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**Folder:** U.S.S.R: General Secretary Gorbachev  
(8790364) (3 of 3)  
**Box:** 41

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:  
Head of State File

**Archivist:** dlb

**File Folder:** U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8790364 <sup>(3)</sup>~~(2 of 2)~~ **Date:** 5/25/99  
Box 41

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Gorbachev, 2 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #482</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
<del>2. Letter</del>	<del>Copy of Item #1, 2 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #483</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
3. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
<del>4. Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Gorbachev, (not used), 8 p. R 8/20/01 F99-051 #485</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
<del>5. Draft Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Gorbachev, 10 p. #486</del>	<del>4/10/87</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
<del>6. Draft Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Gorbachev, 10 p. #487</del>	<del>4/9/87</del>	<del>P1/F1/P3/F3</del>
7. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, (With annotations), 10 p.	4/9/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
8. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, with annotations, 8 p. R 8/20/01 F99-051 #489	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Letter in smooth incorporating  
all ~~a~~ changes incorporated since  
distribution this morning.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90364

April 9, 1987  
1800

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since it has been some time since you and I last communicated directly, I would like to give you my thoughts on how we might bring to fulfillment what I see as a promising moment in our relations. Secretary of State Shultz will, of course, be ready to discuss these matters in detail during his visit to Moscow.

First let me say that, in reviewing the relationship between our two countries, I am pleased that there has been some progress on the agenda that you and I have set out in our meetings. Senior officials of our governments have begun a new cycle of discussions on regional affairs; the conversations between Under Secretary Armacost and senior Soviet officials last month in Moscow demonstrate that this aspect of our dialogue is becoming more candid and wide-ranging. Our two governments seem close to agreement on establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. An agreement on space cooperation is ready for signature, and work is proceeding to expand other bilateral contacts between our governments and peoples. I am watching with great interest a number of developments in your country which touch on the concerns I have discussed with you regarding human rights and humanitarian issues. There has been some modest progress in expanding non-strategic trade between our two countries.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F99-051 # 487

BY

CJS

NARA, DATE

8/20/01

~~SECRET~~

Welcome as these steps are, they are only a beginning. Concrete progress on the large issues must remain our overriding objective.

I must reiterate my great concern about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which imposes a great burden on our relations. Your statements about your determination to withdraw your forces from Afghanistan are welcome. I note that some movement has taken place at the Geneva proximity talks and that the USSR may be studying seriously the possibility of a process of national reconciliation leading to self-determination. However, I want you to understand clearly my view, shared fully by the Government of Pakistan, the Resistance Alliance, and most other governments, that a lengthy timetable for the withdrawal of your troops, far longer than dictated by logistic requirements, and an approach to national reconciliation merely designed to preserve a communist-dominated regime in Kabul will only prolong the war. They will not lead to a lasting political settlement.

Encouraging statements by Soviet leaders need to be backed up by actual Soviet steps to withdraw Soviet forces. Unfortunately, such steps have not been taken. On the contrary, the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime have stepped up bombing raids against villages in Pakistan that have resulted in numerous casualties. Such actions only magnify the suffering, prolong the war, increase the danger of a larger confrontation, and call into question the sincerity of Soviet statements that the USSR wishes

to withdraw its forces. Such actions will not cause those who oppose Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to reduce or to relent in their opposition.

The United States supports a genuine political settlement that is acceptable to the people of Afghanistan. We seek no strategic advantage in Afghanistan. We have made clear in the past, and I repeat, the United States will lend its political support to an agreement, consistent with United Nations resolutions, which brings about the speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

But the critical steps that will allow the Afghan people to live in peace must be taken by the USSR. No single act by the USSR would do more to convince the world that you intend to apply genuinely new thinking to Soviet foreign policy, or gain you more international respect, than to withdraw quickly from Afghanistan.

With respect to human rights and humanitarian concerns, we have seen -- and acknowledged -- positive steps in many of the areas you and I have discussed. I hope that these steps are only a beginning. You have resolved one-half of all our divided family representation list cases, and two-thirds of our separated spouse cases; is it not possible to resolve the small number of remaining cases? You have now released over 100 political prisoners; is it not possible to release those still in prison for expressing their views? Emigration has begun to rise modestly; we hope for a substantial, sustained increase. There is also a

particular urgency to the limited number of cases of seriously ill persons seeking to travel for medical treatment abroad. Finally, I hope you find some means to resolve several cases of special interest to me, including pianist Vladimir Feltsman, refusenik Ida Nudel, separated spouse Galina Goltzman, dual national Abe Stolar and his family, and long time refusenik and Helsinki monitor Vladimir Slepak. Continuing progress in these areas will help significantly in improving our relations, and will be welcomed by the entire world.

In the area of our bilateral relations, much is developing in promising directions. It is therefore regrettable that I must raise with you the matter of your penetration of our embassy in Moscow which we have lately discovered. Let me get directly to the point. Your government ruthlessly exploits the many advantages it enjoys as a very closed society pursuing intelligence objectives against a very open one; it does so with cavalier disregard for our diplomatic rights and the damage this does to our relationship. If this lack of prudence on the part of the USSR continues, the USSR should expect to suffer the resulting discomfort and political cost equally with the United States.

Regarding arms control, my points of departure are our agreement in Geneva to expand common ground and the advances we made in our meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. Both meetings were stepping stones to the goals we have mutually set. From your own recent statements, and in view of the encouraging work now underway at

the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, I believe we are in accord on the urgency of moving forward from Reykjavik. Our task is to find ways to bridge remaining differences.

Our two sides have filled out many of the details of potential agreements on deep and stabilizing reductions in nuclear forces. Other important aspects still await resolution. Solving these questions is essential if reductions agreements are to realize the goal of greater military stability.

The United States places the highest priority on achieving substantial reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Thus, I am heartened that we are getting closer to agreement on deep and equitable reductions in longer-range INF missiles, as we work toward their total elimination. To this end, our negotiators have begun addressing the specific details of treaty language to implement the formula that we agreed on in Reykjavik. And, while we have yet to have the benefit of detailed Soviet proposals, we are in a position with mutual effort to begin to make progress on the elements essential to ensure effective verification.

As we have made clear since 1981, an INF agreement must have appropriate concurrent constraints on shorter-range INF systems. Your agreement to this principle at our meeting in Reykjavik was a significant advance, although work remains to be done on the specific nature of those constraints. In particular, such constraints must be based on equality of rights between us. I

hope that we can work together to resolve our differences about the nature of those constraints.

Regarding strategic offensive forces, the formula for 50 percent reductions that you and I developed and agreed upon in Geneva and Reykjavik provides us with an historic opportunity to move toward a better, safer world now. Limiting both sides to 6000 warheads on 1600 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers -- with appropriate warhead sublimits, counting rules, and verification measures -- would be a dramatic and effective step toward that goal. We should strive toward a rapid and uncomplicated achievement of such an agreement without imposing unnecessary conditions on its realization.

I recall your expressed concerns regarding the uncertainties you perceive to be associated with our SDI program. In your February 28 speech, you expressed concern that this program might lead to the deployment of weapons in space. In direct response to your concerns that we assure predictability in the strategic regime of the next decade, and, in an effort to move the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms forward, I am prepared to sign a treaty now that would commit the United States and the Soviet Union through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying operational defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. After 1994, we would both be able to deploy strategic defenses unless we agreed otherwise.

It goes without saying that I stand by my previous offers to find appropriate methods to share the benefits of any such defenses in the context of an agreed transition permitting the increasing contribution of defenses and moving us toward the ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles. I would be prepared to add this element to any new Defense and Space agreement, as well as to consider certain other ideas which could give us both more predictability about each other's efforts in the area of strategic defenses.

At the same time, you and I would sign a treaty implementing the agreed-upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, with appropriate warhead sublimits. On the vital issue of ballistic missile warhead sublimits, both our sides have made several proposals that are very close and in some cases identical. The American proposal for a sublimit of 4800 ballistic missile warheads is essentially the same as the Soviet proposal for an 80 percent sublimit. Our proposed sublimit of 3300 ICBM warheads draws upon your 60 percent suggestion. Your proposal to reduce heavy ICBMs by half addresses some of the concerns dealt with by our proposed third sublimit on especially dangerous ICBMs.

In recognition of your concerns that such sublimits would force a rapid restructuring of your forces, I suggest that we agree to extend the period to complete the 50 percent reduction to seven years from the date a treaty takes effect. With this additional

time, it should be possible for both sides to implement such sublimits without undue burden.

My proposal, therefore, is that we instruct our negotiators to focus immediately on drafting treaties to implement the principle of 50 percent reductions in seven years with agreed, appropriate sublimits, and a mutual commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. I have asked Secretary Shultz to explain this approach in greater detail during his impending visit.

I hope you will consider these ideas seriously. My effort is to bridge our differences and remove obstacles on the way toward our agreed goals. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should explore these ideas further when they meet in Moscow next week.

I believe these proposals can lead to rapid progress in the NST negotiations. As we move ahead toward reductions of nuclear forces, I wish to stress the importance of addressing other potential sources of military instability, particularly imbalances regarding conventional forces and chemical weapons. As you know, representatives of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are discussing with representatives of the Warsaw Pact a new mandate for negotiations to achieve a stable balance on conventional forces in Europe at lower levels.

The U.S. and Soviet Union are discussing bilaterally and multilaterally the many issues related to a global ban on chemical weapons.

I remain committed to a practical step-by-step approach in the area of nuclear testing limitations as I described to you in Reykjavik. If we are to lay the proper groundwork for mutual confidence that agreements on nuclear testing will be adhered to, we need to address and rectify provisions in existing agreements that do not provide for such confidence. This is why I believe that agreement on necessary verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty is the logical first step for both sides.

In all these negotiations, it will be vital to develop effective means of verification to ensure confidence in the agreements reached. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed concerns about effective verification in the past. The strongest possible verification regime is in the interests of both our nations.

Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have worked hard to establish the basis for accords that would strengthen peace and security. Much remains to be done to make 1987 the year that will bring these efforts to fruition, and I am prepared to embark on an intensive process to see that this is accomplished.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10

The discussions between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will, I hope, prove to be an important step in this process.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

✓

Letter showing line-in line-out  
changes from draft circulated a.m. 4/9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since it has been some time since you and I last communicated directly, I would like to give you my thoughts on how we might bring to fulfillment what I see as a promising moment in our relations. Secretary of State Shultz will, of course, be ready to discuss these matters in detail during his visit to Moscow.

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DECLASSIFIED / (RELEASED)  
NLS F99-051 #489  
BY CAS NARA, DATE 8/20/01

your determination to withdraw your forces from Afghanistan are welcome. I note that some movement has taken place at the Geneva proximity talks and that the USSR may be studying seriously the possibility of a process of national reconciliation leading to self-determination. However, I want you to understand clearly my view, shared fully by the Government of Pakistan, the Resistance Alliance, and most other governments, that a lengthy timetable for the withdrawal of your troops, far longer than dictated by logistic requirements, and an approach to national reconciliation merely designed to preserve a communist-dominated regime in Kabul will only prolong the war. They will not lead to a lasting political settlement.

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~~Our~~ <sup>WE</sup> ~~two sides~~ have filled out many of the details of potential agreements on deep and stabilizing reductions in nuclear forces. Other important aspects still await resolution. ~~Solving these questions is essential if reductions agreements are to realize the goal of greater military stability.~~ The United States places the highest priority on achieving substantial reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Thus, I am heartened that we are ~~getting~~ closer to agreement on deep ~~and equitable~~ reductions in longer-range INF missiles, as we work toward their ~~total~~ elimination. To this end, our negotiators have begun addressing the specific details of treaty language to implement the formula that we agreed on in Reykjavik. ~~And, while we have yet to have the benefit of detailed Soviet proposals, we are in a position with mutual effort to begin to make progress on the elements essential to ensure effective verification.~~

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*Agreed 7/17/75*  
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*I would also be prepared to consider*  
[It goes without saying that] I stand by my previous offers to find appropriate methods to share the benefits of any such defenses in the context of an agreed transition permitting the increasing contribution of defenses and moving us toward the ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles. ~~I would be prepared to add this element to any new Defense and Space agreement, as well as to consider certain other ideas which could give us both more predictability about each other's efforts in the area of strategic defenses.~~

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*I propose*

[My proposal, ~~therefore~~, is that] we instruct our negotiators to ~~focus immediately on drafting~~ treaties to implement the principle of 50 percent reductions in seven years with agreed, appropriate sublimits, and a mutual commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. ~~I have asked Secretary Shultz to explain this approach in greater detail during his impending visit.~~

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Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have worked hard to establish the basis for accords that would strengthen peace and security. Much remains to be done to make 1987 the year that will bring these efforts to fruition, and I am prepared to embark on an intensive process to see that this is accomplished.

-8-

The discussions between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will, I hope, prove to be an important step in this process.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

WHITE HOUSE  
SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

87 APR 9 P8:34

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 23

IMMEDIATE

SITUATION ROOM FAX # 34

DTG 092348Z APR 8

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX #

RELEASER BPK

ROUTINE

RECORD #

FROM/LOCATION

1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM / Bob Pearson

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MR. FRANK CARLUCCI/LOS ANGELES/TOR: 100019Z APR 87

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Letter to Secretary Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By dlh NARA, Date 5/24/99

Secret

CLASSIFICATION

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green			
Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>decom to FCC</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
	<u>URGENT</u>		

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Baker

Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

4/9

(Date/Time)

Attached are two copies of letter to J. Baker

① final smooth w/ all changes included for President's review.

② annotated version showing line-in line-out. When cleared, will inform State and send cable text.

Bsh

8790364(12)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.