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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/4/2015

File Folder USSR (11/16/82-11/18/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

280

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171015 CABLE	160016Z NOV 82 (PAGE 3)	1	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-1-3			
171016 CABLE	160016Z NOV 82 (FULL TEXT)	1	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-1-3			
171018 CABLE	160048Z NOV 82	1	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-2-2			
171020 CABLE	160130Z NOV 82	1	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-3-1			
171021 CABLE	160156Z NOV 82	1	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-4-0			
171017 CABLE	PP. 1-2 OF DOC BEGUN AS #171015 (160016Z NOV 82)	2	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-1-3			
171019 CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #171018 (160048Z NOV 82)	3	11/16/1982	B1
R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-2-2			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

280

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171022	CABLE	STATE 321817	1	11/17/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-5-9		
171023	CABLE	MOSCOW 13895	1	11/17/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-6-8		
171024	CABLE	MOSCOW 13898	2	11/17/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-7-7		
171025	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ANDROPOV	1	11/22/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-8-6		
171026	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE BUSH- ANDROPOV MEETING	2	11/17/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-9-5		
171027	MEMCON	RE 11/15/82 BUSH-ANDROPOV MEETING	6	ND	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-9-5		
171028	CABLE	STATE 323583	2	11/18/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-17-10-3		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

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File Folder USSR (11/16/82-11/18/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

280

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171029 MEMO	M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE VASHCHENKO'S LETTER TO REAGAN	1	11/18/1982	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-11-2			
171030 MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE VASHCHENKO'S LETTER TO REAGAN	1	11/8/1982	B1
171031 MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE LETTER TO REAGAN FROM VASHCHENKO	1	11/3/1982	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-13-0			
171032 LETTER	TO VASHCHENKO	1	ND	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-13-0			
171033 CABLE	MOSCOW 11993	1	10/4/1982	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-14-9			
171034 CABLE	MOSCOW 14008	2	11/18/1982	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-15-8			
171035 CABLE	MOSCOW 14009	3	11/18/1982	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-17-16-7			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171015

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0019 DTG: 160016Z NOV 82 PSN: 008957

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-23-17-1-3
BY CDP NARA DATE 2/4/0

AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE EXPRESSED YOUR COMMITMENT TO VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND, SPEAKING MORE GENERALLY, HE ECHOED YOUR CONCLUDING STATEMENT IN LAST SATURDAY'S RADIO TALK BY SAYING WE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO POSITIVE CHANGES WE SAW.

6. THE POSITIVE SPIN ANDORPOV WAS TRYING TO GIVE OUR TALK WAS ONLY THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OF A NUMBER OF GESTURES MEANT TO SHOW THEY KNEW THEY WERE DEALING WITH VISITORS FROM AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY. AT THE END OF THE FUNERAL CEREMONY, FOR INSTANCE, THE VICE PRESIENT AND I WERE PULLED OUT FROM FAR BACK IN THE LONG LINE, INCLUDING PREMIERS AND HEADS OF STATE, WAITING TO GREET THE LEADERSHIP AFTER THE RECEPTION, AND BROUGHT DIRECTLY TO ANDROPOV AND GROMYKO DESPITE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL RESISTANCE. AS FOR LOGISTICS, THE EMBASSY SAYS THEY CANNOT RECALL SO MUCH COOPERATIONS FROM THE SOVIETS ON ANY VISIT.

7. IN SUM, THE MEETING SHOWED NO NARROWING OF THE WIDE DIFFERENCES ON ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME OR PLACE FOR NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, ANDROPOV WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT HE WANTS A DIALOGUE. ALTHOUGH HE MADE NO MENTION OF A SUMMIT, HE REPEATEDLY ASKED US TO CONVEY HIS POINTS TO YOU. HE HAS GOTTEN YOUR MESSAGE, AND ONE REASON IS SURELY BECAUSE HE RESPECTS YOUR STRENGTH AND STEADINESS. BUT WHETHER OR NOT DIALOGUE WITH HIM CAN PRODUCE THE KINDS OF MOVEMENT

FROM THE SOVIETS THAT WILL LEAD TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS IS OF COURSE STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. SHULTZ.
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0019 DTG: 160016Z NOV 82 PSN: 008426
SIT481 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 319/0112Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: SENT TO VP/PLS ADVISE ON FURTHER DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH

DE RUEHAI #0019 3200016

O 160016Z NOV 82

FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0000

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 15023

MODIS

E.O. 12065: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: OUR MEETING WITH ANDROPOV - NOVEMBER 15

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM PLEASE PASS VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE GIVING HIS IMPRESSION OF OUR MEETING TODAY. I WOULD ALSO URGE YOU TO READ THE SHORT TRANSCRIPT WHICH I HAVE SENT THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIM TO REVIEW. THE MEETING LASTED ONLY HALF AN HOUR, BUT IT MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE REST OF YOUR PRESIDENCY, UNLESS ANDROPOV IS MUCH LESS SECURELY IN CHARGE THAN IT NOW APPEARS. MY OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEETING, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO FURTHER ANALYSIS, ARE AS FOLLOWS.

3. FIRST, THE MAN HIMSELF. FACE-TO-FACE HE WAS INCISIVE, STRONG, AND SECURE WITH HIMSELF AND WITH THE POWER HE NOW WIELDS. ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE FROM A PAPER AND SOUNDED LIKE GROMYKO AT SOME POINTS, HE WAS AT EASE WITH HIS MATERIAL AND WILL CLEARLY BE CAPABLE OF ENGAGING IN GIVE-AND-TAKE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

4. THE FOLLOWING POINTS STOOD OUT FROM HIS PRESENTATION:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

--THE NEW LEADERSHIP HAS GOTTEN THE MESSAGE YOU HAVE BEEN SENDING AND WANTS US TO KNOW IT. ANDROPOV REFERRED EXPLICITLY AND WITH GRATITUDE NOT ONLY TO THE DELEGATION'S VISIT BUT TO YOUR MESSAGE AND YOUR VISIT TO THE EMBASSY TO SIGN THE CONDOLENCE BOOK. HE ASKED US TO CONVEY TO YOU THAT THEY WANT "THE BEST POSSIBLE" RELATIONS WITH US.

--AT THIS POINT CONTINUITY IS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S APPROACH. FOR STARTERS, ANDROPOV HAD BOTH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV'S KEY FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTANTIVELY, HE ECHOED THE LINE I HEARD FROM GROMYKO IN NEW YORK: THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLINE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE DISPLAYED SOME SOPHISTICATION IN RECOGNIZING THAT THE U.S. HAS ITS 'OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE MATTERS."

FOR ANDROPOV, THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FACING THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IS HALTING "FURTHER SPIRALS IN THE ARMS

RACE" AND REACHING "AGREEMENT AT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS." HE ADDED THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD COME TO THE TABLE WITH UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS.

--THE MOST FORCEFUL PART OF HIS PRESENTATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNED INTERFERENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. "THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP RESOLUTELY REJECTS A POLICY OF DICTATING ONE'S OWN STANDARDS TO THE OTHER SIDE," HE SAID.

5. IN RESPONSE TO THESE THEMES, THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD ANDROPOV THAT WE TOO WERE LOOKING FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY WE ALSO FELT DEEPLY ABOUT CERTAIN ISSUES, SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE EXPRESSED YOUR COMMITMENT TO VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND, SPEAKING MORE GENERALLY, HE ECHOED YOUR CONCLUDING STATEMENT IN LAST SATURDAY'S RADIO TALK BY SAYING WE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO POSITIVE CHANGES WE SAW.

6. THE POSITIVE SPIN ANDROPOV WAS TRYING TO GIVE OUR TALK WAS ONLY THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OF A NUMBER OF GESTURES MEANT TO SHOW THEY KNEW THEY WERE DEALING WITH VISITORS FROM AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY. AT THE END OF THE FUNERAL CEREMONY, FOR INSTANCE, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND I WERE PULLED OUT FROM FAR BACK IN THE LONG LINE, INCLUDING PREMIERS AND HEADS OF STATE, WAITING TO GREET THE LEADERSHIP AFTER THE RECEPTION, AND BROUGHT DIRECTLY TO ANDROPOV AND GROMYKO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DESPITE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL RESISTANCE. AS FOR LOGISTICS, THE EMBASSY SAYS THEY CANNOT RECALL SO MUCH COOPERATIONS FROM THE SOVIETS ON ANY VISIT.

7. IN SUM, THE MEETING SHOWED NO NARROWING OF THE WIDE DIFFERENCES ON ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME OR PLACE FOR NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, ANDROPOV WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT HE WANTS A DIALOGUE. ALTHOUGH HE MADE NO MENTION OF A SUMMIT, HE REPEATEDLY ASKED US TO CONVEY HIS POINTS TO YOU. HE HAS GOTTEN YOUR MESSAGE, AND ONE REASON IS SURELY BECAUSE HE RESPECTS YOUR STRENGTH AND STEADINESS. BUT WHETHER OR NOT DIALOGUE WITH HIM CAN PRODUCE THE KINDS OF MOVEMENT FROM THE SOVIETS THAT WILL LEAD TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS IS OF COURSE STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. SHULTZ.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

3

171018

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0020 DTG:160048Z NOV 82 PSN: 005516
SIT078 DATE 11/18/82 TOR: 319/0232Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP SIT
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: ----SENT TO VP PARTY----PLS ADVISE ON ADDTL DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAI #0020 3200048
O 160048Z NOV 82
FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 15024
MODIS

E.O. 12065: NDR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: MOSCOW VISIT; THE MESSAGE OF THE FUNERAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM PLEASE PASS TO VICE PRESIDENTS PARTY

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WILL BE REPORTING TO YOU SEPARATELY ON OUR MEETING WITH ANDROPOV, BUT I ALSO WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU A FEW ON-THE-SPOT IMPRESSIONS OF THE FUNERAL, BECAUSE I THINK IT PROVIDES A SYMBOLIC BACKDROP FOR THE MORE SPECIFIC MESSAGE ANDROPOV WAS SEEKING TO GIVE GEORGE AND ME. WE WERE ONLY IN MOSCOW FOR 18 HOURS AND IT IS HAZARDOUS TO EXTRAPOLATE FROM ONE EVENT. BUT THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED THE FUNERAL TO LEAVE.

3. FIRST, A FUNERAL WITH OUT GOD HAS AN EERIE FEEL TO IT.

4. SECOND, THE CEREMONY ITSELF WAS SOMBER, IMPRESSIVE, BUT IN A WAY DESIGNED TO CONVEY A SENSE OF STRENGTH AND POWER. TO THE EYE, IT WAS EVEN MORE A MILITARY AFFAIR THAN MOST STATE FUNERALS AND HAVING DEFENSE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MINISTER USTINOV SPEAK SECOND, AFTER ANDROPOV, UNDERLINED THE POINT. THE SOVIET STATE WAS MUCH IN EVIDENCE, THE PARTY -- DESPITE ITS LEAD ROLE IN THE SPEECHES -- SOMEWHAT LESS. BOTH THOSE OF US ON RED SQUARE AND THOSE WATCHING ON TELEVISION FELT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WAS TALKING MAINLY TO A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, AND WAS SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH THE COUNTRY HAD LOST A LEADER, HE LEFT IT STRONG, UNITED AND DETERMINED TO STAY THAT WAY. IN THIS SENSE, CONTINUITY WAS THE THEME.

5. THIRD, THE SCENARIO SEEMED GEARED TO SHOW THAT ANDROPOV IS IN CHARGE. AFTER THE SLOW SOLEMNITY OF THE COFFIN'S PASSAGE UP INTO RED SQUARE TO THE FRONT OF LENIN'S MAUSOLEUM, THE PACE SUDDENLY CHANGED AS HE CLIMBED TO THE TRIBUNE AND BEGAN TO SPEAK IN A STRONG, RINGING VOICE. AS MASTER OF CEREMONIES

INTRODUCING THE OTHER SPEAKERS, HE REMAINED BRISK, DECISIVE, AND IN CONTROL AS FOR THE SPEECHES THEMSELVES, WHILE SPRINKLED WITH TRIBUTES TO THE DEPARTED LEADER, THERE WAS SURPRISINGLY LITTLE OF BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL.

6. FINALLY, THESE TWO MESSAGES -- THAT THE COUNTRY IS STRONG, AND THAT ANDROPOV IS IN CHARGE -- GAVE THE PROCEEDINGS A DECISIVE CAST. WE ARE LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, ANDROPOV SEEMED TO BE SAYING. AND THIS MESSAGE WAS DRIVEN HOME BY ANOTHER STILL SHARPER CHANGE OF PACE AT THE END. AFTER AN HOUR OF MOURNFUL DEAD MARCH ON THE GROUND, AND TCHAIKOVSKIY AND CHOPIN FUNERAL MUSIC ON TELEVISION, AS SOON AS BREZHNEV WAS IN THE GROUND, THE BAND STRUCK UP INTO FAST MARTIAL MUSIC. THE PUBLIC CEREMONY ENDED WITH AN ALMOST JAUNTY MARCH-PAST OF HONOR UNITS FROM EVERY MAJOR SERVICE IN THE MOSCOW GARRISON. THE CONTRAST -- BETWEEN THE HONORED BUT MUSTY PAST AND THE VIBRANT NEW PRESENT -- COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE STRIKING. SHULTZ.

USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0020 DTG:160048Z NOV 82 PSN: 005516

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23 17-2-2

BY KDB NARA DATE 12/4/85

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171020

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0021 DTG: 160130Z NOV 82 PSN: 008565
SIT204 DATE 11/18/82 TOR: 319/0327Z

HAS NO WISH TO START DOWN THE SANCTIONS ROAD.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT / 001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAI #0021 3200130

O 160130Z NOV 82

FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TELAVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 15025

NOTES

E.O. 12065: OADR

TAGC: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: SHULTZ-PYM BILATERAL IN MOSCOW: MIDDLE EAST, NOVEMBER 14

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-17-3-1

BY /CDR NARA DATE 12/4/15

USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0021 DTG: 160130Z NOV 82 PSN: 008565

1. SECRETARY SHULTZ (WITH HARTMAN AND BURT) MET WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM LATE THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 14 IN MOSCOW. PYM WISHED MOST URGENTLY TO CONVEY TO THE SECRETARY HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS JUST-COMPLETED VISIT TO JORDAN. THE HUB OF THE PEACE PROCESS ISSUE, PYM SAID, APPEARS TO BE THE ISRAELI POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS. HE IS PERSUADED, FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH HUSSEIN, THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST CONVINCE BEGIN TO ALTER THIS POLICY, AND HE MUST CONVINCE HIM TO DO SO URGENTLY. BECAUSE OF THE SETTLEMENTS, PYM SAID, THE AMERICAN "CREDIBILITY GAP" IS WIDENING SHARPLY AND QUICKLY. PYM REPORTED CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAD SHOWN HIM AN ISRAELI MAP OF THE WEST BANK WITH PLACE NAMES CHANGED AND BORDERS ERASED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION AND WILL ARE THE CRITICAL FACTOR, HE SAID, AND THE TEST OF THIS IS AMERICAN ACTION ON THE SETTLEMENTS. PYM CONCLUDED BY REITERATING HIS CONCERN THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT.

2. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH PYM'S SENSE OF URGENCY. HE THEN EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE CURRENT AMERICAN STRATEGY AND THE INTERLOCKING NATURE OF OUR APPROACHES ON LEBANON, ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. HE STRESSED HOW EACH OF THESE AFFECTS THE DYNAMICS OF THE OTHERS AND DESCRIBED THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING PHIL HABIB'S NEW ROLE. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT IS READY TO ADDRESS THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE SQUARELY BUT RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT AT HOME. THE PRESIDENT

3. PYM REPLIED IT WAS HIS CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT JORDAN BELIEVES THE REAGAN PLAN HAS NO CHANCE UNLESS ISRAEL ALTERS ITS COURSE ON THE WEST BANK. ISRAEL, HOWEVER, WON'T ALTER ITS COURSE WITHOUT US PRESSURE. AND US PRESSURE, PYM WENT ON, "MEANS FUNDS." AGAIN, PYM SAID, THE TIME SCALE FOR THIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN SHORTENED BECAUSE OF THE AGGRESSIVE AND CONTRARY NATURE OF THE ISRAELI POLICY.

4. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE VISIT OF THE FEZ DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON AND THE EMERGENCE OF PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE WEST BANK. HE DESCRIBED THE POSSIBILITY OF STARTING TALKS CENTERED ON TRANSITION ISSUES. PYM AGAIN PREDICTED THAT ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR WILL SOON MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HUSSEIN TO CARRY ARAB OPINION WITH HIM. WHILE HUSSEIN'S DESIRE FOR TALKS REMAINS FULLY INTACT, HE IS WEAKER NOW AND FADING. THE SECRETARY THANKED PYM FOR HIS INSIGHT. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

5

171021

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0022 DTG: 160156Z NOV 82 PSN: 006901
SIT474 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 319/0546Z

IS DOUBTFUL WE CAN EXPECT MILITARY CUTBACKS BUT FARTHER
FLUNG COMMITMENTS MIGHT BE ATTENUATED.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAI #0022 3200156

O 160156Z NOV 82

FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO EC CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

USNATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 15026

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 2 LINE 7 PARA 4 LINE 23)

E.O. 12065: OARD

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: SHULTZ-PYM BILATERAL IN MOSCOW: EUROPEAN ISSUES

1. ON NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 14 IN MOSCOW, SECRETARY SHULTZ (WITH HARTMAN AND BURT) AND FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM BRIEFLY DISCUSSED ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THE SECRETARY SUMMARIZED THE US APPROACH AS RESTING ON REALISM, STRENGTH, AND A WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. WHILE IN MOSCOW, HE AND THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL GIVE EMPHASIS TO THE LAST OF THESE PRINCIPLES. THERE MAY EXIST NEW OPPORTUNITIES BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP, BUT THE TIME CALLS FOR STRESSING THE CONSISTENCY OF OUR POLICY AND NOT THE IMPLICATION OF CHANGE. PYM AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH, ALTHOUGH PERSONALLY HE DOES NOT FORESEE NEW OPPORTUNITIES ARISING FROM THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP. PYM AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S VIEW THAT AN EFFORT TO EXPLOIT NEW

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OPPORTUNITIES MIGHT BE SELF-DEFEATING IF THE MOMENTUM FOR INF DEPLOYMENT IS LOST IN THE MEANTIME. PYM WAS EMPHATIC IN STATING HMG'S FIRMNESS ON THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION WHILE THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS ISSUE THROUGHTOUT 1983 WILL BE CRUCIAL, WE CAN ALSO EXPECT A HARSHNESS AND RIGIDITY IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING OVER THE NEAR TERM. PYM EXPRESSED HIS SUSPICION THAT ANDROPOV IS A TOUGH HARDLINER. THIS MAKES AN EVEN STRONGER CASE FOR WESTERN UNITY AND FIRMNESS.

2. HARTMAN SPECULATED THAT ANDROPOV HAS EMERGED IN THE PREMIER POSITION BUT THE SOLID COALITION TO SUPPORT HIM IS A LONG WAY OFF. ANDROPOV IS OBVIOUSLY IN DEBT TO THE MILITARY. NEVERTHELESS RESOURCE PRESSURES WILL CONVERGE ON HIM AND HE WILL FACE DIFFICULT CHOICES. IT

3. PYM AGREED THERE WILL BE INSTITUTIONAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE GUESSED THAT ANDROPOV IS A DECISIVE MAN. HE SAID SOVIET PROBLEMS ARE IN-GROWN AND STEM FROM THE NATURE AND MOMENTUM OF THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL-MILITARY COMPLEX. IT IS A SELF-PERPETUATING SYSTEM THAT HAS TRAPPED THE LEADERSHIP IN DECISIONS OF THIRTY YEARS AGO. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE FLUIDITY OF THE SUCCESSION SCENE ARGUED EVEN MORE STRONGLY FOR A COHERENT AND COORDINATED ALLIED APPROACH.

4. ON OTHER EUROPEAN ISSUES. PYM CALLED CSCE AN "AWKWARD MOMENT" FOR THE RUSSIANS BUT IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST. BURT SAID WE WILL FIND OUT SOON WHETHER OUR NEW PACKAGE IS ACCEPTABLE. IF NOT, WE SHOULD CONSIDER OTHER APPROACHES OR RISK KEEPING OPEN A PROCESS THAT IS MANIFESTLY DISCORDANT. PYM THEN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE SAID FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IS BEGINNING TO HAVE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS. PYM SAID THE SITUATION COULD COME TO A HEAD IN A MATTER OF WEEKS. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT YUGOSLAVIA'S SITUATION IS SERIOUS BUT NOT MORE SO THAN IN SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. HE AGREED THAT YUGOSLAVIA WAS CRUCIAL, BUT AMERICAN RESOURCES TO HELP ARE LIMITED. THE SECRETARY THEN EXPRESSED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HIS CONCERN THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES ARE NOT PROPERLY ANALYZING THE PROFOUND DISTORTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. PYM AGREED THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE A CENTRAL TOPIC AT THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. ON GIBRALTAR, PYM SAID THE UK AWAITS A SPANISH INITIATIVE. NEVERTHELESS, HMG WILL MAKE PLAIN THE LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE LISBON AGREEMENT AND URGE THE SPANISH TO SEE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH AS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY OUR OF THE ISSUE. SHULTZ

USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0022 DTG: 160156Z NOV 82 PSN: 006901

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0019 DTG: 160016Z NOV 82 PSN: 008957
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WHSR COMMENT: PRESIDENT

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E.O. 12065: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: OUR MEETING WITH ANDROPOV - NOVEMBER 15

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM PLEASE PASS VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE GIVING HIS IMPRESSION OF OUR MEETING TODAY. I WOULD ALSO URGE YOU TO READ THE SHORT TRANSCRIPT WHICH I HAVE SENT THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIM TO REVIEW. THE MEETING LASTED ONLY HALF AN HOUR, BUT IT MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE REST OF YOUR PRESIDENCY, UNLESS ANDROPOV IS MUCH LESS SECURELY IN CHARGE THAN IT NOW APPEARS. MY OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEETING, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO FURTHER ANALYSIS, ARE AS FOLLOWS.

3. FIRST, THE MAN HIMSELF. FACE-TO-FACE HE WAS INCISIVE, STRONG, AND SECURE WITH HIMSELF AND WITH THE POWER HE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0019 DTG: 160016Z NOV 82 PSN: 008957

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NOW WIELDS. ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE FROM A PAPER AND SOUNDED LIKE GROMYKO AT SOME POINTS, HE WAS AT EASE WITH HIS MATERIAL AND WILL CLEARLY BE CAPABLE OF ENGAGING IN GIVE-AND-TAKE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

4. THE FOLLOWING POINTS STOOD OUT FROM HIS PRESENTATION:

--THE NEW LEADERSHIP HAS GOTTEN THE MESSAGE YOU HAVE BEEN SENDING AND WANTS US TO KNOW IT. ANDROPOV REFERRED EXPLICITLY AND WITH GRATITUDE NOT ONLY TO THE DELEGATION'S VISIT BUT TO YOUR MESSAGE AND YOUR VISIT TO THE EMBASSY TO SIGN THE CONDOLENCE BOOK. HE ASKED US TO CONVEY TO YOU THAT THEY WANT "THE BEST POSSIBLE" RELATIONS WITH US.

--AT THIS POINT CONTINUITY IS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S APPROACH. FOR STARTERS, ANDROPOV HAD BOTH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV'S KEY FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTANTIVELY, HE ECHOED THE LINE I HEARD FROM GROMYKO IN NEW YORK: THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLINE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE DISPLAYED SOME SOPHISTICATION IN RECOGNIZING THAT THE U.S. HAS ITS "OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE MATTERS."

--FOR ANDROPOV, THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FACING THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IS HALTING "FURTHER SPIRALS IN THE ARMS RACE" AND REACHING "AGREEMENT AT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS." HE ADDED THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD COME TO THE TABLE WITH UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS.

--THE MOST FORCEFUL PART OF HIS PRESENTATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNED INTERFERENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. "THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP RESOLUTELY REJECTS A POLICY OF DICTATING ONE'S OWN STANDARDS TO THE OTHER SIDE," HE SAID.

5. IN RESPONSE TO THESE THEMES, THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD ANDROPOV THAT WE TOO WERE LOOKING FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY WE ALSO FELT DEEPLY ABOUT CERTAIN ISSUES, SUCH AS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12065: NDR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MOSCOW VISIT; THE MESSAGE OF THE FUNERAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE SITROOM PLEASE PASS TO VICE PRESIDENTS PARTY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WILL BE REPORTING TO YOU SEPARATELY ON OUR MEETING WITH ANDROPOV, BUT I ALSO WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU A FEW ON-THE-SPOT IMPRESSIONS OF THE FUNERAL, BECAUSE I THINK IT PROVIDES A SYMBOLIC BACKDROP FOR THE MORE SPECIFIC MESSAGE ANDROPOV WAS SEEKING TO GIVE GEORGE AND ME. WE WERE ONLY IN MOSCOW FOR 18 HOURS AND IT IS HAZARDOUS TO EXTRAPOLATE FROM ONE EVENT. BUT THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED THE FUNERAL TO LEAVE.

3. FIRST, A FUNERAL WITH OUT GOD HAS AN EERIE FEEL TO

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NLRR 748-2317-2-2

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0020 DTG: 160048Z NOV 82 PSN: 008955

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4. SECOND, THE CEREMONY ITSELF WAS SOMBER, IMPRESSIVE, BUT IN A WAY DESIGNED TO CONVEY A SENSE OF STRENGTH AND POWER. TO THE EYE, IT WAS EVEN MORE A MILITARY AFFAIR THAN MOST STATE FUNERALS AND HAVING DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV SPEAK SECOND, AFTER ANDROPOV, UNDERLINED THE POINT. THE SOVIET STATE WAS MUCH IN EVIDENCE, THE PARTY -- DESPITE ITS LEAD ROLE IN THE SPEECHES -- SOMEWHAT LESS. BOTH THOSE OF US ON RED SQUARE AND THOSE WATCHING ON TELEVISION FELT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WAS TALKING MAINLY TO A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, AND WAS SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH THE COUNTRY HAD LOST A LEADER, HE LEFT IT STRONG, UNITED AND DETERMINED TO STAY THAT WAY. IN THIS SENSE, CONTINUITY WAS THE THEME.

5. THIRD, THE SCENARIO SEEMED GEARED TO SHOW THAT ANDROPOV IS IN CHARGE. AFTER THE SLOW SOLEMNITY OF THE COFFIN'S PASSAGE UP INTO RED SQUARE TO THE FRONT OF LENIN'S MAUSOLEUM, THE PACE SUDDENLY CHANGED AS HE STEPPED TO THE TRIBUNE AND BEGAN TO SPEAK IN A STRONG, RINGING VOICE. AS MASTER OF CEREMONIES INTRODUCING THE OTHER SPEAKERS, HE REMAINED BRISK, DECISIVE, AND IN CONTROL AS FOR THE SPEECHES THEMSELVES, WHILE SPRINKLED WITH TRIBUTES TO THE DEPARTED LEADER, THERE WAS SURPRISINGLY LITTLE OF BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL.

6. FINALLY, THESE TWO MESSAGES -- THAT THE COUNTRY IS STRONG, AND THAT ANDROPOV IS IN CHARGE -- GAVE THE PROCEEDINGS A DECISIVE CAST. WE ARE LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, ANDROPOV SEEMED TO BE SAYING. AND THIS MESSAGE WAS DRIVEN HOME BY ANOTHER STILL SHARPER CHANGE OF PACE AT THE END. AFTER AN HOUR OF MOURNFUL DEAD MARCH ON THE GROUND, AND TCHAIKOVSKIY AND CHOPIN FUNERAL MUSIC ON TELEVISION, AS SOON AS BREZHNEV

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0020 DTG: 160048Z NOV 82 PSN: 008955

WAS IN THE GROUND, THE BAND STRUCK UP INTO FAST
MARTIAL MUSIC. THE PUBLIC CEREMONY ENDED WITH AN
ALMOST JAUNTY MARCH-PAST OF HONOR UNITS FROM EVERY
MAJOR SERVICE IN THE MOSCOW GARRISON. THE CONTRAST --
BETWEEN THE HONORED BUT MUSTY PAST AND THE VIBRANT
NEW PRESENT -- COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE STRIKING.
SHULTZ.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1817
SIT059 DATE 11/18/82

DTG: 170210Z NOV 82 PSN: 010512
TOR: 321/0549Z

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SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #1817 3210220
O 170210Z NOV 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0133

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HARARE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER ONLY
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US, XJ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW

REF: A) MOSCOW 13591 (NOTAL) B) STATE 318298 C) LAGOS
11542 (NOTAL)

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DECEMBER 1-2 TIMEFRAME PROPOSED BY SOVIETS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONSULTATIONS (REF A) IS NOT CONVENIENT, AS IT COMES ON THE HEELS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S AFRICAN TRIP AND A BUSY ROUND OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS. PLEASE PROPOSE TO MFA THAT DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE SOMEWHAT LATER, I.E. DECEMBER 6 OR 7. THIS WOULD PERMIT SUFFICIENT TIME TO REVIEW STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PREPARE FOR SOVIET CONSULTATIONS. SHULTZ

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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BY CDD NARA DATE 12/4/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 3895
SIT072 DATE 11/18/82

DTG: 171119Z NOV 82 PSN: 010964
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHMO #3895 3211120
O 171119Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0481

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XJ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN AFRICA CONSULTATIONS; PRISONER SWAP
REF: STATE 321817

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. POL COUNSELOR INFORMED DEPUTY CHIEF OF MFA USA DIVISION TARASENKO THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO SCHEDULE CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 1 BECAUSE OF OTHER SCHEDULE DEMANDS RELATED TO PROCESS OF SEEKING SETTLEMENT. WE REGRETTED THE NEED TO SLIP THE DATE, BUT WOULD PROPOSE CONSULTATIONS ON DECEMBER 6 OR 7. TARASENKO WAS UNPERTURBED AND PROMISED TO GET BACK TO US.

3. POL COUNSELOR ALSO USED CALL ON TARASENKO TO EXPRESS AS INSTRUCTED OUR PLEASURE THAT LONG, COMPLICATED EFFORT TO ARRANGE A PRISONER SWAP HAD FINALLY PAID OFF. THIS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS TO COOPERATE ON MATTERS AFFECTING SOUTHERN AFRICA. TARASENKO SAID SOVIETS WERE PLEASED TO HAVE THEIR MEN BACK. SOVIETS HAD QUICKLY FOUND COMMON INTEREST

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH U.S. ON THIS SWAP, AND RECOGNIZED THAT DIFFICULTIES THAT AROSE ALONG THE WAY WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO ANY LACK OF WILL OR EFFORT BY U.S. HE SUMMED UP BY QUOTING SHAKESPEARE: ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL.
HARTMAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 3898 DTG: 171152Z NOV 82 PSN: 011351
SIT425 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 321/1734Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0482

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 13898
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US, GW
SUBJECT: READ-OUT ON ANDROPOV-FRG BILATERAL

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING NOVEMBER 15 MEETING WITH FRG BREZHNEV FUNERAL DELEGATION, ANDROPOV TOOK A TOUGH LINE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATO INF DEPLOYMENT ON FRG SOIL, INSISTING THAT MOSCOW WOULD DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE "THE BALANCE AS IT EXISTS TODAY." ANDROPOV OFFERED A GARBLED VERSION OF HIS MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, ASSERTING THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD LINKED INF DEPLOYMENT TO SOVIET POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
END SUMMARY.

3. FRG AMBASSADOR MEYER-LANDRUT (PROTECT) GAVE AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ON NOVEMBER 16 A DETAILED READ-OUT OF NOVEMBER 15 CARSTENS/GENSCHER BILATERAL WITH ANDROPOV. ANDROPOV, WHO DID ALL OF THE TALKING FOR THE SOVIET SIDE, WAS ACCOMPANIED BY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GROMYKO AND FORMER BREZHNEV AIDE ALEXANDROV-AGENTOV, WHO APPARENTLY RETAINS HIS POSITION AS AIDE TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY UNDER ANDROPOV. FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO MET THE FRG PARTY, BUT DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING.

IMPRESSIONS OF ANDROPOV

4. MEYER-LANDRUT DESCRIBED ANDROPOV'S DEMEANOR DURING THE MEETING AS "MATTER OF FACT." ANDROPOV READ HIS PRESENTATION, DEPARTING OCCASIONALLY FROM HIS TEXT TO EXPAND ON A POINT. MEYER-LANDRUT FELT ANDROPOV KNEW HIS LINES WELL, AND THAT HE DISPLAYED A GOOD INTELLECT, BUT COULD NOT DRAW

ANY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MEETING AS TO THE DEPTH OF ANDROPOV'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES. MEYER-LANDRUT WAS STRUCK BY THE APPARENT ONE-SIDEDNESS OF ANDROPOV'S VIEWS ON THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC OF CONVERSATION -- EUROPEAN SECURITY. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION ANDROPOV HAD NOT BEEN EXPOSED IN ANY DETAIL TO WESTERN ARGUMENTS ON THE SUBJECT.

TOUGH LINE ON INF

5. THE CORE OF ANDROPOV'S PRESENTATION WAS A TOUGH, AT TIMES THREATENING, OUTLINE OF SOVIET VIEWS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF BONN'S ALLOWING INF TO BE DEPLOYED ON FRG SOIL. NOTING THAT THE ISSUE WAS A "BASIC QUESTION FOR SOVIET-FRG BILATERAL RELATIONS," HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WERE INF TO BE DEPLOYED, "EUROPE COULD NOT GO ON AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED." THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS, AND TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE.
-- THERE WAS YET TIME TO AVOID IRREVOCABLE STEPS. THE URGENT TASK WAS TO ENSURE AGAINST ANY RIGID "AUTOMATICITY" BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS AND THE FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. THERE WAS NO INHERENT REASON WHY DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD GO AHEAD AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED WHILE EFFORTS WERE STILL UNDER WAY TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- THE GENEVA TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE, AND THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINS ONE OF SEEKING AN AGREEMENT BASED ON "EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY."
-- BUT IF THE U.S. GOAL IS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUPERIORITY IN EUROPEAN INF, THE USSR WILL ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT SUCCEED. IF NEW WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED, THE USSR WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO RESTORE "THE BALANCE AS IT EXISTS TODAY."

ANDROPOV ON U.S. BILATERAL

6. ACCORDING TO MEYER-LANDRUT, THE MOST PUZZLING ASPECT OF ANDROPOV'S PRESENTATION ON INF WAS HIS ASSERTION THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, DURING HIS EARLIER MEETING WITH ANDROPOV, HAD CITED SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND, AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NATO INF IN EUROPE. ANDROPOV SAID HE HAD REJECTED THE LINKAGE, POINTING OUT THAT (A) SOVIET FORCES WOULD

MOSCOW 3898

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 3898
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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0483

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 13898
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WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN WHEN ASKED TO BY THE
KABUL GOVERNMENT; (B) POLAND WAS A SOVEREIGN STATE
(HE ADDED THAT THE USSR COULD HAVE INTERVENED TWO
YEARS AGO IF IT HAD WANTED TO, BUT DID NOT); AND
(C) SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WAS AN INTERNAL
MATTER. (AMBASSADOR HARTMAN MADE CLEAR TO MEYER-
LANDRUT AND UK AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS PRESENT
THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD MADE NO SUCH LINK
BETWEEN INF AND AFGHANISTAN, POLAND, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS. NEITHER HAD ANDROPOV SET FORTH SOVIET
POSITIONS ON THESE QUESTIONS.)

FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS

7. IN RESPONSE TO CARSTENS' DEFENSE OF THE NATO
POSITION ON INF, WHICH INCLUDED AN EXPLANATION OF
FRG PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT POSED TO IT BY
THE "900 WARHEADS AIMED AT IT," ANDROPOV STATED HE
DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO A DEBATE ON NUMBERS.
HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IN ITS APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEM, THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS WHICH THE
U.S. CURRENTLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS. HE ADDED POINTEDLY
THAT SOVIET MISSILES WERE NOT IN ANY CASE TARGETED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AT THE FRG -- BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE IF INF WERE
DEPLOYED ON GERMAN SOIL. THE EXCHANGE ENDED WITH
BOTH SIDES AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUING
EFFORTS IN GENEVA.

SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS

8. MEYER-LANDRUT SAID ANDROPOV HAD EXPRESSED HIS
APPRECIATION FOR THE ESTEEM DEMONSTRATED BY THE
FRG IN SENDING SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO
BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL. IN ASSESSING PROSPECTS FOR
SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS, ANDROPOV DWELT ON THE
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF BREZHNEV IN THE SERIES
OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
SINCE 1970. HE STRESSED THAT THESE AGREEMENTS PROVIDED

A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE RELATIONSHIP FOR THE
REMAINDER OF THE CENTURY, BUT EMPHASIZED THE NEED
FOR "CAUTION" BY BOTH SIDES NOW THAT THERE WERE
NEW LEADERS IN BOTH BONN AND MOSCOW. ANDROPOV
WELCOMED CHANCELLOR KOHL'S RECENT COMMENTS AND
REAFFIRMED THAT "PEACE AND COOPERATION" REMAINED
AT THE HEART OF SOVIET POLICY.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED

9. INASMUCH AS MEYER-LANDRUT IS AN EXPERIENCED
KREMLIN HAND WITH EXCELLENT RUSSIAN, WE BELIEVE
HIS ACCOUNT OF ANDROPOV'S COMMENTS ON OUR BILATERAL
IS ACCURATE. WHETHER ANDROPOV'S DISTORTION OF HIS
CONVERSATION WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH IS THE
HYPERBOLE OF A RELATIVE NOVICE IN THESE KINDS OF
EXCHANGES (WHICH WE DOUBT), A CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH
VISITOR SAID WHAT, OR A DELIBERATE FABRICATION, IT
SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED. WE HAVE SET THE RECORD
STRAIGHT WITH THE GERMANS AND OTHERS HERE. IN
ADDITION, I WILL FIND AN OCCASION AT A SENIOR LEVEL
TO LET THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT WE HAVE NOTED THIS
MISREADING. HARTMAN

MOSCOW 3898

DTG: 171152Z NOV 82 PSN: 011356

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/4/15 (C08)

RECEIVED 18 NOV 82 10

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 17 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

ANDROPOV, YURIY V

BUSH, G

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF BUSH - ANDROPOV MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 19 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

BLAIR

COMMENTS

REF# 8235485

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X 11/18</i>	<i>Pres for info</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP NOV 22 1982</i>	<i>for info via PDB</i>		
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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November 22, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT:

The Vice President's Meeting with Andropov

Attached (Tab A) is a memorandum of conversation of George Bush's meeting with Andropov last Monday, November 15.

Discussion: The tone of Andropov's remarks was courteous but firm. He said that

- the United States had caused the accumulated "stock of stability" between the two countries to be "squandered";
- it was urgent to reverse this process because if it continued the consequences could be catastrophic;
- this calls for a broadening of contacts and negotiations, especially in the field of arms control;
- whatever their stance toward each other in public, in their private negotiations the two parties should act in a businesslike fashion and refrain from making unrealistic demands;
- the United States must not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union or try to "dictate" to it what to do.

There was no hint either of a willingness to compromise or a readiness to cajole. The thrust of the argument was that since it is the Soviet Union that is the injured party, it is Washington's turn to start acting in a responsible fashion and to come up with reasonable proposals, especially in Geneva.

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

Attachment:

Tab A Memcon of the Vice President's meeting with
Andropov (forwarded by Secretary Shultz)

SECRET

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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NLRR 748-23-128-5

BY 6013 NARA DATE 12/9/85

November 17, 1982

17026

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject:

Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

Enclosed is the memorandum of the Vice President's November 15 meeting with Andropov, which the Vice President has approved.

Attachment:
As stated

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DECL: OADR

RM
Drafted: EUR/SOV:RECombs,Jr.
11/17/82:ext 29559

by RM
Cleared: EUR/SOV:TWSimons,Jr.
EUR:MPalmer *by RM*
EUR:RBurt *DS*
S:CMcManaway

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171027

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

U.S. Participants

Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR Participants

General Secretary of the CPSU
Yuriy V. Andropov
Minister of Foreign Affairs
A.A. Gromyko
Mr. Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Assistant to the General Secretary
of the CPSU
Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev
Interpreter

TIME & PLACE: November 15, 1982
4:40 p.m. - 5:10 p.m.
The Kremlin, Moscow

Addressing Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz, General Secretary Andropov first wanted to express his personal appreciation for the respect manifested by the United States toward the Soviet Union on this sad occasion of the death of President Leonid I. Brezhnev as indicated by the high rank of the delegation dispatched to Moscow by the United States.

Andropov said that the recent remarks by President Reagan to the effect that he wanted to conduct a policy of improving Soviet/American relations had not gone unnoticed on the Soviet side, and he wanted to add that the intentions of the Soviet leadership were certainly analogous. At the recent Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and at today's solemn ceremony, he had already had occasion to state that the principled policy of the Soviet leadership would remain unchanged and as consistent as it had been during the life of Leonid I. Brezhnev. In this connection he

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wanted to say that this consistent policy of the Soviet Union toward the U.S. had been and would continue to be based on equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Above all it would be a policy aimed at peaceful development of relations. He would not conceal the fact that the relations between our two countries today were quite complex. However, it was not the Soviet side which had dealt with the other as an adversary. Moreover, the Soviet Union invariably and consistently displayed restraint in the face of unfriendly and at times openly hostile remarks and steps on the U.S. side. Displaying such restraint, the Soviet Union was not doing it because it was unsure of its strength. The U.S. side or anyone else for that matter should have no illusions on this score. The Soviet leadership acted in this fashion because it believed that such a policy was sensible and that to act otherwise would hold no promise.

Andropov wanted to draw the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that due to U.S. actions, at present almost the entire stock of stability between the two countries, which had been built up over the years, had been carelessly squandered. This was true of almost the entire reserve of stability which served to insure both sides against unpleasant surprises. He thought that both sides clearly understood that if such an erosion of the productive layer of Soviet/American relations were allowed to continue, there would be no guarantee that this would not bring the sides to catastrophe. He therefore believed that the urgent task today was to put an end to this process. He understood, of course, that matters could not be helped simply by verbal promises, but it was surely a fact, and he would like the Vice President to understand him correctly, that it would be desirable for our two countries to halt further spirals in the arms race and to reach agreement at the current negotiations on European and nuclear arms on a mutually agreeable basis that would not prejudice the interests of either side and would be based on strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security. Of course, there really was no other way out of the present predicament, because if the arms build up continues, the U.S. side would build up, the Soviet side would build up too, and one might well ask where this would lead in the end and

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what would be the end result. After all, all present here today were certainly experienced and sophisticated people, and he was sure that his friend A.A. Gromyko shared his views in saying that it would be completely impossible for either side to believe that it could come to any negotiation with proposals that were unacceptable to the other side. This applied to both sides. Of course, the two sides could engage in debate and even sometimes scold each other in the press or in some other forum, but when it came to specific matters it was absolutely necessary to act as sober-minded and normal people. There was no way of evading this requirement. Andropov noted that at present there was insufficient trust between the two sides, i.e. trust on the part of the Soviet Union as well as on the part of the United States, but the Vice President should understand that this was so because universally accepted standards of conduct had been violated and attempts had been undertaken to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. The Soviet leadership resolutely rejected such a policy of dictating one's own standards to the other side. No one had the right to do so or to dictate what the other side could or could not do.

He wanted to point out that the entire Soviet leadership had been and continued to be in favor of an active and businesslike dialogue between our two countries with respect to matters of mutual interest and questions that required businesslike discussion. There were certainly many such questions and the Soviet Union was in favor of broadening the range of problems discussed in negotiations and exchanging views in a direct dialogue in order to give such negotiations specific content and to insure that they would result in developing good and stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such relations would certainly be conducive to a far more healthy international atmosphere than existed today.

Andropov apologized to Mr. Bush for raising these questions on this, not the most auspicious occasion, realizing that, after all, he and Secretary Shultz had come to Moscow to express his condolences and sympathy to the Soviet Union at this moment of grief. However, the Soviet leadership wanted to have good relations in fact, and he would appreciate this being conveyed to

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President Reagan. Naturally, these relations had to be based on equality without prejudice to the interests of either country. He was well aware of the fact that Secretary Shultz and his friend Gromyko were used to this kind of dialogue because they were battle-hardened men, but he had felt that this first meeting between Mr. Bush and himself, even on this sad occasion, should be used as an opportunity to express these views.

Andropov thought that if this brief speech of his could contribute to improvement of relations between us, this meeting would have been well worthwhile. In conclusion he would ask the Vice President to convey the views expressed to President Reagan and to express to him best wishes on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, wishes for continued success and good health. He also asked Bush to convey to the President the gratitude of the Soviet leadership for the condolences he had expressed on this sad occasion of the passing of L. I. Brezhnev, in particular when he had visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Vice President Bush first wanted to express officially the condolences we had come here to express and to tender to Andropov and his colleagues our thanks for the extraordinary courtesies extended to us not only here but also in Washington by Ambassador Dobrynin.

Andropov interrupted to repeat his thanks for these condolences, and also for the condolences in writing which President Reagan had conveyed in Washington.

Vice President Bush said he felt that he knew Andropov and that he was delighted to meet him at this table. He thought the two of them had a somewhat similar background. When Bill Clark had become the head of the National Security Council Bush had invited Ambassador Dobrynin to his home for the purpose of meeting Clark. He had asked Dobrynin to be as frank with us as Andropov had been today. In the same spirit of frankness we could, even on this sad occasion, as he had done with Dobrynin, detail some of the problems of deep concern to us, such as Afghanistan, Poland, and human rights from the standpoint of international norms, and one or two others. He could assure the General Secretary that we did not intend to interfere

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in the internal affairs of others but had to say that the American people felt strongly about these issues. We were committed, under this President, to maintaining the strength of our military forces, at a level adequate for our security, but we are not interested in an arms race. We shared the commitment which seemed to be expressed here regarding the need to have fruitful talks, but we believe that, in the arms control field, these must be based on verifiable agreements which provide for real reduction in arms. The Vice President said that the President is deadly serious on this issue.

Bush said that he had noted some contentious areas of deep concern to us, areas where we hoped change would be possible on the Soviet side. He could assure Andropov that we would respond positively to any positive changes. He could not agree more that the objective of our negotiations had to be preservation of peace and stability. Andropov had said that the Soviet Union had acted with restraint in the face of what it considered to be hostile actions. Time did not allow Bush to develop this theme, to rebut Andropov's contentions, or to detail our list of Soviet actions which we considered hostile. Still, if both sides felt it was possible to make progress, it was an important fact. The Vice President said he had noted the young men who had marched in the parade at today's ceremony. He himself had four sons and of course could not help but hope that the negotiations in Geneva would bear fruit. The Vice President appreciated Andropov's taking time to meet with us and wanted to wish him well on his accession to great new responsibilities. We were ready to do our part.

Andropov thanked the Vice President and the Secretary for this meeting and once again for the goodwill manifested in coming here to share the grief of the Soviet people. He did not believe it necessary to go into the details of the questions each of them had raised today, but of course these problems did exist and they should be understood from a correct perspective. At present the US side had its own understanding of these matters, as did the Soviet side. It was therefore necessary to sit down and talk and resolve the differences between us, but this was not the occasion to do so. He would therefore once again thank the Vice President for the views he had

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expressed, and would ask him once again to convey his best regards to President Reagan and assure the President that the most sincere wish of the Soviet leadership was to improve and strengthen the relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S., since this would be in the interests of not only our two countries, but in fact of all mankind.

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National Security Council The White House

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Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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SENSITIVE

November 18, 1982

ACTION

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White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAB NARA, Date 12/4/15

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation of Bush-Andropov Meeting

Attached (Tab A) is the memorandum of conversation of the Bush-Andropov meeting in Moscow last Monday, November 15, and a synopsis for the President (Tab I).

DB Dennis Blair concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memcon of the Vice President's meeting with Yuriy Andropov (forwarded by Secretary Shultz)

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MODIS

PRETORIA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER

E.O. 12356: DECL: 04DR

TAGS:US, USSR, XA

SUBJECT DAS BISHOP CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET EMBASSY STAFFER

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: IN SOVIET INITIATED EXCHANGE EMBASSY STAFFER RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS PROBED ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY BISHOP NOVEMBER 16 ON POSSIBILITIES FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. AS BISHOP REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA PENDING MOSCOW TALKS NEXT MONTH, IT DID NOT BECOME CLEAR IF STAFFER HAD ANY PURPOSE MORE SERIOUS THAN TESTING THE WATERS IN PREPARATION FOR THE MOSCOW MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. SOVIET EMBASSY AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST PAVLOV CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON AF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY BISHOP NOVEMBER 16. THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED PRIOR TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BREZHNEV'S DEMISE. AMBASSADOR BISHOP OPENED THE MEETING WITH CONDOLENCES ON BREZHNEV'S DEATH, WHICH MR. PAVLOV ACKNOWLEDGED. PAVLOV STATED THAT US/SOVIET RELATIONS APPEAR TO BE AT A LOW POINT NOW, AND THAT THEY HAVE TO GET BETTER. AMBASSADOR BISHOP SAID WE SHARED THE SAME HOPE. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR IS THE WORST THREAT FACING US, HE SAID, AND OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST FIND A WAY TO AVOID THAT TERRIFYING EVENTUALITY.

4. TURNING TO THE AFRICAN SCENE, BISHOP NOTED THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER HAS MET WITH SOVIET LEADERS BEFORE, AND WE HOPE FOR ANOTHER MEETING SOON. OUR MUTUAL PURPOSE IN AFRICA SHOULD BE THE REDUCTION OF CONFLICT AND THE AVOIDANCE OF ACTIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO CONFRONTATION. PAVLOV AGREED, AND SAID THAT AFRICA SHOULD UNITE THE SUPER-

POWERS - NOT DIVIDE THEM. WE CAN BE HELPFUL, HE SAID, IF THE US UNDERTAKES HELPFUL ACTIONS. THE USSR IS PATIENTLY AWAITING RESULTS OF THE CONTACT GROUP'S WORK ON NAMIBIA, AND WHILE IT WOULD LIKE TO HELP OUT ON THIS PROBLEM IT CANNOT NEGLECT ITS OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS OR THOSE OF ITS FRIENDS.

5. PAVLOV THEN ASKED WHAT WERE THE PRECISE RESULTS OF THE KORNIENKO/CROCKER MEETING IN NEW YORK; WHAT RESPONSE DOES THE U.S. SIDE HAVE TO THE QUESTIONS POSED BY KORNIENKO; AND IS IT REALLY THE U.S. VIEW THAT EVERY PROBLEM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IS THE FAULT OF THE USSR? U.S. THOUGHTS, HE ADDED, ON THIS LAST QUESTION WILL COLOR ALL FUTURE CONSULTATIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS. IS IT THE AMERICAN VIEW, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SWAPO IS SOVIET-BACKED, THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS REALLY THREATENED BY ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO CUT THE SEA LANES AROUND THE CAPE?

6. BISHOP'S REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS WAS THAT HE HAD NO WISH TO STEAL MR. CROCKER'S THUNDER GIVEN UPCOMING TALKS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS, BUT THAT HE WOULD ADDRESS PAVLOV'S FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION. AFRICAN REALITIES ARE A LARGE ELEMENT OF THESE PROBLEMS, AND THE U.S. DOES NOT SEE THE SOVIET HAND AT WORK IN EVERY PROBLEM OF THE REGION. THE DETAILS OF A DISCUSSION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA SHOULD BE LEFT FOR MR. CROCKER. IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WE CLEARLY DO NOT EX-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PECT ANY PARTY TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

7. PAVLOV PROFESSED TO BE QUITE PLEASED BY THIS RESPONSE AND SPOKE ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, ACTING TOGETHER AS A QUOTE JOINT VENTURE UNQUOTE. BISHOP REJECTED THE BAIT, PREFERRING TO DEFER UNTIL THE MOSCOW TALKS ANY EXPLORATION OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE SOVIETS ACTUALLY MAY HAVE IN MIND IN TERMS OF COLLABORATIVE ACTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

8. PAVLOV ASKED WHEN THE PRISONER EXCHANGE WOULD TAKE PLACE. BISHOP STATED THAT IT SHOULD OCCUR MID-AFTERNOON TODAY (NOVEMBER 16), WASHINGTON TIME. THERE HAD BEEN A PROBLEM, HE SAID, WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN PLANE, BUT THAT PROBLEM HAS BEEN SOLVED. EVERYTHING SHOULD HAPPEN AT ABOUT 7:00 P.M. LUSAKA TIME. PAVLOV SAID THAT THIS EXCHANGE WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHAT WE CAN DO TOGETHER FOR A COMMON GOAL. BISHOP REPLIED THAT THIS IS EXACTLY HOW WE WILL DESCRIBE IT, A JOINT AND COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY ALL INVOLVED. PAVLOV ASKED IF A REFERENCE TO SAVIMBI WOULD BE MADE? BISHOP ANSWERED THAT THIS WAS PROBABLE SINCE UNITA WAS ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED, AND THAT HE WILL NOTE THAT EIGHT DIFFERENT PARTICIPANTS WERE INVOLVED. PAVLOV STATED THAT THE U.S. SURELY KNEW THE USSR'S ATTITUDE ON UNITA, AND THAT IT DID NOT WANT TO GIVE UNITA ANY POLITICAL PUBLICITY. BISHOP SAID WE PLAN NO SPECIAL MENTION OF UNITA, BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR MUST KNOW OUR ATTITUDE ON UNITA AS WELL. PAVLOV ASKED IF MR. CROCKER WOULD RETURN BY THE 24TH OF NOVEMBER, AND BISHOP RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE BACK A BIT BEFORE THAT DATE.

9. PAVLOV DISCUSSED CHAD, ASKING WHAT WAS GOING ON THERE. HE NOTED THAT HIS EMBASSY HERE WAS OUT OF TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT THAT THE U.S. NEWSPAPERS SAY THERE ARE TWO DELEGATIONS IN TRIPOLI. HE ASKED IF CHAD REALLY NEEDS AID AND DOES THE U.S. PLAN TO AID THE NEW GOVERN-

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 11/ 3563 DTG:180136Z NOV 82 PSN: 012423

MENT.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

10. BISHOP SAID THAT IN CHAD HABRE IS REALLY IN CHARGE OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY. AFTER SIXTEEN YEARS OF WAR THEY DO NEED HELP. THE U.S. AIDED CHAD WHEN GOUKOUNI WAS IN CHARGE, WE HELPED THE OAU WITH ITS EFFORTS IN CHAD, AND WE URGED GOUKOUNI TO TALK WITH HABRE AND THE OTHERS. WE NOW CONSIDER HABRE'S TO BE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD AND WE ARE STILL HELPING CHAD. THE U.S. PROVIDED ABOUT \$17 MILLION IN TOTAL ASSISTANCE FOR FY-82 AND WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE GENEVA CHAD DONOR CONFERENCE. PAVLOV ASKED IF THE \$17 MILLION INCLUDED FOOD, AND BISHOP SAID YES. HE ADDED THAT MOST OF THE AID WAS GIVEN DURING THE GOUKOUNI PERIOD.

11. PAVLOV SAID THERE WERE EARLIER RUMORS THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS SHIFTING AID IN AFRICA FROM DA TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN FACT INCREASED BY 50 IN 1981, HE SAID. HE ASKED IF THIS WAS A TREND AND IF IT REALLY SERVES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA. BISHOP RESPONDED THAT THE SHIFT IN ASSISTANCE IS PARTIALLY A SEMANTIC PHENOMENON. ESF IS IN FACT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BUT WE GIVE IT TO STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT COUNTRIES. THUS, HE CONTINUED, WHILE SECURITY ASSISTANCE HAS INCREASED, IT IS NOT ALL MILITARY AID. NEVERTHELESS, IF OUR FRIENDS REALLY NEED MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE IT.

12. AMBASSADOR BISHOP SAID THAT A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE LATTER IS SOMALIA, WHICH HAS RECENTLY BEEN ATTACKED BY THE LARGEST MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN BLACK AFRICA, ETHIOPIA HAVING BECOME THE LARGEST PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE. PAVLOV STATED THAT WE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERED ON EVALUATING THE SITUATION IN THE HORN. ETHIOPIA IS NOT TO BLAME, HE SAID. IT IS THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC FRONT THAT IS ACTIVE IN THE OGADEN, NOT ETHIOPIA. HE NOTED THAT THE US GAVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA LONG BEFORE THESE CURRENT EVENTS BEGAN, AND SAID THE USSR NEVER SHOPS FOR CUSTOMERS IN WEAPONRY. IF THE USSR'S FRIENDS ASK FOR AID THE REPLY IS OFTEN "YES", BUT NOT ALWAYS YES. WE CONSIDER THESE REQUESTS VERY CAREFULLY, HE ADDED, ESPECIALLY WHERE WE THINK IT MIGHT BE A DESTABILIZING FACTOR. THE U.S. MILITARY PACKAGE OF \$50 MILLION FOR SOMALIA WAS SET UP IN 1980, HE

SECSTATE WASHDC 11/ 3583 DTG:180138Z NOV 82 PSN: 012423
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SAID. *

13. BISHOP SAID THAT THIS FIGURE MUST INCLUDE A LOT OF NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AS THE CORRECT FIGURE IS \$20 MILLION, AND NONE WAS DELIVERED UNTIL AFTER SOMALIA WAS ATTACKED. RETURNING TO PAVLOV'S INITIAL THEME, BISHOP SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD WELCOME A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN THE HORN. PAVLOV SAID THE USSR WOULD ALSO. BISHOP STATED THAT WE ARE VERY CAREFUL TO INSURE THAT OUR ASSISTANCE DOES NOT LEAD TO ADVENTURISM BY THE SOMALIS, AS WE PROVIDE EQUIPMENT TO STRENGTHEN THEIR DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES ONLY.

14. PAVLOV SAID THE USSR BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. ACCEPTS TOO WILLINGLY THE STORIES OF SOME AFRICANS, LIKE THE SUDANESE, ABOUT SOVIET AND OTHER THREATS TO THESE COUNTRIES. THERE IS SIMPLY NO ETHIOPIAN/LIBYAN THREAT TO SUDAN, HE NOTED. BISHOP EXPRESSED HIS DISAGREEMENT ON THIS POINT, AND SAID QADHAFI'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE ACTIONS GIVE GOOD REASON FOR HIS NEIGHBORS TO BE FEARFUL. THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL LIBYAN EFFORTS TO USE SUDANESE DISSIDENTS TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT THERE.

15. PAVLOV SAID THAT THIS INFORMATION IS SPURIOUS, AND THAT IT IS "BOTTLED IN THE SAME FACTORY" AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN CANARDS ABOUT SOVIET DESIGNS ON THE SEA LANES. BISHOP SAID WE WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE ON THESE SUBJECTS. PAVLOV THEN THANKED BISHOP FOR MEETING WITH HIM AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO INCREASED CONTACT WITH HIM AND WITH OTHERS IN THE BUREAU. PAVLOV REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT CONFRONTATION CAN BE LESSENED IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE. BISHOP THANKED PAVLOV FOR THE VISIT, AND SAID HE ALSO BELIEVED WE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE DIALOGUE. WE WOULD WELCOME A MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP AS WELL, HE ADDED.

16. PAVLOV ASKED ONE LAST QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE U.S. ATTITUDE ON CUBANS IN ANGOLA? BISHOP REPLIED THAT WE BELIEVE CUBANS BELONG IN CUBA. PAVLOV STATED THAT THEY WERE INVITED BY A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. TO THIS REMARK

SECSTATE WASHDC 11/ 3583 DTG:180138Z NOV 82 PSN: 012423
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BISHOP REPLIED THAT OUR VIEW WAS THAT THEY WERE "INVITED" BEFORE A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT EXISTED. SHULTZ

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

November 18, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

NLRR 748-23-17-11-2
BY 16013 NARA DATE 12/4/15

SUBJECT: Mr. Vashchenko's Letter to the President

We have reviewed and concur with the assessment of the Department of State that the President should not respond to Peter Vashchenko's letter of September 8 and, that in view of Richard Burt's response to Mrs. Vaschenko's letter to the President of August 28, no further response is necessary.

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

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R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE VASHCHENKO'S
LETTER TO REAGAN

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Letter to the President from Mr. Peter Vashchenko

Mr. Vashchenko is one of six Russian Pentecostals who have been in refuge at our Embassy in Moscow since June 1978. Earlier this year, from July 1 until September 11, his wife Augustina and daughter Lilia staged a hunger strike to protest the continued Soviet refusal to permit the family to emigrate. During that strike, on August 30, Mrs. Vashchenko wrote the President. Because that letter was accusatory in tone and misleading in some of the facts it reported, the Department of State recommended that the President himself not respond to it. Instead, Assistant Secretary-Designate for European Affairs Burt sent an answer to Mrs. Vashchenko, emphasizing continued US Government concern for the Pentecostals' plight.

Mr. Vashchenko's letter is far more moderate in tone than his wife's. Although many of the concerns it raised were addressed in Assistant Secretary-Designate Burt's letter to Mrs. Vashchenko, the Assistant Secretary-Designate intends to send a slightly-reworded version of his earlier note to Mr. Vashchenko as well, in order to demonstrate that we continue to pay close attention to the Embassy Pentecostals' situation and are doing what we can to alleviate it.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Letter from Richard Burt to Mr. Vashchenko.
2. Letter from Mr. Vashchenko to the President.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR



United States Department of State

33

Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASE)

176032

NLRR 748-23-1713-0

BY CDR NARA DATE 12/4/15

Mr. Peter Vashchenko
United States Embassy
Moscow, USSR

Dear Mr. Vashchenko:

I am replying to your letter of September 8 concerning your wife's well-being and the continuing efforts of your family to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

The health of your wife and of your entire family is a matter of great concern to the United States Government. Our Embassy medical personnel will continue to provide you with the best treatment at their disposal. We share your desire to see your wife make a speedy recovery to full health, and we will take every appropriate step to help bring that about.

We likewise remain firm in our commitment to seek a favorable resolution to your emigration request. As I emphasized in my September 16 letter to your wife, the President and the Administration will continue to support your efforts. Also, we wish to reassure you that we will not compel you to leave the Embassy against your will.

I wish your wife a speedy recovery, and assure you once again that the United States is unwavering in its commitment to your emigration.

Sincerely,

R. Burt

Richard Burt, Designate

ACTION
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INCOMING
TELEGRAM 34

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11993 051023Z

6830 EUR2394

MOSCOW 11993 051023Z

6830 EUR2394

ACTION EUR-00

ACTION OFFICE SOB1-03

INFO SOL-01 OCT-01 /005 -A3

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SS-10 10-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00
HA-00 PA-01 SMS-01 USIE-00 /048 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9179
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL Leningrad
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USNATO

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NLRR 748-23-1774-9

BY LCB NARA DATE 12/4/0

171033
I AM AWARE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS TERRIBLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM. THE FACT THAT MY COUSIN, GRIGORII VASHCHENKO, HAS BEEN PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE TO THE FRG IS A VERY HELPFUL SIGN AND A POSITIVE INDICATION THAT AN ANSWER CAN BE FOUND.

IN ADDITION TO EXPRESSING MY APPRECIATION TO YOU IN THE LETTER I ALSO WISH TO INFORM YOU ABOUT A FURTHER COMPLICATION IN THE LIFE OF MY FAMILY, THAT IS, THE SERIOUS ILLNESS OF MY WIFE. AS YOU MAY KNOW, MY WIFE SUFFERS ULCERATED COLITIS AND FIBROMA. DOCTOR HAS TOLD US IN THE PAST (THREE YEARS AGO) THAT SHE REQUIRES SURGERY. IN RECENT MONTHS HER CONDITION HAS DETERIORATED, AND THE NEED OF SURGERY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE HAS BECOME QUITE PRESSING. ANY STEPS THAT YOU AND YOUR ADMINISTRATION CAN TAKE TO HELP US OUT OF THIS HORRIBLE SITUATION SO THAT WE CAN EMIGRATE TO THE WEST, OBTAIN THE NECESSARY MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR MY WIFE, AND FINALLY FIND PEACE OF MIND AND THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TO RAISE OUR CHILDREN ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BIBLE, WILL BE PROFOUNDLY APPRECIATED BY EVERY MEMBER OF MY FAMILY.

MAY GOD BLESS YOU AND GIVE YOU STRENGTH IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES. SINCERELY YOURS, PETER VASHCHENKO. END QUOTE.
ZIMMERMANN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 11993

DEPT FOR EUR/SOV

E.O. 12356 :N/A

TAGS :SHUH, CSCE, UR, US, SREF

SUBJECT : LETTER FROM PETER VASHCHENKO TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

REF : (A) MOSCOW 10969 (B) MOSCOW 10444

1. CONSOFF SEPTEMBER 30 DELIVERED ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE RICHARD BURT'S REPLY TO AUGUSTINA VASHCHENKO'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN OF AUGUST 28, 1982 (REF B). DURING THE MEETING, THE VASHCHENKO FAMILY CONFIRMED THE REPORT IN REF A THAT THEY HAVE SENT ANOTHER LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE LETTER, DATED SEPTEMBER 8 AND SIGNED BY PETER VASHCHENKO, IS MUCH Milder IN TONE THAN AUGUSTINA'S MISSIVE, BUT EXPRESSES THE SAME CONCERNS.

WE BELIEVE

THAT IT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED BY AS BURT'S REPLY AND WOULD SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY.

2. TEXT OF PETER'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 8 FOLLOWS:
QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

AS YOU KNOW, I, ALONG WITH MY WIFE, AUGUSTINA, AND TWO OF MY DAUGHTERS, LIUBA AND LILIA, AM RESIDING IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW BECAUSE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PERMIT US TO EMIGRATE. THE OTHER PART OF MY FAMILY OF 12 CHILDREN LIVES IN CHERNOGORSK.

WE ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU PERSONALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, AND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES SO THAT WE MAY FINALLY LEAVE FOR THE WEST.

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National Security Council
The White House

417 ✓

RECEIVED

Package #

7607

35

82 NOV 8 P 5: 58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u></u>	<u>m</u>	<u></u>
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>g</u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>NW 12</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8207607

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 04 NOV 82 09

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 03 NOV 82

VASHCHENKO, PETER

08 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM MR VASHCHENKO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 05 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

LORD

concurs 11/4/82

Amur memo Wheeler to Bremer

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8206212

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(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 11/08</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>NOV 17 1982</i>	<i>Clark approved</i>		
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>S NOV 17 1982</i>	<i>for signature</i>		
	<i>C 11/18</i>	<i>Wheeler's memo</i>	<i>11/18</i>	<i>RP, DO, MW</i>

~~DISPATCH~~

4W. 11/18

W/ATTCH

FILE

(PA) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

37

171034

PAGE 01
SIT: 03
DATE 11/22/82

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MESSAGE:

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O 181740Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0563

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 9391
USIA WASHDC 2828
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0835
COMMISSION USATO 2679
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3526
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2556
AMEMBASSY FCIN 3769
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5408
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4401
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4286
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8585
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7690
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8190
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8370
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7683
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 9815
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6593
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 14008
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: AFTER BREZHNEV: A CHANGE IN MOOD?

1. (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHILE WE WILL BE SORTING OUT FOR SOME TIME WHAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BREZHNEV'S PASSING WILL ULTIMATELY MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AN IMMEDIATE RESULT HAS BEEN A SUBTLE BUT PERCEPTIBLE UP-TURN HERE IN SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. THIS CHANGE IN MOOD HAS MANIFESTED ITSELF IN A NUMBER OF WAYS OVER THE PAST WEEK.
THE VISIT

3. THE PHENOMENON WAS FIRST APPARENT IN THE SOVIETS HANDLING OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S PARTICIPATION IN THE BREZHNEV FUNERAL. IN AN ATYPICAL DISPLAY OF FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS, THEY ACCOMMODATED VIRTUALLY OUR EVERY REQUEST, AND SEEMED ANXIOUS TO CREATE SITUATIONS (E.G. THE WEATH LAYING (CEREMONY) WHICH WOULD SET A POSITIVE TONE. THE

SOVIETS OF COURSE HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THE EVENT CAME OFF SMOOTHLY. BUT IN DEALING WITH US THEY SEEMED GENUINELY CONCERNED THAT OUR DELEGATION COME AWAY WITH A SENSE THAT THE REGIME COULD BE DEALT WITH.

THE MEDIA

4. THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE ADDED TO THIS IMPRESSION IN THEIR TREATMENT OF THE U.S. SINCE NOVEMBER 10. WHILE THERE ARE STILL PLENTY OF ARTICLES WITH NEGATIVE SLANTS TOWARD THE U.S., THE TONE IS MORE MUTED, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NONE OF THE AD HOMINEM ATTACKS ON ADMINISTRATION FIGURES SO COMMON IN RECENT MONTHS. MOREOVER, AUDIENCES ACCUSTOMED TO A STEADY DIET OF ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC WERE TREATED NOVEMBER 17 AND 18 TO NOT ONE BUT TWO SETS OF REPORTS STRESSING THE POSITIVE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

--- THE SOVIET EVENING NEWS PROGRAM "VREMYA" NOVEMBER 17 FEATURED A REPORT ON THE ROLE OF A SOVIET SATELLITE IN DETECTING A RECENT PLANE CRASH IN THE U.S. PRAVDA THE NEXT DAY CARRIED A TASS PIECE ON THE SAME INCIDENT UNDER THE HEADLINE "A POSITIVE RESULT" WHICH QUOTED NASA OFFICIALS' GLOWING DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MUTUAL BENEFITS OF SUCH COOPERATION.

-- IN A SEPARATE ITEM THE SAME EVENING, VREMYA

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BROADCAST AN INTERVIEW WITH THE U.S. AND SOVIET CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S.-SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL (USTEC), WHICH MET NOVEMBER 16-17 IN MOSCOW. AGAIN, THE ACCENT WAS ON COOPERATION AND THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF EXPANDING U.S.-SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES. PRAVDA NOVEMBER 16 REPORTED ON THE MEETING UNDER THE TITLE "IN THE INTEREST OF SOVIET-U.S. COOPERATION." SIGNIFICANTLY, PRAVDA'S COVERAGE DID NOT REPORT TOUGH REMARKS ON THE U.S. MADE AT THE NOVEMBER 16 USTEC LUNCH BY SOVIET DEPUTY FORMIN KORNIYENKO (SEPTEL).
PRIVATE CONTACTS

5. OUR MOST VIVID IMPRESSIONS OF THE CHANGE IN MOOD HAVE COME FROM FACE TO FACE CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS, NOTABLY DURING A NOVEMBER 17 RECEPTION AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FOR U.S. AND SOVIET USTEC PARTICIPANTS. THE MOOD WAS DECIDEDLY UPBEAT DESPITE

MOSCOW 4008

DTG: 181740Z NOV 82 PSN: 013182

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0564

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 9392

USIA WASHDC 2829

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COMMISSION USKATO 2680

AMEMBASSY LONDON 5507

AMEMBASSY PARIS 2657

AMEMBASSY BONN 3700

AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5409

AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4402

AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4287

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8586

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7691

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8191

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8371

AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7684

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 9816

AMCONSUL MUNICH 6594

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 14008
KORNIYENKO'S SPEECH THE DAY BEFORE AND A RESPONSE
NOVEMBER 17 BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN (MOSCOW 13935).
SOVIETS PRESENT EXPRESSED APPARENTLY GENUINE
GRATITUDE FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S PARTICIPATION
IN BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL, AND TENDED TO SEE THE
PRESIDENT'S LIFTING OF PIPELINE SANCTIONS AS A
POSITIVE, IF INSUFFICIENT, GESTURE IN THE RIGHT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DIRECTION. MANY SPOKE OF THEIR HOPES THAT THESE AND
OTHER RECENT CHANGES (THEY RARELY REFERRED DIRECTLY
TO THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP) MARKED A "BOTTOMING OUT"
OF THE DOWNTURN IN THE RELATIONS OR "FIRST STEP"
TOWARD GETTING THINGS BACK ON TRACK. IT HAS BEEN
A LONG TIME SINCE SUCH SENTIMENTS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED
AT EMBASSY GATHERINGS, AND EVEN LONGER SINCE WE HAVE
SENSED THERE WAS ANY CONVICTION BEHIND THEM.
SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS EVEN APOLOGIZED TO US
FOR THE HARSH TONE OF KORNIYENKO'S SPEECH.
CODEL DOLE

6. CODEL DOLE MEMBERS HAVE ALSO FOUND THEIR
INTERLOCUTORS CORDIAL, WITH EMPHASIS ON SOVIET
DESIRE TO REVIVE BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS,

CULTURAL AND PARLIAMENTARY CONTACTS, AND EVEN TRADE.
FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET KUZNETSOV APPEALED TO THE CODEL
TO RATIFY SALT II, ITB TREATY AND PNE TREATY.
ARBATOV, WHO HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ACERBIC IN
RECENT MONTHS, SIMILARLY STRESSED CONTINUITY
IN RELATIONS BUT SAID HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY PESSIMISTIC.
COMMENT

7. MUCH OF WHAT IS CURRENTLY SHOWING UP AS A CHANGE
IN MOOD TOWARD THE U.S. IS CLEARLY NOT RATIONAL.
THE BASIC ISSUES HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE BREZHNEV'S
DEATH, AND KORNIYENKO'S SPEECH, NOT TO MENTION WHAT
WE HAVE HEARD FROM ANDROPOV, SHOWS THAT AT THE POLICY
LEVEL THIS IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. THAT BEING SAID,
BREZHNEV'S VERY DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE, HIS QUICK
SUCCESSION BY ANDROPOV, THE HIGH-LEVEL OF THE U.S.
FUNERAL DELEGATION AND OUR EMPHASIS ON FINDING WAYS
TO EXPAND THE COOPERATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP,
THE LIFTING OF PIPELINE SANCTIONS, AND THE PRESENCE
OF 230 U.S. BUSINESSMEN AND A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
IN MOSCOW A WEEK AFTER BREZHNEV'S DEATH HAVE CREATED
HERE AN AURA OF EXPECTANCY ALL THE MORE PALPABLE
FOR THE PRE-NOVEMBER 10 SENSE OF STASIS WHICH PRECEDED
IT. HOW DURABLE THE PHENOMENON WILL PROVE VERY
MUCH REMAINS TO BE SEEN. END COMMENT. HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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39

171035

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4009
SIT198 DATE 11/22/82

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O 161751Z NOV 82

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0565

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 9393

AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4403

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8192

AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4288

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8587

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7692

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1773

AMEMBASSY PARIS 2658

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0509

AMEMBASSY ROME 7987

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1557

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USMISSION USNATO 2681

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 14009

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/28/88

TAGS: EEWT, PFOR, UR

SUBJECT: US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL -- FIRST

THOUGHTS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL MEETING-
STARTING THE DAY AFTER BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL AND THE VICE
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY
ANDROPOV - COULD NOT HELP BEING A REMARKABLE EVENT.
BOTH THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN AND THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS

WAXED EUPHORIC IN THEIR HOPE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN OVERALL
RELATIONS AND IN BILATERAL TRADE, DESPITE THE LACK OF
CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF ANY CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY OR ANY
FURTHER CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY BEYOND THE PRESIDENT'S
DECISION TO REVISE EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS. SOVIET
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO SURPRISED AND
TURNED OFF THE AMERICAN SIDE WITH A HARD-LINE POLITICAL
SPEECH ATTACKING U.S. POSITIONS IN STANDARD TERMS; EVEN
THE SOVIET TRADE OFFICIALS TOLD US THEY WERE EMBARRASSED.
KORNIYENKO'S FAUX PAS CAUSED THE AMBASSADOR TO BOYCOTT
THE SOVIET DINNER THAT NIGHT. THE FOLLOWING DAY THE
AMBASSADOR RESPONDED WITH A STRONG REBUTTAL WHICH DETAILED
OUR POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHILE OUTLINING
THE LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN U.S. TRADE POLICY. ALTHOUGH
PRIVATE MEETINGS BETWEEN USTEC MEMBERS AND SOVIET TRADERS
ARE CONTINUING, ONLY A FEW CONTRACTS THAT HAPPENED TO BE
READY HAVE BEEN SIGNED. THE NEXT MEETING IS SCHEDULED
FOR 1983 IN THE UNITED STATES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE GENERAL MEETING OF THE US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC
COUNCIL, AN ORGANIZATION CONSISTING ON THE U.S. SIDE OF
SEVERAL HUNDRED U.S. FIRMS AND ON THE SOVIET SIDE OF KEY
ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND FOREIGN TRADE ORGANIZATIONS,
OPENED NOVEMBER 16 WITH UNUSUAL ANTICIPATION REGARDING THE
FUTURE OF US-USSR BUSINESS RELATIONS. NEWS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S CONDOLENCE MESSAGE, HIS SIGNING THE CONDOLENCE
BOOK AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY ON SATURDAY, THE LIFTING OF THE
DECEMBER 1981 AND JUNE 1982 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS,

MOSCOW 4009 DTG: 161751Z NOV 82 PSN: 013189
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE RELEASE OF LECH WALESA, AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY IN THE FUNERAL HAD
REACHED MOST OF THE AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS ENROUTE TO
MOSCOW. AT BREAKFAST TUESDAY IN SPASO HOUSE THE
AMBASSADOR GAVE THE AMERICAN DIRECTORS OF THE COUNCIL (AND
SENATOR DOLE AND CONGRESSMEN FRENZEL, BROYHILL, BREAUX
AND BEREUTER) A GENERAL PICTURE OF THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE FUNERAL AND SET OUT FOR THEM THE OVERALL U.S. POLICY
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION.

4. USTEC CO-CHAIRMAN AND FORMER ARMCO CHAIRMAN WILLIAM
VERITY OPENED THE PROCEEDINGS WITH AN UPBEAT SPEECH
EMPHASIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADE, PARTICULARLY
FOLLOWING THE BUSH-ANDROPOV MEETING. VERITY MENTIONED, WITH-
OUT CRITICIZING, BOTH THE AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND
SITUATIONS AND THE RESULTING U.S. SANCTIONS. THE SOVIET
SPEAKERS AT THE TWO-DAY USTEC PLENARIES DID NOT SAY
ANYTHING NEW ABOUT ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL POLICY. DEPUTY
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS KORNIYENKO AND LATER USA/

MOSCOW 4009 DTG: 161751Z NOV 82 PSN: 013189

40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4009
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0566

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 9394
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4404
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 6193
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4289
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8588
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7693
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 6373
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7686
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8816
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6596
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5411
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1938
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1959
USMISSION USBERLIN 5923
AMEMBASSY BONN 3772
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2710
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1822
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1244
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5509
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0521
AMEMBASSY MADRID 1884
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1356
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1774
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2659
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0510
AMEMBASSY ROME 7988
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1558

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USMISSION USHATO 2682
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 14009
CANADA INSTITUTE ARBATOV EVEN SAID THAT THE MAIN LINES
OF SOVIET POLICY WOULD CONTINUE AS THEY HAD UNDER BREZHNEV.
MANY AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS SEEMED TO AGREE WITH THE SOVIET
ARGUMENT THAT THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO US-SOVIET TRADE
RELATIONS IS THE QUOTE UNRELIABILITY UNQUOTE OF THE UNITED
STATES AS A SUPPLIER, AND THAT THIS DEPENDED UPON U.S.
GOVERNMENT POLICY. MOST SOVIET AND AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS
WERE PLEASED TO HEAR OF THE PENDING BILL IN CONGRESS ON
THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS AND REPRESENTATIVE FRENZEL'S
BRIEF STATEMENT THAT HE HOPED THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD
APPLY THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT IN THE COMING YEAR
QUOTE MORE CLEARLY AND CONSISTENTLY THAN IT HAD IN THE

PAST UNQUOTE. EFFORTS BY SPEAKERS TO BALANCE THIS
VIEW, SUCH AS SENATOR DOLE'S AND REPRESENTATIVE FRENZEL'S
RELATIVELY BRIEF REFERENCES TO JACKSON-VANIK AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, OR REPRESENTATIVE BEREUTER'S STATEMENT THAT HIS
CONSTITUENTS NEEDED GRAIN SALES BUT WOULD NOT MAKE THEM
AT ANY POLITICAL PRICE, DID NOT DISPEL THE EUPHORIA.

5. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO'S SPEECH AT LUNCH
NOVEMBER 16 MISCUED BADLY ON SEVERAL COUNTS. IT WAS
DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL,
(BLAMING THE UNITED STATES), WAS ON THE WHOLE OFFENSIVE TO
MOST OF THE AMERICANS PRESENT, ATTACKED DEFENSE SECRETARY
WEINBERGER BY NAME SEVERAL TIMES, AND WAS TEDIOUSLY LONG
(WELL OVER AN HOUR), CAUSING MANY BUSINESSMEN (INCLUDING
A FEW SOVIETS) TO LEAVE BEFORE THE NEXT SPEAKER.

6. IN RESPONSE TO KORNIYENKO'S REMARKS, THE AMBASSADOR DID
NOT ATTEND THE SOVIET-SPONSORED DINNER THE SAME EVENING,
GETTING WORD TO DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER SUSHKOV
WHY HE WAS STAYING AWAY. (SUSHKOV HAD BEEN TOLD ON
NOVEMBER 9 THAT HOSTILE REMARKS DURING THE COUNCIL MEETING
WOULD MAKE IT VERY HARD FOR BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
PARTICIPANTS TO ATTEND LATER MEETINGS, AND HE HAD ASSURED
ECON COUNSELOR THAT NO ATTACKS WOULD OCCUR.) AT THE DINNER
VERITY READ THE SECRETARY'S LETTER ON THE MEETING,
SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER KOMAROV DELIVERED A
FAIRLY INNOCUOUS ADDRESS, AND SENATOR DOLE SPOKE IN FAVOR
OF PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND INCREASED TRADE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. THE FOLLOWING DAY, AFTER PLENARY SESSIONS ON THE FIVE-
YEAR PLAN AND ON AGRI-BUSINESS AND GRAIN TRADE, AND AFTER
A TYPICALLY EFFUSIVE SPEECH BY ARMAND HAMMER AT THE
(RE)DEDICATION OF THE MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER
AT LUNCH NOVEMBER 17, THE HIGH POINT OF THE GENERAL
MEETING WAS REACHED IN THE CONCLUDING AFTERNOON PANEL
DISCUSSION. AFTER REMARKS BY MICHAEL FORRESTAL, THE
AMBASSADOR MADE A DIRECT RESPONSE TO KORNIYENKO
(MOSCOW 13935). HE SET OUT THE U.S. POSITION ON WHY
DETENTE WENT SOUR AND WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN
FORCED TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSE EFFORT. HE REFERRED
SPECIFICALLY TO AFGHANISTAN, POLAND, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN POINTING OUT SOVIET-IMPOSED OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENT
IN BOTH TRADE AND OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED
STATES. HE CONCLUDED WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE RESTRAINTS
WE HAVE IMPOSED ON ASPECTS OF TRADE AND THE OPPORTUNITIES
THAT NEVERTHELESS REMAIN. USA/CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR
ARBATOV FOLLOWED, WITH A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE INTENDED TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

41

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4009 DTG: 181751Z NOV 82 PSN: 013191
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AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1559

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USMISSION USNATO 2683

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 14009
UNDERLINE THE SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO AVOIDING
WAR. HE CITED TRADE AS A BASIS FOR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE,
AND EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM WHETHER U.S. "GESTURES"
(SANCTION-LIFTING, FUNERAL ATTENDANCE) WERE MORE THAN
A MANEUVER TO CALM THE WEST EUROPEANS. CONGRESSMEN
BEREUTER AND FRENZEL GAVE VERY BRIEF PRESENTATIONS,
SUPPORTING THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS BUT STRESSING THE
VALUE OF UNINTERRUPTED TRADE, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE.
TWO SPEAKERS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE --
MINEEV OF CAPITALIST IMPORTS DEPARTMENT AND KICHEVNIKOV
OF LEGAL DEPARTMENT -- STELLED OUT THE PRACTICAL AND
SERIAL LOSSES TO THE UNITED STATES OF BROKEN CONTRACTS,

BUT DID SO INOFFENSIVELY. SUSHKOV DIPLOMATICALLY SUMMED
UP THE PANEL DISCUSSION AND THE ENTIRE MEETING BY
INVITING U.S. FIRMS TO PURSUE TRADE WHERE LEGALLY
POSSIBLE, AND URGING THE COUNCIL AND ITS SUBSIDIARY
BODIES TO FUNCTION MORE PROMINENTLY THAN OVER THE PAST
FOUR YEARS. HE DECLARED THE MEETING TO HAVE BEEN USEFUL
FOR BOTH SIDES.

8. PRIVATE MEETINGS FOR SOME OF THE 230 U.S. BUSINESS
EXECUTIVES WHO ATTENDED THE GENERAL MEETING ARE CONTINUING
ON NOVEMBER 18. WE HAVE SO FAR HEARD OF ONLY A FEW
CONTRACTS, THOSE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED ANYWAY,
THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNED SO FAR. GIVEN THE EXCITEMENT OF
BEING IN MOSCOW AT AN HISTORIC TIME, WE DOUBT THAT MANY
BUSINESSMEN WILL LEAVE DISAPPOINTED. AT A SPASO RECEPTION
WEDNESDAY NIGHT, EMBASSY OFFICERS MADE EFFORTS TO REDUCE
THEIR EUPHORIA BY PUTTING THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW
DAYS INTO THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
THAT HAS NOT UNDERGONE (AT LEAST NOT YET) ANY
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE. WE ARE NOT SURE IT WORKED. HARTMAN

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42

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date 18 November 1982

To: Admiral Poindexter

Subject: Soviet Press

Sir: Attached for your information are two recent Soviet press articles which we have translated. I think you may find them of interest.

Article #1: Brezhnev's last speech, 28 Oct 82, to Soviet military leadership. In general an overview of the plateful of problems facing the SU (foreign affairs - economic - military). Some points of interest include:

- desire to normalize relations with China
- fairly routine portrayal of US as villain
- acknowledgement of economic problems
- what I would interpret as a "velvet glove"

criticism of the armed forces; i.e., we (the Party) are sparing nothing on your behalf, and you (the military) had better be worthy of it. Also a hint of concerns over armed forces morale.

Article #2: Lead article in SShA journal for Oct 82, written by Arbatov. Succinctly outlines the current Soviet approach to Western Europe. Cleverly written in comparatively scholarly style. Of interest is his appeal to W. Eur. as a superpower in its own right.

Paul D. Mitchell

Paul D. Mitchell
LTC, USA
Chief, MOLINK

THE MEETING OF MILITARY LEADERS AT THE KREMLIN

-Pravda, 28 Oct 82

A meeting of the Soviet Army and Navy leaderships took place on 27 October in the Kremlin. Commanders and members of military councils, (heads of political directorates and chiefs of staffs of military districts, groups of forces and fleets), and also senior personnel of the Ministry of Defense central apparatus attended.

The participants at the meeting greeted comrades L.I. Brezhnev, U.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, N.A. Tikhonov, D.F. Ustinov and K.U. Chernenko with tumultuous, prolonged applause.

At the presidium also were: the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, L.B. Smirnov; Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov; First Deputy Ministers of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov and S.L. Sokolov; Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, General of the Army A.A. Yepishev.

The General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, made a speech at the meeting and was greeted with wild applause.

The Speech by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev

Dear Comrades! Military Friends!

I accepted with great satisfaction Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov's offer to meet with the leadership of the Armed Forces. Such meetings are always beneficial. The more so now when the world situation is so complicated.

The second year following the 26th Party Congress is running out. This period was rich with major events within the country and on the international arena. Life confirmed the correctness of the evaluations and conclusions made by the congress, and the farsightedness of its decisions. Certainly, new questions are also appearing that must be resolved without delay.

This applies to foreign policy as well. The Soviet Union is the largest Socialist state, and the whole world is watching it. This gives our foreign policy special meaning and significance. The 26th Congress outlined an extensive program in the struggle for peace. It follows the spirit of Lenin's legacy and it merits general recognition.

We live, comrades, in complicated times. The international situation obliges us to double, to triple our efforts in the struggle to preserve peace and lessen the threat of nuclear war that is hanging over mankind. In this struggle, we must widen our interaction with all to whom peace on earth is dear. And we are obligated to untiringly strengthen the country's defense and maintain the greatest vigilance.

Lately, the Central Committee of the Party has frequently pointed out that the international situation continues to become more complicated. US ruling circles have opened a political, ideological and economic offensive on socialism and have carried the intensity of their own military preparations to an unprecedented level.

The practical preparation for the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons into European NATO countries is underway.

One must view the Israeli aggression into Lebanon as a consequence of the political course taken by the Americans. It is clear that in the final analysis, this was an American inspired affair. The unfolding situation in a number of areas of Africa, Asia and Central America is very complex. The reason for this is the same attempt to impose American dictates.

The popular masses on all continents are angrily protesting against Washington's aggressive policy, which threatens to push the world into the flames of nuclear war. The adventurism, the crudity and the open egoism of this policy are provoking growing indignation in many countries, including among US allies.

In such an environment, it is certainly very important how our relationships

with other countries will take shape. Relations with China have no small significance. We sincerely want to normalize relations with this country and are doing everything in our power in this regard. They are now also saying in Beijing that normalization is desired. Thus far, no fundamental changes in Chinese foreign-policy have been evident. However, we must not ignore the new features that are appearing.

Two lines are now taking shape in world politics.

The line of the US and those who follow her is to increase tension, and to maximally intensify the situation. They dream of the political isolation and the economic weakening of the USSR and her friends. They unfurled an unprecedented arms race, especially in the nuclear area, and are trying to achieve military superiority. Having embarked upon this course, imperialism is irresponsibly playing with the fates of peoples.

Our line is detente and the strengthening of international security. We will not retreat from this, we will increase our efforts, and maintain the initiative in international affairs.

You understand that more than words are necessary in politics. Policies are effective when they rest upon the real economic and military power of the state, the unbounded support of the people, and the firm friendship and military alliance of allies and friends. We have all of this. And we are untiringly making efforts in this direction.

About internal tasks. Our Motherland is greeting the 60th Anniversary of the USSR in the golden age of its power.

The economic and social progress of the country is at hand. Industry is working with a good rhythm. It is able to create everything necessary, supported almost entirely by its own, native raw-material base.

Certainly, everything is not going smoothly; there are problems and shortages. Metals, fuel and transport remain bottlenecks. Our economic executives still

46

have to work seriously on the elimination of shortages. The situation in capital construction is slowly improving, although the measures taken recently are already producing results.

There is great work taking place in agriculture towards the future elimination of grain purchases abroad, and the full satisfaction of the population's growing needs. We are placing exceptional importance upon the Food Program adopted by the May CC plenum.

Comrades! Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov continually reports to me on the condition of our Armed Forces. Yes, and I myself, as the saying goes, because of the responsibility of my position, am constantly working on the questions of strengthening the Army and Navy, and I know how things are going with you.

You are working with great effort. This year's results confirm that there are unquestionable successes in the combat readiness and training of the Armed Forces. Large-scaled operational, technical and organizational measures have been carried out which have raised the Army's and Navy's combat power. I note with satisfaction the positive results of the large-scale maneuvers of recent years through whose results important conclusions for the future have been made.

Our people love their Armed Forces, and are confident of their constant readiness to defend the socialist Motherland. They value the courage and selflessness displayed in fulfilling its military duty.

Everyone sees that the Soviet Armed Forces are a mighty factor for peace and security and a reliable means for bridling aggressive forces. And the people spare nothing to ensure that they are always equal to their tasks. We are equipping our Armed Forces with the most modern weapons and military technology. The party CC is taking measures so that you want for nothing. And the Armed Forces must always be worthy of this care.

The time is now such that the level of combat readiness in the Army and Navy must be even higher. As a result of growing requirements, we must endeavor constantly, with exceptional responsibility to improve military preparedness.

Then nothing will catch us unaware.

We must be able to act in accordance with the very latest achievements in military science and art. It is important to persistently strive for positive results in military training. In this regard, special attention should be put on the command and control of troops.

It is exceptionally important to skillfully master your weapons, to be able to fully utilize their combat capabilities.

The Soviet Army must be equal to all tasks, equipment, structure and methods of training. It must meet contemporary problems. And you, comrades, bear the responsibility for this.

It is necessary to talk especially about the further strengthening of the Armed Force's material base. The struggle in the military-technical field is sharply intensifying and frequently acquires a fundamentally new character. It is intolerable to lag behind in this area.

We expect that our scientists, designers, engineers and technicians will do everything possible to successfully resolve all tasks in this field.

It goes without saying that the party-political work of educating the troops must be reinforced. High moral spirit has always been the most powerful weapon of our Army. This is still true today to a large extent.

Care for the soldier and officer, and for the structuring of the force have unchangeably been and remain at the center of our Party's and the Soviet government's attention. And you must consider this mission one of the most important in the future as well.

The Party Central Committee is sure, comrades, that the tasks standing before our Armed Forces will be successfully resolved. The tempered, highly-conscious command and political cadre of the Army and Navy, selflessly devoted to the Motherland, the high qualifications and rich experience of the members of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the efficient work of the entire

Ministry, whose rudder of leadership is in the reliable hands of a true son of the Leninist party, a member of the Politbureau of the CC, CPSU, our military friend and comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov: these are guarantees to all of this.

Comrades! You have great work before you, new studies and campaigns. We are certain that they will be yet another significant step in the preparation of the Armed Forces. In the name of the Party Central Committee and myself, I personally express my certainty that you will successfully handle these assigned tasks. In this regard, you have the constant support and help of the CC.

Allow me to wish you new successes in your critical military labor.

The speech of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev was heard by those present with great attention and was repeatedly interrupted by exuberant applause.

Member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU, Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, D.F. Ustinov, spoke on the condition of military and political training in the Army and Navy and on the problems of its further improvement.

The Main Political Issue

by G. A. Arbatov

(USA 10-82, in Russian)

Naturally, various points of view are expressed in the West about the current international situation. One of these is that the two "superpowers," the US and the Soviet Union, are responsible for the increased tension and heightened threat of war, and other countries can but observe their policies with disappointment and fear. During a recent discussion with specialists from a number of Western European countries, I had the opportunity to dispute such views, and I would like to set forth here some of the ideas which were expressed.

First, I said to the group that Europe is not a kernel which has fallen between two huge millstones, the US and the USSR. And it is not a disinterested observer but an active participant, an important player and not an object, in the complex process of forming the future of this continent, and very likely the future of the entire world as well.

And in this regard, Western Europe cannot be deprived of either its roles and responsibilities, or its services. But its own burden of errors and transgressions may not be removed either. In particular, rather influential circles in the Western European countries at one time literally throbbed with feigned hysteria about the "credibility of the American nuclear guarantees," the European military balance, and a number of other things. As a

50

result, the important problems of European security--the problem of intermediate range nuclear weapons, as well as problems of disarmament in general--were driven into a labyrinth from which it is now more difficult to escape than previously.

But no matter how or for what Western Europe uses its influence today, for good or bad, its increased strength has become indisputable. Only through thoughtlessness can Western Europe still be taken for some sort of "junior partner." Today, Western Europe produces goods and services worth \$300 billion per year, which is more than the US, and it exports three times as much. Nine countries of the region have already surpassed the US in national per capita income, and a tenth, France, is overtaking it. I am convinced that Western Europe, especially now, has outstripped the US in the sense of political prestige, and, I would say, political potential, i.e., the capacity for political influence. Of course America has incomparably more nuclear weapons, but no one has yet found any ways to use them that do not threaten suicide. In addition, two Western European nations are also nuclear powers. And in the opinion of many specialists Europe, not America, constitutes NATO's main strike force in terms of conventional arms and armed forces.

In summary it may be said that the might, power and influence of Western Europe are very great. Perhaps it still needs to realize fully its new role in the world. But it cannot escape this. Not someone's good wishes, but the interests of its own security, self preservation, and survival demand such a realization. Obviously

these are all matters which cannot be placed in another's hands, and it seems to me that the Europeans are beginning to understand this better and better.

The second, and perhaps main, thing that I considered important to emphasize in discussions with European colleagues, is that they should not use the expression "the two superpowers" too loosely. The differences and asymmetries here are simply glaring. This begins with the main asymmetry in basic intentions, and approach to politics and international relations. The present US administration constructs its approach on very simple premises: that allegedly the root source of all troubles and evils in the world is the Soviet Union, socialism, and communists, and that if we can be done with them everything will come to order. This is why its entire policy is subordinated to the goal of opposing that "eternal evil." An economic, technological, ideological and political war has been declared, and widespread military preparations are being made against this "evil." The US is trying by persuasion and force to involve also its allies in these matters, which constitute essentially a policy of absolutely unlimited enmity and confrontation.

Soviet foreign policy is built on a completely different basis. If we were to briefly sum up what is said on this matter in the most important Soviet party and state documents and declarations, we would proceed as follows: Mankind is currently encountering serious threats and complex problems--the threat of nuclear war, the dangers and costs of the arms race, the existence

of many regional conflicts and crises, as well as energy, resources, ecological, food supply, and a great number of other problems. We believe that their solution demands, as an absolute minimum, rejection of the unlimited enmity between states, and insofar as possible their concerted actions and equal cooperation. We have proposed and continue to propose this to the US, Western Europe, Japan, and China--to the entire world, to all states.

"The Earth is our home, our past, present and future, and there is no more noble task than to safeguard our planet from the conflagration of nuclear war, to preserve its beauty, and to multiply its riches." Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has made this humanitarian appeal to the whole world. And Soviet proposals, aimed at strengthening peace, halting the arms race, achieving disarmament and cooperation are in complete accord with this appeal. From Washington, unfortunately, we constantly hear entirely different appeals.

How is it possible to put the two superpowers on the same level, and ignore such deep differences in their approach to the main tasks of politics?

I recount all this by no means merely for the sake of restoring fairness. Very often attacks on the USSR and attempts to make it "co-responsible" along with the US for today's international difficulties have as their reason not error or forgetfulness, but definite ideological and political designs. But now the time has come for reappraising many values, and for determining political priorities precisely, among which preventing a nuclear catastrophe

is becoming most urgent.

This threat is real. Moreover, it has intensified. Let no one reassure himself with the hope that, perhaps, an unlimited arms race, saber rattling, and intoxication with military power will not end up in a great calamity. So far a number of powers have in fact gotten away with such a neanderthal approach to international affairs!

Encountering such arguments, I cannot help but recall times of war when I had occasion to read, as well as hear from eye-witnesses, about several instances when pilots of downed aircraft fell from great heights without parachutes and survived. In one case, the fall was cushioned by a wave of air caused by the explosion of the aircraft which had fallen to the earth seconds earlier. In another the pilot fell into a hillside covered with deep snow, and slid tens if not hundred of meters. These are facts, but only an absolute madman would on this basis decide that one might so simply jump from an aircraft in flight.

I think that it would be almost as insane to believe that, under conditions of a fierce nuclear arms race, we can continue with impunity to live in the future, since, they say, we have managed to survive the first thirty-seven years of that race.

First of all, those years were far from idyllic for the world as a whole. Hundreds of military conflicts flared up during their course, blood was shed, and on many occasions strategic nuclear forces were brought to a state of heightened readiness. Many times the world came to the very brink of the abyss, and

even looked over the edge. And what saved it was not only, and perhaps not even so much, universal wisdom as good luck. But, alas, mankind cannot always be so lucky.

Second, each subsequent year and, all the more, decade, the arms race will be more dangerous than the previous. I have in mind the incredible increase in the quantity and improvement in the quality of nuclear weapons, and the appearance of new systems which threaten to sharply destabilize the world situation, making it still more complicated to achieve agreements on disarmament.

I also have in mind that the continuing arms race makes the further proliferation of nuclear weapons around the globe still more likely, and thereafter unavoidable.

It is all the more dangerous that there remain a great number of hotbeds of tension and conflict situations in the world. Recent events in the Middle East, the South Atlantic and southern Africa, and the Iran-Iraq War remind one of this. Under conditions of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, conflicts of this sort might rapidly develop into a catastrophe, and make inescapable that which today seems unthinkable.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev not long ago compared the present state of international relations to a fork in the road. Approaching it one must decide where to go further. And a great deal depends on this decision; essentially everything, the entire future of human civilization.

Now not only governments but people as well must make that choice. Millions and millions of people, whose future and fate

are at stake. Judging by all appearances, this fact is penetrating more and more deeply into the broadest circles of world public opinion. Does not the anti-nuclear movement which developed in 1981-1982 in Europe and the US bear witness to this? This movement is unusual in its scale and breadth of scope, and in the speed at which it has spread. It has united old and young, workers and doctors, businessmen and clergy, prominent social figures and many millions of those simple people who once were named the "silent majority."

But this majority clearly has ceased being silent. And these people are not so simple. Moreover, perhaps they have turned out to be more insightful and farsighted than many governments and specialists.

Of course the day of final reckoning has not yet come. And various points of view are possible here. One is that we are witnessing an upsurge of a powerful but not very long-lived social movement, whose participants will ~~time~~ after a while, and whose enemies will find ways to quiet the indignation, changing nothing in essence, as sometimes seafarers did by pouring several barrels of oil on the waves which surrounded their ship.

But there is another view which I personally hope is no less valid. It is that we may be witnessing the beginning of a fundamental rethinking of the realities of the nuclear era by huge masses of people. Why this beginning came at just this time, during the past two years, is another story. Perhaps this is an example of where, on the one hand, quantity (quantity of many

things, including stockpiled nuclear weapons and disappointed hopes that at long last something would be done in this area) caused a transition in the consciousness of millions of people to a new quality. (Translator's note: The transition from quantity to quality is a standard Marxist theme.). And on the other hand, President Reagan and his administration helped, having torn the shroud from contemporary militarism and its policies, displaying them in all their repulsive and terrible nakedness. Now attempts are being made to cover up this nakedness again and somehow powder it up. But it will hardly be easy to force people to forget rapidly that which they have heard and seen from America's leadership during the past year and a half.

If things are such, then perhaps a "silent revolt" is beginning against nuclear war, nuclear arms, and militarism itself. This would be a natural and healthy reaction of people to the terrible threat to their very existence as a civilization, and perhaps as a biological species as well.

In addition, if we are really at such a beginning, we must not forget that we are talking about a necessarily most complicated process, since tasks have been put on history's agenda which are unprecedented, just as their solutions are unprecedented. On the contrary, the entire experience of history would seem to speak of the hopelessness of attempts to solve these problems: wars have always existed, people have always developed, improved and used weapons, and attempts to put an end to this have never succeeded.

All this is true of course. But at the same time, one other thing is also true: the absolute need to accomplish the unprecedented in order to escape the unprecedented. Mankind can hardly permit itself yet another failure in this matter.

Those who understand this have very powerful enemies. On their side are the force of ancient traditions and customs, the centuries old inertia of mastered and seemingly time tested approaches to the problems, and modes of thought. And they are also greatly helped by the fact that they often seem to others to be realists, while advocates of disarmament come across as people who, although well intentioned, are hopeless dreamers with their heads in the clouds.

In reality, the progress of science and technology, in this case the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, has overturned the world of customary ideas. That which thousands of years ago was realism--in particular reliance on force and weapons as means of attaining security and a guarantee of survival--has become empty illusion, while that which was a beautiful but meaningless dream--a world without wars and without weapons--is not only real, but is the only way to preserve civilization and save mankind.

And this, in the final analysis, has been and remains the main political issue.

G. A. Arbatov

Translated by: P. Mitchell