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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

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File Folder USSR (12/3/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

283

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171068	MEMO	S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. SIMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE TV INTERVIEW R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-20-2-8	1	12/3/1982	B1
171069	MEMO	TO S. KRAEMER RE BACKGROUND ON GRAPHICS USED IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-20-1-9	1	11/30/1982	B1 B3
182658	WASHFAX RECEIPT		1	11/30/1982	B3
171070	CHARTS	RE DEFENSE SPENDING	6	ND	B1
171071	CHARTS	RE FORCES	5	ND	B1
171072	CABLE	STATE 337051 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-20-5-5	1	12/3/1982	B1
171073	CABLE	STATE 337622 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-20-6-4	1	12/3/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171074	MEMO	R. SIMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE JOHN HART INTERVIEW (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	23	12/3/1982	B1
PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-20-7-3					

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449

1

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8305

82 DEC 3 P 3: 59

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	RCM HAS SEEN	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171068	MEMO	1	12/3/1982	B1
	S. KRAEMER THROUGH R. SIMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE TV INTERVIEW			

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8305

mw
2

MEMORANDUM

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INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

171068
December 3, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT B. SIMS *DS*

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: Your TV Interview on US/Soviet Defense Spending

The attached are provided for your use in preparing for your TV appearance on the issue of US and Soviet defense spending as described in the President's address of November 22:

1. A memo from a CIA official to me describing the November 22 charts, but denying that the CIA provided us with any projection data. (I earlier reported CIA's very strong staff-level concerns about the hypothetical/classified projected data and the chart.)
2. The CIA data provided to me (through OSD/PA&E and directly) on projected and past US and Soviet defense spending and the actual charts used in the TV address on past and projected defense spending; also OMB's backup data on US defense spending as percentage of federal budget outlays. Also attached is a State Department reprint of the President's speech incorporating the charts.
3. The OSD FY 83 Posture Statement charts on defense outlays. These charts, particularly I-5 and I-20, support the charts used by the President.
4. Additional charts prepared by OSD, for rebutting the freeze argument and for use with NATO, on the strategic and conventional military balance.

Attachments

Tab I CIA Memo Describing November 22 Charts
Tab II CIA Data on Projected and Past US/Soviet Defense Spending; OMB's Backup Data on US Defense Spending; State's Reprint of President's Speech
Tab III OSD FY 83 Posture Statement Charts
Tab IV Additional Charts from OSD on Rebuttal of Freeze Argument

cc: Dick Boverie

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Declassify on: OADR

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CRET
NLR-74K-23-20-1-9

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BY *GV* N R A DATE *11/13/12*

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171069	MEMO TO S. KRAEMER RE BACKGROUND ON GRAPHICS USED IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH	1	11/30/1982	B1 B3

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Dist
NLZ-748-23-20-28

BY CN NARA DATE 11/13/12

30 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Syeh Kraemer
National Security Council

FROM: J. Michael Martin, Chief
Comparative Analysis Branch, EA/SOVA

SUBJECT: Background on Graphics Used in the President's Speech

1. The dollar cost of Soviet defense activities measures what it would cost using prevailing US prices and wages, to produce and operate a military force of the same size and with the same weapons inventory as that of the USSR. When compared with US defense outlays, these dollar costs can be used to measure the overall magnitude and trends of the defense activities of the two countries, in terms of resource inputs. They are derived with a "building block" methodology--detailed estimates of the quantities of each Soviet defense activity are multiplied by the appropriate prices and the results are aggregated. All national security programs that would be funded in the US by our Department of Defense and the nuclear weapons program of the Department of Energy are included.

2. No specific projections for the 1982-87 period were provided to the NSC by the CIA. Instead, it was suggested to base the showing future Soviet costs graphic on an assumption that the growth would continue at its historical rate of 3-4 percent a year. This was the language the President used. We expect Soviet costs to continue to grow, although they will fluctuate from year to year in the future as they have in the past. The future rate of growth is, however, subject to considerable uncertainty, especially given the leadership transition that has only recently begun.

J. MICHAEL MARTIN

Nov 86

This is untrue. Actual numbers were provided to NSC, these numbers were incorporated into the charts drawn, and they show a levelling off to 1% growth in Soviet spending by 1987.

van Kester

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182658	WASHFAX RECEIPT	1	11/30/1982	B3

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171070	CHARTS RE DEFENSE SPENDING	6	ND	B1

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President Reagan

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms Control

November 22, 1982



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is President Reagan's address to the nation, broadcast from the White House, November 22, 1982. Also included are the President's letter to Congress and statement of November 22 concerning the MX missile.

The week before last was an especially moving one here in Washington. The Vietnam veterans finally came home once and for all to America's heart. They were welcomed with tears, with pride, and with a monument to their great sacrifice. Many of their names, like those of our Republic's greatest citizens, are now engraved in stone in this city that belongs to all of us. On behalf of the nation, let me again thank the Vietnam veterans from the bottom of my heart for their courageous service to America.

Seeing those moving scenes, I know mothers of a new generation must have worried about their children and about peace. And that's what I would like to talk to you about tonight—the future of our children in a world where peace is made uneasy by the presence of nuclear weapons.

A year ago I said the time was right to move forward on arms control. I outlined several proposals and said nothing would have a higher priority in this Ad-

ministration. Now, a year later, I want to report on those proposals and on other efforts we are making to insure the safety of our children's future.

The prevention of conflict and the reduction of weapons are the most important public issues of our time. Yet, on no other issue are there more misconceptions and misunderstandings. You, the American people, deserve an explanation from your government on what our policy is on these issues. Too often the experts have been content to discuss grandiose strategies among themselves and cloud the public debate in technicalities no one can understand. The result is that many Americans have become frightened, and, let me say, fear of the unknown is entirely understandable. Unfortunately, much of the information emerging in this debate bears little semblance to the facts.

To begin, let's go back to what the world was like at the end of World War II. The United States was the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military power was at its peak, and we alone had the atomic weapon. But we didn't use this wealth and this power to bully; we used it to rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged economies, including the economies of those who had fought against us. At first, the peace of the world was unthreatened, because we alone were left with any real power, and we were using

it for the good of our fellow man. Any potential enemy was deterred from aggression because the cost would have far outweighed the gain.

As the Soviets' power grew, we still managed to maintain the peace. The United States had established a system of alliances with NATO as the centerpiece. In addition, we grew even more respected as a world leader with a strong economy and deeply held moral values. With our commitment to help shape a better world, the United States always pursued every diplomatic channel for peace. And for at least 30 years after World War II, the United States still continued to possess a large military advantage over the Soviet Union. Our strength deterred—that is, prevented—aggression against us.


This nation's military objective has always been to maintain peace by preventing war. This is neither a Democratic nor a Republican policy. It's supported by our allies. And most important of all, it has worked for nearly 40 years.

What do we mean when we speak of nuclear deterrence? Certainly we don't want such weapons for their own sake. We don't desire excessive forces, or what some people have called "overkill." Basically, it is a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.


We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it doesn't describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths—deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace.

And, let me say, I believe that if we follow prudent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be reduced. Certainly the United States will never use its forces except in response to attack. Through the years, Soviet leaders have also expressed a sober view of nuclear war; and if we maintain a strong deterrent, they are exceedingly unlikely to launch an attack.

DEFENSE SPENDING



DEFENSE SHARE OF FEDERAL BUDGET



The Military Imbalance

Now, while the policy of deterrence has stood the test of time, the things we must do in order to maintain deterrence have changed. You often hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are in an arms race. The truth is that, while the Soviet Union has raced, we have not. As you can see from this blue U.S. line (see "Defense Spending"), in constant dollars our defense spending in the 1960s went up because of Vietnam, and then it went downward through much of the 1970s. Now, follow the red line, which is Soviet spending. It has gone up and up and up. In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest 12%-14% of their country's gross national product in military spending, two to three times the level we invest.


I might add that the defense share of our U.S. Federal budget has gone way down, too. Watch the blue line again (see "Defense Share of Federal Budget"). In 1962, when John Kennedy was president, 46%, almost half of the Federal budget, went to our national defense. In recent years, about one-quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled. And most of our defense budget is spent on people, not weapons.

The combination of the Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.

This chart (see "Strategic Missiles and Bombers") shows the changes in the total number of intercontinental missiles and bombers. You will see that in 1962 and in 1972, the U.S. forces remained about the same, even dropping some by 1982. But take a look now at the Soviet side. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets could not compare with us in terms of strength. In 1972, when we signed the SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] Treaty, we were nearly equal. But in 1982, well, that red Soviet bar stretching above the blue American bar tells the story.

I could show you chart after chart where there is a great deal of red and a

STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES



much lesser amount of U.S. blue. For example, the Soviet Union has deployed a third more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than we have. Believe it or not, we froze our number in 1965 and have deployed no additional missiles since then.

The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last 15 years. Until last year we hadn't commissioned one in that same period. The Soviet Union has built over 200 modern Backfire bombers and is building 30 more a year. For 20 years, the United States has deployed no new strategic bombers. Many of our B-52 bombers are now older than the pilots who fly them.

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the missiles considered most threatening by both sides—the intermediate-range missiles based on land. We have none. The United States withdrew its intermediate-range land-based missiles from Europe almost 20 years ago.

The world has also witnessed unprecedented growth in the area of Soviet conventional forces; the Soviets far exceed us in the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships they produce every year. What is more, when I arrived in this office, I learned that in


our own forces we had planes that couldn't fly and ships that couldn't leave port, mainly for lack of spare parts and crew members.

The Soviet military buildup must not be ignored. We've recognized the problem, and, together with our allies, we have begun to correct the imbalance. Look at this chart (see "Projected Defense Spending," p. 4) of projected real defense spending for the next several years. Here's the Soviet line. Let us assume the Soviets' rate of spending remains at the level they have followed since the 1960s. The blue line is the United States. If my defense proposals are passed, it will still take 5 years before we come close to the Soviet level. Yet the modernization of our strategic and conventional forces will assure that deterrence works and peace prevails.

Decision To Proceed With MX Missile

Our deployed nuclear forces were built before the age of microcircuits. It's not right to ask our young men and women in uniform to maintain and operate such antiques. Many have already given their lives in missile explosions and aircraft

PROJECTED DEFENSE SPENDING



accidents caused by the old age of their equipment. We must replace and modernize our forces, and that is why I have decided to proceed with the production and deployment of the new ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] known as the MX.

Three earlier presidents worked to develop this missile. Based on the best advice I could get, I concluded that the MX is the right missile at the right time. On the other hand, when I arrived in office, I felt the proposal on where and how to base the missile simply cost too much in terms of money and the impact on our citizens' lives.

I have concluded, however, it is absolutely essential that we proceed to produce this missile, and that we base it in a series of closely based silos at Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. This plan requires only half as many missiles as the earlier plan and will fit in an area of only 20 square miles. It is the product of around-the-clock research that has been underway since I directed a search for a better, cheaper way. I urge the Members of Congress, who must pass this plan, to listen and examine the facts before they come to their own conclusion.

Increasing Prospects for Arms Reductions

Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace. Well, as I explained earlier, a secure force keeps others from threatening us and that keeps the peace. And just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that's what we really want. The United States wants deep cuts in the world's arsenal of weapons.

But unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets—since they're so far ahead—have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point, since it goes to the heart of our policies. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know we were bluffing without a good hand, because they know what cards we hold—just as we know what's in their hand.

You may recall that in 1969 the Soviets didn't want to negotiate a treaty banning antiballistic missiles. It was only after our Senate narrowly voted to fund an antiballistic missile program that the Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then reached an agreement.

We also know that one-sided arms control doesn't work. We've tried time and again to set an example by cutting our own forces in the hope that the Soviets will do likewise. The result has always been that they keep building.

I believe our strategy for peace will succeed. Never before has the United States proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control. Never in our history have we engaged in so many negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable peace. What we are saying to them is this: We will modernize our military in order to keep the balance for peace, but wouldn't it be better if we both simply reduced our arsenals to a much lower level?

Let me begin with the negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces that are currently underway in Geneva. As I said earlier, the most threatening of these forces are the land-based missiles, which the Soviet Union now has aimed at Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

This chart shows the number of warheads on these Soviet missiles (see "Missile Warheads"). In 1972, there were 600. The United States was at zero. In 1977, there were 600. The United States was still at zero. Then the Soviets began deploying powerful new missiles with three warheads and a reach of thousands of miles—the SS-20. Since then the bar has gone through the roof—the Soviets have added a missile with three warheads every week. Still you see no U.S. blue on the chart. Although the Soviet leaders earlier this year declared they had frozen deployment of this dangerous missile, they have, in fact, continued deployment.

Last year, on November 18, I proposed the total, global elimination of all these missiles. I proposed that the United States would deploy no comparable missiles—which are scheduled for late 1983—if the Soviet Union would dismantle theirs. We would follow agreement on the land-based missiles with limits on other intermediate-range systems.

The European governments strongly support our initiative. The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels. Yet I believe and I am hoping that—as the talks proceed and as we approach the scheduled placement of new systems in Europe—the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement.


This summer we also began negotiations on strategic arms reductions, the proposal we call START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]. Here we're talking about intercontinental missiles—the weapons with a longer range than the intermediate-range ones I was just discussing. We are negotiating on the basis of deep reductions. I proposed in May that we cut the number of warheads on these missiles to an equal number, roughly one-third below current levels. I also proposed that we cut the number of missiles themselves to an equal number, about half the current U.S. level. Our proposals would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and some 2,250 missiles. I think that would be quite a service to mankind.

This chart (see "Strategic Ballistic Missiles") shows the current level of U.S. ballistic missiles, both land and sea based. This is the Soviet level. We intend to convince the Soviets it would be in their own best interest to reduce these missiles. Look at the reduced numbers both sides would have under our proposal—quite a dramatic change. We also seek to reduce the total destructive power of these missiles and other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.


In 1977, when the last Administration proposed more limited reductions, the Soviet Union refused even to discuss them. This time their reaction has been quite different. Their opening position is a serious one, and even though it doesn't meet our objective of deep reductions, there's no question we're heading in the right direction. One reason for this change is clear. The Soviet Union knows that we are now serious about our own strategic programs and that they must be prepared to negotiate in earnest.

We also have other important arms control efforts underway. In the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions, we've proposed cuts in military personnel to a far lower and equal level. And in the 40-nation [U.N.] Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we're working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. The whole world remains outraged by the Soviets' and their allies' use of biological and chemical weapons against defenseless people in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos. This experience makes ironclad verification all the more essential for arms control.

MISSILE WARHEADS INTERMEDIATE RANGE • LAND BASED



STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS



Reducing the Risks of Accident and Misunderstanding

There is, of course, much more that needs to be done. In an age when intercontinental missiles can span half the globe in less than half an hour, it's crucial that Soviet and American leaders have a clear understanding of each other's capabilities and intentions.

Last June in Berlin and again at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, I vowed that the United States would make every effort to reduce the risks of accident and misunderstanding and thus to strengthen mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since then, we've been actively studying detailed measures to implement this Berlin initiative.

Today, I would like to announce some of the measures, which I've proposed in a special letter just sent to the Soviet leadership and which I've instructed our ambassadors in Geneva to discuss with their Soviet counterparts. They include but also go beyond some of the suggestions I made in Berlin.

The first of these measures involves advance notification of all U.S. and Soviets test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We will also seek Soviet agreement on notification of all sea-launched ballistic missiles as well as intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles of the type we're currently negotiating. This would remove surprise and uncertainty at the sudden appearance of such missiles on the warning screens of the two countries.

In another area of potential misunderstanding, we propose to the Soviets that we provide each other with advance notification of our major military exercises. Here again, our objective is to reduce the surprise and uncertainty surrounding otherwise sudden moves by either side.

These sorts of measures are designed to deal with the immediate issues of miscalculation in time of crisis. But there are deeper, longer term problems as well. In order to clear away some of the mutual ignorance and suspicion between our two countries, I will propose that we both engage in a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about our nuclear forces. I am instructing our ambassadors at the negotiations on both strategic and intermediate forces to seek Soviet agreement on an expanded exchange of information. The more one side knows about what the other side is doing, the less room there is for surprise and miscalculation.

Probably everyone has heard of the so-called hotline, which enables me to communicate directly with the Soviet

leadership in the event of a crisis. The existing hotline is dependable and rapid with both ground and satellite links. But because it is so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing hotline system.

Now, although we've begun negotiations on these many proposals, this doesn't mean we've exhausted all the initiatives that could help to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. We'll leave no opportunity unexplored, and we'll consult closely with Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Warner, and other Members of the Congress who've made important suggestions in this field.

We are also making strenuous efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would be tragic if we succeeded in reducing existing arsenals only to have new threats emerge in other areas of the world.

Reaffirming America's Destiny

Earlier I spoke of America's contributions to peace following World War II, of all we did to promote peace and prosperity for our fellow man. Well, we're still those same people. We still seek peace above all else. I want to remind our own citizens and those around the world of this tradition of American goodwill, because I am concerned about the effects the nuclear fear is having on our people. The most upsetting letters I receive are from schoolchildren who write to me as a class assignment. It's evident they've discussed the most nightmarish aspects of a nuclear holocaust in their classrooms. Their letters are often full of terror. This should not be so.

The philosopher Spinoza said, "Peace . . . is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice." Those are the qualities we want our children to inherit, not fear. They must grow up confident if they are to meet the challenges of tomorrow, as we will meet the challenges of today.

I began these remarks speaking of our children, and I want to close on the same theme. Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust.

My fellow Americans, on this Thanksgiving when we have so much to be grateful for, let us give special thanks

for our peace, our freedom, and our good people. I've always believed that this land was set aside in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans to be found by a people from every corner of the Earth who had a special love of faith, freedom, and peace. Let us reaffirm America's destiny of goodness and goodwill. Let us work for peace, and, as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous hymn, "O God of love, O King of peace, make wars throughout the world to cease."

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 22, 1982

For many years, U.S. strategic forces have helped protect our Nation and the Free World by providing a capable and effective deterrent. Maintenance of these forces has historically enjoyed broad bipartisan support.

In recent years, our deterrent has become increasingly vulnerable in the face of a relentless Soviet military buildup. As part of our program to modernize the U.S. deterrent, I asked last year that you support improving the capability and survivability of the land-based component of our strategic forces by authorizing development and deployment of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. I also agreed earlier this year to provide you with a permanent basing decision by December 1.

In response to this requirement, the Department of Defense forwarded to me a series of basing options, with associated analyses of technical, environmental, arms control, and other factors. I have also received the counsel of my senior advisers, former Presidents and Administration officials, and Members of Congress. After careful study, I have decided to emplace 100 MX missiles, now known as "Peacekeeper," in superhard silos in a closely-spaced basing mode at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Given Congressional support, these missiles will have an initial operational capability late in 1986. I am prepared also to consider deception and possibly ballistic missile defense, which are options if the Soviet Union continues its military buildup.

We all hope, however, that the Soviets will join us in seeking meaningful progress in arms control negotiations. This MX decision supports and complements the U.S. approach to arms control. While the U.S. must and will improve its forces to maintain a credible deterrent, we remain fully committed to our standing proposals for significant reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals. We seek to reduce ballistic missiles by about one-half and ballistic missile warheads by about one-third.

Under separate cover, I am sending you a copy of my full statement on the decision outlined above. I ask that you keep an open mind on this complex and important question and permit the Administration to make its

case for the decision. We are prepared to respond, at your convenience, to formal and informal requests for additional information that you may desire. I look forward to receiving your counsel and assistance as we work toward our common goal of the security of our Nation.

Sincerely

RC REA

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 22, 1982

For nearly 2 years my Administration has examined the matter of the MX missile, the development of which has been supported by my three immediate predecessors, Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon. We all have strongly agreed that strengthening our land-based missile system is absolutely essential to maintain America's deterrent capability to deter war and to protect our nation.

I have sought the counsel of my predecessors, the opinion of Members of Congress, and the advice of the best technical and scientific minds in the field. My Administration, as well as the ones before it, has examined a wide variety of options, including smaller or bigger missiles, the development of one missile for common use on land or at sea, and the possibility of greater mobility. And, like the preceding administrations, we have concluded that MX is the right missile and that now is the time.

Deciding how to deploy the missile has not been that easy. A variety of basing modes has been studied by previous administrations and by ours. The concept of deceptive basing, as employed in previous planning, was a fundamentally sound one for assuring the stability of land-based ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] forces in times of crisis.

It complied with our strategic arms control objectives. Other sensible growth options were studied as well. As these plans progressed through the two previous administrations, however, they grew enormously in cost. Not only was the financial cost high—\$40-\$50 billion—but the cost to our western citizens in terms of water, land, social disruption, and environmental damage seemed unreasonable.

For these reasons, we considered other approaches while proceeding with the development of the MX missile itself. The missile work is now nearly complete. The first test flight is scheduled for early next year. While test flights are just that—tests—I have no doubts about the technical success, in fact, excellence, of this missile.

In reexamining how to base the missiles, we concluded that by pulling the launch sites much closer together

and making them a great deal harder, we could make significant savings. We would need fewer silos, much less land, and, in fact, fewer missiles. We would achieve a system that could survive against the current and projected Soviet rocket inventory. Deployment of such a system would require the Soviets to make costly new technical developments if they wish to even contemplate a surprise attack. Most of the Soviet countermeasures proposed are really no more than technical dreams on which no Soviet planner or politician would bet the fate of his country. Thus, closely spaced basing is a reasonable way to deter attack, which is our objective.

Now let me outline our overall plan for our ICBM force.

First, we recognize that the best survivability, and thus the best deterrence, lies in the modernization of all three legs of the triad: submarines, bombers, and land-based ballistic missiles. Each gains security as all are rendered less susceptible to technological or operational surprise.

Second, we are closing down our force of huge Titan missiles at the rate of one missile every month or two. Their immense warheads and antiquated fuels have no place in our current inventory.

Third, we will maintain an appropriate Minuteman force, but many of these could be removed if we reach agreement with the Soviets on strategic arms reductions.

Fourth, we plan to produce the MX missile, now named "Peacekeeper," and deploy it in superhard silos at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, near Cheyenne, Wyoming. That seems to be the most cost-effective location, but I appreciate the enthusiastic offers by the citizens of Nevada to base the missile in their state.

We will emplace 100 of these missiles (versus the 200 in some of the earlier plans) in launch canisters which can be moved, if necessary, between closely spaced superhard silos. We plan to build only 100 such silos, but we will design the system so that we can add more silos later, again within the confines of a small land area, if the Soviets will not agree to strategic arms reductions, or if they persist in the development and production of more powerful and deadly weapons. We would prefer that the Soviets dismantle SS-18s, rather than we build more holes. But we can accommodate either and maintain stability.

As far as an active defense is concerned, we do not wish to embark on any course of action that could endanger the current ABM [antiballistic missile] Treaty so long as it is observed by the

Soviet Union. Likewise, we do not wish to build even the minimal ABM system allowed us by the treaty, even though the Soviets have done so.

We plan to continue research on ballistic missile defense technology—the kind of smart, highly accurate, hopefully non-nuclear, weapons that utilize the microelectronic and other advanced technologies in which we excel. The objective of this program is stability for our ICBM forces in the 1990s, a hedge against Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty, and the technical competence to evaluate Soviet ABM developments. We currently have no plan to deploy any ballistic missile defense system.

The entire missile and basing program will cost about \$26 billion in 1982 dollars, commencing with this fiscal year. That's a reduction by half, both in cost and in numbers of missiles deployed, from the other plans on the drawing boards when I entered office. The ongoing ballistic missile defense research and development will cost about \$2.5 billion. Both of these programs are already reflected in the FY 1983 budget projections, but the specific decisions announced today allow us to proceed with the reductions from my February budget request for this year of a billion dollars, which we have so carefully worked out with the Congress.

Continuity of effort in national security affairs is essential. Turbulence is wasteful beyond words. These programs to increase the stability and security of our strategic nuclear forces are urgently needed. The planning by my predecessors made them possible, but it is for my successor that I make these decisions. With every effort, the Peacekeeper missile still will not be fully deployed until the late 1980s when yet another president shoulders these burdens.

I urge the Congress, and all Americans, to support this program, developed under several presidents: those in the past who conceived and urged the deployment of MX and the current President who has made these difficult decisions. It is only by such steadfastness of purpose that we can maintain the peace which every nation needs to work out the hopes and dreams of its own people.

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


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COMPARISON OF US DEFENSE OUTLAYS WITH ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET DEFENSE ACTIVITIES



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
U.S. DEFENSE OUTLAYS INCLUDE NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS FUNDED BY DOD AND DEFENSE RELATED OUTLAYS OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, COAST GUARD, AND SELECTIVE SERVICE AND THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS.

EXCLUDES RETIREMENT, FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND CIVIL DEFENSE.

ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS - FY 1983

Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Defense


CHART I.B.1
**US DEFENSE OUTLAYS AND ESTIMATED DOLLAR
 COST OF SOVIET DEFENSE ACTIVITIES DURING THE
 "COLD WAR" AND "DETENTE" PERIODS**



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Caspar Weinberger
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
CHART I.A.2
**U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET AS A PERCENT OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1940-1981**



ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS - FY 1983


Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

CHART I.A.3
**U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET AS A PERCENT OF
PUBLIC SPENDING, 1950-1981**



ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
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I-8 Caspar Weinberger
Secretary of Defense



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MEDIA

USSR

ARMS CONTROL

DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE TV INTERVIEW ON US / USSR DEFENSE SPENDING

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0555

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XJ

SUBJECT: MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

REF: MOSCOW 14523

1. ~~(C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. CROCKER, SIMPSON, AND NAPPER ACCEPT WITH PLEASURE
KIND INVITATIONS REFTEL. SCHEDULE SOUNDS EXCELLENT. EAGLEBURGER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN'S DECEMBER 1 CALL ON EAGLEBURGER

REF: STATE 335261

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FURTHER TO REFTEL AND FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, THERE FOLLOWS A RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION DURING AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S DECEMBER 1 CALL ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT.

3. HAVING READ THE UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE SOVIET ORAL MESSAGE, EAGLEBURGER SAID WE HAVE NOTED THE SOVIET CBM PROPOSALS AND WOULD BE RESPONDING TO THEM IN GENEVA. IN RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S QUESTION, HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY WHEN THE RESPONSE WOULD BE MADE. HE ADDED THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE EXPLAINING OUR OWN CBM PROPOSALS FURTHER IN GENEVA. WITH RESPECT TO THE MX

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DECISION, THERE IS SIMPLY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 22 STATEMENT DOBRYNIN HAD RAISED, ANSWERS ARE BEING PREPARED.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE STATEMENT IN THE ORAL MESSAGE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATION IN GENEVA IN CONSIDERING OUR CBM PROPOSALS, BURT ASKED DOBRYNIN IF THIS MEANT THAT PROGRESS ON CBMS DEPENDS ON PROGRESS IN THE OVERALL NEGOTIATION. DOBRYNIN REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT STATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE TWO TOPICS ARE RELATED, BUT THERE IS A CONNECTION. LOGICALLY, THEY ARE PART OF THE SAME PICTURE. IF WE CANNOT AGREE ON REDUCTIONS, AGREEMENT ON CBMS CANNOT HELP US VERY MUCH.

5. BURT ASKED HOW DOBRYNIN SAW THE TWO TOPICS BEING NEGOTIATED. DOBRYNIN SAID THEY COULD BE DISCUSSED "IN PARALLEL WAYS." BURT EXPLAINED THAT IN FORMULATING OUR PROPOSALS ON CBMS WE HAD RECOGNIZED THAT A RELATIONSHIP TO THE OVERALL NEGOTIATION EXISTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAKE PROPOSALS IN AREAS WHERE IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO MOVE AHEAD, WITHOUT HOLDING THEM HOSTAGE TO OVERALL PROGRESS. DOBRYNIN AFFIRMED THAT THEY ARE NOT HOSTAGES, BUT ARE NEVERTHELESS RELATED. SUMMING UP, EAGLEBURGER SAID WE UNDERSTOOD DOBRYNIN TO SAY THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP WHICH CANNOT BE DEFINED, BUT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON BOTH TOPICS.

6. SPEAKING FOR THE RECORD, BURT SAID HE WISHED TO ADDRESS THE PASSAGE IN THE ORAL MESSAGE WHICH RAISED A QUESTION CONCERNING U.S. INTENTIONS IN MAKING PROPOSALS ON CBMS. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO KNOW, HE SAID, THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE NOT BEING MADE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, BUT BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA CAN REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR.

7. EAGLEBURGER ASKED IF DOBRYNIN NOW HAD MORE DEFINITE PLANS FOR RETURNING TO MOSCOW. DOBRYNIN SAID HE DID

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT; "THEY" APPEARED TO BE TOO BUSY ORGANIZING IN MOSCOW AT THIS POINT. EAGLEBURGER ASKED JOVIALY IF DOBRYNIN FELT NEGLECTED; JUST AS JOVIALY, DOBRYNIN SAID HE HAD MET WITH ANDROPOV WHILE ON LEAVE IN SEPTEMBER, AND WAS NOT WORRIED AT ALL. EAGLEBURGER

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171074	MEMO R. SIMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE JOHN HART INTERVIEW (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	23	12/3/1982	B1

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

34

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

December 3, 1982

176074

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: ROBERT B. SIMS

SUBJECT: John Hart Interview, Saturday, December 4, 10:00 A.M.

NBC's Hart (212-664-5503 or home 212-689-3674) will interview you in Larry Speakes' office. I will meet Hart in advance and ensure that he's set up for the interview before escorting you there.

Hart understands you will not get into the nuts and bolts of measuring Soviet defense expenditures. For that he will rely on the CIA testimony (Tab I) already provided him. As you know, the Agency also told Hart they are reviewing their methodology.

He hopes to get your response to his interview with Bill Colby, who said, in effect, that counting money is not a rationale for deciding who is militarily superior. Colby used the David and Goliath analogy, saying he would rather be David (with the right arms) than Goliath (heavily armed).

At Tab II, for your review, is the text of the President's address.

Tab III contains back-up information on spending comparisons, provided by Kraemer.

Attachments

Tab I CIA testimony
Tab II President's address
Tab III Information on spending comparisons

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For Immediate Release

November 22, 1982

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
ON ARMS CONTROL

The Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. The week before last was an especially moving one here in Washington. The Vietnam veterans finally came home once and for all to America's heart. They were welcomed with tears, with pride and with a monument to their great sacrifice. Many of their names, like those of our Republic's greatest citizens, are now engraved in stone in this city that belongs to all of us. On behalf of the nation, let me again thank the Vietnam veterans from the bottom of my heart for their courageous service to America.

Seeing those moving scenes, I know mothers of a new generation must have worried about their children and about peace. And that's what I would like to talk to you about tonight -- the future of our children in a world where peace is made uneasy by the presence of nuclear weapons.

A year ago, I said the time was right to move forward on arms control. I outlined several proposals and said nothing would have a higher priority in this administration. Now, a year later, I want to report on those proposals and on other efforts we're making to ensure the safety of our children's future.

The prevention of conflict and the reduction of weapons are the most important public issues of our time. Yet, on no other issue are there more misconceptions and misunderstandings. You, the American people, deserve an explanation from your government on what our policy is on these issues. Too often, the experts have been content to discuss grandiose strategies among themselves, and cloud the public debate in technicalities no one can understand. The result is that many Americans have become frightened and, let me say, fear of the unknown is entirely understandable. Unfortunately, much of the information emerging in this debate bears little semblance to the facts.

To begin, let's go back to what the world was like at the end of World War II. The United States was the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military power was at its peak, and we alone had the atomic weapon. But we didn't use this wealth and this power to bully. We used it to rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged economies, including the economies of those who had fought against us. At first, the peace of the world was unthreatened, because we alone were left with any real power, and we were using it for the good of our fellow man. Any potential enemy was deterred from aggression because the cost would have far outweighed the gain.

As the Soviets' power grew, we still managed to maintain the peace.

MORE

The United States had established a system of alliances with NATO as the centerpiece. In addition, we grew even more respected as a world leader with a strong economy and deeply-held moral values.

With our commitment to help shape a better world, the United States also pursued, and always pursued every diplomatic channel for peace. And for at least 30 years after World War II, the United States still continued to possess a large military advantage over the Soviet Union. Our strength deterred, that is, prevented, aggression against us.

This nation's military objective has always been to maintain peace by preventing war. This is neither a Democratic nor a Republican policy. It's supported by our allies. And most important of all, it's worked for nearly 40 years.

What do we mean when we speak of "nuclear deterrents"? Certainly, we don't want such weapons for their own sake. We don't desire excessive forces or what some people have called "overkill." Basically, it's a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain.

And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times, it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.

We desire peace. But peace is a goal, not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey. It doesn't describe the steps we must take nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal.

I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths: deterrents and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace.

And let me say I believe that if we follow prudent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be reduced.

Certainly the United States will never use its forces except in response to attack.

Through the years, Soviet leaders have also expressed a sober view of nuclear war. And if we maintain a strong deterrent, they are exceedingly unlikely to launch an attack.

Now, while the policy of deterrents has stood the test of time, the things we must do in order to maintain deterrents have changed. You often hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are in an arms race. Well, the truth is that while the Soviet Union has raced, we have not. As you can see from this blue U.S. line in constant dollars, our defense spending in the 1960's went up because of Vietnam. And then it went downward through much of the 1970's.

And now follow the red line, which is Soviet spending. It's gone up and up and up. In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest 12 to 14 percent of their country's gross national product in military spending. Two to three times the level we invest.

I might add that the defense share of our United States federal budget has gone way down, too. Watch the blue line again. In 1962, when John Kennedy was President, 46 percent, almost half of the federal budget, went to our national defense. In recent years, about one quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled. And most of our defense budget is spent on people, not weapons.

The combination of the

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Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionately less changed the military balance, and weakened our deterrent.

Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage. This chart shows the changes in the total number of intercontinental missiles and bombers. You will see that in 1962 and in 1972, the United States' forces remained about the same -- even dropping some by 1982. But take a look now at the Soviet side. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets could not compare with us in terms of strength. In 1972, when we signed the SALT I Treaty, we were nearly equal. But in 1982 -- well, that red, Soviet bar stretching above the blue, American bar tells the story.

I could show you chart after chart where there is a great deal of red and a much lesser amount of U.S. blue. For example, the Soviet Union has deployed a third more, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than we have. Believe it or not, we froze our number in 1965, and have deployed no additional missiles since then. The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last 15 years. Until last year, we had not commissioned one in that same period. The Soviet Union has built over 200 modern backfire bombers, and is building 30 more a year. For 20 years, the United States has deployed no new strategic bombers. Many of our B-52 bombers are now older than the pilots who fly them.

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the missiles considered most threatening by both sides -- the intermediate-range missiles based on land. We have none. The United States withdrew its intermediate-range land-based missiles from Europe almost 20 years ago.

The world has, also, witnessed unprecedented growth in the area of Soviet conventional forces. The Soviets far exceed us in the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships they produce every year. What is more, when I arrived in this office, I learned that in our own forces we had planes that could not fly and ships that could not leave port mainly for lack of spare parts and crew members.

The Soviet military buildup must not be ignored. We have recognized the problem. And, together with our allies, we have begun to correct the imbalance. Look at this chart of projected, real defense spending for the next several years. Here is the Soviet line. Let us assume the Soviets rate of spending remains at the level they have followed since the 1960s. The blue line is the United States. If my defense proposals are passed, it will still take five years before we come close to the Soviet level. Yet, the modernization of our strategic and conventional forces will assure that deterrence works and peace prevails.

Our deployed nuclear forces were built before the age of microcircuits. It is not right to ask our young men and women in uniform to maintain and operate such antiques. Many have already given their lives in missile explosions and aircraft accidents caused by the old age of their equipment. We must replace and modernize our forces. And that is why I decided to proceed with the production and deployment of the new ICBM known as the MX. Three earlier Presidents worked to develop this missile.

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Based on the best advice that I could get I concluded that the MX is the right missile at the right time. On the other hand, when I arrived in office I felt the proposal on where and how to base the missile simply cost too much in terms of money and the impact on our citizens' lives. I have concluded, however, it is absolutely essential that we proceed to produce this missile and that we base it in a series of closely based silos at Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. This plan requires only half as many missiles as the earlier plan and will fit in an area of only twenty square miles. It is the product of around-the-clock research that has been underway since I directed a search for a better, cheaper way.

I urge the members of Congress who must pass this plan to listen and examine the facts before they come to their own conclusion. Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace. Well, as I explained earlier, a secure force keeps others from threatening us and that keeps the peace. Just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that is what we really want.

The United States wants deep cuts in the world's arsenal of weapons, but unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets, since they are so far ahead, have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point because it goes to the heart of our policies. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we had not begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know that we were bluffing without a good hand because they know what cards we hold just as we know what is in their hand.

You may recall that in 1969 the Soviets did not want to negotiate a treaty banning anti-ballistic missiles. It was only after our Senate narrowly voted to fund an anti-ballistic missile program that the Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then reached an agreement. We also know that one-sided arms control does not work. We have tried time and time again to set an example by cutting our own forces in the hope that the Soviets would do likewise. The result has always been that they keep building.

I believe that our strategy for peace will succeed. Never before has the United States proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control. Never in our history have we engaged in so many negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable peace. What we are saying to them is this: We will modernize our military in order to keep the balance for peace, but wouldn't it be better if we both simply reduced our arsenals to a much lower level?

Let me begin with the negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces that are currently underway in Geneva. As I said earlier, the most threatening of these forces are the land-based missiles which the Soviet Union now has aimed at Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

This chart shows the number of warheads on these Soviet missiles. In 1972 there were 600. The United States was at zero. In 1977 there were 600. The United States was still at zero.

MORE

59

Then the Soviets began deploying powerful new missiles with three warheads and a reach of thousands of miles -- the SS-20. Since then the bar has gone through the roof -- the Soviets have added a missile with three warheads every week. Still you see no United States blue on the chart. Although the Soviet leaders earlier this year declared they had frozen deployment of this dangerous missile, they have in fact continued deployment.

Last year, on November 18th, I proposed the total, global elimination of all these missiles. I proposed that the United States would deploy no comparable missiles which are scheduled for late 1983 if the Soviet Union would dismantle theirs. We would follow agreement on the land-based missiles with limits on other intermediate-range systems.

The European governments strongly support our initiative. The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels. Yet I believe and I am hoping that, as the talks proceed and as we approach the scheduled placement of our new systems in Europe, the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement.

This summer we also began negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions, the proposal we call START. Here we're talking about intercontinental missiles -- the weapons with a longer range than the intermediate range ones I was just discussing. We are negotiating on the basis of deep reductions. I proposed in May that we cut the number of warheads on these missiles to an equal number, roughly one-third below current levels. I also proposed that we cut the number of missiles themselves to an equal number, about half the current U.S. level. Our proposals would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and some 2,250 missiles. I think that would be quite a service to mankind.

This chart shows the current level of United States ballistic missiles, both land and sea-based. This is the Soviet level. We intend to convince the Soviets it would be in their own best interest to reduce these missiles. Look at the reduced numbers both sides would have under our proposal -- quite a dramatic change. We also seek to reduce the total destructive power of these missiles and other elements of United States and Soviet strategic forces.

In 1977, when the last administration proposed more limited reductions, the Soviet Union refused even to discuss them. This time their reaction has been quite different. Their opening position is a serious one, and even though it doesn't meet our objective of deep reductions, there's no question we're heading in the right direction. One reason for this change is clear. The Soviet Union knows that we are now serious about our own strategic programs and that they must be prepared to negotiate in earnest.

We also have other important arms control efforts underway. In the talks in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, we've proposed cuts in military personnel to a far lower and equal level. And in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we're working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. The whole world remains outraged by the Soviets' and their allies' use of biological and chemical weapons against defenseless people in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos. This experience makes ironclad verification all the more essential for arms control.

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There is, of course, much more that needs to be done. In an age when intercontinental missiles can span half the globe in less than half an hour, it's crucial that Soviet and American leaders have a clear understanding of each other's capabilities and intentions.

Last June in Berlin, and again at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, I vowed that the United States would make every effort to reduce the risks of accident and misunderstanding and thus to strengthen mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since then, we've been actively studying detailed measures to implement this Berlin initiative.

Today I would like to announce some of the measures which I have proposed in a special letter just sent to the Soviet leadership and which I have instructed our ambassadors in Geneva to discuss with their Soviet counterparts. They include but also go beyond some of the suggestions I made in Berlin.

The first of these measures involves advance notification of all United States and Soviet test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We will also seek Soviet agreement on notification of all sea-launched ballistic missiles as well as intermediate range land-based ballistic missiles of the type we're currently negotiating. This would remove surprise and uncertainty at the sudden appearance of such missiles on the warning screens of the two countries.

In another area of potential misunderstanding, we propose to the Soviets that we provide each other with advance notification of our major military exercises. Here again, our objective is to reduce the surprise and uncertainty surrounding otherwise sudden moves by either side.

These sorts of measures are designed to deal with the immediate issues of miscalculation in time of crisis. But there are deeper, longer-term problems as well. In order to clear away some of the mutual ignorance and suspicion between our two countries, I will propose that we both engage in a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about our nuclear forces. I am instructing our ambassadors at the negotiations on both strategic and intermediate forces to seek Soviet agreement on an expanded exchange of information. The more one side knows about what the other side is doing, the less room there is for surprise and miscalculation.

Probably everyone has heard of the so-called Hotline, which enables me to communicate directly with the Soviet leadership in the event of a crisis. The existing Hotline is dependable and rapid -- with both ground and satellite links. But because it's so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing Hotline system.

Now, although we've begun negotiations on these many proposals, this doesn't mean we've exhausted all the initiatives that could help to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. We'll leave no opportunity unexplored, and we'll consult closely with Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Warner, and other Members of the Congress who have made important suggestions in this field.

We are also making strenuous efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would be tragic if we succeeded in reducing existing arsenals only to have new threats emerge in other areas of the world.

Earlier I spoke of America's contributions to peace following World War II, of all we did to promote peace and prosperity for our fellow man. Well, we're still those same people.

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We still seek peace above all else.

I want to remind our own citizens and those around the world of this tradition of American good will because I am concerned about the effects the nuclear fear is having on our people. The most upsetting letters I receive are from schoolchildren who write to me as a class assignment. It's evident they've discussed the most nightmarish aspects of a nuclear holocaust in their classrooms. Their letters are often full of terror. Well, this should not be so.

The philosopher, Spinoza, said, "Peace is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice." Well, those are the qualities we want our children to inherit, not fear. They must grow up confident if they're to meet the challenges of tomorrow as we will meet the challenges of today.

I began these remarks speaking of our children. I want to close on the same theme. Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We're working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking, above all else, to keep them safe and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust.

My fellow Americans, on this Thanksgiving, when we have so much to be grateful for, let us give special thanks for our peace, our freedom and our good people.

I've always believed that this land was set aside in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans to be found by a people from every corner of the earth who had a special love of faith, freedom and peace.

Let us reaffirm America's destiny of goodness and good will. Let us work for peace; and as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous old hymn "Oh, God of Love, Oh, King of Peace, make wars throughout the world to cease."

Thank you. Good night and God bless you.

END

8:20 P.M. EST

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HART, JOHN

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ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 04 DEC 82 STATUS C FILES PA

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