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Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security
Council: Head of State File: Records
Folder: U.S.S.R: General Secretary Gorbachev
(8690616-8690659)
Box: 40

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:

Archivist: dlb

Head of State File

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8690616-8690659 Date: 5/24/99

Box 40

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8690616			
1. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Soviet Response to President's Message on Daniloff, 2 p.	9/6/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 1 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 445</i>	9/6/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 1 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 446</i>	9/4/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 1 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 447</i>	9/6/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Memo	John Poindexter to Reagan, re: Letter to Secretary General (sic) Gorbachev re Nicholas Daniloff, 1 .	9/4/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Letter	Copy of Item #3, 1 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 449</i>	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
7. Draft Message	Reagan to Gorbachev, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8690659			
8. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Translation), 6 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 451</i>	9/15/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
9. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 4 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 452</i>	9/15/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
10. Letter	Copy of Item #8, 6 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 453</i>	9/15/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
11. Distribution Sheet	CY of Gorbachev 15 Sept Ltr, (partial), 1 p. <i>P 7/25/00 F99 051 # 454</i>	9/22/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
12. Dist. Sheet	CY of Gorbachev 15 Sept Ltr, (partial), 1 p. <i>P " " " # 455</i>	9/22/86	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8690616-8690659 **Date:** 5/24/99
Box 40 (Page 2 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#8690659, cont			
13. Letter	Copy of Item #8, 6 p.	9/15/86	P1/F1/P3/F3
14. Report	Gorbachev Letter to President Dated Sept. 15, 1986: Excerpts and Summary of Main Points, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SYSTEM II PROFILE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ID 8690616

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 SEP 86 14

TO POINDEXTER

FROM PLATT N

WSP 5/26/86

DOCDATE 04 SEP 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

INTELLIGENCE

DANILOFF, NICHOLAS

HS

GORBACHEV MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES MSG TO GORBACHEV RE DANILOFF CASE

gorbachev reply

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER

DUE: 05 SEP 86 STATUS S

FILES *SII*

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

HANLEY

RODMAN

KEEL

PEARSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8627103

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Poindexter</i>	X 9/04	<i>Pres for signature</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	P 9/04	<i>Pres for signature</i>		
	- 9/04	<i>Pres sp / no original ltr sent</i>		
<i>STATE</i>	C 9/04	<i>for delivery by cable</i>		
	C 9/08	<i>recd Gorbachev response / NFR</i>		
DISPATCH <i>ed Cox</i>			W/ATTCH FILE	(C)

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

85 SEP 7 P 7: 55

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMMESSAGE NO. 123 CLASSIFICATION Secret PAGES 1FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 6313
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION President Reagan's Letter To
Mikhail Gorbachev.

TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION

D Maj Simian Reagan
only

REMARKS

Make no copies

*Maj Simian
called at
8:00pm
confirming that he received
the message*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/95

5.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

6.

Уважаемый господин президент,

Ваше письмо от 5 сентября побудило меня запросить информацию по вопросу, поднятому Вами. Как мне доложили компетентные органы, Данилофф, московский корреспондент журнала "Ю.С.Ньюс энд Уорлд Рипорт", давно занимался недозволенной деятельностью, наносящей ущерб государственным интересам СССР. Сейчас ведется расследование, по результатам которого мы будем окончательно судить обо всем этом деле.

Думается, что нам с вами не следует допускать, чтобы такого рода вопросы использовались во вред советско-американским отношениям, налаживание и развитие которых имеет исключительно важное значение.

С уважением

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

6 сентября 1986 года

Его Превосходительству
Рональду РЕЙГАНУ,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки,
Вашингтон, округ Колумбия

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F79-051-445

BY amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 4, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am sure that you have been monitoring, as I have, developments relating to the detention by Soviet authorities of the U.S. News and World Report Moscow correspondent, Nicholas Danilooff. I would like you to have in mind two points as you consider how to handle this case.

First, I can give you my personal assurance that Mr. Danilooff has no connection whatever with the U.S. Government. If you have been informed otherwise, you have been misinformed.

Second, there are no grounds for Mr. Danilooff's detention, nor for any attempt to link him to any other case. If he is not freed promptly, it can only have the most serious and far-reaching consequences for the relationship between our two countries. That would be an extremely unfortunate outcome, and I therefore thought it important to emphasize personally the gravity with which this situation is viewed by the United States.

Therefore, I hope sincerely you will take the necessary actions to allow us to put this matter behind us in the nearest future.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

**Memo for the Record: no original letter sent

NLS F99-051 # 446

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/0

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of September 5 prompted me to ask for information regarding the question you raised. As was reported to me by the competent authorities, Daniloff, the Moscow correspondent of the U.S. News and World Report magazine had for a long time been engaged in impermissible activities damaging to the state interests of the USSR. Now an investigation is being conducted by the results of which we shall be able to make a conclusive judgement about this entire case.

I think that we both should not permit the use of questions of such kind to the detriment of the Soviet-American relations whose improvement and development are extremely important.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

September 6, 1986

The Honorable
Ronald REAGAN
President of the United States of America
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-0514 447

BY and, NARA, DATE 10/16/08

National Security Council
The White House

86 SEP 5 12: 35

System # II
Package # 90616
DOCLOG RS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Rodman/Cockell	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Al Keel	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>RSW</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>2</u>	<u>RAH</u>	<u>docum</u> <u>@ mil/ide at hand</u> <u>@ RSM/OLClew</u> <u>By 6 only</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other AGK

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

LDX'ed to the President last night. He signed copy & sent to State for transmission to Emb. Moscow.

SDG

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Bob

10

86 SEP 4 10:45

C

By
L...

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 116 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3
FROM PAUL THOMPSON 595-6534 SIT 200A
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (AGENCY) STATE DELIVER TO: EXEC. SEC DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION

Bob, Pres sgd the attached ltr to Gorbachev
re Daniloff. West Coast DACOMd it, I LDXd
to Len Pascoe for immediate to Moscow for
DCM to deliver upon opening of business
Friday (at PBT's instruction).

Elaine
2050
9/4

REMARKS TO: LYNN PASCOE BEST COPY AVAILABLE

President signed attached letter to Gorbachev. Per Paul Thompson
(Admiral Poindexter's Military Assistant), need to send immediate
to Moscow for DCM to deliver upon opening of business Friday.

Elaine Mitalar
9/4 2045

URGENT

11.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

RCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 3

IMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 05

DTG 050015Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # _____

RELEASER P. W. Dunne

ROUTINE

RECORD # _____

CDR USN

FROM/LOCATION

MILITARY AIDE (DUNNE) / RANCH

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

TO R: 050019Z

THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM / WASHINGTON, D.C.

RODNEY MCDANIEL / SANTA BARBARA, CA

PEARSON

FORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

86 SEP 4 P 8:14

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/99

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

2610. 0

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

13.

A

14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am sure that you have been monitoring, as I have, developments relating to the detention by Soviet authorities of the U.S. News and World Report Moscow correspondent, Nicholas Daniloff. I would like you to have in mind two points as you consider how to handle this case.

First, I can give you my personal assurance that Mr. Daniloff has no connection whatever with the U.S. Government. If you have been informed otherwise, you have been misinformed.

Second, there are no grounds for Mr. Daniloff's detention, nor for any attempt to link him to any other case. If he is not freed promptly, it can only have the most serious and far-reaching consequences for the relationship between our two countries. That would be an extremely unfortunate outcome, and I therefore thought it important to emphasize personally the gravity with which this situation is viewed by the United States.

Therefore, I hope sincerely you will take the necessary actions to allow us to put this matter behind us in the nearest future.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E99-051 * 449

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 4, 1986

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
re Nicholas Daniloff


Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev re the detention of Nicholas Daniloff of U.S. News and World Report.

Paul Harely concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo for President
Tab A Ltr to Gorbachev
Tab II State Draft

SECRET

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/95

Sit vni: dacom to
mil aide to the
President at the ranch,
to be delivered immediately
to the President for signature.
Mil Aide should notify us upon
signature.
copy to Rod McDaniel

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TIME STAMP

RECEIVED

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM II

90616

86 SEP 4

P 2:20

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER:

MATLOCK

DUE: IMMEDIATELY

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

☒ Prepare Memo For Poindexter

Fortier / Keel

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

☐ Prepare Memo

to

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

- ☐ Brooks
- ☐ Burghardt
- ☐ Burns
- ☐ Cannistraro
- ☐ Childress
- ☐ Cobb
- ☐ Danzansky
- ☐ deGraffenreid
- ☐ Dobriansky
- ☐ Donley
- ☐ Douglass
- ☐ Farrar
- ☐ Grimes
- ☒ Hanley
- ☐ Kelly
- ☐ Kissell
- ☐ Kraemer

FYI

- ☐ Laux
- ☐ Lavin
- ☐ Lenczowski
- ☐ Levine
- ☐ Linhard
- ☐ Mahley
- ☐ Major
- ☐ Mandel
- ☐ Matlock
- ☐ May
- ☐ Mingle
- ☐ North
- ☐ Perry
- ☐ Platt
- ☐ Pugliaresi
- ☐ Raymond
- ☐ Reger

FYI

- ☐ Ringdahl
- ☐ Ross
- ☐ Sable
- ☐ Sachs
- ☐ Saunders
- ☐ Sestanovich
- ☐ Small
- ☐ Sommer
- ☐ Soos
- ☐ Stark
- ☐ Steiner
- ☐ St Martin
- ☐ Tahir-Kheli
- ☐ Teicher
- ☐ Thompson
- ☐ Tillman
- ☐ _____

INFORMATION

☐ McDaniel

☒ Rodman

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☒ Pearson

☐ Cockell

☐ Fortier (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐ _____

☒ Keel (advance)

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

dlb

5/24/95

Return to Secretariat



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II


90616

September 4, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Message to Gorbachev

Attached is a draft message from the President to CPSU Secretary General Gorbachev on the Daniloff case, as discussed earlier today by telephone between Secretary Shultz and the President.


Nicholas Platt
Executive SecretaryDECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlh NARA, Date 5/4/91~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

86701/10 19.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8690659

RECEIVED 20 SEP 86 15

TO PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S DOCDATE 15 SEP 86

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
*WJH
5/26/99*

KEYWORDS: USSR ARMS CONTROL SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD
SUMMIT HS

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV REPLY TO PRES 25 JUL LTR DELIVERED BY SHEVARDNADZE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		LINHARD
		MCDANIEL
		PEARSON
		RODMAN
		COCKELL

COMMENTS LOGGED PER RBM INSTRUCTIONS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (J / F)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 9/22 McDonald sgl memo

DISPATCH

al D Stuart

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

B

DISTRIBUTION RECORD

(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S))Log Number 90055 a/c 27
Date 23 SEPT 86

Subject: CY OF GORBACHEV LTR OF 15 SEPT

WSP
5/26/86DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET☒ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Amb. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Linhard	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Donley	_____ Mr. Lucas	_____ Mr. Rosen	_____ Ms. Tillman
_____ _____	_____ Mr. Dornan	_____ Mr. Mahley	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. Pearson	_____ Col. Douglass	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Sable	_____ Mr. Wigg
_____ Mr. Burghardt	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Mr. Sestanovich	_____ Mr. Wood
_____ Mr. Cannistraro	_____ Mr. Grimes	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Mr. Wright
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Ms. Small	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Col. Cobb	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ Sit. Room
_____ Mr. Covey	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Stark	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Mr. Cox	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Steiner	_____ _____
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Ringdahl	_____ Ms. Tahir-Kheli	_____ _____

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

CYS

Date

Time

Received/Signed For By:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Exec sec/Room 7241THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The PentagonDIRECTOR, ACDA
Room 5933/Dept. of StateCHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 StateCHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 StateDIRECTOR, CIA
Langley, Va/or PickupCHAIRMAN, JCS
The PentagonDIRECTOR, OMB
Room 252 OEOBU.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
Room 6333, State Dept.THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
GA257, Forrestal BldgDIRECTOR, AID
Room 5942, Dept. of StateTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dept. of Justice, Room 5119DIRECTOR, OSTP
Room 360, OEOBDIRECTOR, USIA
400 C Street, S.W.THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
18th & E. Street NWTHE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Independence & 14th SWUNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NWTHE DIRECTOR, FEMA
500 C Street,DIRECTOR, DMSPA
Room 3E813, Pentagon

ORIGINAL

9/23/86

10:55

Joe Mitchell

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

Page 1 of _____ Pages

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90659 a/o 22.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Date 23 SEPT 86

Subject: CY OF GORBACHEV LTR OF 15 SEPT

WSP 5/26/94

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Amb. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Linhard	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Donley	_____ Mr. Lucas	_____ Mr. Rosen	_____ Ms. Tillman
_____	_____ Mr. Dornan	_____ Mr. Mahley	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. Pearson	_____ Col. Douglass	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Sable	_____ Mr. Wigg
_____ Mr. Burghardt	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Mr. Sestanovich	_____ Mr. Wood
_____ Mr. Cannistraro	_____ Mr. Grimes	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Mr. Wright
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Ms. Small	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Col. Cobb	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ Sit. Room
_____ Mr. Covey	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Stark	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Mr. Cox	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Steiner	_____
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Ringdahl	_____ Ms. Tahir-Kheli	_____

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DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State	ORIGINAL	9/23/86	1130	W. B. Staple
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State	_____	_____	_____	_____
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Page 1 of _____ Pages

**National Security Council
The White House**

86 SEP 31 P12: 37

System # 11

Package # 90657

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
Rodney McDaniel			
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	1	ST	R
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 SEP 20 A10: 45

SYSTEM II
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90659

ACTION OFFICER: FOR INFORMATION ONLY DUE:

- | | |
|---|---|
| ☐ Prepare Memo For President | ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew |
| ☐ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Keel | ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan |
| ☐ Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| ☐ Brooks | ☐ Lavin | ☐ Ross |
| ☐ Burghardt | ☐ Lenczowski | ☐ Sable |
| ☐ Burns | ☐ Levine | ☐ Sachs |
| ☐ Cannistraro | ☒ Linhard | ☐ Saunders |
| ☐ Childress | ☐ Mahley | ☐ Sestanovich |
| ☐ Cobb | ☐ Major | ☐ Small |
| ☐ Danzansky | ☐ Mandel | ☐ Sommer |
| ☐ deGraffenreid | ☐ Matlock | ☐ Soos |
| ☐ Dobriansky | ☐ May | ☐ Stark |
| ☐ Donley | ☐ Mingle | ☐ Steiner |
| ☐ Douglass | ☐ Morton | ☐ St Martin |
| ☐ Farrar | ☐ Murdock | ☐ Tahir-Kheli |
| ☐ Grimes | ☐ North | ☐ Teicher |
| ☐ Hanley | ☐ Perry | ☐ Thompson |
| ☐ Kelly | ☐ Platt | ☐ Tillman |
| ☐ Kissell | ☐ Pugliaresi | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Kraemer | ☐ Raymond | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Laux | ☐ Reger | ☐ _____ |

- | | | | |
|-------------|---|---|---|
| INFORMATION | ☒ McDaniel | ☒ Pearson | ☒ Secretariat |
| | ☒ Rodman | ☒ Cockell | ☐ _____ |
| | ☐ Poindexter (advance) | ☐ Keel (advance) | ☐ _____ |

COMMENTS

Unofficial translation

*File with
personnel as
per file*

Dear Mr. President,

I chose to send this letter with E.A. Shevardnadze, who is leaving for the United States to attend the session of the United Nations General Assembly. He is also planning, as has been agreed, to visit Washington and to discuss thoroughly the questions of interest to both sides.

After we received your letter of July 25, 1986, which has been given careful consideration, certain developments and incidents of a negative nature have taken place. This is yet another indication of how sensitive relations between the USSR and the United States are and how important it is for the top leaders of the two countries to keep them constantly within view and exert a stabilizing influence whenever the amplitude of their fluctuations becomes threatening.

Among such incidents - of the kind that have happened before and that, presumably, no one can be guaranteed against in the future - is the case of Zakharov and Daniloff. It requires a calm examination, investigation, and a search for mutually acceptable solutions. However, the US side has unduly dramatized that incident. A massive hostile

HIS EXCELLENCY
RONALD W. REAGAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Washington, D.C.

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campaign has been launched against our country, which has been taken up at the higher levels of the United States administration and Congress. It is as if a pretext was deliberately sought to aggravate Soviet-American relations and to increase tension.

A question then arises: what about the atmosphere so needed for the normal course of negotiations and certainly for preparing and holding the summit meeting?

Since the Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union has been doing a great deal to ensure that the atmosphere is favorable and that negotiations make possible practical preparations for our new meeting.

On the major issues of limiting and reducing arms - nuclear, chemical and conventional - we have undertaken intensive efforts in a search for concrete solutions aimed at radically reducing the level of military confrontation in a context of equivalent security.

However, Mr. President, in the spirit of candidness which is coming to characterize our dialogue, I have to tell you that the overall character of US actions in international affairs, the positions on which its representatives insist at negotiations and consultations, and the content of your letter, all give rise to grave and disturbing thoughts. One has to conclude that in effect no start has been made in implementing the agreements we reached in Geneva on improving Soviet-American relations, accelerating the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and renouncing attempts to secure military superiority. Both in letters and publicly we have made known our views as to the causes of such development, and for my part I do not want to repeat here our assessment of the situation.

First of all, a conclusion comes to mind: is the U.S. leadership at all prepared and really willing to seek agreements which would lead to the termination of the arms race and to genuine disarmament? It is a fact, after all, that despite vigorous efforts by the Soviet side we have still not moved an inch closer to an agreement on arms reduction.

Having studied your letter and the proposals contained therein, I began to think where they would lead in terms of seeking solutions.

First. You are proposing that we should agree that the ABM Treaty continue to exist for another 5 to 7 years, while activities to destroy it would go ahead. Thus, instead of making headway, there would be something that complicates even what has been achieved.

We have proposed that any work on anti-missile systems be confined to laboratories. In response, we witness attempts to justify the development of space weapons and their testing at test sites, and declarations, made in advance, of the intention to start in five to seven years deploying large-scale ABM systems and thus to nullify the Treaty. It is, of course, fully understood that we will not agree to that. We see here a bypass route to securing military superiority.

I trust, Mr. President, you recall our discussion of this subject in Geneva. At that time I said that should the United States rush with weapons into space, we would not help it. We would do our utmost to devalue such efforts and make them futile. You may rest assured that we have every means to achieve this and, should the need arise, we shall use those means.

We favor the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime. This is precisely the reason for our position that work should be confined to laboratories and that the Treaty should be strictly observed for a period of up to 15 years. Should this be the case, it would be possible - and this is our proposal - to agree on significant reduction in strategic offensive arms. We are prepared to do this without delay, and it would thereby be demonstrated in practice that neither side seeks military superiority.

Second. As far as medium-range missiles are concerned the Soviet Union has proposed an optimum solution - complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe. We have also agreed to an interim option - and that, without taking into account the modernization of British and French nuclear systems.

Following our well-known steps towards accommodation, the issue of verification would seem no longer to be an obstacle. Yet, the U.S. side has now "discovered" another obstacle, namely, Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia. Nevertheless, I believe that here, as well, a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is certainty that a willingness to resolve the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe does exist.

Third. The attitude of the United States to the moratorium on nuclear testing is a matter of deep disappointment - and not only in the Soviet Union. The United States administration is making every effort to avoid this key problem, to subsume it in talk of other issues.

You are aware of my views in this regard: the attitude of a country to the cessation of nuclear testing is the touchstone of its policy in the field of disarmament and international security - and, indeed, in safeguarding peace in general.

Arguments to the effect that nuclear testing is needed to ensure reliability of nuclear arsenals are untenable. Today there are other methods to ensure this, without nuclear explosions. After all, the United States does not test devices with yields in excess of 150-200 kilotons, although 70 per cent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal - and in our case the percentage is not smaller - consists of weapons with yields exceeding that threshold.

Modern science combined with a political willingness to agree to any adequate verification measures, including on-site inspections, ensure effective verification of the absence of nuclear explosions. So here too there is room for mutually acceptable solutions.

I have addressed specifically three questions which, in my opinion are of greatest importance. They are the ones to which positive solutions are expected from the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. They are a matter of concern to the whole world, they are being discussed everywhere. Naturally, we are in favor of productive discussions of other major issues as well, such as reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, a chemical weapons ban, regional problems, and humanitarian questions. Here too, common approaches and cooperation should be sought. Yet, the three questions mentioned above remain the key ones.

But in almost a year since Geneva there has been no movement on these issues. Upon reflection and after having given thought to your last letter I have come to the conclusion that the negotiations need a major impetus; otherwise they would continue to mark time while creating only the appearance of preparations for our meeting on American soil.

They will lead nowhere unless you and I intervene personally. I am convinced that we shall be able to find solutions, and I am prepared to discuss with you in a substantive way all possible approaches to them and identify such steps as would make it possible - after prompt follow-up by appropriate government agencies - to make my visit to the United States a really productive and fruitful one. This is exactly what the entire world is expecting from a second meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

That is why an idea has come to my mind to suggest to you, Mr. President, that, in the very near future and setting aside all other matters, we have a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London, may be just for one day, to engage in a strictly confidential, private and frank discussion (possibly with only our foreign ministers present). The discussion - which would not be a detailed one, for its purpose and significance would be to demonstrate political will - would result in instructions to our respective agencies to draft agreements on two or three very specific questions, which you and I could sign during my visit to the United States.

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

M. GORBACHEV

September 15, 1986

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я предпочел направить это письмо с Э.А.Шеварднадзе, который выезжает в США для участия в сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Он также имеет в виду, как было условлено, посетить Вашингтон и основательно побеседовать по интересующим обе Стороны вопросам.

После получения Вашего послания от 25 июля 1986 г., которое было внимательно рассмотрено, произошли некоторые события и инциденты негативного плана. Это лишнее свидетельство того, сколь чувствительны отношения между СССР и США и как важно высшему руководству двух стран постоянно держать их в поле зрения, оказывать стабилизирующее воздействие всякий раз, когда амплитуда их колебаний приобретает угрожающий характер.

К подобным случаям - а они бывали ранее, и, видимо, от них никто не застрахован впредь - относится дело Захарова и Данилоффа. Оно требует спокойного разбирательства, расследования и поиска взаимоприемлемых решений. Однако Американская Сторона незаслуженно драматизировала этот инцидент. Против нашей страны была развернута массированная кампания враждебности, которая поднята на уровень руководства администрации и конгресса США. Будто специально искали предлог, чтобы ухудшить советско-американские отношения, усилить напряженность.

Вот и возникает вопрос: а как же быть с атмосферой, столь необходимой для нормального хода переговоров и, конечно, для подготовки и проведения встречи на высшем уровне?

Советский Союз за период после Женевы много делает, чтобы атмосфера эта была благоприятной и чтобы переговоры обеспечили практическую подготовку к нашей с Вами новой встрече.

По основным вопросам ограничения и сокращения вооружений - ядерных, химических, обычных - нами предприняты интенсивные усилия в поисках конкретных развязок с целью кардинального понижения уровня военного противостояния в условиях равнозначной безопасности.

Однако - в духе той откровенности, которая начала складываться в нашем с Вами диалоге, господин Президент, - должен Вам сказать, что общий характер действий США в международных делах, позиции, которые их представители отстаивают на переговорах и консультациях, то, что содержится в Вашем послании, - наводят на очень серьезные, тревожные мысли.

Его Превосходительству
Рональду У.Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

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Приходится констатировать, что по существу так и не началась реализация договоренностей, достигнутых нами в Женеве, об улучшении советско-американских отношений, ускорении переговоров по ядерным и космическим вооружениям, об отказе от стремления к военному превосходству. Мнения о причинах такого хода дел излагались нами в переписке и публично, и я, со своей стороны, не хочу здесь повторять нашу оценку ситуации.

Напрашивается, прежде всего, вывод: а готово ли вообще и хочет ли на деле американское руководство искать соглашений, которые вели бы к прекращению гонки вооружений, к реальному разоружению. Ведь это факт, что до сих пор мы ни на дюйм не приблизились, несмотря на энергичные усилия Советской Стороны, к договоренности о сокращении вооружений.

Изучив Ваше письмо, изложенные в нем предложения, я задумался, куда же они ведут с точки зрения поиска развязок.

Первое. Вы предлагаете нам согласиться с тем, чтобы Договор по ПРО просуществовал еще 5-7 лет. Тем временем осуществлялись бы работы, которые бы его разрушали. Получается не продвижение вперед, а осложнение даже того, что было раньше.

Мы предложили, чтобы любые работы в области противоракетных систем ограничивались пределами лабораторий. А нам в ответ оправдывают разработку космического оружия и его испытания на полигонах, заранее провозглашают намерение через 5-7 лет начать развертывание широкомасштабных систем ПРО и тем самым перечеркнуть Договор. При этом прекрасно понимают, что мы на это не согласимся. Мы видим здесь обходный канал к получению военного превосходства.

Господин Президент, полагаю, помнит наш разговор в Женеве на эту тему. Я тогда сказал, что если США будут рваться с оружием в космос, то мы помогать им не будем. Сделаем все, чтобы обесценить такие усилия, сорвать их. Могу заверить – у нас для этого есть все возможности, которыми, если придется, мы воспользуемся.

Мы за укрепление режима Договора по ПРО. Именно это соображение лежит в основе нашей позиции о невыходе работ за стены лабораторий и неукоснительном соблюдении Договора по ПРО в течение до 15 лет. В таком случае можно было бы – и мы это предлагаем – договориться о значительных сокращениях стратегических наступательных вооружений. Мы готовы без задержек пойти на это и тем самым на практике было бы показано, что ни одна из Сторон не стремится к военному превосходству.

Второе. По ракетам средней дальности Советский Союз предложил оптимальное решение – полную ликвидацию американских и советских ракет в Европе. Мы согласились и на промежуточную договоренность, причем без учета модернизации ядерных средств Англии и Франции.

Вопрос о контроле – после наших известных шагов навстречу – также, казалось бы, перестал быть препятствием. Однако Американская Сторона теперь "обнаружила" другое препятствие – советские ракеты средней дальности в Азии. Тем не менее считаю, что и здесь можно найти взаимоприемлемую формулу, и готов ее предложить, если будет уверенность, что действительно есть желание решить проблему ракет средней дальности в Европе.

Третье. Глубокое разочарование, и не только в Советском Союзе, вызывает отношение Соединенных Штатов к мораторию на ядерные испытания. Администрация США всячески старается обойти эту ключевую проблему, перевести ее в плоскость рассуждений о других вопросах.

Вы знаете мою точку зрения на этот счет: отношение той или иной страны к прекращению ядерных испытаний – это пробный камень политики в области разоружения и международной безопасности, да и вообще в деле сохранения мира.

Доводы, будто ядерные испытания нужны для обеспечения надежности ядерного арсенала – не основательны. Для этого сейчас существуют другие методы, без ядерных взрывов. Ведь не проводят же США испытания мощностью свыше 150–200 килотонн, хотя 70 процентов американского ядерного арсенала, да и у нас не меньше, составляют заряды, превышающие по мощности этот порог.

Современная наука в сочетании с политической готовностью пойти на любые адекватные меры проверки, вплоть до инспекции на местах, обеспечивает эффективный контроль за отсутствием ядерных взрывов. Так что и здесь есть поле для взаимоприемлемых решений.

Я особо остановился на трех вопросах, которые представляются мне главными. Именно по ним ждут от СССР и США положительных решений. Они беспокоят весь мир, их обсуждают повсюду. Разумеется, мы за результативное обсуждение и других крупных вопросов – таких, как сокращение вооруженных сил и обычных вооружений, запрещение химического оружия, региональные проблемы, гуманитарные вопросы. Надо и здесь искать общие подходы, добиваться взаимодействия. И все же ключевыми остаются те три вопроса, о которых сказано выше.


Но по ним никакого движения за почти год после Женевы нет. Размышляя над этим и обдумывая Ваше последнее письмо, я пришел к убеждению, что переговоры нуждаются в очень серьезном импульсе, иначе они будут и впредь топтаться на месте, создавая лишь видимость подготовки к нашей с Вами встрече на земле Америки.

Они ни к чему не приведут, если мы с вами не вмешаемся лично. Убежден, что мы сможем найти развязки, готов обстоятельно обсудить с Вами все возможные подходы к ним, наметить такие шаги, которые позволили бы – после быстрой проработки на уровне соответствующих ведомств – сделать мой визит в США действительно продуктивным, результативным. Ведь именно этого ждут во всем мире от второй встречи руководителей США и СССР.

Вот почему мне пришла мысль предложить Вам, господин Президент, в самое ближайшее время, отложив все дела, встретиться один на один, накоротке – например, в Исландии или в Лондоне, – может быть, всего на один день, для совершенно конфиденциального, закрытого, откровенного разговора /возможно, только в присутствии наших министров иностранных дел/. Результатом этого разговора – мы не стали бы углубляться в детали, его смысл и значение в демонстрации политической воли – были бы указания нашим соответствующим ведомствам подготовить по совершенно конкретным двум-трем вопросам проекты соглашений, которые мы бы могли с Вами подписать во время моего визита в Соединенные Штаты.

Надеюсь на Ваш скорый ответ.

С уважением



М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

15 сентября 1986 года

National Security Council
The White House

86 SEP 22 AIO: 12

System # II
Package # 90659
DOCLOG BT AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
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Rodman/Cockell	_____	_____	_____
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Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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
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September 23, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE KENNETH L. ADELMAN
Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: General Secretary Gorbachev's Letter
of September 15 (U)

Admiral Poindexter has asked that you be provided a copy of
General Secretary Gorbachev's letter of September 15. (S)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment

As stated

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY 15, NARA, Date 11/10/94

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President,

I chose to send this letter with E.A. Shevardnadze, who is leaving for the United States to attend the session of the United Nations General Assembly. He is also planning, as has been agreed, to visit Washington and to discuss thoroughly the questions of interest to both sides.

After we received your letter of July 25, 1986, which has been given careful consideration, certain developments and incidents of a negative nature have taken place. This is yet another indication of how sensitive relations between the USSR and the United States are and how important it is for the top leaders of the two countries to keep them constantly within view and exert a stabilizing influence whenever the amplitude of their fluctuations becomes threatening.

Among such incidents - of the kind that have happened before and that, presumably, no one can be guaranteed against in the future is the case of Zakharov and Danilooff. It requires a calm examination, investigation, and a search for mutually acceptable solutions. However, the US side has unduly dramatized that incident. A massive hostile

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RONALD W. REAGAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
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campaign has been launched against our country, which has been taken up at the higher levels of the United States administration and Congress. It is as if a pretext was deliberately sought to aggravate Soviet-American relations and to increase tension.

A question then arises: what about the atmosphere so needed for the normal course of negotiations and certainly for preparing and holding the summit meeting?

Since the Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union has been doing a great deal to ensure that the atmosphere is favorable and that negotiations make possible practical preparations for our new meeting.

On the major issues of limiting and reducing arms - nuclear, chemical and conventional - we have undertaken intensive efforts in a search for concrete solutions aimed at radically reducing the level of military confrontation in a context of equivalent security.

However, Mr. President, in the spirit of candidness which is coming to characterize our dialogue, I have to tell you that the overall character of US actions in international affairs, the position on which its representatives insist at negotiations and consultations and the content of your letter, all give rise to grave and disturbing thoughts. One has to conclude that in effect no start has been made in implementing the agreements we reached in Geneva on improving Soviet-American relations, accelerating the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and renouncing attempts to secure military superiority. Both in letters and publicly we have made known our views as to the causes of such development, and for my part I do not want to repeat here our assessment of the situation.

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First of all, a conclusion comes to mind: is the U.S. leadership at all prepared and really willing to seek agreements which would lead to the termination of the arms race and to genuine disarmament? It is a fact, after all, that despite vigorous efforts by the Soviet side we have still not moved an inch closer to an agreement on arms reduction.

Having studied your letter and the proposals contained therein, I began to think where they would lead in terms of seeking solutions.

First. You are proposing that we should agree that the ABM Treaty continue to exist for another 5 to 7 years, while activities to destroy it would go ahead. Thus, instead of making headway, there would be something that complicates even what has been achieved.

We have proposed that any work on anti-missile systems be confined to laboratories. In response, we witness attempts to justify the development of space weapons and their testing at test sites, and declarations, made in advance, of the intention to start in five to seven years deploying large-scale ABM systems and thus to nullify the Treaty. It is, of course, fully understood that we will not agree to that. We see here a bypass route to securing military superiority.

I trust, Mr. President, you recall our discussion of this subject in Geneva. At that time I said that should the United States rush with weapons into space, we would not help it. We would do our utmost to devalue such efforts and make them futile. You may rest assured that we have every means to achieve this and, should the need arise, we shall use those means.

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We favor the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime. This is precisely the reason for our position that work should be confined to laboratories and that the Treaty should be strictly observed for a period of up to 15 years. Should this be the case, it would be possible - and this is our proposal - to agree on significant reduction in strategic offensive arms. We are prepared to do this without delay and it would thereby be demonstrated in practice that neither side seeks military superiority.

Second. As far as medium-range missiles are concerned the Soviet Union has proposed an optimum solution - complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe. We have also agreed to an interim option - and that, without taking into account the modernization of British and French nuclear systems.

Following our well-known steps towards accommodation, the issue of verification would seem no longer to be an obstacle. Yet, the U.S. side has now "discovered" another obstacle, namely, Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia. Nevertheless, I believe that here, as well, a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is certainty that a willingness to resolve the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe does exist.

Third. The attitude of the United States to the moratorium on nuclear testing is a matter of deep disappointment - and not only in the Soviet Union. The United States administration is making every effort to avoid this key problem, to subsume it in talk of other issues.

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Arguments to the effect that nuclear testing is needed to ensure reliability of nuclear arsenals are untenable. Today there are other methods to ensure this, without nuclear explosions. After all, the United States does not test devices with yields in excess of 150-200 kilotons, although 70 per cent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal - and in our case the percentage is not smaller - consists of weapons with yields exceeding that threshold.

Modern science combined with a political willingness to agree to any adequate verification measures, including on-site inspections, ensure effective verification of the absence of nuclear explosions. So here too there is room for mutually acceptable solutions.

I have addressed specifically three questions which, in my opinion, are of greatest importance. They are the ones to which positive solutions are expected from the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. They are a matter of concern to the whole world, they are being discussed everywhere. Naturally, we are in favor of productive discussions of other major issues as well, such as reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, a chemical weapons ban, regional problems, and humanitarian questions. Here too, common approaches and cooperation should be sought. Yet, the three questions mentioned above remain the key ones.

42.
But in almost a year since Geneva there has been no movement on these issues. Upon reflection and after having given thought to your last letter I have come to the conclusion that the negotiations need a major impetus; otherwise they would continue to mark time while creating only the appearance of preparations for our meeting on American soil.

They will lead nowhere unless you and I intervene personally. I am convinced that we shall be able to find solutions, and I am prepared to discuss with you in a substantive way all possible approaches to them and identify such steps as would make it possible - after prompt follow-up by appropriate government agencies - to make my visit to the United States a really productive and fruitful one. This is exactly what the entire world is expecting from a second meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

M.GORBACHEV

September 15, 1986

43

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September 22, 1986


MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY (10), NARA, Date 11/10/94

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Modern science combined with a political willingness to agree to any adequate verification measures, including on-site inspections, ensure effective verification of the absence of nuclear explosions. So here too there is room for mutually acceptable solutions.

I have addressed specifically three questions which, in my opinion are of greatest importance. They are the ones to which positive solutions are expected from the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. They are a matter of concern to the whole world, they are being discussed everywhere. Naturally, we are in favor of productive discussions of other major issues as well, such as reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, a chemical weapons ban, regional problems, and humanitarian questions. Here too, common approaches and cooperation should be sought. Yet, the three questions mentioned above remain the key ones.

But in almost a year since Geneva there has been no movement of these issues. Upon reflection and after having given thought to your last letter I have come to the conclusion that the negotiations need a major impetus; otherwise they would continue to mark time while creating only the appearance of preparations for our meeting on American soil.

They will lead nowhere unless you and I intervene personally. I am convinced that we shall be able to find solutions, and I am prepared to discuss with you in a substantive way all possible approaches to them and identify such steps as would make it possible - after prompt follow-up by appropriate government agencies - to make my visit to the United States a really productive and fruitful one. This is exactly what the entire world is expecting from a second meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

M. GORBACHEV

September 15, 1986

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