

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR (11/30/1982-12/02/1982)

Box: RAC Box 23

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/7/2015

File Folder USSR (11/30/82-12/2/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

282

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171060	CABLE	STATE 318006	1	11/11/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-19-1-1		
171061	MEMO	G. ROBINSON TO W. CLARK RE JOINT US-USSR CRISIS CENTER	2	11/4/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-19-2-0		
171062	MEMO	W. SCOTT THOMPSON TO G. ROBINSON RE US-USSR CRISIS CENTER	2	10/19/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-19-3-9		
171063	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE SOVIET MEETINGS	1	11/24/1982	B1
171064	REPORT	RE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET MEETINGS	2	ND	B1
171065	CABLE	STATE 333962	2	12/1/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-19-5-7		
171066	CABLE	STATE 335261	4	12/2/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-19-6-6		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/7/2015

File Folder USSR (11/30/82-12/2/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

282

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171067	CABLE	MOSCOW 14561	3	12/2/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-19-4-5		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



8236816

FKP

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

8210

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

November 30, 1982

12/7/82

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Soviet Response to Presidential Condolence
Message

Attached is the Soviet response to the President's
message of condolence on the occasion of the death of
President Brezhnev.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive SecretaryAttachmentSoviet Acknowledgement of Presidential
Condolence Message~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~7820
8070

8236816

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.


The Honorable
George P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

November 29, 1982

Dear Mr. Shultz:

I have been instructed to ask you to convey to President R. Reagan the appreciation by V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of his expression of condolences on the death of L.I. Brezhnev.

Sincerely,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

3

171060

PAGE 01
EOB766

SECSTATE WASHDC 8006
AN008585

DTG: 111338Z NOV 82 PSN: 001887
TOR: 315/1748Z CSN: HCE205

DISTRIBUTION: NSCS-01 /001 A1

DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 STER-01 MYER-01 GUHN-01 RAY-01 KRAM-01
PIPE-01 LINH-01 ROBN-01 /009 A1

WHSR COMMENT: FYI

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:

FLASH
DE RUEHC #8006 3151353
Z 111338Z NOV 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH 9955

~~SECRET~~ STATE 318006

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, UR, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CONDOLENCE MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-2319-1-1

BY 1605 NARA DATE 12/7/15

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO VASILIIY VASIL'YEVICH KUZNETSOV FROM THE PRESIDENT.
3. BEGIN TEXT. PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT LEONID IL'ICH BREZHNEV. PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WAS ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT FIGURES FOR NEARLY TWO DECADES. MAY I ASK YOU TO CONVEY OUR SYMPATHIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO CONVEY THROUGH YOU TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE THE STRONG DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES TO WORK TOWARD AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONDUCTING RELATIONS WITH THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE AIM OF EXPANDING THE AREAS WHERE OUR TWO NATIONS CAN COOPERATE TO MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN
END TEXT. SHULTZ
BT

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 30 NOV 82 15

TO SHULTZ, G FROM DOBRYNIN, ANATOLY F
BREMER

DOCDATE 29 NOV 82

30 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL CONDOLENCE MSG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8236816 LOG 8207820 8208070 NSCIFID (H / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
--------------------	----------	-----------------	-----	-----------

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Director



82 NOV 30 12: 08

November 4, 1982

6 NOV 1982

171061

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM:

Gilbert A. Robinson *gar*
Acting Director

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-2379-2-0

SUBJECT:

Joint US-USSR Crisis Center

BY 608 NARA DATE 12/7/15

SUMMARY:

Fear of accidental nuclear holocaust is the single most pervasive element motivating those who champion a nuclear freeze. To alleviate that fear and thereby reduce the psychological and emotional momentum of the nuclear freeze movement, a major U.S. Government initiative is needed. This memorandum suggests that the President take the lead in proposing the establishment of a Joint US-USSR Crisis Center, situated in a neutral country, and staffed by bilingual U.S. and Soviet diplomats and military personnel. The Center would serve as a safety valve in times of crisis by providing constant and expert liaison between the superpowers. END SUMMARY.

In recent months Senators Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn have voiced support for a Joint US-USSR Crisis Center, to reduce the chance of accidental nuclear war and to demonstrate to our arms control critics that we are serious about seeking institutional structures to preserve peace. I feel very strongly that this idea deserves serious consideration at the most senior levels of the Administration.

The existing "Hot Line" system was an innovative step more than two decades ago toward the type of liaison which could prevent unintentional nuclear war. Its introduction was warmly received by the media, academia, and the general public because it was perceived as a peace-ensuring advancement. But that system today is both politically and technologically antiquated. I believe we should greatly expand the hot line concept by moving toward a Joint Crisis Center, in which secure voice and instant facsimile transmissions would be available at the state of the art level.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The essential first step is for the President to focus on this initiative and decide to propose it to the Soviets. We hope that the Soviets will understand that the establishment of such an institution would be in their own best interests and would be forthcoming when we get down to planning the Joint Crisis Center. However, even if we do not get the Soviets to agree, we will have made a major impact on world opinion by demonstrating both U.S. commitment to world peace and efforts to avoid nuclear war.

Since the current working draft of the President's November 18 speech refers very clearly to Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and specifically to the study of improvements in the existing "Hot Line" communications system, I recommend that proposing the establishment of a Joint US-USSR Crisis Center be considered by your speechwriters. A serious proposal of this kind will remind the world that the President is a man of peace, a President of peace. USIA could communicate this news to the world, as we did with the zero option speech a year earlier, when we reached more than 200 million people. It could have an effect similar to the zero option speech.

I asked my staff for a memo which presents counter arguments and answers to those arguments. That memorandum is attached.

Attachment:

As stated

cc: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148 23 / 9-3-9

BY 1003 NARA DATE 12/7/85

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1982

171062

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gilbert A. Robinson
Deputy Director

FROM: P - W. Scott Thompson

SUBJECT: US-USSR Crisis Center

REFERENCE: Your memorandum of October 18

Int T2

Below are listed three possible criticisms of the proposal for a US-USSR Crisis Center and answers for each:

1. Criticism: A Crisis Center would require the use of the most advanced U.S. technology in a neutral country jointly with the Soviets, thereby compromising US technology and consequently US intelligence.

Response: The United States should have the knowledge and ingenuity to control the nature and use of communications technology in a crisis center so that US communications systems and intelligence procedures are not compromised. If this is not possible, doubt is cast on whether other major arms control initiatives including verification can be attained.

2. Criticism: The Center implies a Soviet role in resolving crises around the world in the 1980s and 1990s. In many of the potential crisis spots the Soviets have no role today and it is not in our interest that they obtain one (e.g. the Middle East, Southern Africa, Central America.)

Response: The United States should not necessarily conclude -- certainly not in public -- that establishing a Crisis Center sets any precedent for a Soviet role in crises or trouble spots around the world. As the President has said, arms control is an overarching concern of this nation that must proceed despite other crises. In any event the United States would make clear, if press coverage did not, that a crisis center is a unique response to a unique problem.

3. Criticism: Is the fear of accidental nuclear war truly the driving force behind the freeze movement? What about the perceived nuclear arms buildup, the policies and goals of the US and Soviets? Perhaps a crisis center is merely peripheral to, and a distraction from, the necessity of an immediate freeze, no first use of nuclear weapons, and complete disarmament.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Response: The fear of accidental nuclear war is indeed a major element in the freeze movement that would be addressed both literally and in symbolic terms by a crisis center. Such a center would help ease anxieties among the general public here and abroad and among some activist supporters of the freeze and anti-nuclear movements. The Center demonstrates American maturity and commitment to preventing the accidental outbreak of war.

~~SECRET~~

TO CLARK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
FROM ROBINSON, G 12/7/15 618
RECEIVED 30 NOV 82 12
DOCDATE 04 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT

USSR

SUBJECT: JOINT US - USSR CRISIS CENTER

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH Robinson

DUR Myer

BOVERIE Kraemer

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MW

8150

10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By 208 NARA, Date 12-7-15

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *WP*

SUBJECT: State Analysis of Soviet Internal Policies

Attached for your information (Tab I) is a State Department analysis of the results of the recent Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings.

Attachments:

Tab I State's memorandum of November 24, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/7/2015

File Folder

USSR (11/30/82-12/2/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

282

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171063	MEMO BREMER TO CLARK RE SOVIET MEETINGS	1	11/24/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/7/2015

File Folder

USSR (11/30/82-12/2/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

282

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171064	REPORT RE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET MEETINGS	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

445
1

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 8150

8 130 P 2: 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>		<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>T</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Dated

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15
ID 8208150

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 24 NOV 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

12/7/85
DOC DATE 24 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: STATE ANALYSIS RE SOVIET CENTRAL COM & SUPREME SOVIET MTGS / DOMESTIC
ASPECTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 29 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

COMMENTS

REF# 8236302

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Clark

x

11/30

For info

C

12/6

Noted by McFarlane

EP

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

H

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

16

17065

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 39621 DTG: 010303Z DEC 82 PSN: 031324
SIT868 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 335/0528Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBBSIT KEMP
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS----CHECKLIST-----RTHR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #3962 3350313
O 010303Z DEC 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-19-5-7

BY 1070 NARA DATE 12/7/15

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0469

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4674
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 5249
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 333962
NODIS
LONDON FOR FRASURE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XJ
SUBJECT: MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

REF: MOSCOW 14293

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY MAY INFORM SOVIETS THAT WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS IN DECEMBER 7 DISCUSSIONS WILL BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CROCKER, AF S OFFICE DIRECTOR DAN SIMPSON, AND EUR/SOV OFFICER LARRY NAPPER. WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS WILL ARRIVE IN MOSCOW ON DECEMBER 6 VIA BA710 AT 4:55 P.M.

3. DURING AMERICAN-SOVIET SYMPOSIUM ON CONTEMPORARY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HELD AT BERKELEY NOVEMBER 10-13,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES DIRECTOR ANATOLY GROMYKO EXTENDED INVITATION TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER THROUGH AF S DIRECTOR SIMPSON TO VISIT THE INSTITUTE DURING THE MOSCOW TALKS. IF EMBASSY BELIEVES SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, CROCKER WOULD BE PREPARED TO PAY BRIEF, INFORMAL CALL AT INSTITUTE TO MEET WITH GROMYKO AND HIS COLLEAGUES, AS APPROPRIATE. (MOST USEFUL

INSTITUTE PARTICIPANTS AT SYMPOSIUM FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA PERSPECTIVE WERE SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW BORIS G. PETRUCK AND DEPARTMENT HEAD GLEB B. SMIRNOV.)

4. CROCKER SIMPSON RETURN TRAVEL IS AS FOLLOWS.
DECEMBER 8: DEPART MOSCOW VIA OK893 AT 1455, ARRIVING PRAGUE 1535. DEPART PRAGUE AT 1700 VIA BA701, ARRIVING LONDON 1800. DECEMBER 9: DEPART LONDON AT 1115 VIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 39621 DTG: 010303Z DEC 82 PSN: 031324

PA107, ARRIVING DULLES 1430.

5. IF CONVENIENT FOR EMBASSY MOSCOW, NAPPER PLANS TO
STAY THROUGH DECEMBER 9 FOR CONSULTATIONS. DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 39621 DTG: 010303Z DEC 82 PSN: 031324

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

18

171066

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 52611 DTG: 020137Z DEC 82 PSN: 033040
SIT865 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 336/0423Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBSIT KEMP

EOB: /COMMASSIST/

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----RTHR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5261 3360204
O 020137Z DEC 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 335261 TOSEC 160024

~~NO DIS~~

GENEVA FOR USSTART USINF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PPDC, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO THE
PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 20 LETTER

REF: STATE 326684

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY:

ON DECEMBER 1 SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN DELIVERED TO
UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DESIGNATE BURT AN ORAL MESSAGE "FROM THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP" IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF
NOVEMBER 20 ON NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
CBMS TO DEPUTY CHAIRMAN KUZNETSOV IN THE LATTER'S
TITULAR CAPACITY AS ACTING HEAD OF THE SUPREME SOVIET.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, WHICH WE ARE PROVIDING THE
WHITE HOUSE, AND A TRANSLATION OF THE MESSAGE FOLLOW.
END SUMMARY.

3. THE BASIC TONE OF THE MESSAGE WAS SERIOUS, BUT THE
SOVIETS MAKE CLEAR THEY WILL VIEW PROGRESS TOWARD
AGREEMENT ON US-SOVIET CBMS AS RELATED TO PROGRESS ON
SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS UNDER NEGOTIATION IN START AND
INF. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN REINFORCED THIS POINT IN HIS
OWN COMMENTS, ALTHOUGH HE REFUSED TO DEFINE THE DEGREE OF
"RELATIONSHIP" AND DID NOT EXCLUDE PROGRESS ON BOTH CBMS
AND THE REST OF THE START/INF SUBJECT MATTER.

CONTENT:

DECLASSIFIED

174823-19-6-6

BY KOD NARA DATE 12/4/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 52611 DTG: 020137Z DEC 82 PSN: 033040

4. IN THE MESSAGE THE SOVIET LEADERS EMPHASIZE THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS IN START AND INF IN PARTICULAR, ASSERTING: "THE SOVIET UNION IS EMPHATICALLY FOR IMMEDIATE, CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE ACTIONS TO LOWER, AND TO LOWER RADICALLY, THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES." THEY DESCRIBED THE PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION AS ONE OF "APPROXIMATE PARITY THAT STILL EXISTS" -- A REFUTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE FIRST SECTION OF HIS NOVEMBER 22 SPEECH ON DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL.

5. THE SOVIETS MAKE NOTE OF THEIR OWN CBM PROPOSALS IN GENEVA, BUT STATE THEIR NEGOTIATORS WILL LISTEN CAREFULLY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. EAGLEBURGER TOLD DOBRYNIN WE WOULD BE CONSIDERING THE SOVIET CBM PROPOSALS AND EXPLAINING OUR OWN IN GENEVA., THEY STRESS, HOWEVER, SUCH MEASURES MUST NOT BE SOLELY COSMETIC EFFORTS TO CALM JUSTIFIABLE PUBLIC CONCERNS IN THE WEST OVER THE ARMS RACE (A CHARACTERIZATION WITH WHICH BURT TOOK ISSUE FOR THE RECORD). IN THAT REGARD, THEY STATE THE "NEW STEPS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT," I.E., THE MX CSB DEPLOYMENT DECISION, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CONSISTENT WITH HIS ASSURANCES OF SEEKING

SECSTATE WASHDC 52611 DTG: 020137Z DEC 82 PSN: 033040
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR. THUS, THE CBM PROPOSALS' "REAL MEANING WILL BE JUDGED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WITH ACCOUNT TAKEN OF THE U. S. POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF ISSUES BEARING ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS."

TO BE TONE AND FORMAT:

6. THE MESSAGE IS INTERESTING IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. THOUGH THE LOGIC OF ITS ARGUMENTS TRACKS WITH SUCH EARLIER SOVIET PUBLIC COMMENTARY AS PRAVDA'S QUITE

NEGATIVE TREATMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, ITS TONE IS NOTICEABLY RESTRAINED. IT IS FREE OF DIRECT OR SHARP CRITICISM. THE INDIRECT REFERENCE TO MX, FOR INSTANCE, DOES NOT REPEAT THE PRAVDA ASSERTION THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION RUNS COUNTER TO THE SALT AGREEMENTS, THUS CALLING INTO QUESTION THE ADMINISTRATION'S SINCERITY ON ARMS CONTROL. ITS LANGUAGE SUGGESTS A CAREFUL EFFORT TO CONVEY A SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE. WHILE IN NO WAY SUGGESTIVE OF ANY SOVIET COMPROMISE ON MAJOR ISSUES, IT DOES EXPRESS CAUTIOUS AND MEASURED INTEREST.

7. WE ALSO NOTE THAT IN THE PRESIDENT'S PAST CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE LATE SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV, REPLIES CAME IN THE FORM A SIGNED LETTER. AT THIS STAGE OF THE SUCCESSION IN MOSCOW, IT WAS APPARENTLY DECIDED A SIGNED FORMAL RESPONSE FROM A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL, WHETHER KUZNETSOV, ANDROPOV OR ANOTHER, WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE.

8. BEGIN TEXT:

ORAL MESSAGE OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 52611 DTG: 020137Z DEC 82 PSN: 033040

THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF NOVEMBER 20, 1982 HAS BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THE THOUGHT EXPRESSED IN THAT MESSAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT TASK BEFORE THE GOVERNMENTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAN THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE PURSUED BY THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIET STATE.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE USSR AND THE USA CAN AND MUST MAKE THEIR DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLVING THIS TASK BY PRACTICAL STEPS AIMED AT ENDING THE ARMS RACE, AND ABOVE ALL THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION - AN APPROXIMATE PARITY OF FORCES THAT STILL EXISTS - OFFERS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR MAKING A RESOLUTE PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION AND FOR REACHING AGREEMENTS AT THE CURRENT SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND ON THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE.

IT IS A DIRECT OBLIGATION OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES NOT TO LET THIS OPPORTUNITY SLIP BY AND THUS TO MEASURE UP TO THE HIGH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTINY OF MANKIND THAT THE USSR AND THE USA BEAR BEFORE THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

CONVERSELY, UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO COME TO AGREEMENT, CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE IN A FUTILE ATTEMPT TO GAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE, WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN A STILL GREATER DESTABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION AND IN A MOST DANGEROUS AGGRAVATION OF TENSIONS.

THE SOVIET UNION IS EMPHATICALLY FOR IMMEDIATE, CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE ACTIONS TO LOWER, AND TO LOWER RADICALLY, THE LEVEL OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES, AND BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO AS A WHOLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WOULD BE OF POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE TO WORK OUT AND ADOPT ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, TO REDUCE THE RISK OF ANY SORT OF ACCIDENT OR MISCALCULATION CAPABLE OF CAUSING A CONFLICT EVEN WHEN NEITHER SIDE WANTED IT.

IN THIS REGARD WE WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT THERE IS A WHOLE RANGE OF PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIET SIDE EARLIER IN THE AREA OF MILITARY DETENTE AND STRENGTHENING OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, CONCERNING VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD. ALL THOSE PROPOSALS REMAIN VALID.

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THIS RESPECT HAVE ALSO BEEN SUBMITTED BY US QUITE RECENTLY AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. WE EXPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DULY APPRECIATE THESE PROPOSALS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE READY TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO WHAT IS GOING TO BE SAID BY THE U. S. SIDE IN DEVELOPING THE THOUGHT EXPRESSED IN A GENERAL FORM IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 20 WITH REGARD TO HAVING BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AND LESSENING THE ELEMENTS OF SURPRISE.

WE HAVE NO PREJUDICE WHATSOEVER IN THIS RESPECT. THE MAIN CRITERION OF PRACTICAL USEFULNESS OF ANY MEASURES MUST BE, IN OUR VIEW, ONE THING: WHETHER THEY CORRESPOND TO THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 52611 DTG: 020137Z DEC 82 PSN: 033040

WHETHER THEY SERVE TO ADVANCE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE OBJECTIVES OR ARE DESIGNED SIMPLY TO CALM DOWN THE PUBLIC, LEGITIMATELY CONCERNED OVER THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TO ACCELERATE THE ARMS RACE.

WE MUST SAY QUITE FRANKLY: THE NEW STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 22 CAN IN NO WAY BE CONSIDERED BY US AS BEING IN ACCORD WITH THE ASSURANCE CONTAINED IN HIS MESSAGE REGARDING U. S. DEDICATION TO ADOPTING MEASURES FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THEREFORE, THE REAL MEANING OF THE PROPOSALS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THAT THE U. S. SIDE INTENDS TO PUT FORWARD AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE JUDGED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WITH ACCOUNT TAKEN OF THE U. S. POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES BEARING ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

THE PRESIDENT CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS FULLY DETERMINED TO GO ITS PART OF THE WAY TOWARD REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS LEADING TO A LESSENING AND, ULTIMATELY, TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE.

THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PEOPLES AND THE PEOPLES OF OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT THE SAME FROM THE LEADERSHIP OF THE USA. DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 52611 DTG: 020137Z DEC 82 PSN: 033040

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

22

171067

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG: 021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033902
SIT312 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 336/1746Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB5 MRR
EOB: ERB, PLATT, PASTOR, RENT, OPLIN, HUNT, LARR, COCH, SICK
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST-NODIS DISSEMULITZULTZ--R--IDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #4561/01 3361226
O 021221Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-19-7-5

BY LEOB MAR DATE 12/2/85

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0985

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 14561
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO ON
MIDDLE EAST
REF: STATE 332882

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR HIGHLIGHTED CURRENT U.S. THINKING ON THE ME, DRAWING ON POINTS IN REFTEL. KORNIYENKO SAID THE MAIN QUESTION ON HIS MIND WAS WHETHER THE U.S. AND USSR COULD RETURN TO A COOPERATIVE APPROACH IN SEEKING AN ME SETTLEMENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT UNSC 338 CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW CONSIDERED THIS TO ENCOMPASS U.S. AND USSR. KORNIYENKO FORESHADOWED WHAT PROBABLY WILL BE TOLD TO FEZ FOLLOW-UP GROUP, I.E., THAT THE SOVIETS FAVOR A SEPARATE PALESTINE STATE. HE CHARACTERIZED THE PRESIDENT'S ME PLAN AS A RETROGRESSION FROM CAMP DAVID ON THIS KEY QUESTION. KORNIYENKO DID NOT RULE OUT A PALESTINE ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SO LONG AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WAS SEPARATE STATE. ON IRAN-IRAQ, KORNIYENKO AGREED WITH OUR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSESSMENT THAT A NEGOTIATED PEACE WAS THE OBJECTIVE BUT HAD NO IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO BRING IT ABOUT, GIVEN IRAN'S INTRANSIGENCE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY POL COUNSELOR, MET FOR ONE HOUR WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO ON DEC. 1. PRESENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE WERE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE MFA USA DIVISION TARASENKO AND AN INTERPRETER, WHO TOOK NOTES BUT DID NO TRANSLATING SINCE KORNIYENKO UNCHARACTERISTICALLY CONDUCTED THE ENTIRE MEETING IN ENGLISH.

4. THE AMBASSADOR OPENED BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ABOUT TO RECEIVE ARAB VISITORS TO PRESENT THE

FEZ SUMMIT IDEAS. KORNIYENKO SAID THEY WERE THE SAME AS THE GROUP THAT HAD VISITED WASHINGTON, SPARRING A LITTLE ABOUT WHETHER THE PLO HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE PLO REP HAD NOT ATTENDED THE MEETINGS AND NOTED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP VISITING MOSCOW WAS DIFFERENT ALTHOUGH THE SAME COUNTRIES WERE REPRESENTED.

5. THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE PROPOSAL; HE INDICATED THAT IT HAD SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE PARTIES TO TALK SERIOUSLY. IN THIS RESPECT WE ALSO SAW SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE FEZ PROPOSALS, ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T AGREE WITH EVERYTHING THE ARABS SOUGHT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST WAY TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS AT THIS STAGE WAS TO BRING JORDAN INTO A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL. THIS COULD ENABLE THE PARTIES TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS IN A WAY THAT HAD SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

6. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED TO LEBANON AS AN EXAMPLE OF A SITUATION THAT COULD ARISE IF NOTHING WERE DONE TO BRING THE PARTIES INTO A GENUINE EFFORT TO REACH SETTLEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THE CURRENT EFFORTS OF AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER AND STATED OUR OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON ALONG THE LINES OF REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESENCE

MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG: 021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033902

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF OUR TROOPS WAS TEMPORARY, TO ENABLE LEBANON TO POLICE ITS OWN TERRITORY, WHICH COULD FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. IN CONCLUSION, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT CONTINUING CONTACTS CARRIED OUT BY HABIB AS WELL AS OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE FEZ VISITORS CONVINCED US THAT THE ARABS ARE PREPARED FOR RATIONAL DIALOGUE. WE HOPED THEIR VISITS TO OTHER CAPITALS WOULD ALSO PRODUCE PROGRESS TOWARDS SETTLEMENT.

7. KORNIYENKO SHOWED NO INTEREST IN U.S. TROOPS IN LEBANON OR EFFORTS TO EASE LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. HIS ATTENTION WAS CLEARLY ON THE IMPENDING MOSCOW VISIT OF THE FEZ GROUP. HE WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FORMAL COMMITMENT FOR THE ARABS TO MAKE FURTHER CONTACTS OR DID THEY JUST INTEND A SINGLE ROUND? THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE KNEW OF NO COMMITMENT FOR FURTHER MEETINGS, BUT NOTED THAT HUSSEIN WOULD BE COMING TO THE U.S. ON A BILATERAL VISIT AFTER STOPPING IN MOSCOW AND BEIJING. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE ARABS WOULD HOLD FURTHER MEETINGS AMONG THEMSELVES AFTER THE ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WAS COMPLETE, BUT HE HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR PLANS.

MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG: 021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033902

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG: 021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033916
SIT311 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 336/1749Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBS MRR
EOB: ERB, PLATT, PASTOR, RENT, OPLIN, HUNT, LARR, COCH, SICK
WHSR COMMENT: NODISLIST-----NODIS DISSEMULTZULTZ--R--IDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #4561/02 3361227
O 021221Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0986

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 14561
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO ON

8. KORNIYENKO THEN RAISED THE MAIN QUESTION HE WANTED TO EXPLORE: WHAT ABOUT THE U.S. AND SOVIET ROLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST? HE SAID THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WORKED TOGETHER IN THE PAST, AND HAD ALSO PARTICIPATED IN FOUR-POWER EFFORTS. THEN THE U.S. HAD PUT EVERYTHING ASIDE CONCERNING U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS AND WENT ITS SEPARATE WAY TO CAMP DAVID.

9. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED BY RECALLING THAT WE HAD STATED OUR VIEW THAT WE HAD NOTHING AGAINST A SOVIET ROLE, AND THAT WE RECOGNIZED THE MIDDLE EAST'S IMPORTANCE FOR THE USSR. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM HAD STARTED A PROCESS IN WHICH THE TWO KEY PARTIES BOTH SOUGHT OUR HELP. KORNIYENKO SAID PRESIDENT CARTER'S MEMOIRS SHOWED THAT CAMP DAVID WAS A U.S. INITIATIVE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID WE HAD PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE ONCE THE TWO PARTIES CAME TO US, BUT OUR BASIC APPROACH HAD BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT UNTIL SADAT MADE HIS BOLD MOVE. KORNIYENKO NOTED WRYLY THAT INDEED THE U.S. APPROACH HAD BEEN DIFFERENT, AS MANIFESTED IN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OCTOBER 1, 1977, JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE AMBASSADOR SAID OUR PREVIOUS APPROACH HAD NOT PRODUCED RESULTS; AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET PREFERENCE, IT WAS FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO AGREE ON PRINCIPLES AND THEN SELL THEM TO THE PARTIES. WE DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO A FORMULA THAT ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT. WE DID NOT, HOWEVER, OBJECT TO THE ARABS COMING TO MOSCOW; ANYTHING THAT COULD BE DONE TO PERSUADE THE PARTIES TO TALK TO EACH OTHER WOULD BE POSITIVE.

10. KORNIYENKO RETURNED TO HIS MAIN THEME. HE SAID THE U.S. COULD NOT DEPRIVE THE SOVIETS OF A ROLE IN THE ME, NOR COULD THE SOVIETS DEPRIVE THE U.S. OF A ROLE. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE U.S. WAS PREPARED FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES TO COOPERATE IN A SETTLEMENT EFFORT. THE

AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT SPECIFIC IDEAS THE SOVIETS WERE OFFERING; IT WAS HARD TO REACT IN THE ABSTRACT. KORNIYENKO SAID HE WANTED TO KNOW "IN PRINCIPLE" WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD COOPERATE. FURTHER PRESSED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO ELABORATE, HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED NOT ONLY IN ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES, BUT IN IMPLEMENTATION. HE NOTED THAT THE PLO POSITION WAS NOT WHAT IT HAD BEEN 10 YEARS AGO. THE AMBASSADOR SAID ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES HAD A WAY OF SCARING OFF THE PARTIES; WE WERE TRYING TO PROMOTE A PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE. KORNIYENKO NEVERTHELESS INSISTED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR SHOULD AGREE ON A BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT THAT THEY COULD BOTH USE TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES TOWARDS SETTLEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT THIS BASIS WOULD BE, TO WHICH KORNIYENKO REPLIED "AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE." (COMMENT: KORNIYENKO'S REMARK, MADE WITHOUT CONSCIOUS IRONY, SHOWS HOW FAR THE SOVIETS HAVETOCOME TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTOR TO THE PROCESS.)

11. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS HAD NOT EMBODIED THIS AS A PRINCIPLE, SINCE TO DO SO WOULD HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE DIALOGUE WE HOPED TO PROMOTE. KORNIYENKO DESCRIBED THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION AS A RETROGRESSION FROM THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, WHICH AT LEAST HAD KEPT A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE AS ONE OPTION. AFTER SOME INCIDENTAL DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER CAMP DAVID HAD PRODUCED THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, WHICH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE AMBASSADOR DISPUTED, KORNIYENKO CAME BACK TO HIS POINT ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION. HE DREW THE AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION TO THE LANGUAGE OF RES. 338 WHICH SPECIFIED THAT NEGOTIATIONS AFTER A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD OCCUR UNDER "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." AFTER SOME SPARRING ABOUT THE MEANING OF THIS PHRASE, KORNIYENKO MADE IT PLAIN THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE WORD "AUSPICES" MEANT SOMEBODY BESIDES THE PARTIES THEMSELVES AND THE WORD "APPROPRIATE" REFERRED TO THE U.S. AND USSR. HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WORKED TOGETHER, WE WOULD BE FURTHER ALONG THE PATH TO PEACE.

12. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT KORNIYENKO WOULD FIND THE FEZ GROUP'S ASSESSMENT OF INTEREST. THE ARABS APPROVED OF MANY OF THE THINGS THE U.S. HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DO. NOW THE PLO MIGHT BE MOVING TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. KORNIYENKO INTERJECTED THAT THE OTHER SIDE WAS MOVING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION, PERMANENTLY. THE AMBASSADOR DISAGREED WITH THAT CHARACTERIZATION. KORNIYENKO DECLARED THAT THE USSR HAS SAID SINCE 1947

MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG: 021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033916

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG:021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033911
SIT310 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 336/1750Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

NOT MAKING ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL, JUST EXPLORING. THE
AMBASSADOR UNDERSTOOD THIS. KORNIYENKO SAID HE WOULD
BE PREPARED TO LET US KNOW HOW THE DISCUSSIONS HAD
GONE WITH THE ARABS.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBS MRR
EOB: ERB, PLATT, PASTOR, RENT, OPLIN, HUNT, LARR, COCH, SICK
WHSR COMMENT: NODISL1\$T-----NODIS DISSEMHULTZULTZ--R--IDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #4561/03 3361228
O 021221Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0907

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 14561
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KORNIYENKO ON
THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE A STATE AND THERE SHOULD BE A
SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE. NOW THE U.S. WAS SAYING
IT DIDN'T AGREE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. THE AMBASSADOR
SAID THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE GROUP CLAIMING EXCLUSIVE
REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIANS DID NOT RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AS A STATE. IN OUR VIEW,
HAVING JORDAN SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS WAS A
PRACTICAL WAY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. WE WERE PRAGMATISTS.
IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO INSIST ON A SEPARATE
PALESTINIAN STATE, WE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO WORK
IN PARALLEL TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. KORNIYENKO EXPRESSED
HIS DEEP DISAGREEMENT; HE SAID IF THE PALESTINIANS
ARE DENIED THE RIGHT TO THEIR OWN STATE ACCORDED TO
THEM IN 1947 BY A UN RESOLUTION, THERE WOULD NEVER BE
PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THE SOVIET INTEREST IN
A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE WAS BASED ON AN ANALYSIS
OF THE SITUATION; IT WAS NOT AN EXPRESSION OF SOME
CRUCIAL SOVIET NEED TO HAVE A TINY PALESTINIAN STATE.

13. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD
BE ADVISING THE ARABS TO STAND PAT ON THE PALESTINE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

QUESTION. KORNIYENKO SAID IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF
ADVICE, IT WAS A MATTER OF UNDERSTANDING HOW TO SOLVE
THE PROBLEM. THE PALESTINIANS HAD A RIGHT TO A STATE.
SUCH A STATE WOULD REPRESENT NO DANGER TO ISRAEL.
THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SINCE THE AREA
WAS PART OF TRANS-JORDAN IN 1947, THE PALESTINIAN
ASPIRATIONS COULD BE SATISFIED BY ASSOCIATION WITH
JORDAN. KORNIYENKO SAID THIS MIGHT SATISFY THE 1947
RESOLUTION EXCEPT THAT THERE WERE MAPS ATTACHED TO IT
SHOWING TWO SEPARATE STATES. ISRAEL SHOULD BE HAPPY
THAT THE ARABS SOUGHT ACCEPTANCE OF THE 1967 BORDERS
RATHER THAN THE 1947 BORDERS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE
WOULD REPORT KORNIYENKO'S VIEWS BUT WONDERED WHETHER
ANY COMMON U.S.-SOVIET POSITION WAS REALLY FEASIBLE
SO LONG AS THE USSR WANTED TO GO FURTHER THAN THE
PARTIES WERE WILLING TO GO. KORNIYENKO SAID HE WAS

14. ON IRAN-IRAQ, THE AMBASSADOR DREW ON REFTEL POINTS,
INDICATING THAT HE FAVORED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT DID
NOT HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE WITH EITHER PARTY. KORNIYENKO
AGREED WITH THIS POSITION, BUT DIDN'T SEE WHAT THE
SOVIETS COULD DO. HE FELT IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO SETTLE
THE WAR ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY ALGERIA, ALTHOUGH
IRAQ HAD NOT ACTUALLY INFORMED THE SOVIETS OF THIS.
BUT IRAN REMAINED UNYIELDING. IF MOSCOW WERE TO
APPROACH TEHERAN, THE IRANIANS WOULD REGARD THEM WITH
GREAT SUSPICION AND THIS WOULD SIMPLY MAKE IT HARDER
FOR AN INTERMEDIARY TO WORK TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
IN ANSWER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONS, KORNIYENKO
AGREED THAT IRAN'S OBJECTIVES WERE PROBABLY TO OVERTHROW
SADDAM HUSAYN, BUT HE DOUBTED THEY WOULD SUCCEED.
HOWEVER, IT MIGHT TAKE A LONG TIME FOR BOTH PARTIES TO
RECOGNIZE THEIR INABILITY TO DEFEAT THE OTHER.
KORNIYENKO CONCURRED IN THE AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION
THAT IRAN'S POSITION HAD HARDENED LATELY; IT WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY A BOOST TO KHOMEINI THAT IRANIAN
TROOPS WERE ON IRAQI SOIL.
HARTMAN

MOSCOW 4561 10002 DTG:021221Z DEC 82 PSN: 033911
END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~