilateral ties. The buildup of both nuclear and conventional armaments has taken place in recent decades to address perceived threats to security, including conflicts in other regions of the world. Progress on reducing arms should be accompanied by a corresponding effort to deal with these perceptions. The process of eliminating nuclear arms is liable to prove fragile indeed unless we can deal with our competition in a peaceful and responsible way.

I welcome the statement in your January 15 message to the Soviet people, which calls for settlement of regional conflicts as soon as possible. I would urge you again to consider seriously the proposal I made at the United Nations in October for a comprehensive and flexible framework that would permit our two countries to work together, in conjunction with the peoples involved, to solve regional conflicts that have damaged East-West relations over the years and have brought great suffering to the areas affected. We should make every effort to ensure that in the dialogue on regional issues to which we agreed at Geneva, including discussions by our foreign ministers and the meetings of our senior regional experts, our governments take a fresh look at ways to reduce tensions between us over regional matters. I continue to believe that regional conflicts can and should be resolved peacefully, in ways that allow free choice without outside interference.

Finally, as you know, the United States and its allies must rely today on nuclear weapons to deter conventional as well as nuclear conflict. This is due in large part to the significant imbalance that currently exists between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, it would be necessary, as we reduce nuclear weapons toward zero, that we concurrently engage in a process of strengthening the stability of the overall East-West security balance, with particular emphasis on redressing existing conventional imbalances, strengthening confidence-building measures and accomplishing a verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons. In addition, our cooperative efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime would become even more important.

As for the specifics of your proposal, we certainly agree on the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as we have achieved the conditions for a world which makes that goal feasible. We also agree on the need to get on with the first steps towards creating those conditions now. The pace of progress towards any target date would have to depend on our ability to arrive at mutually acceptable guarantees to ensure that the security of the United States, the Soviet Union and our respective friends and allies is in no sense diminished along the way.

I also agree that the first steps in moving toward this goal involve deep reductions in the existing arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Also, like you, we can envision subsequent steps which could involve the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China, so that all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner. Finally, I also share the view that our efforts should now focus on the first steps which the U.S. and USSR can take bilaterally to begin the process.

I can also agree with several of your ideas on how this program would proceed. There are other details, however, that would require modification before I could accept them.

For example, as our two nations reduce our nuclear weapons toward zero, it is imperative that we maintain equal limits on those weapons at each stage along the way. To this end, the United States last November proposed a detailed plan for reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces. I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet responded to this proposal, which builds on your ideas presented to me last fall by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. As we discussed in Geneva, we agree on the principle of deep reductions, but we cannot agree that certain categories of weapons systems on the U.S. side would be included while like weapons on the Soviet side would be excluded.

Similarly, we must insist that limits be based on system capabilities, not expressed intentions. You made this point very eloquently to me in Geneva. In regard to longer-range INF missiles, this means that we cannot exclude systems from limits merely because of their deployment location, since those systems are capable of moving or being transported in a matter of days between different geographic areas.

I have, however, studied closely, your INF proposal of January 15, 1986, and believe that our negotiators at Geneva should be able to arrive at an equitable, verifiable and mutually acceptable INF agreement. In this regard, I have asked our negotiators during this round to propose a

concrete plan for the elimination of LRINF missiles, not only in Europe but also in Asia, before the end of 1989.

In the defense and space area, your proposal was ambiguous with regard to strategic defense research. I continue to believe that limits on research could be counterproductive and, in any case, could not be verified; therefore, they must not be included in an agreement. Beyond research, as I suggested in Geneva, if there were no nuclear missiles, then there might also be no need for defenses against them. But I am convinced that some non-nuclear defenses could make a vital contribution to security and stability. In any event, our negotiators in Geneva should thoroughly examine how we could make a transition to a world involving the increasing contribution of such defenses.

With respect to nuclear testing, I believe that, so long as we rely on nuclear weapons as an element of deterrence, we must continue to test in order to ensure their continued safety, security and reliability. However, as I wrote to you in December, I see no reason why we should not consider the matter of nuclear testing as we move forward on other arms control subjects. I suggested we establish a bilateral dialogue aimed at constructive steps in this field. I remain hopeful you will take up this offer.

Finally, although your proposal seems to recognize that the crucial first step is substantial bilateral U.S. and Soviet nuclear reductions, it also attaches certain conditions regarding the forces of the United Kingdom and France. As you know, the United States can make no commitments for other nuclear powers, nor can we agree to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arrangements which would suggest otherwise. The negotiations of limitations on third country nuclear systems is solely the responsibility and prerogative of the governments concerned.

The leaders of Britain, France and China have made known their views on this and on the progress necessary in U.S.-Soviet nuclear reductions and in other arms control areas which would establish the

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conditions for them to consider how their security interests would be served by participation in future negotiations. Thus, the important task now before us is to make the necessary progress. When we have done so -- as I noted earlier -- I can envision a process involving the other nuclear powers, so that we all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner.

With these considerations in mind, and building upon your proposal, I propose that we agree upon the elements which we hold in common, as outlined above, and that we accelerate work on the first bilateral steps. Implementing details must be worked out by our negotiators in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm, but our guiding objective should be to reach meaningful, verifiable and balanced arms control measures, each of which can stand on its merits at every stage of the larger process.

In summary, I would propose that the process toward our agreed goal of eliminating nuclear weapons include the following elements:

Initial Steps. I believe that these steps should involve reduction in and limits on nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons as follows:

1. The U.S. and the USSR would reduce the number of warheads on their strategic ballistic missiles to 4500 and the number of ALCMs on their heavy bombers to 1500 resulting in no more than a total number of 6000 such warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. These reductions would be carried out in such a way as to enhance stability.
2. In the INF area, by 1987 both the United States and the Soviet Union would limit their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to no more than 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent, proportionate reductions in Asia. Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the numbers of LRINF launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50%. Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989.

3. Research programs on strategic defenses would be conducted in accord with treaty obligations.
4. The U.S. and the USSR would establish an effective MBFR verification regime and carry out initial reductions in manpower levels along the lines of the recent Western proposal at the MBFR negotiations; they would then begin a process of moving on to a balance of non-nuclear capabilities in Europe.
5. Concrete and meaningful confidence-building measures designed to make the European military environment more open, predictable, and stable would be initiated.
6. An effective, comprehensive worldwide ban on the development, production, possession, and transfer of chemical weapons would be instituted, with strict verification measures including international on-site inspection.

Subsequent steps. Subsequent steps could involve other nuclear powers and would aim at further reductions and increasingly strict limits, ultimately leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We would embark on this process as soon as the steps encompassed in the first stage are completed. The goal would be to complete the process as soon as the conditions for a non-nuclear world had been achieved.

Obligations assumed in all steps and areas would be verified by national technical means, by on-site inspection as needed, and by such additional measures as might prove necessary.

I hope that this concept provides a mutually acceptable route to a goal that all the world shares. I look forward to your response and to working with you in the coming months in advancing this most important effort.

Let me conclude by agreeing with you that we should work constructively before your visit to the United States to prepare concrete agreements on the full range of issues we discussed at Geneva. Neither of us has illusions about the major problems which remain between our two countries,

but I want to assure you that I am determined to work with you energetically in finding practical solutions to those problems. I agree with you that we should use our correspondence as a most important channel of communication in preparing for your visit.

Nancy and I would like to extend to you, Mrs. Gorbacheva and your family our best wishes. It is our hope that this year will bring significant progress toward our mutual goal of building a better relationship between our two countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

*Ronald Reagan*

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

~~Secret~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW *LL FJ: 56*

**IMMEDIATE**

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # *28*

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES *9*

DTG *222238Z FEB 86*

RELEASER *LVS*

FROM/LOCATION

1. *The White House Situation Room*

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. *Jim Kuhn for the President / Camp David*  
3. \_\_\_\_\_  
4. *TOT/222254Z*

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

*Gorbocher Letter*

~~Secret~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1986

Mr. President,

Attached is a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev which responds to his letter of January 14. As I told you on the telephone this morning, we would like to cable this response to Moscow tonight so Art could deliver it tomorrow before their Party Congress convenes on Tuesday.

I recommend you approve it and then have your approval sent back to the Situation Room tonight.



John Poindexter

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/99

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The elimination of nuclear weapons has been an American goal for decades, from our proposals at the dawn of the nuclear age to my vision of a nuclear-free world made possible through the reliance of our countries on defense rather than on the threat of nuclear retaliation. In a 1983 speech to the Japanese Diet and on many subsequent occasions, I have advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have done so because I believe this is an objective which reflects the deep yearning of people everywhere, and which provides a vision to guide our efforts in the years ahead. It was for similar reasons that I have sought to develop concepts and frameworks to guide the efforts of our governments in other aspects of our relations -- whether solving the regional tensions that have damaged our relations over the years, or expanding the people-to-people contacts that can enrich both our societies.

It is in this spirit that I have studied with great care your letter of January 14, your January 15 statement to the Soviet people, and your subsequent statements on the prospects for progress in arms control. I believe they represent a significant and positive step forward.

I am encouraged that you have suggested steps leading toward a world free from nuclear weapons, even though my view regarding the steps necessary differ from yours in certain respects. However, having agreed on the objective and on the need for taking concrete steps to reach that goal, it should be easier to resolve differences in our viewpoints as to what those steps should be. Our initial moves are of course the essential ones to start this process and therefore I believe we should focus our negotiating efforts on them.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 # 420

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

Of course, if we are to move toward a world in which the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons will be possible, there must be far greater trust and confidence between our two countries than exists at present. We cannot simply wave away the suspicion and misunderstandings which have developed over the past four decades between our two countries. The process of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons can by itself nurture greater confidence and trust. But there will be many in my country, and I believe in yours, who will question the wisdom of eliminating nuclear weapons -- which both sides see as the ultimate guarantor of their security -- if they see the other's conduct as threatening. This leads me to three general observations.

First, it will be vitally necessary as we move down this path to ensure the most stringent verification, with measures far more comprehensive and exacting than in any previous agreement. I welcome your recognition of this in your expressed willingness to make use of on-site inspection and to adopt other measures that may be necessary. For our part, we will be proposing verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits which are contemplated. Our negotiators will, of course, work out the details of the measures, but I believe we both will have to pay close attention to this aspect and see to it that our respective governments develop and implement the necessary arrangements. At the same time, it will be essential to resolve outstanding compliance concerns and ensure that all obligations our governments have undertaken are faithfully observed.

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Finally, as you know, the United States and its allies must rely today on nuclear weapons to deter conventional as well as nuclear conflict. This is due in large part to the significant imbalance that currently exists between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, it would be necessary, as we reduce nuclear weapons toward zero, that we concurrently engage in a process of strengthening the stability of the overall East-West security balance, with particular emphasis on redressing existing conventional imbalances, strengthening confidence-building measures and accomplishing a verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons. In addition, our cooperative efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime would become even more important.

As for the specifics of your proposal, we certainly agree on the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as we have achieved the conditions for a world which makes that goal feasible. We also agree on the need to get on with the first steps towards creating those conditions now. The pace of progress towards any target date would have to depend on our ability to arrive at mutually acceptable guarantees to ensure that the security of the United States, the Soviet Union and our respective friends and allies is in no sense diminished along the way.

I also agree that the first steps in moving toward this goal involve deep reductions in the existing arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Also, like you, we can envision subsequent steps which could involve the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China, so that all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner. Finally, I also share the view that our efforts should now focus on the first steps which the U.S. and USSR can take bilaterally to begin the process.

I can also agree with several of your ideas on how this program would proceed. There are other details, however, that would require modification before I could accept them.

For example, as our two nations reduce our nuclear weapons toward zero, it is imperative that we maintain equal limits on those weapons at each stage along the way. To this end, the United States last November proposed a detailed plan for reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces. I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet responded to this proposal, which builds on your ideas presented to me last fall by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. As we discussed in Geneva, we agree on the principle of deep reductions, but we cannot agree that certain categories of weapons systems on the U.S. side would be included while like weapons on the Soviet side would be excluded.

Similarly, we must insist that limits be based on system capabilities, not expressed intentions. You made this point very eloquently to me in Geneva. In regard to longer-range INF missiles, this means that we cannot exclude systems from limits merely because of their deployment location, since those systems are capable of moving or being transported in a matter of days between different geographic areas.

I have, however, studied closely, your INF proposal of January 15, 1986, and believe that our negotiators at Geneva should be able to arrive at an equitable, verifiable and mutually acceptable INF agreement. In this regard, I have asked our negotiators during this round to propose a

concrete plan for the elimination of LRINF missiles, not only in Europe but also in Asia, before the end of 1989.

In the defense and space area, your proposal was ambiguous with regard to strategic defense research. I continue to believe that limits on research could be counterproductive and, in any case, could not be verified; therefore, they must not be included in an agreement. Beyond research, as I suggested in Geneva, if there were no nuclear missiles, then there might also be no need for defenses against them. But I am convinced that some non-nuclear defenses could make a vital contribution to security and stability. In any event, our negotiators in Geneva should thoroughly examine how we could make a transition to a world involving the increasing contribution of such defenses.

With respect to nuclear testing, I believe that, so long as we rely on nuclear weapons as an element of deterrence, we must continue to test in order to ensure their continued safety, security and reliability. However, as I wrote to you in December, I see no reason why we should not consider the matter of nuclear testing as we move forward on other arms control subjects. I suggested we establish a bilateral dialogue aimed at constructive steps in this field. I remain hopeful you will take up this offer.

Finally, although your proposal seems to recognize that the crucial first step is substantial bilateral U.S. and Soviet nuclear reductions, it also attaches certain conditions regarding the forces of the United Kingdom and France. As you know, the United States can make no commitments for other nuclear powers, nor can we agree to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arrangements which would suggest otherwise. The negotiations of limitations on third country nuclear systems is solely the responsibility and prerogative of the governments concerned.

The leaders of Britain, France and China have made known their views on this and on the progress necessary in U.S.-Soviet nuclear reductions and in other arms control areas which would establish the

conditions for them to consider how their security interests would be served by participation in future negotiations. Thus, the important task now before us is to make the necessary progress. When we have done so -- as I noted earlier -- I can envision a process involving the other nuclear powers, so that we all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner.

With these considerations in mind, and building upon your proposal, I propose that we agree upon the elements which we hold in common, as outlined above, and that we accelerate work on the first bilateral steps. Implementing details must be worked out by our negotiators in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm, but our guiding objective should be to reach meaningful, verifiable and balanced arms control measures, each of which can stand on its merits at every stage of the larger process.

In summary, I would propose that the process toward our agreed goal of eliminating nuclear weapons include the following elements:

Initial Steps. I believe that these steps should involve reduction in and limits on nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons as follows:

1. The U.S. and the USSR would reduce the number of warheads on their strategic ballistic missiles to 4500 and the number of ALCMs on their heavy bombers to 1500 resulting in no more than a total number of 6000 such warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. These reductions would be carried out in such a way as to enhance stability.
2. In the INF area, by 1987 both the United States and the Soviet Union would limit their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to no more than 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent, proportionate reductions in Asia. Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the numbers of LRINF launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50%. Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989.

3. Research programs on strategic defenses would be conducted in accord with treaty obligations.

4. The U.S. and the USSR would establish an effective MBFR verification regime and carry out initial reductions in manpower levels along the lines of the recent Western proposal at the MBFR negotiations; they would then begin a process of moving on to a balance of non-nuclear capabilities in Europe.

5. Concrete and meaningful confidence-building measures designed to make the European military environment more open, predictable, and stable would be initiated.

6. An effective, comprehensive worldwide ban on the development, production, possession, and transfer of chemical weapons would be instituted, with strict verification measures including international on-site inspection.

Subsequent steps. Subsequent steps could involve other nuclear powers and would aim at further reductions and increasingly strict limits, ultimately leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We would embark on this process as soon as the steps encompassed in the first stage are completed. The goal would be to complete the process as soon as the conditions for a non-nuclear world had been achieved.

Obligations assumed in all steps and areas would be verified by national technical means, by on-site inspection as needed, and by such additional measures as might prove necessary.

I hope that this concept provides a mutually acceptable route to a goal that all the world shares. I look forward to your response and to working with you in the coming months in advancing this most important effort.

Let me conclude by agreeing with you that we should work constructively before your visit to the United States to prepare concrete agreements on the full range of issues we discussed at Geneva. Neither of us has illusions about the major problems which remain between our two countries,

but I want to assure you that I am determined to work with you energetically in finding practical solutions to those problems. I agree with you that we should use our correspondence as a most important channel of communication in preparing for your visit.

Nancy and I would like to extend to you, Mrs. Gorbacheva and your family our best wishes. It is our hope that this year will bring significant progress toward our mutual goal of building a better relationship between our two countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, UR  
SUBJECT: LETTER FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GENERAL  
SECRETARY GORBACHEV

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN  
TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051-421

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

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THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS BEEN AN AMERICAN GOAL FOR DECADES, FROM OUR PROPOSALS AT THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR AGE TO MY VISION OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE RELIANCE OF OUR COUNTRIES ON DEFENSE RATHER THAN ON THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RETALIATION. IN A 1983 SPEECH TO THE JAPANESE DIET AND ON MANY SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS, I HAVE ADVOCATED THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I HAVE DONE SO BECAUSE I BELIEVE THIS IS AN OBJECTIVE WHICH REFLECTS THE DEEP YEARNING OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE, AND WHICH PROVIDES A VISION TO GUIDE OUR EFFORTS IN THE YEARS AHEAD. IT WAS FOR SIMILAR REASONS THAT I HAVE SOUGHT TO DEVELOP CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS TO GUIDE THE EFFORTS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS IN OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS -- WHETHER SOLVING THE REGIONAL TENSIONS THAT HAVE DAMAGED OUR RELATIONS OVER THE YEARS, OR EXPANDING THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS THAT CAN ENRICH BOTH OUR SOCIETIES.

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IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I HAVE STUDIED WITH GREAT CARE YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 14, YOUR JANUARY 15 STATEMENT TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, AND YOUR SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. I BELIEVE THEY REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE STEP FORWARD.

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I AM ENCOURAGED THAT YOU HAVE SUGGESTED STEPS LEADING TOWARD A WORLD FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN THOUGH MY VIEW REGARDING THE STEPS NECESSARY DIFFER FROM YOURS IN CERTAIN RESPECTS. HOWEVER, HAVING AGREED ON THE OBJECTIVE AND ON THE NEED FOR TAKING CONCRETE STEPS TO REACH THAT GOAL, IT SHOULD BE EASIER TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN OUR VIEWPOINTS AS TO WHAT THOSE STEPS SHOULD BE. OUR INITIAL MOVES ARE OF COURSE THE ESSENTIAL ONES TO START THIS PROCESS AND THEREFORE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FOCUS OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ON THEM.

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OF COURSE, IF WE ARE TO MOVE TOWARD A WORLD IN WHICH THE

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EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE POSSIBLE, THERE MUST BE FAR GREATER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAN EXIST AT PRESENT. WE CANNOT SIMPLY WAVE AWAY THE SUSPICION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST FOUR DECADES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE PROCESS OF REDUCING AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BY ITSELF NURTURE GREATER CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. BUT THERE WILL BE MANY IN MY COUNTRY, AND I BELIEVE IN YOURS, WHO WILL QUESTION THE WISDOM OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- WHICH BOTH SIDES SEE AS THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THEIR SECURITY -- IF THEY SEE THE OTHER'S CONDUCT AS THREATENING. THIS LEADS ME TO THREE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

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FIRST, IT WILL BE VITALLY NECESSARY AS WE MOVE DOWN THIS PATH TO ENSURE THE MOST STRINGENT VERIFICATION, WITH MEASURES FAR MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND EXACTING THAN IN ANY PREVIOUS AGREEMENT. I WELCOME YOUR RECOGNITION OF THIS IN YOUR EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO MAKE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AND TO ADOPT OTHER MEASURES THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL BE PROPOSING VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC WEAPONRY LIMITS WHICH ARE CONTEMPLATED. OUR NEGOTIATORS WILL, OF COURSE, WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE MEASURES, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE BOTH WILL HAVE TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS ASPECT, AND SEE TO IT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE

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GOVERNMENTS DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND ENSURE THAT ALL OBLIGATIONS OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE UNDERTAKEN ARE FAITHFULLY OBSERVED.

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MY SECOND POINT IS THAT ANY SUSTAINED EFFORT TO RESOLVE OUR BASIC SECURITY CONCERNS MUST GO HAND-IN-HAND WITH CONCRETE STEPS TO MOVE AHEAD IN OTHER AREAS OF OUR

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RELATIONSHIP -- NON-NUCLEAR MILITARY ISSUES, REGIONAL PROBLEMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL TIES. THE BUILDUP OF BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS HAS TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT DECADES TO ADDRESS PERCEIVED THREATS TO SECURITY, INCLUDING CONFLICTS IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD. PROGRESS ON REDUCING ARMS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CORRESPONDING EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THESE PERCEPTIONS. THE PROCESS OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR ARMS IS LIABLE TO PROVE FRAGILE INDEED UNLESS WE CAN DEAL WITH OUR COMPETITION IN A PEACEFUL AND RESPONSIBLE WAY.

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I WELCOME THE STATEMENT IN YOUR JANUARY 15 MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, WHICH CALLS FOR SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD URGE YOU AGAIN TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSAL I MADE AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN OCTOBER FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK THAT WOULD PERMIT OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO WORK TOGETHER, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PEOPLES INVOLVED, TO SOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS THAT HAVE DAMAGED EAST-WEST RELATIONS OVER THE YEARS AND HAVE BROUGHT GREAT SUFFERING TO THE AREAS AFFECTED. WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT IN THE DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES TO WHICH WE AGREED AT GENEVA, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS BY OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE MEETINGS OF OUR SENIOR REGIONAL EXPERTS, OUR GOVERNMENTS TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT WAYS TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETWEEN US OVER REGIONAL MATTERS. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS CAN AND SHOULD BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY, IN WAYS THAT ALLOW FREE CHOICE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

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FINALLY, AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES MUST RELY TODAY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR CONFLICT. THIS IS DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE SIGNIFICANT IMBALANCE THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. AS A RESULT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY, AS WE REDUCE

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS TOWARD ZERO, THAT WE CONCURRENTLY ENGAGE  
IN A PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING THE STABILITY OF THE  
OVERALL EAST-WEST SECURITY BALANCE, WITH PARTICULAR  
EMPHASIS ON REDRESSING EXISTING CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCES,

STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND  
ACCOMPLISHING A VERIFIABLE, GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL  
WEAPONS. IN ADDITION, OUR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO  
STRENGTHEN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME WOULD  
BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT.

AS FOR THE SPECIFICS OF YOUR PROPOSAL, WE CERTAINLY AGREE  
ON THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SOON AS WE  
HAVE ACHIEVED THE CONDITIONS FOR A WORLD WHICH MAKES THAT  
GOAL FEASIBLE. WE ALSO AGREE ON THE NEED TO GET ON WITH  
THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD CREATING THOSE CONDITIONS NOW.  
THE PACE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS ANY TARGET DATE WOULD HAVE  
TO DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE  
GUARANTEES TO ENSURE THAT THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED  
STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR RESPECTIVE FRIENDS AND  
ALLIES IS IN NO SENSE DIMINISHED ALONG THE WAY.

I ALSO AGREE THAT THE FIRST STEPS IN MOVING TOWARD THIS  
GOAL INVOLVE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE EXISTING ARSENALS OF  
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ALSO, LIKE YOU,  
WE CAN ENVISION SUBSEQUENT STEPS WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE  
UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,  
SO THAT ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A  
BALANCED AND STABLE MANNER. FINALLY, I ALSO SHARE THE  
VIEW THAT OUR EFFORTS SHOULD NOW FOCUS ON THE FIRST STEPS  
WHICH THE U.S. AND USSR CAN TAKE BILATERALLY TO BEGIN THE  
PROCESS.

I CAN ALSO AGREE WITH SEVERAL OF YOUR IDEAS ON HOW THIS  
PROGRAM WOULD PROCEED. THERE ARE OTHER DETAILS, HOWEVER,  
THAT WOULD REQUIRE MODIFICATION BEFORE I COULD ACCEPT

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THEM.

FOR EXAMPLE, AS OUR TWO NATIONS REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TOWARD ZERO, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE MAINTAIN EQUAL LIMITS ON THOSE WEAPONS AT EACH STAGE ALONG THE WAY. TO THIS END, THE UNITED STATES LAST NOVEMBER PROPOSED A DETAILED PLAN FOR REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. I AM DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT YET RESPONDED TO THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH BUILDS ON YOUR IDEAS PRESENTED TO ME LAST FALL BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. AS WE DISCUSSED IN GENEVA, WE AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS, BUT WE CANNOT AGREE THAT CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON THE U.S. SIDE WOULD BE INCLUDED WHILE LIKE WEAPONS ON THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE EXCLUDED.

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SIMILARLY, WE MUST INSIST THAT LIMITS BE BASED ON SYSTEM CAPABILITIES, NOT EXPRESSED INTENTIONS. YOU MADE THIS POINT VERY ELOQUENTLY TO ME IN GENEVA. IN REGARD TO LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, THIS MEANS THAT WE CANNOT EXCLUDE SYSTEMS FROM LIMITS MERELY BECAUSE OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT LOCATION, SINCE THOSE SYSTEMS ARE CAPABLE OF MOVING OR BEING TRANSPORTED IN A MATTER OF DAYS BETWEEN DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC AREAS.

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I HAVE, HOWEVER, STUDIED CLOSELY YOUR INF PROPOSAL OF JANUARY 15, 1986, AND BELIEVE THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA SHOULD BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE INF AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, I HAVE ASKED OUR NEGOTIATORS IN THIS ROUND TO PROPOSE A CONCRETE PLAN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES, NOT ONLY IN EUROPE BUT ALSO IN ASIA, BEFORE THE END OF 1989.

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IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA, YOUR PROPOSAL WAS AMBIGUOUS WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH. I

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CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT LIMITS ON RESEARCH COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND, IN ANY CASE, COULD NOT BE VERIFIED; THEREFORE, THEY MUST NOT BE INCLUDED IN AN AGREEMENT. BEYOND RESEARCH, AS I SUGGESTED IN GENEVA, IF THERE WERE NO NUCLEAR MISSILES, THEN THERE MIGHT ALSO BE NO NEED FOR DEFENSES AGAINST THEM. BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT SOME NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSES COULD MAKE A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY AND STABILITY. IN ANY EVENT, OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA SHOULD THOROUGHLY EXAMINE HOW WE COULD MAKE A TRANSITION TO A WORLD INVOLVING THE INCREASING CONTRIBUTION OF SUCH DEFENSES.

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WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR TESTING, I BELIEVE THAT, SO LONG AS WE RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS AN ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO TEST IN ORDER TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUED SAFETY, SECURITY AND RELIABILITY. HOWEVER, AS I WROTE TO YOU IN DECEMBER, I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THE MATTER OF NUCLEAR TESTING AS WE MOVE FORWARD ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS. I SUGGESTED WE ESTABLISH A BILATERAL DIALOGUE AIMED AT CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS IN THIS FIELD. I REMAIN HOPEFUL YOU WILL TAKE UP THIS OFFER.

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FINALLY, ALTHOUGH YOUR PROPOSAL SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CRUCIAL FIRST STEP IS SUBSTANTIAL BILATERAL U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, IT ALSO ATTACHES CERTAIN CONDITIONS REGARDING THE FORCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE. AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES CAN MAKE NO COMMITMENTS FOR OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS, NOR CAN WE AGREE TO BILATERAL U.S. -SOVIET ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD SUGGEST OTHERWISE. THE NEGOTIATIONS OF LIMITATIONS ON THIRD

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COUNTRY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IS SOLELY THE RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

THE LEADERS OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA HAVE MADE KNOWN

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THEIR VIEWS ON THIS AND ON THE PROGRESS NECESSARY IN U. S. - SOVIET NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR THEM TO CONSIDER HOW THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, THE IMPORTANT TASK NOW BEFORE US IS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY PROGRESS. WHEN WE HAVE DONE SO -- AS I NOTED EARLIER -- I CAN ENVISION A PROCESS INVOLVING THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS, SO THAT WE ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A BALANCED AND STABLE MANNER.

WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, AND BUILDING UPON YOUR PROPOSAL, I PROPOSE THAT WE AGREE UPON THE ELEMENTS WHICH WE HOLD IN COMMON, AS OUTLINED ABOVE, AND THAT WE ACCELERATE WORK ON THE FIRST BILATERAL STEPS.

IMPLEMENTING DETAILS MUST BE WORKED OUT BY OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA, VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM, BUT OUR GUIDING OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO REACH MEANINGFUL, VERIFIABLE AND BALANCED ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, EACH OF WHICH CAN STAND ON ITS MERITS AT EVERY STAGE OF THE LARGER PROCESS.

IN SUMMARY, I WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE PROCESS TOWARD OUR AGREED GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

(BEGIN UNDERLINE) INITIAL STEPS (END UNDERLINE). I BELIEVE THAT THESE STEPS SHOULD INVOLV- REDUCTION IN AND LIMITS ON NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE U. S. AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THEIR STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES TO 4500 AND THE NUMBER OF ALCMS ON THEIR HEAVY BOMBERS TO 1500, RESULTING IN NO MORE THAN A TOTAL NUMBER OF 6000 SUCH WARHEADS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES. THESE

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REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENHANCE STABILITY.

2. IN THE INF AREA, BY 1987 BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LIMIT THEIR LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE TO NO MORE THAN 140 LAUNCHERS EACH, WITH THE SOVIET UNION MAKING CONCURRENT, PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN ASIA. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING YEAR, BOTH

SIDES WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF LRINF LAUNCHERS REMAINING IN EUROPE AND ASIA BY AN ADDITIONAL 50 . FINALLY, BOTH SIDES WOULD MOVE TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS BY THE END OF 1989.

3. RESEARCH PROGRAMS ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORD WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

4. THE U.S. AND THE USSR WOULD ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE MBFR VERIFICATION REGIME AND CARRY OUT INITIAL REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER LEVELS ALONG THE LINES OF THE RECENT WESTERN PROPOSAL AT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; THEY WOULD THEN BEGIN A PROCESS OF MOVING ON TO A BALANCE OF NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE.

5. CONCRETE AND MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO MAKE THE EUROPEAN MILITARY ENVIRONMENT MORE OPEN, PREDICTABLE, AND STABLE WOULD BE INITIATED.

6. AN EFFECTIVE, COMPREHENSIVE WORLDWIDE BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, POSSESSION, AND TRANSFER OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE INSTITUTED, WITH STRICT VERIFICATION MEASURES INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION.

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(BEGIN UNDERLINE) SUBSEQUENT STEPS (END UNDERLINE).  
SUBSEQUENT STEPS COULD INVOLVE OTHER NUCLEAR POWEJS AND  
WOULD AIM AT FURTHER REDUCTIONS AND INCREASINGLY STRICT  
LIMITS, ULTIMATELY LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE WOULD EMBARK ON THIS PROCESS AS SOON  
AS THE STEPS ENCOMPASSED IN THE FIRST STAGE ARE  
COMPLETED. THE GOAL WOULD BE TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS AS  
SOON AS THE CONDITIONS FOR A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD HAD BEEN  
ACHIEVED.

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OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED IN ALL STEPS AND AREAS WOULD BE  
VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, BY ON-SITE  
INSPECTION AS NEEDED, AND BY SUCH ADDITIONAL MEASURES AS  
MIGHT PROVE NECESSARY.

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I HOPE THAT THIS CONCEPT PROVIDES A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE  
ROUTE TO A GOAL THAT ALL THE WORLD SHARES. I LOOK  
FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE AND TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE  
COMING MONTHS IN ADVANCING THIS MOST IMPORTANT EFFORT.

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LET ME CONCLUDE BY AGREEING WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD WORK  
CONSTRUCTIVELY BEFORE YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES TO  
PREPARE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES  
WE DISCUSSED AT GENEVA. NEITHER OF US HAS ILLUSIONS  
ABOUT THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WHICH REMAIN BETWEEN OUR TWO  
COUNTRIES, BUT I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I AM DETERMINED  
TO WORK WITH YOU ENERGETICALLY IN FINDING PRACTICAL  
SOLUTIONS TO THOSE PROBLEMS. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE  
SHOULD USE OUR CORRESPONDENCE AS A MOST IMPORTANT CHANNEL  
OF COMMUNICATION IN PREPARING FOR YOUR VISIT.

NANCY AND I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU, MRS. GORBACHEVA  
AND YOUR FAMILY OUR BEST WISHES. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT  
THIS YEAR WILL BRING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD OUR  
MUTUAL GOAL OF BUILDING A BETTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 11 OF 11 SECSTATE WASHDC 5985 DTG: 230328Z FEB 86 PSN: 038886

TWO COUNTRIES, AND A SAFER WORLD.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

HIS EXCELLENCY  
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION  
THE KREMLIN  
MOSCOW

END TEXT OF LETTER  
SHULTZ

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 07 APR 86 09

TO PRESIDENT

FROM GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

DOCDATE 02 APR 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

*HS*

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LTR RE US - USSR BILATERAL RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: 07 APR 86 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

SESTANOVICH

RODMAN

FORTIER

MCDANIEL

PEARSON

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Roundtable Pres</i>	<i>X 4/10</i>	<i>Pres for signature</i>		<i>1</i>
	<i>P 4/11</i>	<i>Signature</i>		
	<i>C 4/11</i>	<i>Pres spl ltr</i>		<i>JM</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of April 2, which Ambassador Dobrynin delivered. As Ambassador Dobrynin will report to you, your letter served as the point of departure for a very useful meeting we held in my office, and for additional meetings between him and Secretary Shultz. It is clear that both of us are concerned about the relative lack of progress since our meeting in Geneva in moving overall relations in a positive direction. While each of us would cite quite different reasons to explain this situation, I agree with your thought that the important thing now is to focus our attention on how we can solve the concrete problems facing us.

I described to Ambassador Dobrynin a number of goals which I believe we could set for our meeting. This was of course an optimum list. I recognize that achieving these goals will be a complex and difficult process and that we may not be able to achieve them all in the immediate future. I am confident, however, that all can be achieved if we have the will to get to work on them promptly. Furthermore, they are sufficiently important that progress on even a few of them would be a worthwhile achievement.

Although I believe we should not relent in our search for ways to bridge critical differences between our countries, I agree with your observation on the desirability of moving step by step when an overall solution to a problem eludes us. I want to assure you that our proposals, like yours, are not "all or nothing at all." We wish to negotiate, to find compromises that serve the interests of each of us, and to achieve as much progress as possible. If we can make a critical

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breakthrough, that of course would be best. But as we attempt to deal with the key issues, we should simultaneously try to solve as many of the smaller ones as we can in order to develop momentum for dealing successfully with the larger issues.

This applies particularly to the nuclear testing issue, which you mentioned in your letter. Since nuclear testing occurs because we both depend on nuclear weapons for our security, our ability eventually to eliminate testing is intimately connected with our ability to agree on ways to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons themselves. This is why we simply cannot enter into the moratorium you have proposed.

However, there must be practical means by which we can begin resolving our differences on this issue. Congressmen Fascell and Broomfield have reported to me your suggestion that we open a dialogue to discuss both your ideas and ours on this subject. I am prepared to agree to this idea, to have our representatives meet to discuss the principal concerns on both sides without preconditions. If we could agree on concrete verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, we would be prepared to support ratification of those treaties and create conditions which would let us move toward our ultimate goal of banning all tests.

I have taken careful note of your suggestion that we meet in Europe to deal with this issue. While I agree that it is very important, it is hard for me to understand the basis for a meeting on our level, devoted solely to this issue, when it has been impossible to arrange for our representatives to discuss it. In any event, our calendars are such that we should be able to arrange the meeting we agreed on in Geneva as soon and as easily as we could arrange a one-purpose meeting in Europe. Wouldn't it be better to treat this issue first at a lower level, in the hope that a way could be found to produce some concrete result when we meet in the United States?

In addition to the substantive suggestions I made to Ambassador Dobrynin, I asked him to convey to you some ideas for procedures we might follow to speed up resolution of the issues we face. I hope you will give them serious consideration.

I am pleased that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be meeting in May to discuss how we can accelerate the preparations for your visit to the U.S. I would hope, however, that we can begin immediately to exchange ideas regarding practical goals we can set, and therefore look forward to receiving your more detailed letter and your reaction to the ideas I presented to Ambassador Dobrynin. I would also like to suggest that you look again at our most recent arms control proposals -- the comprehensive proposal of November 1 and the INF proposal of February 24. I believe there are positive elements in them on which we can build. Both of these proposals were designed to pick up on positive aspects of your proposals and bridge the previous positions of our two sides. They also would provide key elements in implementing the first phase of your proposal of January 15.


In conclusion, I want to convey to you the high regard in which Ambassador Dobrynin is held in our country. He has played a truly distinguished, historic role in relations between our countries for over two decades, and we view his departure from Washington with regret. I understand, however, that his future duties will involve relations between our countries, so that we look forward to working with him in the future as well.

I am certain that Ambassador Dobrynin's successor will be received by American officials and our public with the respect due the representative of

a great nation. I agree with you that the widest possible contacts by our Ambassadors both in Washington and Moscow are important if we are to achieve a greater measure of mutual understanding.

Nancy joins me in sending our warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE

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
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Sincerely,

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His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow



83-16-24

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II  
90267

April 11, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Russian Text of April 2 Gorbachev Letter  
to the President

The original, signed Russian text of General Secretary Gorbachev's April 2, 1986 letter to the President is attached. The complementary English translation provided by Ambassador Dobrynin to you and the Secretary at your meeting on Monday, April 7, is also attached.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments: As Stated

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II~~

DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/99



His Excellency  
 Ronald W. Reagan  
 President of the United States of America  
 Washington, D.C.

*We must talk about  
 a reply to this.*

*RR*

April 2, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

I have requested A.F. Dobrynin to transmit this letter to you personally as a follow-up to our exchange of views.

I would like to say that we value A.F. Dobrynin's long years of activity as Soviet ambassador to Washington and his vigorous efforts to develop mutual understanding between our two nations. This, of course, has been greatly facilitated by the contacts he maintained with the American leadership, including under your Administration. We hope that similar opportunities will be available to his successor who we are currently selecting and who will be named shortly.

I intend to send you a more detailed letter on a number of specific issues in our relations and also amplifying on those ideas that I have set forth before. Now, I would like to share with you some of my general observations that I have, and, surely, you must have your own, regarding the state and prospects of the relationship between our two countries. I believe, in doing so, one has to use as a point of departure our meeting in Geneva where we both assumed certain obligations.

I think our assessments of that meeting coincide: it was necessary and useful, it introduced a certain stabilizing element to the relations between the USSR and the USA and to the world

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situation in general. It was only natural that it also generated no small hopes for the future.

More than four months have passed since the Geneva meeting. We ask ourselves: what is the reason for things not going the way they, it would seem, should have gone? Where is the real turn for the better? We, within the Soviet leadership, regarded the Geneva meeting as a call for translating understandings of principle reached there into specific actions with a view to giving an impetus to our relations and to building up their positive dynamics. And we have been doing just that after Geneva.

With this in mind, we have put forward a wide-ranging and concrete program of measures concerning the limitation and reduction of arms and disarmament. It is from the standpoint of new approaches to seeking mutually acceptable solutions that the Soviet delegations have acted in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm.

What were the actions of the USA? One has to state, unfortunately, that so far the positions have not been brought closer together so that it would open up a real prospect for reaching agreements. I will not go into details or make judgements of the US positions here. But there is one point I would like to make. One gathers the impression that all too frequently attempts are being made to portray our initiatives as propaganda, as a desire to score high points in public opinion or as a wish to put the other side into an awkward position. We did not and do not harbor such designs. After all, our initiatives can be easily tested for their practicality. Our goal is to reach agreement, to find solutions to problems which concern the USSR, the USA and actually all other countries.

I have specially focused on this matter so as to ensure a correct, unbiased and business-like treatment of our proposals. I am sure that it will make it easier to reach agreement.

Now what has been taking place in the meantime outside the negotiations? Of course, each of us has his own view of the policy of the other side. But here again, has the Soviet Union done anything in foreign affairs or bilateral relations that would contribute to mounting tensions or be detrimental to the legitimate interests of the USA? I can say clearly: no, there has been nothing of that sort.

On the other hand, we hear increasingly vehement philippics addressed to the USSR and are also witnessing quite a few actions directly aimed against our interests and, to put it frankly, against our relations becoming more stable and constructive. All this builds suspicion with regard to the US policy and, surely, creates no favorable backdrop for the summit meeting. I am saying it with no ambiguity in order to avoid in this regard any uncertainties or misunderstanding that only one side should exercise restraint and display a positive attitude. Our relations take shape not in a vacuum, their general atmosphere is a wholly material concept. The calmer the atmosphere, the easier it is to solve issues which are of equal concern to both sides.

The issues have to be solved - there is no doubt about it. And above all this bears on the area of security. You are familiar with our proposals, they cover all the most important aspects. At the same time I would like specifically to draw your attention to the fact that we do not say: all or nothing at all. We are in

favor of moving forward step by step and we outlined certain possibilities in this regard, particularly, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

We maintained a serious and balanced approach to the problem of ending nuclear tests. One would not want to lose hope that we shall succeed in finding a practical solution to this issue in the way that the world expects us to do. It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of this matter as it is. The solution thereof carries with it also a great positive political potential. It is precisely one of the central thoughts contained in the message of the Delhi Six - countries which called for building a favorable atmosphere in the relations between the USSR and the USA and in the international situation as a whole. We took that also into account, having reacted positively to their appeal to our countries not to conduct nuclear tests pending the next Soviet-American summit meeting.

It was the desire that we work together in the cessation of nuclear tests and set a good example to all nuclear powers that motivated my recent proposal for both of us to meet specifically on this issue at one of the European capitals. Have another look at this proposal, Mr. President, in a broad political context. I repeat, what is meant here is a specific, single-purpose meeting. Such a meeting, of course, would not be a substitute for the new major meeting that we agreed upon in Geneva.

I do very serious thinking with regard to the latter, first of all with a view to making that meeting truly meaningful and substantial, so that it should enable us to move closer to putting

into practice the fundamental understandings reached in Geneva. As you know, I have mentioned some of the questions pertaining to the area of security which are worthwhile working on in preparing for our meeting. I reaffirm that we are ready to seek here solutions in a most serious way, which would be mutually acceptable and not detrimental to the security of either side. Given the mutual will it would be also possible to ascertain other possibilities for agreement in the context of the forthcoming meeting both in the area of space and nuclear arms and on the issues discussed in other fora. To be sure, we also have things to discuss as far as regional matters are concerned.

I assume that you are also working on all these questions and in the subsequent correspondence we will be able in a more specific and substantive way to compare our mutual preliminary ideas for the purpose of bringing the positions closer together. Obviously, this joint work, including the preparations for our meeting, will benefit from the exchanges of views at other levels and particularly from the forthcoming contacts between our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State.

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я попросил А.Ф.Добрынина передать Вам лично письмо в развитие нашего с Вами обмена мнениями.

Хочу сказать, что мы ценим многолетнюю деятельность А.Ф.Добрынина на посту советского посла в Вашингтоне, его энергичные усилия по налаживанию взаимопонимания между нашими народами. Этому, конечно, в значительной степени помогали те контакты, которые у него были с американским руководством, в том числе при Вашей администрации. Надеемся, что аналогичные возможности будут у его преемника, кандидатуру которого мы сейчас подбираем и вскоре назовем.

Я имею в виду направить Вам более подробное письмо по ряду конкретных вопросов, существующих в наших отношениях, в том числе в развитие тех соображений, которые высказывались мною ранее. Сейчас же хотел бы поделиться некоторыми общими раздумьями, которые возникают у меня, да, наверное, и у Вас по поводу состояния и перспектив отношений между нашими странами. Причем, думаю, за точку отсчета надо взять нашу встречу в Женеве, где мы совместно взяли определенные обязательства.

Наши с Вами оценки ее, полагаю, совпадают: она была нужной, полезной, внесла определенный стабилизирующий элемент в отношения между СССР и США, в общую обстановку в мире. Естественно, что она вызвала и немалые надежды на будущее.

С момента женевской встречи прошло уже более четырех месяцев. У нас возникает вопрос: почему же все-таки дела складываются не так, как, казалось бы, это должно было быть? Где же реальный поворот к лучшему? Мы, в советском руководстве, расценили женевскую встречу как необходимость переводить принципиальные понимания, достигнутые там, в конкретные действия, имея в виду дать импульс нашим отношениям, наращивать в них позитивную динамику. Именно так мы и действовали после Женевы.

Исходя из этого, мы выдвинули широкую конкретную программу мер по ограничению и сокращению вооружений, разоружению. В плане новых подходов к поиску взаимоприемлемых решений действовали советские делегации в Женеве, Вене, Стокгольме.

Как же действовали США? К сожалению, приходится констатировать, что сближения позиций, которое открывало бы реальную перспективу на достижение договоренностей, пока не произошло. Не буду входить в детали, давать здесь оценку американских позиций. Но один момент хотел бы отметить. Складывается впечатление, что наши инициативы очень часто пытаются представить как пропаганду, как стремление выиграть в глазах общественного мнения, как желание поставить другую сторону в неудобное положение.

Его Превосходительству  
Рональду У.Рейгану,  
Президенту Соединенных  
Штатов Америки  
Белый дом, Вашингтон

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Никаких подобных расчетов у нас не было и нет. Да и наши инициативы легко проверить на деле. Наша цель - договариваться, решать вопросы, которые касаются СССР, США и по существу всех других стран.

Я специально остановился на этом, чтобы правильно, непредвзято, по-деловому относиться к нашим предложениям. Уверен, что в таком случае договариваться будет легче.

А что происходило в это время вне переговоров? Разумеется, у каждого из нас свой взгляд на политику другой стороны. Но опять-таки, разве Советский Союз в международном плане, в двусторонних отношениях делал что-то, способствующее нагнетанию напряженности или направленное в ущерб законным интересам США? Могу однозначно сказать: нет, такого не было.

С другой стороны мы слышим все более яростные филиппики в адрес СССР, а также видим немало действий, прямо направленных против наших интересов, да и, скажу откровенно, против того, чтобы наши отношения становились более стабильными и конструктивными. Это усиливает недоверие к политике США и отнюдь не создает благоприятного фона для встречи на высшем уровне. Говорю об этом без обиняков с тем, чтобы не возникало здесь недоразумений, неправильного понимания, будто только одна сторона должна проявлять сдержанность и позитивный настрой. Наши отношения складываются не в вакууме, и их общая атмосфера - понятие вполне материальное. Чем она спокойнее, тем легче решать вопросы, в которых заинтересованы в равной мере обе стороны.

То, что решать их надо, - сомнений нет. И прежде всего это относится к области безопасности. Наши предложения Вам известны, они охватывают все важнейшие направления. При всем том хочу особо обратить Ваше внимание - мы не ставим вопрос так: все или ничего. Мы за то, чтобы двигаться шаг за шагом, и определенные возможности на этот счет обозначались нами, в частности, на переговорах по ядерным и космическим вооружениям.

Серьезно и взвешенно подошли мы к вопросу о прекращении ядерных испытаний. Не хотелось бы терять надежды, что мы сможем практически решить этот вопрос так, как этого от нас ждут в мире. Вряд ли стоит говорить, сколь важен этот вопрос сам по себе. Его решение несет и большой позитивный политический потенциал. Ведь именно в этом состоит одна из центральных мыслей в обращении стран дельийской "шестерки", которые выступили за создание благоприятной атмосферы в отношениях между СССР и США, в международной обстановке в целом. Мы учитывали и это, положительно реагируя на их призыв к нашим странам не проводить ядерных испытаний до следующей советско-американской встречи на высшем уровне.

Желанием обеспечить взаимодействие в деле прекращения ядерных испытаний, подать добрый пример всем ядерным державам продиктовано мое недавнее предложение встретиться с Вами специально по этому вопросу


в одной из европейских столиц. Посмотрите еще раз на это предложение, господин Президент, в широком политическом плане. Повторяю, речь идет о специальной, целевой встрече. Конечно, она никак не заменяла бы той новой большой встречи, о которой мы условились в Женеве.

О ней я очень серьезно размышляю, прежде всего с той точки зрения, чтобы она была действительно значимой, существенной, чтобы она позволила нам продвинуться в реализации достигнутых в Женеве фундаментальных пониманий. Некоторые вопросы из области безопасности, над которыми стоило бы поработать при подготовке к встрече, я, как Вы знаете, называл. Подтверждаю, мы готовы самым серьезным образом искать здесь решения, которые были бы взаимоприемлемыми и не наносили ущерба безопасности ни одной из сторон. При взаимном желании можно было бы определиться насчет и других возможностей для договоренностей в контексте предстоящей встречи как в области космических и ядерных вооружений, так и по вопросам, обсуждаемым на других форумах. Разумеется, у нас есть что обсудить и в региональных делах.

Полагаю, что Вы тоже работаете над всеми этими вопросами и в последующей переписке мы сможем более конкретно и предметно сопоставить наши взаимные наметки в целях сближения позиций. Очевидно, такой совместной работе, в том числе и по подготовке нашей с Вами встречи, будут способствовать обмены мнениями на других уровнях и прежде всего предстоящие контакты наших министров иностранных дел.

Буду с интересом ожидать Ваших соображений.

С уважением



М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

2 апреля 1986 года

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

**SIGNED**

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding our suggested reply to Gorbachev's letter of April 2.

The Department of State concurs in the text.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

**Nat Sec Advisor  
has seen**

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Suggested reply to Gorbachev
- Tab B Gorbachev letter of April 2

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/99

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

38

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

86 APR 7 A 9: 09

SYSTEM II  
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90267

**URGENT**

**ACTION OFFICER:** MATLOCK **DUE:** IMMEDIATELY

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____                    | to _____  |

**CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*** **PHONE\*** to action officer at ext. 5112

- | FYI                                    | FYI                                 | FYI   |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt     | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine     | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley     | <input type="checkbox"/> Sigur                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb          | <input type="checkbox"/> Major      | <input type="checkbox"/> Small                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covey         | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel     | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky     | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock    | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> May        | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian     | <input type="checkbox"/> Menges     | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky    | <input type="checkbox"/> Miller     | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley        | <input type="checkbox"/> North      | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass      | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt      | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes        | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hughes        | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond    | <input type="checkbox"/> Wigg                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer       | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger      | <input type="checkbox"/> Wright                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux          | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl   | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski    | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable      | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |

- INFORMATION**
- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> McDaniel  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson           | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rodman    | <input type="checkbox"/> Lehman                       | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fortier (advance) |   |

**COMMENTS**

*Return to Secretariat*